determinism and sin [Archive] - TheologyWeb Campus

Kenny

September 26th 2003, 02:39 PM

Hey Mark,

Thanks for your humble attitude in questioning our position. Though this does not directly address the issue at hand, you should read about my view of the doctrine of original sin for background to this discussion. See this post (http://theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?postid=213076#post213076) for a place where I gather a lot of my thoughts together concerning it.

Under your worldview, how do you account for the existence of Moral evil?

I take a clue from Romans 11:32; “For God has imprisoned all to disobedience so that he may be merciful to all.” I believe that God permitted moral evil because there were surpassingly greater moral goods to be obtained through that permission which could not have been obtained otherwise. The greatest of those being the mercy and love of God demonstrated to us through the cross which shows us the depths of God’s love in a way that would not have been possible were it not for the presence of sin. This view is not without precedence in church tradition; an old Latin liturgy refers to Adam’s fall as “that blessed sin,” not in order to exalt sin, but in recognition of the greatness of God’s redemptive mercy which we have now experienced on account of sin.

Now, I'm asking this because the usual Christian defense would be the free will defense; that God, in creating the universe cannot guarantee that free creatures always act in a morally perfect way.

I think that only OV theists can make a consistent and plausible free will defense. One wonders, for example, why God did not simply choose to create a set of beings which He knew, though having the free will to be capable of sinning, would freely choose not to sin. Alvin Plantinga has addressed this issue by arguing that all rational creaturely essences may be marred by what he calls “transworld depravity” (i.e. all possible rational creatures are such that they will freely choose to engage in at least one sin in any possible circumstances that God might place them in were God to create them), but while I think this view may be coherent (actually, I have my doubts about that as long as we’re holding on to LFW), I don’t find it plausible. Perhaps one could argue instead that all large sets of rational beings are such that at least some members will freely choose to sin. But then we have to ask why God didn’t just actualize a smaller set where such is not the case, and then we’re into a greater goods defense which must appeal to factors other than free will to explain why God permitted moral evil.

In a deterministic universe however, then surely it is possible that God create creatures that do always act in a morally perfect way?

Actually, I think, at least on the version of compatiblism that I hold, where our choices are partially functions of our individual essences which preexist eternally as abstractions in the mind of God prior to our creation, that one could even more plausibly and consistently argue for a transworld depravity view, but I do not go in that direction for the reasons I have given above.

And if so, then what possible motivations could there be for not creating them?

I believe that God created creatures whom He knew would freely sin in order to demonstrate His mercy to them.

One argument which I read on the LeaderU website, which was extremely unconvincing was that if God had not allowed the fall, then we would have been forced into idolatry and looked to Adam for our righteousness....this seems totally uncompelling because there are a couple of alternatives here, one would be that since the righteousness was obviously given of God in the first place, then, being created perfectly, we would recognise that it is ultimately from God and nowhere else. The alternative would be that God dispensed with Adam altogether, and just created us all individually, coming directly from him, in which case we would only look to him for our being.

I agree with these critiques. That argument sounds pretty lame.

Please take the time to respond, I really am interested in the answers that you may have taken the time to think out.

I haven’t gone as in depth as I could, but I think it's best to wait and see what questions come up instead of just shooting in the dark.

In Christ,
Kenny

Smitten

September 26th 2003, 03:02 PM

here's my thoughts

Under your worldview, how do you account for the existence of Moral evil? Now, I'm asking this because the usual Christian defense would be the free will defense;
Which saddens me. I don't think it makes sense.

that God, in creating the universe cannot guarantee that free creatures always act in a morally perfect way.
If someone says this i would ask them to define what it means for a human to be "free". It can be a real ambiguous term. God is free, certainly, but i think most would say that he can't sin.

In a deterministic universe however, then surely it is possible that God create creatures that do always act in a morally perfect way? And if so, then what possible motivations could there be for not creating them?
Yes i would say it was very possible for God to do. But he didn't. As to why, I don't know. But who are we to judge God's actions, or even to be in a position to comprehend his motives? Maybe I'm not understanding your question completely, but if I do the answer is simple. God simply ordained for sin to enter the world. He is the potter and is doing what he wants with the clay. Reasons for why he does everything he does are not necessarily available to us. The whole drama of the redemption of humanity seems to make sense. Ultimately, though, whatever happens is for the glory of God.

markporter

September 27th 2003, 12:47 PM

Yes i would say it was very possible for God to do. But he didn't. As to why, I don't know. But who are we to judge God's actions, or even to be in a position to comprehend his motives? Maybe I'm not understanding your question completely, but if I do the answer is simple. God simply ordained for sin to enter the world. He is the potter and is doing what he wants with the clay. Reasons for why he does everything he does are not necessarily available to us. The whole drama of the redemption of humanity seems to make sense. Ultimately, though, whatever happens is for the glory of God.

Right....this is the kind of reply I was expecting, but not the kind that I was hoping for, you see I think that God does make a lot of his motives known to us, and that a lot of what he is like is revealed through his creation....I think that it is plausible that there is more information available than this.

markporter

September 27th 2003, 12:49 PM

Kenny, thanks for the reply....I shall examine what you've written and bring up some more questions once I've had a time to think through it.

Smitten

September 27th 2003, 02:38 PM

I think that God does make a lot of his motives known to us, and that a lot of what he is like is revealed through his creation....I think that it is plausible that there is more information available than this.
I completely agree, but do you mean this regarding why God didn't create a different world as opposed to the one he did create?

markporter

September 27th 2003, 02:51 PM

Hey Mark,

Thanks for your humble attitude in questioning our position. Though this does not directly address the issue at hand, you should read about my view of the doctrine of original sin for background to this discussion. See this post for a place where I gather a lot of my thoughts together concerning it.

Thanks, it's good to have a place where there are so many knowledgeable christians to be able to discuss things with. I expect a lot of what I've written below is woefully inadequate/incoherent, but you'll have to forgive my inability to express myself and make of it what you will.

I take a clue from Romans 11:32; “For God has imprisoned all to disobedience so that he may be merciful to all.” I believe that God permitted moral evil because there were surpassingly greater moral goods to be obtained through that permission which could not have been obtained otherwise. The greatest of those being the mercy and love of God demonstrated to us through the cross which shows us the depths of God’s love in a way that would not have been possible were it not for the presence of sin. This view is not without precedence in church tradition; an old Latin liturgy refers to Adam’s fall as “that blessed sin,” not in order to exalt sin, but in recognition of the greatness of God’s redemptive mercy which we have now experienced on account of sin.

Yeah ok, sounds like a good starting point....but to me, examining that in this context would lead to the question "why not universalism? Why not be merciful unto all?" but perhaps your view is that there are some individuals which it is impossible to regenerate? But then, my question would be why? You seem to hold a distinction between an individual's essence, and their properties as given by God which I can't quite understand (taken from other thread, see below)....surely a person is just that, a person, with no distinguishing features except those properties which they happen to have, and if that is so, then it is God who gives them these properties...even if these can then be claimed as their own....you wrote "To put it in a more common sense way, there is a certain set of qualities which make me who I am such that if (per impossible) God had attempted to create me without those qualities, it would have been someone else God ended up creating rather than myself." which is where I fall down really...I can't see these distinctions, there is perhaps a gradient of persons with different properties, but I think that the fact that you are you is rooted in that, and nothing else....just like a specific electron being a specific electron really.

I think that only OV theists can make a consistent and plausible free will defense. One wonders, for example, why God did not simply choose to create a set of beings which He knew, though having the free will to be capable of sinning, would freely choose not to sin. Alvin Plantinga has addressed this issue by arguing that all rational creaturely essences may be marred by what he calls “transworld depravity” (i.e. all possible rational creatures are such that they will freely choose to engage in at least one sin in any possible circumstances that God might place them in were God to create them), but while I think this view may be coherent (actually, I have my doubts about that as long as we’re holding on to LFW), I don’t find it plausible. Perhaps one could argue instead that all large sets of rational beings are such that at least some members will freely choose to sin. But then we have to ask why God didn’t just actualize a smaller set where such is not the case, and then we’re into a greater goods defense which must appeal to factors other than free will to explain why God permitted moral evil.

Erm OK, I would have to admit that at the moment the two most plausible positions to me are looking like OV or some form of determinism (although that may well change, depending on where my thoughts lead me)...both deal in an understandable way with the foreknowledge thing, but each has its weakness; in OV it is trying to formulate a coherent account of LFW, and in a deterministic universe it is understanding the evil in the world....hence this thread.

I believe that God created creatures whom He knew would freely sin in order to demonstrate His mercy to them.

Perhaps I can formulate my possible objections to this idea here so I can see how they could be dealt with...It lies in the question of what it is for him to have mercy really (grrrr....just thought of something else which makes the situation a little annoying, but actually may help your case) Mercy would seem to be giving someone that which they don't deserve...ok...but why should it be true that creatures deserve to exist at all, why is not the creative act in itself sufficient for this criterion? Surely eternal life is just as much of an undeserved gift either way? (This starts to confuse me a bit here in a deterministic universe, because everything that happens would happen necessarily (no?) even if our necessity is a derived one, so perhaps this is where it ties in....dunno)

_________________________________________________________
quotes from other thread which may be relevant to the above
_________________________________________________________

Now, as this pertains to my view of original sin, I see Adam’s choice to disobey God in the given set of circumstances in which he found himself as being rooted entirely in Adam’s individual essence as a moral agent. Neither the circumstances themselves, nor the accidental properties which God gave to Adam, nor Adam’s essential humanity played a causally determinative role in Adam’s choice. Another human being acting under precisely the same conditions could have passed the test and rendered obedience (and Christ, who, as a human being, rendered obedience under far less advantageous circumstances, provides us with ample confirmation of this). So Adam’s choice to disobey, in the deepest possible sense, has to do with Adam himself and not with any of the ways that God voluntarily created him.

Granted, it was God’s voluntary choice to actualize the particular set of human beings that He did and not some other set that would have chosen, under the same circumstances, to obey (and if he had, we would not exist), but I believe that God chose to actualize creatures that He knew would be disobedient for the sake of the surpassing good of demonstrating His redemptive mercy to such creatures.

_______________

Thanks for taking the time to respond

markporter

September 27th 2003, 02:52 PM

I completely agree, but do you mean this regarding why God didn't create a different world as opposed to the one he did create?

I think so....at least I think that I mean it regarding some of the properties of the world that he created.

Kenny

September 29th 2003, 02:39 AM

Hi Mark,

Yeah ok, sounds like a good starting point....but to me, examining that in this context would lead to the question "why not universalism? Why not be merciful unto all?" but perhaps your view is that there are some individuals which it is impossible to regenerate?

There are two possible issues I detect here. The first is whether the ‘all’ in Romans 11 entails universalism. It does not, since in the context the ‘all’ simply means ‘both Jews and Gentiles as distinct groups’ rather than the extension of every single person within those groups (or, alternatively, the ‘all,’ in this context may refer to the ‘all Israel’ that will be saved – i.e. all within the elect community which consists of both Jews and Gentiles).

The second issue is just, philosophically, if determinism were true, then why wouldn’t universalism be true? You have proposed one possible solution. I don’t subscribe to it, but I think it is philosophically coherent (my problems with it are Biblical and theological). You suggested that there may be some whom it is impossible for God to regenerate. This would be similar to William Lane Craig’s proposal that all those who will be damned suffer from the condition of “transworld damnation,” – that is, under no possible circumstances would these persons freely choose to repent. Craig approaches this from a Molinist perspective, but I think my version of compatiblism is consistent with it as well, since I believe that our individual essences to some degree constrain what free choices God can cause us to make.

Of course, then the question would be why didn’t God simply not actualize any persons with the condition of transworld damnation? One possible solution to this dilemma might be that, given they way God set up the world, it was impossible for Him to actualize a large set of persons without at least some members of that set suffering from transworld damnation. For example, some views of human identity which see the identity of individual human persons as being derived from their parents require that in order for God to actualize a given individual, He must actualize all the individuals that make up that person’s family history. It may be that all possible large human family trees contain some tanswordly damned persons.

I don’t subscribe to the above view, however. The problem I have with that way of going is that I’m a Calvinist. The above would be a deterministic Arminianism (and, as strange as that might sound, I don’t think such is a contradiction in terms). My reasons for being a Calvinist are my reasons for rejecting the above idea, but those reasons are primarily Biblical and theological rather than philosophical. Since this thread is not specifically about Cavlinism but determinism, I won’t go further into those reasons here.

As a Calvinist, I believe that God could have, by drawing each person via efficacious grace, caused everyone to freely repent. But, then, if we deny universalism, the question is why doesn’t He? Honestly, I think there is genuine mystery here. I’m not a big fan of appeals to mystery, but in some cases they are warranted. If I were just going at this from a philosophical angle, I would be a deterministic universalist, but I do not think such a view is compatible with Scripture. I don’t think we are left totally clueless in this area either, however. Part of the reason behind God not saving everyone, I believe, is that God has chosen to be glorified through demonstrating His love and mercy in the full range of their attributes – including their sovereign freedom and non-obligatory (from God’s end) character. Beyond that, I do not claim to know much more, because Scripture does not tell us much more.

But then, my question would be why? You seem to hold a distinction between an individual's essence, and their properties as given by God which I can't quite understand (taken from other thread, see below)....surely a person is just that, a person, with no distinguishing features except those properties which they happen to have, and if that is so, then it is God who gives them these properties...even if these can then be claimed as their own....you wrote "To put it in a more common sense way, there is a certain set of qualities which make me who I am such that if (per impossible) God had attempted to create me without those qualities, it would have been someone else God ended up creating rather than myself." which is where I fall down really...I can't see these distinctions, there is perhaps a gradient of persons with different properties, but I think that the fact that you are you is rooted in that, and nothing else....just like a specific electron being a specific electron really.

This gets into the issue of what philosophers refer to as “transworld identity.” Intuitively we believe that it is possible that we could have been in different situations and still have remained the same person. For example, my wife and I chose to go see a play on Friday night, but we discussed other options. If things had been slightly different, we might not have gone to see that play. If we had not gone, some of our properties (e.g. our memories) would have been different, but we would still be the same persons that we are now. So there are logically possible worlds (remember that a logically possible world is just a coherent exhaustively descriptive set of possible circumstances) where we have different properties at this moment than we do at this moment in the actual world, yet we are the same people in those possible worlds as we are in the actual world. Likewise, if our past dieting habits had been different, we may have been fatter or skinnier than we are now, but we still would have been the same persons. Thus, my wife and I exist with differing properties across various possible worlds. Yet, if we really can say that we are the same people in all of those worlds then there must be some set of properties which we retain throughout all of those worlds which form the logical criteria for establishing our identities in those worlds. This set of properties for each of us is equivalent to our individual essences. Likewise, the intuitive beliefs that we might not have existed or that we retain personal identity over time but could cease to exist in the future, point to us having a set of transworld properties which establishes our identity across varying possible worlds, which in turn argues that some of our properties are essential (constant over varying possible worlds) while others are accidental (i.e. they very over differing possible worlds). Given that our essential properties are those which we exemplify in all possible worlds in which we exist, it is logically impossible for God to create us without those properties.

