Problem from evil argument [Archive]

John Powell

February 27th 2003, 08:06 PM

POWELL:
Responses to Pereynol, Pate, BryanB, Pilgrim (2), J. J. Ramsey, and Calvinist.

Am I in religious discussion heaven? Why are so many other theist sites so inferior to this one? Where have you people been hiding?

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pereynol:
I think there's some ambiguity here. When you speak of "necessary evil," what is meant by "necessary?"

POWELL:
I failed to anticipate that definitions would be such an obstacle. I'm new to this kind of debate. I'll learn.

necessary: essential, indispensable, requisite, required, must have, can't do without. Will that work for you, pereynol?

pereynol:
In what metaethical context do you propose that a "necessary evil" arise?

POWELL:
I don't know. Any, I suppose. I would expect an OmniGod to remove it, whatever the context. Why should He leave an evil thing be if that particular evil is not necessary? I don't think that I would allow for unnecessary evil if I were an OmniGod.

pereynol:
And finally, what do you think "evil" is; how do you define it? These questions become pretty important.

POWELL:
evil: morally bad or wrong. Will that work for you pereynol?

pereynol:
Also, it is quite possible to conceive of God's relation to evil in other ways, considered apart from our rather effete contemporary notions of this problem.

POWELL:
Apparently, I could benefit from learning about those "other ways."

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Pate:
John, that's an interesting version of the argument from evil. But I'll refrain my comments and critique for now, because of our plans to have a formal debate on this subject soon. Or would you rather like to debate this subject here in the philosophy forum, so that more people would be allowed to participate? I have nothing against that either.

POWELL:
I'm trying to get formal debates going on so people aren't as scared to enter that arena, Pate, but I prefer discussing these things in a less stressful situation such as the present.

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BRIAN B:
Hi John,

POWELL:
Hi, Brian B.

BRIAN B:
Two points:
1.

POWELL:
ATHEIST:
Are you claiming this for certain or do you mean that there very probably is no case anywhere in the universe ever of unnecessary evil? If you're making the extraordinary claim that there is absolutely or very probably no case of unnecessary evil anywhere in the universe ever in all eternity then shouldn't you defend that?

BRIAN B:
No, no defense is necessary. Since this is an argument presented by the atheist, the atheist has the burden of proof to show that there exists some unnecessary evil. The theist has zero burden of proof.

POWELL:
Prove it, Brian B. You just claimed this, so apparently, according to your argument, the burden of proof is entirely upon you. In this case I would prefer you put your argument into a sound deductive syllogism. My argument was one that might be claimed by a hypothetical person. That hypothetical person might be required to defend it as you claim. The argument you just gave is presumably your own. So, justify it.

Now, more seriously, Brian. Don't both sides of the issue have at least SOME burden of proof? Is ALL the burden of proof on the side of the original claimant, none of it AT ALL is on the side which essentially CLAIMS that they are justified in rejecting it?

BRIAN B:
2.
If you intend to present an evidentialist (probabalistic) form of the problem of evil, you need to give us an account of what evil is without reference to an omni-good God.

POWELL:
I defined "evil" for pereynol as "morally bad or wrong." Will that work for you, Brian B?

BRIAN B:
I recommend Doug Geivett's lecture on the problems of evil found on the www.hisdefense.org website.

Warm regards,
Brian

POWELL:
Thank you. I will read that as soon as I can, unless someone gives a good reason why I shouldn't.

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Pilgrim:
Indeed what is "evil" in the first place? We tend to confuse what is evil or "wrong" with what causes us pain and what is good or "right" with what is pleasurable to us. I would submit that such a measure is highly problematic.

POWELL:
Yes. Welcome to the real world. However, is the problem so problematic that one can't come to a rational conclusion on this issue?

I defined "evil" for pereynol as "morally bad or wrong." Will that work for you, Pilgrim?

PILGRIM:
Perhaps a look at the Zen idea is a good one here. The idea there is that the perfection of life only comes in it's {its} imperfections. That's why certain of their ceremonial bowls always have a divot in one side of the opening to show that no circle is absolutly {absolutely} round and to try to make it so would be to deny it's {its} perfect essence. That in turn is a lesson for life.

Pilgrim

POWELL:
Although they doubtless have some good lessons for life, I suspect those Zen people may have some philosophical hang-ups about the world they live in. They, like some Trinitarians, seem to think that difficult-to-understand, apparently contradictory ideas make for profound philosophy. Please don't think I don't realize I have my own hang-ups.

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Pilgrim:
I think the idea is that an omni God would see all evil, know when it was a possability {possibility} and destory {destroy} it or prevent it from happening. This assumes an Omni God would want to.

POWELL:
I think I can agree, Pilgrim if what you mean by "see" includes imagining what it might be like if there were such a thing as unnecessary evil. I would argue that OmniGod shouldn't see unnecessary evil in the present because He would have removed it and He shouldn't see it in the future because He would prevent it. I have problems with the infinite past, however, because I cannot adequately conceive of a being who always existed as an OmniGod and never had His first thought or did His first act.

My version of Mormonism dealt better, I think, with this no-beginning problem.

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J. J. Ramsey:

POWELL:

ATHEIST:
Here's a statistical argument against the existence of an OmniGod based upon the problem of evil. I anticipate little disagreement with premises 1, 2 or 3.

1. If an OmniGod existed then no unnecessary evil would exist.

2. If God is all-powerful then He would have the power to remove all unnecessary evil.

3. If God is all-good then He should remove all unnecessary evil.

4. Because of our free will to do or not do evil, there is, with high probability, at least one case of unnecessary evil.

5. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that an OmniGod exists.

THEIST:
I deny premise 4. There is no unnecessary evil.

J. J. Ramsey:
Actually, it is premise 3 that is the tricky one.

POWELL:
I'm sorry, then, for suggesting that premise 3 would not be a problem. I'll learn.

J. J. Ramsey:
On its face it seems obvious, but it assumes that there are no countering reasons for God, even if all-Good, to stay his hand.

POWELL:
On the contrary, J. J. Ramsey, I think there is no good reason He shouldn't stay His hand because that unnecessary evil is, well, unnecessary. Can you provide a good reason an OmniGod might stay His hand?

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Calvinist:

POWELL:
1. If an OmniGod existed then no unnecessary evil would exist.

CALVINIST:
Why?

POWELL:
Children learn at a young age that "why" is a powerful word that can, to some extent, control adults. There is no question that can't be followed with the query "why?" Adults are sometimes pressured to finally reply with "Because I said so. If you don't do what I say, I'll punish you." The argumentum ad baculum is one of the most persuasively successful arguments there are.

Please don't infer that I'm calling you childish, Calvinist. I only want to make the point to everyone (including myself) that to ask that simple question without elaboration might be inappropriate. You DID elaborate, Calvinist, so your question is fully acceptable to me. I will even try to answer simple "why" questions that don't have additional explanation.

I think the answer to your question, Calvinist, is because an OmniGod could and should prevent unnecessary evil (morally bad things that aren't necessary) from existing.

CALVINIST:
The Reformed tradition lays the onus of evil upon Anthropological concerns. It's a straw man to the classical Christian unless you can explain why it's valid given the doctrine of the fall of man and the serious condition "sin" put the world in.

POWELL:
I don't mean to use a straw man argument, Calvinist. I'm not sure that your point about sin is that relevant. Please elaborate somewhat why you think that arguments related to the doctrine of the fall of man and the existence of sin in our world demonstrates that the problem of unnecessary evil argument I presented should be considered a straw man argument by the classical Christian. What are the fall of man and sin arguments you're referring to?

Are you claiming that every living person, adult, youth, infant, and fetus, who has existed on this Earth, except for Jesus Christ, has sinned?

What is your definition of sin, Calvinist, and what are the Biblical proof texts or other arguments and evidence for your position?

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POWELL:
Good questions, everyone. I'll try to keep up with the attention.

John Powell

Pereynol of Sheer Dread

February 28th 2003, 02:22 AM

John,
Thanks for your responses; I'll try to elaborate a bit on some of what needs to be discussed and clarified, IMHO.

First, as to what evil is: Evil can be defined in a variety of ways. In classical theism, following Augustine and others, evil is often considered as the privatio boni, or "privation of the good." In this view, goodness is associated with substance, being, or existence, while evil is linked to corruption and nothingness. For example, if we had a perfect piece of pottery, a brand new ceramic vessel of some sort, that would represent substantial goodness. If we dropped this object and part of it cracked away, leaving a hole and damaging it, the damaged part would represent "evil." Evil is a corruption of substantial goodness, a privation of the perfect state our pot would have if it had remained whole an unmarred. Notice here that evil depends entirely upon goodness for its "existence," as it could not possibly obtain in a vacuum apart from substantial goodness. In this view, good can exist apart from evil, but evil couldn't exist apart from good. In fact, evil is not a "thing" at all, rather, it is the privation of a thing.

Or, evil could be conceived as one of two dualistic forces, codependent and eternal, a kind of cosmic dialectic, locked within a perpetual interplay. Here, evil could be conceived of as substantial. From here, various ideas have arisen with different degrees of coherence. Notably the work of Jacob Boehme comes to mind as it affected the German philosophical tradition. God manifests himself as both love and wrath, and what we human beings perceive as "evil" may not be such in God, but rather a perceptual part of our finite anthropocentric perspective. These ideas have been held in both theistic and atheistic schemas. There's more to be said about what evil is, but before that, it might be illuminating to venture into metaethics.

What exactly is a moral statement or assertion of the "ought?" Is it a mere preference, as in "You ought not to do X" = "I dislike X?" Or perhaps it is a command; "You ought not to do X" = "Thou shalt not do X." In the first case, we have emotivism and in the second, imperativalism. There remain other options. Perhaps mores, true to their name, are only a matter of societal opinions, a tacit social contract, determined by what the majority of people think, a matter of percentages, social relativism, etc. If this conception is true, then Nazi Germany's penchant for genocide is above solid critique. Though ther are other points of view, I'll end by stating my own, that ethics are teleologically driven. They are goal-oriented, as Alasdair MacIntyre contends.

Theistically speaking, with a teleological ethical schema, we have God's purposes defining what values are. Something is ultimately good if it contributes to establishing divine purpose, even if it entails attendant ostensible "evils" from a human point of view. Evil is a matter of perception in some sense. Colliding inanimate objects, for example, might well do violence to one another, but there'd be no evil per se, because evil only takes shape within minds which have the ability to perceive it. Somethingthat thwarts my goals, or does me violence becomes evil to me. When two individuals come into conflict, or two nations, what is evil to one may well be good to the other with respect to goals. In one sense, this sounds like functional relativism, and it would be, except that within a theistic schema, a hierarchy is set up wherein God's purposes become determinative in the final analysis.

When we consider the hypothetical atheist who want to perpetrate an "unecessary evil" with the express goal of demonstrating the supposed nonexistence of his conception of a divine being, some observations are in order. Not least among these observations is that this atheist has a goal himself, and it is precisely within the context of this goal that the proposed evil act takes place. Moreover, it is by no means apparent that the atheist has not worked within the precise parameters of God's overall purposes in spite of himself, and this would be especially true if God possessed maximal sovereignty.

As to the concept of necessity with respect to evil, the only kind of necessesity that could be ascribed to evil would be teleological necessity, which inheres within God's purposes, vs.
that which we humans perceive as "evil" because it appears to do violence to our goals. But what we perceive as evil may not be such at all with respect to God's purposes. If one holds to the privatio boni definition of evil as conceived within a theistic cosmos wherein ethics are teleologically driven according to God's determinative purposes, then the so-called "problem of evil" is only a problem in the eyes of that portion of humanity which fails to acknowledge God's sovereignty.

Interestingly enough, if those who fail to acknowledge either God or his sovereignty are atheists, then all their grievances become moot, as ethics become merely a product of the human psyche with no ultimate or absolute antecedent. And preoccupation with assigning blame to God (or predicating nonexistence to him), who in their worldview operates like the phantom pains which have displaced an amputated limb, makes but little sense.

There remain all sorts of ways to reason about these matters, and I have only begun to hydroplane over the surface of possibilities. Another interesting solution to the problem of evil as you present it can be found in Alvin Plantinga's God, Freedom, and Evil, for example.

Pilgrim

March 1st 2003, 12:14 PM

POWELL:
Yes. Welcome to the real world. However, is the problem so problematic that one can't come to a rational conclusion on this issue?

I defined "evil" for pereynol as "morally bad or wrong." Will that work for you, Pilgrim?

No, not really, because that definition can mean something different to each person it is presented to.

For example...The more conservative thinks homosexuality is morally bad or wrong, but not the more liberal. So the definition only works when applied to a small subset, it does not work universally.

TheFiveSolas

March 2nd 2003, 12:23 AM

I highly recommend the following article on "The Problem of Evil" by Dr. Greg Bahnsen.

http://www.cmfnow.com/articles/pa105.htm

mattbballman19

March 2nd 2003, 01:29 AM

How about this defintion of evil:
In good Augustinian fashion: "The lack of good."

matt

Pate

March 2nd 2003, 05:24 AM

Hi John!

OK, it seems most appropriate that we discuss your argument here. But I believe that you understand that if Steven Carr chooses to accept my challenge, much of my limited spare time will need to be used in that debate and therefore I may not be willing to discuss the same subject here.

Now, let's have a look at your argument:

1. If an OmniGod existed then no unnecessary evil would exist.

2. If God is all-powerful then He would have the power to remove all unnecessary evil.

3. If God is all-good then He should remove all unnecessary evil.

4. Because of our free will to do or not do evil, there is, with high probability, at least one case of unnecessary evil.

5. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that an OmniGod exists.

There are some important issues concerning the definition of evil, which need to be dealt with, before your argument can even get off the ground. Some people here have already commented on those. I’ll give my brief comments on that issue also, but I’ll do so only at the end of my post.

THEIST:
I deny premise 4. There is no unnecessary evil.

I tend to agree with this hypothetical theist, that this is a very crucial premise in your argument. My contention would be somewhat different, however, in that I will just deny that we have good rational grounds to conclude that there is unnecessary evil.

ATHEIST:
Are you claiming this for certain or do you mean that there very probably is no case anywhere in the universe ever of unnecessary evil? If you're making the extraordinary claim that there is absolutely or very probably no case of unnecessary evil anywhere in the universe ever in all eternity then shouldn't you defend that?

Your argument is supposed to disprove/render very unlikely the theistic (or specifically Christian) hypothesis of God. And I fail to see any reason to accept at face value the supposition that there is anything extraordinary in the claim that there is probably or even absolutely no case of unnecessary evil in the world. That is actually extremely likely, if not certain, consequence of the theistic hypotheisis of the existence of God. You actually agree with this right away in the first premise of your argument when you state that ” If an OmniGod existed then no unnecessary evil would exist.” Therefore, you need to show that there actually is (or probably is) some unnecessary evil in the world. If you are unable to do that, your argument fails.

Are you saying that I can't do an unnecessary evil right now if Iwanted to? Are you saying that if I chose to do an evil thing right now then it must have be a necessary evil? What if I were to choose not to do that necessary evil thing? Would this frustrate the will of God because He wanted me to do that evil thing because it was a necessary evil? How can a merely finite being hope to frustrate the will of an OmniGod?

What you wrote above confirms my belief that you have quite different conception of ”unnecessary evil”, than I (and probably most theists) have. This was already made apparent in the fourth premise of your argument. You seem to fail to notice, that the free will itself is one of the greatest goods that there is. The ability to use free will for evil purposes is just a necessary consequence of our having that free will. You need to show that the existence of beings with free will is not a sufficient good to warrant God to create such beings, despite the fact that the ability to do evil is a necessary consequence of genuine freedom.

Isn't the more logical conclusion that, because of our free will to do or not do evil, that there is very probably at least one case of unnecessary evil and, therefore, it's highly unlikely that God is an Omnibeing?

No, this does not seem to be more logical conclusion. My contention is that we have no good rational grounds to believe that there is any such evil in the world, which is not needed to achieve some greater good. We have reasons to believe that among the most important of these greater goods are the existence of rational, conscious beings endowed with free will (that’s us, human beings) and plenty of possibilities to use their freedom creatively, to work and co-operate to pursue those ends which are valuable, to build a moral character, to build a meaningful and valueable relationships with each other and, most of all, with God himself. It also seems to me, that given the enormous epistemic gulf which exists between our limited knowledge and the perfect knowledge that God has, we have no grounds to infer the nonexistence of a purpose from our inability to see a purpose for any particular instances of evil that we in fact see. Given the mentioned epistemic gulf, it is just to be expected that in a world which is created by God, there are instances of evil, the purposes of which we are not able to grasp. But so far we haven’t even seen any such instances presented in this discussion. I could go on to elaborate these points more carefully, but that’s currently not needed.

Finally, we’ll return to the issue of an additional challenge that an atheist has to face if he or she intends to use the problem of evil as an argument against the existence of God:

On what basis do you make the value judgement that some things are evil. What is the standard of good and evil? If it’s just the personal preference that you have, or that of your society, then the claim that there is evil, really boils down to the claim that ”there are things in the world that I/we don’t like". That makes evil completely subjective. If, on the other hand, the atheist claims that there exists some objective standard for good and evil, then the issue that he/she has to resolve is the grounding of such an objective and morally obligatory standard. I don’t see how such a concept can fit the atheistic worldview. Therefore, if the atheist insist that there are instances of real, objective evil in the world, he/she is, perhaps without realizing it, actually putting forward a theistic, not an atheistic argument. That argument runs as follows:

1. If God does not exist, then objective moral values do not exist.
2. Evil exists.
3. Therfore, objective moral values do exist.
4. Therefore, God exists.

John Powell

March 2nd 2003, 08:19 AM

POWELL:
This only responds to Pereynol's post.

pereynol:

John,
Thanks for your responses; I'll try to elaborate a bit on some of what needs to be discussed and clarified, IMHO.

POWELL:
Pereynol, your post deserves a thoughtful reply. I will do something given the 12K constraint based on what I currently know.

The term "unnecessary evil" when juxtaposed with "all-good" was supposed to avoid the philosophical problems you're bringing up. Maybe you're right that it doesn't. Whatever you want to call evil, it's supposed to be something bad or negative and if that Being who is all good, no bad, no evil allows bad or evil that isn't necessary (for example, not needed to fulfill His purposes) then it should not exist if that God has the power to remove it. That's the argument of premises 1, 2, and 3.

I believe the disagreement between us with my argument should NOT be with premise 1, 2, or 3.

Words like "good" and "bad" are core words to our language that may be impossible to define without using words that imply "goodness" or "badness".

