A question for Molinists

[Solly]

I post this here rather than in the Q&A thread elsewhere, cos Molinists seem to like nothing better than going of the philosophical deep end in discussion.

In searching the web for stuff about Molinism, I came across this (sorry I don't have the url, but it was a site in favour of Molinism):


Middle Knowledge
The idea that God knows what would happen in any situation were that situation different is termed middle knowledge. God not only knows what is, but He knows what would be if.
The reason middle knowledge becomes important is in God’s decision to create the world in which we live. God knows all aspects of every possible world he could create. This is part of His natural knowledge and is essential to Him. His middle knowledge consists of "what every possible free creature would do under any possible set of circumstances and, hence, knowledge of those possible worlds which God could make actual." God then freely decides to create the actual world in which we live and knows every detail, past, present, and future, of how that world will be.
The ramifications of this idea go far and deep. God doesn’t just "look ahead" into the future and predestine someone He knew would choose him - [which is Arminianism, rather than Calvinism - Solly]. [u]He decides to create a world in which that person will actually exists to choose Him, knowing that he will choose that way given those circumstances[/i]. He personally decides to give life to everyone and every event in our world after looking at all possibilities and scenarios, in order to suit His purposes!

Now, the question is, as I am sure it has been asked many times before; if God chooses to create this world out of all the possible worlds he could have made, having seen all the contingents that could have happened, this world in which you became a Christian because he foresaw/foreknew that you would choose to do so in the circumstances that exist in this world which he has decided to create, then how is LFW preserved? Where is your ability to choose otherwise to preserve your LFW? How do you avoid the same accusation of divine puppetry that is levelled at Calvinism, which at least does not try to preserve the notion of LFW under these terms?

[Dee Dee Warren]

Solly, I think this has been answered on that Is Foreknowledge Causative thread hasn't it?

One way it avoids the "puppetry" charge is that there is no irresistable grace issue, which is the only sense in which I ever use that charge at all against Calvinism. In fact it is one of my greatest objections to Calvinism.

[Solly]

DD, I gave up on that thread also, it gets into such deep waters.

The point here is that if God puts you in a position where he knows the outcome, then were is the freedom? You have been as irresistably manoeuvered by God as you say of Calvinists.

Whereas the Calvinist has a simple formula: Total Depravity requiring irresistable grace, since no one can or will choose, the arminian/molinist has total depravity cancelled by prevenient grace, but also requiring a molinist manoeuvering into position to bring forth the reqquired response - still predestination you see. Either way, we are not free in an LFW, which is the point of my question.
We - Christians - are all trying to answer the soteriological question why aren't all saved, and how are the saved saved, and the existence of LFW is not a valid molinist argument against Calvinism IMHO, since they don't seem to have it themselves. doh

Let me try and flesh this out without getting into symbolic logic...

Molinism is presumably a sublapsarian doctrine, so
Given the fall F, given total depravity TD (can't believe? won't believe!!) given prevenient grace PG

God then concludes that amongst the possible worlds that could exist (at his divine fiat of course), there are worlds x, y, z.

In world x, given F/TD/PG God sees that you and Jaltus will believe, and a n other P will not.

In world y, given F/TD/PG God sees that you and P will believe, and Jaltus will not.

In world z, given F/TD/PG God sees that P and Jaltus will believe, and you will not.

God creates world x.

How is this different from the Calvinist supra- or sublapsarian doctrine, that, given F and TD, God then decides to send Irresistable Grace IG leading to You and Jaltus believing.
Oh, but what about P, he never had a chance, is the usual response.
But he never had a chance in the molinist scheme, because God did not create the world wherein the conditions lead to him believing. Whether, contingently he would have responded under certain conditions, is just science fiction other world stuff, there is only one world now, and he is not saved in it, as many are not in reality. Unless you want to say that there were no conditions that could be arranged; which seems to make prevenient grace pointless as well.
Therefore, you, in god's divine fiat, where predestined to salvation, regardless of LFW, and quite irresistably, and P, a sinner, was passed over - which is what reprobation means.

But to keep on topic, where is LFW in the molinist scheme?

[Dee Dee Warren]

Today @ 06:05 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=239686#post239686)
Solly:

DD, I gave up on that thread also, it gets into such deep waters.

The point here is that if God puts you in a position where he knows the outcome, then were is the freedom?

Because foreknowledge isn't causative. If you were to do differently, God would know differently. Though I do not have EDF, I can predict with pretty good certainty what my husband will do in certain situations (this is not meant to be an all fours analogy) but my knowledge of that does not have any causative value on what he will do.


You have been as irresistably manoeuvered by God as you say of Calvinists.

Well I did not coin the word irresistable, that is the one chosen by Calvinists themselves, and no there is nor irresistableness, cause in any situation there is nothing keeping me from choosing differently. I could have chosen not to post this response. If I had, God's foreknowledge would have been different.


Whereas the Calvinist has a simple formula: Total Depravity requiring irresistable grace, since no one can or will choose, the arminian/molinist has total depravity cancelled by prevenient grace, but also requiring a molinist manoeuvering into position to bring forth the reqquired response - still predestination you see.

I do not deny predestination, I just have a different route to get there.



Either way, we are not free in an LFW, which is the point of my question.

But your initial question is philosophically flawed as it require foreknoweldge to be causative and is confusing "will not" with "could not." Thus the foundation to the question is wrong.

[Solly]

*I added to my previous.

God's foreknowledge is causative in the molinist scheme, because on the basis of it, he created the world in which he foresaw you would believe, and you cannot change that, or else his foreknowledge, and creative act was wrong. Having believed, then God knew you would do so, and created the world to bring that to pass. he doesn't change plans half way through. That is the road to OVT.


Because foreknowledge isn't causative. If you were to do differently, God would know differently. Though I do not have EDF, I can predict with pretty good certainty what my husband will do in certain situations (this is not meant to be an all fours analogy) but my knowledge of that does not have any causative value on what he will do.



But then, you are not creating a world in which he will act, having examinied the details beforehand. However, the ladies are pretty good at creating the circumstances in which men to do what they want them to, while leaving us to think we did it of our own accord. :lol:


This from the same text as my initial quote:

[Molinism]... holds that God can create a world where the conditions are right and His Spirit leads and you do choose Him. He can create other worlds where the conditions are changed and you would not choose Him. He is in control of what worlds He creates, and in those worlds He knows that certain choices will have certain effects. He also knows what situations will affect choice and when they happen. He just plans it all out in advance, although still allowing humans to be free.

Now, while I can't bind you to an unattributed source, yet this source is speaking in favour of Molinism, and I notice the telling phrase : He just plans it all out in advance, . In other word, you had no choice, you have no choice, except the one you made.

[Dee Dee Warren]

Today @ 06:47 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=239691#post239691)
Solly:

*I added to my previous.


