mattbballman19
February 21st 2003, 04:49 PM
I'd like to throw all the arguments out there in the open that have been leveled against dualism. I'm a Christian, so if some dualism happens to be false, I'm in trouble. So I ask the brains of this forum to attempt to refute these arguments:-)
Here we go:
First let me define my terms:
Just for choosing's sake, I'll pick Descartes' version of dualism. Descartes holds one sort of a dualist view concerning mind and body, where in addition to mind and body being distinct, Descartes holds further that the two interact with one another. This means that the mind can cause events in the body, such as when one chooses to move one’s arm, and then one’s arm moves. It also means that the body can cause events to occur in one’s mind, such as when one steps on a nail and then feels
pain.
The basic idea behind Descartes’ form of dualism is that we do have an immaterial mind that is somehow associated with the body in that the two interact with one another. It is as if “within” my body (or brain) there is an immaterial ghostlike thing that is my mind. Gilbert Ryle calls this the doctrine of “the ghost in the machine.”
Why should anyone think this doctrine is true? Descartes provides us with two arguments to consider in favor of dualism about mind and body.
First argument (from Meditation II, and given in Blackburn's book THINK on p. 29-30):
(P1) I can doubt that I have a body.
(P2) I can’t doubt that I have a mind. (Or, I can’t doubt that I exist.)
(C) Mind and body are distinct from one another. (Or, I am not identical to my
body.)
If Descartes really intends this to be an argument for dualism, it fails since it is invalid.
Consider the following parallel arguments:
(P1) I can’t doubt that I’m here in the room.
(P2) I can doubt whether a person who will get bad news tomorrow is in the
room.
(C) I’m not a person who will get bad news tomorrow.
or:
(P1) I know who my father is.
(P2) I don’t know who the masked man is.
(C) My father isn’t identical to the masked man.
The first argument is invalid: It’s possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. It simply doesn’t follow that just because one can doubt one thing and not doubt another that there’s some difference between the two. The basic point is that whatever one can doubt, know, believe, hope for, imagine, understand, etc. is independent of what the facts of the matter are with respect to what one doubts, knows, believes, etc.
Within such contexts one can’t substitute terms that have the same reference and keep the same truth value for the whole sentence. The following argument illustrates the same point:
(P1) I believe that Stephen King is Stephen King.
(P2) Stephen King is Richard Bachman.
(C) I believe that Stephen King is Richard Bachman.
(P1) and (P2) can both be true (in fact, they are true) and (C) can be false, so the argument is invalid.
On Descartes behalf, I should note (with Blackburn) that Descartes may not have intended his comments in Meditation II to be an argument for dualism. Instead, he may have merely intended to draw a distinction between how one comes to know about the mind and body. Since one can’t doubt the existence of the mind, and one can doubt the existence of the body, we can’t (or don’t) come to know about the mind by prior knowledge of the body.
Here is his second argument (from Meditation VI):
(P1) It’s clear and distinct that the essence of the mind is merely to think.
(P2) It’s clear and distinct that the essence of the body is merely to be extended
(in space and time).
(P3) If two things differ in their essence, they cannot be identical.
(C) Mind and body are not identical.
Here are possible replies:
Can’t we make the same objection as was made for the first argument? Descartes doesn’t think so, since It’s clear and distinct that... doesn’t behave like I can doubt that..., I can know that..., I believe that..., etc. His reason is that whatever is clear and distinct is necessarily true. If he’s right, then from (P1) it follows that the essence of the mind really is to think, and from (P2) it follows that the essence of the body really is to be extended in
space and time. However, we saw earlier that Descartes failed to adequately defend his “truth rule” about clear and distinct perceptions (it wound up being circular), and so the argument doesn’t appear to be convincing.
Couldn’t it be that the mind can exist without thinking at all? If this is the case then it can’t be that the essence of the mind is to think, and so it wouldn’t go through that mind and body differ in their essence.
Those are the problems that are shown with Descartes' arguments, which I happen to agree with, but I'm willing to discuss with anyone who disagrees with the criticisms.
I now turn to specific objections to Dualism.
These are pretty famous, but I'll just repeat them here for convenience.
