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STR Ambassador
September 7th 2007, 04:56 PM
As a Christian ambassador, your biggest challenge may be making sense of the problem of evil. Surprisingly, though, evil is actually evidence for God, not against Him.


Evil as Evidence for God by Greg Koukl

The wave of best-selling atheist books has forced followers of Christ to confront an age-old objection: the problem evil, considered by some to be the strongest evidence against the existence of God.
I actually think it proves just the opposite. The entire objection hinges on the observation that true evil exists "out there" as an objective feature of the world. Therein lies the problem for the atheist.

Bowling and Badness
Think of it this way. How do you know the difference between a good bowler and a bad one? By the bowlers’ scores, of course. There must be a way to keep score to make a judgment between mediocre and masterful. C.S. Lewis pointed out that a portrait is a good or bad likeness depending on how it compares with the “perfect” original.
In the same way, evil is a value judgment based on a scoring system of some sort, a standard of moral perfection that evil falls short of.
To say something is evil, then, is to make a moral judgment, and moral judgments make no sense outside of a moral standard. Evil as a value judgment marks a departure from that standard of morality. If there is no standard, there is no departure. Lewis notes:

My argument against God was that the universe seemed so cruel and unjust. But how had I gotten this idea of just and unjust? A man does not call something crooked unless he has some idea of a straight line.

Here’s the key question: Where does the moral standard come from? Is it a product of chance? Does morality simply fall from the sky? What world view makes the best sense out of objective morality?
Answering these questions will help clear up another bit of confusion on both sides of the aisle. Some Christians have claimed that no atheist can be a truly moral person. To which Michael Shermer, editor of Skeptic magazine, fires back, “I’m an atheist, and I’m moral.”
It’s a shallow response, but it works because the challenge itself misses the point. The question isn’t whether an atheist can be moral, but whether he can make sense of morality in a universe bereft of God. This is what philosophers call “the grounding problem.” What grounds morality? What does it “stand” on, so to speak? Why is the universe the way it is?
I think we can get much closer to an answer to these questions by simply reflecting on the nature of a moral rule. By making observations about the effect—morality—we can determine its characteristics and then ask what cause is adequate to produce it.

Four Observations about Morality
The first thing we observe about moral rules is that, though they exist, they are not physical because they don't seem to have physical properties. We don't bump into them in the dark. They don't extend into space. They have no weight. They have no chemical characteristics. Instead, they are immaterial things we discover through the process of thought, introspection, and reflection without the aid of our five senses.
This is a profound realization. We have, with a high degree of certainty, stumbled upon something real. Yet it's something that can't be proven empirically or described in terms of natural laws. This teaches us there's more to the world than just the physical universe. If non-physical things—like moral rules—truly exist, then materialism as a world view is false
There seem to be many other things that populate the world, things like propositions, numbers, and the laws of logic. Values like happiness, friendship, and faithfulness are there, too, along with meanings and language. There may even be persons—souls, angels, and other divine beings.
Our discovery also tells us some things really exist that science has no access to, even in principle. Some things are not governed by natural laws. Science, therefore, is not the only discipline giving us true information about the world.
It follows, then, that naturalism as a world view is also false. Our discovery of moral rules forces us to expand our understanding of the nature of reality and open our minds to the possibility of a host of new things that populate the world in the invisible realm.
Second, moral rules are a kind of communication. They are propositions: intelligent statements of meaning conveyed from one mind to another. The propositions are in the form of imperatives, commands. A command only makes sense when there are two minds involved, one giving the command and one receiving it.
There's a third thing we notice when we reflect on moral rules. They have a force we often feel prior to any behavior. This is called the incumbency of moral rules, the "oughtness" of morality. It appeals to a person's will, pushing him to act in a certain way, though he often disregards its force and chooses to disobey.
Finally, there is a deep discomfort that emotionally healthy people feel when they violate clear and weighty moral dictates—a kind of ethical pain—making them aware they have done something wrong and deserve punishment. This sense of guilt carries with it not just the uncomfortable awareness of wrong-doing, but also the dread of having to answer for the deed. Distraction and denial may temporarily numb ethical pain, but it never entirely disappears. Only sociopaths succeed in silencing the conscience completely.

