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View Full Version : William Lane Craig vs. Kevin Scharp: On divine psychology and epistemic confidence



MattMurdock
05-10-2016, 06:07 PM
Okay, so obviously this is only for people who watched the debate between Craig and Scharp. Scharp posed what I thought was an odd argument, insisting that Dr. Craig's deductive arguments could only succeed if the following conditions were fulfilled:

1) His premises didn't need to just be more probable than their negation, but he needed to be 80% confident in them (a number he apparently just sort of plucked out of nowhere).

2) Craig would have to provide an account of the divine psychology of God, arguing forcefully that God would actually want to create the universe, fine-tune it for life, etc.


So, first of all, what are our opinions of these conditions. Isn't the second one a bit of a stretch? We can infer intentionality in any number of instances without knowing anything about the psychological motivations behind any unseen agents merely based on the improbability of their being no intentionality, right? So, that point seems to counter much of what Scharp was arguing.

Moreover, does epistemic confidence feature as prominently in arguments as Scharp may have suggested (particularly in deductive arguments)? Admittedly, it has been a while since I have read any technical work on epistemology.

shunyadragon
05-10-2016, 06:51 PM
I have listened to the debate previously, and I am presently listening again. In general Craig's arguments are reworked old arguments going back to at least Thomas Aquinas, and juggling science to match his assumptions of his arguments. They are also failed arguments he has used over and over again.

I avoid the foolish arguments based on confidence in percentages, and cut to the chase concerning straight weak logic based arguments based on 'begging the question.'

Best example, his belief, and it is a belief, in the necessity of an 'absolute beginning,' which in reality is not necessary by any 'objective evidence' based on science. It is based on the priori assumption that God exists. His arguments follow the same trend they intensely 'beg the question,' and assumes God exists in all his arguments. There is absolutely no evidence for an absolute beginning of anything including our universe and any possible multi-verse.

He over states the scientific basis for 'fine tuning,' which is only one possibility, and science, of course does not support the notion that 'fine tuning is necessary.

I contend that cultural morals and ethics do indeed exist consistently in a diversity of cultures. They are based on the evolutionary needs of an intelligent omnivorous that requires a complex cooperative social organization to support the family unit. The concept of theistic 'objective morals' are not supported by any evidence, simply based on the assumption that God exists and is the ultimate source of morality.

In summary natural explanations remain a possibility for all the above.

37818
05-10-2016, 06:58 PM
Is the following video that debate?


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8KMd_eS2J7o

shunyadragon
05-10-2016, 07:01 PM
Is the following video that debate?


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8KMd_eS2J7o

I believe so, I am listening to it now.

37818
05-10-2016, 07:26 PM
Yes. After listening to Kevin Scharp's intro arguments it is it.

Both presume existence. Dr Craig introduced contingent existences. Dr Scharp probabilities - epistemic confidence.

Both fail to address the existence for which God is to exist: Uncaused existence which BTW needs no God from the get go.

37818
05-10-2016, 08:26 PM
Interestingly, it was a claimed confidence of knowing for sure that lead me to become a Christian. Accepting the gospel of unmerited favor, called grace, which allowed me to know God through trusting God's Christ. [1John 5:9-13]

seer
05-12-2016, 10:21 AM
It is interesting that Kevin Scharp stated that reductive naturalism is wrong.

shunyadragon
05-12-2016, 11:47 AM
It is interesting that Kevin Scharp stated that reductive naturalism is wrong.

Need clarification and citation where Scharp stated reductive naturalism is wrong.

seer
05-12-2016, 11:58 AM
Need clarification and citation where Scharp stated reductive naturalism is wrong.


Start at 53 minutes. And then come back and apologize for ever doubting me....

shunyadragon
05-12-2016, 12:26 PM
It is interesting that Kevin Scharp stated that reductive naturalism is wrong.

I believe you have to put Scharp in context of what he proposes in the following, because he proposes a variation of methodological naturalism.


Metrological naturalism states that philosophers ought to draw on the resources of the sciences in philosophical
theorizing. There are many ways one can follow this advice. Here are three:
1. Cast one’s philosophical theories of X as measurement systems for X, where ‘X’ is replaced by a central
philosophical term (truth, knowledge, nature, meaning, virtue, …). That requires an account of measurement
systems. Example: a proper theory of truth is a measurement system for truth.

