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shunyadragon
03-03-2014, 02:00 PM
Philosophers who believe that Gettier-style arguments pose a substantial problem for the tripartite theory of knowledge vastly outnumber those who do not. In this series, I’m going to throw my lot in with the latter group and argue that Gettier arguments do not present substantial counterexamples to the justified true belief theory of knowledge as commonly construed. I will argue that while Gettier arguments do surface some problems in epistemology, they do not undermine JTB. Specifically, I will argue that JTB describes the justification of beliefs while Gettier arguments merely show the limitations of language that reference beliefs. I will argue that most Gettier-style counterexamples fail to make a distinction between a proposition (or a statement that exemplifies a proposition) and beliefs about or of propositions.

This is sort of a learning thread for me to understand the Gettier Problem and the claim of Tripartite theory of knowledge (JTB - Justification, Truth and Belief.). The above is the beginning of a rather lengthy argument for the conditional acceptance of some arguments for some cases for knowledge based on JTB. I think a great deal of Plantinga's arguments are based on JTB, which I have never at this point accept as an adequate justification for knowledge, therefore Justified True Belief. I have up to now consider the Justification for True Belief as portrayed by Plantinga too subjective to be consistently applied as a basis of consistent knowledge.

Carrikature
03-04-2014, 06:42 AM
This is sort of a learning thread for me to understand the Gettier Problem and the claim of Tripartite theory of knowledge (JTB - Justification, Truth and Belief.). The above is the beginning of a rather lengthy argument for the conditional acceptance of some arguments for some cases for knowledge based on JTB. I think a great deal of Plantinga's arguments are based on JTB, which I have never at this point accept as an adequate justification for knowledge, therefore Justified True Belief. I have up to now consider the Justification for True Belief as portrayed by Plantinga too subjective to be consistently applied as a basis of consistent knowledge.

Just for reference (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/#KnoJusTruBel):


S knows that p iff

(i) p is true;
(ii) S believes that p;
(iii) S is justified in believing that p.

The first two are generally beyond debate. The third is quite the opposite. What counts as justification? If you have what normally counts as justification, but it's wrong, then what? Is it still knowledge? These last two questions are the root of Gettier Problems.

Paprika
03-04-2014, 07:19 AM
Platinga doesn't believe that traditional JTB suffices due to Gettier-style problems, and therefore developed his theory of warrant.

shunyadragon
03-04-2014, 10:38 AM
Platinga doesn't believe that traditional JTB suffices due to Gettier-style problems, and therefore developed his theory of warrant.

I consider the Theory of Warrant also still weak, because of the subjective nature of religious belief. In other words I do not think he gets around the problem. In relation to this I will look more closely again as to the nature of his 'Theory of Warrant,' because it has been a while. I believe it remains a version of JTB.

I looked again and find this to be problematic 'Virtue Epistomology' is too vague to justify a specific claim. This could be used to justify any one of many conflicting beliefs.




Plantinga's theory of warrant

Alvin Plantinga offers another theory of knowledge closely related to virtue epistemology. According to him, knowledge is warranted if one's intellectual faculties are operating as they are designed to. That is, knowledge is valid if it is obtained through the correct operation of the faculties of the intellect which are designed to have an inherent ability, because they are designed that way, to capture and produce true beliefs.

Potential advantages of virtue epistemology

Some varieties of virtue epistemology that contain normative elements, such as virtue responsibilism, can provide a unified framework of normativity and value. Others, such as Sosa's account, can circumvent Cartesian skepticism with the necessity of externalism interacting with internalism. In this same vein, and because of the inherent flexibility and social nature of some of types of virtue epistemology, social conditioning and influence can be understood within an epistemological framework and explored. This flexibility and connection between internal and external makes virtue epistemology more accessible

shunyadragon
03-04-2014, 10:40 AM
Just for reference (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/#KnoJusTruBel):


S knows that p iff

(i) p is true;
(ii) S believes that p;
(iii) S is justified in believing that p.

The first two are generally beyond debate. The third is quite the opposite. What counts as justification? If you have what normally counts as justification, but it's wrong, then what? Is it still knowledge? These last two questions are the root of Gettier Problems.

I believe (i) p is true. is dependent on: What is the basis for claiming p is true?

Carrikature
03-04-2014, 12:55 PM
I believe (i) p is true. is dependent on: What is the basis for claiming p is true?

That's a misunderstanding of its treatment, then. Either p is true or it isn't. If you want to look at basis, that's a discussion of (iii).

shunyadragon
03-04-2014, 03:47 PM
That's a misunderstanding of its treatment, then. Either p is true or it isn't. If you want to look at basis, that's a discussion of (iii).

Please explain, if (I) p is true, and (iii) S is justified believing in p. How does (iii) justified questioning whether p is true or not?

Carrikature
03-04-2014, 06:16 PM
Please explain, if (I) p is true, and (iii) S is justified believing in p. How does (iii) justified questioning whether p is true or not?

It might help to start with an example. In order to have knowledge of gravity (p), gravity must actually exist as a force (i). The person in question (S) has to believe that gravity exists (ii), and they have to believe it in a way that is justified (iii). For gravity, justification could be something akin to repeated observations that what goes up comes back down.

Part (i) is simply saying that it's impossible to know something that is false. Knowledge can only refer to true statements. Part (ii) says that a person must actually believe (i) in order for it to count as knowledge. If a person doesn't believe (i), they don't have knowledge. Part (iii) says that a person must have justification for their belief (read: logically valid reasoning which leads to the given conclusion). The problem is that 'logically valid' doesn't imply soundness. It's perfectly possible for the premises to be false, the reasoning valid, and the conclusion true. Gettier's question, then, is essentially "Can a true conclusion reached by valid reasoning based on false premises count as knowledge?" Most people say that it does not count, but as yet no one has come up with a foolproof way of redefining knowledge.