Perhaps I can formulate my possible objections to this idea here so I can see how they could be dealt with...It lies in the question of what it is for him to have mercy really (grrrr....just thought of something else which makes the situation a little annoying, but actually may help your case) Mercy would seem to be giving someone that which they don't deserve...ok...but why should it be true that creatures deserve to exist at all, why is not the creative act in itself sufficient for this criterion? Surely eternal life is just as much of an undeserved gift either way?

Mercy is more than just giving beings what they do not deserve; mercy is withholding judgment from beings which deserve to be condemned in addition to giving them good gifts which they do not deserve. You are right that all good gifts from God to any finite creature are undeserved, whether that creature be sinful or not. God’s giving undeserved good gifts to finite creatures is grace. Mercy is a very particular kind of grace, however. All mercy is grace, but not all grace is mercy. God’s giving of mercy exemplifies more of the full range of God’s character than His merely giving non-merciful grace would.

(This starts to confuse me a bit here in a deterministic universe, because everything that happens would happen necessarily (no?) even if our necessity is a derived one, so perhaps this is where it ties in....dunno)

I would say that the conditions for a deterministic universe are that every event which occurs follows as a logical consequence of the exhaustive set of antecedent circumstances which precedes it. That’s not quite the same as saying that every event happens necessarily, since to say that an event happens necessarily is to say that it happens in all logically possible worlds. I think it is coherent to maintain that there are differing logically possible worlds, with slightly different (or widely different) initial conditions and thus diverging sets of possible antecedent circumstances than those that actually obtain at a given moment in this world. It may be helpful for you to look at my explanation as to how holding a deterministic view still allows for the contingency of creation towards the end of this post (http://theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?postid=132424#post132424) (look for the four paragraph discussion on divine causation – you may need to refer back to some of the other posts on that thread for context, but I think that part, at least, stands largely independent from the rest).

In Christ,
Kenny

mickiel

September 29th 2003, 11:24 AM

No one can construt such a list. Nothing has ever occured, that God didnot want to occur, good or evil events included. If something happens that God didnot want to happen, it is more powerful than God. Nothing happened in the garden of Eden that God didnot want to happen. Nothing happens in life that God didnot want to happen. Many christians believe that God "allows" things to occur. This softens the reality of God doing evil in their minds, they cannot accept that God is in control of all things, including evil. Look at Job 42:11, notice Jobs family comforted him from all THE EVIL THAT GOD HAD BROUGHT ON HIM. This is uncomfortable to the christian mind. Actually we are very fortunate that God does control evil, if he didnot, we would really be in serious trouble. I used to believe that if satan could, he would murder mankind. Now i believe , if satan could, he would want to keep mankind alive to worship and serve him.

People misunderstand the awesome power of God. God does not share power-- or decesions OF power. For example, salvation is power, men think God allows mankind to share in that decesion of power, thinking we deceide for ourselves to be saved. This is the crux of the free will believers, they think God shares power and authority. Some christians are actually teaching we can TAKE authority for ourselves, spiritual authority. This teaching actually is a fruit of free will belief taken to more extremes.

Smitten

September 29th 2003, 02:57 PM

Kenny, just a quick question on something that confused me.

Craig approaches this from a Molinist perspective, but I think my version of compatiblism is consistent with it as well, since I believe that our individual essences to some degree constrain what free choices God can cause us to make.
How is your view different from molinism? Your description sounds like it to me.

Kenny

September 29th 2003, 07:32 PM

Yesterday @ 07:57 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=225662#post225662)
Smitten:

Kenny, just a quick question on something that confused me.

How is your view different from molinism? Your description sounds like it to me.

My view is not Molinism because I do not believe in libertarian free will (but compatiblist free will instead) and I am not an Arminian.

On the Molinist LFW model, if an agent, S, makes an LFW decision, D, in an exhaustive set of antecedent circumstances, C, there is a logically possible world in which S chooses ~D in the same exhaustive set of antecedent circumstances, C. Thus, God’s knowledge of which possible world would result if God were to actualize S in C is something over and above God’s natural knowledge of all possible worlds – hence, the Molinist term “middle knowledge.”

Like Molinists, I hold that God has counterfactual knowledge concerning what free will decisions given free agents would have made in alternative circumstances. Unlike Molinists, however, I maintain that everything which occurs, including free will decisions, are deterministic functions of antecedent circumstances. Thus, in my view, if S makes a decision, D, in the exhaustive set of antecedent circumstances, C, then there are no possible worlds in which S in C chooses ~D. Thus, on my view, God’s natural knowledge subsumes knowledge of counterfactuals of freedom and I have no need to postulate middle knowledge as an additional category. But, since I hold that truths concerning what free will decisions particular agents will make in given sets of exhaustive antecedent circumstances are necessary truths, this has the philosophical consequence that there are logical constraints on the types of free will decisions God can cause free agents to make. If S chooses D in the exhaustive set of antecedent circumstances, C, then on my view it was logically impossible for God to create a world in which S chooses ~D in C, because there are no such logically possible worlds.

Philosophically, I think this view is compatible with Arminianism as I explained above. But, I’m not an Arminian. My Calvinism extends beyond mere philosophical concerns to Biblical and theological ones.

In Christ,
Kenny

Stephen

September 29th 2003, 07:43 PM

I'd say it all boils down to God's glory. With no sin, God may have been able to show power and love, but only in a world of sinfulness could God demonstrate His grace and mercy and forgiveness, and justice

Smitten

September 30th 2003, 12:07 AM

Kenny,

Thanks for the clarification. I think I(as a calvinist who has serious problems with both molinism and libertarian free will) understand the difference between your view of compatibilism and molinism, but I guess I still take issue with it.

Correct me if i'm mistaken in my understanding on this. According to the molinist, God's foreknowledge of an agent's free choices(via middle knowledge) is possible because God knows the agent's essence. This eternal(logically prior to God's decree) essence of the agent is the "evidence" that God has access to that is the means by which his middle knowledge is possible. So even though the agent has LFW, God can know what the agent will freely choose(even though there are possible worlds in which the agent would choose differently). There is only one possible world(regarding one choice) that God can in fact actualize(the one he knows will be chosen).

In your view, the agent has an eternal essence as well. However, due to the lack of LFW, there are no other possible worlds regarding a single choice, as the outcome is determined.

However, in both views, the effects and limitations on God's creative options are the same. There is only one world(in referrence to a single choice) that can be actualized. And, in both views, that one world is determined by and contingent on man's choice.

I think there may be problems(for the calvinist especially) with believing in the idea of eternal essences that exist logically prior to God's creative decrees, regardless of whether one holds to LFW or not. Is there really a substantial difference between one whose choices are:
1. free from causality(LFW)
and
2. determined by an essence free from causality(your CFW)?
It almost seems like semantics to me, I'm not seeing a genuine difference. In both cases, it seems to me, the agent has the same kind of autonomy.

Kenny

September 30th 2003, 03:34 PM

Today @ 05:07 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=226189#post226189)
Smitten:

Kenny,

Thanks for the clarification. I think I(as a calvinist who has serious problems with both molinism and libertarian free will) understand the difference between your view of compatibilism and molinism, but I guess I still take issue with it.

Correct me if i'm mistaken in my understanding on this. According to the molinist, God's foreknowledge of an agent's free choices(via middle knowledge) is possible because God knows the agent's essence. This eternal(logically prior to God's decree) essence of the agent is the "evidence" that God has access to that is the means by which his middle knowledge is possible.

Whether a Molinist believes God’s knowledge of what an LFW agent would do in various circumstances is grounded in God’s knowledge of that agent’s essence varies from Molinist to Molinist. No Molinist holds that the paticular free will decisions an LFW agent would make are actually essential properties of that agent (they cannot be, since there is a possible world, according to Molinism, where an agent makes a different choice in exactly the same circumstances). However, some Molinists regard the truths about what an agent would do in particular circumstances to be grounded in contingent properties of that agent’s essence. Others would formulate things differently. Nevertheless, for all Molinists, as I understand their view, God’s ability to refer to a particular possible agent prior to its creation stems from the fact that the agent’s essence exists eternally in God’s mind as a description of that possible agent.

If any Molinists would like to add corrections to this account, feel free.

So even though the agent has LFW, God can know what the agent will freely choose(even though there are possible worlds in which the agent would choose differently). There is only one possible world(regarding one choice) that God can in fact actualize(the one he knows will be chosen).

That’s right. On Molinism, there are logically possible worlds which God does not have access to. Which possible worlds God has access to depend on certain contingent aspects of reality which are independent of both God’s nature and decree. This marks a significant metaphysical and theological difference between Molinism and my view. I hold that there are no propositions whose truth values do not depend either on God’s nature or on God’s decree.

In your view, the agent has an eternal essence as well. However, due to the lack of LFW, there are no other possible worlds regarding a single choice, as the outcome is determined.

Yes, so in my view God can actualize all logically possible worlds. In Molinism, He can’t.

However, in both views, the effects and limitations on God's creative options are the same.

On my view, the limitations are strictly logical. Unless we’re going to adopt nominalism (which, BTW, I find incompatible with other basic Christian convictions such as the essential goodness of God and the doctrine of the Trinity) and an extreme divine voluntarism, we have to concede that at least some things are true independently of God’s will. For example, I do not believe that God could have created a perfectly spherical object with a circumference to diameter ratio equal to something other than the numerical value of pi. That’s because having a circumference to diameter ratio equal to pi is an essential attribute of a perfectly spherical object, and this is true because of the nature of mathematical abstractions, not because of anything God voluntarily determined. However, while I hold that there are some truths which are independent of God’s will, contrary to Molinism, I do not believe that there are any truths which are independent of God. I hold that abstractions and the truths regarding them, are metaphysically grounded in God’s nature, which cannot be other than it is.

There is only one world(in referrence to a single choice) that can be actualized. And, in both views, that one world is determined by and contingent on man's choice.

Actually, on my view, there are no contingent limitations on which possible worlds God can actualize. On my view, God can actualize any possible world.

I think there may be problems(for the calvinist especially) with believing in the idea of eternal essences that exist logically prior to God's creative decrees, regardless of whether one holds to LFW or not.

If one does not hold that at least some abstractions, at least some essences (such as my example of the essence of a sphere above), exist eternally independent of God’s decrees, then the only option is nominalism and extreme divine voluntarism and these, in my view, have very negative theological consequences.

Is there really a substantial difference between one whose choices are:
1. free from causality(LFW)
and
2. determined by an essence free from causality(your CFW)?

On my view, essences do not causally determine anything (they are just abstractions with no causal powers), though they do logically determine some things. It is true that I hold that essences exist as they are independently of God’s decrees but not independently of God (they are grounded in God’s nature). This is very different from the Molinist view that there are eternal independent contingent conditions which place restrictions of God’s power.

It almost seems like semantics to me, I'm not seeing a genuine difference. In both cases, it seems to me, the agent has the same kind of autonomy.

If by “autonomy,” you mean that some aspects of the agent or the reality pertaining to the agent are independent of God, then that is true on Molinism but not on my view for the reasons I have explained above.

There are further practical differences. LFW denies that human actions are grounded in essence and character. My view affirms this. In this respect, I’m not sure how compatible LFW really is with a Biblical view of original sin (I am a five point Calvinist – I affirm the doctrine of total depravity). Because of this difference between my view and Molinism, I can consistently maintain that human beings are incapable of doing what is good outside of God’s grace and still maintain that human beings are morally responsible for their failure to do what is good in the absence of God’s grace. If an LFW advocate is being consistent, she must deny this.

I realize that those Calvinists whose primary aim is to maintain the highest view of God’s sovereignty and power possible will have problems with my account. But, the motive behind my Calvinism is not to hold the highest possible view of divine sovereignty. My motives are to exalt the grace of God and take away in grounds for boasting in human beings. To that end, I want to do two things. First, I want to lay as much responsibility as possible on human beings for their sin. I am concerned that we not regard God as the direct cause of human evil. To do otherwise, I think, compromises God’s grace because then God’s grace becomes nothing more than God getting us out of a situation that God directly placed us in the first place. It would be like someone tossing me in the deep water, waiting until I nearly drowned, rescuing me and then expecting me to be thankful for it. Instead, I want to say that I jumped in the deep water and deserved to drown, but that God graciously pulled me out. It’s this first reason which forms the primary motive for my formulating a model where there are some logical restrictions on the extent to which God voluntarily determined what free will decisions we make. I want to put some sort of hedge around our sin and what God freely determined, but do so in a way that does not in any real sense compromise God’s sovereignty (hence my reason for making the restrictions strictly logical in nature).

Second, I want to deny any grounds for human boasting either in their salvation or in their good works. Hence, I hold that it is impossible for human beings to freely respond to God in the absence of God’s efficacious grace. Furthermore, I hold that any good works which human beings do, they would not have done were it not for the grace of God at work within them (even the good works of unbelievers, I hold, are the result of the influence of God’s common grace). In the absence of God’s grace, we would have spurned everything to do with God and we would have done only evil instead. Notice that assertions such as the above imply truths concerning counterfactual conditions pertaining to our morally responsible choices. We would not have done some action, A (repentance, good works), were it not for some circumstance, C (God’s grace).

In Christ,
Kenny

Smitten

October 1st 2003, 03:59 PM

Kenny,

Smitten:In your view, the agent has an eternal essence as well. However, due to the lack of LFW, there are no other possible worlds regarding a single choice, as the outcome is determined.
Kenny:Yes, so in my view God can actualize all logically possible worlds. In Molinism, He can’t.
Ok, but the amount of worlds that God cannot actualize is the same isn't it? It doesn't seem to me that your view grants God any more "power" or creative options than the molinist account. In your view, the number of logically possible worlds is the same as the number of molinist actualizable worlds. God is left with the same amount of pieces to work with. Maybe this is redundant and you admit this, but it seemed to me you were saying God had more creative capacity in your view, which I am not seeing.

On my view, the limitations are strictly logical. Unless we’re going to adopt nominalism (which, BTW, I find incompatible with other basic Christian convictions such as the essential goodness of God and the doctrine of the Trinity) and an extreme divine voluntarism, we have to concede that at least some things are true independently of God’s will.
I have to admit I'm not familiar with the meanins of nominalism and divine voluntarism. I probably understand the ideas behind them but not by those names. From the context, it seems to me they imply that God ordains all things, including sin. Am i understanding you?

For example, I do not believe that God could have created a perfectly spherical object with a circumference to diameter ratio equal to something other than the numerical value of pi. That’s because having a circumference to diameter ratio equal to pi is an essential attribute of a perfectly spherical object, and this is true because of the nature of mathematical abstractions, not because of anything God voluntarily determined.
I don't see how this is analogous to God's capabilities, or lack of, in determining human events and choices. In the above, God is also the ground for the mathematical and logical laws that those shapes depend on. A square circle or such as above is simply contradiction of terms, they are not 'limits' on God. They are logical, but i would not call them logical "limits" because God is the source of the laws. Maybe I'm misunderstanding you and this is a moot point.

However, while I hold that there are some truths which are independent of God’s will, contrary to Molinism, I do not believe that there are any truths which are independent of God. I hold that abstractions and the truths regarding them, are metaphysically grounded in God’s nature, which cannot be other than it is.
How about this. Do you not agree that if man freely creates his own essence, that it is possible that one could have had a different essence than the one God "foresaw" them having? If this is the case, isn't this a striking similarity to molinism? Only, instead of having possible worlds generated by the same essence, you have possible essences all generating one world each(per choice), resulting in an equal number of logically possible worlds between the two views.