PEREYNOL:
First, as to what evil is: Evil can be defined in a variety of ways. In classical theism, following Augustine and others, evil is often considered as the privatio boni, or "privation of the good." In this view, goodness is associated with substance, being, or existence, while evil is linked to corruption and nothingness. For example, if we had a perfect piece of pottery, a brand new ceramic vessel of some sort, that would represent substantial goodness. If we dropped this object and part of it cracked away, leaving a hole and damaging it, the damaged part would represent "evil." Evil is a corruption of substantial goodness, a privation of the perfect state our pot would have if it had remained whole an unmarred. Notice here that evil depends entirely upon goodness for its "existence," as it could not possibly obtain in a vacuum apart from substantial goodness. In this view, good can exist apart from evil, but evil couldn't exist apart from good. In fact, evil is not a "thing" at all, rather, it is the privation of a thing.

POWELL:
Perhaps "good" could then be defined as the privation of evil. I don't see how the vacuum of space must be considered evil.

What if the person, artist, or God wanted that crack / hole ? Then it would be "good," right?

I can't yet understand how good can exist without bad.

I suggest good and bad are opposite ends of a "Good / Bad" continuum that everyone essentially uses going from perfect bad through neutral to perfect good. "Better" means more good or less bad and "worse" means less good or more bad than something else that might be "good" (i.e. on the positive side of the continuum) or "bad" (i.e., on the negative side of the continuum). Subjectively, each person values things differently. What one person might call "good" another might call "bad." Objectively, "good" and "bad" are based upon some weighted average of the individual judgments of the expert authorities (whoever they are).

PERYENOL:
Or, evil could be conceived as one of two dualistic forces, codependent and eternal, a kind of cosmic dialectic, locked within a perpetual interplay.

POWELL:
This seems to be along the same lines as my view.

PERYENOL:
Here, evil could be conceived of as substantial. From here, various ideas have arisen with different degrees of coherence. Notably the work of Jacob Boehme comes to mind as it affected the German philosophical tradition. God manifests himself as both love and wrath, and what we human beings perceive as "evil" may not be such in God, but rather a perceptual part of our finite anthropocentric perspective. These ideas have been held in both theistic and atheistic schemas. There's more to be said about what evil is, but before that, it might be illuminating to venture into metaethics.

POWELL:
I believe this is bad doctrine. Although it is true that one would expect God to know better what is good and bad for us, it's difficult to accept that our moral judgment could be so much in error that what the God of the Bible has apparently done or might do is actually good (e.g. Num 31:17-18 and 1 Sam 15:2-3). That's where faith must come in. The priest says we should believe this mystery and we choose to do so. Perhaps that view is officially promoted partly because if the priest does something that might look evil to us, we will have a precedent to justify him. If we can't tell when God is evil, how can we tell when God's servants are evil?

Let me challenge that with this scenario.

Imagine that God, despite your belief that He has made clear promises to the contrary, immediately after you read this paragraph He annihilates everything that exists in the universe and all other planes of existence except for you and Him, no Second Coming, no heaven, no hell, nobody and nothing except for you and Him. Would God be justified in doing that? Would that be good or bad / evil? What do you think?

PEREYNOL:
What exactly is a moral statement or assertion of the "ought?" Is it a mere preference, as in "You ought not to do X" = "I dislike X?" Or perhaps it is a command; "You ought not to do X" = "Thou shalt not do X." In the first case, we have emotivism and in the second, imperativalism. There remain other options. Perhaps mores, true to their name, are only a matter of societal opinions, a tacit social contract, determined by what the majority of people think, a matter of percentages, social relativism, etc. If this conception is true, then Nazi Germany's penchant for genocide is above solid critique. Though ther{e} are other points of view, I'll end by stating my own, that ethics are teleologically driven. They are goal-oriented, as Alasdair MacIntyre contends.

POWELL:
In the case of God "oughting" to remove unnecessary evil, I think it would better match your preference meaning rather than your command meaning. It's awkward having God ordering himself to do something. Perhaps your goal-oriented view of "ought" will work here.

Even if moral codes are human inventions, rather than divine, how does that objectively justify the NAZI's? They might be able to justify their actions among those who agreed with them, but the majority of the world then and today disagree with that justification. The expert authorities are in good agreement that the NAZI's did bad.

If, on the other hand, you suggest that moral codes are based on the opinion of God, how do you know God didn't support Hitler? Evidently, He supported the extermination of the Midianites and Amalakites (referenced above). Has God revealed His current opinion on the Holocaust? Who are you to disagree with God?

PEREYNOL:
Theistically speaking, with a teleological ethical schema, we have God's purposes defining what values are. Something is ultimately good if it contributes to establishing divine purpose, even if it entails attendant ostensible "evils" from a human point of view. Evil is a matter of perception in some sense.

POWELL:
Your answer to my "annihilate all" scenario should help here. Put more generally, what if God behaves like what we would expect an evil Demon to behave like? Should we worship Him anyway?

PEREYNOL:
Colliding inanimate objects, for example, might well do violence to one another, but there'd be no evil per se, because evil only takes shape within minds which have the ability to perceive it. Something that thwarts my goals, or does me violence becomes evil to me. When two individuals come into conflict, or two nations, what is evil to one may well be good to the other with respect to goals. In one sense, this sounds like functional relativism, and it would be, except that within a theistic schema, a hierarchy is set up wherein God's purposes become determinative in the final analysis.

POWELL:
That might be ok if God were to give a clear message what He considered to be good and bad. Mark 10:2-12 suggests that divorce for any reason is bad, whereas Matt 5:31-32 suggests that divorce is ok for the cause of fornication. Which is it? Christians are divided on a number of issues such as male domination, abortion, euthanasia, and homosexuality. They used to be divided on the issue of slavery. What is God's opinion on all these issues?

PEREYNOL:
When we consider the hypothetical atheist who want to perpetrate an "unecessary evil" with the express goal of demonstrating the supposed nonexistence of his conception of a divine being, some observations are in order. Not least among these observations is that this atheist has a goal himself, and it is precisely within the context of this goal that the proposed evil act takes place. Moreover, it is by no means apparent that the atheist has not worked within the precise parameters of God's overall purposes in spite of himself, and this would be especially true if God possessed maximal sovereignty.

POWELL:
Are you suggesting my goal is bad? With what justification?

This "God might be using his enemies" idea may be a non-falsifiable, and, therefore non-scientific-like position. I need your answer to my "annihilate all" scenario and "worshiping a demon" question.

PEREYNOL:
As to the concept of necessity with respect to evil, the only kind of necessesity that could be ascribed to evil would be teleological necessity, which inheres within God's purposes, vs.
that which we humans perceive as "evil" because it appears to do violence to our goals. But what we perceive as evil may not be such at all with respect to God's purposes. If one holds to the privatio boni definition of evil as conceived within a theistic cosmos wherein ethics are teleologically driven according to God's determinative purposes, then the so-called "problem of evil" is only a problem in the eyes of that portion of humanity which fails to acknowledge God's sovereignty.

POWELL:
I meant evil in the objective sense: what the expert authorities (whoever they are) consider to be evil, rather than the subjective sense: what each individual considers to be evil.

To help answer your "God's determinative purposes" issue, I need to know your answers to my "annihilate all" scenario and "worshiping a demon" question?

PEREYNOL:
Interestingly enough, if those who fail to acknowledge either God or his sovereignty are atheists, then all their grievances become moot, as ethics become merely a product of the human psyche with no ultimate or absolute antecedent. And preoccupation with assigning blame to God (or predicating nonexistence to him), who in their worldview operates like the phantom pains which have displaced an amputated limb, makes but little sense.

POWELL:
We atheists sometimes argue as if there is a God so we can discuss these things logically with you. If you'd stop believing in Him then we'd stop "complaining about Him" and we could all spend more time doing science, philosophy, art, sports, etc.

PEREYNOL:
There remain all sorts of ways to reason about these matters, and I have only begun to hydroplane over the surface of possibilities. Another interesting solution to the problem of evil as you present it can be found in Alvin Plantinga's God, Freedom, and Evil, for example.

POWELL:
I'm sure I could learn something useful by reading that, but I don't wish to "argue" with someone who can't respond. If you support Plantinga's solution to my problem of evil argument then please post it for consideration.

John Powell

John Powell

March 2nd 2003, 08:41 AM

POWELL:
Comments to Pilgrim, TheFiveSolas, and Mattballman19.

POWELL:
Yes. Welcome to the real world. However, is the problem so problematic that one can't come to a rational conclusion on this issue?

I defined "evil" for pereynol as "morally bad or wrong." Will that work for you, Pilgrim?

PILGRIM:
No, not really, because that definition can mean something different to each person it is presented to.

POWELL:
So what? Is the difference significant? Are you saying that YOU don't agree with the definition AS STATED, Pilgrim? Let those others come forward if they exist or, if you think this will help, you can try to represent their view.

PILGRIM:
For example...The more conservative thinks homosexuality is morally bad or wrong, but not the more liberal. So the definition only works when applied to a small subset, it does not work universally.

POWELL:
What particular things different people might consider to be evil was not supposed to be relevent to the argument.

The argument from evil is designed so that each person can use their own unique definitions to some extent and, yet, come up with essentially the same conclusion.

TheFiveSolas:
I highly recommend the following article on "The Problem of Evil" by Dr. Greg Bahnsen.

http://www.cmfnow.com/articles/pa105.htm

POWELL:
Thanks, TheFiveSolas. I hope I can get around to reading it. If there's something there that rebuts my argument from evil and you're willing to defend it, please post it.

mattballman19:
How about this defintion of evil:
In good Augustinian fashion: "The lack of good."

matt

POWELL:
Thanks for pointing that out. Maybe that would work.

John Powell

Pereynol of Sheer Dread

March 2nd 2003, 11:26 AM

03-02-2003 @ 07:19 AM
John Powell:

The term "unnecessary evil" when juxtaposed with "all-good" was supposed to avoid the philosophical problems you're bringing up. Maybe you're right that it doesn't. Whatever you want to call evil, it's supposed to be something bad or negative and if that Being who is all good, no bad, no evil allows bad or evil that isn't necessary (for example, not needed to fulfill His purposes) then it should not exist if that God has the power to remove it. That's the argument of premises 1, 2, and 3.

I believe the disagreement between us with my argument should NOT be with premise 1, 2, or 3.

Words like "good" and "bad" are core words to our language that may be impossible to define without using words that imply "goodness" or "badness".

IMHO, the relationship between God and evil is more complex than your argument allows, but the arg nevertheless has some weight. The common theistic answer to it usually involves God's overall intentions to remove evil with respect to time. Since God's goals extend to the future, then so does his allowance of evil. A small example would be that say, God knows that John Powell's great-grandson will be a murderer, but that his great-great-grandson will be a humanitarian, philanthropic hero who shall do great good. To compound matters, suppose a vast, interconnected web of geneologies filled with beings God intends to create, some of whom will choose to embrace God and his goodness, and some of whom will become corrupted with terrible evil, and, of course, some of whom will remain rather bland, ethically speaking. In this matrix of cause/effect and human choice, God's purposes are enmeshed, cosmically speaking. Genetically speaking, the identities of all the human beings God wishes to create throughout history will no doubt depend upon their having the precise parents they need to have in the precise temporal sequence and societal settings necessary. All this, in turn, involves a regularity of natural causes and the relatively unimpeded development of human choices.

At this point in the Christian response to your arg, we generally find some version of the free-will theodicy, or, if the one responding is a compatibilist, a dismissal of the entire problem on the basis of God's sovereignty. The latter option possesses the arguable weaknesses inherent within double-predestination (weaknesses, that is, in the eyes of the sceptic), that God, as the potter, has the right to make of the clay whatever he pleases, and this move implies voluntarism with respect to God, as well as a perspectival definition of evil. However, if the privatio boni is also utilized (as it usually is), in conjuction with various theodicies, matters become even more interesting. Many times we get the picture of a divinely wrought system of natural causes operating in a predictably stable world, entailing unavoidable evil if God does not regularly intervene to prevent the regular movement of the "laws of nature" and the human faculty of choice.

Notice that here we have something strikingly close to Deism. The question then becomes, Why does God not regularly disrupt the natural operation of the physical world and human freedom in order to squelch evil? Though the various answers are not damning to any particualr postion that I know of, the are illuminating, and new quasi-worldviews arise from hence, like Deism itself, Process Theology, and of course pure naturalism itself. Open Theism, too, would have different objections and responses to your arg, as it, like the aforementioned positions, poses a different conception of God's power, knowledge, and therefore, the extent of his ability to wield moral responsibility for the evil in the world. And as John Polkinghorne has so eloquently asserted, theologies that postulate greater conceptions of God's sovereignty will have greater difficulty in developing theodicies that will satisfy sceptics. But, of course, those who hold to such theologies will themselves remain quite satisfied. Many times, the sceptic and the theist will hold tacitly divergent notions of how theodicy should be conducted, and this should come as no surprise at all.

Perhaps "good" could then be defined as the privation of evil. I don't see how the vacuum of space must be considered evil.

It is considered evil because it is a corruption. If "evil" and "corruption" are taken as synonyms, then it is easy to see the point of the privatio; just as a corruption cannot exist independently of the thing corrupted, so evil as corruption has no indenpendent existence.

MORE LATER....

John Powell

March 2nd 2003, 12:14 PM

POWELL:
Response to Pate's post.

Pate:

Hi John!

POWELL:
Hi Pate.

PATE:
OK, it seems most appropriate that we discuss your argument here. But I believe that you understand that if Steven Carr chooses to accept my challenge, much of my limited spare time will need to be used in that debate and therefore I may not be willing to discuss the same subject here.

POWELL:
Understood.

PATE:
Now, let's have a look at your argument:

POWELL / ATHEIST:
<snipped>

PATE:
There are some important issues concerning the definition of evil, which need to be dealt with, before your argument can even get off the ground. Some people here have already commented on those. I'll give my brief comments on that issue also, but I'll do so only at the end of my post.

POWELL:
I posted responses on definitions.

POWELL / THEIST:
I deny premise 4. There is no unnecessary evil.

PATE:
I tend to agree with this hypothetical theist, that this is a very crucial premise in your argument.

POWELL:
Agreed. Are you willing to assert that premises 1, 2, and 3 are true?

PATE:
My contention would be somewhat different, however, in that I will just deny that we have good rational grounds to conclude that there is unnecessary evil.

POWELL / ATHEIST:
Are you claiming this for certain or do you mean that there very probably is no case anywhere in the universe ever of unnecessary evil? If you're making the extraordinary claim that there is absolutely or very probably no case of unnecessary evil anywhere in the universe ever in all eternity then shouldn't you defend that?

PATE:
Your argument is supposed to disprove/render very unlikely the theistic (or specifically Christian) hypothesis of God. And I fail to see any reason to accept at face value the supposition that there is anything extraordinary in the claim that there is probably or even absolutely no case of unnecessary evil in the world. That is actually extremely likely, if not certain, consequence of the theistic hypotheisis of the existence of God. You actually agree with this right away in the first premise of your argument when you state that " If an OmniGod existed then no unnecessary evil would exist." Therefore, you need to show that there actually is (or probably is) some unnecessary evil in the world. If you are unable to do that, your argument fails.

POWELL:
I believe that I may need to persuade you to accept that it is very likely that there is at least one case of unnecessary evil to persuade you to accept that an OmniGod very probably does not exist.

Let me try to persuade you.

If you claim there is no unnecessary evil, every evil that does exist must be a necessary evil to fulfill God's purposes, then imagine the following situation. I decide this moment to do some evil. If I were to do that evil then, according to you, it must be a necessary evil, isn't that so? So, after doing the evil, I ask you: "Was that evil I just did necessary to fulfill God's purposes?" You reply with "Yes, must have been."

Now, imagine that I change my mind before actually doing the evil, so I don't do it. I did not do an evil that was necessary to fulfill God's purposes. I frustrated God's purposes. God needed me to do the evil because it was necessary to fulfill His purposes, but I refused. Does that sound like the OmniGod you believe in?

I submit that you may have to choose between a non OmniGod due to the argument from evil or a non OmniGod who is frustrated by a single atheist exercising his free will.

POWELL / ATHEIST:
Are you saying that I can't do an unnecessary evil right now if I wanted to? Are you saying that if I chose to do an evil thing right now then it must have be a necessary evil? What if I were to choose not to do that necessary evil thing? Would this frustrate the will of God because He wanted me to do that evil thing because it was a necessary evil? How can a merely finite being hope to frustrate the will of an OmniGod?

PATE:
What you wrote above confirms my belief that you have quite different conception of "unnecessary evil", than I (and probably most theists) have. This was already made apparent in the fourth premise of your argument. You seem to fail to notice, that the free will itself is one of the greatest goods that there is. The ability to use free will for evil purposes is just a necessary consequence of our having that free will. You need to show that the existence of beings with free will is not a sufficient good to warrant God to create such beings, despite the fact that the ability to do evil is a necessary consequence of genuine freedom.

POWELL:
Why shouldn't I fail to notice that? Why do you claim that free will is so good given that it results in so much evil? What is your justification for that assertion?

Couldn't God have made us non-free-will robots that obeyed His will perfectly? That way there would be a lot less evil. There are even less drastic methods to this I can suggest depending upon your particular beliefs. I can do that already for Mormons.

What is your definition of sin? Is there an age of accountability before which the person automatically is saved without needing to accept Jesus? If no, how about fetuses? I assume you agree that animals don't sin. Could animals have spirits? If they could, then maybe God could give us all ape-like, but non-human bodies.

POWELL / ATHEIST:
Isn't the more logical conclusion that, because of our free will to do or not do evil, that there is very probably at least one case of unnecessary evil and, therefore, it's highly unlikely that God is an Omnibeing?

PATE:
No, this does not seem to be more logical conclusion. My contention is that we have no good rational grounds to believe that there is any such evil in the world, which is not needed to achieve some greater good.

POWELL:
What greater good is there for us than eternal salvation? Wouldn't you be willing to sacrifice free will on Earth for ASSURED eternal salvation with God? I sure would. If you don't think we have any say in the manner, shouldn't an all-good God nevertheless do this great good for us of assuring all of us salvation by sacrificing our free will? I would if I were God. Would I be a better God than the one you believe in?

PATE:
We have reasons to believe that among the most important of these greater goods are the existence of rational, conscious beings endowed with free will (that's us, human beings) and plenty of possibilities to use their freedom creatively, to work and co-operate to pursue those ends which are valuable, to build a moral character, to build a meaningful and valueable relationships with each other and, most of all, with God himself.