Paprika
03-04-2014, 07:37 PM
I consider the Theory of Warrant also still weak, because of the subjective nature of religious belief.
Have you actually read any of his works on warrant? Warrant doesn't have any explicit theological basis. It has, however, a strongly teleological bent.

shunyadragon
03-05-2014, 03:22 AM
Have you actually read any of his works on warrant? Warrant doesn't have any explicit theological basis. It has, however, a strongly teleological bent.

Yes I have. There is a nebulous difference between 'explicit theological basis and strong teleological bent. The teleological argument for design is a very poor argument for the existence of God. As far as I know the Theory of Warrant is only used to deal with theological belief. You may help with a better explanation of the Theory of Warrant and 'strong teleological bent.'

Paprika
03-05-2014, 06:30 AM
As far as I know the Theory of Warrant is only used to deal with theological belief.
:lmbo:
Now really, it is funny to see you expose your ignorance for all to see, but you should really go do the research.

seer
03-05-2014, 06:42 AM
:lmbo:
Now really, it is funny to see you expose your ignorance for all to see, but you should really go do the research.

Well it wouldn't be the first time...

shunyadragon
03-05-2014, 07:56 AM
:lmbo:
Now really, it is funny to see you expose your ignorance for all to see, but you should really go do the research.

OK, please give a references where it is used outside theological claims of the nature of belief and knowledge. Citations please. I said, 'As far as I know.' I can find no references that indicate the Theory of Warrant is referred to outside the justification of a belief system as Plantinga proposed it.

Paprika
03-05-2014, 08:04 AM
OK, please give a references where it is used outside theological claims of the nature of belief and knowledge. Citations please.
Firstly, the teleological nature of Plantinga's warrant system is not necessarily religious. As he says in Warrant and Proper Function, "We are accustomed to hearing about biological functions for various bodily organs. The heart, the kidneys, and the pituitary gland, we're told have functions--things that they are, in this sense supposed to do.." In the work Plantinga goes on to discuss epistemological topics from the perspective of his warrant system, such as the problem of other minds (chapter 4), [sense] perception (chapter 5), a priori knowledge (chapter 6), the problem of induction (chapter 7) and so on.

These are hardly religious but classic philosophical problems and issues.

Carrikature
03-05-2014, 08:06 AM
Have you actually read any of his works on warrant? Warrant doesn't have any explicit theological basis. It has, however, a strongly teleological bent.

I have to admit curiosity regarding how teleology exists without theology. How is that things have final causes without something giving that cause to them?

Paprika
03-05-2014, 08:07 AM
I have to admit curiosity regarding how teleology exists without theology. How is that things have final causes without something giving that cause to them?
Hmm, my usage of 'teleological' may have been a bit inaccurate. See my post above. Plantinga builds on the assumption that a mind has some proper functions, analogous to the functions of biological organs.

Carrikature
03-05-2014, 08:22 AM
Hmm, my usage of 'teleological' may have been a bit inaccurate. See my post above. Plantinga builds on the assumption that a mind has some proper functions, analogous to the functions of biological organs.

I'm not sure it is inaccurate, actually. A proper function indicates there's a right and a wrong way to do it. How could that be, unless something set the 'right way'?

*will be reading WCB*

shunyadragon
03-05-2014, 08:24 AM
Hmm, my usage of 'teleological' may have been a bit inaccurate. See my post above. Plantinga builds on the assumption that a mind has some proper functions, analogous to the functions of biological organs.

Plantinga uses the Teleological Argument specifically in an attempt to disprove the possibility of Natural Evolution, arguing for the necessity of 'Intelligent Design. If not arguing for God, maybe aliens are responsible? Plantinga's arguments come primarily from Thomas Aquina's 'Five Arguments for the existence of God. Have you read Plantinga's arguments????


A teleological or physico-theological argument, also known as an argument from design, or from intelligent design, is an argument for the existence of God, or more generally of some kind of intelligent agent of creation, based upon proposed empirical evidence of human-like design or purpose in nature.[1] The argument goes back to Greek philosophy but is today central to the creationist religious concepts of creation science and intelligent design which are presented as alternative scientific explanations in opposition to evolution theory.

Paprika
03-05-2014, 08:29 AM
Plantinga uses the Teleological Argument specifically in an attempt to disprove the possibility of Natural Evolution, arguing for the necessity of 'Intelligent Design. If not arguing for God, maybe aliens are responsible? Plantinga's arguments come primarily from Thomas Aquina's 'Five Arguments for the existence of God.
Yes, but he's not using that teleological argument to support his warrant system. He uses a an analogy from biology as an axiom: biological structures such as organs have functions, so similarly our minds are likely to have some functions. What then are the mind's functions, and what is their relation to knowledge?

Paprika
03-05-2014, 08:38 AM
For those interested in Plantinga's work on warrant, I recommend reading his Warranted Christian Belief. Based on his previous two works on warrant, he tackes the issue of whether some Christian beliefs are warranted.

You can read it online or download it here (http://www.ccel.org/ccel/plantinga/warrant3) for free.

shunyadragon
03-05-2014, 08:44 AM
Plantinga epistemology -As far as I can see, and checking other references, his arguments for 'Theory of Warrant,' properly basic, and 'proper functionalism' are applied only to theistic arguments. Please reference alternatives, and avoid meaningless ridicule.