There are further practical differences. LFW denies that human actions are grounded in essence and character. My view affirms this.
Yes, but it seems that the agent freely creates his own essence, which doesn't seem very different from LFW. Whereas in LFW, an agent chooses autonomously from the circumstances, in your CFW, the agent chooses autonomously his essence, which then determines a choice based on that and the circumstances. Well, actually i think i do see a major difference, being that you don't hold that the will is autonomous from external circumstances, as LFW does. However, the essence itself, how is that not created in a libertarian fashion?

I’m not sure how compatible LFW really is with a Biblical view of original sin
I agree, I think the two ideas contradict each other.

Also, how does your view of essences relate to total depravity?

I realize that those Calvinists whose primary aim is to maintain the highest view of God’s sovereignty and power possible will have problems with my account. But, the motive behind my Calvinism is not to hold the highest possible view of divine sovereignty. My motives are to exalt the grace of God and take away in grounds for boasting in human beings. To that end, I want to do two things. First, I want to lay as much responsibility as possible on human beings for their sin. I am concerned that we not regard God as the direct cause of human evil. To do otherwise, I think, compromises God’s grace because then God’s grace becomes nothing more than God getting us out of a situation that God directly placed us in the first place. It would be like someone tossing me in the deep water, waiting until I nearly drowned, rescuing me and then expecting me to be thankful for it. Instead, I want to say that I jumped in the deep water and deserved to drown, but that God graciously pulled me out. It’s this first reason which forms the primary motive for my formulating a model where there are some logical restrictions on the extent to which God voluntarily determined what free will decisions we make. I want to put some sort of hedge around our sin and what God freely determined, but do so in a way that does not in any real sense compromise God’s sovereignty (hence my reason for making the restrictions strictly logical in nature).
I think I understand your motives. I can see this point of view in relation to the Fall, but how is this relevant to any of us? We are born into sin. To work off of your imagery above, Adam pushed us into the water. How can sinners after the fall be held morally accountable in this case, if moral responsibility is only possible for those who freely jump in?

Second, I want to deny any grounds for human boasting either in their salvation or in their good works.
Amen to that!

Hence, I hold that it is impossible for human beings to freely respond to God in the absence of God’s efficacious grace. Furthermore, I hold that any good works which human beings do, they would not have done were it not for the grace of God at work within them.
How does an individual's autonomous essence fit into this? If we can only do good because of God's grace, what is it that our essence does?

Kenny

October 1st 2003, 06:40 PM

Today @ 08:59 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=228832#post228832)
Smitten:

Ok, but the amount of worlds that God cannot actualize is the same isn't it? It doesn't seem to me that your view grants God any more "power" or creative options than the molinist account.

All else being equal, I agree. All else being equal, there would just be fewer possible worlds on my account than on the Molinist account. But, I don’t think all is quite equal when all the rest of my views are taken into consideration. For instance, I have a much higher view of the power and efficaciousness of God’s grace to move human choices than any consistent Arminian could, so in terms of my view in its entirety (not restricted to just this particular issue), I would say that there is much more, practically speaking, that God is able to accomplish on my view than on the Molinist view.

Maybe this is redundant and you admit this, but it seemed to me you were saying God had more creative capacity in your view, which I am not seeing.

All else being equal, God would be just as restricted on my view as on Molinism. But, all else is not equal given that I have a higher view of the power of God’s grace than most Molinists do.

I have to admit I'm not familiar with the meanins of nominalism and divine voluntarism. I probably understand the ideas behind them but not by those names. From the context, it seems to me they imply that God ordains all things, including sin. Am i understanding you?

I believe that God ordains all things, including sin, also (though I believe God’s decretive will has both active and passive components to it), so that’s not what I was referring to. Nominalism is a denial of any sort of metaphysical realities to abstractions – abstractions are ultimately nothing more than just the conventional names that we give to groups of individual things according to this view. Nominalism entails that there are no genuine universals but only particulars. As I see it, a denial that there are no truths outside of God’s decree equates to a denial of the metaphysical reality of abstractions. Denial of the metaphysical reality of abstractions, when combined with theism, entails divine voluntarism – the idea that all things are as they are (including mathematical, logical and moral truths) simply because that is what God decreed them to be. Thus, on divine voluntarism, goodness, for example, (since there is no reality to any sort of abstraction under the name ‘goodness’) is simply what God decides is good. God has decided that it is good for us to love our neighbor so that’s what is good, but if God had decided that we should rape, pillage and burn our neighbors, then such would have been good instead. To me such a view would make any claim to the effect that God is good a semantically empty statement. I also do not believe that a denial of abstractions is compatible with the doctrine of the Trinity since classical Trinitarian formulations presuppose the metaphysical realties of concepts such as ‘essence’ and ‘being.’

I don't see how this is analogous to God's capabilities, or lack of, in determining human events and choices. In the above, God is also the ground for the mathematical and logical laws that those shapes depend on. A square circle or such as above is simply contradiction of terms, they are not 'limits' on God.

Likewise, the individual essence of a person is just a mathematical/logical abstraction – it is simply a set of properties which describe a possible person. God is just as much the ground of our individual essences as He is the ground of all other abstractions.

They are logical, but i would not call them logical "limits" because God is the source of the laws. Maybe I'm misunderstanding you and this is a moot point.

They are not limits in the sense that they present any real possibilities that God cannot actualize, though they are limits in the sense that they restrict the range of what conceivable actions God can perform. For example, I do not know if God can create a perfect sphere with a circumference to diameter ratio where the 10^100 place in the base ten decimal expansion of that ratio is equal to 2 because I don’t know whether or not the 10^100 place in the base ten decimal expansion of pi is equal to 2. Thus, there is a conceivable action here that for all I know God could do. Likewise, there are nine other conceivable actions, so far as I know, pertaining to God actualizing spheres with differing numbers in the 10^100 place in that ratio. But, logical possibility restricts all of these conceivable possibilities to just one that God can actually do.

How about this. Do you not agree that if man freely creates his own essence, that it is possible that one could have had a different essence than the one God "foresaw" them having?

No, human beings cannot create their essences any more than they can create mathematical abstractions. An essence is nothing more than an abstraction – the set of properties an object has in all possible worlds in which it exists. It is logically impossible for the same individual to have a different essence because then it would, by definition, no longer be the same individual.

Yes, but it seems that the agent freely creates his own essence, which doesn't seem very different from LFW.

No, on the contrary, an agent’s essence eternally precedes the existence of that agent and logically (but not causally) constrains what that agent can freely do. The agent is as it is as a logical function of its essence and not vice versa.

Whereas in LFW, an agent chooses autonomously from the circumstances, in your CFW, the agent chooses autonomously his essence, which then determines a choice based on that and the circumstances.

No, this is mistaken. The agent doesn’t choose her essence. Her essence is an eternal given. It is simply that abstract description of what makes that agent who she is.

Well, actually i think i do see a major difference, being that you don't hold that the will is autonomous from external circumstances, as LFW does. However, the essence itself, how is that not created in a libertarian fashion?

The essence isn’t created at all. It exists in the same way that all other abstractions exist – eternally in the mind of God as part of His natural knowledge.

Also, how does your view of essences relate to total depravity?

My view is that our actions are deterministic functions of our character which is in turn a deterministic function of our essence and total set of life circumstances. See the link I gave to Mark in my first post concerning my view of original sin for how I see our essences as related to the fall. Given the fall, our character is now marred by sin and this effects every aspect of our being.

I think I understand your motives. I can see this point of view in relation to the Fall, but how is this relevant to any of us? We are born into sin. To work off of your imagery above, Adam pushed us into the water. How can sinners after the fall be held morally accountable in this case, if moral responsibility is only possible for those who freely jump in?

Given that I have a semi-realist view of the fall, I would say that there is some meaningful sense in which we all freely jumped in the water along with Adam through Adam’s act of jumping. Again, see the link I gave to Mark on my view of original sin.

How does an individual's autonomous essence fit into this? If we can only do good because of God's grace, what is it that our essence does?

Our essence doesn’t really do anything – it's just an abstraction, a description of a possible person, including a description of how that person would freely act in all possible circumstances. Give the circumstance of the fall, our essences describe us as beings which always freely choose to do evil when left to our own choices apart form God’s grace.

In Christ,
Kenny

Smitten

October 1st 2003, 11:30 PM

Kenny,

I read your post with your view of the Fall and original sin. I think I'm still missing some things regarding essences. If the agent does not create their own essence, and God does not create it(He is eternally aware of it, independent of his will), where does it come from?

Kenny

October 2nd 2003, 11:38 AM

Smitten,

Our essences come from the same place that all other abstractions come from – they exist eternally in God’s mind as a result of God’s self-contemplation and they are grounded in and reflections of God’s nature. As a Trinitarian being, God exists in an infinitely rich variety of eternal and necessary relationships to Himself, as an infinitely rich interplay between the one and the many. All logical and mathematical abstractions are reflections of the infinitely rich variety of eternal and necessary relationships within God’s being.

In terms of the order of God’s knowing, God, in a single eternal act contemplates the fullness of his own divine nature and as a consequence obtains knowledge of all possible worlds He could create. Among all of these possible worlds, some propositions are true throughout all of them because they reflect essential truths of God’s nature. Among such necessary truths there are truths pertaining to logical and mathematical abstractions. God’s knowledge in these respects is referred to as God’s “natural knowledge.” Since God’s natural knowledge is based on God’s eternal and necessary contemplation of His own eternal and necessary being, the content of this knowledge is also eternal and necessary. Because this knowledge is directly dependent on God’s nature, it is also true that God does not volitionally determine its content any more than God volitionally determined to exist or to be Triune. Of course, God does necessarily will to be eternally faithful to His own nature, so these things, though not volitionally determined by God, are not contrary to God’s will either.

Within the contents of God’s natural knowledge, there are abstract descriptions of possible persons (i.e. individual personal essences) which God could create if He so wills. In creating humanity, God selected from among the set of all possible persons He could create a certain subset of possible persons to, in fact, create. God could have selected other possible persons from this set to create if He wanted to, but He chose to create those persons He did in accordance with His own purposes.

God Bless,
Kenny

Smitten

October 2nd 2003, 01:46 PM

Kenny,

Aside from the discussion that could be made regarding essences and their relation to God's natural knowledge, let me ask about this point. How does this grant humans any freedom? How is God, in the Fall, still not pushing us into sin? We have no conrol of our essences whatsoever, and since our moral choices are determined by circumstances + character(circumstances + essence), what ground is there for our moral responsibility?

Kenny

October 2nd 2003, 02:08 PM

Today @ 06:46 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=230241#post230241)
Smitten:

Kenny,

Aside from the discussion that could be made regarding essences and their relation to God's natural knowledge, let me ask about this point. How does this grant humans any freedom? How is God, in the Fall, still not pushing us into sin? We have no conrol of our essences whatsoever, and since our moral choices are determined by circumstances + character(circumstances + essence), what ground is there for our moral responsibility?

Keep in mind that our essences only logically determine our choices but they do not causally determine them. Remember that at the end of the day all of our individual essences are simply nothing more than abstract descriptions of our selves. Think of God’s nature for an analogy. God’s nature logically determines that God never does anything evil. Yet, God’s nature has no causal power over God but it is rather nothing more than an abstract description of God. God is the agent who acts, not God’s nature. Likewise, our individual essences describe what we will do in any given circumstance. However, our essences have no real causal power over us. We are the agents who do the action. Our essences simply describe what sort of agents we are.

To say that our actions are deterministic functions of our individual essences is really nothing more than to say that our actions flow out of who we are as individual moral agents. We are responsible for our actions because we are the cause of them. This is the Biblical view of moral responsibility, BTW, a bad tree cannot bear good fruit and a good tree cannot bear bad fruit. Unlike as is the case with LFW, the Bible presents no causal disconnection between our choices and the core of our being – rather, the later is the source of the former. In fact, because LFW severs this causal connection, I actually think LFW is incompatible with moral responsibility. See this link (http://theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&threadid=5896&perpage=16&pagenumber=1) for a further argument along these lines.

In Christ,
Kenny

Smitten

October 2nd 2003, 04:42 PM

Kenny,

an agent’s essence eternally precedes the existence of that agent and logically (but not causally) constrains what that agent can freely do.

Remember that at the end of the day all of our individual essences are simply nothing more than abstract descriptions of our selves.

Likewise, our individual essences describe what we will do in any given circumstance. However, our essences have no real causal power over us. We are the agents who do the action. Our essences simply describe what sort of agents we are.

I'm not sure i understand. The first quote, which was from an earlier post, seemed to me to indicate that one's essence is something that is bestowed on them, that they have no control over, limiting their freedom. From your last post, I'm getting the impression that our essence only describes what we already are.

In your view of compatibilism, an agent's essence is key in determining what he will choose. But, if an essence is merely a description of what we will choose, we have just come full circle without explaining anything. "Why does an agent choose the way they do?" "Because of their essence." "Well what is the essence?" "It's a description of what we will do."

If something is describing something, it follows that there is something that exists that is being described. If essences are only descriptions, it seems to me that the thing that works to determine our actions(and that our character largely consists of) is not our essence, but is something else(whatever the essence is describing).

We are the agents who do the action. Our essences simply describe what sort of agents we are.
If our essences describe us, what is it really about us that makes us free? On what basis do we have moral responsibility? I, like you, do not believe in LFW, but what can you put in its place? What is it that makes us the "sort of agents we are"?

Kenny

October 3rd 2003, 01:41 PM

Yesterday @ 09:42 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=230534#post230534)
Smitten:

Kenny,

I'm not sure i understand. The first quote, which was from an earlier post, seemed to me to indicate that one's essence is something that is bestowed on them, that they have no control over, limiting their freedom. From your last post, I'm getting the impression that our essence only describes what we already are.

Our essences describe who we are in terms of what we have in common in all logically possible worlds in which exist. In other words, one’s individual essence is equivalent to the set of properties which remain constant throughout all the logically possible ways one could have been different and yet still have been considered the same individual. Your individual essence would have existed even if you never did because even if you had not existed, the possibility that you might have existed if things had been different would still have remained. Broad logical possibility remains independent of what occurs in the actual world because no matter how things have actually turned out, we can still refer to alternative ways things could have turned out.

It’s probably not the best wording then to say that your individual essence was “bestowed on you.” Your individual essence simply describes the core of who you are – the set of properties which make you you. In a sense, it is the definition of you. God cannot create you without instantiating the set of properties which makes up your essence because if He had, it would have been some different possible person God had created and not you at all.
Your essence logically restricts your freedom only in the sense that how you act is ultimately contingent on who you are. For instance, I know a lot about my wife’s character. Thus, I can predict with a great deal of confidence how she will react in various situations. In a sense, you might say that my wife’s character “restricts” the types of free choices she can make. But this is no real limitation on her freedom. When my wife acts in accordance with her character, she is simply being who she is. In fact, I would say that if my wife started acting in radically different ways from what I know her character to be, I would be likely to conclude that something was wrong with her (perhaps a severe chemical imbalance or something) which was actually interfering with her freedom.

