LFW and foreknowledge

[Smitten]

I am familiar with the basics of molinism, in that God's middle knowledge informs him of how agents would freely act in any given circumstance, etc...

But what I haven't heard is a point of view or explanation on how God foreknows the outcomes of LFW choices. Is it more of an assumption that he can, or is there a typical argument, or several different ones?

[Bill the Cat]

Today @ 04:21 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=243209#post243209)
Smitten:

I am familiar with the basics of molinism, in that God's middle knowledge informs him of how agents would freely act in any given circumstance, etc...

But what I haven't heard is a point of view or explanation on how God foreknows the outcomes of LFW choices. Is it more of an assumption that he can, or is there a typical argument, or several different ones?

My view is called the B theory of time where God is now in the Past, present and future. He already knows what we will choose, but still allows us to choose it. He does not directly force our decision, but is already aware of our decision.

There are many other ideas, but that's mine and I'm sticking to it!!

[geebob]

But what I haven't heard is a point of view or explanation on how God foreknows the outcomes of LFW choices. Is it more of an assumption that he can, or is there a typical argument, or several different ones?

You just named one, molinism. It allegedly does this.

There is also simple foreknowledge which merely says that God knows our actions directly, though there are several explanations as to how this happens, such as what Bill suggested, or backwards causation.

Of course none of these work against the argeuement that William Hasker puts forth concerning clarence and his omlet (which I will one day post).

The only view that escapes the contradiction of foreknowledge and free will (other than the notion of some open theists who maintain that uncertainties are real and knowable as real) is the one that God is timeless (not to be confused with what Bill suggested) to the extent that God does not foreknow the future but knows all of time timelessly. So God does not know today what you will do tomorrow. But for that matter, God doesn't even exist today.

Of course although it has not been conclusively shown that this view of "foreknowledge" conflicts with free will (though I still find it suspect), there are other reasons to doubt this view. Reformed Philosopher Nicolaus Wolterstorff for example has argued that such a God cannot redeem because for that to happen, God must hold something against us, but then forgive us. This places God in a temporal sequence, which is an explicit contradiction of what it means to be timeless.

[Smitten]

geebob,

I am aware of views in which God foreknows LFW choices(arminianism, molinism) but what i'm not aware of is arguments for how God can foreknow those choices. I know these views believe that he can, but i am not aware if there are particular arguments supporting the idea that God can foreknow LFW choices, or if it's more of an assumption that comes with the view. If there are, then i am lacking in my comprehension of those views, as I have understood it to be an assumption.

I'm not familiar with backwards causation, but that phrase itself sounds kinda nonsensical to me. And I believe that God is atemporal, but I don't see how this view can be maintained if one believes in LFW choices occuring within time. If God is transcendent over time so that he can "look" at the future and see it in completion, it follows that what he is looking at, if it is real, already exists. Since there is no causal determinism in a LFW choice, I don't see how future LFW choices can already be made and already exist to be seen.

[geebob]

I am aware of views in which God foreknows LFW choices(arminianism, molinism) but what i'm not aware of is arguments for how God can foreknow those choices.

I don't know that arminianism holds to any specific view on how God would know the future. Of course, I consider myself an arminian and I don't think that God knows the future as certain (but he does know it because I insist that uncertainty exists and/or reflects truth to be known).

As for molinism, it is not simply a view which suggests that God forknows the future. It is primarily a strategy to that end. It's the notion that there is a fact about what anyone would do in any circumstance and since God knows what circumstances, he knows how we will specifically choose freely. Allegedly, since God does not determine these facts (called counterfactuals of freedom), we are free. FYI I don't find it a convincing strategy.


I'm not familiar with backwards causation, but that phrase itself sounds kinda nonsensical to me.

yes it does. :grin:



If God is transcendent over time so that he can "look" at the future and see it in completion, it follows that what he is looking at, if it is real, already exists.

the future would not have to exist at all, just as God would not exist. For God to exist, he would have to be in the present. God does exist, but he just does not exist right now, nor in the past, nor in the future. He is just that far removed from time and so is foreknowledge.

It is a really weird view, but as William Hasker says, the problem with most views of timelessness is not that they are too weird to be true but rather that they are not weird enough to have a chance at being true.

[Sheepdog]

so, Geebob, do you not exist because you are not in Tahiti right now? :poke: But God exists, and he is here, where you are at, and at Tahiti at the same time. Some views (like my own and it seem BTC's) places God as omnipresent in time as well as in space.

i do shy away from strict timelessness though. not a big fan of deism :violin:

[geebob]

so, Geebob, do you not exist because you are not in Tahiti right now?

I do not exist in tahiti, and If I was aspacial, I would not exist anywhere, but being aspacial, that would not mean that I didn't exist. The same applie to God and timelessness.

When I said that God didn't exist, that is in the present tense of the word. The problem with language is that it is tensed so to say that a timeless God exists or doesn't exist in such a way that it can be of use to the foreknowledge debate can be misleading.