Plantinga's contributions to epistemology include an argument which he dubs "Reformed epistemology". According to Reformed epistemology, belief in God can be rational and justified even without arguments or evidence for the existence of God. More specifically, Plantinga argues that belief in God is properly basic, and due to a religious externalist epistemology, he claims belief in God could be justified independently of evidence. His externalist epistemology, called "Proper functionalism", is a form of epistemological reliabilism.[38]

Plantinga discusses his view of Reformed epistemology and Proper functionalism in a three-volume series. In the first book of the trilogy, Warrant: The Current Debate, Plantinga introduces, analyzes, and criticizes 20th-century developments in analytic epistemology, particularly the works of Chisholm, BonJour, Alston, Goldman, and others.[39][40] In the book, Plantinga argues specifically that the theories of what he calls “warrant”- what many others have called justification- put forth by these epistemologists have systematically failed to capture in full what is required for knowledge.[41]

In the second book, Warrant and Proper Function, he introduces the notion of warrant as an alternative to justification and discusses topics like self-knowledge, memories, perception, and probability.[42] Plantinga's "proper function" account argues that as a necessary condition of having warrant, one's "belief-forming and belief-maintaining apparatus of powers" are functioning properly—"working the way it ought to work".[43] Plantinga explains his argument for proper function with reference to a "design plan", as well as an environment in which one's cognitive equipment is optimal for use. Plantinga asserts that the design plan does not require a designer: "it is perhaps possible that evolution (undirected by God or anyone else) has somehow furnished us with our design plans",[44] but the paradigm case of a design plan is like a technological product designed by a human being (like a radio or a wheel). Ultimately, Plantinga argues that epistemological naturalism- i.e. epistemology that holds that warrant is dependent on natural faculties - is best supported by supernaturalist metaphysics - in this case the belief in a creator God or designer who has laid out a design plan that includes cognitive faculties conducive to attaining knowledge.[45]

According to Plantinga, a belief, B, is warranted if:


(1) the cognitive faculties involved in the production of B are functioning properly…; (2) your cognitive environment is sufficiently similar to the one for which your cognitive faculties are designed; (3) … the design plan governing the production of the belief in question involves, as purpose or function, the production of true beliefs…; and (4) the design plan is a good one: that is, there is a high statistical or objective probability that a belief produced in accordance with the relevant segment of the design plan in that sort of environment is true.

Outis
03-05-2014, 09:29 AM
The Gettier problems are simple to resolve. In each case, the "justification" of the belief is in error. The belief is not justified, it simply seems to be, due to an artifact of the situations as described.

Quoting one example from Wikipedia:



Smith has applied for a job, but, it is claimed, has a justified belief that "Jones will get the job". He also has a justified belief that "Jones has 10 coins in his pocket". Smith therefore (justifiably) concludes (by the rule of the transitivity of identity) that "the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket".

In fact, Jones does not get the job. Instead, Smith does. However, as it happens, Smith (unknowingly and by sheer chance) also had 10 coins in his pocket. So his belief that "the man who will get the job has 10 coins in his pocket" was justified and true. But it does not appear to be knowledge.

Gettier never provided an explanation as to why Smith's belief that "Jones will get the job" was justified. Obviously, if Jones didn't get the job, it was not. Smith then uses this unjustified belief to extrapolate other information. He was technically correct only in the sense of a broken clock being technically correct twice a day.

Because Smith's belief that "Jones will get the job" was not accurate, any correct assumption based on that belief is not "knowledge"--it's simply an artifact of Smith's error.

Outis
03-05-2014, 09:42 AM
Firstly, the teleological nature of Plantinga's warrant system is not necessarily religious. As he says in Warrant and Proper Function, "We are accustomed to hearing about biological functions for various bodily organs. The heart, the kidneys, and the pituitary gland, we're told have functions--things that they are, in this sense supposed to do.." In the work Plantinga goes on to discuss epistemological topics from the perspective of his warrant system, such as the problem of other minds (chapter 4), [sense] perception (chapter 5), a priori knowledge (chapter 6), the problem of induction (chapter 7) and so on.

These are hardly religious but classic philosophical problems and issues.

This is not a case of teleology: this is a case of functionality. Teleology is the study of design, purpose, and intent: contra Aristotle, you cannot have intent without having (in Aristotle's words) "an agent deliberating." This is avoided today in science, because science is not competent to evaluate the question. There may or may not be a God ... I don't know. But science is not the tool to use to decide the question.

Plantinga is either unaware of this, or refuses to accept it, but by invoking teleology into the argument, he is indeed "frontloading" his assumptions.

Carrikature
03-05-2014, 10:20 AM
The Gettier problems are simple to resolve. In each case, the "justification" of the belief is in error. The belief is not justified, it simply seems to be, due to an artifact of the situations as described.

Quoting one example from Wikipedia:




Gettier never provided an explanation as to why Smith's belief that "Jones will get the job" was justified. Obviously, if Jones didn't get the job, it was not. Smith then uses this unjustified belief to extrapolate other information. He was technically correct only in the sense of a broken clock being technically correct twice a day.

Because Smith's belief that "Jones will get the job" was not accurate, any correct assumption based on that belief is not "knowledge"--it's simply an artifact of Smith's error.

If they're so simple to resolve, why is it that 50 years later epistemologists are still trying to do so? I admit that the particular example is a bad one, but there are sufficient alternative examples to still establish Gettier's point.

Outis
03-05-2014, 10:44 AM
If they're so simple to resolve, why is it that 50 years later epistemologists are still trying to do so? I admit that the particular example is a bad one, but there are sufficient alternative examples to still establish Gettier's point.

Because my solution undermines the theory of justification. If something can seem to be justified, but is actually in error, justification is an uncertain standard.

My "solution" actually reintroduces problems that the theory of justification had already solved ... I'm of the opinion that the "solution" provided by the Theory of Justification was actually a false lead (more accurately, it's not universally applicable and is subject to messy errors).

shunyadragon
03-05-2014, 11:03 AM
Because my solution undermines the theory of justification. If something can seem to be justified, but is actually in error, justification is an uncertain standard.