In your view of compatibilism, an agent's essence is key in determining what he will choose. But, if an essence is merely a description of what we will choose, we have just come full circle without explaining anything. "Why does an agent choose the way they do?" "Because of their essence." "Well what is the essence?" "It's a description of what we will do."

I hold that the individual essence of a person is first and foremost primarily description of who that person is. It is the basic set of moral and spiritual characteristics which describe that individual at the core of her being. We might call these sorts of properties which pertain directly to who the agent is, ‘first order essential properties.’ However, given that our actions flow out of who we are, our first order essential properties entail second order essential properties about how we would act in accordance with who we are in various counterfactual situations. Both first order essential properties and second order essential properties are indeed essential properties because they are properties which the agent has in all possible worlds in which she exists, but the latter logically derives from the former and not vice versa.

So, to start answering the questions above: Why does an agent choose the way she does? Because she acts in accordance with her first order essential properties. Well what are her first order essential properties? They are a logical description of who she is at the core of her being. Well why is she who she is? This question has no further answer since it pertains to basic issues of identity which are irreducible; it’s like asking why is A identical to A?

If something is describing something, it follows that there is something that exists that is being described.

Not necessarily. A unicorn is a horse-like animal with a single horn on its forehead. Hobbits are little people with furry feet. I just described some things to you which do not exist.

If essences are only descriptions, it seems to me that the thing that works to determine our actions(and that our character largely consists of) is not our essence, but is something else(whatever the essence is describing).

I would say what works to determine our actions is the logical/causal structure of the world as it actually is and which we as moral agents form irreducible parts of. In other words, we as causal agents acting in accordance with who we are in the world as it is determine our actions.

I think a lot of confusion in these discussions stems from the fact that we tend to still think in the enlightenment categories of atomism and causal reductionism, where the whole is simply reduced to the sum of the parts, even though our philosophy and our science is starting to unravel this view. So we tend to think that if what we do is a deterministic function of the circumstances which came before us, then the causal explanation for our actions reduces to those circumstances. However, in physics we see all sorts of counterexamples to this sort of thinking. The behavior of a chaotic system, for example, is (in principle at least) deterministically described by the same mathematical laws which describe all the inputs that made up the system in the first place and continue to be fed into the system and which describe the behaviors of all the parts of the system, but we know that the behavior of such a system cannot (even in principle) be reductively explained in terms of the external inputs to that system nor in terms of the individual parts which make up that system. The system’s behavior can only be explained by making reference to the configuration of that system as a whole. As it turns out, in many cases the whole is indeed greater than the sum of the parts.

Likewise, I affirm that free human actions are deterministic functions of the logical/causal structure of the world, but I deny that such entails that free human actions can be reductively explained solely in terms of antecedent factors external to the human agents themselves. The human agents themselves must be appealed to as causal actors in the situation in order to explain their free behavior. Because human beings, causally acting as moral agents, play a definitive causal role in terms of explaining their free actions, they are morally accountable for those actions.

If our essences describe us, what is it really about us that makes us free?

We are free because our actions genuinely stem from who we are as moral agents, without the causal explanations for those actions reducing to causal factors external to ourselves.

On what basis do we have moral responsibility?

We are morally responsible for our free actions because we form the definitive causal explanation for those actions.

I, like you, do not believe in LFW, but what can you put in its place?

The Biblical view that morally responsible action flows out of who we are as moral agents.

What is it that makes us the "sort of agents we are"?

If you mean, what makes us the sort of agents who we are qua character, the answer is that our characters are deterministic functions of our individual essences and total life circumstances. If you mean, what makes us the sort of agents we are qua essence, then the answer is simply that’s who we are by definition. What is it that makes A, A? At this point you are asking about basic issues of identity and thus have reached a point where there can be no further reduction in explanation.

In Christ,
Kenny

Smitten

October 3rd 2003, 02:57 PM

Kenny,

Thanks for your continued clarification. I'm trying to understand your view the best I can, i think i'm partly curious because i haven't heard something like this coming from a calvinist before.

Is one born with all their essential qualities in place? Or can one take part in developing them to a certain extent?

And, what is it about an agent's essence that qualifies it as part of God's natural knowledge. If one's essence is purely their own core being, belonging only to them and giving them their moral agency, what does it have to do with God? God knows about them of course, but how are they necessary to Him? And how is their existence necessary at all?

Is there an infinite number of essences, or a finite set?

Kenny

October 6th 2003, 07:39 PM

10-03-2003 @ 07:57 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=232537#post232537)
Smitten:

Kenny,

Thanks for your continued clarification. I'm trying to understand your view the best I can, i think i'm partly curious because i haven't heard something like this coming from a calvinist before.

My views may be somewhat idiosyncratic, but, ultimately, I believe they fall within the general parameters of the Reformed tradition. As I’m sure you well know, there is great diversity within Calvinist thought. I’m more of an infralapsarian style Calvinist (i.e. low Calvinist). I do affirm all five points of Calvinism, however.

But, in terms of aspects of the Reformed tradition itself which I am drawing on, I note that the Westminster Confession speaks of God working through both primary and secondary causes. If this is so, if everything does not ultimately simply reduce to God as primary cause, there must be some genuine causal integrity and causal power that can be ascribed to creation itself which is distinct from simple divine causation. Also, I think the Reformed emphasis on the Creator/creature distinction requires us to affirm such, not to mention the broader rejection of pantheism just in terms of orthodox Christianity itself. Along such lines, Calvinists often speak of God’s decretive will having both active and passive aspects to it. God is said to directly cause some things and to merely permit others. My model is one way of philosophically working through such distinctions.

Furthermore, many Calvinists affirm some sort of compatiblist view of free will. Calvinists also hold that human beings are both fully morally responsible for their sins but also incapable of turning to God apart from God’s efficacious grace. Often Calvinists say that humans are responsible for their sins not in spite of the fact but because of the fact that they are acting from their nature. Calvinists affirm that people are not sinners because they sin but they sin because they are sinners. I am trying to construct a philosophical model which fits these claims together in a coherent fashion, and I don’t think I am stepping outside of the boundaries of distinctions found within the resources of the Reformed tradition itself.

Also, outside of theological concerns, there are broader philosophical issues at work here, including issues of causation, personal identity, analysis of counterfactual conditionals and even philosophy of language.

Is one born with all their essential qualities in place? Or can one take part in developing them to a certain extent?

Since one’s essential qualities are by definition those properties which one possesses in all logically possible worlds in which she exists, it is logically impossible that they could have been different. So, yes, one is born with all of her essential qualities in place. But it is important to remember that one’s essence is just an abstract description of who one is, and it does not have any causal powers over one. One acts consistently with one’s essence simply because one’s essence is an accurate description of who one is, not because one’s essence compels one to act in certain ways.

And, what is it about an agent's essence that qualifies it as part of God's natural knowledge. If one's essence is purely their own core being, belonging only to them and giving them their moral agency, what does it have to do with God?

An essence is just an abstraction. It is not the actual core of one's being, but the set of qualities that adhere to one in the core of one's being. One's being is concrete, but one's essence is abstract. So, like all abstractions, one's essence exists eternally and necessarily even though one's self does not. One’s individual essence is just a description of the possible person that one happens to be. Even before I existed, the idea of me existed in God’s mind as an option of a possible person He could create. Likewise, there are several possible persons God could have created but didn’t, but God is aware of the possibility that these persons could have existed if He had chosen to create them. Likewise, if God had chosen not to create me, He still would have been aware of the possibility of my existence. This is a simple affirmation that God’s omniscience includes not only all actualities but all possibilities as well.

God knows about them of course, but how are they necessary to Him? And how is their existence necessary at all?

They are necessary to God because knowing all possibilities is a necessary property of omniscience.

Is there an infinite number of essences, or a finite set?

This depends on the class of objects concerning which one is speaking. For example, pertaining to the class of all integers, the set of individual essences pertaining to members belonging to this set is infinite because the number of individual members of that class is infinite. Pertaining to the class of prime numbers between one and ten, however, the number of individual essences pertaining to members belonging to this set is finite. Some classes of individual essences may not properly be viewed as a set. There are some good philosophical reasons for believing there are an infinite number of true propositions but no set of true propositions for example, though that takes us into matters far beyond this topic.

With respect to the issue of whether the set of possible persons is infinite or finite, it may depend somewhat on philosophical views of personal identity. My intuitions point to the set of possible persons being infinite and I might even be able to work up a formal argument or two for that if I put my mind to it, but I don’t care to press the issue.

In Christ,
Kenny

Smitten

October 6th 2003, 10:44 PM

Kenny,

Since one’s essential qualities are by definition those properties which one possesses in all logically possible worlds in which she exists, it is logically impossible that they could have been different. So, yes, one is born with all of her essential qualities in place. But it is important to remember that one’s essence is just an abstract description of who one is, and it does not have any causal powers over one. One acts consistently with one’s essence simply because one’s essence is an accurate description of who one is, not because one’s essence compels one to act in certain ways
If one is born with their essential properties, where is the moral responsibility or causal integrity? If I'm born with the properties that will determine(in conjunction with circumstance) my choices, where is my freedom? I don't have any control over my essential properties. I'm not saying one's essence forces them to action, as essences are abstract descriptions, I'm talking about the properties themselves.

And as far as calvinism in general and interpreting the WCF, I think a fundamental difference between us is understanding of foreknowledge. I think God has foreknowledge of something because he has ordained it. I don't think any other view of foreknowledge(infallible foreknowledge) is coherent.

Kenny

October 7th 2003, 03:04 AM

Today @ 03:44 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=235965#post235965)
Smitten:

Kenny,

If one is born with their essential properties, where is the moral responsibility or causal integrity? If I'm born with the properties that will determine(in conjunction with circumstance) my choices, where is my freedom?

There’s that Enlightenment assumption of causal reductionism again. You are assuming that if your actions are a deterministic function of prior causes then the causal explanation for your actions reduces to those prior causes. We have every reason in terms of contemporary physics to believe that this assumption is false. See my discussion of chaotic systems a few posts ago. Furthermore, the reductionist assumption itself is one very peculiar to the culture of Modernism in the West and one which was not held by the culture in which the Bible itself was written. Drop that assumption and your conclusion doesn’t follow.

Your freedom lies in the fact that you yourself, acting holistically as a personal agent exhibiting both knowledge and intent, are the direct cause of your actions. Your actions cannot be fully causally explained without making reference to you yourself as an intentional moral agent acting causally within the situation even though those actions may follow as a deterministic function of prior causes. You (by God’s permission and concurrence) are the deciding causal factor in the situation, not the prior causes. The whole is greater than the sum of the parts.

I don't have any control over my essential properties. I'm not saying one's essence forces them to action, as essences are abstract descriptions, I'm talking about the properties themselves.

Again, to say that just because one’s actions follow as a deterministic function of one’s individual qualities means that the explanation of one’s actions reduces strictly to those qualities is to make the unwarranted assumption of causal reductionism.

Furthermore, strictly speaking, I would hold that individual properties are also abstractions. Even though I may have used the terms ‘qualities’ and ‘properties’ interchangeably in the course of this discussion in certain places, I think that if I did it was sloppy of me to do so. From here on out, I’ll allow the term ‘quality’ to refer to some concrete feature of something and the term ‘property’ to refer to an abstract description of a quality. I know it may sound like a point of minutia, but I think the distinction is actually very important for this discussion. The individual qualities of something adhere to that thing and depend on that thing for their existence, but properties exist as abstractions independently of any given thing. So, for example, if a sweater is blue, the individual quality ‘the blueness of that sweater’ depends for its existence on the existence of that sweater. The property ‘blueness’ itself, however, exists as an abstraction independently of any particular object. Qualities may or may not exhibit causal powers. Properties do not exhibit causal powers at all. I do not hold that individual qualities exist eternally independent of the agents to which they adhere, but individual properties do exist eternally independent of the agents they happen to describe.

I think God has foreknowledge of something because he has ordained it. I don't think any other view of foreknowledge(infallible foreknowledge) is coherent.

Actually, I agree with this fully. God’s knowledge of what will actually happen is based entirely on God’s decree. However, this does not negate the fact that knowledge of counterfactual conditionals is included within God’s natural knowledge pertaining to logical possibilities. God knows that if He were to create particular causal agents and place them in particular circumstances without interference that these agents would behave in certain specific ways. Such knowledge is simply based in God’s knowledge of certain logical truths. It is no different in principle than God knowing that if He were to create a perfectly spherical object that its circumference to diameter ratio would be equal to the numerical value of pi. However, God’s knowledge that certain specific agents will actually behave in certain specific ways depends on God foreordaining those agents to exist and foreordaining what circumstances to place them in and foreordaining whether or not to interfere with their behavior. So all happens by God’s decree though that decree has both active and passive components. It includes a decision to directly cause some things and a decision to allow some things to come about indirectly through secondary causal means.

God Bless,
Kenny

mickiel

October 7th 2003, 12:05 PM

In Isaiah 40:17, all the nations (including the christian ones) are as NOTHING before God, and God PERSONALLY REGUARDS them as LESS than nothing and MEANINGLESS. All of our intelligent spectulation concerning Gods will and power and characther are less than nothing to him. His ways are far ABOVE ours, as is his will, power and talents. Gods manipulation of all life is effortless to him, nothing happens that he does not want to occur. We live and move and have our being BY GODS WILL. That means he controls our very lives, our thoughts, our learning.

Jesus said "of his own initative, or of his own power or will, HE COULD DO NOTHING. Jesus explained that he cannot think on his own, make spiritual decesions on his own, HE KNEW THE TRUTH. Without God, Christ cannot do anything, God is the source of his power. Christians teach the total oppisite of this truth. They teach we can freely think for ourselves, decide for ourselves, will our own lives, lean in our own understanding. They teach free will because it is a religon that has declared its independance from God. Mankind as a whole has declared its independance from God, thinking the branch can do without the tree. Jesus said without me you can do nothing, why christians exclude free will thinking from this is beyound me. The only freedom mankind will ever have is in Christ. Christ can do no thinking on his own, why men like thinking they can is strange indeed.

markporter

October 7th 2003, 12:29 PM

mickiel

October 7th 2003, 12:43 PM

Today @ 05:29 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=236458#post236458)
markporter:

Oh, come on now....We're fearfully and wonderfully made, the father rejoices over us with singing, GOD LOVES US. We are not nothing, we are valuable in God's sight. He may be way above us, but he created us for a purpose, and that was to love him as he loves us, not to be little toys that he pushes around.

I agree with all you have writtened, the words are true. As i travel into a certain understanding, there are certain things that do not concern God. I will list them; what we understand about him, how much we doubt him, our lack of faith, our human weaknesses, our emotional fears about him not loving us, all these things are meaningless to him. Meaning he will be himself weather we believe in him or not. He will follow his path weather we understad him or not, follow him or not. God will be God, he is and we are not. We really are LESS than toys to him, and although i do not favor your impression of "he is pushing us around", he is in complette control of us and we will do what he wills. But this leads to the awesome plan of salvation, God will make men to be Gods themselves, children of the most high served by angels for eternity. The destiny of man is astounding. But i would advise to anyone not to belittle Gods power or increase their view of your own power. We are nothing without him. I don't think people realize what Christ did when he became human, the sheer sacrifice of it. Its like a human becomming a roach. The sheer difference in human life and spiritual life is awesome. Just to help you consider; In the spirit world their is no sickness, no sin, no suffering, no death, only complette happiness and peace. We are nowhere even NEAR this reality. God is so far above humanity its pathectic.

markporter

October 7th 2003, 12:52 PM

Cool. That is awesome, sorry...it was just the way you were writing.

