Distingushing potentiality arguments

[Jezz]

When I wrote my last thread (http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/showthread.php?t=106590) in this thread, the subject of potentiality arguments came up. I didn't want to derail the other thread, but it occurred to me that there was more than one type of potentiality argument and the two were getting confused. Hence this thread.

Consider the two statements:

1. X is a potential human being.
2. X is potentially a human being.

A subtle but important difference. To help distinguish them better, let me rephrase them:

1a. X is not a human being, but has the potential to become one at some point in the future.
2a. It is possible that X is already a human being.

Ie, the difference is that in 1, we are sure that X is not a human being at this point in time, whereas in 2 we are not sure.

Clearly the second of these two is a good argument against abortion, however the first is not. Because in the first, what you are saying is "we are certain that what we are aborting is not a human being", and there is no law against killing non-human beings. That they might become one is not that important. I mean, if you are talking about that kind of potential, then there is the potential for food to become a human being, because the food gets eaten by humans, and the food's atoms become part of the human, and subsequently part of their offspring and a new human life. Is it wrong to kill plants and animals because they have the potential to become human in this round-about way?

In the argument between SpinyNorman and Wyzaard which I referred to in the previous thread, Wyzaard was saying that potentiality arguments do not carry any weight. Many of the pro-lifers disagreed with him. I actually agree with both - because it seemed to me that Wyzaard was referring to the first kind of potentiality argument, whereas the pro-lifers undoubtedly had in mind an argument more akin to the second.

Something to ponder! Make sure that people don't equivocate like this when you're discussing these issues! :smile:

[JonLanceBarker]

a distinction i hadn't really thought about. thanks a billion! :thumb:

[Spheniscine]

Yeah, English is weird that way. :tongue:

[joel]

Good distinction to point out.

I heard someone else put it: "The preborn is not a potential person, but a person with potential."
So that, actually introduces a 3rd concept of potential in this issue. X may be actually a person and have potentiality. I personally favor the argument that the preborn's capacity (a category of potential) for reason and choice is necessary and sufficient to qualify him/her as a person.

[Avi_of_Fierl]

I have to ask if you studied English because the distinction you point out is very subtle. at first glance the two statements seem like they could be saying the same thing, when in fact the entire argument changes upon which statement is used. this has definitely made me think.

[historic salve]

Hmm, I don't think you'll find many people who deny that the fetus is a human being. They'll instead say that it doesn't have the qualities of personhood, however those may be defined by the one making the argument.

[joel]

Hmm, I don't think you'll find many people who deny that the fetus is a human being. They'll instead say that it doesn't have the qualities of personhood, however those may be defined by the one making the argument.
Then you have:

1. X is a potential person.
2. X is potentially a person.

with the 2 different meanings.