Narrowing Our Options
These four observations provide us with a foundation from which to answer the question, "Why morality?" We need only determine the possible options, then ask which option best accounts for our observations.
A word of caution here. At this point our discussion gets personal, because the ultimate answer to our question has serious ramifications for the way we live our lives. It's tempting to abandon careful thinking when conclusions that make us uncomfortable come into focus. Faced with a limited number of options, no one sits on the fence. When the full range of choices is clear, rejection of one means acceptance of another.
Our options are limited to three. One: Morality is simply an illusion. Two: Objective moral rules exist, but are mere accidents, the product of chance. Three: Moral rules are not accidents, but instead are the product of intelligence. Which option makes most sense given our four observations about morality?
Some want to argue that morals just don't exist. They're nothing but illusions, useful fictions that help us to live in harmony. This is the relativist's answer. This view is not an option for those who raise the problem of evil. Their complaint about the injustice of the universe is a tacit admission of morality. C.S. Lewis observed:

Thus in the very act of trying to prove that God did not exist—in other words, that the whole of reality was senseless—I found I was forced to assume that one part of reality—namely my idea of justice—was full of sense. Consequently, atheism turns out to be too simple....If there were no light in the universe and therefore no creatures with eyes, we should never know it was dark. Dark would be without meaning. [emphasis in the original]

Some take a second route. They believe in objective morality, but contend that God is not necessary to ground ethics. We discover them as part of the furniture of the universe, so to speak, but they have no explanation, nor do they need one. This seems to be the course taken by Christopher Hitchens, best-selling author of God Is not Great—How Religion Poisons Everything.
This won't do for a good reason: Moral rules that have no ground or justification need not be obeyed.
An illustration is helpful here. One evening in the middle of a Scrabble game, you notice the phrase "do not go" formed in the random spray of letter tiles on the table. Is this a command that ought to be obeyed? Of course not. It's not a command at all, just a random collection of letters.
Commands are communications between two minds. Chance might conceivably create the appearance of a moral rule, but there can be no bona fide command if no one is speaking. Since this phrase is accidental, it can safely be ignored.
Even if a person is behind the communication, one could ignore the command if it isn't backed by appropriate authority. If I stood at an intersection and put my hand up, cars might stop voluntarily, but they'd have no duty to respond. They could ignore me with no fear of punishment because I have no authority to direct traffic. If, on the other hand, a policeman replaced me, traffic would come to a halt.
What is the difference between the policeman and me? My authority is not grounded. It doesn't rest on anything solid. The policeman, however, represents the government, so his authority is justified. The state can appoint legitimate representatives to carry out its will because it is operating within its proper domain.
We learn from this that a law has moral force when it is given by an appropriate authority, one operating within its legitimate jurisdiction. If one violates such a law, he could be punished. The same is true of moral laws. They have incumbency—force to them—if there is a proper authority behind them. Moral rules that appear by chance have no such grounding.
Our second option fails because it doesn't explain three important features we observed about morality. Chance morality fails to be a communication between two minds, and therefore, cannot be imperative. It doesn't account for the incumbency of moral rules, nor does it make sense of the guilt and expectation of punishment one feels when those rules are violated.

One Remaining Answer
Only one answer remains as a possible source of morality. If morality is not an illusion and not the product of chance, then morals must be the result of an intelligent Mind. Universal moral laws that have genuine incumbency require an author whose proper domain is the universe, who has the moral authority to enforce his laws, and the power to ultimately mete out perfect justice.
What is the best explanation for the existence of morality? A personal God whose character provides an absolute standard of goodness is the best answer. An impersonal force won't do because a moral rule is both a proposition and a command, and these are features of minds. Ethicist Richard Taylor explains:

A duty is something that is owed....but something can be owed only to some person or persons. There can be no such thing as a duty in isolation....The concept of moral obligation [is] unintelligible apart from the idea of God. The words remain, but their meaning is gone.