2. Focus on semantic theories of X locutions rather than analyses of X; the latter almost always fail. Arriving at a proper understanding of the semantics for some central philosophical term is often a good way to cut through the clutter associated with traditional philosophical theorizing about it. Example: reasons. Getting straight on the semantics for reasons locutions can help tremendously in assessing traditional philosophical debates about
reasons—e.g., the debate between factualists and mentalists.

3. Utilize the tools of measurement theory for answering philosophical questions. Example: invariance and
symmetry can be used to make sense of the distinction between objective and subjective features. Various
philosophers have emphasized this as well—Nozick, Daston and Galison, and Debs on objectivity and invariance.

Features of metrological naturalism:
• It says nothing about the methods one uses to arrive at or justify philosophical theories. So metrological
naturalism is not opposed to apriori methods (e.g., intuitions, deductions) in philosophy.
• It is not opposed to apriori philosophical claims. In fact, it is plausible to think that certain aspects of a
measurement system for some concept will be constitutive of that concept.
• It does not offer analyses or necessary and sufficient conditions for concept application.
• It does not offer reductive explanations in any sense (except perhaps the weakest forms of supervenience).
• It is not a metaphysical thesis about what exists or does not exist.
• It does not need a leading science, a criterion for what demarcates science from non-science, or an account
of scientific methodology.
• It is applicable to abstract topics (e.g., one can do measurement theory for mathematics and logic).
• It is applicable to normative topics (e.g., formal axiology).

shunyadragon
05-12-2016, 12:29 PM
Start at 53 minutes. And then come back and apologize for ever doubting me....

No apologies, I need clarification. If you make a claim, beyond this interview. Scharp here does not give an explanation, and just shrugs.

Assertions by theists and atheists does not past muster in my book.

seer
05-12-2016, 12:32 PM
I believe you have to put Scharp in context of what he proposes in the following, because he proposes a variation of methodological naturalism.

Not the point, he clearly said that reductive naturalism is false, and that not everything is open to scientific inquiry (morals being one example he used). And I said nothing about methodological naturalism.

seer
05-12-2016, 12:36 PM
No apologies, I need clarification. If you claim a claim, cit it specifically, and do not make a vague out of context reference, beyond this interview. Scharp her does not give an explanation, and just shrugs.

Why would I need to cite the specific reference? I thought you listened to the debate twice?

shunyadragon
05-12-2016, 12:46 PM
Not the point, he clearly said that reductive naturalism is false, and that not everything is open to scientific inquiry (morals being one example he used). And I said nothing about methodological naturalism.

Well a deeper more in context of what Scharp proposes is not methodological naturalism, but what he calls metrological naturalism. I need to look at Scharp more closely as to what his view. It does remain Ontological Naturalism.

Some assumptionns of his metrological naturalism:


Features of metrological naturalism:
• It says nothing about the methods one uses to arrive at or justify philosophical theories. So metrological naturalism is not opposed to apriori methods (e.g., intuitions, deductions) in philosophy.
• It is not opposed to apriori philosophical claims. In fact, it is plausible to think that certain aspects of a measurement system for some concept will be constitutive of that concept.
• It does not offer analyses or necessary and sufficient conditions for concept application.
• It does not offer reductive explanations in any sense (except perhaps the weakest forms of supervenience).
• It is not a metaphysical thesis about what exists or does not exist.
• It does not need a leading science, a criterion for what demarcates science from non-science, or an account of scientific methodology.
• It is applicable to abstract topics (e.g., one can do measurement theory for mathematics and logic).
• It is applicable to normative topics (e.g., formal axiology).

seer
05-12-2016, 01:12 PM
Well a deeper more in context of what Scharp proposes is not methodological naturalism, but what he calls metrological naturalism. I need to look at Scharp more closely as to what his view. It does remain Ontological Naturalism.

That's nice, so we agree that he said that reductive naturalism is false.

shunyadragon
05-12-2016, 01:13 PM
That's nice, so we agree that he said that reductive naturalism is false.

His reasons do not match yours.

seer
05-12-2016, 01:19 PM
His reasons do not match yours.

What reasons did I give that he didn't? Did you actually listen to it?

shunyadragon
06-15-2016, 05:10 AM
What reasons did I give that he didn't? Did you actually listen to it?

Yes, you apparently are reading things into it that are not there to justify your religious agenda.