My "solution" actually reintroduces problems that the theory of justification had already solved ... I'm of the opinion that the "solution" provided by the Theory of Justification was actually a false lead (more accurately, it's not universally applicable and is subject to messy errors).

Good response. I still consider the problems of Theory of Warrant will be similar and must face the Gettier Problem as does Tripartite theory of knowledge (JTB).

Paprika
03-05-2014, 10:18 PM
Plantinga epistemology -As far as I can see, and checking other references, his arguments for 'Theory of Warrant,' properly basic, and 'proper functionalism' are applied only to theistic arguments. Please reference alternatives, and avoid meaningless ridicule.
LOL Wikipedia. I've already shown (http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/showthread.php?1093-The-Gettier-Problem-and-epistomology&p=24921&viewfull=1#post24921) that in one of his works Plantinga applies his warrant theory to classic philosophical problems. Stop being dense.

Paprika
03-05-2014, 10:21 PM
The Gettier problems are simple to resolve. In each case, the "justification" of the belief is in error. The belief is not justified, it simply seems to be, due to an artifact of the situations as described.

Quoting one example from Wikipedia:




Gettier never provided an explanation as to why Smith's belief that "Jones will get the job" was justified. Obviously, if Jones didn't get the job, it was not. Smith then uses this unjustified belief to extrapolate other information. He was technically correct only in the sense of a broken clock being technically correct twice a day.

Because Smith's belief that "Jones will get the job" was not accurate, any correct assumption based on that belief is not "knowledge"--it's simply an artifact of Smith's error.
LOL Wikipedia. It's not a matter of just resolving one Gettier problem, but resolving all of the different types of Gettier problems.

Paprika
03-05-2014, 10:22 PM
This is not a case of teleology: this is a case of functionality. Teleology is the study of design, purpose, and intent: contra Aristotle, you cannot have intent without having (in Aristotle's words) "an agent deliberating." This is avoided today in science, because science is not competent to evaluate the question. There may or may not be a God ... I don't know. But science is not the tool to use to decide the question.

Plantinga is either unaware of this, or refuses to accept it, but by invoking teleology into the argument, he is indeed "frontloading" his assumptions.
I don't recall Plantinga ever calling his warrant theory teleological, only myself, and I later conceded that it may have been an inaccurate description. He invokes "function" analagous to the "function" biologists assign to various biological structures.

Paprika
03-05-2014, 10:26 PM
Good response. I still consider the problems of Theory of Warrant will be similar and must face the Gettier Problem.
Right. Do demonstrate it; I would love to see it.

Outis
03-05-2014, 11:49 PM
LOL Wikipedia.

Would you prefer the IEP (http://www.iep.utm.edu/gettier/#H5), where the problem above is Gettier Case I? I'd also be willing to direct you to the Stanford EoP (http://plato.stanford.edu/contents.html), but they don't have an article specific to that topic.

Laughing at, or deriding, the source of the information when the information is accurate is a form of ad hominem.


It's not a matter of just resolving one Gettier problem, but resolving all of the different types of Gettier problems.

I'm quite aware of that. I'm also aware that I don't have the space to develop a proof in a TWeb post.

Outis
03-06-2014, 12:02 AM
I don't recall Plantinga ever calling his warrant theory teleological, only myself, and I later conceded that it may have been an inaccurate description. He invokes "function" analagous to the "function" biologists assign to various biological structures.

If you're referring to the "proper function" of the brain, and your definition of "proper" means working according to the "design plan" (Warrant and Proper Function, p 21), you're appealing to teleology.

Paprika
03-06-2014, 12:16 AM
If you're referring to the "proper function" of the brain, and your definition of "proper" means working according to the "design plan" (Warrant and Proper Function, p 21), you're appealing to teleology.
And again, in p14, he invokes "design plan" as analagous to "design" in biology.

Outis
03-06-2014, 12:33 AM
And again, in p14, he invokes "design plan" as analagous to "design" in biology.

Which is, again, teleological language. Considering that Plantinga firmly rejects naturalism and prefers intelligent design, the conclusion that he argues from teleology is inescapable.

Paprika
03-06-2014, 12:38 AM
Which is, again, teleological language. Considering that Plantinga firmly rejects naturalism and prefers intelligent design, the conclusion that he argues from teleology is inescapable.
Given that biologists use teleological language (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/teleology-biology/), with "many contemporary biologists and philosophers of biology [believing] that teleological notions are a distinctive and ineliminable feature of biological explanations but that it is possible to provide a naturalistic account of their role", I don't consider anything untoward of Plantinga's usage.

Outis
03-06-2014, 12:47 AM
Given that biologists use teleological language (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/teleology-biology/), with "many contemporary biologists and philosophers of biology [believing] that teleological notions are a distinctive and ineliminable feature of biological explanations but that it is possible to provide a naturalistic account of their role", I don't consider anything untoward of Plantinga's usage.

As soon as you are the authoritative source of what is "untowards," I'll consider your opinion on the issue relevant.

Plantinga's notions of knowledge are firmly rooted in his theistic preconceptions: his concept of warrant is teleological, despite your handwaving.

Paprika
03-06-2014, 01:05 AM
Plantinga's notions of knowledge are firmly rooted in his theistic preconceptions: his concept of warrant is teleological, despite your handwaving.
Teleological concepts can also be based on naturalistic conceptions (as I have pointed out in my previous post). Now, though his teleological warrant theory may be theistically motivated, it doesn't mean it is thus invalidated. Does his teleological axiom require, implictly or explicitly, a designer? If no, I suggest addressing the argument, instead of trying to handwave it away.

MaxVel
03-06-2014, 04:10 AM
As soon as you are the authoritative source of what is "untowards," I'll consider your opinion on the issue relevant.