Only one option makes sense of each observation about morality: a personal God, who is the creator of both the material and the immaterial domain. Moral laws suggest a moral law giver. His laws are a communication of his desires, imperatives expected to be obeyed.
The existence of God also explains the incumbency of morality. Ethics are adequately grounded because God is a proper authority for moral rules. The universe is his possession because he created it, and he has the right to rule over it.
Ethical pain—true moral guilt—also makes sense. Since morals are not disembodied principles, but personal commands, a violation is not just a broken rule, but an offense against the person who made the rule. Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard has pointed out that a man could not have anything upon his conscience if God did not exist.
Some—like Michael Shermer—attempt to argue they don't need God for them to be moral. They can be virtuous people even though they’re atheists. No one thinking carefully about it, though, would deny that an atheist can behave in a way one might call moral. The real question is, "Why ought he?" Trappist monk Thomas Merton put it this way:

In the name of whom or what do you ask me to behave? Why should I go to the inconvenience of denying myself the satisfactions I desire in the name of some standard that exists only in your imagination? Why should I worship the fictions that you have imposed on me in the name of nothing?

A moral atheist is like a man sitting down to dinner who doesn't believe in farmers, ranchers, fishermen, or cooks. He believes the food just appears, with no explanation and no sufficient cause. This is silly. Either his meal is an illusion, or someone provided it. In the same way, if morals exist—as the reality of evil proves—then some cause adequate to explain the effect must account for them. God is the most reasonable solution.

The Final Verdict
The argument against God based on the problem of evil can only be raised if some form of moral objectivism is true. Morals, therefore, exist. I don’t need to give a complete taxonomy of ethical guidelines to make my case. If there is even one moral absolute, it invites the question, "What kind of world view best explains its existence?"
Atheism can't make any sense of it. Neither can most Eastern religions, by the way. If reality is an illusion, as they hold, then the distinction between good and evil is ultimately rendered meaningless. Something like the Judeo-Christian or Muslim idea of God must be true to adequately account for moral laws.
Morality grounded in God explains our hunger for justice—our desire for a day of final reckoning when all wrongs are made right, when innocent suffering is finally redeemed, when all the guilty are punished and the righteous are rewarded.
This also explains our own personal sense of dread. We feel guilty because we are guilty. We know deep down inside that we have offended a morally perfect Being who has the legitimate authority to punish us. We know we will have to answer for our own crimes against God.
In the end, we're forced to accept one of two alternatives. Either relativism is true or morality is true. Either we live in a universe in which morality is a meaningless concept and are forever condemned to silence regarding the problem of evil, or moral rules exist and we're beholden to a moral God who holds us accountable to His law.
There are no other choices. As Dr. Francis Schaeffer put it, "These are not probability answers; [these] are the only answers. It is this or nothing." If one is certainly false, the other is certainly true.


Stand to Reason - Equipping Christian ambassadors with knowledge, wisdom, and character - www.str.org

fetal_bandito
April 7th 2010, 12:34 PM
Evil as Evidence for God by Greg Koukl


This is the premise of the article. Please note that only the first paragraph, below, makes reference to it. The rest is a attempt to prove that morality is not relative, but the author never ties this into the premise.



The wave of best-selling atheist books has forced followers of Christ to confront an age-old objection: the problem evil, considered by some to be the strongest evidence against the existence of God. I actually think it proves just the opposite. The entire objection hinges on the observation that true evil exists "out there" as an objective feature of the world. Therein lies the problem for the atheist.


Issue 01: Right from the very beginning, the author has already screwed up the entire essay by using the word "observation". This is an assumption on the author's part. Moral relativists do not make objective claims about the existence of "good" or "evil" because, of course, they believe these concepts to be relative. Trying to say that moral relativists are claiming that 'evil' exists in an objective sense is absolutely absurd, thus making the author's entire argument a classic straw man. -- The author is now refuting an argument that nobody ever made to begin with.