(1) The interaction problem. On Descartes’ view mind and body are distinct, but interact with one another. But: If the two kinds of things are distinct, HOW exactly do they interact? If the mind is an immaterial thing, not extended in space, then how can an unextended thing interact with an extended thing? In the absence of a thorough explanation of how the interaction happens, dualism looks to be in trouble.
(2) Causal closure of the physical world. It is often held that the realm of physical things is “closed” under the laws of nature. For everything that happens, there is a physical explanation in terms of physical laws. But if dualism were right then there would be
events (such as the moving of one’s arm by an act of will) in the physical world that aren’t governed by laws of nature. Since the laws of nature govern everything, then dualism can’t be true.
(3) Dualism doesn’t rule out the possibility of zombies and mutants. It does seem as if there are correlations between bodily events and mental events. Most every time one steps on
a nail, one feels pain in one’s foot. Yet even if dualism were right, it doesn’t rule out the possibility of the following kinds of beings:
Zombies. Beings that behave just like us in speech and bodily action, but aren’t conscious at all.
Mutants. Beings that behave just like us in speech and bodily action, and are conscious, but have much different mental states than you and me given the same physical stimuli.
We can imagine the existence of such beings, but how can we know that they aren’t all around us? These bizarre possibilities aren’t ruled out by dualism, and in fact the thesis that mind and body interact seems to predict that there couldn’t be such beings.
However, other views on the mind don’t rule them out either.
Here’s another problem that is raised by such bizarre possibilities as zombies and mutants: How do we know that there are other minds at all? And how do we know that other people have mental lives that are similar to our own? These questions are left open by a dualistic account of the relation between mind and body, and we would like a theory of the mind that gives us answers to them.
Some solutions, which I find distastful, have been offered (feel extra free to examine these).
(1) occasionalism. Mind and body don’t interact causally, but God directly causes mental states on the “occasion” of the physical body being in an appropriate state. So, God causes pain when one steps on a nail, and in all other physical states that are similar to one’s stepping on a nail. But the stepping on a nail doesn’t itself cause the pain.
(2) pre-established harmony. Mind and body don’t interact, but they each occupy distinct realms with their own laws that govern their action. However, God has set it up such that the two realms are in “harmony” with one another. When one steps on a nail, one feels pain, but this is merely the harmony of the material realm with the immaterial.
I'm looking forward to slam dunking these objections and invalid/unsound alternatives.
matt
Here we go:
First let me define my terms:
Just for choosing's sake, I'll pick Descartes' version of dualism. Descartes holds one sort of a dualist view concerning mind and body, where in addition to mind and body being distinct, Descartes holds further that the two interact with one another. This means that the mind can cause events in the body, such as when one chooses to move one’s arm, and then one’s arm moves. It also means that the body can cause events to occur in one’s mind, such as when one steps on a nail and then feels
pain.
The basic idea behind Descartes’ form of dualism is that we do have an immaterial mind that is somehow associated with the body in that the two interact with one another. It is as if “within” my body (or brain) there is an immaterial ghostlike thing that is my mind. Gilbert Ryle calls this the doctrine of “the ghost in the machine.”
Why should anyone think this doctrine is true? Descartes provides us with two arguments to consider in favor of dualism about mind and body.
First argument (from Meditation II, and given in Blackburn's book THINK on p. 29-30):
(P1) I can doubt that I have a body.
(P2) I can’t doubt that I have a mind. (Or, I can’t doubt that I exist.)
(C) Mind and body are distinct from one another. (Or, I am not identical to my
body.)
If Descartes really intends this to be an argument for dualism, it fails since it is invalid.
Consider the following parallel arguments:
(P1) I can’t doubt that I’m here in the room.
(P2) I can doubt whether a person who will get bad news tomorrow is in the
room.
(C) I’m not a person who will get bad news tomorrow.
or:
(P1) I know who my father is.
(P2) I don’t know who the masked man is.
(C) My father isn’t identical to the masked man.
The first argument is invalid: It’s possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false. It simply doesn’t follow that just because one can doubt one thing and not doubt another that there’s some difference between the two. The basic point is that whatever one can doubt, know, believe, hope for, imagine, understand, etc. is independent of what the facts of the matter are with respect to what one doubts, knows, believes, etc.
Within such contexts one can’t substitute terms that have the same reference and keep the same truth value for the whole sentence. The following argument illustrates the same point:
(P1) I believe that Stephen King is Stephen King.