POWELL:
What reasons do you have to believe this? Is it because that's what we have and God must have a good reason for that, although you can't think what the reasons are given the possible superiority of the non-free-will world I propose?

Even if there are good reasons to think that the existence of rational, conscious beings with plenty of possibilities to be creative and cooperative, with moral character, is a greater good wouldn't you be willing to sacrifice all that for the greatest good for us, namely eternal salvation, guaranteed? I would unless, maybe, God knew I would be saved even having free will. Maybe enough of these rational, creative, cooperative, character things can be learned after we die to be worth the temporary loss of free will while on Earth.

PATE:
It also seems to me, that given the enormous epistemic gulf which exists between our limited knowledge and the perfect knowledge that God has, we have no grounds to infer the nonexistence of a purpose from our inability to see a purpose for any particular instances of evil that we in fact see. Given the mentioned epistemic gulf, it is just to be expected that in a world which is created by God, there are instances of evil, the purposes of which we are not able to grasp. But so far we haven't even seen any such instances presented in this discussion. I could go on to elaborate these points more carefully, but that's currently not needed.

POWELL:
Perhaps the knowledge of God isn't so much superior to ours than you think. Given science problem passages in the Bible (for example, Gen 1), it appears that God didn't understand some things as well as we do today.

PATE:
Finally, we'll return to the issue of an additional challenge that an atheist has to face if he or she intends to use the problem of evil as an argument against the existence of God:

On what basis do you make the value judgement that some things are evil. What is the standard of good and evil?

POWELL:
Our moral codes, which are based on our genetics and experience with the universe, in particular with each other. We each look at a thing and judge its "goodness / badness." The subjective standard is that for each individual. The objective standard is what is common for large groups, specifically of expert authorities. The larger the group which agrees, the more "objective" the standard. Universal standards are those which all expert authorities agree with.

Expert authorities are those who have extraordinary experience with these things and are considered reasonably reliable sources of truth.

PATE:
If it's just the personal preference that you have, or that of your society, then the claim that there is evil, really boils down to the claim that "there are things in the world that I/we don't like". That makes evil completely subjective.

POWELL:
There is some subjectivity, that's true. As more and more people's individual subjective opinions are seen to agree, however, the standard becomes more and more objective.

The theist seems to decide that one specific being's subjective opinion, namely God's, is the standard. That's a choice the theist can make, to rely on the opinion of a single expert authority, but it seems to be statistically / objectively inferior to using lots of apparently moral human beings. Given the apparent behavior of God in the Bible (e.g., Num 31:17-18 and 1 Sam 15:2-3), God appears to be less moral than the average human being of our day. Even if you were to use God's opinion, statistics suggest you should include the weighted opinions of all expert authorities provided their opinions are sufficiently independent of God's.

PATE:
If, on the other hand, the atheist claims that there exists some objective standard for good and evil, then the issue that he/she has to resolve is the grounding of such an objective and morally obligatory standard.

POWELL:
It's based on lots of apparently moral human beings who are well-experienced (experts) and well-respected (authorities) agreeing that certain things are good and others are bad. If they don't agree then we don't objectively know if it's good.

PATE:
I don't see how such a concept can fit the atheistic worldview. Therefore, if the atheist insist that there are instances of real, objective evil in the world, he/she is, perhaps without realizing it, actually putting forward a theistic, not an atheistic argument. That argument runs as follows:

1. If God does not exist, then objective moral values do not exist.
2. Evil exists.
3. Therfore, objective moral values do exist.
4. Therefore, God exists.

POWELL:
There's a missing conditional needed to make this a valid deductive argument.

By "objective" I mean based on the opinions of expert authorities. It is expected that they will base their opinions on the correspondence of those opinions to reality, in other words, truth. Unfortunately, that's not always the case. Welcome to the real world.

John Powell

Pereynol of Sheer Dread

March 2nd 2003, 09:41 PM

03-02-2003 @ 07:19 AM
John Powell:

What if the person, artist, or God wanted that crack / hole ? Then it would be "good," right?

In a teleogical consideration of good and bad, one must ascertain what a particular agent intends within the specific context of whatever goal one is examining. In the pottery example, I assumed the general purpose behind having a functional pot as a given; in other words, normally, a "good" pot is one that holds its contents securely. It doesn't have holes or cracks or leaks. If some agent wanted a broken, cracked, or otherwise ruined pot for some other purpose apart from the common purposes for having undamaged pots, that would constitute another goal with its own separate evaluative criteria for success or failure. For you to legitimately assert a hypothetical "goodness" surrounding a damaged pot implies another goal, another context, and other evaluative criteria.

Pereynol of Sheer Dread

March 2nd 2003, 10:21 PM

03-02-2003 @ 07:19 AM
John Powell:

I can't yet understand how good can exist without bad.

With any binary opposition, the terms do help elucidate each other by virtue of their antithetical relationship. However, upon closer examination, one usually finds that, though the opposing terms have an epistemological relation, they do not necessarily have any kind of ontological codependence.

I suggest good and bad are opposite ends of a "Good / Bad" continuum that everyone essentially uses going from perfect bad through neutral to perfect good. "Better" means more good or less bad and "worse" means less good or more bad than something else that might be "good" (i.e. on the positive side of the continuum) or "bad" (i.e., on the negative side of the continuum). Subjectively, each person values things differently. What one person might call "good" another might call "bad." Objectively, "good" and "bad" are based upon some weighted average of the individual judgments of the expert authorities (whoever they are).

The existence of an ethical continuum might pose problems. The first question concerns whether such a continuum has extramental existence such that all minds might appeal to it. If so, then it functions as an absolute, and, if this is true, one must ask---how? If such a continuum isn't extramental, and is merely a characteristically human mode of making evaluations via common ethical categories that just happen to obtain in all human minds, then one must ask---why? The answers to these questions unavoidably engage with one's presuppositions and worldview. The theist might explain such phenomena in terms of natural law or conscience as part of the imago dei, while the atheist might tie these tendencies to evolutionary survival mechanisms, but here, nothing conclusive awaits us.
.

I believe this is bad doctrine. Although it is true that one would expect God to know better what is good and bad for us, it's difficult to accept that our moral judgment could be so much in error that what the God of the Bible has apparently done or might do is actually good (e.g. Num 31:17-18 and 1 Sam 15:2-3).

I don't know.... If one looks at human history, one sees a regular and extended riot of carnage and conquest, quite apart from the God of Jews and Christians. One sees that even atheists have managed to perpetrate cruelty without recourse to theological justification in the twentieth century. Of course, it is undeniable that western man has used God as an excuse for all kinds of reprehensible acts, but IMHO, such behavior cannot establish guilt by association in the final analysis. Nor can one make God responsible for the terrible moral blunders men have committed in his name. Theists ascribe such blunders and evils to fallen human nature. Atheists often ascribe evils like these to the mere existence of what they deem to be religious superstition, as if the eradication of religion would also eradicate this particularly heinous genre of evil---an opinion I find somewhat naive.

That's where faith must come in. The priest says we should believe this mystery and we choose to do so. Perhaps that view is officially promoted partly because if the priest does something that might look evil to us, we will have a precedent to justify him. If we can't tell when God is evil, how can we tell when God's servants are evil?

Actually, such behavioral dynamics are hardly restricted to the sphere of "the priest;" this kind of thinking is leftover from eighteenth century theories connected with enlightenment rationalism, not to mention a slight nod to Machiavellian politics. Today, it's largely the politician we ought to eyeball askance. Seriously though, accusations or motivational theories about how those in power manipulate knowledge in order to control the masses by propagandistic indoctrination remains insufficient to disprove anything, even if such things are substantiated (Foucault notwithstanding).

MORE TO COME!

Pereynol of Sheer Dread

March 3rd 2003, 12:40 AM

03-02-2003 @ 07:19 AM
John Powell:

Imagine that God, despite your belief that He has made clear promises to the contrary, immediately after you read this paragraph He annihilates everything that exists in the universe and all other planes of existence except for you and Him, no Second Coming, no heaven, no hell, nobody and nothing except for you and Him. Would God be justified in doing that? Would that be good or bad / evil? What do you think?

Like your previous senario regarding the possibility of an agent indending a ruined pot over against a functional one, this hypothetical situation would require elaboration. If God were to be "justified," I suppose that we'd need to know his specific purpose behind annihilating all existence. If we don't have any insight into such things, then we'd also consequently lack sufficient evaluative criteria to deem them good or bad. However, I must say I find your hypothetical situation terribly counterintuitive----and the hypothetical itself is only a bit of rhetoric designed by you to satisfy a goal of your own. In my mind, such considerations are neither here nor there. That being said, there are several possible responses. One response would be to claim a Kierkegaardian "teleological suspension of the ethical." Another would be to declare that God himself being the highest evaluative authority, the scenario you propose is moot (but this would be pure voluntarism, something I'm not at all sold on).

In the case of God "oughting" to remove unnecessary evil, I think it would better match your preference meaning rather than your command meaning. It's awkward having God ordering himself to do something. Perhaps your goal-oriented view of "ought" will work here.

Either way, whether we are emotivists, imperativalists, or whether we hold to a goal driven ethics, we would still be stuck with positing a hierarchy of sorts. Why would we hold that anyone's preferences, commands, or goals are more authoritative than anyone else's? But if God is the author/authority who created all contingent beings, as well as the eternal antecedent for all mental and ethical activity---the One who framed the whole universe and all sentient beings within it according to his creative intentions---it would seem that his preferences, commands, and goals are at the top of the hierarchy. This would be so on every level---ontologically, epistemologically, ethically, etc.

Even if moral codes are human inventions, rather than divine, how does that objectively justify the NAZI's? They might be able to justify their actions among those who agreed with them, but the majority of the world then and today disagree with that justification. The expert authorities are in good agreement that the NAZI's did bad.

What these objections of yours fail to take into account is that, in a world in which moral, societal relativism holds, all the evaluative criteria for determining whether something is good or bad resides within the context of particular societies. It will not do to say in one breath that particular societies determine what is moral for themselves, and in the next breath assert that some extraneous "expert authorities" outside any particular society in question somehow possess the clout to render judgments to the contrary. You can't have it both ways. If relativism is to be taken seriously, then we can only guarantee its integrity by affirming that what the Nazis decided was moral really was moral---for them, despite whatever a body of expert authorities might think from outside of that society.

If, on the other hand, you suggest that moral codes are based on the opinion of God, how do you know God didn't support Hitler? Evidently, He supported the extermination of the Midianites and Amalakites (referenced above). Has God revealed His current opinion on the Holocaust? Who are you to disagree with God?

I find your speculations on the moral opinions of God highly dubious; what reason have I to suppose that God supported Hitler? Moreover, when you use the Bible to draw a parrallel between historical events, you must assume it has a certain degree of authority. You and I both have access to the historical documents of ancient Israel, as well as the historical sources pertaining to the Nazis and the holocaust, but, as to the full information about the divine teleology, well, we are both rather limited. Could God have had his undisclosed reasons for allowing the holocaust or for endorsing ancient wars? The tenor of the Bible seems to suggest that he could, otherwise all its readers across the span of millennia (and particularly its contemporary Hebraic readers) would have abandoned their confidence in God's ethicality long ago out of pure unintelligibility.

YET MORE TO COME....

Pereynol of Sheer Dread

March 3rd 2003, 01:29 AM

03-02-2003 @ 07:19 AM
John Powell:

Your answer to my "annihilate all" scenario should help here. Put more generally, what if God behaves like what we would expect an evil Demon to behave like? Should we worship Him anyway?

To me, you run aground upon the same shoals here as before. How do we evaluate the behavior of an "evil demon?" Do we have sufficient insight into such a being's goals such that we could render judgment? The mere positing of such a hypothetical on your part, however, does fit into your rhetorical goals, but it hasn't much significance for me. If we were able to evaluate and condemn the behavior of an "evil demon" who also happened to be the ultimate authority whose teleology occupied the supposed apex of all ethical hierarchies, wouldn't our very ability to so judge presuppose a yet higher moral standard to which we'd be appealing? Whence comes this higher standard? Does this higher standard function as some kind of absolute, even though it, again, simply happens to be engraved upon our minds as if it were divine law?

That might be ok if God were to give a clear message what He considered to be good and bad. Mark 10:2-12 suggests that divorce for any reason is bad, whereas Matt 5:31-32 suggests that divorce is ok for the cause of fornication. Which is it? Christians are divided on a number of issues such as male domination, abortion, euthanasia, and homosexuality. They used to be divided on the issue of slavery. What is God's opinion on all these issues?

I think the fact that Christians have had and still have differences of opinion concerning the issues you raise obscures the overidding truth that both Christians and the bulk of humanity seem to share an overall ethical intuition and sense of justice. And I don't believe that quibbling over details in the cannonical gospels need concern us here, after all, many Christians are not inerrantists, and all Christians (and all humans) are fallible in their judgments, but this has little bearing upon the problem of evil per se. If we were to likewise quibble over the variances found in collections of civil law across societal and cultural boundaries, what we'd find significant is the fact that the moral point of view is pervasive, not that we sometimes face ambiguities. It's how we account for the existence of the moral point of view that matters, and theism is by no means discredited by random smokescreens of ethical ambiguity anymore than is the moral point of view in general....

YET MORE...

flipper

March 3rd 2003, 01:30 AM

Mattbballman wrote:

How about this defintion of evil:
In good Augustinian fashion: "The lack of good."

Is there good on the moon?

Pereynol of Sheer Dread

March 3rd 2003, 01:59 AM

03-02-2003 @ 07:19 AM
John Powell:

Are you suggesting my goal is bad? With what justification?

I am only suggesting that your goal runs counter to my own and that there is no reason why I ought to forward it. Why should I grant it credence? There's nothing that compels me to even engage with it, and I am within my full epistemic rights if I disregard it entirely. Can you supply me with any compelling moral reason I should submit to your goal?

This "God might be using his enemies" idea may be a non-falsifiable, and, therefore non-scientific-like position. I need your answer to my "annihilate all" scenario and "worshiping a demon" question.

Ah, positivism.... For clarity's sake, and especially if you claim to be an emotivist, the fact/value distinction entailed by positivism precludes "scientific positions" within ethical matters. And from your point of view, how could your hypothetical demon scenario be seen as any more "scientific" than the supposition of God's possible use of his unwitting enemies? While both notions are logically possible, neither are verifiable in any positivistic sense. (The demon scenario is a Cartesian relic---but of course you know this.)

I meant evil in the objective sense: what the expert authorities (whoever they are) consider to be evil, rather than the subjective sense: what each individual considers to be evil.

Again, how would you account for "evil in an objective sense?" Is objective evil extramental? If so, have we not trespassed into absolutism? The subject percieves the object. If the object is mere preference, then subjectivity reigns in ethics; the number of minds considering an issue changes nothing. We can't say that an appeal to a group of expert authorities somehow renders emotivism "objective."

We atheists sometimes argue as if there is a God so we can discuss these things logically with you. If you'd stop believing in Him then we'd stop "complaining about Him" and we could all spend more time doing science, philosophy, art, sports, etc.

Belief in God may in fact assist in logical thinking. As to science, philosophy, art, and sports, well, you're of course free to indulge in any of these pursuits as you wish. I enjoy them myself, and I find that my theism integrates with such things beautifully. But if I believed as you do about God, then I'd probably not give him much thought; why remain preoccupied with something you've dismissed? Why become a dysangelist? Of course, it is enjoyable to spar with one's atheist friends. I've got several close friendships with atheists, and I do find all good human relationships built on mutual respect valuable.

I'm sure I could learn something useful by reading that, but I don't wish to "argue" with someone who can't respond. If you support Plantinga's solution to my problem of evil argument then please post it for consideration.

John Powell

I've enjoyed our discussion thus far, John, and I'd be happy to discuss Plantinga's specific ideas with you if you like. My personal preference is not for outright debate or argument in the polemical sense of the words, but for mutually beneficial discourse. In the final analysis, neither side of this debate is going to forcibly overwhelm the other, but good discussions can happen---even on the internet....

mattbballman19

March 3rd 2003, 08:41 AM

flipper,

I'm not sure I understand your question. Are you talking about the actual concept 'good', in all it's ontological glory, hanging out on the moon in a lawn chair gettin some sun? Or are you talking about the kind of good that holds as a result of living in the universe which is ethically subordinate to the morals which flow from the nature of God? I don't think you mean the former:-). But it seems intuitive to me that if God created the universe then anyone being anywhere in that universe would be under the moral law which has it's origination in God's nature.

matt

BrianB

March 3rd 2003, 11:30 AM

Hi again John, I hope you are finding this web board to be both stimulating and challenging. I'm not going to quote everything you said (especially since I only read your reply to me) but instead summarize my position with just a few quotes from you.

In this discussion we must remember who is making claims and who is not. Because it is an argument begun by you, you have the burden of proof to support your argument, no matter how much you want to shift that burden.

Part of your argument is your claim is that it is highly probable that there exists some instance of unnecessary evil. After laying out the argument in your original post, you then say:

--- Begin quote ---
Are you claiming this for certain or do you mean that there very probably is no case anywhere in the universe ever of unnecessary evil? If you're making the extraordinary claim that there is absolutely or very probably no case of unnecessary evil anywhere in the universe ever in all eternity then shouldn't you defend that?

--- End quote ---

See, what you're attempting to do is shift the burden of proof off yourself and on to the Christian, which is improper. For my response to your argument, I claim nothing.

I simply deny your assertion, with the burden of proof remaining on you to support your assertion. Have you ever heard the phrase "what is gratuitously asserted may be gratuitously denied"? It means I don't have to support my denial of your assertion, both are gratuitous.

Since I'm making no claims (hint, to deny your claim is not the same thing as to take up defending the opposite), the burden of proof remains completely on you. You may not like it, but to be poetically sophisticated, "them's tough cookies." :)

Warm regards,
Brian

mattbballman19

March 3rd 2003, 01:59 PM

Hey Brian,

I may not be following the exchange properly, so if I missed something let me know.

You say that the assertions asserted by the asserter you quoted must be proven, since the burden of proof is on him. But as I glance through the quote you extrapolated, it doesn't look like assertions at all. They look like questions!

Tell me if I misunderstood you.

matt

BrianB

March 3rd 2003, 03:53 PM

Hi Matt,

The assertion is in his original post, specifically step #4 in his argument. _That_ is the assertion that needs to be adequately argued for, otherwise it can simply be denied without requiring any argumentation on the part of the theist.

Hope that helps,
Brian

Pate

March 3rd 2003, 04:32 PM

POWELL:
Are you willing to assert that premises 1, 2, and 3 are true?