:whip:



God's foreknowledge is causative in the molinist scheme, because on the basis of it, he created the world in which he foresaw you would believe...

No that is not causative in that God's action was the cause of our actions. It may be predeterminative or (made-up word alert!) predestinative (and it is here that I see great commanality with Calvinism in that Arminianism has God not really predetermining anything at all and being very reactive rather than proactive). We are referring to causative in the referent with free will. Our actions are truly free, withou coercive force from God. Though yes He did choose the world in which we would freely be this way. This to me, reconciles (and to me has been the only way to reconcile) the Biblical fact that men are truly free and that God truly predestines.




, and you cannot change that, or else his foreknowledge, and creative act was wrong.

Confusing would not with could not again. I certainly could, but if I did God would have foreknown differently.




Having believed, then God knew you would do so, and created the world to bring that to pass. he doesn't change plans half way through. That is the road to OVT.

Of course He doesn't. If I were to do differently He would have foreknown differently.




But then, you are not creating a world in which he will act, having examinied the details beforehand. However, the ladies are pretty good at creating the circumstances in which men to do what they want them to, while leaving us to think we did it of our own accord. :lol:

You are having a confusion that I had pre-Molinist. Our circumstances are predeterminative. In identical circumstances I can choose differently, and being a woman, I actually may do so as I am quite unpredictable.

But you have a Molinist newbie here Solly though these questions I am perfectly comfortable with. Have you considered shooting off a PM to Jaltus, Matt, Cirisme, and Bill who are all also Molinists?

Blake is considering Molinism and may wish to participate too.

But since you and I both have admitted that we got lost when it gets too intricate, let's request things be kept simple.

[Solly]

But your action would have occured in a different, and nonExistent world. Given F and TD and PG and the circumstances which God knew would lead to your believing, and his creation of those circumstances, you believed, as he desired you would - as opposed to P who had no such provision made. He did not create a world in which you could or would do any other thing than you have done. That world has never existed except in the calculations of God. If you had not believed, it is not just that God's foreknowledg would have been different - in fact it would not be different at all, since he sees all counterfactuals anyway - this world would have been different.

[Solly]

The others lose me, but they are welcome here. You just happened to be on, and since you have probably asked these questions, it is helpful talking to you.

But I insist again, if you had chosen differently, this would be a different world that God created. You could not have chosen differently, since God created this world so that you would believe rather than not.

[Dee Dee Warren]

Today @ 07:08 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=239701#post239701)
Solly:

The others lose me...

Me too at times, but I find that each time I grasp a little bit more.




But I insist again, if you had chosen differently, this would be a different world that God created. You could not have chosen differently, since God created this world so that you would believe rather than not.

But He created this world knowing how I would choose. Not every world is possible. If I had chosen differently, this exact world would not have been "available" for God to create.

[Dee Dee Warren]

Hint: The minute you start using letters I am lost.


/ot you need to change your byline to "Stop groveling!"

[Solly]

Today @ 12:10 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=239702#post239702)
Dee Dee Warren:

But He created this world knowing how I would choose. Not every world is possible. If I had chosen differently, this exact world would not have been "available" for God to create.

EXACTAMUNDO!! So you could not have chosen differently, although in the counterfactuals God saw that there were occasions under which you would not choose "yes" (given the Fall, total depravity, and prevenient grace), yet he did not make that world, but this one, and you chose (your choice was dependant not only on F, TD, and PG, but the circumstances you were in, ie hearing the gospel; no gospel no belief - God could have created that world in which everything was pretty much the same, but DD did not hear the gospel). So where is the choice? where is LFW? God having created all the circumstances from eternity, has predestined you, foreordained you to believe, whatever the mechanics of it might be. You chose of your own desire, as any Calvinist would also say, and you were free from coercion, as any Calvinist would say, despite the caricatures of our position; you were free, though only having one choice - as Harry Frankfurt says (free will philosopher). You could not have chosen differently once God had actually made the world and nullified all other counterfactuals. So LFW does not exist in the molinist scheme, and you are all closet calvinists trying not to be.

case closed shhy

[themuzicman]

The other part of this is that Molinism assumes that in given circumstance X, we will choose Y. Only under these conditions can God move with foreKNOWLEDGE beyond the first decision.

However, if in circumstance X we must choose Y, then either our free will has been overridden, or we have been created robots who respond as programmed.

The problem with DDW's response regarding knowing her husband is that sometimes he suprises her. Now, God isn't suprised to the extent that DDW is, because He knows our thoughts as we think them, and by the time we execute our decision He's already ahead of us. However, until the idea is generated in our mind, God cannot know what we will think up before we do, because we do then because robots.

Michael

[Solly]

Thanks MM, but that is OVT, not molinism. I am interested in how Molinism squares the circle of maintaining LFW while seemingly proposing that god created the world and it operates the way he created it, and it can't change. For those purposes, we are assuming some kind of pre-creation EDF, rather than ongoing time based interaction.

I think Molinism might have fallen down on the fact that given F TD and PG, plus predetermined and created circumstances, that it would be possible in principle to choose X or Y, which seems to be the LFW case, but it cannot get a look-in here IMHO

Added later: one angle that might be argued is that God has created a world where all those he foresaw would believe, in fact are brought into circumstances where they do believe. Which means prevenient grace is wasted on all those others who have TD cancelled to put them in a savable/believable position, yet they strangely still do not want to know God. And it creates a scenario like the Calvinist, who also believes the world was created in such a way that those God has foreknown/ordained to salvation will believe, and the rest will not, because they don't want to, and more than the elect did until God regenerated them.
Molinism also leaves open the possibility that someone who would have believed, might get missed because God couldn't create the world in which n,n1, n2...nn and them get saved. As a possiblity at least, ie, DD decided she didn't want to believe, and so Jaltus didn't get saved because he needed to hear the gospel from her in the great scheme of things.

[Jaltus]

Today @ 07:51 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=239779#post239779)
Solly:

Thanks MM, but that is OVT, not molinism. I am interested in how Molinism squares the circle of maintaining LFW while seemingly proposing that god created the world and it operates the way he created it, and it can't change. For those purposes, we are assuming some kind of pre-creation EDF, rather than ongoing time based interaction.

Actually, it is a little bit of both. William Lane Craig believes God acts within time (I agree, but I do it much differently than he does) even though He already knew how He would interact in the forthcoming interactions. Thus, God interacts in time in the way in which He foreknew He would (this avoids Hasker's critique of Simple Foreknowledge by making the foreknowledge based on woulds).

The problem you are having Solly, the one I had also in trying to understand Molinism, is that you are confusing LFW and Deism. I'll explain near the end of the post, but just think about how LFW and THEISM would relate given both are true (I know you do not agree, but just try working within the system as you have been doing).


