William Lane Craig vs. Kevin Scharp: On divine psychology and epistemic confidence

[MattMurdock]

Okay, so obviously this is only for people who watched the debate between Craig and Scharp. Scharp posed what I thought was an odd argument, insisting that Dr. Craig's deductive arguments could only succeed if the following conditions were fulfilled:

1) His premises didn't need to just be more probable than their negation, but he needed to be 80% confident in them (a number he apparently just sort of plucked out of nowhere).

2) Craig would have to provide an account of the divine psychology of God, arguing forcefully that God would actually want to create the universe, fine-tune it for life, etc.


So, first of all, what are our opinions of these conditions. Isn't the second one a bit of a stretch? We can infer intentionality in any number of instances without knowing anything about the psychological motivations behind any unseen agents merely based on the improbability of their being no intentionality, right? So, that point seems to counter much of what Scharp was arguing.

Moreover, does epistemic confidence feature as prominently in arguments as Scharp may have suggested (particularly in deductive arguments)? Admittedly, it has been a while since I have read any technical work on epistemology.

[shunyadragon]

I have listened to the debate previously, and I am presently listening again. In general Craig's arguments are reworked old arguments going back to at least Thomas Aquinas, and juggling science to match his assumptions of his arguments. They are also failed arguments he has used over and over again.

I avoid the foolish arguments based on confidence in percentages, and cut to the chase concerning straight weak logic based arguments based on 'begging the question.'

Best example, his belief, and it is a belief, in the necessity of an 'absolute beginning,' which in reality is not necessary by any 'objective evidence' based on science. It is based on the priori assumption that God exists. His arguments follow the same trend they intensely 'beg the question,' and assumes God exists in all his arguments. There is absolutely no evidence for an absolute beginning of anything including our universe and any possible multi-verse.

He over states the scientific basis for 'fine tuning,' which is only one possibility, and science, of course does not support the notion that 'fine tuning is necessary.

I contend that cultural morals and ethics do indeed exist consistently in a diversity of cultures. They are based on the evolutionary needs of an intelligent omnivorous that requires a complex cooperative social organization to support the family unit. The concept of theistic 'objective morals' are not supported by any evidence, simply based on the assumption that God exists and is the ultimate source of morality.

In summary natural explanations remain a possibility for all the above.

[37818]

Is the following video that debate?

[shunyadragon]

Is the following video that debate?

I believe so, I am listening to it now.

[37818]

Yes. After listening to Kevin Scharp's intro arguments it is it.

Both presume existence. Dr Craig introduced contingent existences. Dr Scharp probabilities - epistemic confidence.

Both fail to address the existence for which God is to exist: Uncaused existence which BTW needs no God from the get go.

[37818]

Interestingly, it was a claimed confidence of knowing for sure that lead me to become a Christian. Accepting the gospel of unmerited favor, called grace, which allowed me to know God through trusting God's Christ. [1John 5:9-13]

[seer]

It is interesting that Kevin Scharp stated that reductive naturalism is wrong.

[shunyadragon]

It is interesting that Kevin Scharp stated that reductive naturalism is wrong.

Need clarification and citation where Scharp stated reductive naturalism is wrong.

[seer]

Need clarification and citation where Scharp stated reductive naturalism is wrong.

Start at 53 minutes. And then come back and apologize for ever doubting me....

[shunyadragon]

It is interesting that Kevin Scharp stated that reductive naturalism is wrong.

I believe you have to put Scharp in context of what he proposes in the following, because he proposes a variation of methodological naturalism.

Source: http://kevinscharp.com/ScharpPhilosophyandDefectiveConceptsHandout.pdf

Metrological naturalism states that philosophers ought to draw on the resources of the sciences in philosophical
theorizing. There are many ways one can follow this advice. Here are three:
1. Cast one’s philosophical theories of X as measurement systems for X, where ‘X’ is replaced by a central
philosophical term (truth, knowledge, nature, meaning, virtue, …). That requires an account of measurement
systems. Example: a proper theory of truth is a measurement system for truth.