(P2) Stephen King is Richard Bachman.
(C) I believe that Stephen King is Richard Bachman.
(P1) and (P2) can both be true (in fact, they are true) and (C) can be false, so the argument is invalid.
On Descartes behalf, I should note (with Blackburn) that Descartes may not have intended his comments in Meditation II to be an argument for dualism. Instead, he may have merely intended to draw a distinction between how one comes to know about the mind and body. Since one can’t doubt the existence of the mind, and one can doubt the existence of the body, we can’t (or don’t) come to know about the mind by prior knowledge of the body.
Here is his second argument (from Meditation VI):
(P1) It’s clear and distinct that the essence of the mind is merely to think.
(P2) It’s clear and distinct that the essence of the body is merely to be extended
(in space and time).
(P3) If two things differ in their essence, they cannot be identical.
(C) Mind and body are not identical.
Here are possible replies:
Can’t we make the same objection as was made for the first argument? Descartes doesn’t think so, since It’s clear and distinct that... doesn’t behave like I can doubt that..., I can know that..., I believe that..., etc. His reason is that whatever is clear and distinct is necessarily true. If he’s right, then from (P1) it follows that the essence of the mind really is to think, and from (P2) it follows that the essence of the body really is to be extended in
space and time. However, we saw earlier that Descartes failed to adequately defend his “truth rule” about clear and distinct perceptions (it wound up being circular), and so the argument doesn’t appear to be convincing.
Couldn’t it be that the mind can exist without thinking at all? If this is the case then it can’t be that the essence of the mind is to think, and so it wouldn’t go through that mind and body differ in their essence.
Those are the problems that are shown with Descartes' arguments, which I happen to agree with, but I'm willing to discuss with anyone who disagrees with the criticisms.
I now turn to specific objections to Dualism.
These are pretty famous, but I'll just repeat them here for convenience.
(1) The interaction problem. On Descartes’ view mind and body are distinct, but interact with one another. But: If the two kinds of things are distinct, HOW exactly do they interact? If the mind is an immaterial thing, not extended in space, then how can an unextended thing interact with an extended thing? In the absence of a thorough explanation of how the interaction happens, dualism looks to be in trouble.
(2) Causal closure of the physical world. It is often held that the realm of physical things is “closed” under the laws of nature. For everything that happens, there is a physical explanation in terms of physical laws. But if dualism were right then there would be
events (such as the moving of one’s arm by an act of will) in the physical world that aren’t governed by laws of nature. Since the laws of nature govern everything, then dualism can’t be true.
(3) Dualism doesn’t rule out the possibility of zombies and mutants. It does seem as if there are correlations between bodily events and mental events. Most every time one steps on
a nail, one feels pain in one’s foot. Yet even if dualism were right, it doesn’t rule out the possibility of the following kinds of beings:
Zombies. Beings that behave just like us in speech and bodily action, but aren’t conscious at all.
Mutants. Beings that behave just like us in speech and bodily action, and are conscious, but have much different mental states than you and me given the same physical stimuli.
We can imagine the existence of such beings, but how can we know that they aren’t all around us? These bizarre possibilities aren’t ruled out by dualism, and in fact the thesis that mind and body interact seems to predict that there couldn’t be such beings.
However, other views on the mind don’t rule them out either.
Here’s another problem that is raised by such bizarre possibilities as zombies and mutants: How do we know that there are other minds at all? And how do we know that other people have mental lives that are similar to our own? These questions are left open by a dualistic account of the relation between mind and body, and we would like a theory of the mind that gives us answers to them.
Some solutions, which I find distastful, have been offered (feel extra free to examine these).
(1) occasionalism. Mind and body don’t interact causally, but God directly causes mental states on the “occasion” of the physical body being in an appropriate state. So, God causes pain when one steps on a nail, and in all other physical states that are similar to one’s stepping on a nail. But the stepping on a nail doesn’t itself cause the pain.
(2) pre-established harmony. Mind and body don’t interact, but they each occupy distinct realms with their own laws that govern their action. However, God has set it up such that the two realms are in “harmony” with one another. When one steps on a nail, one feels pain, but this is merely the harmony of the material realm with the immaterial.
I'm looking forward to slam dunking these objections and invalid/unsound alternatives.
matt