Smitten

October 7th 2003, 02:54 PM

Kenny,

Smitten:If one is born with their essential properties, where is the moral responsibility or causal integrity? If I'm born with the properties that will determine(in conjunction with circumstance) my choices, where is my freedom?
Kenny:There’s that Enlightenment assumption of causal reductionism again. You are assuming that if your actions are a deterministic function of prior causes then the causal explanation for your actions reduces to those prior causes.

I'm just working off of the definition you gave me. Not to say the error is on your part, as it may be in my understanding. But you have said that one's actions are determined by essential properties + circumstance. Unless you meant that some and not all of one's actions are determined in this way, how is that definition not assuming that "the causal explanation for your actions reduces to those prior causes"?

We have every reason in terms of contemporary physics to believe that this assumption is false. See my discussion of chaotic systems a few posts ago. Furthermore, the reductionist assumption itself is one very peculiar to the culture of Modernism in the West and one which was not held by the culture in which the Bible itself was written. Drop that assumption and your conclusion doesn’t follow.

Well human choice is not at all like a chaotic system, though I know you weren't implying that, but I don't see the relevance in the comparison. Whatever self-sustaining systems are present in the universe, on what basis can we say humans are like them? The human life isn't cyclical or self-sustaining, we have a beginning and an end.

Your freedom lies in the fact that you yourself, acting holistically as a personal agent exhibiting both knowledge and intent, are the direct cause of your actions. Your actions cannot be fully causally explained without making reference to you yourself as an intentional moral agent acting causally within the situation even though those actions may follow as a deterministic function of prior causes. You (by God’s permission and concurrence) are the deciding causal factor in the situation, not the prior causes. The whole is greater than the sum of the parts.

(Emphasis mine)

Not sure i follow. Seems that you admit that the agent's causation is determined by causes, but then the next sentence seems to indicate the opposite.

Smitten:I don't have any control over my essential properties. I'm not saying one's essence forces them to action, as essences are abstract descriptions, I'm talking about the properties themselves.
Kenny:Again, to say that just because one’s actions follow as a deterministic function of one’s individual qualities means that the explanation of one’s actions reduces strictly to those qualities is to make the unwarranted assumption of causal reductionism.

How is it unwarranted? It seems to follow from the definition. Is one's actions determined by prior causes or not? "the explanation of one's actions reduces strictly to those qualities" seems to follow from "one's actions follow as a deterministic function of one's individual qualities". The only way i see it doesn't follow is to change "one's actions follow as a deterministic function of one's individual qualities" to "one's actions follow as a deterministic function of one's individual qualities and X."

Smitten:I think God has foreknowledge of something because he has ordained it. I don't think any other view of foreknowledge(infallible foreknowledge) is coherent.
Kenny:Actually, I agree with this fully.

Ok, great. But, whether we are thinking of the same thing being implied by that statement I don't know. If I was to say, "God ordained the Fall," i would also be implying that God planned the Fall, or it was his intention that it would happen, not a permission or allowing. What I do not think is ordaining is for God to "look" into the future and see that if he does X, Y will happen, and then "allow" it to occur.

TheFiveSolas

October 8th 2003, 02:05 AM

Smitten,

I was just browsing forums other than the one I help out in as a moderator and had to stop to say I'm enjoying your posts.

Welcome to TWeb!

Kenny

October 8th 2003, 12:00 PM

I'm just working off of the definition you gave me. Not to say the error is on your part, as it may be in my understanding. But you have said that one's actions are determined by essential properties + circumstance.

I’ve been trying to make careful distinctions. I’ve distinguished between logical determination and causal determination, for example. One’s actions are logically determined by one’s essence in conjunction with a given set of exhaustive antecedent circumstance, but they are not causally determined by it. This sort of “determination” is really just accurate description, not causal compulsion. It’s similar to the way I might say that a mathematical equation “determines” the behavior of a certain physical process. It’s not that the equation has some sort of mystical causal power over the process. The equation merely accurately describes the causal features of the physical process itself and so can be used to accurately predict what the system will do.

Unless you meant that some and not all of one's actions are determined in this way, how is that definition not assuming that "the causal explanation for your actions reduces to those prior causes"?

I’m making a distinction between A being a deterministic function of prior causes and A being exclusively determined by prior causes. The former just means that given certain prior causes, A will definitely occur. The latter means that the causal explanation for A reduces strictly the prior causes which make A inevitable. To say the former entails the latter is by no means logically self-evident and, in fact, there are numerous examples which make such a statement seem false. It may be inevitable, for example, that if an ardent patriot were offered a buck to betray her country that she would refuse the offer. Thus, one could say that the prior causes involved in generating the offer to betray her country for a buck lead to the inevitable state of affairs that the patriot refuses the offer to betray her country for a buck. So the patriot’s refusal to betray her country for a buck comes about as a deterministic function of the prior causes inherent in generating the offer. Nevertheless, we cannot causally explain the patriot’s actions in that situation merely in terms of the causal factors that led to her being put in a situation where she would inevitably choose a certain course of action. We have to make reference, in terms of our causal explanation of the patriot’s actions, to the patriot herself acting causally as a moral agent.

Chaotic systems in physics provide another example. Even though such systems are (in principle) described by a deterministic function of the external causal inputs to the system and the internal causal happenings within the system, these non-linear systems often exhibit several elaborate feedback loops so that the behavior of the system at any given moment in time can only be explained in terms of the configuration of the whole system. Thus, one can not reduce the causal explanation of the system’s behavior to the prior external and internal causes. One must make also reference to causal contribution the system itself makes to the situation.

Well human choice is not at all like a chaotic system, though I know you weren't implying that, but I don't see the relevance in the comparison. Whatever self-sustaining systems are present in the universe, on what basis can we say humans are like them? The human life isn't cyclical or self-sustaining, we have a beginning and an end.

Chaotic systems do not necessarily exhibit cyclical or self-sustaining features, especially when they are interacting with a complex external environment. And human beings may very well, in many ways, exhibit features of chaotic systems. Much of our brain activity, for example, exhibits characteristics of a chaotic system with numerous non-linear processes and complex feedback loops. Similar considerations apply to our body chemistry. I’m not a mind/body monist so I don’t try to explain all of human behavior in terms of physical processes of the body, but obviously there is a very close relationship between whatever non-physical causes are involved in human behavior and the bodily ones, so there may be a closer analogy here than you seem to think.

Nevertheless, the example of chaos systems wasn’t really intended as an analogy for human behavior but as a counterexample to the assumption of causal reductionism.

(Emphasis mine)

Not sure i follow. Seems that you admit that the agent's causation is determined by causes, but then the next sentence seems to indicate the opposite.

I defer to the above discussion of the distinction between something being a deterministic function of prior causes and to its being exclusively determined by prior causes.

Kenny:Again, to say that just because one’s actions follow as a deterministic function of one’s individual qualities means that the explanation of one’s actions reduces strictly to those qualities is to make the unwarranted assumption of causal reductionism.

How is it unwarranted? It seems to follow from the definition. Is one's actions determined by prior causes or not?

One’s actions are deterministic functions of prior causes, yes. They are not exclusively determined by prior causes, however. There is no logically self-evident reason why the former should entail the latter, though it may be hard for some of us not to see such as self-evident because the assumption of causal reductionism has been so deeply ingrained in our culture for so long. But this assumption is ultimately based in an Enlightenment atheistic atomistic reductionism, so we should be wary of it as Christian theists.

Ok, great. But, whether we are thinking of the same thing being implied by that statement I don't know. If I was to say, "God ordained the Fall," i would also be implying that God planned the Fall, or it was his intention that it would happen, not a permission or allowing.

I agree that God planned the Fall and that there is a sense in which He intended for it to occur. I affirm that God set in motion a causal chain of events which He knew would eventually lead to the occurrence of the Fall and that God chose not to prevent that chain of events from leading to the Fall. I deny, however, that God was the direct cause of the Fall or that the causal explanation for the Fall can be reduced to God’s activity. The direct cause of the Fall was Adam and Eve themselves, causally acting as moral agents in the situation in which God had placed them. The direct causal responsibility for it falls solely on Adam and Eve themselves, not God. God did ordain the Fall, but He ordained it to come about through secondary causes. Calvin himself made similar distinctions so such is not really an odd thing for a Calvinist to say.

Do you deny, Smitten, that there is a real distinction between primary and secondary causes? Do you think that everything comes about solely through divine causation? Does creation have any sort of causal integrity of its own (note, I said “causal integrity,” not “autonomy” – I believe that any causal action on the part of creation depends on prior causal acts on the part of God and the continual supply of God’s sustaining power, so I do not think there is any point where creation acts “independently” of God)?

What I do not think is ordaining is for God to "look" into the future and see that if he does X, Y will happen, and then "allow" it to occur.

I don’t think that either. I believe that all of God’s knowledge about how particular agents would behave is based strictly in God’s natural knowledge of certain logical truths about how certain systems with certain specific causal features would behave if He were to create them and place them in certain circumstances. There is no “looking into the future” involved, nor is there anything about this knowledge which is contingent.

In Christ,
Kenny

Smitten

October 8th 2003, 02:38 PM

Kenny,

I think i just interpreted some of your statements differently then how you intended.

I’m making a distinction between A being a deterministic function of prior causes and A being exclusively determined by prior causes.

One’s actions are deterministic functions of prior causes, yes. They are not exclusively determined by prior causes, however.

This is where i was misunderstanding you. When you say, X is determined by Y, i thought you meant that was a full description of how X came about. X being exclusively determined by Y.

So, how do one's choices come about then? If one's essential properties and external circumstances are only part of what determines one's choices, what is the missing part? The definition you have offered before is that one's choices are determined by circumstances + character, character being circumstances + essence, essence being an abstraction of one's essential properties. What am i missing? Because it seems that in light of your last post this definition is only part of what causes choices.

I’ve distinguished between logical determination and causal determination, for example. One’s actions are logically determined by one’s essence in conjunction with a given set of exhaustive antecedent circumstance, but they are not causally determined by it. This sort of “determination” is really just accurate description, not causal compulsion. It’s similar to the way I might say that a mathematical equation “determines” the behavior of a certain physical process. It’s not that the equation has some sort of mystical causal power over the process. The equation merely accurately describes the causal features of the physical process itself and so can be used to accurately predict what the system will do

I am aware of your distinctions regarding this, I have been pursuing questions about the things themselves that cause, not the descriptions of those things. The equation is descriptive, but what is it describing? Some process or law, which is what I'm trying to get at.

Do you deny, Smitten, that there is a real distinction between primary and secondary causes? Do you think that everything comes about solely through divine causation? Does creation have any sort of causal integrity of its own (note, I said “causal integrity,” not “autonomy” – I believe that any causal action on the part of creation depends on prior causal acts on the part of God and the continual supply of God’s sustaining power, so I do not think there is any point where creation acts “independently” of God)?

No i do not deny that at all, and I agree with you here completely, assuming I am gathering the intended meaning. If there is a difference between us on this, maybe it concerns the issue further down..

I believe that all of God’s knowledge about how particular agents would behave is based strictly in God’s natural knowledge of certain logical truths about how certain systems with certain specific causal features would behave if He were to create them and place them in certain circumstances. There is no “looking into the future” involved, nor is there anything about this knowledge which is contingent.

Is God's knowledge regarding this dependent on his will or does he eternally "intuit" them, or simply know them eternally, apart from his will.

Kenny

October 8th 2003, 07:27 PM

Today @ 07:38 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=237744#post237744)
Smitten:

So, how do one's choices come about then? If one's essential properties and external circumstances are only part of what determines one's choices, what is the missing part? The definition you have offered before is that one's choices are determined by circumstances + character, character being circumstances + essence, essence being an abstraction of one's essential properties. What am i missing? Because it seems that in light of your last post this definition is only part of what causes choices.

You are missing the agent herself.

In physics we speak of systems which exhibit something called “non-linear functional behavior.” In mathematics, a linear function is defined as a function which is closed both under addition and multiplication. That is, if a function, f(x), is linear, then:

f(x+y) = f(x) + f(y)

f(A*x) = A*f(x)

So, if a system is described by a linear function, then the behavior of the whole system can be described in terms of the behavior of all the individual variables which make it up acting in isolation from one another. So, you might say than such a system exhibits only “bottom up” causality. The whole doesn’t contribute anything causally to the behavior of the system, only the parts.

However, many systems in nature are described by functions which do not meet the above criteria. The functions which describe them contain interaction terms in which the behavior of individual variables become entangled with one another. They contain feedback loops so that not only do the individual parts make causal contributions to the behavior of the system, but the configuration of the system as a whole makes causal contributions to the behavior of the parts. These sorts of systems exhibit not only bottom up causality (the causal contribution of the parts to the whole) but also “top down” causality (the causal contribution of the whole to the parts). In such a system, the whole is genuinely greater than the sum of the parts. One can predict, in principle, how such a system will behave if one knows the function which describes the system and the initial conditions, because the interaction terms of the function will tell one how the whole influences the parts and vice-versa, but causally, the system as a whole contributes to how the system will behave, not just the parts in isolation.

I’m suggesting that human beings are holistic systems such that they exhibit both top down and bottom up causal features. So the agent herself must be taken into consideration when causally explaining her behavior, not just the external inputs or her essential qualities acting in isolation.

I am aware of your distinctions regarding this, I have been pursuing questions about the things themselves that cause, not the descriptions of those things. The equation is descriptive, but what is it describing? Some process or law, which is what I'm trying to get at.

In the case of a personal agent, what is being described is the causal make-up of the agent herself and this description includes interaction terms which describe how top down and bottom up causes relate to one another.

Is God's knowledge regarding this dependent on his will or does he eternally "intuit" them, or simply know them eternally, apart from his will.

This knowledge is just a sub-category of God’s knowledge of abstractions which depends on God’s nature and is therefore independent of God’s will, as I have already explained. It’s just God’s knowledge that if He creates certain agents which exhibit certain causal features and puts them in certain circumstances, then they will behave in certain ways. It’s just a simple matter of observing logical relationships. There’s nothing in this that’s different in principle from saying that God knows eternally, apart from his will, that 2+2=4.

In Christ,
Kenny

Smitten

October 8th 2003, 08:39 PM

Kenny,

I’m suggesting that human beings are holistic systems such that they exhibit both top down and bottom up causal features. So the agent herself must be taken into consideration when causally explaining her behavior, not just the eternal inputs or her essential qualities acting in isolation.

So, this part of the agent that is independent of the essential properties, is it part of one's 'essence' that God eternally has knowlewdge of? It seems it would be, yet its not one of one's essential properties, which is what one's essence was said to be an abstraction of.

And, this 'top down' causality, is it predictable via a causal chain of some sort? Or, can the agent introduce factors that affect the top down causality spontaneously, or in other words factors that are self-generated without a preceding causal chain?