Plantinga's notions of knowledge are firmly rooted in his theistic preconceptions: his concept of warrant is teleological, despite your handwaving.


Outis, you seem to be verging on an ad hominem rejection of Plantinga, something you yourself decried in post #31.

Outis
03-06-2014, 08:20 AM
Outis, you seem to be verging on an ad hominem rejection of Plantinga, something you yourself decried in post #31.

I am not. I do reject teleology as a concept in biology, based on Occam's razor and _some_ elements of the "argument from bad design." As I am agnostic, I can neither reject nor accept his theology, thus because his theology is so foundational to his arguments, I have to view his arguments as factually unfounded.

As far as the man himself, I'd love to sit down with him for a cup of coffee and a discussion of these issues.

shunyadragon
03-06-2014, 01:28 PM
Given that biologists use teleological language (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/teleology-biology/), with "many contemporary biologists and philosophers of biology [believing] that teleological notions are a distinctive and ineliminable feature of biological explanations but that it is possible to provide a naturalistic account of their role", I don't consider anything untoward of Plantinga's usage.

False in science do not use teleological language of 'design' as Plantinga and other theist philosophers use it.

shunyadragon
03-06-2014, 01:30 PM
Teleological concepts can also be based on naturalistic conceptions (as I have pointed out in my previous post). Now, though his teleological warrant theory may be theistically motivated, it doesn't mean it is thus invalidated. Does his teleological axiom require, implictly or explicitly, a designer? If no, I suggest addressing the argument, instead of trying to handwave it away.

Plantinga's teleological axiom requires a designer and rejects a Naturalist evolution. That is the purpose of his whole argument.

Paprika
03-07-2014, 04:24 AM
False in science do not use teleological language of 'design' as Plantinga and other theist philosophers use it.

Plantinga's teleological axiom requires a designer and rejects a Naturalist evolution. That is the purpose of his whole argument.

Asserted, not shown.

shunyadragon
03-08-2014, 06:12 AM
Asserted, not shown.

Plantinga's argument for design/theistic evolution, and against Naturalism were present in 1993 and 2008. The following is a summary of his 2008 argument.



In his discussion of EAAN, Michael Ruse described Plantinga as believing in the truth of the attack on evolution presented by intelligent design advocate Phillip E. Johnson, and as having endorsed Johnson's book Darwin on Trial. Ruse said that Plantinga took the conflict between science and religion further than Johnson, seeing it as not just a clash between the philosophies of naturalism and theism, but as an attack on the true philosophy of theism by what he considers the incoherent and inconsistent philosophy of naturalism.[32]

Plantinga has stated that EAAN is not directed against "the theory of evolution, or the claim that human beings have evolved from simian ancestors, or anything in that neighborhood".[38] He also claimed that the problems raised by EAAN do not apply to the conjunction of theism and contemporary evolutionary science.[39] In his essay Evolution and Design Plantinga outlines different ways in which theism and evolutionary theory can be combined.[40]

In the foreword to the anthology Naturalism Defeated? James Beilby wrote: "Plantinga's argument should not be mistaken for an argument against evolutionary theory in general or, more specifically, against the claim that humans might have evolved from more primitive life forms. Rather, the purpose of his argument is to show that the denial of the existence of a creative deity is problematic."

Paprika
03-08-2014, 06:31 AM
Plantinga's argument for design/theistic evolution, and against Naturalism were present in 1993 and 2008. The following is a summary of his 2008 argument.
:doh:

shunyadragon
03-08-2014, 07:45 AM
:doh:

I will take that as an agreement that: Plantinga's teleological axiom requires a designer and rejects a Naturalist evolution. That is the purpose of his whole argument

Paprika
03-08-2014, 08:02 AM
I will take that as an agreement that: Plantinga's teleological axiom requires a designer and rejects a Naturalist evolution. That is the purpose of his whole argument
:doh:
You're being dense. That he builds an argument against naturalistic evolution based on the axiom doesn't necessarily mean the axiom "requires a designer and rejects a Naturalist evolution".

shunyadragon
03-08-2014, 08:57 AM
:doh:
You're being dense. That he builds an argument against naturalistic evolution based on the axiom doesn't necessarily mean the axiom "requires a designer and rejects a Naturalist evolution".

Your being dense, and avoiding reality. The whole purpose of Plantinga's argument for requiring a designer is a rejection of 'Naturalist Evolution.' There are a number of refences by and on Plantinga's works that clearly document this. My reference makes this clear.

shunyadragon
03-08-2014, 09:01 AM
Your being dense, and avoiding reality. The whole purpose of Plantinga's argument for requiring a designer is a rejection of 'Naturalist Evolution.' There are a number of refences by and on Plantinga's works that clearly document this. My reference makes this clear.

The purpose of Teleological arguments for design is to support the theist argument since Thomas Aquinas at least. Can you site an example where the teleological argument is not used with this specific purpose?


A teleological or physico-theological argument, also known as an argument from design, or from intelligent design, is an argument for the existence of God, or more generally of some kind of intelligent agent of creation, based upon proposed empirical evidence of human-like design or purpose in nature.[1] The argument goes back to Greek philosophy but is today central to the creationist religious concepts of creation science and intelligent design which are presented as alternative scientific explanations in opposition to evolution theory.

MaxVel
03-09-2014, 12:56 AM
Shunya, it looks like you're conflating the Teleological Argument (which you quoted above from Wikipedia) with teleology (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teleology). They're not the same thing.

Secondly, arguing that Plantinga's ideas about warrant and justification are wrong merely because he is a theist is a logical fallacy, and makes it look like you're against the argument because of Plantinga's ultimate conclusions (he's a Christian) rather than because there's a flaw in what he actually argues.