Yes, I probably am. There is one issue that I’d like to clarify, however. When you divide evils to the categories of ”necessary evil” and ”unnecessary evil” in your argument, this causes certain possibities of misunderstanding when applied to my position. I think that there are many evils which are part of the current world, which are not necessary in the sense that God could not have fulfilled his purposes just as well without those evils, by using certain other means. But it’s just that the total amount of all the evil in the world would be the same or greater in the case that God would use those other means, or alternatively there would be less evil but also less good. The point is that it is necessary for God to allow some amount of evil in the world in order to fulfill his purposes. This does not imply the lack of omnipotence, because those evils are the consequence of, or are needed because of, the free will that God has given to people, which we can consider to be among the greatest goods. And of course, if God chooses to create beings with free will, he can’t force them to refrain from doing any evil without violating their freedom. God cannot make a person to do something against his/her own free will and also sustain that free will at the same time. That would be contradictory.

POWELL:
If you claim there is no unnecessary evil, every evil that does exist must be a necessary evil to fulfill God's purposes, then imagine the following situation. I decide this moment to do some evil. If I were to do that evil then, according to you, it must be a necessary evil, isn't that so? So, after doing the evil, I ask you: "Was that evil I just did necessary to fulfill God's purposes?" You reply with "Yes, must have been."

Now, imagine that I change my mind before actually doing the evil, so I don't do it. I did not do an evil that was necessary to fulfill God's purposes. I frustrated God's purposes. God needed me to do the evil because it was necessary to fulfill His purposes, but I refused. Does that sound like the OmniGod you believe in?

I don’t think that this example persuades me. The problem that immediately comes to mind is that in the actual world, you really either do or do not carry out this intention to do evil.

This reminds me a little of an atheist who said that he can prove that God can’t have foreknowledge. His ”proof” was this:

First, he asked: ”Can God foreknow that I’ll put white socks on tomorrow?”

I replied: ”Yes.”

Then he said: ”But now, I’ll change my mind. I won’t put white socks on after all. I’ll use black ones instead. There you go, I just proved that God doesn’t foreknow my actions.”

But obviously this is mistaken. If the situation is like the one that this atheist described, God will have foreknowledge of both his decision to put on white socks and his changing mind later.

Similarly, God foreknows what will be your eventual free choice. Therefore, if it’s the case that you’ll eventually choose to do that evil, then it’s also the case that this evil free action is part of the set of evil actions by free agents, that God chose to allow as a necessary consequence of creaturely freedom.

But God’s foreknowledge will not enable him to actualize such a world where people endowed with free will are going to always choose to do good and never to do evil at all. This is because it may be the case, that no matter what kind of circumstances God will select to create, there are always some people who will freely choose to do evil.

In short, if it will turn out that you’ll do the evil in question, then we can come to a conclusion that God chose to actualize a world in which your evil choice is among those possibilities of evil which are actualized as necessary prerequisites to the achievement of greater goods, among which is the creaturely freedom. If it will turn out that this potential evil is not actualized in this world, then it’s the case that God chose to actualize certain other evils for achieving the same purposes.

You may also object that there are many such evils in the world which do not seem to have much to do with our freedom of will, but I’ll not answer that objection before it is presented.

POWELL:
Why shouldn't I fail to notice that? Why do you claim that free will is so good given that it results in so much evil? What is your justification for that assertion?

My justification is the fact that most of the goods that we can conceive, are such that they have free will as prerequisite of either their existence or at least their existence in the fullest forms. I’ll just mention some of such goods that will first come to my mind:

Love, respect, justice, heroism, altruism, creativity, imagination, responsibility, rationality, gratefulness, communion.

POWELL:
Couldn't God have made us non-free-will robots that obeyed His will perfectly? That way there would be a lot less evil.

Yes, it would have been possible for God to create a world in which there would have been less evil, by removing or drastically restricting our freedom. But in such a world, there would be also much less good.

With regard to the scenario of our being robots without free will, do you really find it appealing when you think about it more closely? Besides, I really doubt whether such a scenario is even logically possible. Given that we currently have free will, those beings who would be robot-like, would not be ”us”.

POWELL:
What is your definition of sin?

I’d say that sin is something like a violation against God’s perfect moral nature.

POWELL:
Is there an age of accountability before which the person automatically is saved without needing to accept Jesus?

Perhaps. I haven’t really decided my view concerning this question, with any large degree of certainty.

POWELL:
If no, how about fetuses? I assume you agree that animals don't sin. Could animals have spirits? If they could, then maybe God could give us all ape-like, but non-human bodies.

It may not be easy for us to know where exactly we shoud draw the line. It also depends on certain other assumptions, like how personality, accountability etc. are defined.

POWELL:
What greater good is there for us than eternal salvation? Wouldn't you be willing to sacrifice free will on Earth for ASSURED eternal salvation with God? I sure would. If you don't think we have any say in the manner, shouldn't an all-good God nevertheless do this great good for us of assuring all of us salvation by sacrificing our free will? I would if I were God. Would I be a better God than the one you believe in?

I cant think of a good that I’d consider greater than eternal salvation. But the eternal salvation, in the Christian sense of the word, presupposes the existence of free will. I’m not sure at all that ”salvation” of robots without freedom would be a very great good. And again, I think that your question ”Wouldn't you be willing to sacrifice free will on Earth for ASSURED eternal salvation with God?” is mistaken, in a way that somewhat resembles the question ”would you be annoyed if you didn’t exist?”. I don’t think that I, a being who has free will, could possibly exist if there would be no free will.

POWELL:
Perhaps the knowledge of God isn't so much superior to ours than you think. Given science problem passages in the Bible (for example, Gen 1), it appears that God didn't understand some things as well as we do today.

I don’t think that the issues of Biblical interpretation and errancy/inerrancy are very essential to our current discussion.

PATE:
Finally, we'll return to the issue of an additional challenge that an atheist has to face if he or she intends to use the problem of evil as an argument against the existence of God:

On what basis do you make the value judgement that some things are evil. What is the standard of good and evil?

POWELL:
Our moral codes, which are based on our genetics and experience with the universe, in particular with each other. We each look at a thing and judge its "goodness / badness." The subjective standard is that for each individual. The objective standard is what is common for large groups, specifically of expert authorities. The larger the group which agrees, the more "objective" the standard. Universal standards are those which all expert authorities agree with.

Any man-made moral codes are not truly objective. They are more or less widely held subjective opinions. They express personal preferences, some of which are more widely held than others. There would not be truly binding moral truths, not objective moral obligations or rights. Clearly certain action in certain context cannot be both objectively right and objectively wrong, even if some some people expert authorities believe it to be ”right” and others ”wrong”. If morality is merely subjective, there is not morally binding obligations that a person can impose to another. A person can threaten another with consequences enforced by a society as a result of certain action, of course, but that’s a different matter.

POWELL:
The theist seems to decide that one specific being's subjective opinion, namely God's, is the standard. That's a choice the theist can make, to rely on the opinion of a single expert authority, but it seems to be statistically / objectively inferior to using lots of apparently moral human beings.

Given that God is the ultimate ground of all existence and has perfect knowledge, I dare to doubt your claim that he’s ”objectively inferior” to human authorities. :smile:

POWELL:
Given the apparent behavior of God in the Bible (e.g., Num 31:17-18 and 1 Sam 15:2-3), God appears to be less moral than the average human being of our day.

A detailed discussion of this matter is probably outside the scope of this discussion. It’s far from clear that these examples present God as ”less moral than average human being of our day” (you’re assuming objective moral standard again, by the way). And in any case, because I’m not very committed to the doctrine of inerrancy, there’s always the easy way out of this problem available for me, as well as for anyone who doesn’t think that Inerrancy is a necessary belief for a Christian.

You can find quite exhaustive discussion of issues of this kind from Glenn Miller’s site. See for example http://www.christian-thinktank.com/qamorite.html I also believe that J. P. Holding may be willing to discuss this issue in detail with you, if that’s something that you want to do. It might be better to start a new thread for that discusion, however.

CONTINUED IN THE NEXT POST

Pate

March 3rd 2003, 04:32 PM

PATE:
I don't see how such a concept can fit the atheistic worldview. Therefore, if the atheist insist that there are instances of real, objective evil in the world, he/she is, perhaps without realizing it, actually putting forward a theistic, not an atheistic argument. That argument runs as follows:

1. If God does not exist, then objective moral values do not exist.
2. Evil exists.
3. Therfore, objective moral values do exist.
4. Therefore, God exists.

POWELL:
There's a missing conditional needed to make this a valid deductive argument.

By "objective" I mean based on the opinions of expert authorities. It is expected that they will base their opinions on the correspondence of those opinions to reality, in other words, truth. Unfortunately, that's not always the case. Welcome to the real world.

I wouldn’t accept your definition of ”objective”, as I have already made clear. If we also take it as a given that talk about evil is meaningful only if there is objective standard for moral values, then it’s clear that one can’t rationally accept the premises of this argument without accepting its conclusion. Maybe I should have presented these concepts in a more detailed fashion in the context of this argument in my previous post.

Pereynol of Sheer Dread

March 3rd 2003, 06:55 PM

03-02-2003 @ 11:14 AM
John Powell:

Couldn't God have made us non-free-will robots that obeyed His will perfectly? That way there would be a lot less evil.

This doesn't work because any world devoid of free moral agents would be, properly speaking a-moral, rendering a moral comparison between say, World A, in which there are free moral agents, and World A', in which there are only "non-free-will robots impossible. There would be no way to make such an evaluation because the evaluative act requires a moral point of view, which cannot be applied to an a-moral world. It would be like asking if a world only populated by tomatos would be morally superior to our world, in the light of the fact that tomatos tend not to commit criminal or immoral acts....

John Powell

March 3rd 2003, 09:48 PM

PEREYNOL 03-02-2003 @ 03:26 PM
in response to
POWELL 03-02-2003 @ 07:19 AM

POWELL:
The term "unnecessary evil" when juxtaposed with "all-good" was supposed to avoid the philosophical problems you're bringing up. Maybe you're right that it doesn't. Whatever you want to call evil, it's supposed to be something bad or negative and if that Being who is all good, no bad, no evil allows bad or evil that isn't necessary (for example, not needed to fulfill His purposes) then it should not exist if that God has the power to remove it. That's the argument of premises 1, 2, and 3.

I believe the disagreement between us with my argument should NOT be with premise 1, 2, or 3.

Words like "good" and "bad" are core words to our language that may be impossible to define without using words that imply "goodness" or "badness".

PEREYNOL:
IMHO, the relationship between God and evil is more complex than your argument allows, but the arg nevertheless has some weight. The common theistic answer to it usually involves God's overall intentions to remove evil with respect to time. Since God's goals extend to the future, then so does his allowance of evil. A small example would be that say, God knows that John Powell's great-grandson will be a murderer, but that his great-great-grandson will be a humanitarian, philanthropic hero who shall do great good. To compound matters, suppose a vast, interconnected web of geneologies filled with beings God intends to create, some of whom will choose to embrace God and his goodness, and some of whom will become corrupted with terrible evil, and, of course, some of whom will remain rather bland, ethically speaking. In this matrix of cause/effect and human choice, God's purposes are enmeshed, cosmically speaking. Genetically speaking, the identities of all the human beings God wishes to create throughout history will no doubt depend upon their having the precise parents they need to have in the precise temporal sequence and societal settings necessary. All this, in turn, involves a regularity of natural causes and the relatively unimpeded development of human choices.

POWELL:
This could be a more acceptable argument if God were less than all-powerful. An all-powerful God, however, would not be expected to have to work within the constraints of such things as human genealogies. Even if He chose to do so, an all-powerful God could cause to not be born the unnecessarily evil persons and allow to exist only the necessary evil ones and the good ones.

Perhaps you would argue that every single evil person exists because they are necessary to fulfill God's purposes. I would argue that if I were God, my purposes would be better, require less evil. Perhaps God's purposes aren't that good. Even if we were to accept that God's current purposes (whatever they are) are the best, I suspect that if I were God I could accomplish those same purposes with at least one less evil than He required. You tell me what you think is one of the goals or purposes of God (for example: avoid Midianite or Amalekite corruption of the Jewish people so God orders the non-Jews killed.) and I'll try to explain how I might accomplish it with less evil than there apparently is in our universe or described in the Bible or, perhaps, I will argue that THAT particular purpose you claim for God is inferior to another related purpose I might have if I were God.

PEREYNOL:
At this point in the Christian response to your arg, we generally find some version of the free-will theodicy, or, if the one responding is a compatibilist, a dismissal of the entire problem on the basis of God's sovereignty. The latter option possesses the arguable weaknesses inherent within double-predestination (weaknesses, that is, in the eyes of the sceptic), that God, as the potter, has the right to make of the clay whatever he pleases, and this move implies voluntarism with respect to God, as well as a perspectival definition of evil. However, if the privatio boni is also utilized (as it usually is), in conjuction with various theodicies, matters become even more interesting. Many times we get the picture of a divinely wrought system of natural causes operating in a predictably stable world, entailing unavoidable evil if God does not regularly intervene to prevent the regular movement of the "laws of nature" and the human faculty of choice.

POWELL:
Would you please define your philosophical terms?

Argument to use a better method.
1. If there were at least one method to accomplish God's good purposes that required less evil than the method that God currently uses then an OmniGod would use that other method.
2. If God were all-powerful He could use such a method.
3. If God were all-good He should use such a method.
4. If there is such a method then God is probably not an Omnibeing

I think there are other methods that could accomplish God's good purposes without so much evil. If you tell me one of God's purposes (such as reduce the risk of corruption of the ancient Jews by the Midianites or the Amalekites) then I will either propose a method that I think uses less evil than the one described in the Bible or I may argue that THAT particular purpose is not as good as a related purpose I might have had if I were God.

If you support the notion that God has the right to do whatever He wants regardless of whether it might appear bad to us, please answer the following scenario you evaded:

Suppose that immediately after reading this paragraph, God annihilated everything in the universe and all other planes of existence so that nothing exists, nobody, no heaven, no hell, nothing but you and God. Would God be justified in doing that? Would that be good or bad? What do you think?

PEREYNOL:
Notice that here we have something strikingly close to Deism. The question then becomes, Why does God not regularly disrupt the natural operation of the physical world and human freedom in order to squelch evil? Though the various answers are not damning to any particualr postion that I know of, the are illuminating, and new quasi-worldviews arise from hence, like Deism itself, Process Theology, and of course pure naturalism itself. Open Theism, too, would have different objections and responses to your arg, as it, like the aforementioned positions, poses a different conception of God's power, knowledge, and therefore, the extent of his ability to wield moral responsibility for the evil in the world.

And as John Polkinghorne has so eloquently asserted, theologies that postulate greater conceptions of God's sovereignty will have greater difficulty in developing theodicies that will satisfy sceptics. But, of course, those who hold to such theologies will themselves remain quite satisfied. Many times, the sceptic and the theist will hold tacitly divergent notions of how theodicy should be conducted, and this should come as no surprise at all.

POWELL:
Why are they imagining all this about God? Apparently, different people are inventing their own kind of God to fit their personal philosophical ideal. If the OmniBeing really exists and is as nice and willing to answer questions as people claim, why don't they just ask Him to tell us all in such a way that we can understand and accept? That's what I would have done if I were God. Would I have been a better God than the one you believe in?

POWELL:
Perhaps "good" could then be defined as the privation of evil. I don't see how the vacuum of space must be considered evil.

PEREYNOL:
It is considered evil because it is a corruption.

POWELL:
Couldn't it be the other way around? Are you suggesting that things existed in space before that empty space even existed? Perhaps things in space is a corruption of the natural order.

PEREYNOL:
If "evil" and "corruption" are taken as synonyms, then it is easy to see the point of the privatio; just as a corruption cannot exist independently of the thing corrupted, so evil as corruption has no indenpendent existence.

MORE LATER....

POWELL:
It sounds like a sneaky trick to argue that good can exist independently from evil by using a term for evil that means change for the worse. Couldn't I counter argue that good really means change for the better, so there must be a bad for good to be the better of, so bad can exist independently of good? The philosopher is evidently trying to define good and evil in such a way that they satisfy his view of reality. How do other talented people use the terms "good" and "bad," specifically the expert authorities?

www.dictionary.com (renumbered):
CORRUPT:

adj.
1. Marked by immorality and perversion; depraved.
2. Venal; dishonest: a corrupt mayor.
3. Containing errors or alterations, as a text: a corrupt translation.
4. Archaic. Tainted; putrid.

v. tr.
5. To destroy or subvert the honesty or integrity of.
6. To ruin morally; pervert.
7. To taint; contaminate.
8. To cause to become rotten; spoil.
9. To change the original form of (a text, for example).
10. Computer Science. To damage (data) in a file or on a disk.

v. intr.
11. To become corrupt.

POWELL:
Definitions 1, 2, and 6 appear to be forms of "to make evil." However, the others suggest a change that is PRESUMABLY bad. Perhaps that's usually the case, but it's not necessarily always the case. One person's garbage is another person's treasure. One person's corruption is another person's excellence.

"Corrupting" in the other ways such as altering a text, destroying the integrity, contaminating, spoiling, changing the original form, or damaging a disk file is not NECESSARILY bad.

BAD is necessarily bad, by definition, but "corruption" is not necessarily bad. It could be good.

PEREYNOL 03-03-2003 @ 01:41 AM
in response to
POWELL 03-02-2003 @ 07:19 AM

POWELL:
What if the person, artist, or God wanted that crack / hole ? Then it would be "good," right?

PEREYNOL:
In a teleogical consideration of good and bad, one must ascertain what a particular agent intends within the specific context of whatever goal one is examining. In the pottery example, I assumed the general purpose behind having a functional pot as a given; in other words, normally, a "good" pot is one that holds its contents securely. It doesn't have holes or cracks or leaks. If some agent wanted a broken, cracked, or otherwise ruined pot for some other purpose apart from the common purposes for having undamaged pots, that would constitute another goal with its own separate evaluative criteria for success or failure. For you to legitimately assert a hypothetical "goodness" surrounding a damaged pot implies another goal, another context, and other evaluative criteria.

POWELL:
How is that any different when using the terms "good" and "bad"? I think that if you had stuck with the terms "good" and "bad" rather than bringing in corruption in the way you did, this additional unnecessary problem would have been avoided. "Corrupt" does not necessarily mean "bad," so using it to define bad as you did does not appear advisable.

Here's a riddle: What things can you put in a box that make it weigh less the more you put?

Continued.

