'No Other Name'

[dizzle]

A Middle Knowledge Perspective on the Exclusivity of Salvation through Christ

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LEADERSHIP U (http://www.leaderu.com)

By DR. WILLIAM LANE CRAIG

The conviction of the New Testament writers was that there is no salvation apart from Jesus. This orthodox doctrine is widely rejected today because God's condemnation of persons in other world religions seems incompatible with various attributes of God.

Analysis reveals the real problem to involve certain counterfactuals of freedom, e.g., why did not God create a world in which all people would freely believe in Christ and be saved? Such questions presuppose that God possesses middle knowledge. But it can be shown that no inconsistency exists between God's having middle knowledge and certain persons' being damned; on the contrary, it can be positively shown that these two notions are compatible.

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"'No Other Name': A Middle Knowledge Perspective on the Exclusivity of Salvation through Christ". Faith and Philosophy 6. (1989): 172-88.

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Introduction

"There is salvation in no one else, for there is no other name under heaven given among men by which we must be saved" (Acts 4.12). So proclaimed the early preachers of the gospel of Christ. Indeed, this conviction permeates the New Testament and helped to spur the Gentile mission. Paul invites his Gentile converts to recall their pre-Christian days: "Remember that you were at that time separated from Christ, alienated from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers to the covenants of promise, having no hope and without God in the world" (Ephesians 2.12). The burden of the opening chapters of Romans is to show that this desolate situation is the general condition of mankind. Though God's eternal power and deity are evident through creation (1.20) and the demands of His moral law implanted on the hearts of all persons (2.15) and although God offers eternal life to all who seek Him in well-doing (2.7), the tragic fact of the matter is that in general people suppress the truth in unrighteousness, ignoring the Creator (1.21) and flouting the moral law (1.32). Therefore, "all men, both Jews and Greeks, are under the power of sin, as it is written: 'None is righteous, no, not one; no one understands, no one seeks for God...'" (3.9-1 1). Sin is the great leveler, rendering all needy of God's forgiveness and salvation. Given the universality of sin, all persons stand morally guilty and condemned before God, utterly incapable of redeeming themselves through righteous acts (3.19-20). But God in His grace has provided a means of salvation from this state of condemnation: Jesus Christ, by his expiatory death, redeems us from sin and justifies us before God (3.21-26). It is through him and through him alone, then, that God's forgiveness is available (5.12-21). To reject Jesus Christ is therefore to reject God's grace and forgiveness, to refuse the one means of salvation which God has provided. It is to remain under His condemnation and wrath, to forfeit eternally salvation. For someday God will judge all men, "inflicting vengeance upon those who do not know God and upon those who do not obey the gospel of our Lord Jesus. They shall suffer the punishment of eternal destruction and exclusion from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of his might" (II Thessalonians 1.8-9).

It was not just Paul who held to this exclusivistic, Christocentric view of salvation. No less than Paul, the apostle John saw no salvation outside of Christ. In his gospel, Jesus declares, "I am the way, and the truth, and the life; no one comes to the Father, but by me" (John 14.6). John explains that men love the darkness of sin rather than light, but that God has sent His Son into the world to save the world and to give eternal life to everyone who believes in the Son. "He who believes is not condemned; he who does not believe is condemned already, because he has not believed in the name of the only Son of God" (John 3.18). People are already spiritually dead; but those who believe in Christ pass from death to life (John 5.24). In his epistles, John asserts that no one who denies the Son has the Father and identifies such a person as the antichrist (I John 2.22-23; 4.3; II John 9). In short, "He who has the Son has life; he who has not the Son of God has not life" (I John 5.12). In John's Apocalypse, it is the Lamb alone in heaven and on earth and under the earth who is worthy to open the scroll and its seven seals, for it was he that by his blood ransomed men for God from every tribe and tongue and people and nation on the earth (Revelation 5.1-14). In the consummation, everyone whose name is not found written in the Lamb's book of life is cast into the everlasting fire reserved for the devil and his cohorts (Revelation 20.15).

One could make the same point from the catholic epistles and the pastorals. It is the conviction of the writers of the New Testament that "there is one God, and there is one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, who gave himself as a ransom for all" (I Timothy 2.5-6).

Indeed, it is plausible that such was the attitude of Jesus himself. New Testament scholarship has reached something of a consensus that the historical Jesus came on the scene with an unparalleled sense of divine authority, the authority to stand and speak in the place of God Himself and to call men to repentance and faith.{1} Moreover, the object of that faith was he himself, the absolute revelation of God: "All things have been delivered to me by my Father; and no one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son and anyone to whom the Son chooses to reveal him" (Matthew 11.27) .{2} On the day of judgment, people's destiny will be determined by how they responded to him: "And I tell you, everyone who acknowledges me before men, the Son of Man also will acknowledge before the angels of God; but he who denies me before men will be denied before the angels of God" (Luke 12.8-9).{3} Frequent warnings concerning hell are found on Jesus' lips, and it may well be that he believed that most of mankind would be damned, while a minority of mankind would be saved: "Enter by the narrow gate, for the gate is wide and the way is easy, that leads to destruction, and those who enter by it are many. For the gate is narrow and the way is hard, that leads to life, and those who find it are few" (Matthew 7:13-14) .{4}

A hard teaching, no doubt; but the logic of the New Testament is simple and compelling: The universality of sin and the uniqueness Christ's expiatory sacrifice entail that there is no salvation apart from Christ. Although this exclusivity was scandalous in the polytheistic world of the first century, with the triumph of Christianity throughout the Empire the scandal receded. Indeed, one of the classic marks of the church was its catholicity, and for men like Augustine and Aquinas the universality of the church was one of the signs that the Scriptures are divine revelation, since so great a structure could not have been generated by and founded upon a falsehood.{5} Of course, recalcitrant Jews remained in Christian Europe, and later the infidel armies of Islam had to be combated, but these exceptions were hardly sufficient to overturn the catholicity of the church or to promote religious pluralism.

But with the so-called "Expansion of Europe" during the three centuries of exploration and discovery from 1450 to 1750, the situation changed radically.{6} It was now seen that far from being the universal religion, Christianity was confined to a small comer of the globe. This realization had a two-fold impact upon people's religious thinking: (i) it tended toward the relativization of religious beliefs. Since each religious system was historically and geographically limited, it seemed incredible that any of them should be regarded as universally true. It seemed that the only religion which could make a universal claim upon mankind would be a sort of general religion of nature. (ii) It tended to make Christianity's claim to exclusivity appear unjustly narrow and cruel. If salvation was only through faith in Christ, then the majority of the human race was condemned to eternal damnation, since they had not so much as even heard of Christ. Again, only a natural religion available to all men seemed consistent with a fair and loving God.

In our own day the influx into Western nations of immigrants from former colonies, coupled with the advances in telecommunications which have served to shrink the world toward a "global village," have heightened both of these impressions. As a result, the church has to a great extent lost its sense of missionary calling or been forced to reinterpret it in terms of social engagement, while those who continue to adhere to the traditional, orthodox view are denounced for religious intolerance. This shift is perhaps best illustrated by the attitude of the Second Vatican Council toward world mission. In its Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, the Council declared that those who have not yet received the gospel are related in various ways to the people of God.{7} Jews, in particular, remain dear to God, but the plan of salvation also includes all who acknowledge the Creator, such as Muslims. People who through no fault of their own do not know the gospel, but who strive to do God's will by conscience can also be saved. The Council therefore declared that Catholics now pray for the Jews, not for the conversion of the Jews and also declares that the Church looks with esteem upon Muslims.{8} Missionary work seems to be directed only toward those who "serve the creature rather than the Creator" or are utterly hopeless.{9} Carefully couched in ambiguous language and often apparently internally inconsistent,{10} the documents of Vatican II could easily be taken as a radical reinterpretation of the nature of the Church and of Christian missions, according to which great numbers of non-Christians are specifically related to the Church and therefore not appropriate subjects of evangelism.

The difficulty of the orthodox position has compelled some persons to embrace universalism and as a consequence to deny the incarnation of Christ. Thus, John Hick explains,

For understood literally the Son of God, God the Son, God-incarnate language implies that God can be adequately known and responded to only through Jesus; and the whole religious life of mankind, beyond the stream of Judaic-Christian faith is thus by implication excluded as lying outside the sphere of salvation. This implication did little positive harm so long as Christendom was a largely autonomous civilization with only relatively marginal interaction with the rest of mankind. But with the clash between the Christian and Muslim worlds, and then on an ever-broadening front with European colonization through the earth, the literal understanding of the mythological language of Christian discipleship has had a divisive effect upon the relations between that minority of human beings who live within the borders of the Christian tradition and that majority who live outside it and within other streams of religious life.

Transposed into theological terms, the problem which has come to the surface in the encounter of Christianity with the other world religions is this: If Jesus was literally God incarnate, and if it is by his death alone that men can be saved, and by their response to him alone that they can appropriate that salvation, then the only doorway to eternal life is Christian faith. It would follow from this that the large majority of the human race so far have not been saved. But is it credible that the loving God and Father of all men has decreed that only those born within one particular thread of human history shall be saved?{11}

But what exactly is the problem with God's condemning persons who adhere to non-Christian religions? I do not see that the very notion of hell is incompatible with a just and loving God. According to the New Testament, God does not want anyone to perish, but desires that all persons repent and be saved and come to know the truth (11 Peter 3.9; 1 Timothy 2.4). He therefore seeks to draw all men to Himself. Those who make a well-informed and free decision to reject Christ are self-condemned, since they repudiate God's unique sacrifice for sin. By spurning God's prevenient grace and the solicitation of His Spirit, they shut out God's mercy and seal their own destiny. They, therefore, and not God, are responsible for their condemnation, and God deeply mourns their loss.

Nor does it seem to me that the problem can be simply reduced to the inconsistency of a loving and just God's condemning persons who are either un- , ill-, or misinformed concerning Christ and who therefore lack the opportunity to receive Him. For one could maintain that God graciously applies to such persons the benefits of Christ's atoning death without their conscious knowledge thereof on the basis of their response to the light of general revelation and the truth that they do have, even as He did in the case of Old Testament figures like Job who were outside the covenant of Israel.{12} The testimony of Scripture is that the mass of humanity do not even respond to the light that they do have, and God's condemnation of them is neither unloving nor unjust, since He judges them according to standards of general revelation vastly lower than those which are applied to persons who have been recipients of His special revelation.

Rather the real problem, it seems to me, involves certain counterfactuals of freedom concerning those who do not receive special revelation and so are lost. If we take Scripture seriously, we must admit that the vast majority of persons in the world are condemned and will be forever lost, even if in some relatively rare cases a person might be saved through his response to the light that he has apart from special revelation.{13} But then certain questions inevitably arise: Why did God not supply special revelation to persons who, while rejecting the general revelation they do have, would have responded to the gospel of Christ if they had been sufficiently well-informed concerning it? More fundamentally, Why did God create this world when He knew that so many persons would not receive Christ and would therefore be lost? Even more radically, why did God not create a world in which everyone freely receives Christ and so is saved?

Now all of these questions appear, at least, to presuppose that certain counterfactuals of freedom concerning people's response to God's gracious initiatives are true, and the last two seem to presuppose that God's omniscience embraces a species of knowledge known as middle knowledge (scientia media). For if there are no true counterfactuals of freedom, it is not true that certain persons would receive Christ if they were to hear the gospel, nor can God be held responsible for the number of the lost if He lacks middle knowledge, for without such knowledge He could only guess in the moment logically prior to His decree to create the world how many and, indeed, whether any persons would freely receive Christ (or whether He would even send Christ!) and be saved. Let us assume, then, that some such counterfactuals are true and that God has middle knowledge.{14}

For those who are unfamiliar with this species of knowledge and as considerable confusion exists concerning it, a few words about the concept of middle knowledge and its implications for providence and predestination might be helpful.