Bowling and Badness
Think of it this way. How do you know the difference between a good bowler and a bad one? By the bowlers’ scores, of course. There must be a way to keep score to make a judgment between mediocre and masterful. C.S. Lewis pointed out that a portrait is a good or bad likeness depending on how it compares with the “perfect” original. In the same way, evil is a value judgment based on a scoring system of some sort, a standard of moral perfection that evil falls short of.

Issue 02: "Evil is a value judgement based on a scoring system of some sort, a standard of moral perfection that evil falls short of." -- Why? Because the author says so? Once again, the author is making the assumption that there is an objective standard by which judgement can be made, though the author presents no argument or evidence as to why this is the case. This constitutes a circular argument eg. "This is true because I say it's true."



To say something is evil, then, is to make a moral judgment, and moral judgments make no sense outside of a moral standard. Evil as a value judgment marks a departure from that standard of morality. If there is no standard, there is no departure.


Issue 03: "Evil as a value judgement marks a departure from that standard of morality." This statement does not make sense.

First, a judgement by a person cannot be absolutely correct unless that person happens to be God. Therefore any value judgement made by a human is automatically inclusive of a margin for error, thus it cannot be considered 100% objective.

Second, even if we assume that morality is absolute, how is evil a "departure" from that standard? It is not a "departure" but rather a variance in position on a moral continuum - to use the author's own argument that "evil is a value judgement based on a scoring system".



Lewis notes: "My argument against God was that the universe seemed so cruel and unjust. But how had I gotten this idea of just and unjust? A man does not call something crooked unless he has some idea of a straight line."


This bit by C.S. Lewis presumes that there is an objective moral standard rather than considering that perhaps the concepts of "just and unjust" came from Lewis's own mind and experiences.



Here’s the key question: Where does the moral standard come from? Is it a product of chance? Does morality simply fall from the sky? What world view makes the best sense out of objective morality?


Issue 04: Notice that the author, without giving any evidence whatsoever as to why it is so, has made the assumption that a "moral standard" exists. But where exactly is the evidence of this so-called "moral standard"? Further, the author has failed to differentiate between a personal conception of a moral standard and a universal moral standard. Clearly his argument is trying to assert that a universal moral standard exists. But if that is so, why quote Lewis? Are we to believe that C.S. Lewis is God? If not, then how is his personal conception of a moral standard relevent to a universal moral standard? Are they one and the same? If so, then wouldn't that make C.S. Lewis God? -- What a mess.



Answering these questions will help clear up another bit of confusion on both sides of the aisle. Some Christians have claimed that no atheist can be a truly moral person. To which Michael Shermer, editor of Skeptic magazine, fires back, “I’m an atheist, and I’m moral.” It’s a shallow response, but it works because the challenge itself misses the point. The question isn’t whether an atheist can be moral, but whether he can make sense of morality in a universe bereft of God.


Issue 05: Why is the existence and/or belief in the existence of God neccessary for humans to conceptualize morality? -- Simply put: it's not. Atheists have personal moral beliefs even if those beliefs do not conform to the same positions on the moral continuum that some Christians or theists have. It's one thing to say that atheists do not follow a 'universal moral standard', but quite another to say that atheists are incapable of having any conceptualization of morality - which would be patently false. Atheists are certainly capable of existing in general harmony with society which would be impossible if they had no conception of morality.

Note that the author makes no attempt whatsoever to answer his own question or examine it in any way.



This is what philosophers call “the grounding problem.” What grounds morality? What does it “stand” on, so to speak? Why is the universe the way it is?

Issue 06: "Why is the universe the way it is?" -- Where did this question come from? I thought we were speaking about morality, not cosmology. This question by the author, as well as the underlying assumtion that the universe is a particular way is rather amusing. In order to make a claim about the nature of the entire universe, it follows that the author would have had to have traveled throughout the universe in order to make such a statement. Had the author done so? If not, one wonders on what basis the author is qualified to make claims as to the nature of the universe, and, moreover, what relevence this has to morality?



I think we can get much closer to an answer to these questions by simply reflecting on the nature of a moral rule. By making observations about the effect—morality—we can determine its characteristics and then ask what cause is adequate to produce it.