How about showing where Plantinga goes wrong in his arguments about warrant and justification, addressing what he actually says?

shunyadragon
03-09-2014, 07:57 AM
Shunya, it looks like you're conflating the Teleological Argument (which you quoted above from Wikipedia) with teleology (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teleology). They're not the same thing.

You're going to have to justify your objection with references. The Wikipedia source is accurate with many references. What are not the same? The Teleological arguments since Thomas Aquinas have been the teleological arguments for the existence of God. The issue here is "Teleological Arguments" for the existence of God, regardless of how you wish to conflate the argument away on another mindless track. Plantinga's arguments are specifically targeted to dis prove Philosophical Naturalism. Again, Can you site an example where the teleological argument for design is not used with this specific purpose?


Secondly, arguing that Plantinga's ideas about warrant and justification are wrong merely because he is a theist is a logical fallacy, and makes it look like you're against the argument because of Plantinga's ultimate conclusions (he's a Christian) rather than because there's a flaw in what he actually argues.

Come again???? I have never made this argument in any of my posts. His Teleological arguments fail miserably for other reasons.


How about showing where Plantinga goes wrong in his arguments about warrant and justification, addressing what he actually says?

That has already been addressed in previous posts until this thread was derailed by the nonsense that Plantinga's Teleological arguments for design do not specifically argue against Philosophical Naturalism and for Theistic evolution. The side topis in this thread concern the Physico-Theology argument for design presented by Plantinga regardless.

This is in reality side show from the Gettier problem and epistemology where I still consider Plantinga's arguments to suffer similar weaknesses as the Tripartite definition of knowledge.

shunyadragon
03-09-2014, 08:41 AM
How about showing where Plantinga goes wrong in his arguments about warrant and justification, addressing what he actually says?

First big time failure for the design argument was demonstrated in the Dover Trial where the proponents had the opportunity to present their case. As far as science goes they failed miserably. Falsifiable hypothesis ad theories were demonstrated as impossible.

Second, There are many philosophers that have very sound objections to Plantinga's arguments for design, but I like Ruse's response.




Ruse's response

In a chapter titled 'The New Creationism: Its Philosophical Dimension', in The Cultures of Creationism, philosopher of science Michael Ruse discussed EAAN. He argued:
That the EAAN conflates methodological and metaphysical naturalism.[32]
That "we need to make a distinction that Plantinga fudges" between "the world as we can in some sense discover" and "the world in some absolute sense, metaphysical reality if you like." Then, "Once this distinction is made, Plantinga's refutation of naturalism no longer seems so threatening."[33]
That "It is certainly the case that organisms are sometimes deceived about the world of appearances and that this includes humans. Sometimes we are systematically deceived, as instructors in elementary psychology classes delight in demonstrating. Moreover, evolution can often give good reasons as to why we are deceived." We know there are misconceptions arising from selection as we can measure them against reliable touchstones, but in Plantinga's hypothesised deceptions we are deceived all the time which is "not how evolution's deceptions work".[33] He comments that in Plantinga's thinking we have confusion between the world as we know it, and the world as it might be knowable in some ultimate way, but "If we are all in an illusion then it makes no sense to talk of illusion, for we have no touchstone of reality to make absolute judgements."[34]

Ruse concluded his discussion of the EAAN by stating:


To be honest, even if Plantinga's argument [the EAAN] worked, I would still want to know where theism ends (and what form this theism must take) and where science can take over. Is it the case that evolution necessarily cannot function, or it is merely false and in another God-created world it might have held in some way — and if so, in what way? Plantinga has certainly not shown that the theist must be a creationist, even though his own form of theism is creationism.

MaxVel
03-10-2014, 08:57 AM
:facepalm:



You're going to have to justify your objection with references. The Wikipedia source is accurate with many references. What are not the same?

I gave you a reference to teleology above, using Wikipedia, which is where you got your reference on the Teleological Argument from.

Paprika mentioned that part of Plantinga's approach to his theory of Warrant uses the (teleological) idea that, for example, just as we say that the heart has the function of pumping blood, the brain (or mind) has the function of arriving at true beliefs.

Please note that Plantinga does not use the Teleological Argument in developing his theory of Warrant. If you think I'm wrong, please supply specific quotes from Plantinga himself showing that he uses the Telelogical Argument in support of his theories on warrant.




The Teleological arguments since Thomas Aquinas have been the teleological arguments for the existence of God. The issue here is "Teleological Arguments" for the existence of God, regardless of how you wish to conflate the argument away on another mindless track.


Do get a grip, Shunya. I'm trying to help you bring the discussion back to your own OP topic. You started going on about the Teleological Argument for God, which has nothing to do with Plantinga's idea that we are warranted in believing something if our minds are functioning properly (iow as they should) in a sufficiently good cognitive environment. He was attempting to overcome the Gettier problem.





Plantinga's arguments are specifically targeted to dis prove Philosophical Naturalism. Again, Can you site an example where the teleological argument for design is not used with this specific purpose?


Irrelevant to the discussion of Gettier problems and epistemology.


One, just one, of Plantinga's Arguments - the EEAN - was targeted at Naturalism + Evolution. But it seems that it's got under your skin or something, because you keep coming back to it, every time Plantinga is mentioned.


Notable ideas
Reformed epistemology
Free will defense
Modal ontological argument
Proper Function Reliabilism
Evolutionary argument against naturalism

Wikipedia cites 5 of Plantinga's 'Notable ideas' - that's 4 that aren't the EEAN. Included in those 4 are Reformed epistemology and Proper Function Reliabilism; which are related to the OP topic. Note that the Teleological Argument is not there...






Come again???? I have never made this argument in any of my posts. His Teleological arguments fail miserably for other reasons.