Scientia Media

Largely the product of the creative genius of the Spanish Jesuit of the Counter-Reformation Luis Molina (1535-1600), the doctrine of middle knowledge proposes to furnish an analysis of divine knowledge in terms of three logical moments.{15} Although whatever God knows, He has known from eternity, so that there is no temporal succession in God's knowledge, nonetheless there does exist a sort of logical succession in God's knowledge in that His knowledge of certain propositions is conditionally or explanatorily prior to His knowledge of certain other propositions. That is to say, God's knowledge of a particular set of propositions depends asymmetrically on His knowledge of a certain other set of propositions and is in this sense posterior to it. In the first, unconditioned moment God knows all possibilia, not only all individual essences, but also all possible worlds. Molina calls such knowledge "natural knowledge" because the content of such knowledge is essential to God and in no way depends on the free decisions of His will. By means of His natural knowledge, then, God has knowledge of every contingent state of affairs which could possibly obtain and of what the exemplification of the individual essence of any free creature could freely choose to do in any such state of affairs that should be actual.

In the second moment, God possesses knowledge of all true counterfactual propositions, including counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. That is to say, He knows what contingent states of affairs would obtain if certain antecedent states of affairs were to obtain; whereas by His natural knowledge God knew what any free creature could do in any set of circumstances, now in this second moment God knows what any free creature would do in any set of circumstances. This is not because the circumstances causally determine the creature's choice, but simply because this is how the creature would freely choose. God thus knows that were He to actualize certain states of affairs, then certain other contingent states of affairs would obtain. Molina calls this counterfactual knowledge "middle knowledge" because it stands in between the first and third moment in divine knowledge. Middle knowledge is like natural knowledge in that such knowledge does not depend on any decision of the divine will; God does not determine which counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are true or false. Thus, if it is true that

If some agent S were placed in circumstances C, then he would freely perform action a,

then even God in His omnipotence cannot bring it about that S would refrain from a if he were placed in C. On the other hand, middle knowledge is unlike natural knowledge in that the content of His middle knowledge is not essential to God. True counterfactuals of freedom are contingently true; S could freely decide to refrain from a in C, so that different counterfactuals could be true and be known by God than those that are. Hence, although it is essential to God that He have middle knowledge, it is not essential to Him to have middle knowledge of those particular propositions which He does in fact know.

Intervening between the second and third moments of divine knowledge stands God's free decree to actualize a world known by Him to be realizable on the basis of His middle knowledge. By His natural knowledge, God knows what is the entire range of logically possible worlds; by His middle knowledge He knows, in effect, what is the proper subset of those worlds which it is feasible for Him to actualize. By a free decision, God decrees to actualize one of those worlds known to Him through His middle knowledge. According to Molina, this decision is the result of a complete and unlimited deliberation by means of which God considers and weighs every possible circumstance and its ramifications and decides to settle on the particular world He desires. Hence, logically prior, if not chronologically prior, to God's creation of the world is the divine deliberation concerning which world to actualize.

Given God's free decision to actualize a world, in the third and final moment God possesses knowledge of all remaining propositions that are in fact true in the actual world. Such knowledge is denominated "free knowledge" by Molina because it is logically posterior to the decision of the divine will to actualize a world. The content of such knowledge is clearly not essential to God, since He could have decreed to actualize a different world. Had He done so, the content of His free knowledge would be different.

Molina saw clearly the profound implications a doctrine of middle knowledge could have for the notions of providence and predestination. God's providence is His ordering of things to their ends, either directly or mediately through secondary agents. Molina distinguishes between God's absolute and conditional intentions for creatures. It is, for example, God's absolute intention that no creature should sin and that all should reach beatitude. But it is not within the scope of God's power to control what free creatures would do if placed in any set of circumstances. In certain circumstances, then, creatures would freely sin, despite the fact that God does not will this. Should God then choose to actualize precisely those circumstances, He has no choice but to allow the creature to sin. God's absolute intentions can thus be frustrated by free creatures. But God's conditional intentions, which are based on His middle knowledge and thus take account of what free creatures would do, cannot be so frustrated. It is God's conditional intention to permit many actions on the part of free creatures which He does not absolutely will; but in His infinite wisdom God so orders which states of affairs obtain that His purposes are achieved despite and even through the sinful, free choices of creatures. God thus providentially arranges for everything that does happen by either willing or permitting it, and He causes everything to happen insofar as He concurs with the decisions of free creatures in producing their effects, yet He does so in such a way as to preserve freedom and contingency.

Middle knowledge also serves to reconcile predestination and human freedom. On Molina's view predestination is merely that aspect of providence pertaining to eternal salvation; it is the order and means by which God ensures that some free creature attains eternal life. Prior to the divine decree, God knows via His middle knowledge how any possible free creature would respond in any possible circumstances, which include the offer of certain gifts of prevenient grace which God might provide. In choosing a certain possible world, God commits Himself, out of His goodness, to offering various gifts of grace to every person which are sufficient for his salvation. Such grace is not intrinsically efficacious in that it of itself produces its effect; rather it is extrinsically efficacious in accomplishing its end in those who freely cooperate with it. God knows that many will freely reject His sufficient grace and be lost; but He knows that many others will assent to it, thereby rendering it efficacious in effecting their salvation. Given God's immutable decree to actualize a certain world, those whom God knew would respond to His grace are predestined to do so in the sense that it is absolutely certain that they will respond to and persevere in God's grace. There is no risk of their being lost; indeed, in sensu composito it is impossible for them to fall away. But in sensu diviso they are entirely free to reject God's grace; but were they to do so, God would have had different middle knowledge and they would not have been predestined.{16} Similarly those who are not predestined have no one to blame but themselves. It is up to God whether we find ourselves in a world in which we are predestined, but it is up to us whether we are predestined in the world in which we find ourselves.

The Soteriological Problem of Evil

Years ago when I first read Alvin Plantinga's basically Molinist formulation of the Free Will Defense against the problem of evil, it occurred to me that his reasoning might also help to resolve the problem of the exclusivity of salvation through Christ, and my own subsequent study of the notion of middle knowledge has convinced me that this is in fact so.{17} For the person who objects to the exclusivity of salvation through Christ is, in effect, posing what one might call the soteriological problem of evil, that is to say, he maintains that the proposition

1. God is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent

is inconsistent with

2. Some persons do not receive Christ and are damned.

Since (1) is essential to theism, we must therefore deny (2).

The orthodox Christian will point out, however, that (1) and (2) are not explicitly contradictory, since one is not the negation of the other, nor are they logically contradictory, since a contradiction cannot be derived from them using first order logic. The objector, then, must mean that (1) and (2) are inconsistent in the broadly logical sense, that is, that there is no possible world in which both are true. Now in order to show this, the objector must supply some further premise(s) which meets the following conditions: (it) its conjunction with (1) and (2) formally entails a contradiction, (ii) it is either necessarily true, essential to theism, or a logical consequence of propositions that are, and (iii) its meeting conditions (i) and (ii) could not he rationally denied by a right-thinking person.{18}

I am not aware of anyone who has tried to supply the missing premise which meets these conditions, but let us try to find some such proposition. Perhaps it might be claimed that the following two propositions will suffice:

3. God is able to actualize a possible world in which all persons freely receive Christ.

4. God prefers a world in which no persons fail to receive Christ and are damned to a world in which some do.

It might be claimed that anyone who accepts (1) must also accept (3) and (4), since (3) is true in virtue of God's omniscience (which includes middle knowledge) and His omnipotence, and (4) is true in virtue of His omnibenevolence.

But is (3) necessarily true or incumbent upon the theist who is a Molinist? This is far from clear. For although it is logically possible that God actualize any possible world (assuming that God exists in every possible world), it does not follow therefrom that it is feasible for God to actualize any possible world.{19} For God's ability to actualize worlds containing free creatures will be limited by which counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are true in the moment logically prior to the divine decree. In a world containing free creatures, God can strongly actualize only certain segments or states of affairs in that world, and the remainder He must weakly actualize, using His middle knowledge of what free creatures would do under any circumstances. Hence, there will be an infinite number of possible worlds known to God by His natural knowledge which are not realizable by Him because the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom which must be true in order for Him to weakly actualize such worlds are in fact false.{20} His middle knowledge serves to delimit, so to speak, the range of logically possible worlds to those which are feasible for Him to actualize. This might be thought to impugn divine omnipotence, but in fact such a restriction poses no non-logical limit to God's power.{21}

So the question is whether it is necessarily true or incumbent upon the Molinist to hold that within the range of possible worlds which are feasible to God there is at least one world in which everyone freely receives Christ and is saved. Now within Molinism there is a school known as Congruism which would appear to agree that such a position is mandatory for the theist .{22} According to Suarez, for any individual God might create there are gifts of prevenient grace which would be efficacious in winning the free consent of that individual to God's offer of salvation.{23} Such grace, which Suarez calls "congruent grace" (gratia congrua), consists in the divine gifts and aids which would be efficacious in eliciting the response desired by God, but without coercion. No grace is intrinsically efficacious, but congruent grace is always in fact efficacious because God knows via His middle knowledge that the creature would freely and affirmatively respond to it, were He to offer it. Accordingly, the Congruist might claim

5. God knows for any individual S under what circumstances S would freely receive Christ.

But why is it incumbent upon us to accept (5)? Given that persons are free, might there not be persons who would not receive Christ in any actual world in which they existed? Suarez himself seemed to vacillate at this point. When asked whether there is a congruent grace for every person God could create or whether some persons are so incorrigible that regardless of the grace accorded them by God, they would not repent, Suarez wants to say that God can win the free response of any creature He could create. But when pressed that it is logically possible that some person should resist every grace, Suarez concedes that this is true, but adds that God could still save such a person by over- powering his will.{24} But such coercive salvation is beside the point; so long as there might be individuals for whom no grace would be congruent, (5) cannot be regarded as necessary or essential to theism. On the contrary, the theist might hold that

6. For some individual S, there are no circumstances under which S would freely receive Christ.

In such a case, the theist could consistently maintain that there are no worlds feasible for God in which S exists and is saved.

The Congruist could, however, accept (6) and still insist that there are congruent graces for many other individuals and that God could actualize a world containing only such individuals, so that every one would receive Christ and be saved. But the Congruist must show more than that for certain (or even every) individual there are circumstances under which that person would freely receive Christ. He must show that the circumstances under which various individuals would freely receive Christ are compossible, so that all persons in some possible world would freely receive Christ and be saved. It is not even enough to show that the various circumstances are compossible; if he is to avoid the counterfactual fallacy of strengthening the antecedent, he must show that in the combined circumstances the consequent still follows. It might be that in circumstances C1, individual S1 would do action a and that in circumstances C2 individual S2 would do b and that C1 and C2 are compossible, but it does not follow that in C1 - C2, S1 would do a or that in C1 - C2, S2 would do b. Hence, even if it were the case that for any individual He might create, God could actualize a world in which that person is freely saved, it does not follow that there are worlds which are feasible for God in which all individuals are saved. Contrary to (3) the theist might hold that

7. There is no world feasible for God in which all persons would freely receive Christ.

Unless we have good reason to think that (7) is impossible or essentially incompatible with Christian theism, the objector has failed to show (1) and (2) to be inconsistent.

That leads to (4), which, it is said, is incumbent upon anyone who accepts God's omnibenevolence. Now I think that it is obvious that, all things being equal, an omnibenevolent God prefers a world in which all persons are saved to a world containing those same persons some of whom are lost. But (4) is stronger than this. It claims that God prefers any world in which all persons are saved to any world in which some persons are damned. But again, this is far from obvious. Suppose that the only worlds feasible for God in which all persons receive Christ and are saved are worlds containing only a handful of persons. Is it not at least possible that such a world is less preferable to God than a world in which great multitudes come to experience His salvation and a few are damned because they freely reject Christ? Not only does this seem to me possibly true, but I think that it probably is true. Why should the joy and blessedness of those who would receive God's grace and love be prevented on account of those who would freely spurn it? An omnibenevolent God might want as many creatures as possible to share salvation; but given certain true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, God, in order to have a multitude in heaven, might have to accept a number in hell. Hence, contrary to (4) the theist might well hold that

8. God prefers certain worlds in which some persons fail to receive Christ and are damned to certain worlds in which all receive Christ and are saved.

So unless we have good reason to think that (8) is impossible or essentially incompatible with Christian theism, the objector has again failed to show (1) and (2) to be inconsistent.

Since we have no good grounds for believing (3) and (4) to be necessary or essential to theism, or for that matter even contingently true, the opponent of the traditional Christian view has not succeeded in demonstrating that there is no possible world in which God is omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent and yet in which some persons do not receive Christ and are damned.

