For Jack Bauer

[Philosophickle]

The other day someone pointed out that I have no right to oppose abortion because I do not believe a fertilized egg has a mind/soul. You apparently thought that this was a pretty good point, but I have to admit that I'm a little confused here. As far as I know, you deny that an embryo has a mind/soul as well, do you not? What could you say about personal identity that I couldn't? Surely we both have beliefs about an embryo that are physiologically equivalent, and we would both say that a three-day-old embryo has no functioning mental life and we would both deny that this embryo has a non-physical soul. What gives?

[Dr. Jack Bauer]

The other day someone pointed out that I have no right to oppose abortion because I do not believe a fertilized egg has a mind/soul. You apparently thought that this was a pretty good point, but I have to admit that I'm a little confused here. As far as I know, you deny that an embryo has a mind/soul as well, do you not? What could you say about personal identity that I couldn't? Surely we both have beliefs about an embryo that are physiologically equivalent, and we would both say that a three-day-old embryo has no functioning mental life and we would both deny that this embryo has a non-physical soul. What gives?
What gives is that as an emergentist, you identify a person with the emergent mind. As a physicalist, I identify the person with the body. Body exists = person exists. therefore for a physicalist like me, human life truly does begin at conception.

Although non-religious people who favour abortion rights tend to be physicalists also, they do tend to act a bit like dualists on this issue, since in order for personhood to be granted, they say that something PLUS a body is required - a rational mind, a kinda functional mind, awareness, the standards are variously set. But an emergentist is in exactly the same spot as far as I can tell. A traditional dualist is not, provided she believes that the soul is added at conception.

[Philosophickle]

What gives is that as an emergentist, you identify a person with the emergent mind. As a physicalist, I identify the person with the body. Body exists = person exists. therefore for a physicalist like me, human life truly does begin at conception.

Why couldn't I say the same thing? We both have the same developmental view of the body, and we both say that an embryo doesn't have a mind, it's just that for you the mind is physical and for me it is non-physical.

[Dr. Jack Bauer]

Why couldn't I say the same thing? We both have the same developmental view of the body, and we both say that an embryo doesn't have a mind, it's just that for you the mind is physical and for me it is non-physical.
You couldn't say the same thing, because I said "I identify the person with the body." As an emergentist, you are committed to the rejection of that view. If we are identical with our bodies, then we are so regardless of mental development.

While we may share a view of the physiological development of the unborn, you are prevented from saying that the unborn is a human person because for you, the person is something emergent upon that body, and such emergence occurs only when the brain reaches a certain developmental level. But the body exists from the very point of conception, and as such I have the ability to consistently maintain that the person exists from conception, whereas you can't say that.

[Philosophickle]

You couldn't say the same thing, because I said "I identify the person with the body." As an emergentist, you are committed to the rejection of that view. If we are identical with our bodies, then we are so regardless of mental development.

Ok, so why can't I say that someone is identical to their body? So what if they don't have a non-physical mind- you don't believe they have a physical mind, so we are on the same ground there.

While we may share a view of the physiological development of the unborn, you are prevented from saying that the unborn is a human person because for you, the person is something emergent upon that body, and such emergence occurs only when the brain reaches a certain developmental level. But the body exists from the very point of conception, and as such I have the ability to consistently maintain that the person exists from conception, whereas you can't say that.

The bold part is, as far as I can see, blatantly false, unless all emergentists are necessarily committed to that idea (which they aren't, any more than you are committed to the view that the physical mind gives personal identity). We emergent dualists claim that it is the mind that is something that emerges from the body. That is the only thing vital to the emergent system.

[Dr. Jack Bauer]

Ok, so why can't I say that someone is identical to their body? So what if they don't have a non-physical mind- you don't believe they have a physical mind, so we are on the same ground there.We are on the sdame ground in believing that an embryo doesn;t have a non-physical mind, that is true. But I can say that a person is identical with his body, but you cannot, because you're an emergentist, and unless I've been mistaken about you, you share the view of William hasker, where a person is something emergent on a body, and is not a body.
The bold part is, as far as I can see, blatantly false, unless all emergentists are necessarily committed to that idea (which they aren't, any more than you are committed to the view that the physical mind gives personal identity). We emergent dualists claim that it is the mind that is something that emerges from the body. That is the only thing vital to the emergent system.Rather than attempt to speak for emergentists, here's how William Hasker states the matter (in this context, he is saying that he is not merely advocating emergent properties, but something more):
So it is not enough to say that there are emergent properties here; what is needed is an emergent individual, a new individual entity which comes into existence as a result of a certain functional configuration of the material constituents of the brain and nervous system.
The emergent self, 190.Even the title of his major work on the subject is telling: The emergent self. It is the self that is emergent on the body. These are not just two isolated examples of Hasker using unclear language. In fact I think clarity as a writer is Hasker's greatest asset as a philosopher (although not, of course, his only asset). He makes the same claim equally clearly elsewhere:
n order to account for [the unity of consciousness], we must posit that, given the appropriate configuration of elements, a [I]new individual emerges, a consious self which has a unitary experience of the disparate items of information coded in various parts of the brain and which, given that awareness, makes decisions and initiates actions which the organism as a whole then carries out. Very briefly stated, then: the view is dualist, in that it posits a continuing, unitary, psychic individual that is distinct from the biological organism. But it is an emergent dualism, because the mental individual emerges from the organism and is sustained by it...
"On behalf of Emergent Dualism" in Joel B Green (eds) What About the Soul?: Neuroscience and Chrisian Athropology, 113.
I must respectfully disagree about this claim being a "blatant falsehood." There seems to be no doubt at all that - in Hasker's presentation of emergentism at least - the body is not an individual, and nor is the individual a composite of mind and body, but rathetr the individual is that which is emergent.