You're apparently rejecting Plantinga's ideas on warrant because (a) he's a theist (odd because you are a theist too, right?); (b) he uses a teleological concept in his discussion of what warrant is, and you reject the Teleological Argument for God. The last two underlined are two separate things - Plantinga does not say: "Because there is evidence of order and design in the universe, there must be a designer, which is God (Teleological Argument for God); and therefore we are warranted in believing we have knowledge because God designed our brains." which is something like what you seem to think he is saying.




That has already been addressed in previous posts until this thread was derailed by the nonsense that Plantinga's Teleological arguments for design do not specifically argue against Philosophical Naturalism and for Theistic evolution. The side topis in this thread concern the Physico-Theology argument for design presented by Plantinga regardless.

This is in reality side show from the Gettier problem and epistemology where I still consider Plantinga's arguments to suffer similar weaknesses as the Tripartite definition of knowledge.

Except that you haven't yet actually said anything of significance, with reason or evidence, to show where Plantinga's position on warrant is wrong, or how it fails to overcome the Gettier problems. If I'm wrong, please point me to the specific posts you have made. All you've done so far is assert that he's wrong.

TBH I doubt you actually understand much of anything about the Gettier problems, the Tripartitie theory of knowledge (although Carrikature has helped there), and even less about what Plantinga actually argues. All of which is fine, except that you are incredibly dogmatic about being sure about knowing stuff that you don't know, instead of letting people help you.



I have one more question, if you would be so kind:

As a Baha'i, you are (I presume) a Theist - there is a God "The Bahá'í writings describe a single, personal, inaccessible, omniscient, omnipresent, imperishable, and almighty God who is the creator of all things in the universe" {from Wikipedia}

What do you think is the best argument for that God's existence? Why should someone believe that that God exists? I'm not looking to argue against your argument, just trying to understand why you, Shunyadragon, believe that there is a God. Because you seem to argue against every single argument for God I've seen you come across here on TWeb. But there must be some reason why you believe... what is it?

MaxVel
03-10-2014, 09:02 AM
First big time failure for the design argument was demonstrated in the Dover Trial where the proponents had the opportunity to present their case. As far as science goes they failed miserably. Falsifiable hypothesis ad theories were demonstrated as impossible.

Second, There are many philosophers that have very sound objections to Plantinga's arguments for design, but I like Ruse's response.


I don't think the EEAN is an argument for Design. If you think it is, I think you've misunderstood it altogether. It's an argument against certain forms of philosophical naturalism.


Plantinga is on record as saying that there are no good arguments for ID. Here (http://www.thinkingchristian.net/posts/2011/11/plantinga-theres-no-good-argument-for-design-but-who-needs-one/)
Following detailed and rather technical discussions of both cosmological fine tuning, he concludes that the arguments in favor of design are not compelling.

Carrikature
03-10-2014, 09:09 AM
Because my solution undermines the theory of justification. If something can seem to be justified, but is actually in error, justification is an uncertain standard.

My "solution" actually reintroduces problems that the theory of justification had already solved ... I'm of the opinion that the "solution" provided by the Theory of Justification was actually a false lead (more accurately, it's not universally applicable and is subject to messy errors).

We are probably not terribly far apart in our opinions on justification. I suspect our solutions are drastically different, though it needs elaboration to be sure.

Carrikature
03-10-2014, 09:15 AM
Given that biologists use teleological language (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/teleology-biology/), with "many contemporary biologists and philosophers of biology that teleological notions are a distinctive and ineliminable feature of biological [B]explanations but that it is possible to provide a naturalistic account of their role", I don't consider anything untoward of Plantinga's usage.

The last little bit of that paragraph continues with, "Terminological issues sometimes serve to obscure some widely-accepted distinctions."

I think the key point here is one of terminology and explanations. Granting that such notions are "distinctive and ineliminable", we're still left wondering if they are wholly accurate or merely functionally useful. I claim the latter.

MaxVel
03-10-2014, 09:48 AM
It's interesting just how hard it seems to be for us to remove all references to any kind of teleology at all fro the language we use to talk about the world around us. AFAIK only a few 'extreme' philosophers like the Churchlands and Alex Rosenberg even attempt to do so.

It's almost as if we were made to think of things in teleological terms, like it's built-in by evolutionary processes or something.... :wink:

shunyadragon
03-10-2014, 05:31 PM
:facepalm:

[quote] I gave you a reference to teleology above, using Wikipedia, which is where you got your reference on the Teleological Argument from.

The issue in this side issue of the thread is Plantinga's Teleological Argument against the Naturalist Evolution. I read the reference, no problem, but this is Plantinga's Telological argument against Naturalist Evolution.


Paprika mentioned that part of Plantinga's approach to his theory of Warrant uses the (teleological) idea that, for example, just as we say that the heart has the function of pumping blood, the brain (or mind) has the function of arriving at true beliefs.

This is not how Plantinga uses the teleological arguments. Not the subject.


Please note that Plantinga does not use the Teleological Argument in developing his theory of Warrant. If you think I'm wrong, please supply specific quotes from Plantinga himself showing that he uses the Telelogical Argument in support of his theories on warrant.

Please note, never claimed he did.


Do get a grip, Shunya. I'm trying to help you bring the discussion back to your own OP topic. You started going on about the Teleological Argument for God, which has nothing to do with Plantinga's idea that we are warranted in believing something if our minds are functioning properly (iow as they should) in a sufficiently good cognitive environment. He was attempting to overcome the Gettier problem.

My thread I included Plantinga's Theory of Warrant problems as similar to the Tripatite Theory of Knowledge.





Irrelevant to the discussion of Gettier problems and epistemology.

Not irrelevant to the issue I chose to cover in this thread. Again, Plantinga's arguments are specifically targeted to dis prove Philosophical Naturalism. Again, Can you site an example where the teleological argument for design is not used with this specific purpose?