John Powell

John Powell

March 3rd 2003, 09:54 PM

PEREYNOL 03-03-2003 @ 02:21 AM
in response to
POWELL: 03-02-2003 @ 07:19 AM

POWELL:
I can't yet understand how good can exist without bad.

PEREYNOL:
With any binary opposition, the terms do help elucidate each other by virtue of their antithetical relationship. However, upon closer examination, one usually finds that, though the opposing terms have an epistemological relation, they do not necessarily have any kind of ontological codependence.

POWELL:
Please define your philosophical terms.

Have you seriously considered the possibility that people might already accept the antithetical / binary concepts like good / bad or big / small before they come up with words to represent those instinctive / experiential concepts?

POWELL:
I suggest good and bad are opposite ends of a "Good / Bad" continuum that everyone essentially uses going from perfect bad through neutral to perfect good. "Better" means more good or less bad and "worse" means less good or more bad than something else that might be "good" (i.e. on the positive side of the continuum) or "bad" (i.e., on the negative side of the continuum). Subjectively, each person values things differently. What one person might call "good" another might call "bad." Objectively, "good" and "bad" are based upon some weighted average of the individual judgments of the expert authorities (whoever they are).

PEREYNOL:
The existence of an ethical continuum might pose problems. The first question concerns whether such a continuum has extramental existence such that all minds might appeal to it. If so, then it functions as an absolute, and, if this is true, one must ask---how? If such a continuum isn't extramental, and is merely a characteristically human mode of making evaluations via common ethical categories that just happen to obtain in all human minds, then one must ask---why?

POWELL:
I prefer the second, but wish to avoid the assertion that it is universal in your sense of the term. Are you asking why it is that every single human being agrees that good and bad are opposites? Evidently, they don't. Didn't you give me a counter example? However, I think the vast majority of people do because it seems to work better than other conceptual frameworks. Do you think good is the opposite of bad?

PEREYNOL:
The answers to these questions unavoidably engage with one's presuppositions and worldview. The theist might explain such phenomena in terms of natural law or conscience as part of the imago dei, while the atheist might tie these tendencies to evolutionary survival mechanisms, but here, nothing conclusive awaits us.

POWELL:
Perhaps.

POWELL
I believe this is bad doctrine. Although it is true that one would expect God to know better what is good and bad for us, it's difficult to accept that our moral judgment could be so much in error that what the God of the Bible has apparently done or might do is actually good (e.g. Num 31:17-18 and 1 Sam 15:2-3).

PEREYNOL
I don't know.... If one looks at human history, one sees a regular and extended riot of carnage and conquest, quite apart from the God of Jews and Christians.

POWELL:
Good point. Perhaps the Jews and Christians weren't that special after all.

PEREYNOL:
One sees that even atheists have managed to perpetrate cruelty without recourse to theological justification in the twentieth century. Of course, it is undeniable that western man has used God as an excuse for all kinds of reprehensible acts, but IMHO, such behavior cannot establish guilt by association in the final analysis. Nor can one make God responsible for the terrible moral blunders men have committed in his name. Theists ascribe such blunders and evils to fallen human nature. Atheists often ascribe evils like these to the mere existence of what they deem to be religious superstition, as if the eradication of religion would also eradicate this particularly heinous genre of evil---an opinion I find somewhat naive.

POWELL:
Do you agree with me then that the events described in Num 31 and 1 Sam 15 could NOT have been ordered or sanctioned by an OmniGod?

Do you agree with me that it's significantly easier to persuade men to do your bidding if they believe that they will be rewarded greatly after they die for doing so?

POWELL:
That's where faith must come in. The priest says we should believe this mystery and we choose to do so. Perhaps that view is officially promoted partly because if the priest does something that might look evil to us, we will have a precedent to justify him. If we can't tell when God is evil, how can we tell when God's servants are evil?

PEREYNOL:
Actually, such behavioral dynamics are hardly restricted to the sphere of "the priest" this kind of thinking is leftover from eighteenth century theories connected with enlightenment rationalism, not to mention a slight nod to Machiavellian politics. Today, it's largely the politician we ought to eyeball askance. Seriously though, accusations or motivational theories about how those in power manipulate knowledge in order to control the masses by propagandistic indoctrination remains insufficient to disprove anything, even if such things are substantiated (Foucault notwithstanding).

MORE TO COME!

POWELL:
Insufficient to disprove ANYTHING? What is your definition of "prove" and "disprove"?

PEREYNOL 03-03-2003 @ 04:40 AM
in response to

POWELL 03-02-2003 @ 07:19 AM

POWELL:
Imagine that God, despite your belief that He has made clear promises to the contrary, immediately after you read this paragraph He annihilates everything that exists in the universe and all other planes of existence except for you and Him, no Second Coming, no heaven, no hell, nobody and nothing except for you and Him. Would God be justified in doing that? Would that be good or bad / evil? What do you think?

PEREYNOL:
Like your previous senario regarding the possibility of an agent indending a ruined pot over against a functional one, this hypothetical situation would require elaboration. If God were to be "justified," I suppose that we'd need to know his specific purpose behind annihilating all existence. If we don't have any insight into such things, then we'd also consequently lack sufficient evaluative criteria to deem them good or bad.

POWELL:
Even if you can't tell me the "objective" answer, meaning (to me) what all expert authorities would judge if they were in your shoes, you could have still told me what YOU would probably think given your imperfect understanding. Will you at least do that?

A) Would you think God did right, although you can't come up with a good justification right now or

B) would you think God did wrong since He would be failing to fulfill some of His promises if He did that or

C) would you think something else (please explain)?

PEREYNOL:
However, I must say I find your hypothetical situation terribly counterintuitive----and the hypothetical itself is only a bit of rhetoric designed by you to satisfy a goal of your own.

POWELL:
What is counterintuitive about it? If someone does bad, that's bad right? Certainly, I'm doing this for a purpose. For one thing, I'm trying to show you that YOUR sense of right and wrong is based on your experiences and genetics.

Here's the conclusions of that scenario put into an argument.
1) If God were today to annihilate everything, leaving only one person and Himself, that would be failing to fulfill His promises concerning lots of things like heaven and hell.
2) If God were to fail to fulfill His promises that would be bad.
3) If God were to do bad then He could not be a all-good.

Is this a good argument, a bad argument, something in between or something else in your opinion, Pereynol?

PEREYNOL:
In my mind, such considerations are neither here nor there. That being said, there are several possible responses. One response would be to claim a Kierkegaardian "teleological suspension of the ethical."

POWELL:
This sounds like evasion to me. If God lies can we call Him a liar? Yes or no or something else, Pereynol? Would Kierkegaard evade that question too?

PEREYNOL:
Another would be to declare that God himself being the highest evaluative authority, the scenario you propose is moot (but this would be pure voluntarism, something I'm not at all sold on).

POWELL:
This sounds reasonably close to my suggested possible response A: Yes, God must have done right if He did that. Is that what you think?

I would really like you to give me your current best provisional answer to this scenario, realizing that you might change your mind later. Will you do that for me?

Do you have a few "difficult" scenarios you'd like me to answer for you as a show of fair play?

POWELL:
In the case of God "oughting" to remove unnecessary evil, I think it would better match your preference meaning rather than your command meaning. It's awkward having God ordering himself to do something. Perhaps your goal-oriented view of "ought" will work here.

PEREYNOL:
Either way, whether we are emotivists, imperativalists, or whether we hold to a goal driven ethics, we would still be stuck with positing a hierarchy of sorts. Why would we hold that anyone's preferences, commands, or goals are more authoritative than anyone else's?

POWELL:
Based on statistics. In general, the more experience someone has the more likely their opinion is to be correct. We should seek the advice of experts. On the other hand, those who are considered to be authorities by others regardless of their experience are likely to be more reliable than those who aren't experts and aren't considered to be authorities. We should seek the advice of authorities. The best advice, statistically speaking, is from expert authorities.

PEREYNOL:
But if God is the author/authority who created all contingent beings, as well as the eternal antecedent for all mental and ethical activity---the One who framed the whole universe and all sentient beings within it according to his creative intentions---it would seem that his preferences, commands, and goals are at the top of the hierarchy. This would be so on every level---ontologically, epistemologically, ethically, etc.

POWELL:
In science if there's one datum more certain than the others, that still doesn't justify completely ignoring other good data. You should weight (apply weighting factors to) the other data and average the weighted data. Perhaps you would argue that God's opinion is so much superior to anyone else's that it should weighted so highly that all others would be insignificant by comparison. Is that your position?

Continued

John Powell

John Powell

March 3rd 2003, 09:57 PM

POWELL:
Even if moral codes are human inventions, rather than divine, how does that objectively justify the NAZI's? They might be able to justify their actions among those who agreed with them, but the majority of the world then and today disagree with that justification. The expert authorities are in good agreement that the NAZI's did bad.

PEREYNOL:
What these objections of yours fail to take into account is that, in a world in which moral, societal relativism holds, all the evaluative criteria for determining whether something is good or bad resides within the context of particular societies.

POWELL:
Of course. We could agree that in the NAZI culture what they did was ok. However, in the wider culture of the world it was wrong. We are members of that wider culture. We agree that what the NAZIs did was wrong. If the NAZIs had developed the A-bomb early enough and forced the US to surrender in WW II and later took over the entire planet, we might never be having this discussion because what they did to the Jews and others might be considered by nearly all of us to be at least acceptable, if not good. Welcome to the real world. It wasn't that long ago that pretty much everyone knew that slavery was ok and that men were superior to women and other such things. Apparently morality changes.

Argument for time-consistent morality
1. Having morality be consistent through out all historical time is a good thing.
2. If morality were God-inspired then one would expect morality to be consistent through out all historical time.
3. If God were all-powerful He could cause morality to remain consistent through out all historical time.
4. If God were all-good He should cause morality to remain consistent through out all historical time.
5. If morality has not been sufficiently consistent throughout all historical time then it's unlikely that morality is God-inspired.

PEREYNOL:
It will not do to say in one breath that particular societies determine what is moral for themselves, and in the next breath assert that some extraneous "expert authorities" outside any particular society in question somehow possess the clout to render judgments to the contrary.

POWELL:
Why not? Each person has a right to their own opinion. Isn't this what the historical record suggests has happened? Why don't we have slaves anymore in the U.S.? Is it because it was always immoral or is it because it BECAME immoral to enough people that in the 19th century the U.S. people fought a war over it (and other issues) or something else? According to the Bible, what does God think about slavery? Has God changed His opinion since then?

PEREYNOL:
You can't have it both ways.

POWELL:
I think that's what we have. Welcome to the real world. If I had been born into ancient Jewish society I might have seen no problem in hacking or stabbing to death neighboring peoples including pregnant mothers and male children, but taking one of the virgin girls as a war-booty wife and forcing her to have sex with me. But living today, I feel differently about such things. Morality apparently has changed over time. Wouldn't you agree? Is that what you would expect if morality came from an OmniGod?

PEREYNOL:
If relativism is to be taken seriously, then we can only guarantee its integrity by affirming that what the Nazis decided was moral really was moral---for them, despite whatever a body of expert authorities might think from outside of that society.

POWELL:
I take this kind of relativism seriously. I concede that objective morals in the way you seem to think may not exist. What the NAZI's did might very well have been moral to them, REALLY MORAL TO THEM, but I doubt that this is true except for a small minority. Most of the NAZIs probably didn't know the full story and would be morally outraged if they were to see it personally.

The best we have today is what our expert authorities on morality / ethics tell us. In the future the expert authorities might conclude that it is immoral to be married. That might be considered selfish and emotionally inhibitory. Having more than 1 child might be considered unethical partly because it's too much of a burden on society. How do you imagine that your religious replacements of that future will explain to my future skeptical replacements how it was different in the past, but God's moral opinion has remained the same?

POWELL:
If, on the other hand, you suggest that moral codes are based on the opinion of God, how do you know God didn't support Hitler? Evidently, He supported the extermination of the Midianites and Amalakites (referenced above). Has God revealed His current opinion on the Holocaust? Who are you to disagree with God?

PEREYNOL:
I find your speculations on the moral opinions of God highly dubious; what reason have I to suppose that God supported Hitler?

POWELL:
God seemed to approve of genocide in the Old Testament. Why would that change? Perhaps God wanted to punish the Jews for disobeying Him or to pressure them to return to Palestine. What do you think of these possibilities?

PEREYNOL:
Moreover, when you use the Bible to draw a parrallel between historical events, you must assume it has a certain degree of authority.

POWELL:
Sure, as a representation of Jewish and Christian theology, but not necessarily as a source of truth.

PEREYNOL:
You and I both have access to the historical documents of ancient Israel, as well as the historical sources pertaining to the Nazis and the holocaust, but, as to the full information about the divine teleology, well, we are both rather limited. Could God have had his undisclosed reasons for allowing the holocaust or for endorsing ancient wars? The tenor of the Bible seems to suggest that he could, otherwise all its readers across the span of millennia (and particularly its contemporary Hebraic readers) would have abandoned their confidence in God's ethicality long ago out of pure unintelligibility.

YET MORE TO COME....

POWELL:
So, do you concede that God might have inspired and endorsed the holocaust?

PEREYNOL: 03-03-2003 @ 05:29 AM
in response to
POWELL 03-02-2003 @ 07:19 AM

POWELL:
Your answer to my "annihilate all" scenario should help here. Put more generally, what if God behaves like what we would expect an evil Demon to behave like? Should we worship Him anyway?

PERYNOL:
To me, you run aground upon the same shoals here as before. How do we evaluate the behavior of an "evil demon?" Do we have sufficient insight into such a being's goals such that we could render judgment?

POWELL:
You ask how to evaluate: We watch his actions and compare them with our concepts of "good" and "evil."

You ask whether there is enough insight into his goals: I hope so. Sometimes a person behaves "badly" for good reasons, but that's much more rare than that they behave "badly" (in apparently bad ways) for bad reasons.

If you don't think you can tell the difference between a good God and an evil Demon based upon their fruits or actions then I would suggest you don't have a very well developed sense of right and wrong. Can you tell the difference between a good man and an evil man? If you can then try to extrapolate that to a very powerful good super being and a weaker evil super being. That might be close enough for the present purposes.

PEREYNOL:
The mere positing of such a hypothetical on your part, however, does fit into your rhetorical goals, but it hasn't much significance for me.

POWELL:
Why do you keep evading my scenarios? Even answering the scenarios directly with something like a yes or no and explanation is apparently asking too much of you. Can you propose scenarios you'd like me to answer for you? I'll try my best to answer them directly. If I honestly don't know what I would do then I'll say as much.

PEREYNOL:
If we were able to evaluate and condemn the behavior of an "evil demon" who also happened to be the ultimate authority whose teleology occupied the supposed apex of all ethical hierarchies, wouldn't our very ability to so judge presuppose a yet higher moral standard to which we'd be appealing?

POWELL:
I guess.

PEREYNOL:
Whence comes this higher standard?

POWELL:
Us. Human beings. Genetics and experience. By pressuring you to call God a liar if He lies or a promise breaker if He breaks his promises, I'm trying to persuade you to realize that YOU are the real source of your morals, not God. You refuse to be persuaded. That's your right.

PEREYNOL:
Does this higher standard function as some kind of absolute, even though it, again, simply happens to be engraved upon our minds as if it were divine law?

POWELL:
No, it's not absolute. It's subjective. It becomes more objective as more opinions are seen to agree.

POWELL:
That might be ok if God were to give a clear message what He considered to be good and bad. Mark 10:2-12 suggests that divorce for any reason is bad, whereas Matt 5:31-32 suggests that divorce is ok for the cause of fornication. Which is it? Christians are divided on a number of issues such as male domination, abortion, euthanasia, and homosexuality. They used to be divided on the issue of slavery. What is God's opinion on all these issues?

PEREYNOL:
I think the fact that Christians have had and still have differences of opinion concerning the issues you raise obscures the overidding truth that both Christians and the bulk of humanity seem to share an overall ethical intuition and sense of justice. And I don't believe that quibbling over details in the cannonical gospels need concern us here, after all, many Christians are not inerrantists, and all Christians (and all humans) are fallible in their judgments, but this has little bearing upon the problem of evil per se. If we were to likewise quibble over the variances found in collections of civil law across societal and cultural boundaries, what we'd find significant is the fact that the moral point of view is pervasive, not that we sometimes face ambiguities. It's how we account for the existence of the moral point of view that matters, and theism is by no means discredited by random smokescreens of ethical ambiguity anymore than is the moral point of view in general....

YET MORE...

POWELL:
Then will you, Pereynol, concede that the Bible is errant?

And then will you, Pereynol, concede that the Bible is unclear as to what God's will is concerning issues such as divorce, male domination, abortion, euthanasia, and homosexuality?

Continued

John Powell

John Powell

March 3rd 2003, 09:59 PM

PEREYNOL 03-03-2003 @ 05:59 AM
in response to
POWELL 03-02-2003 @ 07:19 AM

POWELL:
Are you suggesting my goal is bad? With what justification?

PEREYNOL:
I am only suggesting that your goal runs counter to my own and that there is no reason why I ought to forward it. Why should I grant it credence?

POWELL:
Because you are persuaded that it is true. Until then you should not accept it as true.

PEREYNOL:
There's nothing that compels me to even engage with it, and I am within my full epistemic rights if I disregard it entirely. Can you supply me with any compelling moral reason I should submit to your goal?

POWELL:
I'm here to discuss things, not force you to do something against your will. What reasons might I offer for you to continue? It's important to keep the lines of communication open between Christians and their skeptics. There's a reasonable chance I might be right on some significant issues. Even if I'm wrong on every single important issue, it's likely that you'll know better what is right and how to evangelize this truth better to others, particularly to skeptics.

POWELL:
This "God might be using his enemies" idea may be a non-falsifiable, and, therefore non-scientific-like position. I need your answer to my "annihilate all" scenario and "worshiping a demon" question.

PEREYNOL:
Ah, positivism.... For clarity's sake, and especially if you claim to be an emotivist, the fact/value distinction entailed by positivism precludes "scientific positions" within ethical matters.

POWELL:
Please provide your evidence and argument in support of that assertion that the "fact / value distinction entailed by positivism precludes ‘scientific positions' within ethical matters." Perhaps a syllogism would be helpful.

Please define your philosophical terms.

PEREYNOL:
And from your point of view, how could your hypothetical demon scenario be seen as any more "scientific" than the supposition of God's possible use of his unwitting enemies?

POWELL:
It's not more scientific.