Smitten:Is God's knowledge regarding this dependent on his will or does he eternally "intuit" them, or simply know them eternally, apart from his will.
Kenny:This knowledge is just a sub-category of God’s knowledge of abstractions which depends on God’s nature and is therefore independent of God’s will, as I have already explained. It’s just God’s knowledge that if He creates certain agents which exhibit certain causal features and puts them in certain circumstances, then they will behave in certain ways. It’s just a simple matter of observing logical relationships. There’s nothing in this that’s different in principle from saying that God knows eternally, apart from his will, that 2+2=4.

2+2=4 is just an analytical, circular statement. On the other hand..

It’s just God’s knowledge that if He creates certain agents which exhibit certain causal features and puts them in certain circumstances, then they will behave in certain ways.

Why does an agent exhibit certain causal features and not others? Human agents are not tautologies. In my understanding of your view, one's causal features are the result of the agent's own causal integrity. If the whole is greater than the sum of the parts, how can the whole Whole be part of God's natural knowledge in the form of logical relationships? Musn't God have a posteriori knowledge of his creation if this is the case, and not only a priori knowledge of logical relationships?

In other words, given that God has knowledge of all agents' essences, he can know via logical relationships the effect that will occur for any circumstance he places an agent in, as you have said. But, why does one have the essence that they do? Given an essence, God can apprehend the logical relationships that he has to work with, but the essence itself is not the product of logical relationships is it? Where is the moral or causal integrity in an analytical piece of information, such as 1+1=2?

Kenny

October 10th 2003, 03:30 PM

Yesterday @ 01:39 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=238160#post238160)
Smitten:

Kenny,

So, this part of the agent that is independent of the essential properties, is it part of one's 'essence' that God eternally has knowlewdge of? It seems it would be, yet its not one of one's essential properties, which is what one's essence was said to be an abstraction of.

Being self-identical is an essential property of any individual thing – necessarily, A is A. So for a particular agent, A, ‘being A’ is an essential property of A. However, I don’t think that’s quite what you are getting at here. Honestly, I’m not entirely sure if I understand the question you are asking. I think what you are asking is if the agent herself is something else over and above the essential qualities which make her up (aside from the trivial essential quality of being self-identical), qualities which are distinct from herself, then on what basis can one predict the behavior of that agent on the basis of such qualities?

Well, I would say there’s an analogy here to the manner in which the behavior of a chaotic physical system could (in principle) be predicted if the initial conditions and qualities which make it up were exactly known. The causal rules which describe the system are based in physical laws which pertain to how the individual parts within the system behave in isolation. But, these physical laws predict that when these individual parts come together they will form a complex system with non-linear functional behavior which exhibits interaction terms and complex top-down causal features. However, the physical laws which described how the individual parts would behave in isolation are not violated in this process because those laws predict exactly how the individual parts come together to form the more complex system and the interaction terms that emerge as a result. In other words, even though the non-linear system exhibits holistic causal features which cannot be reductively explained in terms of the causal behavior of the parts of that system (on account of the interaction terms), the rules governing the behavior of the parts of that system predict the type of holistic system that will emerge when those parts are brought together.

I believe something similar is true of human beings in terms both of their physical and spiritual qualities. I can be described in terms of set of qualities which are not identical to myself, but I am something more than just the summation of those qualities. Those qualities have come together to form a complex system with numerous feedback loops and interaction terms such that the behavior of the system cannot be reductively explained in terms of the qualities which make it up in isolation, and I am that system. However, the causal rules governing the individual qualities that come together to form myself predict the type of holistic system I will be.

And, this 'top down' causality, is it predictable via a causal chain of some sort? Or, can the agent introduce factors that affect the top down causality spontaneously, or in other words factors that are self-generated without a preceding causal chain?

The agent, as a holistic system, emerges as the result of that which causes all of the qualities which make her up to come together and form that system. Once these qualities do come together, they will exhibit non-linear interaction terms with one another such that the behavior of the agent will not be reductively explicable in terms action of those individual qualities. The interaction terms which emerge are themselves a consequence of the causal rules governing the individual qualities, however, so they are not really divorced from previous causes. However, once these interaction terms emerge, they describe causal features which make reference to the whole system and no longer merely the individual features of that system, so that the causal features they describe are something over and above the causal inputs that were fed in. So, I suppose the answer to your above question is “yes and no.”

2+2=4 is just an analytical, circular statement. On the other hand..

Actually, many philosophers do not believe that mathematical statements are analytic. I agree with them. Modern philosophy of mathematics has attempted to reduce mathematics to logic and has failed to do so. Godel’s incompleteness theorem demonstrates that no formal axiomatic system is able to accommodate all of mathematical truth. And, in addition to all of these considerations, while there may be a certain plausibility to saying that truths such as 2+2=4 are analytic, to me it simply stretches credulity to say this of other mathematical statements. For example, in turns out that the infinite series 1 – 1/3 + 1/5 – 1/7… is exactly equal to pi/4. I don’t know about you, but I can’t see anything that looks analytic there. Certainly there are no immediately discernible contradictions inherent in denying such is the case. I don’t see that the above infinite series somehow “contains” the meaning of pi/4. The above statement can be proven, so denying it does entail certain mathematical contradictions, but to get those contradictions you have to make reference to other mathematical structures which move outside of what is refered to in the statement itself.

In fact, I doubt whether the analytic/synthetic distinction is even applicable to mathematics.

Why does an agent exhibit certain causal features and not others? Human agents are not tautologies.

This has the potential to launch us into a complex discussion in philosophy of language really fast. But, we tend to intuitively believe that our words actually genuinely refer to objects in the world outside of our own conceptions of those objects. When I speak of my wife, I assume I am referring to a real person in the external world, not just some mental image in my head that has resulted from various phenomenological experiences which my mind has grouped together and forged the idea ‘my wife’ out of.

For now, let me just say that I find there to be powerful philosophical arguments to the effect that the above entails that the meanings of our words are not just fixed by our internal conceptualizations of them, but in terms of how we, operating within a given social-linguistic community, use various words to refer to objects in the external world, such that the external world itself contributes much to the meanings of our words. The position that such is the case is called “semantic externalism.

Now, if semantic externalism is true, then this has very interesting implications for necessary truths. For instance, philosophers such as Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke have suggested that the statement ‘necessarily, water is composed of H20 molecules’ is true. This is because the meaning of the English term ‘water’ has been fixed by the way in which the English speaking community has used the term ‘water’ to refer to various objects in the external world. Putnam and Kripke suggest that such would be true even if we did not have the scientific knowledge that the substance we refer to as water is composed of H20 molecules because the external world that our words refer to and not just our concepts fixes the meanings of our words.

Now, this has consequences for theology, I think, as well. If it is true that ‘necessarily, water is composed of H20,’ then it is logically impossible that God could have created water without the substance He created being composed of H20. He could have created a substance very similar to water in terms of its immediately perceptible qualities which was not composed of H20 instead, but that substance would not have been water. So, if God wants to make water. He has to make a substance composed of H20 molecules.

Now, the real interesting thing is that it doesn’t really seem like an analytic statement to say that water is composed of H20 molecules. I suppose you could argue that if the meaning of the term ‘water’ really does contain the meaning ‘being composed of H20’ molecules, then by the classic definition of an analytic statement (‘A is B’ is analytic if the meaning of A contains the meaning of B), the above statement is analytic, but analytic statements are generally regarded to be self-evident, certain, incapable of empirical falsification and all the rest. But it is not self-evident that water is composed of H20 molecules and, even though it is unlikely, the statement that water is composed of H2O molecules is also potentially empirically falsifiable (maybe we’ll discover in the future that molecular theory has been radically mistaken, for example). Moral of the story: the analytic/synthetic distinction isn’t very useful here.

I think similar considerations apply in the case of our reference to human beings. When I refer to my wife, Sarah, the meanings of my words are not just fixed by my internal conceptions, but how I, within the broader context of my social linguistic community, use my words to refer to Sarah as a real person in the external world. So, there may be necessary truths about Sarah which are not entailed merely by my internal conceptualizations of what Sarah is like. When we combine this with the notion of transworld identity, the basic intuitive belief that some of the properties which my wife now exhibits could have been different and yet she would have still been the same person, we have a strong case that individual persons have some properties which are essential to them and some which are accidental. That there are some truths which are necessarily true of certain individuals and there are other truths about those individuals which could have been false. If that’s the case, then there are logical restrictions pertaining to the manner in which God could have made Sarah. He might have been able to create someone very similar to Sarah who did not posses Sarah’s essential qualities, but that person would not have been the same person as the person I actually refer to as ‘Sarah.’

Sorry; I know the above probably left you with more questions than answers, but this gets into issues of philosophy of language which are huge topics in their own right and they are very difficult to treat adequately in just a few paragraphs.

In my understanding of your view, one's causal features are the result of the agent's own causal integrity. If the whole is greater than the sum of the parts, how can the whole Whole be part of God's natural knowledge in the form of logical relationships? Musn't God have a posteriori knowledge of his creation if this is the case, and not only a priori knowledge of logical relationships?

No; I think I covered that in my above discussion about how holistic systems emerge.

But, why does one have the essence that they do?

Why is A, A? This is just a basic irreducible matter of identity.

In Christ,
Kenny

Smitten

October 10th 2003, 06:54 PM

Kenny,

Well, I would say there’s an analogy here to the manner in which the behavior of a chaotic physical system could (in principle) be predicted if the initial conditions and qualities which make it up were exactly known. The causal rules which describe the system are based in physical laws which pertain to how the individual parts within the system behave in isolation. But, these physical laws predict that when these individual parts come together they will form a complex system with non-linear functional behavior which exhibits interaction terms and complex top-down causal features. However, the physical laws which described how the individual parts would behave in isolation are not violated in this process because those laws predict exactly how the individual parts come together to form the more complex system and the interaction terms that emerge as a result. In other words, even though the non-linear system exhibits holistic causal features which cannot be reductively explained in terms of the causal behavior of the parts of that system (on account of the interaction terms), the rules governing the behavior of the parts of that system predict the type of holistic system that will emerge when those parts are brought together.

(Emphasis mine)

It seems you are saying that the holistic Whole can be predicted by looking at the parts, but also that they can't. I'm not grasping this completely I think. If the holistic Whole and its interaction terms are caused by the coming together of the parts, how can the Whole not be predicted or determined by the parts.

Working off of my understanding of your view:

In making choices(i'm just bracketing aside the factor of circumstance) one's essential properties will create bottom-up causal determinism. The result of this will meet up with the part of the agent that is independent of these essential properties, a combination forming the Whole. From the Whole, there will then be top-down causality. I'll call the part that is independent of the other essential properties 'X'.

Earlier, I had noted that if one's choices are determined by essential properties + circumstance, and if they were born with their essential properties(which they are, obviously, as they are essential to the agent), the agent is not free because they have no power or volition over their essential properties. You replied that essential properties were only part of the determinism, that a part of the agent herself, that is independent of these properties, also is a factor('X').

The problem i see is that X must be an essential property, as it is essential to the agent's identity. But, if this part of the agent is also an essential property, they were born with it already in place were they not? As an essential property is essential to the identity of the agent, it is fixed and unchanging. If essential property X has a value of A, but at some point changes to value B, X cannot be an essential property, because it's value was never essential(A couldn't have changed, or B would have always been the original value).

If X is an essential property it is unchanging and is present at birth. If this is the case, then it seems to me that whether we describe causation as top-down or bottom-up or what have you, it doesn't change the fact that the agent had no control over the property's value.

If on the other hand, X isn't an essential property, the agent could manipulate it. But, if X isn't essential, how can God foreknow one's choices, as X can't be part of one's essence that God eternally knows, and X is a critical factor in all choices? Or maybe X is part of one's essence that God eternally knows but is not an essential property. But, since one's essence is tied to identity, it would follow that one's identity changes as the value of X is altered, which doesn't make sense. Even if one would say that X can be altered without changing identity, there is the problem with how God could have foreknowledge, in eternity, of a variable's value that is spinning like a roulette wheel when the agent hasn't even been born yet.

Smitten:But, why does one have the essence that they do?
Kenny:Why is A, A? This is just a basic irreducible matter of identity.

I don't think we have reached the irreducible yet. There is the matter of an essence's ontology. Where does it come from? I think one's eternal identity is dependent on God's will/decree, I see the alternative as falling into molinism. God does not have set of pieces given to him, in which he then decides how to arrange them through a decree, rather the identity of his creation flows from his decree.

Kenny

October 12th 2003, 03:18 AM

10-10-2003 @ 11:54 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=240817#post240817)
Smitten:

Kenny,

(Emphasis mine)

It seems you are saying that the holistic Whole can be predicted by looking at the parts, but also that they can't.

Once the holistic system has formed, its behavior cannot be predicted by looking at its parts in isolation without making reference to their configuration as the whole, but prior to the formation of the whole, the causal features of the parts predict the type of whole which will emerge when the parts are brought together. So the predictive logic runs like this: when the set of parts P come together to make the whole, W, a holistic system will emerge with causal features of its own, F, which do not reduce to the causal features of the parts, f. However, I can predict from f what F will be when P comes together and then I can predict what W will do on the basis of F.

In other words, the parts do causally determine what sort of system the whole will be, but once the whole forms, it will no longer be possible to continue to predict the behavior of the parts simply on the basis of their individual causal features without making reference to how those parts are related to the whole. It’s not that the causal features of the parts are altered in the process; it’s just that those features have become embedded in a larger causal network which is greater than the sum of the parts that make it up.

I’m not engaging in any far out philosophical speculation here – we have empirical examples of systems like this.

If the holistic Whole and its interaction terms are caused by the coming together of the parts, how can the Whole not be predicted or determined by the parts.

It is predicted by the parts. I never claimed otherwise. The sort of system the whole will be is predicted by the causal features of the parts. But once the whole forms, its behavior will not be reductively explicable in terms of the behavior of the parts – the parts have now become embedded in a larger causal network. One cannot explain what the whole does from then on just by making reference to the parts without considering their relationships to the whole – the system now exhibits non-linear feed back loops. Thus, the whole is part of what causally determines its future behavior and not just the parts that make it up. But, the holistic causal features of the new system that forms can be anticipated by looking at the causal features of the parts before they come together and using that as a basis to predict what sort of non-linear interaction terms will come into play when the parts are brought together.

Again, we have empirical examples of this via chaotic systems in physics.

In making choices(i'm just bracketing aside the factor of circumstance) one's essential properties will create bottom-up causal determinism.

You should say “one’s essential qualities” here, in line with the distinction I have made a few posts above. Qualities can have causal features; properties are merely descriptive. Also, you should bracket out the quality of being self-identical here, since I do hold that for a system, S, the essential quality, ‘being S,’ does causally determine the behavior of S – in other words, S exhibits a degree of self-determination. Those qualifications made, I accept this as an accurate description of my view.

The result of this will meet up with the part of the agent that is independent of these essential properties, a combination forming the Whole.

I never said that the holistic causal features of an agent are independent of the parts that make her up. The whole depends on the causal features of the parts as the source and sustenance of her own causal features.

From the Whole, there will then be top-down causality. I'll call the part that is independent of the other essential properties 'X'.