I think Molinism might have fallen down on the fact that given F TD and PG, plus predetermined and created circumstances, that it would be possible in principle to choose X or Y, which seems to be the LFW case, but it cannot get a look-in here IMHO

You are, as DDW said, confusing will happen with must happen. Just because something will happen, such as in looking from 1925 WW II will happen, does not mean that it is in fact inevitable (what if Hitler had not come to power?). There is a difference between something will happen and something must happen. Will happen just means it is the past which has not yet happened. Must happen means it is a necessary condition of the world ever existing such that no world could exist without it. Will happen indicats future, must happen indicates necessity.

I hope you are tracking the difference.

If something will happen, it just means it is a future occurrence in this world. If something must happen, it means it is an occurrence in any world which God would have created.

You are assuming the future is a must happen instead of a will happen.


Added later: one angle that might be argued is that God has created a world where all those he foresaw would believe, in fact are brought into circumstances where they do believe. Which means prevenient grace is wasted on all those others who have TD cancelled to put them in a savable/believable position, yet they strangely still do not want to know God. And it creates a scenario like the Calvinist, who also believes the world was created in such a way that those God has foreknown/ordained to salvation will believe, and the rest will not, because they don't want to, and more than the elect did until God regenerated them.

This difference is that PG is needed to ensure God does not show favoritism and to show that God not only wants all men to be saved, but that He gave them the opportunity. Within the Calvinistic system, only the elect ever have the opportunity to be saved, never the non-elect.


Molinism also leaves open the possibility that someone who would have believed, might get missed because God couldn't create the world in which n,n1, n2...nn and them get saved. As a possiblity at least, ie, DD decided she didn't want to believe, and so Jaltus didn't get saved because he needed to hear the gospel from her in the great scheme of things.

That is true, it is a possibility. However, I find it unlikely that the omnipotent God was unable to find circumstances wherein everyone who would be saved will be saved. I think you are right that it is in fact a possibility, but it is an unlikely possibility.

Now, as I said earlier, I want to deal with the issue of LFW, Deism, and Theism.

LFW means that a person is responsible for their actions only when they are not causally influenced by external forces (by this I mean forces external to the person's own thought process, will, mind, etc). note the key word "causally" in the previous sentence. This means external influences can be in play, they just cannot determine what is going on. Also notice that this does not rule out causative influence being able to be exerted, it just means the person would not be free in such a circumstance.

Deism is the belief that God created the world and then left it alone. He will not return until the end of time in order to judge and set things right (assuming Christian Deism).

Theism is the belief in a personal God who willingly interacts with the world and within the world.

Many people see LFW and think it ties God's hands because LFW assures that God cannot interact with us and that in order to maintain the concept of LFW God must not interact with us. However, that is certainly not true, for instead of being LFW, it becomes Deism.

This means that a true believer in God who holds to LFW must understand that God will interact within space-time such that some events will be causally influenced (thus negating responsibility) and some just influenced. Also, God will interact freely with inert issues (meaning non-persons, so there is no LFW involved) which is generally one of the things we pray for.

This means LFW and Theism go together quite well as long as you realize that LFW does not ential total freedom from God working in the world and in your own life.

Becareful of how you understand LFW and its "involate" nature...you might do as I did and slide cinceptually into Deism.

[themuzicman]

So, does God know which choices will be selected before we get there?

Michael

[Jaltus]

Yes, that is why it is foreknowledge.

(I keep spelling it foreknwoledge time and again)

[themuzicman]

So, if God knows what will happen, either He created every moment in time beforehand, knowing that other possibilities exist, and we're just following the tunnel of time which God laid out for us, or we're psycological robots who will choose that which God foreknew that we would choose.

(is it time to move this thread?)

Michael

[Solly]

Hi Jaltus, thanks for commenting, and bearing with my ignorance.


You are, as DDW said, confusing will happen with must happen. Just because something will happen, such as in looking from 1925 WW II will happen, does not mean that it is in fact inevitable (what if Hitler had not come to power?). There is a difference between something will happen and something must happen. Will happen just means it is the past which has not yet happened. Must happen means it is a necessary condition of the world ever existing such that no world could exist without it. Will happen indicates future, must happen indicates necessity.
I hope you are tracking the difference.
If something will happen, it just means it is a future occurrence in this world. If something must happen, it means it is an occurrence in any world which God would have created.
I think there is a confusion in the doctrine itself, and your expression of it. God creates the world. He has created the world on the basis of his prior assessment of counterfactuals and his desires to do whatever he will do in creating the world in a particular way; that includes the salvation of X, who in another world would not get saved, or might get saved, but someone else might not. In creating this world, not only will it happen that they get saved, but it must happen on the basis of divine fiat - God created the world after all, he is Lord, not the contingencies, (even if it does involve God's interaction with the world at such a time, which I don't deny as a Calvinist.) It does seem to em to be semantic hairsplitting to avoid similarities with Calvinism. What God does, must come to pass, even if it is a free moral action on our part - he created the world in which we can do that, and he created it such that we do not do the opposite because he has decided that he will create the world in which we do choose him. You argue from limited human knowledge examples to God's full and clear foreknowledge before creation.

This difference is that PG is needed to ensure God does not show favoritism and to show that God not only wants all men to be saved, but that He gave them the opportunity. Within the Calvinistic system, only the elect ever have the opportunity to be saved, never the non-elect.
Calvinism has no need of that hypothesis. It holds people responsible on the basis of Rom 1-3. The fact that people are in a bad situation, and want to be in a bad situation, and don't like being told they are in a bad situation, and should get out, but don't want to. We don't need to cancel TD, because it is an intellectual matter first, not a volitional one. God has left himself with enough witness in the world. If we thought God was being unfair, Calvinism would have collapsed long ago. Equally, unless you are going to argue for nonPropositional inclusivism, then you have the problem that God gives the ability to choose something they never hear about.

LFW means that a person is responsible for their actions only when they are not causally influenced by external forces (by this I mean forces external to the person's own thought process, will, mind, etc).
Having read several books and a number of articles on LFW I have to say that this is not all there is to LFW, and in fact your view closes with free moral action of the deterministic variety - "uncoerced volitional action is free", rather than LFW. LFW in every definition I have read states that we are free to do X or Y regardless not only of external influence, but internal disposition. This from the likes of Frankfurt, Double, Kane.

Be careful of how you understand LFW and its "inviolate" nature...you might do as I did and slide conceptually into Deism.
:lol: Not much chance of that, since I don't believe in LFW, but I do believe in an interacting God

[Solly]

I'll move the thread now.

OK free for all, now I have said my piece and got a response.

[Smitten]

Something I don't understand is how a LFW choice can be foreknown. Is there a particular molinist response or are there various views on it floating around?

[Solly]

Let me further elaborate on will and must.