Hypotheses that are non-falsifiable are considered to be non-scientific. Both the God hypothesis and the Demon hypothesis are non-falsifiable. The purpose of the Demon hypothesis was NOT to support, using scientific-quality arguments, the real existence of a Demon acting like God, but to support it using non-scientific, philosophical arguments similar to your own. It was to show you the WEAKNESS of your non-scientific arguments for God by presenting similarly WEAK arguments that you might be unable to refute using the kinds of arguments you use to support your God hypothesis. For example, if you can't refute the Demon hypothesis to explain the facts, why should anyone accept your God hypothesis to explain the same facts? Wishful thinking? Historical precedence?

PEREYNOL:
While both notions are logically possible, neither are verifiable in any positivistic sense. (The demon scenario is a Cartesian relic---but of course you know this.)

POWELL:
Then I see no good reason at this point to prefer God over a Demon masquerading as God to explain the available facts.

No, I didn't know it was a Cartesian relic. My background is science, not philosophy.

POWELL:
I meant evil in the objective sense: what the expert authorities (whoever they are) consider to be evil, rather than the subjective sense: what each individual considers to be evil.

PEREYNOL:
Again, how would you account for "evil in an objective sense?"

POWELL:
I would deny that such a thing exists as you seem to use the word objective. I suggest, therefore, that we clarify (or redefine if you wish) the word so that it is understood that one can speak of "objective morals" in a way that's beneficial to most language users. "Subjective morals" are those of the individual or small groups of individuals. "Objective morals" are those of larger groups and, therefore, more likely to be true or of widespread utility.

PEREYNOL:
Is objective evil extramental?

POWELL:
No. According to how I think you use the word "objective" I don't think objective evil exists outside the mind. According to the way I use the word "objective," it exists in the minds of men. It's a concept that the expert authorities have defined to mean a certain thing.

PEREYNOL:
If so, have we not trespassed into absolutism? The subject percieves the object. If the object is mere preference, then subjectivity reigns in ethics; the number of minds considering an issue changes nothing.

POWELL:
Then I guess subjectivity reigns in ethics.

The number of minds considering the issue doesn't change the REALITY of the thing, whatever that reality is, but it can change what we agree to think about it. If all language expert authorities agree to use "objective" in the sense I've suggested, for example, then that will be the meaning of the word. Isn't that right?

PEREYNOL:
We can't say that an appeal to a group of expert authorities somehow renders emotivism "objective."

POWELL:
Perhaps I just did. Maybe I'm not justified, but I can do it. And you can tell me I can't.

POWELL:
We atheists sometimes argue as if there is a God so we can discuss these things logically with you. If you'd stop believing in Him then we'd stop "complaining about Him" and we could all spend more time doing science, philosophy, art, sports, etc.

PEREYNOL:
Belief in God may in fact assist in logical thinking.

POWELL:
Possibly. However, in my case, I believe theistic belief frustrated my abilities to think logically. I compartmentalized "religious-think" separate from "science-think." I have found my mind much more efficient since my mind has been free to use more of its logic resources in a unified manner.

PEREYNOL:
As to science, philosophy, art, and sports, well, you're of course free to indulge in any of these pursuits as you wish. I enjoy them myself, and I find that my theism integrates with such things beautifully. But if I believed as you do about God, then I'd probably not give him much thought; why remain preoccupied with something you've dismissed? Why become a dysangelist?

POWELL:
Because you matter. Because I think I can make enough of a difference. Because I benefit mentally from the exercise of discussing God and the Bible with people who believe in God and the Bible. Because I think it's important that more people accept that real life atheists exist. Because I think I can persuade some people to shift somewhat away from religious belief towards religious skepticism.

PEREYNOL:
Of course, it is enjoyable to spar with one's atheist friends. I've got several close friendships with atheists, and I do find all good human relationships built on mutual respect valuable.

POWELL:
Likewise.

POWELL:
I'm sure I could learn something useful by reading that, but I don't wish to "argue" with someone who can't respond. If you support Plantinga's solution to my problem of evil argument then please post it for consideration.

PEREYNOL:
I've enjoyed our discussion thus far, John, and I'd be happy to discuss Plantinga's specific ideas with you if you like. My personal preference is not for outright debate or argument in the polemical sense of the words, but for mutually beneficial discourse. In the final analysis, neither side of this debate is going to forcibly overwhelm the other, but good discussions can happen---even on the internet....

POWELL:
Good.

I'd rather not get sidetracked if it isn't necessary. There is enough discussion to keep me occupied, in fact, too much at the moment. The discussion here is great.

End.

John Powell

Pereynol of Sheer Dread

March 4th 2003, 01:09 AM

03-03-2003 @ 08:48 PM
John Powell:

POWELL:
This could be a more acceptable argument if God were less than all-powerful. An all-powerful God, however, would not be expected to have to work within the constraints of such things as human genealogies.

Actually, what you and I expect God to do in terms of working within constraints, granting free agency, mode of creation by means of human lines of decent, etc, are quite different. I think God's choices to work within certain parameters are in accordance with his goals. And his goals are only partially revealed in the natural world. The mere fact that you have expectations that God should work differently is not at all alarming.

Even if He chose to do so, an all-powerful God could cause to not be born the unnecessarily evil persons and allow to exist only the necessary evil ones and the good ones.

Geneologically speaking, you ought to know as a scientist that all your forebears would have been "necessary" to produce you. You should also realize that your exact life experiences, the society in which you have lived, the time range between your birth and death, and all the minutia of your personal experience come together to make you who you are.

Perhaps you would argue that every single evil person exists because they are necessary to fulfill God's purposes. I would argue that if I were God, my purposes would be better, require less evil.

I think every person who has existed has done so within the context of God's purposes. And we don't know what God's purposes are in any exhaustive sense. Further, your claim to have comparatively "better" purposes that "require less evil" are as yet undemonstrated. It is my prediction that they will remain so.

Perhaps God's purposes aren't that good. Even if we were to accept that God's current purposes (whatever they are) are the best, I suspect that if I were God I could accomplish those same purposes with at least one less evil than He required.

You speculate that God's purposes "aren't that good" without any viable ethical standard to make such speculations. You also admit your ignorance concerning God's "current purposes." Then you "suspect" that if you were divine, you could accomplish these same purposes (of which you are ignorant), reducing the overall quanta of evil by at least one. I must say I find such claims inordinate as stated.

You tell me what you think is one of the goals or purposes of God (for example: avoid Midianite or Amalekite corruption of the Jewish people so God orders the non-Jews killed.) and I'll try to explain how I might accomplish it with less evil than there apparently is in our universe or described in the Bible or, perhaps, I will argue that THAT particular purpose you claim for God is inferior to another related purpose I might have if I were God.

As I said before, and as you have admitted above, we are not aware of the full scope of God's goals, nor are we fully aware of what history would have been like had this war not been conducted as it had. And if you are ignorant of these things, it is simply not apparent how you could substantiate the superiority of an alternative proposal. It doesn't work to say, though I'm not entirely aware of what someone else is doing or why they are doing it, I am entirely confident I could do a superior job. This is nonsensical.

Argument to use a better method.
1. If there were at least one method to accomplish God's good purposes that required less evil than the method that God currently uses then an OmniGod would use that other method.
2. If God were all-powerful He could use such a method.
3. If God were all-good He should use such a method.
4. If there is such a method then God is probably not an Omnibeing

Again, without knowing the entirety of God's purposes and without grasping the mechanistic complexity of his methods such that we could hope to duplicate them, how do you propose we make the evaluations suggested above? Moreover, as I have alluded, the common athesitic conception of an "Omnibeing" doesn't accord with many theologies; there are differing conceptions of God's power and how he deploys it, his knowledge and how he obtains it, as well as his emotions and the extent to which they are anthropopathic. There remain also several divergent takes on how ethics obtain with respect to God, what evil is, etc, some of which I've elaborated. The complexity of theological and philosophical discourse about God's nature is much greater than you seem to realize, and, as I've said, your simplistic conceptions as stated within your arguments fail to do justice to that complexity.

If you support the notion that God has the right to do whatever He wants regardless of whether it might appear bad to us, please answer the following scenario you evaded:

Your responses to what I've said have been fairly selective as well, and your characterization that I've "evaded" this scenario of yours is not accurate---rather, I rejected it. Instead of reproducing my former reply here, I'll invite you to read it again if you wish by consulting my earlier response. I haven't changed my mind.

Why are they imagining all this about God? Apparently, different people are inventing their own kind of God to fit their personal philosophical ideal. If the OmniBeing really exists and is as nice and willing to answer questions as people claim, why don't they just ask Him to tell us all in such a way that we can understand and accept? That's what I would have done if I were God. Would I have been a better God than the one you believe in?

This rhetoric has no rigor. You've not substantiated the roles of imagination or invention or idealization within theology, and you are beginning to address issues outside the boundaries of the problem of evil. Human experience of God is another topic which we can discuss if you'd like, and the fact that your experiences don't meet your expectations of how you suppose God should have revealed himself to you specifically or within history may well be poignant to why you are an atheist. I know that my own experiences of God, personally speaking, have driven me to conclusions opposite yours. Though I have an acute interest in the theistic arguments and other issues in the philosophy of religion, these matters remain ancillary to my undeniable relationship with God.

Couldn't it be the other way around? Are you suggesting that things existed in space before that empty space even existed? Perhaps things in space is a corruption of the natural order.

I'm not following you here, as I suspect you're not understanding the privatio boni. I'm suggesting nothing about "space." I was rather using the broken pottery analogy to illustrate the conception of evil as a privation of substantial goodness.

It sounds like a sneaky trick to argue that good can exist independently from evil by using a term for evil that means change for the worse. Couldn't I counter argue that good really means change for the better, so there must be a bad for good to be the better of, so bad can exist independently of good?

This idea fails because good is equated with being. And while one might indeed make improvements on something that has being, ie, one could make a "better" pot by adding a handle, widening the spout, etc, so that the pot would meet the goal for which it was created more efficiently, it doesn't therefore follow that the pot was "evil" in its former, unimproved state. You are pressing the analogy too far; the analogy itself was not meant to illustrate comparative degrees of efficiency by defining good as "change for the better" and evil as "change for the worse." Instead, the analogy was drawn to compare evil with damage or corruption of something substantially good. "Evil" itself, according to the privatio boni, cannot exist independently of the thing it corrupts.

The philosopher is evidently trying to define good and evil in such a way that they satisfy his view of reality. How do other talented people use the terms "good" and "bad," specifically the expert authorities?

Of course Augustine is working within the context of his own worldview! None can escape this. As to other opinions of evil, we have discussed several already, including your own.

I think that if you had stuck with the terms "good" and "bad" rather than bringing in corruption in the way you did, this additional unnecessary problem would have been avoided. "Corrupt" does not necessarily mean "bad," so using it to define bad as you did does not appear advisable.

From your vantage point, it is easy to see why the privatio would seem "unadvisable," but, the arg has a most respectable theological and philosophical pedigree despite your lack of enthusiasm.

Pereynol of Sheer Dread

March 4th 2003, 02:04 AM

03-03-2003 @ 08:54 PM
John Powell:

Have you seriously considered the possibility that people might already accept the antithetical / binary concepts like good / bad or big / small before they come up with words to represent those instinctive / experiential concepts?

When considering binary oppositions, whether experience temporally preceeds language or vice versa one can yet distinguish the epistemological relation of the terms from the ontological relation of their referrents.

I prefer the second, but wish to avoid the assertion that it is universal in your sense of the term. Are you asking why it is that every single human being agrees that good and bad are opposites? Evidently, they don't. Didn't you give me a counter example? However, I think the vast majority of people do because it seems to work better than other conceptual frameworks. Do you think good is the opposite of bad?

Binary oppositions themselves are constructs of the perceiving mind and the opposing terms have an epistemological relationship which may or may not imply an ontological relationship. The relation "is the opposite of" which might obtain between X and Y, is precisely an epistemological or conceptual relation. So, if commonly suppose that good and evil stand in such a relation, we'd best elaborate these terms within a metaethical context. If good and evil are concepts without any extramental existence, then their mode of existence is mental; that is, they exist only as ideas within minds. Whether they denote preferences, commands, or goals, they have absolutely no ontological status apart from minds. And apart from minds, there would be no evaluations, no ethics, and no evaluative criteria, however that criteria may be divergently conceived.

When a person makes an evaluation of whether objective conditions in the physical world outside her mind constitute "good" or "bad," she is evaluating physical conditions in relation to herself or some other mind, or some mental state. And she tends to oppose the two terms because states of affairs in the physical world tend to be ostensibly beneficial or not, preferable or not, a violation of some command or not, an impediment to some goal or not, etc. Note, however, that all such evaluations inhere within a mental context. A world without minds would be a world without intentionality, without subject/object relations, and hence, without morality. That means, that without minds, terms like "good" and "evil" wouldn't exist, and so, without minds, good and evil would have absolutely zero ontological status.

In an atheistic cosmos, good and evil did not exist prior to the evolution of sentient beings like human beings. But, in a theistic cosmos (or an idealistic one), mind is the primary reality. Reductive materialism entails no mind, but thesim and idealism do. Thus, the two conceptions of the ontological status of a binary opposition like good/evil would vary enormously with respect to atheism and theism. There are many questions surrounding these issues. Among which is whence comes mind? Even within the most staunch naturalism or reductive materialism, there's the apparent anomaly to be explained as to why matter has the tendency to give rise to mind. Is mind somehow inherent within matter? Are ethical relations?

When you assume an eternal dualism between good and evil (as you have), you seem to violate your own worldview in that you must move beyond the evolutionary understanding of mind in order to posit a metaphysical or ontological relation which has existence independently of mind, before language, experience, or persons evolved. If you reject the privatio boni on the amorphous grounds that you suppose good and evil have a more fundamental existential relation beyond goals, preferences, or intentionality, then where does that leave you? You seem to do just this when you posit a metaphyscial dualism or insist on a codependency between epistemologcal and ontological relations between the terms of the binary opposition good/evil.

Pereynol of Sheer Dread

March 4th 2003, 02:31 AM

John,
As I read through the rest of your second reply to me, I see more of the same reiteration of your "difficult scenario" type examinations, the most insistent of which is your "demon" thing. I also note the "evasion" accusation repeated again because you find it unpleasant that I reject these devices. You have, in turn, repeated the invitation into what you suppose an ethical quagmire involving the passages in Numbers and I Samuel, despite my former remarks. I know you are eager to guide our conversation along proscribed lines, but, as I said, I have other thoughts, which I shall elaborate upon in my own fashion rather than be led Socratically down the ruts in the road worn by traditional debates about the problem of evil. Perhaps later, we'll talk more of Numbers and I Samuel, but for now, consider: What might this mean?

In Isaiah 45:7, we find:

"I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace and create evil: I the LORD do all these things."

Pereynol of Sheer Dread

March 4th 2003, 10:05 AM

03-03-2003 @ 08:54 PM
John Powell

Good point. Perhaps the Jews and Christians weren't that special after all.

This kind of rhetoric is a good example of your sort of selective response.

Do you agree with me then that the events described in Num 31 and 1 Sam 15 could NOT have been ordered or sanctioned by an OmniGod?

As I stated earlier, is it not possible that God could have undisclosed purposes for endorsing ancient wars? And as I also have stated earlier, I believe that your characterization of an "OmniGod" becomes far too narrow.

Do you agree with me that it's significantly easier to persuade men to do your bidding if they believe that they will be rewarded greatly after they die for doing so?

While this has been rehashed again and again, it is possibly a truism, yet, it is not apparent that the essence of any religion is encapsulated by such a rule. It is also a truism to declare that men can be equally, if not more effectively, manipulated to do someone else's bidding if they are led to expect that they shal be rewarded greatly in the here and now under the auspices of some worldly ideology or political agenda. But such a declaration wouldn't serve to reduce the essence of ideologies or political agendas in general to a clandestine relationship between manipulation and rewards.

Insufficient to disprove ANYTHING? What is your definition of "prove" and "disprove"?

I think that there are various definitions of proof and disproof. I largely believe that a "proof" is an attempt to persuade by argument, and that the success or failure of this enterprise becomes person-relative, such that different arguments have varying power to convince individuals with respect to the noetic structures of those individuals. Some arguments actually compel the assent of nearly all rationally minded people, but, as we can see, quite a few arguments lack that power.

In the case of propagandistic manipulation mentioned above, as I have said, whether or not one can verify the presence of propagandistic manipulation (and whether it entails promises of rewards or not), does nothing to substantiate truth or falsity. A position could well be true in spite of the fact that there might be propagandistic manipulation perpetrated by its adherents, and conversely, a position may well be false, even though it involved no manipulation. The nature or essence of a particular belief or position, be it religious or political or whatever else, simply cannot be ascertained by using the presence or absence of propagandistic manipulation as a litmus test.

Pereynol of Sheer Dread

March 4th 2003, 10:41 AM

03-03-2003 @ 08:54 PM
John Powell
Even if you can't tell me the "objective" answer, meaning (to me) what all expert authorities would judge if they were in your shoes, you could have still told me what YOU would probably think given your imperfect understanding. Will you at least do that?

Again, John, I find your whole scenario an irrelevant fantasy. God is not going to destroy everything except me after I read your posts. (I've read them several times, just to be sure.) Obviously you want me to admit of my hypothetical ability to sit in judgement upon God should he commit some wrong, so that later, when you suppose you can claim he has done so---perhaps with respect to those passages in Numbers or I Samuel---you may press me to acquiesce. My intent is to save us both the tedium by stating my rejection of your whole line of thought. To wit, God is not going to indulge your fantasy, and, being ignorant as you are of God's purposes in ostensibly endorsing past violence or present evils, you cannot substantiate that he has commited, is commiting, or will commit "unnecessary evils." This is so because you lack the evaluative criteria to make such judgments, as the apprehension of such criteria would require your complete grasp of God's teleology, his goals and knowledge, etc.

What is counterintuitive about it? If someone does bad, that's bad right? Certainly, I'm doing this for a purpose. For one thing, I'm trying to show you that YOUR sense of right and wrong is based on your experiences and genetics.

Do you really suppose I'm not aware of how experience affects morality? The role of genetics is also worth exploring; what precisely do you mean? Nevertheless, none of this excludes God's involvement in determining morality as well. As I keep saying, there are many different conceptions of morality, and there are obviously disagreements---if there were not, there'd be no need for ethical discourse at all.

This sounds like evasion to me. If God lies can we call Him a liar? Yes or no or something else, Pereynol? Would Kierkegaard evade that question too?

God has not lied. Why indulge in fantasy? Cut to the chase.