But, on the pattern of the Free Will Defense, we can yet go further. For I believe that we can demonstrate not only that (1) and (2) have not been shown to be inconsistent, but also that they are, indeed, consistent. In order to show (1) and (2) to be consistent, the orthodox defender has to come up with a proposition which is consistent with (1) and which together with (1) entails (2). This proposition need not be plausible or even true; it need be only a possibly true proposition, even if it is contingently false.

Now we have seen that it is possible that God wants to maximize the number of the saved: He wants heaven to be as full as possible. Moreover, as a loving God, He wants to minimize the number of the lost: He wants hell to be as empty as possible. His goal, then, is to achieve an optimal balance between these, to create no more lost than is necessary to achieve a certain number of the saved.

But it is possible that the balance between saved and lost in the actual world is such an optimal balance. It is possible that in order to create the actual number of persons who will be saved, God had to create the actual number of persons who will be lost. It is possible that the terrible price of filling heaven is also filling hell and that in any other possible world which was feasible for God the balance between saved and lost was worse. It is possible that had God actualized a world in which there are less persons in hell, there would also have been less persons in heaven. It is possible that in order to achieve this much blessedness, God was forced to accept this much loss. Even if we grant that God could have achieved a better ratio between saved and lost, it is possible that in order to achieve such a ratio God would have had to so drastically reduce the number of the saved as to leave heaven deficient in population (say, by creating a world of only four people, three of whom go to heaven and one to hell). It is possible that in order to achieve a multitude of saints, God had to accept an even greater multitude of sinners.

It might be objected that necessarily a loving God would not create persons who He knew would be damned as a concomitant of His creating persons who He knew would be saved. Given His middle knowledge of such a prospect, He should have refrained from creation altogether. But this objection does not strike me as true, much less necessarily so. It is possible that God loves all persons and desires their salvation and furnishes sufficient grace for the salvation of all; indeed, some of the lost may receive even greater gifts of prevenient grace than some of the saved. It is of their own free will that people reject the grace of God and are damned. Their damnation is the result of their own choice and is contrary to God's perfect will, which is that all persons be saved, and their previsioned obduracy should not be allowed to preclude God's creating persons who would freely respond to His grace and be saved.

But it might be further objected that necessarily a loving God would not create persons who would be damned as a concomitant of His creating persons who would be saved if He knew that the former would under other circumstances have freely responded to His grace and been saved. Therefore, He should not have created at all. Now one might respond by denying the necessary truth of such a proposition; one could argue that so long as people receive sufficient grace for salvation in whatever circumstances they are, then they are responsible for their response in such circumstances and cannot complain that had they been in different circumstances, then their reaction would have been different. But even if we concede that the objector's principle is necessarily true, how do we know that its antecedent is fulfilled? We have seen that it is possible that some persons would not freely receive Christ under any circumstances. Suppose, then, that God has so ordered the world that all persons who are actually lost are such persons. In such a case, anyone who actually is lost would have been lost in any world in which God had created him. It is possible, then, that although God, in order to bring this many persons to salvation, had to pay the price of seeing this many persons lost, nevertheless He has providentially ordered the world such that those who are lost are persons who would not have been saved in any world feasible for God in which they exist. On the analogy of transworld depravity,{25} we may accordingly speak of the property of transworld damnation, which is possessed by any person who freely does not respond to God's grace and so is lost in every world feasible for God in which that person exists (this notion can, of course, be more accurately restated in terms of individual essences and instantiations thereof).

Therefore, we are now prepared to furnish a proposition which is consistent with (1) and entails (2):

9. God has actualized a world containing an optimal balance between saved and unsaved, and those who are unsaved suffer from transworld damnation.

So long as (9) is even possible, one is consistent in believing both (1) and (2).

On the basis of this analysis, we now seem to be equipped to provide possible answers to the three difficult questions which prompted our inquiry. ( i ) Why did God not create a world in which everyone freely receives Christ and so is saved? There is no such world which is feasible for God. He would have actualized such a world were this feasible, but in light of certain true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom every world realizable by God is a world in which some persons are lost. Given His will to create a world of free creatures, God must accept that some will be lost. (ii) Why did God create this world when He knew that so many persons would not receive Christ and would therefore be lost? God desired to incorporate as many persons as He could into the love and joy of divine fellowship while minimizing the number of persons whose final state is hell. He therefore chose a world having an optimal balance between the number of the saved and the number of the damned. Given the truth of certain counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, it was not feasible for God to actualize a world having as many saved as but with no more damned than the actual world. The happiness of the saved should not be precluded by the admittedly tragic circumstance that their salvation has as its concomitant the damnation of many others, for the fate of the damned is the result of their own free choice. (iii) Why did God not supply special revelation to persons who, while rejecting the general revelation they do have, would have responded to the gospel of Christ if they had been sufficiently well-informed concerning it? There are no such persons. In each world in which they exist God loves and wills the salvation of persons who in the actual world have only general revelation, and He graciously and preveniently solicits their response by His Holy Spirit, but in every world feasible for God they freely reject His grace and are lost. If there were anyone who would have responded to the gospel if he had heard it, then God in His love would have brought the gospel to such a person. Apart from miraculous intervention, "a single revelation to the whole earth has never in the past been possible, given the facts of geography and technology";{26} but God in His providence has so arranged the world that as the gospel spread outward from its historical roots in first century Palestine, all who would respond to this gospel, were they to hear it, did and do hear it. Those who have only general revelation and do not respond to it would also not have responded to the gospel had they heard it. Hence, no one is lost because of lack of information due to historical or geographical accident. All who want or would want to be saved will be saved.

The above are only possible answers to the questions posed. We have been about a defense, not a theodicy, concerning the soteriological problem of evil. What I have shown is that the orthodox Christian is not inconsistent in affirming that an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God exists and that some people do not receive Christ and are damned. It might, of course, be countered that while the possibility of (9) shows the orthodox position to be consistent, still (9) is highly improbable, given the world in which we live, so that (2) still remains improbable, if not inconsistent, with regard to (1). But here the strength of the position I have been defending emerges beyond that of Plantinga's Free Will Defense. For while it seems fantastic to attribute all natural evil to the actions of demonic beings (e.g., earthquakes' being caused by the demons pushing about tectonic plates), (9) does not seem similarly implausible. On the contrary I find the above account of the matter to be quite plausible not only as a defense, but also as a soteriological theodicy. Indeed, I think that it helps to put the proper perspective on Christian missions: it is our duty to proclaim the gospel to the whole world, trusting that God has so providentially ordered things that through us the good news will be brought to persons who God knew would respond if they heard it.

Conclusion

In conclusion, then, I think that a middle knowledge perspective on the problem of the exclusivity of the Christian religion can be quite fruitful. Since all persons are in sin, all are in need of salvation. Since Christ is God's unique expiatory sacrifice for sin, salvation is only through Christ. Since Jesus and his work are historical in character, many persons as a result of historical and geographical accident will not be sufficiently well-informed concerning him and thus unable to respond to him in faith. Such persons who are not sufficiently well-informed about Christ's person and work will be judged on the basis of their response to general revelation and the light that they do have. Perhaps some will be saved through such a response; but on the basis of Scripture we must say that such "anonymous Christians" are relatively rare. Those who are judged and condemned on the basis of their failure to respond to the light of general revelation cannot legitimately complain of unfairness for their not also receiving the light of special revelation, since such persons would not have responded to special revelation had they received it. For God in His providence has so arranged the world that anyone who would receive Christ has the opportunity to do so. Since God loves all persons and desires the salvation of all, He supplies sufficient grace for salvation to every individual, and nobody who would receive Christ if he were to hear the gospel will be denied that opportunity. As Molina puts it, our salvation is in our own hands.

Finally, I hope that no reader has been offended by what might appear to be a rather dry and dispassionate discussion of the salvation and damnation of people apart from Christ. But with such an emotionally explosive issue on the table, it seems to me that it is prudent to treat it with reserve. No orthodox Christian likes the doctrine of hell or delights in anyone's condemnation. I truly wish that universalism were true, but it is not. My compassion toward those in other world religions is therefore expressed, not in pretending that they are not lost and dying without Christ, but by my supporting and making every effort myself to communicate to them the life-giving message of salvation through Christ.{27}

NOTES

{1} On Jesus' self-understanding, see James D. G. Dunn, Jesus and the Spirit (London: SCM Press, 1975), pp. 11 -92; Royce Gordon Gruenler, New Approaches to Jesus and the Gospels (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1982), especially pt. 1.

{2} For arguments for the authenticity of this saying, see Dunn, Jesus , pp. 26-33, 371.

{3} On the authenticity of this and other "Son of Man" sayings, see Seyoon Kim, The Son of Man as the Son of God (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1985), especially pp. 88- 89, and the literature cited there.

{4} The authenticity of this saying is supported by its multiple attestation (cf. Lk. 13:22-30), its Jewish milieu, and its coherence with Jesus's other teachings. The most plausible way to avoid the inference would be to deny the universal scope of the saying, restricting it to the Jews of Jesus' generation. But it hardly seems likely that Jesus believed that the majority of the Gentile world would respond to him in repentance and faith.

{5} Augustine De vera religione 3.5; 24.47; Augustine De civitate Dei 20.5; Thomas Aquinas Summa contra gentiles 1. 6.

{6} For a brief account, see my The Historical Argument for the Resurrection of Jesus during the Deist Controversy, Texts and Studies in Religion 23 (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1985), pp. 82-92.

{7} "Dogmatic Constitution on the Church" [Lumen Gentium 2.16], in The Documents of Vatican II, ed. W. M. Abbott (New York: Guild Press, 1966), p. 34.

{8} "Declaration on Non-Christian Religions," in Documents, pp. 663-66.

{9} "The Church" [LG 2.16], p. 35.

{10} For example, the constitution on the Church also affirms that anyone who knows that Christ is the unique way of salvation and that the Church is his body and yet refuses to become a Catholic cannot be saved ("The Church" [LG 2.14], in Documents, pp. 32-33). The ambiguity and inconsistency of the documents probably reflects the struggle between traditionalists and modernists in the Council.

{11} John Hick, "Jesus and the World Religions," in The Myth of God Incarnate, ed. John Hick (London: SCM, 1977), pp. 179-80.

{12} For a defense of such a position, see Stuart C. Hackett, The Reconstruction of the Christian Revelation Claim (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1985), pp. 242 46.

{13} As we have seen, it is the testimony of Scripture that most persons who hear the gospel do not respond with saving faith and, moreover, that most of those without the light of the gospel do not even respond to the light of general revelation fact which sociological observations would seem to confirm. Hence, I would agree with Hick that attempts to resolve the difficulty by appeal to "anonymous Christians" or "implicit faith" or "the invisible church" are ultimately unavailing, but not because they are clinging to the husk of the old theology, but precisely because they are incompatible with it.

{14} Of course, this is a controversial assumption, But for a defense of the doctrine of middle knowledge see Alvin Plantinga, "Reply to Robert Adams, " in Alvin Plantinga, ed. James Tomberlin and Peter Van Inwagen, Profiles 5 (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1985), pp. 372-82; Jonathan L. Kvanvig, The Possibility of an All-Knowing God (New York: St. Martin's, 1986), pp. 121-48; Alfred J. Freddoso, "Introduction," in Luis Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge, trans. with notes by Alfred J. Freddoso (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1988); and my own Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990).

{15} For Molina's doctrine, see Ludovici Molina De liberi arbitrii cum gratia donis, divina praescientia, providentia, praedestinationae et reprobatione Concordia 4. This section has been translated by Freddoso under the title in note 14. For Suarez's doctrine, see R. P. Francisci Suarez, Opera omnia, ed. Carolo Berton, vol. 11: Opuscula theologica sex materiam de auxiliis gratiae absolventia quaestionesque de scientia, libertate et justitia Dei elucidantia: Opusculum II: De scientia Dei futurorum contingentium 2. 7.

{16} In a proposition taken in the composite sense, the modal operator governs the proposition as a whole, e.g., "Necessarily, if God sees Socrates sitting, he is sitting." When the proposition is taken in the divided sense, the modal operator governs only a component of the proposition, e.g. "If God sees Socrates sitting, he is necessarily sitting. " The distinction is analogous to the more familiar difference between necessity de dicto and de re. In the case at hand, the proposition "If God via His middle knowledge and decree has foreknown and chosen to actualize a world in which Peter will be saved, then necessarily Peter will be saved" is true in sensu composito, but false in [I]sensu divivo.