God G - initials used just in case - precreation PC contemplates the creation CK (Contemplative knowledge, as oppsed to foreknowledge FK since nothing exists yet to foreknow.) Having surveyed all the counterfactuals/contingents what ever you want to call them, contemplatively CK, he decides to create one possible world, this world, the real world RW. At this point he has FK because the world exists,and the future is possible and he can see it, rather than just contemplate it and other possible futures - they can't be foreknown before cretion, because that would give an indeopendance to them from God's creative will.
However, all those other contingents/counterfactuals no longer exist. There is no possibility anymore. What will be will be. But more than that, must be, because we are talking about creation here, not an a-theistic reality. This creation was planned from beginning to end. While to you it seems to be 'will happen' and therefore you deny any cuasation to God's FK, yet because it is decreed, it is 'must happen', and the causality rests not in FK but divine fiat to create this world.

And since this all centre's on the fact of salvation; how does molinism address God's FK of Adam's sin? In other possible worlds Adam would not sin, but God created RW in which he did, and he could do no other, because God knew he would sin when he created this world.

[mattbballman19]

Solly,

I realize I’m late in the discussion, so I apologize ahead of time if I missed something pertinent to the discussion. What I plan on doing is responding to the first couple of posts in an attempt to answer a significant chunk of what has been posed. Let’s start with the first question posed in the first post.

You ask how it is that LFW is preserved when God creates a world in which you will choose to be saved. In other words, out of all possible worlds (residing in God’s natural knowledge) where it is the case that you will choose God (residing in God’s middle knowledge), how can the Molinist say that God actualizes the content of his middle knowledge (If S will do A in circumstance C, then God would know that. If S were to do ~A in circumstance C instead, then God would have foreknown that instead.) and continue to hold to a Libertarian analysis of free-will? It seems obvious. Since the content of God’s middle knowledge is contingent to how S will use his/her freedom to do A or ~A in C, then S’s choice is not necessitated by God’s knowledge. God’s middle knowledge is what it is because S freely makes it that way. S has counterfactual power over what God believes. If S’s choice is not necessitated by God’s knowledge, then S freely chooses his/her courses of action. Therefore, it can consistently be said that we have LFW and God has middle knowledge.

To you second post:

Here you introduce terms which may not be understandable by the layman. For this reason, I shall provide brief definitions.

William Lane Craig is to be given credit for the following formulations:

Supralapsarianism: the view that God’s determination of each person’s eternal destiny is logically prior to his decree to create mankind and permit the Fall.

Infralapsarianism: the view that God’s determination is logically subsequent to his decrees to create and permit the fall.

That said, let’s take a look at your argument:

You say that it does not seem different from the Calvinistic way of election because in world W, specific people P are chosen to salvation and others O are not; and this could have been altered by God creating another W*, in which O are saved and P is not. You say this formulation of the Molinistic way of election and the Calvinistic way of election essentially synonymous. Briefly, this is not the case for 2 reasons:

1. Calvinism entails determinism with regard to actions. This, in turn, leads to fatalism, which is logically fallacious. Molinism does not entail determinism, because actions by creatures are contingent, relative to a possible world. God only actualizes the states of affairs which constitutes His middle knowledge: that middle knowledge merely being counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (If Peter was in such and such circumstances, then Peter will freely deny Christ 3 times: The circumstances do not determine the creature‘s choice, but simply because this is how the creature would freely choose). If this is true, then Molinism isn’t deterministic, in the sense that the actions taken by agents are not up to them.

2. The 3 possible worlds which you concocted give the impression that each one is feasible. The problem is when one is actualized the other 2 become infeasible. This idea would have already been known by an omniscient God, of course, but the point is that when you said that world X is the one God chose to instantiate (utilizing His middle knowledge to delimit the range of possible worlds to feasible ones), both world Y and world Z became infeasible, and, therefore, not able to be chosen as a viable option to for the creation of a world. To see this, you need to see what is involved in the nature of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. First, God does not determine which counterfactuals of freedom are true or not. They are “fixed” in God’s middle knowledge. So if the counterfactual

1. If Peter were in circumstances C, then Peter would freely deny Christ 3 times.

is true, then not even God and His omnipotence can bring it about that Peter would freely affirm Christ in circumstances C. The reason why this is not an affront to LFW, is because the counterfactual itself is not necessary. It still COULD be the case that Peter freely affirms Christ in circumstances C, since counterfactuals are contingent and, therefore, differ from possible world to possible world. Now, if world X (back to your examples) is actualized (in accordance with God’s divine middle knowledge), and this actualization involves what agents would do in various circumstances, then worlds Y and Z should have always been infeasible for God to instantiate. Although worlds Y and Z continue to be possible, their being possible does not entail their being feasible, since it is now the case that the direction of the actions of Jaltus, P, and Dee Dee are maximally specified in the various counterfactuals which have been instantiated as a result of God creating a world. For example, if it is true that, within God’s middle knowledge, there existed the counterfactual

2. If God were to actualize world X, then Jaltus and Dee Dee would freely choose to be saved
and P would freely choose to reject salvation.

then the counterfactuals

3. If God were to actualize world Y, then Jaltus and P would freely choose to be saved and
Dee Dee would freely choose to reject salvation.

and

4. If God were to actualize world Z, then P and Dee Dee would freely choose to be saved and
Jaltus would freely choose to reject salvation.

are infeasible, though possible. So, I think your error resides in your assumption that every possible world that exists in God’s natural knowledge is able to be feasible. But this ignores the nature of God’s middle knowledge and the logical order that God’s knowledge must travel through when deciding to make a world.

You make the complaint that the ones who were damned in the provided possible worlds never were given a chance to freely choose salvation, if it was the case that these worlds were actualized. But this is only true if he was determined to choose his course of action. That can only be true if the circumstances determine the actions chosen. But this was shown above to be false.

You go on to make the claim that God’s foreknowledge is causative in the determinative sense, because you cannot change the contents of God’s middle knowledge. But this ignores the contingency inherent within His middle knowledge. The contents of such knowledge is contingent. If such knowledge is contingent, then you can (it is possible) change God knowledge. Molinism states that we have a counterfactual power over Gods knowledge: As Shandon Guthrie states, “this situation, X can by anything and that will constitute God's foreknowledge. If S will do A in circumstance C, then God would know that. If S were to do ~A in circumstance C instead, then God would have foreknown that instead. It is curious indeed that the Christian should surmise that God's foreknowledge is what causes or ensures some designated action. Instead, it is the action itself that constitutes God's foreknowledge.”

matt

[Sheepdog]

While it is evident that Solly's objection is indeed not sound, i do have an objection that is not unlike his. In fact, i had posted it in the Q&A thread, and the post yet to be challanged (not pointing fingers, i know that Jaltus is busy. i am sure you are as well, Matt). below is a link to the original post, but i'll post the jist here (and apologies if i hijack the thread, that is not my intention).

(By the way, it is a fallacy of composition to infer that because God determined which world He would Create, that the choices of the creatures in that world are also determined, without justification.* not sure if that was the thrust of Solly's argument though.