2. Focus on semantic theories of X locutions rather than analyses of X; the latter almost always fail. Arriving at a proper understanding of the semantics for some central philosophical term is often a good way to cut through the clutter associated with traditional philosophical theorizing about it. Example: reasons. Getting straight on the semantics for reasons locutions can help tremendously in assessing traditional philosophical debates about
reasons—e.g., the debate between factualists and mentalists.

3. Utilize the tools of measurement theory for answering philosophical questions. Example: invariance and
symmetry can be used to make sense of the distinction between objective and subjective features. Various
philosophers have emphasized this as well—Nozick, Daston and Galison, and Debs on objectivity and invariance.

Features of metrological naturalism:
• It says nothing about the methods one uses to arrive at or justify philosophical theories. So metrological
naturalism is not opposed to apriori methods (e.g., intuitions, deductions) in philosophy.
• It is not opposed to apriori philosophical claims. In fact, it is plausible to think that certain aspects of a
measurement system for some concept will be constitutive of that concept.
• It does not offer analyses or necessary and sufficient conditions for concept application.
• It does not offer reductive explanations in any sense (except perhaps the weakest forms of supervenience).
• It is not a metaphysical thesis about what exists or does not exist.
• It does not need a leading science, a criterion for what demarcates science from non-science, or an account
of scientific methodology.
• It is applicable to abstract topics (e.g., one can do measurement theory for mathematics and logic).
• It is applicable to normative topics (e.g., formal axiology).

© Copyright Original Source

[shunyadragon]

Start at 53 minutes. And then come back and apologize for ever doubting me....

No apologies, I need clarification. If you make a claim, beyond this interview. Scharp here does not give an explanation, and just shrugs.

Assertions by theists and atheists does not past muster in my book.

[seer]

I believe you have to put Scharp in context of what he proposes in the following, because he proposes a variation of methodological naturalism.

Not the point, he clearly said that reductive naturalism is false, and that not everything is open to scientific inquiry (morals being one example he used). And I said nothing about methodological naturalism.

[seer]

No apologies, I need clarification. If you claim a claim, cit it specifically, and do not make a vague out of context reference, beyond this interview. Scharp her does not give an explanation, and just shrugs.

Why would I need to cite the specific reference? I thought you listened to the debate twice?

[shunyadragon]

Not the point, he clearly said that reductive naturalism is false, and that not everything is open to scientific inquiry (morals being one example he used). And I said nothing about methodological naturalism.

Well a deeper more in context of what Scharp proposes is not methodological naturalism, but what he calls metrological naturalism. I need to look at Scharp more closely as to what his view. It does remain Ontological Naturalism.

Some assumptionns of his metrological naturalism:

Source: http://kevinscharp.com/ScharpPhilosophyandDefectiveConceptsHandout.pdf

Features of metrological naturalism:
• It says nothing about the methods one uses to arrive at or justify philosophical theories. So metrological naturalism is not opposed to apriori methods (e.g., intuitions, deductions) in philosophy.
• It is not opposed to apriori philosophical claims. In fact, it is plausible to think that certain aspects of a measurement system for some concept will be constitutive of that concept.
• It does not offer analyses or necessary and sufficient conditions for concept application.
• It does not offer reductive explanations in any sense (except perhaps the weakest forms of supervenience).
• It is not a metaphysical thesis about what exists or does not exist.
• It does not need a leading science, a criterion for what demarcates science from non-science, or an account of scientific methodology.
• It is applicable to abstract topics (e.g., one can do measurement theory for mathematics and logic).
• It is applicable to normative topics (e.g., formal axiology).

© Copyright Original Source

[seer]

Well a deeper more in context of what Scharp proposes is not methodological naturalism, but what he calls metrological naturalism. I need to look at Scharp more closely as to what his view. It does remain Ontological Naturalism.

That's nice, so we agree that he said that reductive naturalism is false.