{17} For his reasoning see Alvin Plantings, God and Other Minds (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967), pp. 115-55; Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, Clarendon Library of Logic and Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), pp. 164-95; Alvin Plantinga, "Self-Profile," in Plantinga, pp. 36-55.

{18} For an explanation of why each of these conditions must be met, see Plantinga, God and Other Minds, pp. 116-17, and Plantinga, "Self-Profile," pp. 39-40.

{19} See Thomas P. Flint, "The Problem of Divine Freedom," American Philosophical Quarterly 20 (1983): 257. According to Flint, although all worlds are possible for God to actualize, a world is feasible for God to actualize if and only if it is a member of that proper subset of all possible worlds determined by the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom which God knows to be true.

{20} See Plantinga, "Self-Profile," pp. 50-52.

{21} See Thomas P. Flint and Alfred J. Freddoso, "Maximal Power," in The Existence and Nature of God, ed. Alfred J. Freddoso (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), pp. 93-98.

{22} On Congruism, see Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, ed. A. Vacant, E. Mangenot, E. Amann, (Paris: Letouzey et ane, 1923), s.v. "Congruisme," by H. Quilliet, vol. 3. 1, cols. 1120-1138; Hastings' Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, s.v. "Molinism," by Aelfred Whitacre; Th. de Régnon, Banes et Molin (Paris: H. Oudin, 1883), pp. 122-60.

{23} Suarez, Opera, vol. 11: Opuscula 1: De concursu et efficaci auxilio Dei ad actus libri arbitrii necessario 3.6, 14, 16, 17, 20; Suarez, Opera, vol. 10: Appendix prior: Tractatus de vera intelligentia auxi ii efficacis, ejusque concordia cum libertate voluntarii consensus 1, 12, 13, 14.

{24} Suarez, De concursu et aux ilio Dei [I]3.14, 16; Suarez, [I]De scientia Dei 2.6.9.

{25} See Plantinga, Nature of Necessity, pp. 184-99.

{26} Hick, "Jesus and World Religions," p. 180.

{27} I am very grateful to Thomas Flint and Robert Gundry for helpful comments on the first draft of this paper.

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About Dr. Craig

William Lane Craig is Research Professor of Philosophy at Talbot School of Theology in La Mirada, California. He lives in Atlanta, Georgia, with his wife Jan and their two teenage children Charity and John. At the age of sixteen as a junior in high school, he first heard the message of the Christian gospel and yielded his life to Christ. Dr. Craig pursued his undergraduate studies at Wheaton College (B.A. 1971) and graduate studies at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School (M.A. 1974; M.A. 1975), the University of Birmingham (England) (Ph.D. 1977), and the University of Munich (Germany) (D.Theol. 1984). From 1980-86 he taught Philosophy of Religion at Trinity, during which time he and Jan started their family. In 1987 they moved to Brussels, Belgium, where Dr. Craig pursued research at the University of Louvain until 1994.

Dr. Craig has recently authored God? A Debate between a Christian and an Atheist, co-authored with Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and published by Oxford University Press.

"The question of whether or not God exists is endlessly fascinating and profoundly important. Now two articulate spokesmen--one a Christian, the other an atheist--duel over God's existence in a lively and illuminating battle of ideas. In God?, William Lane Craig and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong bring to the printed page two debates they held before live
audiences, preserving all the wit, clarity, and immediacy of their public exchanges. With none of the opaque discourse of academic logicians and divinity-school theologians, the authors make claims and comebacks that cut with precision. Their arguments are sharp and humorous, as each philosopher strikes quickly to the heart of his opponent's case. For
example, Craig claims that we must believe in God to explain objective moral values, such as why rape is wrong. Sinnott-Armstrong responds that what makes rape wrong is the harm to victims of rape, so rape is immoral even if there is no God. From arguments about the nature of infinity and the Big Bang, to religious experience and divine action, to the resurrection of
Jesus and the problem of evil, the authors treat us to a remarkable display of intelligence and insight—a truly thought-provoking exploration of a classic issue that remains relevant to contemporary life."

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[dizzle]

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[geebob]

Considering William Lane Craig's expertise is in philosophy I would focus on his philosophical claims on counterfactuals, etc. rather than the scriptural claim as there is a wealth of material for other threads and his work on counterfactuals is more unique to him. But that is just my prefference, though if others were to discuss his scriptural case, I would give comments there. I would only like to highlight that Dr. Craig focusses on universalism and pluralism as the alternatives to Exclusivism, there is also the inclusivists answer, which also happens to be an orthodox position with a rich tradition going back to Justin Martyr. And considering that Billy Gram himself is an inclusivist, It is not necessarily the case that exclusivism (or shall I say restrictivism, considering that exclusivism is often viewed as the opinion that only Jesus is the way to heaven, thus making inclusivism well within the boundaries of exclusivism) provides the only case for enthusiastic evangelism.



In each world in which they exist God loves and wills the salvation of persons who in the actual world have only general revelation, and He graciously and preveniently solicits their response by His Holy Spirit, but in every world feasible for God they freely reject His grace and are lost.

In the portions of God only wise that I have read, Criag goes out of his way to show that our actions were not necessary just because God foreknew them. Here, I can't help but see that he is making such an action necessary.

There are two forms of necessity of course relevent to possible worlds ontology, De re necessity is of an aspect that an object will have in any possible world albeit the object may not exist in all possible worlds, and de dicto necessity has to do with statements that are true in all possible worlds.

Transworld damnation of particular individuals is a clear case of de re necessity.

Now perhaps this technically isn't a case of de dicto necessity. This could be argued on the case that the trans-world damned may not reject christ in the same manner and at the same time in all possible worlds. And of course they don't reject him the worlds in which there is no opportunity to reject Christ. But this is not convincing in terms of there freedom.

There are no possible worlds in which most of us (excluding the possibility of Christ's return), are free to avoid physical death. most of us are not free to escape physical death. We may be able to delay it or hurry it up in our freedom, but it is innevitable and I don't see how you can say that someone is free with regard to dieing. So I am not convinced that the transworld damned are free with respect to accepting Christ. As a matter of fact, they are less free because as I've indicated, it is only generally true that we cannot ultimately escape physical death as there are extremely rare exceptions such as enoch and elijah, and all of those who survive until God defeats death.

[yxboom]

Awesome response geebob :thumb:

[Jaltus]

Today @ 05:18 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=213245#post213245)
geebob:
In each world in which they exist God loves and wills the salvation of persons who in the actual world have only general revelation, and He graciously and preveniently solicits their response by His Holy Spirit, but in every world feasible for God they freely reject His grace and are lost.

In the portions of God only wise that I have read, Criag goes out of his way to show that our actions were not necessary just because God foreknew him. Here, I can't help but see that he is making such an action necessary.

First, the name of his book is The Only Wise God, which is not a big deal, but will help people who are looking for this book.

Second, I am not going to deal with your discussion of inclusivism being within exclusivism etc, as I would tend to agree with you in the realm of terminology, if not in actual specific theology.

Third, I will respond to your critique below (I had to have a third, it just feels wrong without one).

There are two forms of necessity of course relevent to possible worlds ontology, De re necessity which is an aspect that an object will have in any possible world albeit the object may not exist in all possible worlds, and de dicto necessity, which has to do with statements that are true in all possible worlds.

Transworld damnation of particular individuals is a clear case of de re necessity.

Now perhaps this technically isn't a case of de dicto necessity. This could be argued on the case that the trans-world damned may not reject christ in the same manner and at the same time in all possible worlds. And of course they don't reject him the worlds in which there is no opportunity to reject Christ. But this is not convincing in terms of there freedom.

There are no possible worlds in which most of us (excluding the possibility of Christ's return), are free to avoid physical death. most of us are not free to escape physical death. We may be able to delay it or hurry it up in our freedom, but it is innevitable and I don't see how you can say that someone is free with regard to dieing. So I am not convinced that the transworld damned are free with respect to accepting Christ. As a matter of fact, they are less free because as I've indicated, it is only generally true that we cannot ultimately escape physical death as there are extremely rare exceptions such as enoch and elijah, and all of those who survive until God defeats death.

I think you are overextending your metaphor, and thus defeating your own argument before it gets off the ground. In some respects physical death is akin to spiritual death, which is what damnation is, but I fail to see how the necessity of physical death calls for the necessity of spiritual death. In both cases we are born such that death is what will happen unless circumstances change. In the case of salvation, however, spiritual death deals more with remaining in a condition that is not necessary, whereas mortality is something which is in fact necessary given the fall.

In other words, physical death is not something one can avoid, whereas spiritual death is. So I fail to see how your metaphor and concepts of necessity in any way impinge on what Dr. Craig has said. Not being free with regard to dying is not the same as not being free with regard to salvation. It is a non sequitur argument. It is much as if I said that we can change our clothes so changing who is the ruler of our heart means there is no possible world in which my choice of salvation is restricted.

I just do not see the connection. You might as well argue since we cannot control birth we cannot control salvation.

[geebob]

First, the name of his book is The Only Wise God, which is not a big deal, but will help people who are looking for this book.

:blush: :egad:

In other words, physical death is not something one can avoid, whereas spiritual death is. So I fail to see how your metaphor and concepts of necessity in any way impinge on what Dr. Craig has said. Not being free with regard to dying is not the same as not being free with regard to salvation. It is a non sequitur argument. It is much as if I said that we can change our clothes so changing who is the ruler of our heart means there is no possible world in which my choice of salvation is restricted.

You missed my point here jaltus. My purpose in bringing up physical death is to give an example of de re necessity. Transworld damnation exibits this same type of necessity. For an entity to have something by necessity in terms of possible worlds ontology is to have it in all possible worlds. Well, that's damnation for transworld damned.

In other words, physical death is not something one can avoid, whereas spiritual death is.

Well lets translate this into a proposition in terms of possible world's ontology. If they can accept Christ, then there is a possible world in which they do accept Christ. So much for Dr. Craig's explanation of the transworld damned.

[Jaltus]

Now that I know what your actual point was that I had missed previously, I will try to actually defend WLC.

There are two forms of necessity of course relevent to possible worlds ontology, De re necessity is of an aspect that an object will have in any possible world albeit the object may not exist in all possible worlds, and de dicto necessity has to do with statements that are true in all possible worlds.

Transworld damnation of particular individuals is a clear case of de re necessity.

Why? How is it an aspect and not a statement? I think this needs a bit of a defense. Being damned is not essential to their being, it is just a necessary outworking of who they are. In other words, it is not an aspect of my being that I have dark hair, it is just part of my gene structure. (ok, not the best analogy, but I hope my point comes through)

Now perhaps this technically isn't a case of de dicto necessity. This could be argued on the case that the trans-world damned may not reject christ in the same manner and at the same time in all possible worlds. And of course they don't reject him the worlds in which there is no opportunity to reject Christ. But this is not convincing in terms of there freedom.

I am confused. You said earlier de re and now you say de dicto. Did I miss something in here?

I think you need to give more warrant as to why this argument is not convincing. So far it looks like a casual dismissal instead of a reasoned critique.

Well lets translate this into a proposition in terms of possible world's ontology. If they can accept Christ, then there is a possible world in which they do accept Christ. So much for Dr. Craig's explanation of the transworld damned.

Isn't there a difference between actualized possibility and nonactualized possibility? My guess is that there is no possible world in which I personally could ever fly. At the same time, I think it is impossible to truly rule it out.

I think possible worlds ontology has a few distinctions left to be made.

[apologetics]

I love William Lane Craig. While I do not necessarily agree with him on several of his beliefs...these are secondary issues within the pail of orthodoxy. He is a fantastic apologist and scholar....one whose intellectual pursuits satisfies the requirements of Matthew 22:37 and 1 Peter 3:15.

[dizzle]

Second, I am not going to deal with your discussion of inclusivism being within exclusivism etc, as I would tend to agree with you in the realm of terminology, if not in actual specific theology.


Boom and I were discussing this the other day. For the form of inclusivism that I see promoted here quite a bit, I would agree. It is exclusivistic inclusivism if that makes any sense at all. :teeth:

Now where are the rest of the Molinists? :shifty:

[geebob]

I am confused. You said earlier de re and now you say de dicto. Did I miss something in here?

you didn't miss anything. I goofed. :blush: I commonly make mistakes like this so bear with me (sometimes I catch it in editing and other times I must leave people more confused than necessary).