But God exists, and he is here, where you are at,

even omnipresence is typically mitigated somehow so we do not risk commiting ourselves to such notions that a certain amount of space holds a certain volume of God.

[Smitten]

geebob,


As for molinism, it is not simply a view which suggests that God forknows the future. It is primarily a strategy to that end. It's the notion that there is a fact about what anyone would do in any circumstance and since God knows what circumstances, he knows how we will specifically choose freely.

Which undermines LFW, since for a libertarian free choice to occur there can be no necessity from previous factors. If God can look at previous factor(s) and infallibly know the outcome of a choice, there was no LFW in the choice.


Allegedly, since God does not determine these facts (called counterfactuals of freedom), we are free.

Yea i've heard that, but am not aware of how he is supposed to know those things(which gets back to my question).

This is something i have wondered about open theism too. Just because God isn't determining something, it doesn't seem to follow that humans are really free.

[geebob]

Which undermines LFW, since for a libertarian free choice to occur there can be no necessity from previous factors. If God can look at previous factor(s) and infallibly know the outcome of a choice, there was no LFW in the choice.

I would agree. molinism is not a full blown theological determinism, but as far as I can tell, it is still determinism.


Yea i've heard that, but am not aware of how he is supposed to know those things(which gets back to my question).

he knows them simply because he is omniscient. How God can be omniscient is not an issue in molinism but rather how future free actions as specifically settled can be a part of omniscience.

The more pertinant question in my mind is why there should be counterfactuals of freedom at all.


This is something i have wondered about open theism too. Just because God isn't determining something, it doesn't seem to follow that humans are really free.

yes, there is still a bit of mystery to free will. Indeterminism and an open future dos not get us free will, but free will is not possible without indeterminism and an open future. We cannot fully comprehend free will any more than we can fully comprehend conciousness, the workings of responsibility, causation, the soul, existence itself, God and so on. But we do know some things about these issues (albeit many of our claims to knowledge on these issues are controversial).

[Jaltus]

Today @ 03:14 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=244254#post244254)
Smitten:
Which undermines LFW, since for a libertarian free choice to occur there can be no necessity from previous factors. If God can look at previous factor(s) and infallibly know the outcome of a choice, there was no LFW in the choice.

False view of Molinism here, since it does not in any way say the choice is necessary due to previous factors, it just says that God knows that in a certain set of circumstances, God knows what you would do. There is no necessity. You are reading that in. The problem is that we do not know HOW God knows, only that He does in fact know.


Yea i've heard that, but am not aware of how he is supposed to know those things(which gets back to my question).

Nor is anybody else, unless they say He determines things, but then there are obvious problems with that.


This is something i have wondered about open theism too. Just because God isn't determining something, it doesn't seem to follow that humans are really free.

Then what does it mean to be free and who other than God can determine things?

[Smitten]

geebob,


yes, there is still a bit of mystery to free will. Indeterminism and an open future dos not get us free will, but free will is not possible without indeterminism and an open future.

I agree. As far as open theism goes, does God, in creation, create in such a way as to where he can't foreknow or infallibly predict the future, or does he create in such a way to where he can, but somehow limits himself to where he doesn't know the future. I'm guessing you believe the former, but is there disagreement among open theists over it, or is there a fairly unanimous consensus?

[Smitten]

Jaltus,



Smitten: Which undermines LFW, since for a libertarian free choice to occur there can be no necessity from previous factors. If God can look at previous factor(s) and infallibly know the outcome of a choice, there was no LFW in the choice.
Jaltus: False view of Molinism here, since it does not in any way say the choice is necessary due to previous factors, it just says that God knows that in a certain set of circumstances, God knows what you would do. There is no necessity. You are reading that in. The problem is that we do not know HOW God knows, only that He does in fact know.

All right, then i guess there isn't an answer to what i was looking for. Since you admit this, I'm guessing that the main reason for asserting that God can in fact foreknow LFW choices is because you don't see the alternatives as being intuitively or biblically acceptable(determinism or a non-omniscient God)?



Smitten: Yea i've heard that, but am not aware of how he is supposed to know those things(which gets back to my question).
Jaltus: Nor is anybody else, unless they say He determines things, but then there are obvious problems with that.

No problems at all on the issue of foreknowledge however :smile:
I'm guessing you agree that it is easy to see how God can be omniscient in a deterministic creation?



Smitten: This is something i have wondered about open theism too. Just because God isn't determining something, it doesn't seem to follow that humans are really free.
Jaltus: Then what does it mean to be free and who other than God can determine things?

Well i am using free in the libertarian sense here. I'd say there is no other "who" who could determine things, perhaps there could be "whats" though. External circumstances, genetics, one's intelligence/personality, etc., are all factors that influence the will. I'm not arguing that these things are deterministic, just saying that I don't see how God creating in such a way to where he cannot predict the future necessarily leads to the conclusion that humans are fully in control(in the libertarian sense).