First, Kevin Scharp is an atheist. He does not disagree with methodological Naturalism on the basis that if fails to incorporate Theism of the existence of God in scientific investigations.

Second, read his work carefully, because he addresses mostly on the deductive/reductive methodology as applied to philosophical questions. He believes the philosophy can apply both to science and philosophy.

Third, he makes no effort to propose changes in the methods of scientific investigation.

Fourth, he does not propose any changes in the philosophy nor methodology of science that would include the question of the existence of God in scientific methodological methods.

Fifth, his reasons were that 'metrological naturalism' offers a better philosophical methodology that can function in both philosophy and science to deal with questions of truth, and Schrap does not include questions of supernatural explanations, nor the existence of God.

Your objections are more in line with those of Alvin Plantinga:

Alvin Plantinga, "The philosophical doctrine of methodological naturalism holds that, for any study of the world to qualify as "scientific," it cannot refer to God's creative activity (or any sort of divine activity)." The possibility of divine intervention in nature is not only neglected, but positively dismissed.

You also likely believe that 'Methodological Naturalism' directly leads to 'Ontological Naturalism.' Sharp does not hold this view because he is an Atheist.

seer
06-15-2016, 05:18 AM
Yes, you apparently are reading things into it that are not there to justify your religious agenda.

First, Kevin Scharp is an atheist. He does not disagree with methodological Naturalism on the basis that if fails to incorporate Theism of the existence of God in scientific investigations.

Second, read his work carefully, because he addresses mostly on the deductive/reductive methodology as applied to philosophical questions. He believes the philosophy can apply both to science and philosophy.

Third, he makes no effort to propose changes in the methods of scientific investigation.

Fourth, he does not propose any changes in the philosophy nor methodology of science that would include the question of the existence of God in scientific methodological methods.

Fifth, his reasons were that 'metrological naturalism' offers a better philosophical methodology that can function in both philosophy and science to deal with questions of truth, and Schrap does not include questions of supernatural explanations, nor the existence of God.

Your objections are more in line with those of Alvin Plantinga:

Alvin Plantinga, "The philosophical doctrine of methodological naturalism holds that, for any study of the world to qualify as "scientific," it cannot refer to God's creative activity (or any sort of divine activity)." The possibility of divine intervention in nature is not only neglected, but positively dismissed.

You also likely believe that 'Methodological Naturalism' directly leads to 'Ontological Naturalism.' Sharp does not hold this view because he is an Atheist.

What are you babbling about Shuny? I simply repeated what Sharp said, that reductive naturalism is false and that not all questions can be answered by science. Did I take I any further than that? Did I even bring up religion? And Shuny, you really need to look at your deep hatred of the Christian religion. From where does that spring.

shunyadragon
06-15-2016, 05:45 AM
What are you babbling about Shuny? I simply repeated what Sharp said, that reductive naturalism is false and that not all questions can be answered by science.

This is a combative non-answer. Actually Methodological Naturalism DOES NOT conclude that all questions can be answered by Scientific methods. Methodological Naturalism only addresses objective falsifiable.


Did I take I any further than that? Did I even bring up religion?

Everything you state or propose on Tweb has a religious motive.

To clarify your position. It is obvious that your view of the problems with Methodological Naturalism are different, because of his atheist perspective concerning philosophy and science.

What are your objections to 'Methodological Naturalism'?

How does Metrological Naturalism improve or is better than Methodological Naturalism and the methodology of science?

Please be specific.

seer
06-15-2016, 06:05 AM
This is a combative non-answer. Actually Methodological Naturalism DOES NOT conclude that all questions can be answered by Scientific methods. Methodological Naturalism only addresses objective falsifiable.



Everything you state or propose on Tweb has a religious motive.

To clarify your position. It is obvious that your view of the problems with Methodological Naturalism are different, because of his atheist perspective concerning philosophy and science.

What are your objections to 'Methodological Naturalism'?

How does Metrological Naturalism improve or is better than Methodological Naturalism and the methodology of science?

Please be specific.

Shuny, are you daft? Where in this thread did I say anything about the above? We were speaking of reductive naturalism. Which Sharp says if false. Period, end of story.

shunyadragon
06-15-2016, 03:42 PM
Shuny, are you daft? Where in this thread did I say anything about the above? We were speaking of reductive naturalism. Which Sharp says if false. Period, end of story.

Answer the questions . . .