*words in italics added on edit)

Molinism argues that should cicumstances S come about, I will do P. That is,
If Sn, then Pn.

Solly's mistake is that (if i understand him correctly) he makes God's foreknowledge of the above proposition determinative. Rather, i argue that the conditional itself is determinative, in that, if the circumstances S1 comes about, it is impossible that not-P1 will occur. Now think about the implications! What this tells us is that given a specific set of circumstanses, i will only choose one thing, and will not choose anything else. This, my man, is determinism! That is, my choice was determined to come about by my circumstances.

The only way around, is to toss in a wild card to represent choice, but rather then use a deductive hypothetical, go inductive. Thus:

If Sn and x, then pPn=y.

where x is the wild card representing the creature's ability to coose, and pPn is the probability that Pn will come about.

You will no doubt notice that this comes to a position similar Open Theism. Unlike Open Theism, i hold that God knows definitely what will come about (that is, he doesn't need to infer Pn from Sn: he already has access the Pn that have been and will be actualized).


http://theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?postid=232722#post232722


*edited to add*
after rereading Matt's post, it became obvious that a part of it strikes the heart of this issue, so i will respond to it here:


2. The 3 possible worlds which you concocted give the impression that each one is feasible. The problem is when one is actualized the other 2 become infeasible. This idea would have already been known by an omniscient God, of course, but the point is that when you said that world X is the one God chose to instantiate (utilizing His middle knowledge to delimit the range of possible worlds to feasible ones), both world Y and world Z became infeasible, and, therefore, not able to be chosen as a viable option to for the creation of a world.

first off, please explain your usage of "feasible." as far as i am aware, it is synonymous with "possilbe." but more importantly, i am interested in these counterfactuals, to wit...


To see this, you need to see what is involved in the nature of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. First, God does not determine which counterfactuals of freedom are true or not. They are “fixed” in God’s middle knowledge.

technically this would be correct. however, it stands to be shown that the counterfactuals themselves would not be determinative, should the condition (circumstances, Sn above) be actualized. God Himself wouldn't be a determinant unless he actualized the given circumstances.



So if the counterfactual

1. If Peter were in circumstances C, then Peter would freely deny Christ 3 times.


err.... you loaded the conditional in a way that begs the question, by adding the term "freely." it would be no more helpful to your case than it would be to mine if stated as:

1'. If Peter were in circumstances C, then Peter is determined to deny Christ 3 times.

Needless to say, we should strip the bias:

1". If Peter were in circumstances C, then Peter would deny Christ 3 times.


[If the above counterfactual] is true, then not even God and His omnipotence can bring it about that Peter would freely affirm Christ in circumstances C. The reason why this is not an affront to LFW, is because the counterfactual itself is not necessary. It still COULD be the case that Peter freely affirms Christ in circumstances C, since counterfactuals are contingent and, therefore, differ from possible world to possible world.

your getting garbled here, either due to terminology or equivocation or faulty logic. The below syllogism is invalid:
If Peter were in circumstances C, then Peter would deny Christ 3 times
Peter is in circumstances C
Therefore, Peter affirms Christ.

Let's weed this out, shall we? First off, what does the contingent/necessary dichotomy have to do with anything? In deductive logic, it is true that "If S then P" has no existential import (that is, neither S nor P are asserted to be true-- only the relationship is asserted). however, if it is true that "If S then P," and S is true, then P necessarily results. It appears, though, that you are trying to say that C is different in every world. That is, we have different possible conditions, C1, C2, etc. i prefer subscripts in this context because it clears up any ambiguity (so it is not assumed errantly that C means the same circumstances in different worlds, where the intention is different worlds have different C's). But this doesn't do anything in terms of solving the LFW/determinism dilemma. This is because the given S is depentant on a given world, W, being actuallized. That is,

If Wn, then Sn.

And you know the result of the pure hypothetical syllogism:
If Wn, then Sn
If Sn, then Pn
Therefore, If Wn, then Pn

Thus, Solly just got the justification he needs to say that, in molinism, God determines our actions by the world he creates (your welcome, Solly :teeth:)


Now, if world X (back to your examples) is actualized (in accordance with God’s divine middle knowledge), and this actualization involves what agents would do in various circumstances, then worlds Y and Z should have always been infeasible for God to instantiate. Although worlds Y and Z continue to be possible, their being possible does not entail their being feasible, since it is now the case that the direction of the actions of Jaltus, P, and Dee Dee are maximally specified in the various counterfactuals which have been instantiated as a result of God creating a world.

I still don't understand the distinction between possible and feasable, as you are using the terms, so i will wait before responding further.

(the rest is not pivotal to my case, as far as i can tell, so i chose to snip it-- or was i determined to? :smile:)

[Solly]

thanks for the replies you two, I will read, mark and learn, and come back to you as soon as poss.

[Jaltus]

10-10-2003 @ 10:37 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=240985#post240985)
Sheepdog:

While it is evident that Solly's objection is indeed not sound, i do have an objection that is not unlike his. In fact, i had posted it in the Q&A thread, and the post yet to be challanged (not pointing fingers, i know that Jaltus is busy. i am sure you are as well, Matt). below is a link to the original post, but i'll post the jist here (and apologies if i hijack the thread, that is not my intention).

Sorry, man, I have not been back to that thread in forever.


(By the way, it is a fallacy of composition to infer that because God determined which world He would Create, that the choices of the creatures in that world are also determined, without justification.* not sure if that was the thrust of Solly's argument though.

*words in italics added on edit)

You end up making this supposition anyway, as we shall see.


Molinism argues that should cicumstances S come about, I will do P. That is,
If Sn, then Pn.

Solly's mistake is that (if i understand him correctly) he makes God's foreknowledge of the above proposition determinative. Rather, i argue that the conditional itself is determinative, in that, if the circumstances S1 comes about, it is impossible that not-P1 will occur. Now think about the implications! What this tells us is that given a specific set of circumstanses, i will only choose one thing, and will not choose anything else. This, my man, is determinism! That is, my choice was determined to come about by my circumstances.

It is not that the circumstances force the choice, it is only that God knows what your choice will be in a certain set of circumstances. It is determinism only if an external influence causes the decision, it is not determinative if an external force non-causatively determines my choice, even if they make one instantiated and the other not instantiated.

In other words, if I offer my wife her choice of mustard (which she hates with a passion) or ice cream (which she loves), I know for a fact which she will choose every single time, yet in no way have I determined what she will do. At the same time, I set up the circumstances within which she will choose ice cream. Does that mean I am able to determine her choices? I think not!


The only way around, is to toss in a wild card to represent choice, but rather then use a deductive hypothetical, go inductive. Thus:

If Sn and x, then pPn=y.

where x is the wild card representing the creature's ability to coose, and pPn is the probability that Pn will come about.

