Reasons and Causes: How Can We Know If Determinism is True?

[Jim B.]

It's often claimed by determinists that everything physical that happens is explainable in terms of physical causes. Why am I typing these words? Some determinists would claim it's because of the physical causes going on in my brain and nervous system, that this is the whole explanation. I personally find this hard to believe as it's stated, although I also doubt that it even has a clear meaning. Any thoughts?

[37818]

Even if quatium determinism could in some small way be measured - at the quantium level of things determinism as we think of determinism remains for us now as indeterminate. And as yet we do not know if or how quantium mechanics, if at all, plays any role in the brain. Determinism and "free will" which we call our self will remains a purely philosophical argrument.

[shunyadragon]

Even if quatium determinism could in some small way be measured - at the quantum level of things determinism as we think of determinism remains for us now as indeterminate. And as yet we do not know if or how quantum mechanics, if at all, plays any role in the brain. Determinism and "free will" which we call our self will remains a purely philosophical argument.

I do not believe the nature of things on the macro level, ie free will, or reasons of causes and effects in our macro world, are directly related to behavior of the Quantum level of existence. The nature of the Quantum world primarily determines the fundamental nature of our physics in the macro worlds, ie the Theory of Relativity and the behavior of basic particles of of matter that result in matter and energy.

[robrecht]

I do not believe the nature of things on the macro level, ie free will, or reasons of causes and effects in our macro world, are directly related to behavior of the Quantum level of existence. The nature of the Quantum world primarily determines the fundamental nature of our physics in the macro worlds, ie the Theory of Relativity and the behavior of basic particles of of matter that result in matter and energy.

Can you clarify what you mean by this? It seems like your second sentence is kind of contradictory to your first sentence.

1. I do not believe the nature of things on the macro level, ie free will, or reasons of causes and effects in our macro world, are directly related to behavior of the Quantum level of existence.
- Removing the negative preamble (I do not believe), I will make this a negative statement:
- The nature of things on the macro level (ie, free will, or reasons of causes and effects in our macro world), are NOT directly related to behavior of the Quantum level of existence

2. The nature of the Quantum world primarily determines the fundamental nature of our physics in the macro worlds, ie the Theory of Relativity and the behavior of basic particles of of matter that result in matter and energy.

How can the quantum world determine the fundamental nature of our physics in the macro world but at the same time the nature of things on the macro level not be directly related to behavior at the quantum level?

Are you perhaps thinking that the nature of things on the macro level are only indirectly (not directly) related to behavior at the quantum level?

[shunyadragon]

It's often claimed by determinists that everything physical that happens is explainable in terms of physical causes. Why am I typing these words? Some determinists would claim it's because of the physical causes going on in my brain and nervous system, that this is the whole explanation.

Careful on over stating what 'determinism' and 'the whole explanation' translates to in terms of scientific evidence concerning the nature of the mind, consciousness, and human will. Many falsely conclude that the scientific view concludes that 'physical causes' are indeed the only causes of the nature of being human, therefore humans would be some sort of robotic creatures without free will. This is far from the truth of what the scientific evidence has determined. Science does not claim it is the 'whole explanation,' because science cannot go beyond the limits of Methodological Naturalism. The claim that science is the 'whole explanation' is Philosophical Naturalist claim and beyond the scientific evidence.

The philosophical view of a 'Source' of human mind, consciousness, and will that is beyond a physical explanation is indeed possible, but that conclusion remains a theological/philosophical explanation and not based on any objective verifiable evidence.



I personally find this hard to believe as it's stated, although I also doubt that it even has a clear meaning. Any thoughts?[/QUOTE]

[shunyadragon]

Can you clarify what you mean by this? It seems like your second sentence is kind of contradictory to your first sentence.

1. I do not believe the nature of things on the macro level, ie free will, or reasons of causes and effects in our macro world, are directly related to behavior of the Quantum level of existence.
- Removing the negative preamble (I do not believe), I will make this a negative statement:
- The nature of things on the macro level (ie, free will, or reasons of causes and effects in our macro world), are NOT directly related to behavior of the Quantum level of existence.

Correct, I made a typo.'

2. The nature of the Quantum world primarily determines the fundamental nature of our physics in the macro worlds, ie the Theory of Relativity and the behavior of basic particles of of matter that result in matter and energy.

How can the quantum world determine the fundamental nature of our physics in the macro world but at the same time the nature of things on the macro level not be directly related to behavior at the quantum level?

The behavior of the Quantum Mechanics is indeed limited to the Quantum World. The macro world observation of possible Quantum behavior where the Theory of Relativity rules is anecdotal at best.

Are you perhaps thinking that the nature of things on the macro level are only indirectly (not directly) related to behavior at the quantum level?