Pereynol of Sheer Dread

March 4th 2003, 11:11 AM

03-03-2003 @ 08:54 PM
John Powell:

Based on statistics. In general, the more experience someone has the more likely their opinion is to be correct. We should seek the advice of experts. On the other hand, those who are considered to be authorities by others regardless of their experience are likely to be more reliable than those who aren't experts and aren't considered to be authorities. We should seek the advice of authorities. The best advice, statistically speaking, is from expert authorities.

In discussing emotivism, imperativalism, a goal-driven ethics, or some kind of ethical realism, we must realize that there are, as I said, "experts" who hold all these divergent views; there is no consensus such that we may appeal to it and settle disagreements. Some "experts" are theists who hold to moral realism, and there are many other "expert" opinions with which you would not agree, statistics or no. You would do well to bone up on these things....

In science if there's one datum more certain than the others, that still doesn't justify completely ignoring other good data. You should weight (apply weighting factors to) the other data and average the weighted data.

I think you could benefit from further study in the history of philosophy, particularly with respect to the rise, apogee, and fall of logical positivism and how this movement affected the study of metaphysics and ethics. In any event, it isn't quite apparent how one might apply the scientific method to ethics in the way you seem to be proposing. How would you go about doing such a thing? What comprises "data" and how does one go about evaluating it in the face of a multiplicity of ethical positions---a disparate range of imcompatible opinions generated by sharply disagreeing "experts?"

Perhaps you would argue that God's opinion is so much superior to anyone else's that it should weighted so highly that all others would be insignificant by comparison. Is that your position?

Of course I believe God's opinions are superior. I don't think that human opinions are "insignificant," however; all well-conceived thinking is worthy of examination....

Pereynol of Sheer Dread

March 4th 2003, 01:09 PM

03-03-2003 @ 08:57 PM
John Powell:

Of course. We could agree that in the NAZI culture what they did was ok. However, in the wider culture of the world it was wrong. We are members of that wider culture. We agree that what the NAZIs did was wrong. If the NAZIs had developed the A-bomb early enough and forced the US to surrender in WW II and later took over the entire planet, we might never be having this discussion because what they did to the Jews and others might be considered by nearly all of us to be at least acceptable, if not good.

Yes, we can agree that Nazi morality was wrong, but not on the basis of moral or societal relativism. When you set Nazi morality in an antithetical relationship to the morality of the greater civilized world, and yet claim that, had the Nazis won WW II, the current morality of the greater civilized world might in fact have become that of the Nazis, you merely underscore my point.

Welcome to the real world.

Welcome to the real world yourself. Let us be done with patronising contempt.

It wasn't that long ago that pretty much everyone knew that slavery was ok and that men were superior to women and other such things. Apparently morality changes.

Do you honestly believe that theists are unaware of moral flux?

Argument for time-consistent morality
1. Having morality be consistent through out all historical time is a good thing.

On what basis can you make such an evaluation?

2. If morality were God-inspired then one would expect morality to be consistent through out all historical time.

Why? What if God held that the general progress of human learning and moral development within societies was a good thing? What if God's purposes in creating human free moral agents included societal and cultural progress in a way superior in God's mind to a static world with unchanging morality? And finally, what if God had different purposes with respect to people who have lived in different epochs? If God's goals changed or progressed, so might morality.

3. If God were all-powerful He could cause morality to remain consistent through out all historical time.

It is not apparent how God could cause morality to remain static in a world involving truly free human moral agents without coercing them. And if God intended to respect our free moral agency by design, it is not unreasonable to suppose he wouldn't coerce our actions.

4. If God were all-good He should cause morality to remain consistent through out all historical time.

Again, perhaps not.

5. If morality has not been sufficiently consistent throughout all historical time then it's unlikely that morality is God-inspired.

Some morality is God-inspired, and some is unchanging. Yet, God might favor moral and societal progress, and he may well grant the possibility of such progress as an integral part of human free agency. There are indeed moral shifts and developments for the worse within a society, just as there are bad individual moral choices. Both stem from the abuse of free moral agency.

Pereynol of Sheer Dread

March 4th 2003, 01:37 PM

03-03-2003 @ 08:57 PM
John Powell:

Why not? Each person has a right to their own opinion. Isn't this what the historical record suggests has happened? Why don't we have slaves anymore in the U.S.? Is it because it was always immoral or is it because it BECAME immoral to enough people that in the 19th century the U.S. people fought a war over it (and other issues) or something else? According to the Bible, what does God think about slavery? Has God changed His opinion since then?

Moral flux is indeed a reality in history, and possibly within the goals of God as well. But your assumption that this somehow ices your argumentative cake remains triumphalistically premature.

I think that's what we have. Welcome to the real world. If I had been born into ancient Jewish society I might have seen no problem in hacking or stabbing to death neighboring peoples including pregnant mothers and male children, but taking one of the virgin girls as a war-booty wife and forcing her to have sex with me. But living today, I feel differently about such things. Morality apparently has changed over time. Wouldn't you agree? Is that what you would expect if morality came from an OmniGod?

And if you had reached the prime of life as a Gestapo agent, you might find yourself gassing Jews, or if you were raised in some contemporary Muslim environments, you might find yourself strapping on a bomb. If you were an American during the late 1770's, you might find yourself shooting at redcoats, and if you were an American male in the 1940's, you might find yourself participating in the invasion of Normandy, etc, etc, etc. Some of these pursuits are morally justifiable by different available ethical positions and some are not. Some of these pursuits may be morally justifiable in the eyes of God, while some others are merely the fruit of human evil and miscalculation. And while you could indeed have participated in each of these historical currents had you lived during the periods in question, it remains equally true that you could have declined to participate by an exercise of your free moral agency.

As to your conception of an"OmniGod" and whether all morality can be ascribed to him, well, I've already responded to that. I think your conception of divinity (and divine teleology) much too narrow and your conception of moral flux overly simplistic.

John Powell

March 4th 2003, 09:06 PM

POWELL:
I have no intention of evading for long your well-thought out replies, Pereynol. I owe you and others full responses and I intend to do that. However, I would like to deal with two issues here.

POWELL:
This sounds like evasion to me. If God lies can we call Him a liar? Yes or no or something else, Pereynol? Would Kierkegaard evade that question too?

PEREYNOL:
God has not lied. Why indulge in fantasy? Cut to the chase.

POWELL:
I will try right here.

In another forum I would like to discuss with you the possibility that God has lied in a number of places based on the Biblical record. Are you interested in discussing those problem texts?

Now, I have something else that is nagging on me, Pereynol. You can help by considering the following.

Please answer the following hypothetical scenario for me, Pereynol. I hope you don't "reject" it like you've done my others.

Powell is saved scenario

If I were to accept your religious beliefs as true, Pereynol, and sincerely admit I'm a sinner worthy of hell and honestly accept Jesus as my Lord and Savior and the Bible as the Word of God and / or do and be everything your religion claims is necessary for salvation, could I be saved? What do you think?

Please answer yes, no, or neither and explain.

John Powell

Pereynol of Sheer Dread

March 4th 2003, 10:56 PM

John,
I suppose I'd be willing to discuss your "problem texts," but I must also say that, without an appeal to a strict fundamentalist form of inerrancy, most of the problems associated with such texts are not all that threatening. The contemporary inerrancy debate is a convoluted thing, and even the most conservative of participants work with fairly sophisticated ideas that range well beyond popular conceptions of what constitutes "inerrancy." However, if you want to discuss these texts, I'd either like to do so after we finish with the problem of evil or in conjunction with it on this thread. In any event, after having read tons of arguments pro and con on both issues, it is my firm conviction that two intelligent and informed opponents can only reach a stalemate in the end. Normally I don't engage in protracted discussions (especially online), simply because it's usually all a matter of reproducing tedious quantities of information out of pure tenacity. Such things are not nearly so pleasant as a living conversation between folks who are earnestly seeking the truth together instead of simply attempting to outwit or vanquish one another.

As to the question of your potential "salvation," I wonder, given your strong assertions about being an atheist, if you are not merely setting another rhetorical trap. Part of the reason I reject rhetorical traps or Socratic lines of interrogation is that I see absolutely no reason to conduct most discussions or debates on an opponent's terms, nor do I see any merit in doing so. When it comes to questions of personal soteriology, I especially detest such tactics because they smack of insincerity. I mean you no disrespect in saying this, but, if you are the staunch, intractible atheist you claim to be, your question regarding your own salvation is most likely another device or rhetorical ploy. If I'm going to take the time to consider your atheistic ideas, I'd rather do so at face value, without rhetoric, ploys, or devices. But if you're genuinely sincere and are willing to become vulnerable, I'm game. Otherwise, spare me (please) the unnecessary trouble and bring out your ideas plainly. If you'd like to discuss personal issues and experiences, rather than just toss ideas about in a polemical fashion, I'd be glad to answer your last "scenario;" let me know.

And concerning the problem of evil, I have had some staggeringly significant personal experiences which drew me into God's very light, even while they heightened the mysterious darkness and pain of trying to comprehend evil. The more one attempts to understand, the more one fails in some ways. And sometimes, those of us who have become supersaturated with knowledge are the most ignorant of all---and the most blind.

psychopath

March 5th 2003, 02:33 AM

John, going back to your original post, I just have a quick question which may be easily answerable. For now, I don't have the time to engage in a full-fledged debate on this topic.

What I'm wondering about is your phrase "unnecessary evil," and specifically the way in which it's used in premise 3:

"3. If God is all-good then He should remove all unnecessary evil."

If evil exists, isn't it, by default, necessary? If it was unnecessary, then there would be a possibility of it not being so; however, since it exists, it must be so - it is necessary. Therefore, God wouldn't be able to remove unnecessary evil, because such doesn't exist.

John Powell

March 5th 2003, 07:35 PM

psychopath:

John, going back to your original post, I just have a quick question which may be easily answerable. For now, I don't have the time to engage in a full-fledged debate on this topic.

What I'm wondering about is your phrase "unnecessary evil," and specifically the way in which it's used in premise 3:

"3. If God is all-good then He should remove all unnecessary evil."

If evil exists, isn't it, by default, necessary? If it was unnecessary, then there would be a possibility of it not being so; however, since it exists, it must be so - it is necessary. Therefore, God wouldn't be able to remove unnecessary evil, because such doesn't exist.

POWELL:
Thank you so much! Your question reminds me of something I forgot about in my discussion about the definition of evil.

Do you agree with the following argument?

If AN ELECRON exists, isn't it, by default, necessary? If it was unnecessary, then there would be a possibility of it not being so; however, since it exists, it must be so - it is necessary. Therefore, God wouldn't be able to remove an unnecessary ELECTRON, because such doesn't exist.

To answer your question: Yes, but perhaps only in unimportant ways in the present discussion. For example, If X exists then it is necessary for X to exist in order for X to exist. In the present context, however, I think we're referring to "necessary to fulfill God's purposes" or something like that.

Perhaps you meant to argue that if there were evil then God must have a good reason to allow it to exist or something like that.

John Powell

John Powell

March 5th 2003, 08:35 PM

POWELL:
I have no intention of evading for long your well-thought out replies, Pereynol. I owe you and others full responses and I intend to do that. However, I would like to deal with two issues here.

POWELL:
After this post, I'm going to start work on replying to those posts of yours and others that I've missed.

POWELL:
This sounds like evasion to me. If God lies can we call Him a liar? Yes or no or something else, Pereynol? Would Kierkegaard evade that question too?

PEREYNOL:
God has not lied. Why indulge in fantasy? Cut to the chase.

POWELL:
I will try right here.

In another forum I would like to discuss with you the possibility that God has lied in a number of places based on the Biblical record. Are you interested in discussing those problem texts?

Now, I have something else that is nagging on me, Pereynol. You can help by considering the following.

Please answer the following hypothetical scenario for me, Pereynol. I hope you don't "reject" it like you've done my others.

Powell is saved scenario

If I were to accept your religious beliefs as true, Pereynol, and sincerely admit I'm a sinner worthy of hell and honestly accept Jesus as my Lord and Savior and the Bible as the Word of God and / or do and be everything your religion claims is necessary for salvation, could I be saved? What do you think?

Please answer yes, no, or neither and explain.

John Powell

PEREYNOL:
John,
I suppose I'd be willing to discuss your "problem texts," but I must also say that, without an appeal to a strict fundamentalist form of inerrancy, most of the problems associated with such texts are not all that threatening. The contemporary inerrancy debate is a convoluted thing, and even the most conservative of participants work with fairly sophisticated ideas that range well beyond popular conceptions of what constitutes "inerrancy." However, if you want to discuss these texts, I'd either like to do so after we finish with the problem of evil or in conjunction with it on this thread.

POWELL:
Fair enough. I have too much to catch up with to get into that right now anyway.

PERYNOL:
In any event, after having read tons of arguments pro and con on both issues, it is my firm conviction that two intelligent and informed opponents can only reach a stalemate in the end.

POWELL:
Argument from ignorance. You don't know me.

PEREYNOL:
Normally I don't engage in protracted discussions (especially online), simply because it's usually all a matter of reproducing tedious quantities of information out of pure tenacity. Such things are not nearly so pleasant as a living conversation between folks who are earnestly seeking the truth together instead of simply attempting to outwit or vanquish one another.

POWELL:
I try very hard to have "seeking and promoting the truth" discussions rather than "win the argument at all costs" discussions.

PEREYNOL:
As to the question of your potential "salvation," I wonder, given your strong assertions about being an atheist, if you are not merely setting another rhetorical trap.

POWELL:
"My Lord King, could this be a trap?"
"You see a trap everywhere. That's why I'm still alive."
(paraphrased from "Princess Bride.")

You are smart, Pereynol and consistent, but I think I'll trap you anyway because you've chosen obstinance on the wrong issue in the wrong place.

PEREYNOL:
Part of the reason I reject rhetorical traps or Socratic lines of interrogation is that I see absolutely no reason to conduct most discussions or debates on an opponent's terms, nor do I see any merit in doing so. When it comes to questions of personal soteriology, I especially detest such tactics because they smack of insincerity.

POWELL:
What is your meaning of soteriology? I keep asking for definitions of your philosophical terms, Pereynol, but you won't give them. Don't you realize that the dictionary definition isn't necessarily your own?

PEREYNOL:
I mean you no disrespect in saying this, but, if you are the staunch, intractible atheist you claim to be, your question regarding your own salvation is most likely another device or rhetorical ploy.

POWELL:
I'm not doing this to hurt you, Pereynol, but to help you free your mind to imagine a world of what could be that you won't allow yourself to indulge in probably because of fear. One of the great attributes of humans and a reason we have advanced as a culture as far as we have is the keen ability of our minds to imagine what could have been or even cannot be, to dream, to make believe. I suspect that you're selectively restraining that power of your mind in order to insulate your religious beliefs from your own scrutiny. Perhaps you fear you'll doubt and go to hell for that. If not, then why won't you answer my silly little hypothetical scenarios?

Make up some of your own and I'll try to answer them.

PEREYNOL:
If I'm going to take the time to consider your atheistic ideas, I'd rather do so at face value, without rhetoric, ploys, or devices. But if you're genuinely sincere and are willing to become vulnerable, I'm game. Otherwise, spare me (please) the unnecessary trouble and bring out your ideas plainly. If you'd like to discuss personal issues and experiences, rather than just toss ideas about in a polemical fashion, I'd be glad to answer your last "scenario" let me know.

POWELL:
I'm all about persuasion, Pereynol. I want to persuade you to believe as I do because I think I'm right. I am willing to seriously consider your efforts to persuade me to believe as you do. This should be done fairly.

Instead of discussing personal issues at this time (later would be fine), let me tempt you to fall into another trap.

Please answer the following hypothetical scenario for me, Pereynol. I hope you don't "reject" it like you've done my others.

Powell reads the Bible cover to cover.

If I were to begin this week to read the entire Bible from cover to cover beginning with Genesis and ending with Revelation and if I were to finish reading the Bible by the end of the year, Pereynol, would I have been reading the Word of God?

Please answer yes, no, or neither and explain.

Since I fear you'll "reject" that scenario too to maintain consistency with your previous rejections to consider hypotheticals that you consider to be fantasy and because you might lose too much patience with me if I don't hurry this along, let me spring what would have been my next trap on you.

Speaking from a philosophical point of view, Pereynol, and I believe those participating here are supposed to be doing that, is the following a valid deductive argument?

1) P.
2) therefore, P.

This has the linguistic meaning of "If P then P." Isn't this a deductively valid argument because if the premise is true then the conclusion must true, cannot be false? Granted it's circular, but that shouldn't be relevant here.

Is the correct response in this philosophical forum to the question "Is this argument (above) a valid deductive argument?"

A) YES! That is a valid deductive argument. REGARDLESS of what P might be, if P is true then P must be true. EVEN if P = "God lied" or some other fantastic hypothetical scenario, it is still a valid deductive argument.

or

B) IT DEPENDS! If P refers to anything possible or impossible other than things like "God lied" or God did other things which God can't do then yes, it's a valid deductive argument. If, however, P means something like "God lied" then I should reject your hypothetical proposition and argument because it's God-related fantasy. God has not lied. It's a trap.

or

C) Something else. Please explain.

Now, Pereynol, which is the correct response in this philosophical section of tweb?

PEREYNOL:
And concerning the problem of evil, I have had some staggeringly significant personal experiences which drew me into God's very light, even while they heightened the mysterious darkness and pain of trying to comprehend evil. The more one attempts to understand, the more one fails in some ways. And sometimes, those of us who have become supersaturated with knowledge are the most ignorant of all---and the most blind.

POWELL:
At some point down the road I would like to try to persuade you to view those experiences in a more naturalistic, less supernatural, way. However, only if that's of interest to you.

John Powell.

Pereynol of Sheer Dread

March 5th 2003, 11:22 PM

John,
You think my tame remark about stalemate is an "argument from ignorance," since I don't know you, I'm somehow going to be surprised, you'll "trap" me anyhow, I'm "obstinate on the wrong issue in the wrong place," etc. Soon it'll be, "I'll get you, my pretty, and your little dog, too!" After reminding me of how little I know you, you proceed to embark upon a presumptuously bogus bit of psychoanalysis directed my way. Then, after I've requested that you depart from the hypotheticals and simply discuss substantive ideas, you just give me a few more hypo's anyway.

Why don't we just forbear discussing the problem of evil and turn the conversation to Nascar, the WWF, or perhaps how many microbreweries there are in the great state of Utah?

John Powell

March 6th 2003, 02:43 AM

POWELL:
Responses to Flipper, Mattballman19 (2) and Brian B (2).

MATTBALLMAN19:
How about this defintion of evil:
In good Augustinian fashion: "The lack of good."