Earlier, I had noted that if one's choices are determined by essential properties + circumstance, and if they were born with their essential properties(which they are, obviously, as they are essential to the agent), the agent is not free because they have no power or volition over their essential properties. You replied that essential properties were only part of the determinism, that a part of the agent herself, that is independent of these properties, also is a factor('X').

No, this is a misunderstanding of my response, probably because it wasn’t sufficiently clear on my end. One’s choices are both logically and causally determined by one’s essential qualities (and logically but not causally determined by one’s essential properties), but the essential qualities which emerge via the parts coming together do not reduce to the qualities possessed by the parts in isolation. In other words, for a non-reductive causal system S, the essential quality ‘being S,’ (which is, I think, what you are referring to as ‘X’) does not logically reduce to other essential qualities. So among the essential qualities which cause the behavior of the system which cannot be reduced to other essential qualities, the quality of being that particular system is included. The whole is greater than the some of the parts.

The problem i see is that X must be an essential property, as it is essential to the agent's identity.

Yes.

But, if this part of the agent is also an essential property, they were born with it already in place were they not?

Yes.

If X is an essential property it is unchanging and is present at birth. If this is the case, then it seems to me that whether we describe causation as top-down or bottom-up or what have you, it doesn't change the fact that the agent had no control over the property's value.

X is just the quality of being S. If S is a personal agent, the quality ‘being S’ is just the quality of being herself. You’re right, she has no control over that. We are who we are. But, S can hardly complain about that since she would just be complaining about the fact of her own existence. Also, S cannot use that as an excuse to deny moral responsibility for her actions. The fact that S’s actions are caused by X just means that her actions are caused by S herself. The fact that S is the cause of her actions is precisely what makes S responsible for them.

I don't think we have reached the irreducible yet. There is the matter of an essence's ontology. Where does it come from?

It comes from God’s natural knowledge of logical possibilities as I have already explained.

I think one's eternal identity is dependent on God's will/decree

As it stands, I believe this assertion to be incoherent. It violates the most basic intuition concerning identity that we have – namely, that an object is necessarily self-identical. Necessarily, A is A. If personal identity depends on God’s decree, then personal identity is contingent, but that would violate the above.

In Christ,
Kenny

Kenny

October 12th 2003, 03:54 AM

Smitten,

Earlier I said:

Again, to say that just because one’s actions follow as a deterministic function of one’s individual qualities means that the explanation of one’s actions reduces strictly to those qualities is to make the unwarranted assumption of causal reductionism.

This is somewhat sloppy of me and may have confused matters somewhat. I should have bracket the quality of being self-identical out of the above. I should have said something like “…one’s individual qualities other than the quality of being one’s self…” That qualification made, however, I stand by the above.

The way that one’s actions can follow as a deterministic function of qualities distinct from being one’s self and still not be reductively explicable in terms of those qualities is that those qualities predict one’s future behavior merely by predicting the existence of one’s self as a causal agent and the type of causal agent one will be.

So, if Q includes all of the essential qualities of S which are not identical to S and S is a holistic system (and let’s go ahead and bracket out circumstances for convenience) and A includes of the actions which are caused by S, then the full causal explanation for A (starting from Q and ending with A) runs like this:

Q causes S causes A

Furthermore, this cannot be reduced to:

Q causes A.

A cannot be fully causally explained merely by making reference to Q without including the fact that Q has caused S and that S also functions as a causal factor in the situation over and above Q.

But, I can predict from Q that S will emerge and that S will cause A.

Hopefully, that’s a little clearer.

In Christ,
Kenny

Smitten

October 12th 2003, 03:49 PM

Kenny,

I do hold that for a system, S, the essential quality, ‘being S,’ does causally determine the behavior of S – in other words, S exhibits a degree of self-determination.

Can you elaborate some on self-determination? What do you mean by it?

I never said that the holistic causal features of an agent are independent of the parts that make her up. The whole depends on the causal features of the parts as the source and sustenance of her own causal features.

I probably worded myself badly. Since the whole is greater than the sum of the parts, part of the whole is independent of the deterministic outcome of the other essential qualities. This other part, which interacts with the deterministic outcome of the other essential qualities, is independent of the other essential qualities. The holistic system is not independent of the other essential qualities, only the part of the holistic system that combined with the deterministic outcome of the other essential qualities is.

In other words, for a non-reductive causal system S, the essential quality ‘being S,’ (which is, I think, what you are referring to as ‘X’) does not logically reduce to other essential qualities.

Yes this is what i meant, X is the part of the holistic system that was not determined by the bottom-up causality of the other essential qualities.

But, i was not using X merely to refer to the quality of being self-identical, i was using X to refer to this part of the agent herself. But before pursuing more about that I think i would need to know what you mean by self-determination as i asked above, as if i am understanding you right, the part of the agent that i refer to as X is the part which generates self-determination.

Smitten: I don't think we have reached the irreducible yet. There is the matter of an essence's ontology. Where does it come from?
Kenny: It comes from God’s natural knowledge of logical possibilities as I have already explained.

I don't see this as answering the question. Given that the essence along with its properties exists, God then sees the logical possibilities and relationships that exist. The logical possibilities presuppose that the essence already exists. How does it exist?

Smitten: I think one's eternal identity is dependent on God's will/decree.
Kenny: As it stands, I believe this assertion to be incoherent. It violates the most basic intuition concerning identity that we have – namely, that an object is necessarily self-identical. Necessarily, A is A.

What does this have to do with God creating something? If God creates A, that doesn't mean A isn't A.

If personal identity depends on God’s decree, then personal identity is contingent, but that would violate the above.

It only violates the above if you assume that our identity must be just as eternal as God is, which I don't see as coherent at all. If God creates someone within eternity, they had no identity logically prior to that. I believe he created all, he wasn't handed an eternal set of pieces to work with.

Sovereignishe

October 13th 2003, 11:29 PM

My two cents... :eek:

Sin is unrighteousness, unrighteousness cannot "originate" from God." He may have orchestrated the circumstances for sin to arise. But he did not deviate from His own will to bring about sin. Sin is like darkness, it doesn't need to be created. The absence or skewing of something in creation is all that's necessary for it to exist.

Johnny
"Twelve Highlanders and one bagpipe makes a rebellion."
-Scottish Proverb
:cheers:

Kenny

October 16th 2003, 03:54 AM

10-12-2003 @ 08:49 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=242171#post242171)
Smitten:

Kenny,

Can you elaborate some on self-determination? What do you mean by it?

I mean that to the agent herself causally determines her actions rather than her actions being strictly causally determined by things non-identical with herself, whether those things be exterior circumstances or internal qualities.

I probably worded myself badly. Since the whole is greater than the sum of the parts, part of the whole is independent of the deterministic outcome of the other essential qualities. This other part, which interacts with the deterministic outcome of the other essential qualities, is independent of the other essential qualities. The holistic system is not independent of the other essential qualities, only the part of the holistic system that combined with the deterministic outcome of the other essential qualities is.

No. The fact that the agent cannot be reduced to the sum of the qualities non-identical to herself does not mean that any aspect of her exists independently of those qualities. The agent, as I’m construing her, is a higher level organizational structure that emerges as a result of the lower level organization of the parts. The reason the agent does not reduce to the parts is not because some aspect of her is independent of the parts, but because when the parts come together they exhibit certain relations to one another, and these relations depend on the configuration of the whole in such a way that the configuration of the whole must be taken into consideration in order to causally explain the behavior of the parts. Thus, the agent, as a holistic system, exhibits top down causal influence on the parts, but such does not occur independently of the parts given that the agent just is the holistic relationship of the parts to one another.

‘Relations,’ ‘interaction terms,’ ‘configuration of the whole,’ etc. – these, in my estimation are the key terms to this discussion. Given that Enlightenment style metaphysical atomism is still deeply ingrained in our cultural psyche, I think it is easy for us to simply ignore the fact that relationships between parts often have just as much reality as the parts themselves and that parts in relation to one another may exhibit causal attributes which do not simply adhere in the parts alone.

Yes this is what i meant, X is the part of the holistic system that was not determined by the bottom-up causality of the other essential qualities.

But, i was not using X merely to refer to the quality of being self-identical, i was using X to refer to this part of the agent herself.

It seems you are assuming that my view entails that there is some feature of the agent which acts completely independently from all the other parts of that make up that agent. In fact, that is precisely what I’m denying by affirming that the agent exists as a holistic causal system. In fact, I am affirming that no essential quality of the agent acts independently from the rest. In fact, the agent herself is ultimately just a holistic system of mutual relations of dependence among parts. The mutual dependent relations are so tight, in fact, that it impossible to explain what any individual part does without making reference to that part’s setting within the whole, and that is why the whole winds up being greater than the sum of the parts. On my view, it’s the agent’s existence as mutual relationships of dependence and not some autonomous independence of the agent’s will (as LFW would maintain) which is the key to the agent’s freedom. Such mutual interdependence is what allows the agent to exert genuine causal influence on the parts which make her up in such a way that her behavior is ultimately not causally determined by anything not identical with herself.

But before pursuing more about that I think i would need to know what you mean by self-determination as i asked above, as if i am understanding you right, the part of the agent that i refer to as X is the part which generates self-determination.

What I mean is that the relationships between the parts have just as much causal relevance to what occurs as the parts themselves such that the agent, conceived as being identical with the holistic system described by these relationships, exhibits causal influences which do not reduce to the causal influence inherent in the parts when taken in isolation from the whole.

I don't see this as answering the question. Given that the essence along with its properties exists, God then sees the logical possibilities and relationships that exist. The logical possibilities presuppose that the essence already exists. How does it exist?

The essence is itself just a subset of logical possibility. If personal agents are basically just holistic systems of relationships between parts, the essence of any given agent would simply be a logical description of one possible set of such relationships. Broad logical possibilities remain in place independently of what God decrees so it follows that the sets of possible relationships which are identical to the essences of personal agents exist independently of God’s decrees.

Kenny: As it stands, I believe this assertion to be incoherent. It violates the most basic intuition concerning identity that we have – namely, that an object is necessarily self-identical. Necessarily, A is A.

What does this have to do with God creating something? If God creates A, that doesn't mean A isn't A.

Right, but does it make any sense to say that God could have created non-A such that it was actually A? In other words, could God have made Smitten but made him someone else other than Smitten? As it stands, I see such as incoherent. If God had created Smitten such that he was not Smitten, then it would never have been Smitten who God created in the first place, but someone else instead. Smitten would simply never have existed. It is not coherent, imho, to maintain that personal identity is contingent, and thus it is not coherent to say that personal identify varies depending on God’s decrees. Note: that is not the same thing as saying that *personal existence* cannot be contingent. It makes sense to say that Smitten might not have existed. It makes no sense, however, to say that Smitten might not have been Smitten.

In Christ,
Kenny

Smitten

October 17th 2003, 02:02 PM

Kenny,

Smitten: I don't see this as answering the question. Given that the essence along with its properties exists, God then sees the logical possibilities and relationships that exist. The logical possibilities presuppose that the essence already exists. How does it exist?
Kenny: The essence is itself just a subset of logical possibility. If personal agents are basically just holistic systems of relationships between parts, the essence of any given agent would simply be a logical description of one possible set of such relationships. Broad logical possibilities remain in place independently of what God decrees so it follows that the sets of possible relationships which are identical to the essences of personal agents exist independently of God’s decrees.
These essences are abstract descriptions of human agents. If the essence exists in eternity then the agent being described exists in eternity. How?

I think it is incoherent to hold that an essence of an agent exists in eternity if part of the essence/identity of the agent is contingent on the agent's self-determination and the agent hasn't been actualized yet to self-determine himself.

Kenny: As it stands, I believe this assertion to be incoherent. It violates the most basic intuition concerning identity that we have – namely, that an object is necessarily self-identical. Necessarily, A is A.
Smitten: What does this have to do with God creating something? If God creates A, that doesn't mean A isn't A.
Kenny: Right, but does it make any sense to say that God could have created non-A such that it was actually A?
No it doesn't, but that isn't what I said.

In other words, could God have made Smitten but made him someone else other than Smitten? As it stands, I see such as incoherent. If God had created Smitten such that he was not Smitten, then it would never have been Smitten who God created in the first place, but someone else instead. Smitten would simply never have existed. It is not coherent, imho, to maintain that personal identity is contingent, and thus it is not coherent to say that personal identify varies depending on God’s decrees.
Your presupposing that humans are just as eternal as God is as i said in my earlier post. Identity doesn't 'vary' on God's decrees because there is nothing existing to vary. He doesn't alter something that already exists, he creates. If he created me, my identity didnt 'vary' with his decree because i had no identity prior to it to 'vary from'.

Kenny

October 17th 2003, 03:16 PM

Today @ 07:02 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=248074#post248074)
Smitten:

These essences are abstract descriptions of human agents.

Prior to God’s decree of creation they are just abstract descriptions of possible human agents. In the act of creating particular human agents, God chose from the set of possible human agents a certain subset of these possible agents to create.

If the essence exists in eternity then the agent being described exists in eternity. How?

No, prior to God’s actualizing her essence, the agent doesn’t exist at all. Only the idea of her, as a possible person that God could create if He chooses, exists in God’s mind. This is simply an affirmation of God’s omniscience – that God knows all possibilities as well as all actualities. Even prior to the decree to create, God is aware of all possible creative options.

I think it is incoherent to hold that an essence of an agent exists in eternity if part of the essence/identity of the agent is contingent on the agent's self-determination and the agent hasn't been actualized yet to self-determine himself.

I think so too, but that’s not my position. I hold that the agent’s actions follow as a result of self-determination (as I have defined such above), but the agent’s essence is an eternal given, something she has no control over whatsoever. As I’ve explained, however, this in no way compromises the agent’s freedom because her essence is merely the abstract description of who she is. If the agent complains about the fact that she was born with the particular essence that she has, she is merely complaining about the fact of her own existence. Of course, no agent has voluntary control over the fact of her own initial existence – not even God – but such is no reason for denying moral responsibility for the actions which one volitionally chooses and is causally responsible for.

Your presupposing that humans are just as eternal as God is as i said in my earlier post.

Not at all. I’m only proposing that broad logical possibility is just as eternal as God (but, note, that I’m not asserting that it is independent of God since I believe it depends on God’s eternal nature).

Identity doesn't 'vary' on God's decrees because there is nothing existing to vary.

If there is such a thing as transworld identity (and there are good reasons for thinking there is – one of my posts to Mark above), then the identity of an agent exists even if the agent does not. Let’s put it this way:

Do you affirm that it is logically possible that Smitten might not have existed if God had chosen not to create him?

If the answer to the above is, “yes,” then would God have still been aware of the logical possibility that Smitten could have existed if God had chosen not to create him?

If you answer both of the above questions in the affirmative (and it seems fairly intuitive to do so), then you are basically admitting that God’s awareness of the possibility of Smitten existing – God’s awareness of Smitten as a logically possible agent – remains in place independently of God’s decree to create. Furthermore, you are admitting that even if God had not created Smitten, propositions which make reference to Smitten as a logically possible agent would have still been meaningful. The proposition, ‘Smitten could have existed,’ would have still been true and known by God. This, in turn, entails that Smitten’s identity as a logically possible agent that God could have created remains in place independently of God’s decree.