That seems like a valid argument. Let's see what happens:



Four Observations about Morality

The first thing we observe about moral rules is that, though they exist, they are not physical because they don't seem to have physical properties. We don't bump into them in the dark. They don't extend into space. They have no weight. They have no chemical characteristics. Instead, they are immaterial things we discover through the process of thought, introspection, and reflection without the aid of our five senses.


Issue 07: Let's look at that again:

"[Moral rules]... are immaterial things we discover through the process of thought, introspection, and reflection.."

Did the author really just say that??

According to his argument thus far, there is an objective moral standard that transcends human conceptualization of morality; It is universal and comes from God. This cannot be so if morality comes through "the process of thought, introspection, and reflection". -- This 'observation' is actually a excellent working definition of Moral Relativism: we define morality based on our personal interpretation of morality.

This 'observation' by the author completely contradicts his entire argument of a "objective moral standard"...!



This is a profound realization. We have, with a high degree of certainty, stumbled upon something real. Yet it's something that can't be proven empirically or described in terms of natural laws. This teaches us there's more to the world than just the physical universe. If non-physical things—like moral rules—truly exist, then materialism as a world view is false.


Issue 08: This last statement by the author fails on several grounds:

First, there are many, many non-physical things that exist. This is not a "profound realization"; it's a statement of the obvious. For example, one wonders if the author is familar with the emotion of love? It can't be proven empirically or described in terms of natural laws but millions can testify that it exists. Another example is philosophy itself. Another example is logic. Another example is mathematics. Etc, etc, etc. Ironically, in the next paragraph the author cites many of these things.

Second, here's an odd premise: "If humans can conceptualize morality then materialism is false". Eh? How exactly does that follow, and moreover, how is it relevant to the orginal premise of this argument? Another red herring by the author.



There seem to be many other things that populate the world, things like propositions, numbers, and the laws of logic. Values like happiness, friendship, and faithfulness are there, too, along with meanings and language. There may even be persons—souls, angels, and other divine beings. Our discovery also tells us some things really exist that science has no access to, even in principle. Some things are not governed by natural laws. Science, therefore, is not the only discipline giving us true information about the world. It follows, then, that naturalism as a world view is also false. Our discovery of moral rules forces us to expand our understanding of the nature of reality and open our minds to the possibility of a host of new things that populate the world in the invisible realm.


Issue 09: This one is a real two-fisted head-clencher.

First, who exactly made the claim that science is the sole source of information? Atheists? Non-Christians? Who? Nobody but the author, and then he proceeds to knock down his Straw Man.

Second, he claims "Nautralism is false". I agree that it's false, but not based on any argument present by the author because his claim is this: humans can conceptualize things that do not empirically exist therefore these things automatically do exist, and therefore Naturalism is false. Because something can be conceptualized doesn't neccessarily mean that it exists. The fact that we can conceptualize objective moral law doesn't automatically bring it into existence any more than a child conceptualizing the Tooth Fairy makes that entity real.

Third, what does any of this have to do with the premise that "Evil proves the existence of God"?



Second, moral rules are a kind of communication. They are propositions: intelligent statements of meaning conveyed from one mind to another. The propositions are in the form of imperatives, commands. A command only makes sense when there are two minds involved, one giving the command and one receiving it.


Are moral rules propositions or are they commands? The author needs to make up his mind.



There's a third thing we notice when we reflect on moral rules. They have a force we often feel prior to any behavior. This is called the incumbency of moral rules, the "oughtness" of morality. It appeals to a person's will, pushing him to act in a certain way, though he often disregards its force and chooses to disobey.


Issue 10: I would like to know exactly on what the author bases this information and how he can demonstrate the veracity of this claim. I assert that he cannot.

Further, after searching the web, the only reference I could find to the phrase "incumbency of moral rules" was in direct reference to the author. Making up your own terminology and then trying to pass it off as an accepted philosophical principle is deceptive to say the least and calls into question the author's own adherence to a "objective moral standard".