The direct relationship has only been determined to be the basis of the fundamental nature of matter energy, and not behavior of the macro world.

Source: https://arxiv.org/abs/1403.4307

Quantum Theory and Human Perception of the Macro-World by Diederik Aerts
(Submitted on 17 Mar 2014 (v1), last revised 29 May 2014 (this version, v3))

We investigate the question of 'why customary macroscopic entities appear to us humans as they do, i.e. as bounded entities occupying space and persisting through time', starting from our knowledge of quantum theory, how it affects the behavior of such customary macroscopic entities, and how it influences our perception of them. For this purpose, we approach the question from three perspectives. Firstly, we look at the situation from the standard quantum angle, more specifically the de Broglie wavelength analysis of the behavior of macroscopic entities, indicate how a problem with spin and identity arises, and illustrate how both play a fundamental role in well-established experimental quantum-macroscopical phenomena, such as Bose-Einstein condensates. Secondly, we analyze how the question is influenced by our result in axiomatic quantum theory, which proves that standard quantum theory is structurally incapable of describing separated entities. Thirdly, we put forward our new 'conceptual quantum interpretation', including a highly detailed reformulation of the question to confront the new insights and views that arise with the foregoing analysis. At the end of the final section, a nuanced answer is given that can be summarized as follows. The specific and very classical perception of human seeing -- light as a geometric theory -- and human touching -- only ruled by Pauli's exclusion principle -- plays a role in our perception of macroscopic entities as ontologically stable entities in space. To ascertain quantum behavior in such macroscopic entities, we will need measuring apparatuses capable of its detection. Future experimental research will have to show if sharp quantum effects -- as they occur in smaller entities -- appear to be ontological aspects of customary macroscopic entities.

© Copyright Original Source

[shunyadragon]

More on Quantum behavior in the macro world describing the details.

[The Thinker]

It's often claimed by determinists that everything physical that happens is explainable in terms of physical causes. Why am I typing these words? Some determinists would claim it's because of the physical causes going on in my brain and nervous system, that this is the whole explanation. I personally find this hard to believe as it's stated, although I also doubt that it even has a clear meaning. Any thoughts?

To deny determinism you must believe that things begin to exist without a cause. And if what you're doing is not because of the physical causes going on in your brain and nervous system, then you have to believe there is something non-physical that has a causal effect on the physical matter of your body. But that would violate the laws of physics, which is a miracle. So you'd have to believe your every action is a miracle. And that just doesn't happen.

[Carrikature]

It's often claimed by determinists that everything physical that happens is explainable in terms of physical causes. Why am I typing these words? Some determinists would claim it's because of the physical causes going on in my brain and nervous system, that this is the whole explanation. I personally find this hard to believe as it's stated, although I also doubt that it even has a clear meaning. Any thoughts?

I think you should elaborate. "Hard to believe" isn't an argument. "Doubt it has a clear meaning" just presents your own ignorance and isn't a critique of the claims.

[Jim B.]

Careful on over stating what 'determinism' and 'the whole explanation' translates to in terms of scientific evidence concerning the nature of the mind, consciousness, and human will. Many falsely conclude that the scientific view concludes that 'physical causes' are indeed the only causes of the nature of being human, therefore humans would be some sort of robotic creatures without free will. This is far from the truth of what the scientific evidence has determined. Science does not claim it is the 'whole explanation,' because science cannot go beyond the limits of Methodological Naturalism. The claim that science is the 'whole explanation' is Philosophical Naturalist claim and beyond the scientific evidence.

The philosophical view of a 'Source' of human mind, consciousness, and will that is beyond a physical explanation is indeed possible, but that conclusion remains a theological/philosophical explanation and not based on any objective verifiable evidence.

I am not making these claims about determinism and scientific evidence. I am saying that some determinists believe that human behavior is explicable entirely through physical causes.There are many positions in the area of free will. Since methodological naturalism is a research strategy, a methodological approach, then I agree with you that one should be very careful about drawing metaphysical conclusions from them.

[Jim B.]

To deny determinism you must believe that things begin to exist without a cause. And if what you're doing is not because of the physical causes going on in your brain and nervous system, then you have to believe there is something non-physical that has a causal effect on the physical matter of your body. But that would violate the laws of physics, which is a miracle. So you'd have to believe your every action is a miracle. And that just doesn't happen.

There would be physical realizers of our thoughts even under agent causation, so that our thoughts would be physically caused, even if the causes are not sufficient for everything that I as an agent do. I think the idea is that I as an agent am caused. And the causes of me are necessary though not sufficient for some of the causal chains that I initiate. So what would be uncaused?

But getting back to the OP, regardless of what we think about determinism/free will, how is it possible that our reasoning capacity and our ability to know truths is nothing more than the interaction of physical causes?