One, just one, of Plantinga's Arguments - the EEAN - was targeted at Naturalism + Evolution. But it seems that it's got under your skin or something, because you keep coming back to it, every time Plantinga is mentioned.

At present, I am addressing the problems of this one argument. I'm sticking to it because an assertion has been made and not backed up.




Wikipedia cites 5 of Plantinga's 'Notable ideas' - that's 4 that aren't the EEAN. Included in those 4 are Reformed epistemology and Proper Function Reliabilism; which are related to the OP topic. Note that the Teleological Argument is not there...

Room for at least five more threads concerning the problems with Plantinga's arguments. I may start more to deal with them.


You're apparently rejecting Plantinga's ideas on warrant because (a) he's a theist (odd because you are a theist too, right?); (b) he uses a teleological concept in his discussion of what warrant is, and you reject the Teleological Argument for God. The last two underlined are two separate things - Plantinga does not say: "Because there is evidence of order and design in the universe, there must be a designer, which is God (Teleological Argument for God); and therefore we are warranted in believing we have knowledge because God designed our brains." which is something like what you seem to think he is saying.

I reject Plantinga's arguments because they are bad unsound arguments. It is a house of cards to justify one's belief on a superficial logical argument.



Except that you haven't yet actually said anything of significance, with reason or evidence, to show where Plantinga's position on warrant is wrong, or how it fails to overcome the Gettier problems. If I'm wrong, please point me to the specific posts you have made. All you've done so far is assert that he's wrong.

I have, and I may repeat them and add to them. Waiting for an answer to the above question. Where did Plantinga, anyone else use the Teleological Argument for design any other way then argument for the existence of God?


TBH I doubt you actually understand much of anything about the Gettier problems, the Tripartitie theory of knowledge (although Carrikature has helped there), and even less about what Plantinga actually argues. All of which is fine, except that you are incredibly dogmatic about being sure about knowing stuff that you don't know, instead of letting people help you.

Lets get the question answered.




I have one more question, if you would be so kind:

As a Baha'i, you are (I presume) a Theist - there is a God "The Bahá'í writings describe a single, personal, inaccessible, omniscient, omnipresent, imperishable, and almighty God who is the creator of all things in the universe" {from Wikipedia}

What do you think is the best argument for that God's existence? Why should someone believe that that God exists? I'm not looking to argue against your argument, just trying to understand why you, Shunyadragon, believe that there is a God. Because you seem to argue against every single argument for God I've seen you come across here on TWeb. But there must be some reason why you believe... what is it?

The basic reason I believe in God, lies in the Baha'i Faith itself, and not in logical proofs, nor any self justified reason for the need for a God or Gods, For the most part logical arguments are self justified based on presuppositions for the existence of God. No ancient world view, Jewish, Christian, Islam, or any other ancient religion offers any adequate explanation for the problem of universal evolution of knowledge and information in the contemporary world, nor do they adequately explain a universal view of god's relationship to humanity and Creation, They are locked in ancient cultures. The question is justified why is God silent in the other cultures of the world in 10,000 years of recent history, and today from the perspective of the hands on God of Judaism and Christianity. The failure of ancient paradigms to be relevant leads to one of two conclusions; No God exists, or a universal God exists that is relevant to knowledge of the contemporaneous world, the Baha'i Faith. Good topic for another thread. It is very possible no God exists, Naturalism provides an adequate explanation for our existence, where ancient world views fail.

shunyadragon
03-10-2014, 06:29 PM
I don't think the EEAN is an argument for Design. If you think it is, I think you've misunderstood it altogether. It's an argument against certain forms of philosophical naturalism.

What forms of philosophical Naturalism does it not argue against???



Plantinga is on record as saying that there are no good arguments for ID. Here (http://www.thinkingchristian.net/posts/2011/11/plantinga-theres-no-good-argument-for-design-but-who-needs-one/)

The record is provoking one to buy his book, and not really Plantinga's argument.


All kidding about criminality aside, I need to pause at this point and explain what I’m trying to accomplish here. I’m trying to provoke your interest so that you’ll buy Plantinga’s book and read it. I’m not trying to re-create his argument. There may be someone who can compress his argument into a short form suitable for a blog discussion, but I’m not that one. I only know how to point at it and say, “this is really fascinating and you oughtta come see it!”

Carrikature
03-18-2014, 08:30 PM
It's interesting just how hard it seems to be for us to remove all references to any kind of teleology at all fro the language we use to talk about the world around us. AFAIK only a few 'extreme' philosophers like the Churchlands and Alex Rosenberg even attempt to do so.

It's almost as if we were made to think of things in teleological terms, like it's built-in by evolutionary processes or something.... :wink:

I would have to question how much that exists in other languages/cultures. I don't remember where you're from, but American English is horrible at talking about the world. The understood connotations of most words make it nearly impossible to discuss a topic without bringing in extra (unwanted) baggage.

Even so, there would seem to be a benefit to assuming agency from a survival standpoint. I'd think that false positives are unlikely to be detrimental while true positives could drastically affect outcomes.

Paprika
03-18-2014, 09:03 PM
American English
is an oxymoron. :yes:

Carrikature
03-18-2014, 09:29 PM
is an oxymoron. :yes:

The fun part about oxymorons is that they still describe existing things. :shrug:

Paprika
03-18-2014, 09:42 PM
The fun part about oxymorons is that they still describe existing things. :shrug:
I suggest "Yankeese".

shunyadragon
03-19-2014, 07:32 AM
Even so, there would seem to be a benefit to assuming agency from a survival standpoint. I'd think that false positives are unlikely to be detrimental while true positives could drastically affect outcomes.

An understanding of the theory of evolution would reveal that natural selection from a survival (beneficial) stand point would represent both false (detrimental) positives and beneficial positives result in the survival and flourishing of the diversity of life including humans.