Finally, there is a deep discomfort that emotionally healthy people feel when they violate clear and weighty moral dictates—a kind of ethical pain—making them aware they have done something wrong and deserve punishment.


Issue 11: Before I get into this comment, let me point out a few ambiguities:

A) "emotionally healthy people" - How exactly does the author define this? And, on what grounds is the author qualifed to make a statement about people's emotional health? And further, how does one's emotional health have direct bearing on one's sense of morality? No evidence here.

B) "clear and weighty moral dictates" - Indeed, this is a peculiar term. First, the author was talking about a 'objective moral standard', but now the author has introducted the idea that some moral standards carry less weight than other moral standards. How exactly does that work? If there is one objective moral standard, universal for all, how can there be degrees of the objectiveness or the emphasis?

C) "clear and weighty moral dictates" - The use of the word "clear" indicates that there are some moral issues which are not clear. However, if there is indeed a "objective moral standard" as the author asserts, then how is it possible for a moral issue to be unclear? Without meaning to, the author has once again given an argument in favor of Moral Relativism.



This sense of guilt carries with it not just the uncomfortable awareness of wrong-doing, but also the dread of having to answer for the deed.


This statement begs the question: "answer" to whom and in what capacity?



Distraction and denial may temporarily numb ethical pain, but it never entirely disappears. Only sociopaths succeed in silencing the conscience completely.


Once again, the author makes an amusing assertion: those who do not agree with the author's questionable arguments are "sociopaths". Is the author indeed qualified to make this determination?



Narrowing Our Options

These four observations provide us with a foundation from which to answer the question, "Why morality?"


The actual question the author asked was, and I quote: "Here’s the key question: Where does the moral standard come from?"

And, incidentally, the author never actually answer this question.



We need only determine the possible options, then ask which option best accounts for our observations.A word of caution here. At this point our discussion gets personal, because the ultimate answer to our question has serious ramifications for the way we live our lives. It's tempting to abandon careful thinking when conclusions that make us uncomfortable come into focus. Faced with a limited number of options, no one sits on the fence. When the full range of choices is clear, rejection of one means acceptance of another.


Ok.



Our options are limited to three. One: Morality is simply an illusion. Two: Objective moral rules exist, but are mere accidents, the product of chance. Three: Moral rules are not accidents, but instead are the product of intelligence. Which option makes most sense given our four observations about morality?


To answer the author's question, so far the "observations" given about morality (by the author) are:

1. ".. we discover [moral rules] through the process of thought, introspection, and reflection.." - Moral Relativism.

2. Moral rules are both propositions and commands at the same time.

3. Moral rules are based on a term the author made up and cannot support.

4. There are variances within the objective moral standard, some of which can be unclear.

That being said, let's continue:



Some want to argue that morals just don't exist.


This is false. There are people who argue that there is no 'objective' or 'universal' moral standard, but even those who make this argument still believe in the concept of morality.



They're nothing but illusions, useful fictions that help us to live in harmony. This is the relativist's answer.


This is false. Moral relativists argue that morality is relative to the individual; not that it doesn't exist. Moreover, where is the author's source for this claim?



This view is not an option for those who raise the problem of evil. Their complaint about the injustice of the universe is a tacit admission of morality.


We now return to the Author's Orginal Strawman already in progress....

Who, exactly, is making an argument about "the problem of evil"?

Surely, the author is not foolishly suggesting that moral relativists are doing so because that would be a complete and utter contradiction of his erroneous statement that moral relativists do not believe in morals...



C.S. Lewis observed:

Thus in the very act of trying to prove that God did not exist—in other words, that the whole of reality was senseless—I found I was forced to assume that one part of reality—namely my idea of justice—was full of sense. Consequently, atheism turns out to be too simple....If there were no light in the universe and therefore no creatures with eyes, we should never know it was dark. Dark would be without meaning. [emphasis in the original]
[/quote

What does this quote have to do with the subject at hand? The issue here is objective morality; not theism. It seems to me that the author is making a Hasty Generalization that all atheists are moral relativists and that all moral relativists are atheists.