[geebob]

I agree. As far as open theism goes, does God, in creation, create in such a way as to where he can't foreknow or infallibly predict the future, or does he create in such a way to where he can, but somehow limits himself to where he doesn't know the future. I'm guessing you believe the former, but is there disagreement among open theists over it, or is there a fairly unanimous consensus?

Most open theists would hold that God created in such a way that the future is open with some uncertainties thus he would not know it as closed or certain. This isn't unanimous but it is the predominant view. I don't understand why anyone would want to hold the other view but there are a few who do. I suppose they want to say that there is nothing that God cannot do so it is only his choice not to know. But I consider this a weak point because God can surely know the future as exhaustively settled if that's the kind of creation he wanted. And to say that he cannot know an open future in which uncertainties have real metaphysical existence is to say no more than the likes of denying his power to make 2+2=5.

There is a further division of open theists who are of the persuasion that the openness of the future is a built in feature. One group as represented by William Hasker says that there are facts about the future that God cannot know. But that is because God's knowledge is infallible and these facts that he cannot know can change there truth values. These are called soft facts. Soft facts do have a place in our normal discourse (for example, someone says, "I thought Jimmy was going to the mall," to which the reply comes, "yes he was going to the mall but he ran out of time."). However, I want to be a nominalist about soft facts and deny that they represent a real feature in existence. It just represents a way of speaking about subjectively percieved vectors in the way things may come about. Of course God does know all hard facts, which are facts that cannot have their truth value changed.

Other open viewers such as myself will follow Greg Boyd and say that there is indeed an exhaustive set of facts about the future but they deny that every future event can truthfully described in terms of what will or will not happen. Instead, statements about what may and may not happen represent the truth about some future events.

[Bill the Cat]

I tried to come upwith a practical example:

If I put a bowl of peas and a cupcake in front of my son, i'm 100%sure what he'll pick... the cupcake. I foreknew that he would pick the tasty confection over the vile green veggies, but still provided the choice so he can't say he didn't have a choice. Would he ever pick the peas? No. Now, my 8 year old would pick the peas and I know that in advance.

That's the best I, a non-philosopher, can come up with... :chat:

[Solly]

of course, you could tell him he can have the cake if he eats the peas...

[Bill the Cat]

It's an either/or selection, not both.

[Solly]

/ot tempted to veer this thread seriously off topic, but withdraws gracefully :lol:

[themuzicman]

Today @ 08:27 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=244897#post244897)
Bill the Cat:

I tried to come upwith a practical example:

If I put a bowl of peas and a cupcake in front of my son, i'm 100%sure what he'll pick... the cupcake. I foreknew that he would pick the tasty confection over the vile green veggies, but still provided the choice so he can't say he didn't have a choice. Would he ever pick the peas? No. Now, my 8 year old would pick the peas and I know that in advance.

That's the best I, a non-philosopher, can come up with... :chat:

But you can't be 100 percent sure about ALL his decisions, can you?

I mean, you're not really 100 percent sure about this one. He may want to suprise or impress you by picking what's good for him, rather than the cupcake once, right?

Michael

[Bill the Cat]

Today @ 09:25 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=245014#post245014)
themuzicman:



But you can't be 100 percent sure about ALL his decisions, can you?

I'm not God...so no.


I mean, you're not really 100 percent sure about this one. He may want to suprise or impress you by picking what's good for him, rather than the cupcake once, right?

Michael

I would have a heart attack and die...

[themuzicman]

So, your example falls apart.

And this is the problem with "free will" foreknowledge, if God is not timeless:

The presumption is that in situation X, we will respond with Y (or some varition thereof), but this very assertion violates free will, because now we are just responding as we have been programmed.

And in some cases, this is true, but not every case.

Michael

[geebob]

If I put a bowl of peas and a cupcake in front of my son, i'm 100%sure what he'll pick... the cupcake. I foreknew that he would pick the tasty confection over the vile green veggies, but still provided the choice so he can't say he didn't have a choice. Would he ever pick the peas? No. Now, my 8 year old would pick the peas and I know that in advance.

Generally he would not be considered libertarian free. An irresistable impulse for the cupcake (because it's yummy) and and a revulsion to peas determines that your son will not eat the cupcake.

Yes it's a choice. But it's not a free choice. Or if we will grant that it is a free choice, it is not a libertarian free choice. It would be a compatibilistically free choice (if we can consider such choices to be free at all) and that sort of freedom is not what free will theists insists is the type involved in undetermined decisions such as our choice to accept God's grace.

[themuzicman]

However, if you offer me ice cream or oreos and milk, you don't know which I'd choose, because I don't know which I'd choose, until you offered it to me.

Now, If I don't know, how can anyone else?

Michael

[geebob]

exactly. arbitrary choices provide some of the most recognizable instances of libertarian free choices.

[Bill the Cat]

Like I said, that's the best I could come up with. I am no philosopher...

[geebob]

Then again, it may not be so much the case that you are philosophically uninclined but rather that the position that exhaustive definite foreknowledge is compatible with libertarian free will really is a defunct position.