What are your objections to 'Methodological Naturalism'?

How does Metrological Naturalism improve or is better than Methodological Naturalism and the methodology of science?

seer
06-15-2016, 04:56 PM
Answer the questions . . .

What are your objections to 'Methodological Naturalism'?

How does Metrological Naturalism improve or is better than Methodological Naturalism and the methodology of science?


What does it matter? But I will play - give me your definition, or an accepted definition, of Methodological Naturalism, since I have ran across a number of different understandings.

shunyadragon
06-15-2016, 04:57 PM
What does it matter? But I will play - give me your definition, or an accepted definition, of Methodological Naturalism, since I have ran across a number of different understandings.

Answer the questions . . .

What are your objections to 'Methodological Naturalism'?

How does Metrological Naturalism improve or is better than Methodological Naturalism and the methodology of science?

seer
06-16-2016, 03:28 AM
Answer the questions . . .

What are your objections to 'Methodological Naturalism'?

How does Metrological Naturalism improve or is better than Methodological Naturalism and the methodology of science?

Stop being an idiot Shuny, first give me your definition of Methodological Naturalism then I can reply. Or don't you have a definition?

shunyadragon
06-16-2016, 06:29 AM
Stop being an idiot Shuny, first give me your definition of Methodological Naturalism then I can reply. Or don't you have a definition?

The internet has many good definitions, and this has been addressed in many previous threads. For those that need to be spoon fed with pablum here is one I made short sweet and concise:

Methodological Naturalism is the philosophy of science that defines the limits of scientific knowledge of our 'Natural' physical existence as theories and hypothesis that can be falsified by scientific methods. Philosophical and Theological concepts and beliefs, like the 'existence of God' cannot be falsified by objective scientific methods.

Ontological or Philosophical Naturalism is based on the 'philosophical assumption' that the physical existence based in objective scientific methods is all that exists. Ontological Naturalism cannot be falsified by 'objective scientific methods.'

Answer the questions . . .

What are your objections to 'Methodological Naturalism'?

How does Meterological Naturalism improve or is better than Methodological Naturalism and the methodology of science?




Answer the questions . . .

What are your objections to 'Methodological Naturalism'?

How does Metrological Naturalism improve or is better than Methodological Naturalism and the methodology of science?

seer
06-16-2016, 07:10 AM
The internet has many good definitions, and this has been addressed in many previous threads. For those that need to be spoon fed with pablum here is one I made short sweet and concise:

Methodological Naturalism is the philosophy of science that defines the limits of scientific knowledge of our 'Natural' physical existence as theories and hypothesis that can be falsified by scientific methods. Philosophical and Theological concepts and beliefs, like the 'existence of God' cannot be falsified by objective scientific methods.

Ontological or Philosophical Naturalism is based on the 'philosophical assumption' that the physical existence based in objective scientific methods is all that exists. Ontological Naturalism cannot be falsified by 'objective scientific methods.'

Answer the questions . . .

What are your objections to 'Methodological Naturalism'?

How does Meterological Naturalism improve or is better than Methodological Naturalism and the methodology of science?




Answer the questions . . .

What are your objections to 'Methodological Naturalism'?

How does Metrological Naturalism improve or is better than Methodological Naturalism and the methodology of science?

OK, I have no problem with Methodological Naturalism. Now as far Metrological Naturalism, I have no idea what that is. Can you LINK an accepted definition?

shunyadragon
06-16-2016, 07:51 AM
OK, I have no problem with Methodological Naturalism. Now as far Metrological Naturalism, I have no idea what that is. Can you LINK an accepted definition?

Your previous links concerning Schrap defined and described it. It is his philosophical baby.

seer
06-16-2016, 08:12 AM
Your previous links concerning Schrap defined and described it. It is his philosophical baby.

Right, it is not a widely accepted idea, and I doubt very much that you understand it. If you do, please explain it to all of us.

shunyadragon
06-16-2016, 11:34 AM
Right, it is not a widely accepted idea, and I doubt very much that you understand it. If you do, please explain it to all of us.

It would help if you understood your own reference when you cite it. It is not a widely accepted concept.

It is not easy to understand, and Schrap and those reviewing his books are the only references available.

Scharp proposes metrological naturalism, also Ascending and Descending Truth (ADT) where Science and Philosophy are merged and both have respond to inductive and deductive arguments. It is difficult to understand with a high fog index, but after careful reading he wants to hold philosophy to the same objective standards as science.