This ensures that foreknowledge is not in fact possible. Essentially, you might as well have x=y since everything else is irrelevant in your discussion.


You will no doubt notice that this comes to a position similar Open Theism. Unlike Open Theism, i hold that God knows definitely what will come about (that is, he doesn't need to infer Pn from Sn: he already has access the Pn that have been and will be actualized).

The question becomes, if God already knows Pn, He already knows what His response will be to that, then how does this allow God any room to respond? If He knows all that will take place, He therefore knows all of His own actions in advance, and therefore God is unable to freely react to anything His creation does. You have fallen into the trap of Simple Foreknowledge which allows for no providential control.



technically this would be correct. however, it stands to be shown that the counterfactuals themselves would not be determinative, should the condition (circumstances, Sn above) be actualized. God Himself wouldn't be a determinant unless he actualized the given circumstances.

The problem with this objection is it assumes psychological determination, which I would reject, and it comes close to saying that just because God knows what will happen, not only must it happen, but it disallows free will (back to the Open Theism issue).


I'll let Matt deal with the rest of what you have thrown his way.

- Jaltus

[Solly]

OK Matt, getting to the nitty gritty, I gather that what you are telling me is that in Molinism, although God has what you call natural knowledge of all possibilities, and I called CK, yet these possibilities don't really matter anyway, because it is God's MK which provides the direction for the world he will create, but this MK in God is backwardly produced by creatures who don't exist, in conditions that don't exist, and that are also dependant upon previously created conditions that also don't exist?
So how can there be any possible worlds other than the one actuated by the counterfactual choices of people? It seems to me that God is in hock to an equally fatalistic system in which he must bow to the choices of people and create the world in which their choices become reality. That seems to me to undermine the whole doctrine of salvation on the basis of God's free and unmerited grace.


then not even God and His omnipotence can bring it about that Peter would freely affirm Christ in circumstances C
Since even some Arminian's concede that God interfere's with some will's at some times, I think you have overstated the case here, and have conceded the very determinism you deny, and undermined the very LFW - "could have done differently in the same circumstances" - you promote.

What we seem to have here is a system that is neither fish nor fowl - steering away from Calvinism as far as possible, yet too wary of OVT to jump in and say that God's MK can be changed on a momently basis because he does not have complete future knowledge. But ultimately, you are still saying that God does not know the future conclusively or exhaustively, since his knowledge is only MK until events are realised, whether that happens in eternity or in time.

[Solly]

Today @ 11:37 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=243618#post243618)
Jaltus:


It is not that the circumstances force the choice, it is only that God knows what your choice will be in a certain set of circumstances. It is determinism only if an external influence causes the decision, it is not determinative if an external force non-causatively determines my choice, even if they make one instantiated and the other not instantiated.

Hairsplitting. A kleptomaniac, a schizophrenic, and a psychopath believe they are acting of their own free will, yet their actions are determined according to modern medicine and science. A man forced into a shot gun wedding, with a woman he happens to want to marry, is performing a free act to his own mind, despite outward causation. For once your view is not very nuanced.


In other words, if I offer my wife her choice of mustard (which she hates with a passion) or ice cream (which she loves), I know for a fact which she will choose every single time, yet in no way have I determined what she will do. At the same time, I set up the circumstances within which she will choose ice cream. Does that mean I am able to determine her choices? I think not!
Firstly, you forgot that she might choose neither, having been insulted by your offering mustard, and wondering why you were rummaging around in the larder, when she was not in need of anything. Secondly, she may already have desired something, which changes the terms; Arm/Mol must hold to Total Depravity to stay orthodox, but bring in the unorthodox prevenient grace to undermine it, leading to a free vote on the matter of salvation. But even then, you are still in a position that we do not already desire salvation, because we do not know what it is. Unless you wish to talk about God-shaped holes in our hearts...

More so, you are not God. God created a world in which choices in his MK come to pass; choices already detrmined by non-existent creatures. He could have created a different world, regardless of natural knowledge and MK, but he did this one, and so it is again hairsplitting to say that my choice was not determined. It was determined by the very fact that God created the circumstances that lead up to that choice, including my own internal states.

[TedO]

Today @ 02:06 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=243669#post243669)
Solly:Arm/Mol must hold to Total Depravity to stay orthodox, but bring in the unorthodox prevenient grace to undermine it, leading to a free vote on the matter of salvation. But even then, you are still in a position that we do not already desire salvation, because we do not know what it is. Unless you wish to talk about God-shaped holes in our hearts...

Question for you Solly - what is the extent of "dead in sins" in Eph 2:5 (or John 5:25)? If a person's will is dead, then what is regenerated upon rebirth? Is there any resemblance between that which existed before salvation and that which exists afterwards? If so, what is it? If nothing correlates, how can it be said we are translated from death to life, from darkness into light (Col 1:13)?

Romans 7 is so clear that under the Law, Paul knew that the Law was good, but he did not have the ability to do all of it (we know from other passages he was good at doing some of it - Phl 3:6). Yet, he wanted, he willed to do right (Rom 7:16). The will is not dead, it is in bondage. Those who call upon the Lord are set free from this bondage and given the power to walk by the Spirit and not according to the flesh (Rom 8).

So orthodoxy is not defined by Calvinistic TD, but rather total inability seems more biblical. Jesus came to set the captives free.

[Jaltus]

Unorthodox prevenient grace? It was A Calvinistic category originally!

Good grief, next you will be saying that free will is unorthodox just because you as a Calvinist do not hold to it when the rest of Christianity does ( Eastern Orthodoxy, RCC, and Arminians, putting you Calvinists in quite the minority there).

[smilax]

Today @ 06:37 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=243618#post243618)
Jaltus:
In other words, if I offer my wife her choice of mustard (which she hates with a passion) or ice cream (which she loves), I know for a fact which she will choose every single time, yet in no way have I determined what she will do. At the same time, I set up the circumstances within which she will choose ice cream. Does that mean I am able to determine her choices? I think not!Thus saith Ernest Reisinger, that Reformed Baptist fox, "How does God influence the will of man? He presents objects or circumstances to the understanding, and through these, effectually moves and inclines the will. Therefore, although they choose that which God wills, they do it nevertheless from their own deliberation and choice and therefore act freely." (Found here (http://www.reformedreader.org/rbb/reisinger/gwmwfwch01.htm); see also the lyrics to The Hornet Song, which he includes.)

How, pray tell, is this any different from your view?

And another thing! Can someone point me to a exegetical defense of Molinism (the whole system, not just God's knowledge of could-haves and would-haves--pointing to counterfactuals in Scripture and supposing you've proven Molinism is like a Calvinist pointing to passages that say we're saved by grace and then expecting you to swallow all five points) from the word of God alone?