[quote]
Some take a second route. They believe in objective morality, but contend that God is not necessary to ground ethics. We discover them as part of the furniture of the universe, so to speak, but they have no explanation, nor do they need one. This seems to be the course taken by Christopher Hitchens, best-selling author of God Is not Great—How Religion Poisons Everything. This won't do for a good reason: Moral rules that have no ground or justification need not be obeyed.


Issue 12: This argument by the author is particularly weak. The author claims that not having dine grounds as justification for an objective moral standard means that that standard doesn't have to be followed -- BUT -- he doesn't say that people don't follow it. He says it doesn't have to be followed. But the same is true for those who adhere to a divine-oriented objective moral standard: there is nothing to compel anybody to do anything. Even those who are Christian still must make a choice to follow their moral standard.



An illustration is helpful here. One evening in the middle of a Scrabble game, you notice the phrase "do not go" formed in the random spray of letter tiles on the table. Is this a command that ought to be obeyed? Of course not. It's not a command at all, just a random collection of letters.
Commands are communications between two minds. Chance might conceivably create the appearance of a moral rule, but there can be no bona fide command if no one is speaking. Since this phrase is accidental, it can safely be ignored.


But this is not the case. If people claim an objective moral standard, but refuse to follow it, then why would they bother to claim it at all in the first place? -- This argument makes no sense whatsoever.



Even if a person is behind the communication, one could ignore the command if it isn't backed by appropriate authority.


Anybody can choose to ignore any command, even one from God. That's called Free Will.



If I stood at an intersection and put my hand up, cars might stop voluntarily, but they'd have no duty to respond. They could ignore me with no fear of punishment because I have no authority to direct traffic. If, on the other hand, a policeman replaced me, traffic would come to a halt.
What is the difference between the policeman and me? My authority is not grounded. It doesn't rest on anything solid. The policeman, however, represents the government, so his authority is justified. The state can appoint legitimate representatives to carry out its will because it is operating within its proper domain.


Stamp out, eliminate, and erradicate redundancy.



We learn from this that a law has moral force when it is given by an appropriate authority, one operating within its legitimate jurisdiction. If one violates such a law, he could be punished. The same is true of moral laws. They have incumbency—force to them—if there is a proper authority behind them. Moral rules that appear by chance have no such grounding.


This argument from the author tries to imply that, without "grounding" every potentially positive moral choice will be ignored. But on what evidence does he base this?

As far as I know, as of today, April 7th, 2010, there has not been a world-wide crime spree by atheists and moral relativists. To hear the author tell it, atheists and moral relativists are wild animals seconds away from throwing themselves at people's throats. Absurdity.




Our second option fails because it doesn't explain three important features we observed about morality. Chance morality fails to be a communication between two minds, and therefore, cannot be imperative. It doesn't account for the incumbency of moral rules, nor does it make sense of the guilt and expectation of punishment one feels when those rules are violated.


Nothing in the above paragraph is based on anything but the author's unsupported claims and contradictory arguments.



One Remaining Answer
Only one answer remains as a possible source of morality. If morality is not an illusion and not the product of chance, then morals must be the result of an intelligent Mind. Universal moral laws that have genuine incumbency require an author whose proper domain is the universe, who has the moral authority to enforce his laws, and the power to ultimately mete out perfect justice.


Just where is this "perfect justice"? And where is the evidence that those who adhere to this principle are acting with perfect moral conduct?

--SNIP--



The Final Verdict
The argument against God based on the problem of evil can only be raised if some form of moral objectivism is true. Morals, therefore, exist.


This is not even an argument. Let's break it down:

Premise: Arguments against God's existence are dependent on moral objectivism.

Supporting Premise: NONE

Conclusion: Morals exists.

So the author is asserting that objective morality exists because atheism based on the existence of evil is dependent on objective morality.

That doesn't make any sense whatsoever. Plus, it's based on the author's self-contradictory straw man arguement.

My conclusion is that this particular author should be avoided by Christian Apologists who plan on discussing the issue of morality with others if they desire to be taken seriously.