Again, if you answer both of the above questions in the affirmative, you are logically committed to affirming these things. If you deny one of them, then you are logically committing yourself to alternatives which are even more bizarre and theologically unacceptable than you may find the above. If you deny that it is logically possible that Smitten might not have existed, then you are logically committed to believing that Smitten’s existence is logically necessary in some sense. But this, in turn, denies God’s creative freedom with respect to the creation of Smitten. If you answer the first question in the affirmative but then answer the second question in the negative, you are then affirming that there are possibly some true propositions which God has no knowledge of. If God hadn’t created Smitten, then it would still be logically possible that God could have created Smitten even though He, in fact, did not. But, if you answer the second question in the negative, you are affirming that if God had not created Smitten, then He would not have been aware of that logical possibility. This amounts to a denial of the necessity of God’s omniscience.

You could try to escape these conclusions by answering yes to the first question but no to the second on the grounds that outside of the condition of Smitten’s existence, propositions pertaining to Smitten are meaningless. Thus, if God had not created Smitten, the statement ‘Smitten could have existed’ would have failed to retain any truth value because ‘Smitten’ would have no referent. The above statement would have literally been meaningless. But it is questionable whether answering no to the second question on such grounds is actually consistent with affirming the first. If we hold it is meaningful to say “Smitten might not have existed,” then it seems we are saying that in one possible way that things could have been different from the way they are, the proposition ‘Smitten does not exist’ would have been true. But, if that’s the case, then we are committed to affirming that at least one proposition which refers to Smitten would have been true and meaningful even in conditions where Smitten did not exist.

He doesn't alter something that already exists, he creates.

Agreed. God’s actualizing an agent’s essence is not God altering something that already exists. It is simply God creating an agent in accordance with one of the possible ways in which He could exemplify His creative power, but God knows all the possible ways He can exemplify His creative power from all eternity as a function of His omniscience.

In Christ,
Kenny

Smitten

October 17th 2003, 11:57 PM

Kenny,

Smitten: If the essence exists in eternity then the agent being described exists in eternity. How?
Kenny: No, prior to God’s actualizing her essence, the agent doesn’t exist at all. Only the idea of her, as a possible person that God could create if He chooses, exists in God’s mind.
I think i understand what you're saying, but let me try and clarify more as i think my point stands. I think that "possible", while i understand why you use it, can be a misleading term in describing essences in eternity logically prior to God's willing anything or decreeing. The only sense in which an essence is 'possible' is in that God can choose whether or not to actualize it. But apart from that, the agent has a very real existence. One's essence is an abstract description of them, the real agent, including all of their essential properties.

I agree with you that God knows logical relationships and such in eternity, but it seems to me that your view of essences requires that there is more than just logical relationships being perceived by God in eternity. The essences each have an identity to them. The eternal essence of Kenny is your essence, not mine. Smitten's eternal essence is distinctly mine. Our essences describe us, they don't prescribe us. For an essence to exist its referrent must exist(not necessarily actualized though). You have maintained that one's essence does not control them, rather it describes them, this is what saves their moral and causal integrity. But if this is the case, then God's knowledge in eternity is not merely logical possibilities. He has empirical knowledge thrust at him from his possible creations in the future, since essences are descriptive of agents.

This is simply an affirmation of God’s omniscience – that God knows all possibilities as well as all actualities. Even prior to the decree to create, God is aware of all possible creative options.
I agree that God is aware of all his options prior to willing or decreeing, but i see the options as things he can create from nothing, whereas i see your view as having a pre-existing set of pieces offered to Him to work with(due to the requirements of causal integrity in the agent, as mentioned above).

Do you affirm that it is logically possible that Smitten might not have existed if God had chosen not to create him?
Yes, but I don't know if we interpret "not have existed" in the same way.

If the answer to the above is, “yes,” then would God have still been aware of the logical possibility that Smitten could have existed if God had chosen not to create him?
Yes, with same addendum as above.

If you answer both of the above questions in the affirmative (and it seems fairly intuitive to do so), then you are basically admitting that God’s awareness of the possibility of Smitten existing – God’s awareness of Smitten as a logically possible agent – remains in place independently of God’s decree to create.
Yes, but the possibility of my existence is based on the possibility of God creating me in a certain way. In case i've been unclear, I don't think God lacks knowledge of things he didn't but could have created, i just don't agree that those things have eternal existences that God intuits(along the lines of what i've explained above).

Furthermore, you are admitting that even if God had not created Smitten, propositions which make reference to Smitten as a logically possible agent would have still been meaningful. The proposition, ‘Smitten could have existed,’ would have still been true and known by God. This, in turn, entails that Smitten’s identity as a logically possible agent that God could have created remains in place independently of God’s decree.
Yes, but my logically possible identity is dependent on God, contra God's knowledge of my possible identity being dependent on me.

If you deny that it is logically possible that Smitten might not have existed, then you are logically committed to believing that Smitten’s existence is logically necessary in some sense. But this, in turn, denies God’s creative freedom with respect to the creation of Smitten.
Yea i definitely don't believe that. But in your view, it seems to me that God has no creative freedom regarding Smitten, except for whether to actualize me or not.

Kenny

October 18th 2003, 04:41 AM

Today @ 04:57 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=248589#post248589)
Smitten:

I think i understand what you're saying, but let me try and clarify more as i think my point stands. I think that "possible", while i understand why you use it, can be a misleading term in describing essences in eternity logically prior to God's willing anything or decreeing. The only sense in which an essence is 'possible' is in that God can choose whether or not to actualize it. But apart from that, the agent has a very real existence.

What do you mean by “very real existence”?

One's essence is an abstract description of them, the real agent, including all of their essential properties.

If by “real agent,” you mean the actual agent who exists in the real world, then that is only true after God has decreed to create that agent. Prior to the creative decree, there is no actual agent for the essence to describe. It merely describes a possibility – actually, it simply is a possibility.

I agree with you that God knows logical relationships and such in eternity, but it seems to me that your view of essences requires that there is more than just logical relationships being perceived by God in eternity.

How so?

The essences each have an identity to them. The eternal essence of Kenny is your essence, not mine.

Yes, because I am a distinct possible person from you.

Our essences describe us, they don't prescribe us.

Logically, they simply define us. From all of eternity, God knew my essence as a distinct creative possibility from, say, the possibility of creating Smitten. He was able to choose to create one of us, neither of us or both of us, but He couldn’t have made me such that I was you and you such that you were me. That’s nonsensical.

For an essence to exist its referrent must exist(not necessarily actualized though).

What do you see as the distinction between “existing” and “being actualized” here? The essence is just a set of logically consistent properties. It requires no referent outside of itself.

You have maintained that one's essence does not control them, rather it describes them, this is what saves their moral and causal integrity. But if this is the case, then God's knowledge in eternity is not merely logical possibilities. He has empirical knowledge thrust at him from his possible creations in the future, since essences are descriptive of agents.

Not at all. Prior to God’s actualizing that particular essence, the essence doesn’t describe any actual person, just a possible one – or rather, the essence just is a possible person. There’s nothing about God’s future creation which determines it. Once God does actualize that essence and that possible person becomes a reality, then the essence does describe an actual person. But, it’s the essence which comes first, both logically and temporally, not the actual person. The person’s identity is fixed by her essence rather than her essence being fixed by her identity. It is the fact that she is the instantiation of that particular essence which makes her the person that she is rather than another, not the other way around.

I agree that God is aware of all his options prior to willing or decreeing, but i see the options as things he can create from nothing, whereas i see your view as having a pre-existing set of pieces offered to Him to work with(due to the requirements of causal integrity in the agent, as mentioned above).

What sort of pieces? If God wants to make spheres, He’s got to make round objects (because that’s part of the essence of a sphere). If God wants to make water. He’s got to make H2O molecules (because that’s part of the essence of water). If God wants to make Smitten, He’s got to actualize whatever properties are essential to Smitten. I don’t see how this means that God is somehow working with “pre-existing” materials. That might be a fair critique of Molinism, where part of what God has to work with prior to creation are contingent truths outside of the scope of His voluntary decree, but on my view there are no contingent factors involved. It’s all just a matter of logical definitions.

Yes, but I don't know if we interpret "not have existed" in the same way.

How do you interpret it?

Yes, but the possibility of my existence is based on the possibility of God creating me in a certain way.

Yes. But, do you think God had infinite flexibility pertaining to the ways in which He could have created you? Could God have made you a rock, for example, and have it still be you that He created? Or, is there only a limited range of ways that God could have made you different than you are such that it would still be right to say that it was really you He created and not someone or something else? If God did have an infinite range, then it seems that identity statements are ultimately meaningless. My wife could have just as well been the house next door if God had decreed things that way. This seems absurd to me. But, if there’s a limited range, then you have an eternal essence – it’s just the set of what stays in common over all the different ways God could have made you different such that it is still right to say that it was, in fact, still you that He made and not something or someone else.

In case i've been unclear, I don't think God lacks knowledge of things he didn't but could have created, i just don't agree that those things have eternal existences that God intuits(along the lines of what i've explained above).

But what does that mean exactly? If God knows of possible persons and objects He could create, but there are no individual essences, then that entails that the identity of all these possible persons and things is completely flexible (see above). God could have just as easily made Smitten the house next door and the house next door Smitten if there’s no essential identity attached to the possible persons and objects of which God is aware. I know you probably don’t mean to affirm this, but it is what the denial that objects have pre-existing individual essences entails.

Yes, but my logically possible identity is dependent on God, contra God's knowledge of my possible identity being dependent on me.

I agree. You are Smitten because you are the instantiation of a particular essence which depends entirely on God’s natural knowledge for its existence. It is not the other way around. Your essence is not the way it is because of your actual identity, but your actual identity is what it is because you instantiate a particular essence.

But in your view, it seems to me that God has no creative freedom regarding Smitten, except for whether to actualize me or not.

God can alter any of your non-essential qualities at will and have it still be you that He created. So there is a great deal of freedom pertaining to the manner in which God could have created you in that respect. But there are limits to the number of ways that God could have made you different such that it would have been right to say that it really was you God created and not someone or something else. If God steps over that line, then it wouldn’t really be you that He’s creating any more. Of course, God is free to step over that line if He chooses. He could have created, no doubt, a number of persons very similar to you who did not share your essential properties, but these persons would not have been you but someone else – just like God could have no doubt created many substances similar to water to fill the Earth’s oceans which were not composed of H2O molecules; it just wouldn’t have been water that He had created but something else. The “limits” on God’s creative freedom here, however, simply pertain to logical definitions, not to anything imposed on God from without.

God Bless,
Kenny

Smitten

October 18th 2003, 11:36 AM

Kenny,

There’s nothing about God’s future creation which determines it. Once God does actualize that essence and that possible person becomes a reality, then the essence does describe an actual person. But, it’s the essence which comes first, both logically and temporally, not the actual person. The person’s identity is fixed by her essence rather than her essence being fixed by her identity.

Well i agree with this, except I have got the impression that your view doesn't really entail this. In many previous posts on this thread, it seemed you were arguing that(in order to preserve causal integrity) the agent's essential properties described them but did not determine them. Like i asked where the freedom was if one was born with their essential qualities. How did God not push Adam into the water if Adam had no say in his his essential qualities or what made up his core being. Along these lines, it seemed you argued that Adam was responsibile for who he was, hence his essence being descriptive, not fully determinitive.

So maybe you can clear up my confusion. Is ones essence descriptive and thus only logically but not causally determinitive(saving causal integrity) or is ones essence causally determinitive(which would then mean that God's knowledge in eternity of the essence would be only logical possibilties and not empirical knowledge). My recent posts have conveyed that i thought you believe the former, which would make God's knowledge in eternity somewhat empirical, since one's essence had a referrent from the future(the agent, if they were to exist).

Kenny

October 20th 2003, 07:30 PM

10-18-2003 @ 04:36 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=248800#post248800)
Smitten:

Kenny,

Well i agree with this, except I have got the impression that your view doesn't really entail this. In many previous posts on this thread, it seemed you were arguing that(in order to preserve causal integrity) the agent's essential properties described them but did not determine them.

That’s right (or more precisely, one’s essence logically determines one but it does not causally determine one), because essences are just abstractions. Abstractions lack causal powers. If we speak in terms of the agents essential qualities (which are the concrete instantiations of her essential properties) then those qualities do causally determine the agent’s behavior, but only if we are including the essential quality of being self-identical among those qualities. The agent’s behavior is not strictly causally determined by qualities non-identical with herself.

Like i asked where the freedom was if one was born with their essential qualities.

I explained that true freedom lies in causally acting from one’s self as a volitional moral agent. Acting according to one’s essential qualities is nothing more than action in accordance with and out of who one is.

How did God not push Adam into the water if Adam had no say in his his essential qualities or what made up his core being.

Saying that Adam had no control over being created with his essential qualities ultimately reduces to saying that Adam had no control over the fact of his existence. If God had created Adam without those qualities, Adam would never have existed in the first place. Of course, no being has control over the fact of her initial existence, but such does not negate moral responsibility for that being’s actions when they flow out of who she is as a volitional moral agent.

God created Adam knowing that Adam was the sort of being who would freely choose to jump on his own and then God let him go ahead and jump. God did not create Adam and then toss him in, nor could God have created Adam, since this choice flowed out of Adam’s essential being, in such a way that Adam would have acted differently in the same circumstances. God could have made another being who would have acted differently, but that being would not have been Adam. So if Adam complains to God that God made him in such a way that he would choose to jump, he’s just complaining about the fact that God created him in the first place.

Along these lines, it seemed you argued that Adam was responsibile for who he was, hence his essence being descriptive, not fully determinitive.

I never said any such thing. In fact, I explicitly denied it on a number of occasions. I said our essences were eternal givens which we have no control over whatsoever. What Adam is causally responsible for are his actions given that the cause of those actions do not reduce to factors which are not identical to Adam himself acting as a volitional moral agent.

So maybe you can clear up my confusion. Is ones essence descriptive and thus only logically but not causally determinitive(saving causal integrity) or is ones essence causally determinitive(which would then mean that God's knowledge in eternity of the essence would be only logical possibilties and not empirical knowledge).

One’s essence is only logically determinative and not causally determinative, as explained above. The whole of one’s essential qualities (including the quality of being self-identical) does causally determine one’s actions but not if the quality of being self-identical is left out of this. That’s where the whole discussion of causal reductionism comes into play. I’m arguing that since causal reductionism fails, it is possible for God to have counterfactual knowledge pertaining to what free creatures (in a compatiblist sense and not in an LFW sense) would do if God were to create them and place them in various circumstances, this knowledge being prior to any sort of creative decree on God’s part, without this knowledge being in any sense contingent or empirically based, and without the choices of such creatures being causally determined by anything non-identical to themselves.

It seems to me that you are still stuck on the assumption of causal reductionism. You are assuming that if A definitively follows as a result of causes B, C and D then the causal explanation for A must reduce to B, C and D. You are also assuming that if the causal explanation for A does not reduce to B, C and D then it is impossible to predict A on the basis of B, C and D. There are numerous good reasons, philosophical, scientific and theological, to believe the above two assumptions are false. In fact, these assumptions are based in an anti-Christian metaphysical atomism which has now been thoroughly discredited by contemporary science and philosophy both inside and outside of Christian circles.

In Christ,
Kenny