The following is review of his book Replacing Truth which only explains somethings but leaves the fog:



Having argued that truth should be replaced, Scharp proposes to replace it with a pair of concepts: ascending truth and descending truth. The names are perhaps misleading; neither of these concepts is a kind of truth at all -- that's the whole point! That is, despite the names, being ascending true and being descending true are not ways of being true; they are other statuses entirely. (Scharp sometimes speaks of 'ascending and descending truth', but if we are being careful this should strike us the same as 'The League of and The United Nations'.)

Scharp gives an axiomatisation, which he calls ADT, of ascending and descending truth. (ADT is not meant to be the full story about ascending and descending truth, but rather an important sub-story (p. 153).) According to ADT, the claim that φ is descending true, which I'll write D〈φ〉, is at least as strong as φ itself, but possibly stronger. The claim that φ is ascending true, which I'll write A〈φ〉, is at least as weak as φ itself, but possibly weaker. That is, D〈φ → φ and φ → A〈φ〉 are theorems of ADT, but their converses are not. In addition, ascending and descending truth are duals; a sentence is descending true iff its negation is not ascending true, and ascending true iff its negation is not descending true. (This is only a small part of ADT; I won't present the axiomatisation in full here, but will instead focus just on some of its more striking features.)

It is possible to see in this a 'splitting' of the familiar T-schema, T〈φ〉↔ φ. Descending truth takes over the left-to-right direction of this equivalence, and ascending truth takes over the right-to-left direction. (Ascending truth 'captures' but does not 'release'; descending truth 'releases' but does not 'capture'.) It can be tempting to think (and it is sometimes true) that other familiar alethic principles will work like this as well, but this is not always so; some care is required. For example, we usually expect a truth predicate to validate the followingconjunction schema: (T φ ∧ T〈ψ〉) ↔ T〈φ ∧ ψ〉. The directions of this schema, though, are not split between ascending and descending truth; neither of them validates the left-to-right direction of the conjunction schema, while both validate the right-to-left direction instead. (The left-to-right direction is secured on a mixed reading: (D〈φ〉∧ D〈ψ) → A〈φ ∧ ψ〉is a theorem (p. 171).)

As the example of the conjunction schema shows, neither ascending nor descending truth is closed under multi-premise validity (since φ, ψ ⊢ φ ∧ ψ); nor is either of them closed under single-premise validity. Neither is even closed under replacement of logical equivalents (p. 173). That is, there are sentences φ and ψ such that φ ↔ ψ is a theorem, and D〈φ〉is a theorem, but D〈ψ〉is not. (In fact, there are cases like this where ¬D〈ψ〉is a theorem. For example, let φ be an axiom of ADT, and let ψ be the 'descending liar' discussed below.) This can take some getting used to.

seer
06-16-2016, 11:44 AM
It would help if you understood your own reference when you cite it. It is not a widely accepted concept.

Add more in a moment . . .

Nonsense, I did not have to understand everything he said to understand that he believed that reductive naturalism is false. And where in the debate did Sharp get into Meterological Naturalism? Can you give me the exact time like I gave you?

shunyadragon
06-16-2016, 12:16 PM
Nonsense, I did not have to understand everything he said to understand that he believed that reductive naturalism is false. And where in the debate did Sharp get into Meterological Naturalism? Can you give me the exact time like I gave you?

I do not expect you to know everything, but you need to basically understand something.

You did not give the exact time of anything.

seer
06-16-2016, 12:29 PM
I do not expect you to know everything, but you need to basically understand something.

You did not give the exact time of anything.

Yes I did in post nine, about the timing of his quote, and I don't need to understand Metrological Naturalism to know that he said that reductive naturalism is false. And On that point I doubt very much that you understand the the quote you posted. And as far as I know this did not come up in the debate that we have been discussing.

seer
06-16-2016, 12:31 PM
It would help if you understood your own reference when you cite it. It is not a widely accepted concept.

It is not easy to understand, and Schrap and those reviewing his books are the only references available.

Scharp proposes metrological naturalism, also Ascending and Descending Truth (ADT) where Science and Philosophy are merged and both have respond to inductive and deductive arguments. It is difficult to understand with a high fog index, but after careful reading he wants to hold philosophy to the same objective standards as science.