Further, the point of Matthew xi, 21 is to indict the cities of Galilee, not to give an account of the doctrine of foreknowledge--knowledge brings accountability, as the next verse shows, and while Tyre and Sidon were in darkness, Chorazin and Bethsaida saw the light and rejected it. When I read this passage, I don't realize that middle knowledge reconciles exhaustive divine foreknowledge and libertarian free will; I realize that I have not responded as fully as I should have to the grace the Most High has bestowed upon me. Ultimately, what keeps me from Molinism is my inability to think of it in terms of Scriptural categories, whereas for the Reformed faith, I have never had a problem with sheep and goats; the book of life; I was blind, now I see; etc.; and also the fact that any true, holy, glorious doctrine ought to lead us to better worship. Arthur Bennet's collection of Puritan prayers, The Valley of Vision, is Calvinism in action. How, I wonder, does Molinism assist one's devotional life?

And of incidental interest, the fact that the Jesuits concocted the system to combat "the heresy of the Reformers" (taken from here (http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10437a.htm)) suggests that Molinism is just stealth Roman Catholic soteriology; and, sorry, I'm not going there.

[Solly]

Yesterday @ 09:56 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=244302#post244302)
Jaltus:

Unorthodox prevenient grace? It was A Calvinistic category originally!

Good grief, next you will be saying that free will is unorthodox just because you as a Calvinist do not hold to it when the rest of Christianity does ( Eastern Orthodoxy, RCC, and Arminians, putting you Calvinists in quite the minority there).

Well...:ahem:

Funny, Calvinists are criticised for basing themselves on aspects of Greek philosophy - particularly neoPlatonism, when that can truly be said of Eastern Orthodoxy, the RCC, and...er...Arminians!!

Can you show that the Calvinist use of prevenient grace - grace that goes before, which for Calvinists means awakens, regenerates and converts - is the same as Arminian prevenient grace - which...does none of these things, but rather merely removes the obstacle of TD, but does not save, and therefore should not be called grace, anymore than some Calvinists characterisation of Providence should be called common grace?

[Solly]

Yesterday @ 07:05 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=244057#post244057)
TedO:
Question for you Solly - what is the extent of "dead in sins" in Eph 2:5 (or John 5:25)? If a person's will is dead, then what is regenerated upon rebirth? Is there any resemblance between that which existed before salvation and that which exists afterwards? If so, what is it? If nothing correlates, how can it be said we are translated from death to life, from darkness into light (Col 1:13)?

Romans 7 is so clear that under the Law, Paul knew that the Law was good, but he did not have the ability to do all of it (we know from other passages he was good at doing some of it - Phl 3:6). Yet, he wanted, he willed to do right (Rom 7:16). The will is not dead, it is in bondage. Those who call upon the Lord are set free from this bondage and given the power to walk by the Spirit and not according to the flesh (Rom 8).

So orthodoxy is not defined by Calvinistic TD, but rather total inability seems more biblical. Jesus came to set the captives free.

Modern Calvinists refer to Total Depravity as Total inability - see Grudem's Systematic Theology for instance. The will is not dead 100% - this is an ex will, it is no more, it's a stiff - it is dead towards God and his will. It is very active in trespasses and sins though. It is a simple matter of "Can't obey? Won't obey!!" The end result of that is death, so Paul can say dead in trespasses and sins speaking judicially, and from thence morally, because that is the situation we exist in: under bondage to sin and death, not merely restrained in some of its abilities, though it desparately wants to do otherwise. The will is only the end of the process, with the devices and desires of the heart going before; those desires must themselves be renewed in order to call upon God, since we don't do that. What we do is what we are; as the heart leads, so we go. The bondage we are in is accepted by us, it is the result of our own desires - cf Rom 5. the reason we can be condemned with Adam is that we are there saying, You go Adam, we're right with you.

I'll discuss Romans 7 after I have preached through it next month and dealt with the various views on it.

[Dee Dee Warren]

/ot Turretin's views on Romans 7 are interesting. At one point i agreed with him, I no longer do.

[mattbballman19]

Sheepdog,

This is in response to your, supposedly, new kind of objection to Molinism. Geebob, I shall respond to your rebuttal in the not to distant future.

(i) To tell you the truth, I do not see too much of a difference. You bring out a distinction between the determinate nature of the action and the determinate nature of the counterfactual. The Molinist would disagree with both counts, because the contingency of the counterfactual implies the contingency of the action. Keep in mind, though, that counterfactuals are slightly different than conditionals. In conditionals, I believe, the consequent flows necessarily from the antecedent. If such necessity was evident in the counterfactual then, indeed, our action would not be free. The counterfactual is different in that it states what “will” be the consequent in case the state of affairs explicated by the antecedent (the circumstances) are instantiated. A conditional states what “must” (a necessary condition) the case for the consequent state of affairs to obtain.

You base this on the one choice that will obtain as a result of the agent choosing one course of action in the actual world in accordance with a given counterfactual. I do not see how necessity is entailed here. If there are possible worlds where the agent chooses another course of actions (and Molinism says that this is the case), then the choice is not necessary and, therefore, free. I’ve said this before, but the power of the circumstances inherent in a counterfactual do not cause or determine the actions of creatures. This is simply a mistaken view of what Molinism advocates. Rather, this is just how the creature freely chooses. Let me allow William Lane Craig a space for sufficient explanation:

“By his middle knowledge God knows an infinity of orders that he could create because he knows how the creatures in them would in fact respond given the various circumstances. He then decides by the free act of his will how he would respond in these various circumstances and simultaneously wills to bring about one of these orders. He directly causes certain circumstances to come into being and brings about others indirectly through causally determined secondary causes. Free creatures, however, he allows to act as he knew they would act when placed in such circumstances, and he concurs with their decisions in producing in being the effects they desire. Some of these effects God desired unconditionally and so wills positively that they occur. Others he does not unconditionally desire, but he nevertheless permits due to his overriding desire to allow creaturely freedom, knowing that even these sinful acts will fit into the overall scheme of things, so that God’s ultimate ends in human history will be accomplished. God has thus providentially arranged for everything that happens by either willing or permitting it, and he causes everything to happen, yet in such a way as to preserve freedom and contingency.”

(ii) Feasible is defined by way of an example. Suppose the following counterfactual is true:

X: If Peter were in circumstances C, he would freely deny Christ three times.

We know that there is possible world in which Peter freely affirms Christ in precisely the same circumstances he denied him. This is needed for Peter’s freedom. But of X is true, then that possible world is infeasible for God to create, because X specifies what indeed will happen under those specific circumstances. God can MAKE Peter affirm Christ in those circumstances, but then his confession would not be free. So if God’s intentions are for humans to retain freedom, then the actions of those humans, as described by various counterfactuals, will be inviolable towards God’s interference (since such interference will expunge LFW). Thus making such a world infeasible.