Perhaps you think it is wrong for me to think that "individual" here does not mean "person," but do not see why this is wrong.

[Dr. Jack Bauer]

:bump:

[Philosophickle]

Sorry Jack, I've been gone a few days, and I'm working on a paper. I'll get back to this, I swears it...

[Philosophickle]

We are on the sdame ground in believing that an embryo doesn;t have a non-physical mind, that is true. But I can say that a person is identical with his body, but you cannot, because you're an emergentist, and unless I've been mistaken about you, you share the view of William hasker, where a person is something emergent on a body, and is not a body.

There is a leap here. Minimally, we emergent dualists believe that the mind is emergent on a body. Personhood is a different question. And I would rephrase your first sentence to say that "We are on the same ground in believing that an embryo doesn't have any sort of mind, physical or otherwise.

Rather than attempt to speak for emergentists, here's how William Hasker states the matter (in this context, he is saying that he is not merely advocating emergent properties, but something more):
So it is not enough to say that there are emergent properties here; what is needed is an emergent individual, a new individual entity which comes into existence as a result of a certain functional configuration of the material constituents of the brain and nervous system.
The emergent self, 190.Even the title of his major work on the subject is telling: The emergent self. It is the self that is emergent on the body. These are not just two isolated examples of Hasker using unclear language. In fact I think clarity as a writer is Hasker's greatest asset as a philosopher (although not, of course, his only asset). He makes the same claim equally clearly elsewhere:
n order to account for [the unity of consciousness], we must posit that, given the appropriate configuration of elements, a [I]new individual emerges, a consious self which has a unitary experience of the disparate items of information coded in various parts of the brain and which, given that awareness, makes decisions and initiates actions which the organism as a whole then carries out. Very briefly stated, then: the view is dualist, in that it posits a continuing, unitary, psychic individual that is distinct from the biological organism. But it is an emergent dualism, because the mental individual emerges from the organism and is sustained by it...
"On behalf of Emergent Dualism" in Joel B Green (eds) What About the Soul?: Neuroscience and Chrisian Athropology, 113.

Well, I think Hasker is able to say that a person is identical with their soul and not their body, but he does not have to any more than you have to say that a person is equal with their physical mind. My position is that I do not not know how personhood is created/sustained, so abortionists are stuck with the burden of proof until they can show me where it starts.

I must respectfully disagree about this claim being a "blatant falsehood." There seems to be no doubt at all that - in Hasker's presentation of emergentism at least - the body is not an individual, and nor is the individual a composite of mind and body, but rathetr the individual is that which is emergent.

Perhaps you think it is wrong for me to think that "individual" here does not mean "person," but do not see why this is wrong.

I just do not see any reason why I need to be any more committed to the view that the non-physical mind brings personhood any more than you. Neither of us believe that the fetus has a mind, physical or non-physical.

[Dr. Jack Bauer]

There is a leap here. Minimally, we emergent dualists believe that the mind is emergent on a body. Personhood is a different question. And I would rephrase your first sentence to say that "We are on the same ground in believing that an embryo doesn't have any sort of mind, physical or otherwise.

Well, I think Hasker is able to say that a person is identical with their soul and not their body, but he does not have to any more than you have to say that a person is equal with their physical mind. My position is that I do not not know how personhood is created/sustained, so abortionists are stuck with the burden of proof until they can show me where it starts.OK, but my critique assumed that you agreed with Hasker about the person/self being the thing that is emergent. If you reject that view, and do not identify the self with that which is emergent (as hasker does), then you avoid certain problems - like having to agree that an embryo with no mind is not a person.
I just do not see any reason why I need to be any more committed to the view that the non-physical mind brings personhood any more than you.See above. You can reject that, but I assumed that you wouldn't, because Hasker accepts it.
Neither of us believe that the fetus has a mind, physical or non-physical.
Agreed - this is not an issue for a person who thinks the person is the body. I thought it would be an issue for you, however, because of my assumption that, like Hasker, you thought that the person was the emergent mind.