[Jim B.]

I think you should elaborate. "Hard to believe" isn't an argument. "Doubt it has a clear meaning" just presents your own ignorance and isn't a critique of the claims.

Right you are. It was just an OP.

If all our thoughts are physical events and the effects of physical causes, how would knowing this fact be possible? My belief that all of my beliefs are physical events, etc, would merely be another event that was causally determined to happen due to other events in my brain and the world. What would privilege this event epistemically over any other event, either caused or uncaused if all events form a more or less seamless, undifferentiated causal web? If this belief were true, we'd have no way of knowing it because knowing depends on a reasonable ground, but how to explain this ground as being able to support justifiable beliefs if all is reducible to a physical ground? We wouldn't really "know" anything but would just be causally interacting with ourselves and each other to perpetuate this illusion.

[The Thinker]

There would be physical realizers of our thoughts even under agent causation, so that our thoughts would be physically caused, even if the causes are not sufficient for everything that I as an agent do. I think the idea is that I as an agent am caused. And the causes of me are necessary though not sufficient for some of the causal chains that I initiate. So what would be uncaused?

But what causes those "physical realizers"? And they part of a physically determined process or not?

But getting back to the OP, regardless of what we think about determinism/free will, how is it possible that our reasoning capacity and our ability to know truths is nothing more than the interaction of physical causes?

How could it not be? If you're raised on the idea that we have a soul and that this explains human rationality, then just being physical seems far fetched. But to me the idea of a soul is far fetched since I was not raised with it. How does a non-physical soul have a causal effect on the physical body, in a way that is compatible with the laws of physics? On pages 196-197 of his book The Last Superstition, Edward Feser writes:

"But for the mind as understood in Descartes's sense to have any causal influence on the body, it would surely have to transfer energy into the physical universe; and for the body to have a causal influence on the soul, it would have to transfer energy out of the physical universe. Hence the notion of souls and bodies interacting seems, if understood Descartes's way, to violate the laws of physics."

We've discovered that everything in the mind is due to something in the brain. The brain as a whole is capable of giving us a rational response to stimuli. And the brain can do rational things just like computers can. Listen to this lecture here for a brief explanation of that.

[Jim B.]

But what causes those "physical realizers"? And they part of a physically determined process or not?

Some of them are caused by me.

How could it not be? If you're raised on the idea that we have a soul and that this explains human rationality, then just being physical seems far fetched. But to me the idea of a soul is far fetched since I was not raised with it. How does a non-physical soul have a causal effect on the physical body, in a way that is compatible with the laws of physics? On pages 196-197 of his book The Last Superstition, Edward Feser writes:



We've discovered that everything in the mind is due to something in the brain. The brain as a whole is capable of giving us a rational response to stimuli. And the brain can do rational things just like computers can. Listen to this lecture here for a brief explanation of that.

The question I am asking is: How can reasoning be possible if reasons and thoughts are physical events?

Reasons are not physically located in me, are not in my skull the way that neural events are in my skull. My deliberations happen in a space of reasons, not cranial space, regardless of how many correlations can be discovered with physical facts (what Pinker talks about). My belief that 1+1=2 is not physically in my brain even if it's physically realized by a brain event. Otherwise, how could I know that it's true? It would merely be another brain event, and no physical event is "true"; it merely is. If my representation of X = X, then it wouldn't be a representation but just another instance of X. I could not justifiably believe that every belief is a physical event if that belief is a physical event.

Do you believe in determinism because you are determined to believe it or because it is true? If those two things, what i am determined to believe and what is true, don't always coincide, then there has to be something to account for the distinction. I could be deternined to have false beliefs.

We don't have to posit a soul in the Cartesian sense to doubt that all beliefs are physical events, although I think there are good reasons for thinking that the self is a non-physical substance. There's also emergence, and the idea that, considering consciousness, not all reality is physical reality.

[shunyadragon]

I am not making these claims about determinism and scientific evidence. I am saying that some determinists believe that human behavior is explicable entirely through physical causes.There are many positions in the area of free will.

I have difficulty with a vague reference to 'some' or 'often claimed' by determinists with references and contrasting the views of the 'some' with other references.

Since methodological naturalism is a research strategy, a methodological approach, then I agree with you that one should be very careful about drawing metaphysical conclusions from them.

Most metaphysical conclusions are based on claims of the lack or insufficient scientific evidence. The common argument among theists that the apparent and real limits of methodological naturalism leads to the conclusion that the ultimate source of the mind and consciousness in part or all from an outside 'Source' some call God. This argument falls into the tar pit of 'Arguing from Ignorance.'

We cannot 'know' that determinism is true, but the reality is that methodological naturalism has an adequate natural explanation for the 'evolution' of the mind, consciousness and the will of human nature.