(iii) You accuse me of begging question by loading into the wording of the counterfactual the word “freely”. I see this is not begging the question for 2 reasons (1 of which is could not be aware of); 1. because we are working from within the paradigm of Molinism. Molinism states that these counterfactuals involve the free actions of human agents. Since the frame-work of such counterfactuals involve circumstances and free decisions involved therein, then it seems I was merely being consistent with the normal in which counterfactuals are explicated. 2. (the one you couldn’t be aware of) is that I have provided an argument that it is not the case that our circumstances are determinate factors in the decisions of humans.

(iv) The contingent/necessary dichotomy is crucial because this distinction is the factor utilized by the modalist to determine whether or not an action is free. If it was contingent, then it was free; if it was necessary, then it was not free. If you are not familiar with modal logic and/or possible world semantics, I shall explicate further if needed.

(v) You incorrectly say that the Molinist says that conditions and/or circumstances are contingent. The circumstances have a ubiquitous quality in that they must be maximally specified. Regardless of what possible world the circumstances are instantiated (unless of course the circumstances, by nature, exclude being in a particular world), then, contingently, the agent chooses a course of action. The actions, not the circumstances, are contingent. (e.g. Given possible worlds W1, W2, and W3, let’s say that there exist only one set of circumstances, C1, such that when instantiated will, contingently (since it is relative to a possible world), entail actions by creatures. So, is it possible that (W1 & C1) -> A1; and (W2 & C1) -> A2; and (W3 & C1) -> A3. Do you see how the circumstances are ubiquitous throughout the conditionals and yet different possible actions entailed. Since the actions are contingent upon possible worlds, then they are free. Just because the circumstance was a necessary feature of the counterfactual, doesn’t mean the action was determinative, since the circumstance is only a sufficient, not a necessary, condition for the act. C becomes necessary for the act only in conjunction with W; but since W changes from world to world, action A, which flows from C&W, is free.)

in Christ,

MattD

[TedO]

Today @ 08:46 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=244740#post244740)
Solly:Modern Calvinists refer to Total Depravity as Total inability - see Grudem's Systematic Theology for instance.

Oh, sorry.


The will is not dead 100% - this is an ex will, it is no more, it's a stiff - it is dead towards God and his will. It is very active in trespasses and sins though. It is a simple matter of "Can't obey? Won't obey!!" The end result of that is death, so Paul can say dead in trespasses and sins speaking judicially, and from thence morally, because that is the situation we exist in: under bondage to sin and death, not merely restrained in some of its abilities, though it desparately wants to do otherwise.

Please clarify this last sentence. Are you agreeing that the will of unregenerate man can want to do otherwise? For that is what I see, a will in bondage, but wanting - when enlightened with the truth - to be free. Therefore, a man in bondage can call out to the one able to unlock the cell and let him out.

Those who have experienced the pain of sin are often the most ready to submit themselves to God. They understand they are trapped in death and bondage. But the smell of death upon themselves makes them even hungrier to be free.


The will is only the end of the process, with the devices and desires of the heart going before; those desires must themselves be renewed in order to call upon God, since we don't do that. What we do is what we are; as the heart leads, so we go. The bondage we are in is accepted by us, it is the result of our own desires - cf Rom 5. the reason we can be condemned with Adam is that we are there saying, You go Adam, we're right with you.

Man is more than desires and instinct. Man's reason, though impaired, along with a man's will, though in bondage, can be awakened by the truth of the gospel to then choose - "do I submit to the call of repentance, or keep trying my way".

[smilax]

If freedom means the choice is contingent rather than necessary, then Calvinists believe in free will.

This talk of other choices being "possible" is not very helpful, because alternate "free choices" are possible in the same way that it is possible for the head of a half-fish, half-roly-poly hybrid to be swimming in orbit around an Italian restaurant with Oriental women situated in the center of Alpha Centauri--logically self-consistent, or rather, not self-contradictory. In some possible world, he's there, floating in the cosmic soup while sipping away at his cappuccino. He's "free" to exist, just as we are "free" to make other choices. And I'm sure he'd be very happy to hear that.

Another thought: Matthew xi, 21 says, "If the mighty works, which were done in you, had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes." Theoretically, it is "possible" for Tyre and Sidon not to have repented even if the works had been done because of libertarian free will. But not in this world.

I guess it's also "possible" for Molinism to provide more freedom than Calvinism.

[Solly]

Yesterday @ 10:22 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=245738#post245738)
TedO:
Please clarify this last sentence. Are you agreeing that the will of unregenerate man can want to do otherwise? For that is what I see, a will in bondage, but wanting - when enlightened with the truth - to be free. Therefore, a man in bondage can call out to the one able to unlock the cell and let him out.

One must distinguish here. man as he is, in bondage to sin, does not want to do otherwise. Even when men like Seneca and Cicero bewailed their sins, more often than not it is bewailing the effects of their sins, rather than the fact of them. I am sure drug addicts would rather not have the side affects associated with addiction; but they would still want to use drugs. Simply stated, man does not seek God, only release from unpleasant side affects.


Those who have experienced the pain of sin are often the most ready to submit themselves to God. They understand they are trapped in death and bondage. But the smell of death upon themselves makes them even hungrier to be free.

You have removed the fact that sin is rebellion against God first of all, before you come to any moral/immoral actions on our part. If it was that simple, there would be no offense of the Gospel. A man eating tiger may be aware that it is trapped, and seek escape from it's bondage, but it is still a man eating tiger. Most criminals who get caught don't bewail their captivity, other than to plan how to avoid capture next time.


Man is more than desires and instinct. Man's reason, though impaired, along with a man's will, though in bondage, can be awakened by the truth of the gospel to then choose - "do I submit to the call of repentance, or keep trying my way".

Quite true, we are also intellect; though how many times have you known what is right, and done the other thing? Even as a Christian. It is the Reformed contention that the act of submission to God can only be a work of the spirit in conversion and repentance, not a prior act on man's part.

Anyway, this is all getting off topic, so I'll leave it there.

[Dee Dee Warren]

/ot TedO what is your position?

[TedO]

Today @ 09:48 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=246149#post246149)
Dee Dee Warren:

/ot TedO what is your position?

/ot I am not a Calvinist, but I have not come to a firm conclusion of what I am (molinist, arminian, ...). I think molinism has a strong philosophical basis - but I too get lost when the letters start flying. I see scriptural holes in all five petals of the TULIP. The T is too far reaching and over-emphasizes metaphors and hyperbole. The U is similarly over-reaching in that it applies election to the the individual rather than manner/means of salvation. The L flies in the face of too many scriptures. The I makes no sense when the scriptures say man does resist the Holy Spirit. Much of the book of Hebrews is moot (as well as Revelation 1-3) if P is true. So while I agree with 95% of the basis of TULIP, that last 5% goes beyond what I see in scripture.

/ot I am reworking a position paper I have written on the topic - I will gladly email it to you when I am satisfied with it (if that ever happens) if you wish.