Why? How is it an aspect and not a statement?

you can say it's a statement about an aspect, which it is. It's still a case of de re necessity.

Being damned is not essential to their being, it is just a necessary outworking of who they are.

okay, it's a necessary outworking to who they are. So much for freedom.

It's still an example of de re necessity. The definition of de re necessity is nothing more nor less than that an entity or object exibits a certain aspect in all of the possible world's in which it exists.

Your not free with regard to your inherited gene pool btw.

Isn't there a difference between actualized possibility and nonactualized possibility?

yes. But I don't see the relevence.

My guess is that there is no possible world in which I personally could ever fly. At the same time, I think it is impossible to truly rule it out.

then what you should say is that for all you know, there might be such a possible world since it is to rule out impossible to rule out.

yes, there are unresolved issues in possible world's ontology, but I don't think you've pointed one out.





Now, I want to close some gaps here. There is a technicality to deny the de re aspect of damnation for the transworld damned and that is within Craig's terminology here:

in every world feasible for God

so perhaps there is a world where whom we call the transworld damned does in fact accept Christ to recieve salvation. It's just not a world that can feasibly be brought about by God.

Technically, then, we couldn't call this an instance of de re necessity. I have three things to say about this consideration.

Now I haven't attacked the whole project molinism here. Just William Lane Craig's notion of the transworld damned. I think that the project of molinism fails because if libertarian freedom is true, then it isn't the case that in all possible worlds that if p obtains, then q would obtain (where p is our imeadiate and relevent situation and q is our action). It should be the case that in some relevent possible worlds, p is the case but not q and in others, p is the case as well as q, thus negating the truth of any would counterfactual to the affect that someone would or would not do q in situation p. But lets forego this observation and only note a distinction between what Craig is trying to do with molinism and restrictivism and what is a bare bones necessity to molinism. Molinism only requires that there is a counterfactual describing what we would certainly but freely do in any circumstance. So it could be the case that in some circumstances I would choose something but in other circumstances, I wouldn't choose in that manner. Now William Lane Craig takes this further and says that there is something that someone (the transworld damned) would avoid in any possible world that is significantly actualizable. In such a case, It would appear to me that a robot is more free in many of it's actions than the transworld damned. This is because though a robot is determined according to it's programmer, a robot may be programmed to do one task or it may be programmed to not do that task. So although both possibilities are viable for the robot in some real sort of sense, in contrast, there is no viable second option for the transworld damned. Of course you could name that option that isn't feasible, he could accept Christ, but to use craig's terminology, it isn't feasible.

Secondly, even if the proponent of the existence of the transworld damned (henceforth abbreviated as twd) was to claim that there is a possible world in which the twd accepted Christ, I would say that the de re aspect is still an issue for the following reason. Is that a possible world in which God create the twd? No, Craig said it wasn't feasible. So the twd, a creature created in the image of God who could not exist any other way especially since it's nonsense to speak of a world in which someone is damned for rejecting Christ where there is no Christ and God to damn them (at least not our Christ who is God) had damnation and the rejection of Christ as a an item of de re necessity.

Thirdly, if the modal arguements for God, that is the ontological arguements of God are true, or at least reflect something about existence, namely that God exists in all possible worlds, then there is no possible world in which the transworld damned accept Christ because the only possible worlds that exist are the ones that God makes or could make since he is in all of them.

[Jaltus]

Thirdly, if the modal arguements for God, that is the ontological arguements of God are true, or at least reflect something about existence, namely that God exists in all possible worlds, then there is no possible world in which the transworld damned accept Christ because the only possible worlds that exist are the ones that God makes or could make since he is in all of them.

Quick note since I do not have the time for a full reasoned defense.

This is only in fact true if God's full character is necessary to His ontology, which is the one serious problem in the modal argument for God's existence. It shows theism, but not Christian theism. Thus, in some possible worlds God's character could be other, thus negating your point.

[geebob]

I thought I'd throw it out there. I'm suspicious of the ontological arguement anyway.

[rocket]

What kind of horsetradin' pile of dung is all this?....Look at this! You've all amde your lives into a dung heap of trying to explain a bunch petty scriptures that mean absolutely NOYHING now...you're just a bunch of pathetic little worms crwling all over each other for an answer that isn't there....you've wrapped yourselves in some big damn maze of black magic, and you have no clue what it all means because it doesn't mean anything....HOW STUPID CAN YOU BE!?!

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[Omega Red]

Today @ 02:05 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=215225#post215225)
rocket:

What kind of horsetradin' pile of dung is all this?....Look at this! You've all amde your lives into a dung heap of trying to explain a bunch petty scriptures that mean absolutely NOYHING now...you're just a bunch of pathetic little worms crwling all over each other for an answer that isn't there....you've wrapped yourselves in some big damn maze of black magic, and you have no clue what it all means because it doesn't mean anything....HOW STUPID CAN YOU BE!?!

I see Rocket is back with his usual coherent rebuttals?!

[mattbballman19]

Hello my theological discussing pal! Geebob,

Before offering my analysis of geebob's throughtful replies to WLC's article I would prefer to begin with some definitional foundations, just in case someone arrives in this room who is unfamiliar with the terminology:

Universalism- Everybody is going to be saved.

Exclusivism- People can only become saved (appropriate salvation on the basis of Christ's atoning sacrafice) as a result of explicitly placing your faith in Him.

Inclusivism- People become saved not necessarily by means of explicitly placing your faith in Him, but merely by and on the basis of Christ's atoning sacrafice.

Pluralism- People are saved by means of multifarious conditions through a multiplicty of religions.

I don't know if WLC purposefully ignored inclusivism in his theological/philophical articulation of exclusivity in the context of a Molinistic view of God's knowledge. I see inclusivism as a sort of sub-set of exclusivism with pluralism and universalism being diametrically opposed to the common denominator of Christ's atoning sacrafice being a necessary condition for the appropriation of salvation. So, even through it was by-passed, I still see WLC purpose in doing so.

(i) First, I believe you mean to say 'possible world semantics'. This seems to be the meaning attempted to be communicated here. I'm unfamiliar with the terminology of 'possible world ontology'. You correctly explain the necessary distinction inherent in modal logic of de re and de dicto necessity. You go on to state that on the basis of Craig's quote (the essence of which states that every feasible world which God chose to create in which that human being possessed free-will, that person willingly refused God's offer of salvation), that a person's refusal to accept salvation is an example of de dicto necessity, since God couldn't actualize a feasible world in which that person had free-will and appropriated salvation.

On the contrary, de dicto necessity if mis-placed since there are other possible worlds that that person can be placed in which he is saved by some other means. It is only the application of the specific de re necessary quality of 'free-will' which accurately explicates the nature of the counter-factual (person x 'freely' refusing salvation s in every 'feasible' (not possible) circumstance c. Since we are only dealing with feasibility, de dicto is irrelevent, since feasibility is just a proper sub-set of possiblity.

(ii) Your example of death is misplaced because death is an example of de-dicto, but my freely refusing God's gift of salvation is an example of de-re (per the above), since it is 'not' the case that I refuse God's salvation in every 'possible' world, but that I 'freely' (de re) refuse God's salvation in every feasible world in which God instantiates.

matt

[geebob]

rocket, scroll back up and reread your post. It says something different now.








Hello my theological discussing pal!

hoy fry of indeterminate size!

Inclusivism- People become saved not necessarily by means of explicitly placing your faith in Him, but merely by and on the basis of Christ's atoning sacrafice.

I'm not sure I would agree with this def. Ruth is a model of faith as Hebrews tells us (a model for Christians no less :brow:) and all she knew was that the israelites had a powerful God on their side and she might be able to escape his wrath if she helped his servants.

I would suggest an alternative definition to the effect that though God's favorite means of dispensing his grace is through the historical explicit Gospel of Christ and though that is what gives us the greatest intimacy with God possible this side of death, he is resourceful to make grace available to all peoples regardless of their standing in relation to the spacial temporal boundary of the spoken historical Gospel.

You go on to state that on the basis of Craig's quote (the essence of which states that every feasible world which God chose to create in which that human being possessed free-will, that person willingly refused God's offer of salvation), that a person's refusal to accept salvation is an example of de dicto necessity, since God couldn't actualize a feasible world in which that person had free-will and appropriated salvation.

yes Jaltus caught me saying de dicto when I meant de re. I cleared that up in a subsequent post.

(i) First, I believe you mean to say 'possible world semantics'. This seems to be the meaning attempted to be communicated here. I'm unfamiliar with the terminology of 'possible world ontology'.

they're close enough. I wouldn't use them differently and don't know of a significant difference.

but my freely refusing God's gift of salvation is an example of de-re (per the above), since it is 'not' the case that I refuse God's salvation in every 'possible' world, but that I 'freely' (de re) refuse God's salvation in every feasible world in which God instantiates.

well that's enough reason for me to conclude against freedom. Free actions are not by necessity. De re necessity is no less a significant hindrance. A physical square is not indeterminate with regards to having four sides (since it's a physical one, you can't call this de dicto as it is reasonable that there is a possible world in which there are no physical squares). In all possible worlds in which squares exist, they have four sides.

If you'd like to ascribe de re necessity to free actions, I honestly don't know what we mean by libertarian freedom any more. look at my paragraph that begins "Now I haven't attacked..." in post number 10 and You may see why.

The definition of libertarian freedom that I rigorously hold to btw is typically of a similar form to Alvin Plantinga's, (the original modern molinist(who doesn't ascribe to a notion of the transworld damned).

If a person is free with respect to a given action, then he is free to perform the action and free to refrain from performing it; no antecedent conditions and/or causal laws determine that he will perform the action, or that he won't...It is within his power, at the time in question, to take or perform the action and within his power to refrain from it.

(Taken from Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings by Peterson et al. pg. 267)

[Jezz]

Hi all,

I have a comment that I would like to make that is not in direct response to anything that anyone here (including WLC) has said, but it does have an impact on the inclusivism/exlusivism argument. I am not sure if my ideas have any precedent in any Christian theologian, so I'm not sure if this idea that I have had is within the realm of orthodoxy or not. Hence, I thought I would air them here to see if I could get a good discussion going.

You may or may not be aware that the word for "salvation" (especially of God) in Hebrew/Aramaic is "yeshuah". This is a feminine noun. When the Word became flesh, the Word was a man, and hence was given a masculine name. And that name was "Yeshua". "Yeshua" is the masculine form of "yeshuah" and hence carries the same meaning. The Word's name, literally, means "God's salvation". And this forms the basis of my idea - just as Jesus is the Wisdom/Word of God made flesh, I believe that Jesus is the Salvation of God made flesh. God's Word and Wisdom is Salvation. Salvation is God's Word. The Son of God is Salvation. It all has a very nice ring to it, I think.

So, here's where I make what might be an unorthodox leap. Any place in the Bible that says something is done through Jesus or in the name of the Son or the name of Christ, I think it means it is done through God's salvation (because the name of the Son is "God's salvation"). Conversely, whenever the Bible talks about the salvation of God, it is talking about Jesus.

I think it is enlightening to look through the Bible and see all the places where "salvation" appears, and interpret it with that as background. There are hundreds of them, so I won't go through them all here. Instead, I will focus on some of the common passages to prove exlusivism. (All quotes from the NIV unless otherwise stated.)
John 14:6 Jesus answered, "I am the way and the truth and the life. No one comes to the Father except through me.
If my above conjecture is true, then this would read:

"[God's Salvation] is the way and the truth and the life. No one comes to the Father except through [God's Salvation]."
John 3:17-18 17 For God did not send his Son into the world to condemn the world, but to save the world through him. 18 Whoever believes in him is not condemned, but whoever does not believe stands condemned already because he has not believed in the name of God's one and only Son.
Now, from above, we know that "the name of God's one and only Son" is "God's salvation". Making this substitution:

"Whoever believes in [God's Salvation] is not condemned, but whoever does not believe stands condemned already because he has not believed in [God's Salvation]."

What could make more sense, or be fairer? Those who do not believe in the Salvation of God will not be saved by God.
Acts 4:11-12 11 He is
" 'the stone you builders rejected,
which has become the capstone. ' 12 Salvation is found in no one else, for there is no other name under heaven given to men by which we must be saved."
Again, we see the focus on the salvation in the name of Christ. And the name of Christ is "God's Salvation". This verse has additional significance that I will point out later.