The following is review of his book Replacing Truth which only explains somethings but leaves the fog:



Having argued that truth should be replaced, Scharp proposes to replace it with a pair of concepts: ascending truth and descending truth. The names are perhaps misleading; neither of these concepts is a kind of truth at all -- that's the whole point! That is, despite the names, being ascending true and being descending true are not ways of being true; they are other statuses entirely. (Scharp sometimes speaks of 'ascending and descending truth', but if we are being careful this should strike us the same as 'The League of and The United Nations'.)

Scharp gives an axiomatisation, which he calls ADT, of ascending and descending truth. (ADT is not meant to be the full story about ascending and descending truth, but rather an important sub-story (p. 153).) According to ADT, the claim that φ is descending true, which I'll write D〈φ〉, is at least as strong as φ itself, but possibly stronger. The claim that φ is ascending true, which I'll write A〈φ〉, is at least as weak as φ itself, but possibly weaker. That is, D〈φ → φ and φ → A〈φ〉 are theorems of ADT, but their converses are not. In addition, ascending and descending truth are duals; a sentence is descending true iff its negation is not ascending true, and ascending true iff its negation is not descending true. (This is only a small part of ADT; I won't present the axiomatisation in full here, but will instead focus just on some of its more striking features.)

It is possible to see in this a 'splitting' of the familiar T-schema, T〈φ〉↔ φ. Descending truth takes over the left-to-right direction of this equivalence, and ascending truth takes over the right-to-left direction. (Ascending truth 'captures' but does not 'release'; descending truth 'releases' but does not 'capture'.) It can be tempting to think (and it is sometimes true) that other familiar alethic principles will work like this as well, but this is not always so; some care is required. For example, we usually expect a truth predicate to validate the followingconjunction schema: (T φ ∧ T〈ψ〉) ↔ T〈φ ∧ ψ〉. The directions of this schema, though, are not split between ascending and descending truth; neither of them validates the left-to-right direction of the conjunction schema, while both validate the right-to-left direction instead. (The left-to-right direction is secured on a mixed reading: (D〈φ〉∧ D〈ψ) → A〈φ ∧ ψ〉is a theorem (p. 171).)

As the example of the conjunction schema shows, neither ascending nor descending truth is closed under multi-premise validity (since φ, ψ ⊢ φ ∧ ψ); nor is either of them closed under single-premise validity. Neither is even closed under replacement of logical equivalents (p. 173). That is, there are sentences φ and ψ such that φ ↔ ψ is a theorem, and D〈φ〉is a theorem, but D〈ψ〉is not. (In fact, there are cases like this where ¬D〈ψ〉is a theorem. For example, let φ be an axiom of ADT, and let ψ be the 'descending liar' discussed below.) This can take some getting used to.

Oh stop Shuny, you don't have a clue what this is about, and how many more scientists hold to his view? Can you name them? Or is it his pet theory?

shunyadragon
06-16-2016, 07:50 PM
Oh stop Shuny, you don't have a clue what this is about, and how many more scientists hold to his view? Can you name them? Or is it his pet theory?

Apparently pet theory, because no other scientist, or even philosophers refer to, use nor describe metrological naturalism.

seer
06-17-2016, 03:25 AM
Apparently pet theory, because no other scientist, or even philosophers refer to, use nor describe metrological naturalism.

Then why did you ask me how it worked and fit in? Were you just trying to make cheap points?

shunyadragon
06-17-2016, 03:55 AM
Then why did you ask me how it worked and fit in? Were you just trying to make cheap points?

No. Did you refer to it only for the reason Scharp considered Methodological Naturalism false, without understanding the reasoning behind the claim?

seer
06-17-2016, 05:01 AM
No. Did you refer to it only for the reason Scharp considered Methodological Naturalism false, without understanding the reasoning behind the claim?

I said nothing about metrological naturalism, we were discussing what was in the Craig debate, and that was not brought up as far as I remember. And I never said that Scharp claimed that Methodological Naturalism was false, but he did clearly say that Reductive Naturalism was false. You do know the difference - correct?

Doug Shaver
07-02-2016, 04:48 PM
Interestingly, it was a claimed confidence of knowing for sure that lead me to become a Christian.
A belief in one's own infallibility does have its attractions.

shunyadragon
07-02-2016, 04:53 PM
A belief in one's own infallibility does have its attractions.

. . . and detractions.