So here's how I think Jesus' atoning sacrifice/exclusivism works: I believe that his sacrifice was necessary for our salvation. And, I believe that we are saved by God by having faith/believing in God's Salvation. But, I am starting to suspect that it is not really necessary to know that God's Salvation actually became a man in Nazareth.

The nice thing about this interpretation is that it gives an answer to the old exclusivism/inclusivism debate. From the dawn of time, people have looked to God. Therefore, belief in God's Salvation is accessible to everyone - even those who haven't heard of the person of Jesus, or of his atoning sacrifice that made that Salvation possible.

Well, that's all nice and warm and fuzzy, but is it Biblical? I am starting to suspect that it is. Because this position also solves another "problem" that arises - what about those people who died before Jesus was born, and thus never knew of the person Jesus? In my interpretation, this question is answered nicely. Those that lived before Jesus were saved in the same way that we who have heard the Gospel are - by believing in the name of Jesus ("God's Salvation"). But what's even better is that this assertion has Biblical support! Here are some examples:

Genesis 49:18 "I look for your deliverance, O LORD.This is Jacob speaking. The word translated "deliverance" in the NIV is "yeshuah" - salvation. So we see that Jacob had faith in the Salvation of God.

Exodus 15:2
The LORD is my strength and my song;
he has become my salvation.
He is my God, and I will praise him,
my father's God, and I will exalt him.The Israelites were all singing this song. The word "salvation" is again "yeshuah". Thus, they had were giving praise for God's Salvation.
Job 13:16 He also shall be my salvation: for an hypocrite shall not come before him.Job was speaking of God. Thus, we see that Job had faith in God's Salvation.
Psalm 118:14-22
14 The LORD is my strength and my song;
he has become my salvation.

15 Shouts of joy and victory
resound in the tents of the righteous:
"The LORD's right hand has done mighty things!
16 The LORD's right hand is lifted high;
the LORD's right hand has done mighty things!"

17 I will not die but live,
and will proclaim what the LORD has done.
18 The LORD has chastened me severely,
but he has not given me over to death.

19 Open for me the gates of righteousness;
I will enter and give thanks to the LORD .
20 This is the gate of the LORD
through which the righteous may enter.
21 I will give you thanks, for you answered me;
you have become my salvation.

22 The stone the builders rejected
has become the capstone;
23 the LORD has done this,
and it is marvelous in our eyes.The significance of this passage is in its connection to Acts 4:12, listed above, through verse 22 (note that Jesus himself quotes this Psalm in the parable of the tenants - eg, Mark 12:10). The Psalmist explicitly refers to God as being his salvation. The word for "salvation" here is "yeshuah" - the feminine form of Jesus' name. It also refers to the "right hand of God" doing marvellous things - of course, we know that the Son of Man was exalted to the right hand of God. It is God who opens the gates of righteousness and allows the Psalmist to enter. And because of God's Salvation, and because of the mighty things that the right hand of the LORD has done, the Psalmist shall not die but live. So we see that the Psalmist had faith God's Salvation.

There are plenty of more examples, both OT and NT, that I could quote.

In summary: I believe that Jesus was Salvation in the flesh. His sacrifice makes salvation possible. But, I believe that a saving faith is not necessarily through belief in Jesus' historical, earthly existence per se. Rather I think we are saved by recognising the necessity of, and having faith in, what Jesus personified - God's Salvation.

Thoughts? Comments? Am I way off target here? Or does it make as much sense to anyone else as it does to me?

[mattbballman19]

geebob,

(i) Your counter-example of the situation with Ruth does not seem to be sufficient. First, we need clarification on what is meant by a ‘model of faith’. Is it not possible for one to be a model of faith and not be saved? If so, and it is the case that Ruth was saved for the very reason that she was a model of faith, then it seems that the means by which she was saved does not contradict the inclusivistic spin on salvation evinced by my provided definition. For, it doesn’t seem evidently explicit in the text that she made a conscious decision to place her faith in something. From this, we can deduce that her ‘model of faith’ status was a conducive result of the application of God’s atoning sacrifice.
(ii) Your reformulation of inclusivism seems to involuntarily reiterate what I previously stated. The grace dispensed as a consequence of God’s atoning sacrifice is adduced on and through the basis of its application on persons not exercising a conscious decision of faith. This specific means is compatible and in agreement with your reformulation in that its application is instantiated independent of a necessary “spatial temporal boundary”. So, I don’t see anything wrong with my definition.
(iii) To your reasons for concluding that the basis of our free actions are an example of de re necessity which is an obstacle for libertarian free-will. I think clarification is needed on what makes this specific case a de re necessity. De re necessity is applied in only those possible worlds which contain creatures possessing a property essentially. So, agent A has a property P essentially in a possible world W iff P has its extension in all W’s in which agent A is instantiated. But when I stated that transworld depravity was the case because of the de re necessity of our free-will always going wrong in all possible worlds in which we are instantiated, I wasn’t speaking of de re necessity in terms of possible worlds, but in terms feasible worlds. For there exist possible worlds in which agent X possesses libertarian free-will F such that X utilizes F at all times and, therefore, never rebels against God. Since, I wasn’t speaking of de re necessity in terms of possible worlds, but in terms of feasible worlds, then it seems that this particular articulation/application of de re necessity does not relinquish the libertarian analysis of free-will. So, the nature of transworld depravity doesn’t seem to be pertinent to de re and/or de dicto necessity in terms of possible worlds, per the above. De re necessity, it seems, should be applied in terms, not essentiality (since there are possible worlds in which that can be violated), but contingently (dependent upon the instantiation of feasible worlds simpliciter).
matt

[geebob]

(i) Your counter-example of the situation with Ruth does not seem to be sufficient. First, we need clarification on what is meant by a ‘model of faith’. Is it not possible for one to be a model of faith and not be saved?

First of all, I made a mistake. It's not Ruth but Rahab. And I'll say from the context that I don't think this possibility that you suggest is reasonable.

Rahab is listed with a number of saints of whom Chapter Hebrews 11 concludes:

39These were all commended for their faith, yet none of them received what had been promised. 40God had planned something better for us so that only together with us would they be made perfect.

Then verse 12 begins:

1Therefore, since we are surrounded by such a great cloud of witnesses, let us throw off everything that hinders and the sin that so easily entangles, and let us run with perseverance the race marked out for us.

(ii) Your reformulation of inclusivism seems to involuntarily reiterate what I previously stated.

no, I rejected the part of your definition were you deny that they have faith. Thus I used Rahab as a counterexample who knew nothing of Christ. It is an incredible stretch to say that she anticipated the messiah Like some restrictivists try to claim about other old testament saints who we view as heaven bound.

But when I stated that transworld depravity was the case because of the de re necessity of our free-will always going wrong in all possible worlds in which we are instantiated, I wasn’t speaking of de re necessity in terms of possible worlds, but in terms feasible worlds.

well that makes a difference. I just felt that once you willingly use the term necessity, you've given up the ship so I don't know why you'd even want to give it this mitigated sense.

But supposing you would take back that term or suppose . I don't see that unfeasable worlds have any significance with regard to establishing libertarian freedom. If there is no accessible possibility for both action and refrain, then the person is not free with regard to the action.


BTW, I still feel that my first two of the last three objections I raised in post 10 in this thread are still authoritative. The third still has some merit but I'm not really willing to back it up.

[mattbballman19]

geebob,

(i) Your name emendation is conducive towards a further interpolative nuance necessary to having a more accurate definition of inclusivism. Since I extrapolated the essence of my understanding of inclusivism from the works of various prominent theological texts, then I humbly ask that you provide the documentation which supports this seemingly expanded version of inclusivism in light of your modicum of added qualifications. I’ll proceed to provide explication regarding this distinctive nuance, since I have a warranted predilection that you have such documentation. I shall label this distinction hard inclusivism and soft inclusivism. I will proceed to define this ideological coterie and point out the difference between soft inclusivism and exclusivism. Hard inclusivism is the view which states that one saved independent of any and conscious act of faith, but by and through God’s atoning sacrifice being applied accordingly. This is the way which I originally conceived it. Your emendation (soft inclusivism) agrees with the fact that the sole determining factor in one’s salvation is God’s atoning a sacrifice, but that it is not exclusive to those exercising a particular kind of conscious faith. Whereas hard inclusivists say that the exercising of faith (a faith towards Christ) is the factor which distinguishes it from exclusivism; soft inclusivists state that the exercising of any kind of faith (what would you suggest that the limits be in confining the faith exercised to genuine/acceptable for a salvific result) is sufficient to receive salvation. Let me know what you think of these distinctions.

(ii) The reason for my necessary distinction between possible worlds and feasible worlds was to curtail critics who decry the latter to invoke a contradiction to the traditional analysis of libertarian free-will. Since feasible worlds are only meant to be a proper sub-set of possible worlds such that the latter is evinced subsequent to the effects that free-will has on the former. So your complaint that the solution ignores your necessary pre-conditions for genuine libertarian free-will (the power to act or refrain) ignores the nature of way in which possible worlds become feasible, in this particular case. It is not the case that free-actions are the way they are because of the necessary features of feasible worlds, but because feasible worlds are the way they are because of the libertarian free actions of free deliberative agents. The feasible world’s de re necessity is such because of our free-actions, not vice versa. The instantiation of the sub-set of possible worlds is contingent upon which way we, as free agents, use our free-will. Since the de re necessity of feasible worlds is formed in this way, libertarian free-will is not eliminated.

(iii) A look at post 10. You state that Molinism fails because the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom which specify a particular action being the result of various circumstances does not happen in all possible worlds. But Molinism doesn’t even state this. In fact, it is a major tenet in Molinism that the counterfactuals which are inherent in God’s middle knowledge are contingent and, therefore, do not obtain every possible world. So, this is, I think, a misunderstanding on what Molinism teaches. Your suggestive solution doesn’t seem to make sense. You say that the revision of specifying the possibility of WOULD counterfactuals and WOULD NOT counterfactuals relevant to possible worlds precludes the truth of any WOULD counterfactual instantiated in the actual world. I really do not see how this follows. Especially if its obtaining was contingent upon how the agent brought about the truth of the counterfactual residing in God’s middle knowledge with it being the case that it is at God’s disposal to instantiate or no. If it is instantiated (consequently leaving behind other possible results of the action in the circumstances in other possible worlds), it don’t see how its instantiation is ruled out by counterfactuals with similar antecedents, but different consequents, cannot also exist in nearby possible worlds.

(iv) Your robot analogy would do well to consult (ii).

(v) You say that if the Molinist says that de re necessity is not relevant (in the possible sense), since we are speaking of feasibility, you suggest that if a possible world is qualified with the TWD state of affairs, then the solution of feasibility fails, since the composite state of affairs of TWD and its actualization in a possible world is untenable. For didn’t the Molinist just state that this state of affairs was not feasible? But what is not understood here is that the feasibility is evinced as a result of a world being instantiated. The Molinist would agree that there is a possible world where the composite state of affairs of TWD and everyone never rebelling against God, e.g. Feasibility is possible, and because of this possibility, the imaginability of it obtaining is not absurd. Thus, feasibility, in this context, through possible, is not feasible (once the results deriving from TWD are instantiated into the actual world).

(vi) Your 3rd reason is not clear at all. There is a huge unexplained leap that would be appreciated if articulated more deeply. Your seminal premise states that begs the question by presupposing that God’s existence in all possible worlds is conducive towards TWD. This is not at all clear. You must explain how God’s mere presence in all possible worlds necessarily results in TWD. If it is at least possibly true that this is false, then its necessity is eliminated, thus your inference is logically fallacious and ambiguous.

matt

[jesusreligion]

I see the verse, "I am the way, the truth and the life; no one comes to the Father but by me," as having a different meaning. No where in scripture, did Jesus ever say "bow to me, I am the Father" (He did say, "I and my Father are one"); instead he was in effect saying, "when you look at me, see who you really are...see how to relate with your Heavenly Father in a personal relationship. Follow my example." This is how I believe John stated, "Now, we are the sons of God."

You may check out more at http://www.jesusreligion.com

[dizzle]

Hey there, we do not allow advertisement in posts. Please PM me with any questions.

[geebob]

then I humbly ask that you provide the documentation which supports this seemingly expanded version of inclusivism in light of your modicum of added qualifications.

My view would be closest (if not identical, but don't assume that) to John Sanders' view he presents in No other Name. But we may be splitting hairs further than he does here.

soft inclusivists state that the exercising of any kind of faith (what would you suggest that the limits be in confining the faith exercised to genuine/acceptable for a salvific result)

it isn't just any kind of faith. It's a response to the grace of God that is available in one's life. That may take several different forms. The informational content may very. But it isn't just any sort of faith.

Honestly, with inclusivism, God's methods are not entirely disclosed. There may be some instances where there isn't a conscious act of faith. It just may be following the law that is written on the heart for some persons. It all depends on what God has given them or made available to them.

I shall label this distinction hard inclusivism and soft inclusivism.

hrrmm. er weeellllll. geebob no like. I'd rather leave it like this. whatever other forms of inclusivism are out there, I'm promoting a specific form, and for all practical perposes, considering that you are dialogueing with me, you could just call it inclusivism.

(ii) The reason for my necessary distinction between possible worlds and feasible worlds was to curtail critics who decry the latter to invoke a contradiction to the traditional analysis of libertarian free-will.

I just started counterfactuals Lewis doesn't even consider that the necessity operator need apply to all possible worlds. He only holds that they describe a consistency in all accessible worlds. I doubt there'd be any significant difference between Lewis' "accessible" worlds and craig's "feasible."

It is not the case that free-actions are the way they are because of the necessary features of feasible worlds, but because feasible worlds are the way they are because of the libertarian free actions of free deliberative agents. The feasible world’s de re necessity is such because of our free-actions, not vice versa.

I don't see that this helps you. Of course possible world's, feasible worlds, etc. are the way they are in part because of the actual world and the entities that populate them. Given that feasible worlds are the way they are due to free will, then in some of the closest feasible world's, if the action of choosing christ is free, then because of that, the alleged twd should accept Christ. That's what it means to be free. It's that you REALLY could go one way or the other. That you REALLY could go one way or another comes from within you (and that is not what molinism describes as it alleges that you would only choose one way comes from within you, actually, I'm not even sure how consistently they can claim that it comes from within, and for that particular objection, see my question in Jaltus' new thread on molinism (instead of adding one more tangent to this one)).

The instantiation of the sub-set of possible worlds is contingent upon which way we, as free agents, use our free-will.

How do you reconsile this with presentism. the instantiation occurs before we even exist. That's allegedly the way molinists claim God can have foreknowledge.

A look at post 10. You state that Molinism fails because the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom which specify a particular action being the result of various circumstances does not happen in all possible worlds. But Molinism doesn’t even state this. In fact, it is a major tenet in Molinism that the counterfactuals which are inherent in God’s middle knowledge are contingent and, therefore, do not obtain every possible world. So, this is, I think, a misunderstanding on what Molinism teaches.

I think I show recognition of what your saying here in my writting above. I know it's not the case in all possible worlds. However, clearly, to me, freedom still has to entail that we choose one way in some of the closest possible worlds and that we choose another in other closests possible worlds, and the only difference between the two is the difference in choosing.

Your suggestive solution doesn’t seem to make sense. You say that the revision of specifying the possibility of WOULD counterfactuals and WOULD NOT counterfactuals relevant to possible worlds precludes the truth of any WOULD counterfactual instantiated in the actual world.

And this is where our debate on conjoined counterfactuals becomes relevent. I let you answer my last reply there.

Especially if its obtaining was contingent upon how the agent brought about the truth of the counterfactual residing in God’s middle knowledge with it being the case that it is at God’s disposal to instantiate or no.

Is it really contingent? am I free to change the counterfactuals I brought about? could I change them tomorrow?

the imaginability of it obtaining is not absurd.

x being free to choose a is poorly represented by our ability to coherently imagine x being able to choose a.

(vi) Your 3rd reason is not clear at all.

and I'll let it go for three reasons. One, I find the ontological arguement suspect. two, Jaltus' consideration may have some merit, though it may be possible to answer his objection. three, I'm too lazy.

You must explain how God’s mere presence in all possible worlds necessarily results in TWD.

well, I'll just briefly answer this. If God is necessarily the creator in any possible world where there is something other than God, (perhaps excluding abstraction if we are platonists) then all possible worlds of this sort are feasible worlds. Thus twd is de re necessity in it's most conventional understanding.

In a sense, this is the mirror image of my second objection in post 10. That is being a created being, created in the image of God is necessary to one's being, then the only possible world's in which he exists are one's in which God created him, and the only world's that God would create are feasible ones, thus again establishing this basic concept of de re necessity.


I'll add one more thing to these comments. I could be wrong but the notion that there are possible worlds that could never have been (ie one's that aren't feasible/accessible) is controversial. I think Peter Van Inwagen might challenge this. I recall reading that he doesn't think we should speak of "logical" possibilities. We should only be concerned with possible worlds that are, or have been, possible. And a world is either possible or it isn't.


Well Matt, I hope we're not talking past eachother. I'm a little rushed so I didn't have as much time to reread some of your comments, which I probably should have done as occasionally you are a bit hard to follow (not that I'm never that way). So if I really miss the boat in responding coherently with what you said, I beg thee, have a little patience and don't let it frustrate you.

[rebootski]

Hey everyone,
I've been following an a discussion on an article by by DR. WILLIAM LANE CRAIG in which he discusses Molinism.

The discussion of Middle Knowledge and possible worlds is interesting to follow, but I find myself frustrated at the portrayal of human "free will", along with the "Omnipotence" of God.

I see a consistency in argument, but not a consistency with regard to how Scripture portrays mankind's "free will" and God's omnipotence.

I have two questions:
1. What determines mankinds freedom by which he/she is able to excersize that will?
2. How can God be omnipotent if He isn't sovereign over all?

Thanks in advance for your reply.

[geebob]

1. What determines mankinds freedom by which he/she is able to excersize that will?

the molinist would allege that man does. I don't think that molinism is really consistent with that but that isn't the route that I've explitely pursued in my criticism of Criag's notion of the transworld damned.

2. How can God be omnipotent if He isn't sovereign over all?

omnipotence and soverignty are two different concepts. Omnipotence is about the extent and range of God's power. Soverignty can be viewed either as how God uses that power or God's right to rule. Whether or not God excersizes meticularous soverignty (controlling everything) or general soverignty (controlling the direction of history without controlling all the details, and/or allowing his creatures a say in how to bring about the future albeit broadly on His terms), omnipotence, God's ability to do anything that is possible for a being to do, is not affected.

These issues I would add are a little bit more broad than the topic of this thread. I welcome you to get into these issues and similar ones more in depth in our theology 201 section. This thread isn't just about Craig's take on molinism. It's his application of molinism to the question of eternal status of the unevangelized.

[Babaloo]

09-18-2003 @ 12:18 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=214401#post214401)
Dee Dee Warren:

Boom and I were discussing this the other day. For the form of inclusivism that I see promoted here quite a bit, I would agree. It is exclusivistic inclusivism if that makes any sense at all. :teeth:

Now where are the rest of the Molinists? :shifty:


ED: Where indeed are the Molinists?

And where does it all end? viz.,
"No other name,"
"No other inspired Holy Book,"
"No other church,"
"No other denomination," etc.

The Reformers couldn't even agree with one another on a general CONFESSION OF FAITH, i.e., they continued to disagree on predestination and the Eucharist. (Luther said Calvin's view of the Eucharist could damn a person to hell.) And they continued to assume that their views of the Trinity and infant baptism were also unassailable, when even those views were being questioned by other devout men of their day.

And just look at Christianity today, it has sprouted (like the Darwinian plant it is), into over 20,000 different denominations and missionary branches according to the World Christian Encyclopedia put out by Oxford University Press. Or, as I've written elsewhere:

CHRISTIANITY RUNS THE GAMUT .

From silent Trappist monks and quiet Quakers -- to hell raisers and snake handlers;

From those who "hear the Lord" telling them to run for president, seek diamonds and gold (via liaisons with bloody African dictators), or sell "Lake of Galilee" beauty products -- to those who have visions of Mary, the saints, or experience bleeding stigmata;

From those who believe the communion bread and wine remain just that -- to those who believe they are partially miraculous -- to those who believe the bread and wine are transformed into "invisible" flesh and blood (and can vouch for it with miraculous tales of communion wafers turning into human flesh and wine curdling into blood cells during Mass);

From those who argue that they are predestined to argue in favor of predestination -- to those who argue for free will of their own free will;

From those who say that God's interactions with humanity and invitations to "change" do not change the future at all, since God knows everything must occur as He has foreseen -- to those who argue in favor of what is called "Openness Theology" and suggest that God may not know the future and hence the future is truly "open" for both individuals and societies, and that
God's interactions with humanity involve genuine choices and reactions on our part to God's invitations to change ("Openness Theologians" find the Bible riddled with deceptively worded speeches by God, i.e., if God already knows how things must turn out);

From those who believe everyone may (or will) eventually be saved -- to those who believe nearly everyone (except themselves and their church) will be damned;

From Christian monks and priests who have gained insights into their own faith after dialoging with Buddhist monks and Hindu priests -- to Christians who view Eastern religious ideas and practices as "Satanic;"

From castrati (boys in Catholic choirs who underwent castration to retain their high voices) -- to Protestant hymns and Gospel quartets -- all the way to "Christian rap;"

From Christians who reject any behavior that even mimics "what
homosexuals do" (including a rejection of fellatio and cunnilingus between a husband and wife) -- to Christians who accept committed, loving, homosexual relationships (including gay evangelical Church groups like the nationwide Metropolitan Baptist Church);

From Catholic nuns and Amish women who dress to cover their bodies -- to Christian nudists, and even born-again strippers;

From those who believe that a husband and wife can have sex for
pleasure -- to those who believe that sex should be primarily for procreation -- to those who believe celibacy is superior to marriage (i.e., Catholic priests, monks, nuns, and some Protestant groups like the Shakers) -- all the way to those who cut off their genitals for the kingdom of God (the Skoptze, a
Russian Christian sect);

From those who believe sending out missionaries to persuade others to become Christians is essential -- to the Anti-Mission Baptists who believe that sending out missionaries and trying to persuade others constitutes a lack of faith and the sin of pride, and that the founding of "extra-congregational missionary organizations" is not Biblical;

From those who believe that the King James Bible is the only inspired translation -- to those who believe that no translation is totally inspired, only the original "autographs" were perfect -- to those who believe that "perfection" only lay in the "spirit" that inspired the writing of the Bible's books, not in the "letter" of each word;

From those who believe Easter should be celebrated on one date (Roman Catholics) -- to those who believe Easter should be celebrated on another date (Eastern Orthodox). And, from those who believe that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son (Roman Catholics) -- to those who believe it proceeds from the Father alone (Eastern Orthodox view as taught by the early Church Fathers). Those disagreements, as well as others,
sparked the greatest schism of church history (the Schism of 1054) when the uncompromising patriarch of Constantinople, Michael Cerularius, and the envoys of the uncompromising Pope Leo IX, excommunicated each other;

From those who worship God on Sunday -- to those who worship God on Saturday (Saturday being the Hebrew "sabbath" that God said to "keep holy" according to one of the Ten Commandments) -- all the way to those who believe their daily walk with God and love of their fellow man is more important than church attendance;

From those who stress "God's commands" -- to those who stress "God's love;"

From those who believe that you need only accept Jesus as your "personal savior" to be saved -- to those who believe you must accept Jesus as both savior and "Lord" of your life in order to be saved. (Two major Evangelical Christian seminaries debated this question in the 1970s, and still disagree);

From those who teach that being "baptized with water as an adult believer" is an essential sign of salvation -- to those who deny it is;

From those who affirm that infant baptism is necessary -- to those who deny infant baptism and affirm that baptism as an adult is what is necessary -- to those who believe you must be baptized both as an adult and into their particular denomination rather than any other Christian denomination;

From those who believe that unbaptized infants who die go straight to hell (or at least risk hellfire) -- to those who deny the (once popular) church doctrine known as "infant damnation."

From those who teach that "baptism in the Holy Spirit" along with
"speaking in tongues" are important signs of salvation -- to those who deny they are (some of whom see mental and Satanic delusions in modern day "Spirit baptism" and "tongue-speaking");

From those who believe that avoiding alcohol, smoking, gambling, dancing, contemporary Christian music, movies, television, long hair (on men), etc., are all important signs of being saved -- to those who believe you need only trust in Jesus as your personal savior to be saved;

From pro-slavery Christians (there are some today who still remind us that the Bible never said slavery was a "sin") -- to anti-slavery Christians;

From Christians who defend the Biblical idea of having a king (and who oppose democracy as "the meanest and worst of all forms of government" to quote John Winthrop, first governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, with whom some Popes agreed, as well as some of today's Protestant Reconstructionist Christians) -- to Christians who oppose kingships and support democracies;

From "social Gospel" Christians -- to "uncompromised Gospel" Christians;

From Christians who do not believe in sticking their noses in politics -- to coup d'etat Christians;

From "stop the bomb" Christians -- to "drop the bomb" Christians.

All in all, Christianity gives Hinduism with its infinite variety of sects
and practices a run for its money.

- E.T.B.
____________________________

Live long enough and you'll encounter a lot of folks who say you are not really a Christian for a host of reasons. I've found the
"no-true-Christian-would-or-wouldn't-do-or-believe-XYZ" game one of the more popular among ... well ... Christians.
- Jonathan ( jge642000@yahoo.com ) at the yahoo group ExitFundyism
____________________________

In my journeys in Christianity both in America and abroad I've run across a myriad of believers, a mosaic of Christianity:

I remember a converted Christian who used to be a "Satanist ," saying, "What's the big deal about smoking marijuana?"

A Pentecostal pastor in Holland sat crying at a street side cafe worried that one of his woman parishioners was going to hell since she had stopped coming to church and was now wearing make-up. And as he cried, his tears rolled off his cheeks into his beer. (Many Pentecostal Christians in the U.S. ascribe to an ethic of absolute abstinence from alcohol.)

I've known Christians who won't own a TV. Others who won't allow playing cards into their house. And others who drink alcohol liberally and have every material possession imaginable. Others who attempt to memorize the Bible to such an extent it blocks most of their own original thoughts about anything. Others who are social activists who take up causes like opposing abortion or picketing a Marilyn Manson concert. Others who are simple and
humble and feed the poor and house the homeless. Others who are missionaries in third world countries suffering hardship for the "cause of Christ."

There was a sub group, however, in my institute who were King James Only -- they believed the KJV was the only true inspired Bible for today and that all other versions were corrupted. As a group, they were radically enthusiastic and were proud to be KJV ONLY, and often fueled arguments over alternate translations. Something like the Living Bible, which is a paraphrase, was "the Devil's work."
- Karl Arendale <mauikarl@yahoo.comat the Yahoo Group, ExitFundyism
___________________________


THE WORLD'S NEED

So many gods, so many creeds,
So many paths that wind and wind,
While just the art of being kind,
Is all the sad world needs.

- Ella Wheeler Wilcox (1850-1919)

____________________________

All the world's religions are just the same guilt with different holidays:
"God I feel guilty."
"Let's eat!"

- Cathy Ladman


Best, Edward T. Babinski
http://edwardtbabinski.us

[dizzle]

Not the place, try that post in Apologetics 201 without restriction.

[mattbballman19]

Geebob,

I shall respond to your reply some time in the near future. An unfortunate turn of events has precluded an earlier date at which I would have preferred to respond. My computer finally commenced the cessation of the suspense (of, at any time, it terminating itself for some undisclosed reasons), and consummated in absolute, unequivocal break-down. The good news is that I have succeeded in reviving it by means of a computer engineer, who was even initially puzzled as to my computer’s predicament. Another event with contributed to my lack of response seems, queerly, to be germane to my attempting a response. I was actually on Tweb last night, and was in the process of writing my response when, out of the blue, the text disappears and my screen freezes simultaneously! So, forgive me for my involuntary punctual handicap.

matt

[geebob]

blieb!

[dizzle]

Hey you guys completely ignored Jezz!!! :rant:


And I am mssing something... what is "transworld" damned?

[geebob]

I disagree his strategy and manner of using scripture but I'm not sure how to articulate why I don't think it's a good strategy.

And as I stated, considering this thread is about Craig's essay and Considering that Craig's genius is not in biblical exegesis but rather in philosophy, I was going to stick with the philosophy, specifically critiqueing his use of molinism.

But as to Jezz's inclusivism, all I have to say is :thumb: and :cheers:

And I am mssing something... what is "transworld" damned?

It's Dr. Craig's term. someone who is transworld damned is someone who would reject Christ in any feasible possible world, that is someone who'd reject the world in any world that is feasible for God to create.

[mattbballman19]

Geebob,
(i) For me, some form of accessibilism-inclusivism is probably true given God's general revelation in nature and conscience (cf. Rom 1-2). And I have no qualms about your comments on de re/de dicto necessity and human freedom -- that compatibilism is not true.
(ii) Which necessity operator was Lewis speaking of when he said that it does not apply to all possible worlds: de re or de dicto? Also, when you say that this supposed necessity operator serves as a means to consistency, what do you mean by that?
(iii) You say that a necessary feature within a consistent idea of transworld depravity is that those who are created in a given world should be able to choose Christ because the Molinist says that they are free. This is precisely what the Molinist believes! This also does nothing to subtract from what transworld depravity advocators promulgate. In fact, your objection seems to be misplaced, because you disprove transworld depravity through inviting in the possibility of our choosing salvation; but this is precisely the question! You cannot disprove the feasibility of a world by pointing us to a possibility. If this is true, then TWD is unscathed.
(iv) You state that because the choice for salvation comes from within, this somehow takes away from the freedom which Molinism adheres to. Your reason lies in the idea that because libertarian freedom can only be available through the possibility of going one way or the other and that Molinism states, that given the circumstances, the person will only go one way, then, therefore, that person lacks libertarian freedom. This may get back to our debate between the priority of ‘woulds’ and ‘coulds’, but maybe not. Be that as it may, I stand by my contention that there is no inconsistency. Just because, given the circumstances, Jones will choose X; this does not mean that Jones was not free in his choice, since it was possible that he choose X or ~X. So, it still seems that your conditions for freedom are met. I just think that I’m not reading you correctly, or your not articulating yourself unambiguously.
(v) You then imply that existence is a necessary condition for the contingency which is inherent within God’s middle knowledge. This is not so, since middle knowledge is before free knowledge. Our existence in the actual world would be a necessary condition for free knowledge, but not middle knowledge. This seems to make the implicit presupposition that counterfactuals must be grounded in actual states of affairs, which I think is dubious.
(vi) Yes, counterfactuals are so contingent, otherwise they would be necessary. If they were necessary, then we would not be free.
(vii) My comment on imaginability was not reminiscent of my using my imagination to think of various fantastic thoughts, but more along the lines of, again, possible world semantics. If there is nothing contradictory about agent x choosing X, then there is a possible world where that happens. Saying that there is a possible world in which that situation occurs is, in the literature at least, synonymous with imaginability. Though I realize I was sloppy with the terms.
(viii) But I do disagree with your statement that all possible worlds where God exists and created things exist are feasible worlds. Your further comments suggest you are aiming for something more like: All feasible worlds where something exists other than God are worlds where God necessarily exists. And I find this uncontroversial as an Anselmnian (or de re necessity of God given creation). This rewording cleans up the problems that arise in thinking that any world where creatures exist is a feasible world, which just isn't true.
And, yes, you should be aware that not all possible worlds are feasible (or actualizable). Some courses of action are forever stunted by one's stubbornness to do the opposite. In these circumstances, God can never make some freely do something they will never do under any circumstances.

BTW, I always enjoy our exchanges, even if we do talk past each other at times! :-)

[geebob]

(i) For me, some form of accessibilism-inclusivism is probably true given God's general revelation in nature and conscience (cf. Rom 1-2).

accessibility is a modal notion btw.

unless your willing to hold that there are people who actually do respond to general revelation such that God would count that as faith sufficient for faith, I still wouldn't say you were an inclusivist. I would insist that the accessibility has be present in every way possible at some points in the lives of the unevangelized, and this accessibility must also be present in feasible worlds (so the exception might be some sort of temporal accessibility, but those occur over time, if the notion of temporal accessibility is what I think it is).

(ii) Which necessity operator was Lewis speaking of when he said that it does not apply to all possible worlds: de re or de dicto? Also, when you say that this supposed necessity operator serves as a means to consistency, what do you mean by that?

de dicto. He doesn't hold that de dicto is something true in all possible worlds however. You can speak of it in terms accessibility such as physical accessibility, temporal accessibility, and so on. On further reflection, I suppose feasability is not synonomouse with accessibility but rather it is a type of accessibility such as physical accessibility. After all, you can have a physically accessible world that is not feasible (by Craig's reconing). Honestly though, I've only read the first part about strict conditionals and I haven't gotten to the would counterfactuals, though he calls them variably strict conditionals and I have a feel for where he is going with it. But for the time being, I'm limited on my time that I can spend in that book.

Aslo, I don't think I've read the term "de dicto" in that section of the book, but that is what he's talking about. It is a statement that holds over a range of possible worlds that is accessible from a specific world for one reason or another (and that reason is what dictates the range of accessibility being considered).

It makes little difference to me though as to whether the necessity is de dicto or de re. The necessity must not exist until opportunities have occured and have passed.

You say that a necessary feature within a consistent idea of transworld depravity is that those who are created in a given world should be able to choose Christ because the Molinist says that they are free.

no, twd is not consistent with libertarian free will nor the actual choosing of Christ. I merely insist that it must be possible, absolutely possible (meaning that the actual world really can turn out that way) for the person to choose Christ if we hold that he is libertarian free.

But suppose I grant someone is twd and they have libertarian free will. Well the only way for this to make sense that some twd person has the power to bring it about that they are not transworld damned. Suppose that God knows that they are transworld damned. Well that person must have the power (the present tense power!) to bring it about that God does not know that they are twd. (of course you may admit that the twd does have such power, but I can't imagine how such a thing can be intelligible at the present of the moment. And there is reason to believe that God's past knowledge is in terms of hard facts and the notion of changing a hard fact is a contradiction.

You cannot disprove the feasibility of a world by pointing us to a possibility.

yes, which is why I often use the notions of real and accessible.

You state that because the choice for salvation comes from within, this somehow takes away from the freedom which Molinism adheres to. Your reason lies in the idea that because libertarian freedom can only be available through the possibility of going one way or the other and that Molinism states, that given the circumstances, the person will only go one way, then, therefore, that person lacks libertarian freedom.

no, that's not what I had in mind with that particular objection, but instead of drawing this out further, I'll refer you to my main objection in Jaltus' "molinism q & a" thread in the theology 101 section.

since it was possible that he choose X or ~X. So, it still seems that your conditions for freedom are met.

I don't like the truth conditions for disjuctions as applied to libertarian freedom. I think they imply freedom in normal ordinary usage but that's because soft facts have a place in ordinary usage and I want to be a nominalist about soft facts (which allows me to hold to absolute and total omniscience).

Given that, the either or statement doesn't satisfy my condition. You need a conjoined might.

I just think that I’m not reading you correctly, or your not articulating yourself unambiguously.

could be. I'm still learning modal and counterfactual logic. But also, we are coming from different perspectives so it may take time to fully draw out our differening ways of conceptualizing the issue. The only way to go about it is patiently.

v) You then imply that existence is a necessary condition for the contingency which is inherent within God’s middle knowledge. This is not so, since middle knowledge is before free knowledge.

no, that's the problem. middle knowledge is before not only free knowledge but also our actual existence. That doesn't jive with self determinism. Again, though, instead of one more tangent in this thread, I would refer you to my main objection in Jaltus' Molinism q and a" thread.

If there is nothing contradictory about agent x choosing X, then there is a possible world where that happens.

by that same means, we can establish libertarian free will in robots.

(viii) But I do disagree with your statement that all possible worlds where God exists and created things exist are feasible worlds.

actually, by Craig's reckoning, (as far as I can tell) feasibility is about the strict conditional (Lewis's term) of God and a created creation by Him. Maybe he wouldn't take it that far, but I don't see how he couldn't.

And, yes, you should be aware that not all possible worlds are feasible (or actualizable).

not according to modal skepticism. The only possibilities that should be considered according to this view are ones that are or were absolutely possible. Peter Van Inwagen goes into this in his chapter Modal epistemology in [i]Ontology, Identity, and Modality.