FLIPPER:
Is there good on the moon?

POWELL:
It depends on who you ask, Flipper. "Good" and "bad" are subjective. What specific things are considered good or bad become more objective as more people agree. I think there's good on the Moon, yes. Do you?

MATTBALLMAN19:
flipper,

I'm not sure I understand your question. Are you talking about the actual concept 'good', in all it's ontological glory, hanging out on the moon in a lawn chair gettin some sun? Or are you talking about the kind of good that holds as a result of living in the universe which is ethically subordinate to the morals which flow from the nature of God? I don't think you mean the former:-). But it seems intuitive to me that if God created the universe then anyone being anywhere in that universe would be under the moral law which has it's origination in God's nature.

POWELL:
I don't think that last sentence follows, Matt. Is a child absolutely obligated to live the moral standards of his parents? I don't think so. Children usually do follow the moral standards of their parents to some extent and they are often punished for trying to live their own moral standards. In a way parents "create" their children. Why should it be different for God and us? Even if God did create us, that shouldn't absolutely obligate us to follow His morals, especially if we're smart enough to figure out better ones. Considering the kinds of things God evidently thought was moral to do (e.g., Num 31:17-18 and 1 Sam 15:2-3), our morals seem to be better than His already.

BRIAN B
Hi again John, I hope you are finding this web board to be both stimulating and challenging.

POWELL:
Yes, both.

BRIAN B:
I'm not going to quote everything you said (especially since I only read your reply to me) but instead summarize my position with just a few quotes from you.

In this discussion we must remember who is making claims and who is not.

POWELL:
Yes Brian, we must remember that. By the way, you just made some claims, didn't you?

BRIAN B.
Because it is an argument begun by you, you have the burden of proof to support your argument, no matter how much you want to shift that burden.

POWELL:
Who told you that, Brian? When they made that claim to you did you ask them to support their claim or did you just accept it without needing further support? If you accepted it without supporting argument then shouldn't you concede that sometimes the person making a claim doesn't have to support their claim?

The argument you're referring to was phrased as a hypothetical argument that might be proposed by an atheist. Didn't I concede that you might be right that this hypothetical atheist might be obligated to defend his claim? Didn't I then ask you to defend your assertions? Are you going to do that, Brian, or does your burden of proof argument NOT apply in the case of you making assertions in the way you did?

BRIAN B:
Part of your argument is your claim is that it is highly probable that there exists some instance of unnecessary evil. After laying out the argument in your original post, you then say:

--- Begin quote ---
ATHEIST (to THEIST):
Are you claiming this for certain or do you mean that there very probably is no case anywhere in the universe ever of unnecessary evil? If you're making the extraordinary claim that there is absolutely or very probably no case of unnecessary evil anywhere in the universe ever in all eternity then shouldn't you defend that?
--- End quote ---

BRIAN B:
See, what you're attempting to do is shift the burden of proof off yourself and on to the Christian, which is improper. For my response to your argument, I claim nothing.

POWELL:
You seem to have trouble understanding what a claim is, Brian. Are you claiming that

"See, what you're attempting to do is shift the burden of proof off yourself and on to the Christian, which is improper. For my response to your argument, I claim nothing." ?

Did I hear you right, Brian, are you claiming that you are not claiming? What kind of confused deception are you trying to pull over on me?

If you are claiming these statements to be true, Brian, and expecting the person who claims something to be true should prove it to his listener, then please prove your claimed statements true to me, preferably using sound deductive arguments.

What I'm trying to do, Brian, is persuade you to accept that both parties have some burden of proof, although not necessarily equally. Otherwise, you can find yourself in this go - in - a - circle debate in which you are expected by me to prove your claim that "those who make claims must take the burden of proof to defend them" but YOU DON'T HAVE TO TAKE THE BURDEN of proof to defend YOUR CLAIM that they have the burden of proof.

Is this problem becoming more apparent to you?

One way to avoid the problem is to ask more questions and make fewer difficult - to - support dogmatic claims, Brian, wouldn't you agree?

BRIAN B:
I simply deny your assertion, with the burden of proof remaining on you to support your assertion.

POWELL:
Well then, Brian, if you can justifiably do that, then so can I. I deny your assertion that the burden of proof is entirely upon the person who makes the claim, with the burden of proof now remaining on you, Brian, to support your claim that the burden of proof is entirely upon the person who makes the claim. Is that ok?

BRIAN:
Have you ever heard the phrase "what is gratuitously asserted may be gratuitously denied"? It means I don't have to support my denial of your assertion, both are gratuitous.

POWELL:
I have heard the phrase now. It sounds familiar.

Please prove that maxim true if you believe it is, Brian. Also, please prove that my argument contained "gratuitous assertions." What specific sentence(s) are you referring to as being gratuitous assertion(s)? Don't you agree that to avoid hypocrisy, you need to take the full burden to prove your claimed statements true if you're going to claim that the claimant has the full burden of proof for what he claims to be true?

BRIAN B:
Since I'm making no claims (hint, to deny your claim is not the same thing as to take up defending the opposite), the burden of proof remains completely on you. You may not like it, but to be poetically sophisticated, "them's tough cookies." :)

Warm regards,
Brian

POWELL:
Are you claiming, Brian B, the following to be true statements? "Since I'm making no claims (hint, to deny your claim is not the same thing as to take up defending the opposite), the burden of proof remains completely on you. You may not like it, but to be poetically sophisticated, "them's tough cookies." :)" If you are claiming these to be true statements, Brian, then shouldn't you take the full burden of proof to demonstrate them to be true or risk the charge of hypocrisy for requiring that of others?

If you understand the following joke, Brian, then the chances are greater that you can understand the point I'm trying to make. On the other hand, if you don't understand the following joke, the chances are less that you can understand the point I'm trying to make.

Joke:
I HATE BIGOTS!!!!!!!!!!!!!

In case you still don't understand the point I'm trying to make, Brian, please consider the following claims. They are for illustration only. They are not true!

- - - - - -
I am not claiming anything, Brian. I am not typing this to you.
- - - - - -

If I were to claim that (above), Brian, would you believe me?

John Powell

MATTBALLMAN19:
Hey Brian,

I may not be following the exchange properly, so if I missed something let me know.

You say that the assertions asserted by the asserter you quoted must be proven, since the burden of proof is on him. But as I glance through the quote you extrapolated, it doesn't look like assertions at all. They look like questions!

Tell me if I misunderstood you.

POWELL:
Good job, Matt. You seem to understand that a question is not usually a claim or an assertion.

BRIAN B:
Hi Matt,

The assertion is in his original post, specifically step #4 in his argument. _That_ is the assertion that needs to be adequately argued for, otherwise it can simply be denied without requiring any argumentation on the part of the theist.

Hope that helps,
Brian

POWELL:
That 4th assertion is the following:

4. Because of our free will to do or not do evil, there is, with high probability, at least one case of unnecessary evil.

The fictional Theist in the argument did what you suggest, Brian.

POWELL:
THEIST:
I deny premise 4. There is no unnecessary evil.

POWELL:
However, like you Brian, THEIST merely asserted this without argument. If, as you say the claimant has the full burden to prove his claim, then don't you agree that this THEIST, once he made this assertion, has the full burden to prove that "There is no unnecessary evil"? If no, why not?

John Powell

John Powell

March 6th 2003, 03:05 AM

POWELL:
You evaded again, Pereynol! This is distressing.

pereynol:
John,
You think my tame remark about stalemate is an "argument from ignorance," since I don't know you, I'm somehow going to be surprised, you'll "trap" me anyhow, I'm "obstinate on the wrong issue in the wrong place," etc. Soon it'll be, "I'll get you, my pretty, and your little dog, too!"

POWELL:
Ah, Wizard of Oz. I still remember being scared as a kid while watching that.

PEREYNOL:
After reminding me of how little I know you, you proceed to embark upon a presumptuously bogus bit of psychoanalysis directed my way. Then, after I've requested that you depart from the hypotheticals and simply discuss substantive ideas, you just give me a few more hypo's anyway.

POWELL:
Are you suggesting, Pereynol, that merely valid deductive arguments are not substantive? Aren't you aware that merely valid deductive arguments are hypotheticals? Are you saying that you only wish to use sound deductive arguments? What are you saying, Pereynol?

Why won't you even consider examining hypotheticals that might make your God look bad? Is the risk that great?

PEREYNOL:
Why don't we just forbear discussing the problem of evil and turn the conversation to Nascar, the WWF, or perhaps how many microbreweries there are in the great state of Utah?

POWELL:
Evidently in order to avoid having to hypothesize about God lying, Pereynol, you wouldn't even assert that the identity statement is true. Are you so scared I'll help open doubt in your mind that you won't even concede the most basic of philosophical truth statements, namely A = A? What is wrong here?

Let's start slowly. Let's try to get back on firm, logical footing.

Is the following a valid deductive argument, Pereynol?

1. P
2. therefore, P.

where the meaning of this syllogism is "if P is true then P is true."

Please answer yes, no, or something else and explain. If it helps you, then pretend that it's a theist asking you the question.

Thanks for your indulgence,

John Powell

John Powell

March 6th 2003, 05:38 AM

PATE:
This is only a reply to Pate.

POWELL:
Are you willing to assert that premises 1, 2, and 3 are true?

PATE:
Yes, I probably am.

POWELL:
That's great.

PATE:
There is one issue that I’d like to clarify, however. When you divide evils to the categories of "necessary evil" and "unnecessary evil" in your argument, this causes certain possibities of misunderstanding when applied to my position. I think that there are many evils which are part of the current world, which are not necessary in the sense that God could not have fulfilled his purposes just as well without those evils, by using certain other means. But it’s just that the total amount of all the evil in the world would be the same or greater in the case that God would use those other means, or alternatively there would be less evil but also less good. The point is that it is necessary for God to allow some amount of evil in the world in order to fulfill his purposes.

POWELL:
Interesting. So, are you saying essentially that God adds weighting factors to the various "good" and "evil" things which might exist in the universe and maximizes the "sum of weighted good minus sum of weighted evil" difference? I like that. Surely one must assign weighting factors since some good things are "more" good and some bad things are "more" bad than others. You can't just add the number of good and bad things as if they're all equal.

However, there are problems as far as the argument of evil goes. For one thing, the weighting factors might be dependent on time or other parameters. If God considers changing things at all in the universe it seems unlikely that He will be able to obtain exactly the same absolute maximum. It seems very likely that there is only one reality that will maximize the good/evil function at any particular moment of time.

If the weighting factors are time-dependent then perhaps God must do the calculation over and over again every instant of time. Also remember, He's having to include everything which exists in the universe and every plane of existence in every calculation. That's asking a lot of your God. Wouldn't it make things a lot easier for Him if He only had to derive an acceptable reality, rather than the absolutely best reality? Perhaps we should add "Omni-fast" to His other attributes so He can do these calculations fast enough.

PATE:
This does not imply the lack of omnipotence, because those evils are the consequence of, or are needed because of, the free will that God has given to people, which we can consider to be among the greatest goods.

POWELL:
Why do you think free will is so good, Pate, when it results in so much evil? Why doesn't God just destroy our free will during our lifetimes and turn us into obedient robots while on Earth and then give us free will after we die? The decrease of good (for not having free will on Earth, for example) is surely more than offset by the much less evil that would result and the great increase of good because we all would be assured of salvation because we would be obedient, sinless, robots.

PATE:
And of course, if God chooses to create beings with free will, he can’t force them to refrain from doing any evil without violating their freedom. God cannot make a person to do something against his/her own free will and also sustain that free will at the same time. That would be contradictory.

POWELL:
I'm glad you see that.

POWELL:
If you claim there is no unnecessary evil, every evil that does exist must be a necessary evil to fulfill God's purposes, then imagine the following situation. I decide this moment to do some evil. If I were to do that evil then, according to you, it must be a necessary evil, isn't that so? So, after doing the evil, I ask you: "Was that evil I just did necessary to fulfill God's purposes?" You reply with "Yes, must have been."

Now, imagine that I change my mind before actually doing the evil, so I don't do it. I did not do an evil that was necessary to fulfill God's purposes. I frustrated God's purposes. God needed me to do the evil because it was necessary to fulfill His purposes, but I refused. Does that sound like the OmniGod you believe in?

PATE:
I don’t think that this example persuades me.

POWELL:
Ok. I'm glad you're at least considering my arguments. The arguments surely could be improved, assuming they are correct.

PATE:
The problem that immediately comes to mind is that in the actual world, you really either do or do not carry out this intention to do evil.

POWELL:
True.

If I do the evil and ask you whether it was necessary, you would probably claim something like "Yes, must have been necessary," don't you agree Pate? However, if I don't do the evil and ask you whether the thing I thought to do, but didn't was a necessary evil, you would probably claim something like "No, must not have been necessary," don't you agree Pate?

Assuming you agree to both questions above, Pate, please tell me BEFORE I make my final decision whether to do the evil or not: Is that thing I'm considering doing a necessary evil?

If you truthfully say "yes, it's necessary" and if I decide not to do it then I frustrate the purposes of God, do I not?

If you truthfully say "no, it's not necessary" and if then I do it then I would have done an evil that wasn't necessary, don't you agree?

Since you might claim ignorance about this hypothetical evil, let's replace you with God and me with Satan.

Necessary Evil Scenario with God
Satan:
God, I am considering doing an evil thing. You know what I'm thinking. Is the thing I'm considering doing a necessary evil?

If God says, "yes, it's necessary" and if Satan decides not to do it then Satan will have frustrated the purposes of God, don't you agree Pate?

If God says, "no, it's not necessary" and if Satan decides to do it then Satan will have done an evil that wasn't necessary, don't you agree Pate?

Surely God knows whether that evil is necessary or not. What should God do? Should God refuse to answer the question and quote something from the Bible? What do you think you would do if you were God, Pate?

PATE:
This reminds me a little of an atheist who said that he can prove that God can’t have foreknowledge. His "proof" was this:

First, he asked: "Can God foreknow that I’ll put white socks on tomorrow?"

I replied: "Yes."

Then he said: "But now, I’ll change my mind. I won’t put white socks on after all. I’ll use black ones instead. There you go, I just proved that God doesn’t foreknow my actions."

But obviously this is mistaken. If the situation is like the one that this atheist described, God will have foreknowledge of both his decision to put on white socks and his changing mind later.

POWELL:
EXCELLENT PATE!

I think you're ready for this, Pate, so please don't back out now. Think it through very carefully.

A theist, but foreknowledge skeptic, asks God, "God, will I put white socks on tomorrow?" God replies with . . .

If God answers "yes" and then the skeptic decides NOT to put on white socks, doesn't that mean God really didn't know?

On the other hand, if God answers "no" and the skeptic decides to put on white socks, wouldn't that also mean God didn't really know?

In other words, Pate, if the foreknowledge skeptic has free will to decide to do other than what God said the skeptic would do then doesn't that mean that God didn't really know what the skeptic would do, but that He was, at most, just predicting what the skeptic would do?

PATE:
Similarly, God foreknows what will be your eventual free choice. Therefore, if it’s the case that you’ll eventually choose to do that evil, then it’s also the case that this evil free action is part of the set of evil actions by free agents, that God chose to allow as a necessary consequence of creaturely freedom.

But God’s foreknowledge will not enable him to actualize such a world where people endowed with free will are going to always choose to do good and never to do evil at all. This is because it may be the case, that no matter what kind of circumstances God will select to create, there are always some people who will freely choose to do evil.

In short, if it will turn out that you’ll do the evil in question, then we can come to a conclusion that God chose to actualize a world in which your evil choice is among those possibilities of evil which are actualized as necessary prerequisites to the achievement of greater goods, among which is the creaturely freedom. If it will turn out that this potential evil is not actualized in this world, then it’s the case that God chose to actualize certain other evils for achieving the same purposes.

You may also object that there are many such evils in the world which do not seem to have much to do with our freedom of will, but I’ll not answer that objection before it is presented.

POWELL:
Ok for now.

POWELL:
Why shouldn't I fail to notice that? Why do you claim that free will is so good given that it results in so much evil? What is your justification for that assertion?

PATE:
My justification is the fact that most of the goods that we can conceive, are such that they have free will as prerequisite of either their existence or at least their existence in the fullest forms. I’ll just mention some of such goods that will first come to my mind:

Love, respect, justice, heroism, altruism, creativity, imagination, responsibility, rationality, gratefulness, communion.

POWELL:
Ok. But couldn't you name at least as many, if not more evils that exist due to free will that wouldn't exist without it?

POWELL:
Couldn't God have made us non-free-will robots that obeyed His will perfectly? That way there would be a lot less evil.

PATE:
Yes, it would have been possible for God to create a world in which there would have been less evil, by removing or drastically restricting our freedom. But in such a world, there would be also much less good.

POWELL:
Ok.

PATE:
With regard to the scenario of our being robots without free will, do you really find it appealing when you think about it more closely?

POWELL:
Sure. I'd give up free will and the good derived from it for a few decades of Earthlife if, in exchange, I was assured salvation. Wouldn't most people, especially those at risk to not obtain it? What other good is worth as much as that?

Matt. 16: 26 (KJV):
26 For what is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul? or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul?

PATE:
Besides, I really doubt whether such a scenario is even logically possible. Given that we currently have free will, those beings who would be robot-like, would not be "us".

POWELL:
I don't see it as being logically impossible hypothetically speaking.

Continued

John Powell

John Powell

March 6th 2003, 05:40 AM

POWELL:
What is your definition of sin?

PATE:
I’d say that sin is something like a violation against God’s perfect moral nature.

POWELL:
Is there an age of accountability before which the person automatically is saved without needing to accept Jesus?

PATE:
Perhaps. I haven’t really decided my view concerning this question, with any large degree of certainty.

POWELL:
I see.

POWELL:
If no, how about fetuses? I assume you agree that animals don't sin. Could animals have spirits? If they could, then maybe God could give us all ape-like, but non-human bodies.

PATE:
It may not be easy for us to know where exactly we shoud draw the line. It also depends on certain other assumptions, like how personality, accountability etc. are defined.

POWELL:
I'll grant there are problems, but I'm not sure the problems prohibit making the sensible conclusion that God could give us animal bodies that would not sin.

POWELL:
What greater good is there for us than eternal salvation? Wouldn't you be willing to sacrifice free will on Earth for ASSURED eternal salvation with God? I sure would. If you don't think we have any say in the manner, shouldn't an all-good God nevertheless do this great good for us of assuring all of us salvation by sacrificing our free will? I would if I were God. Would I be a better God than the one you believe in?

PATE:
I cant think of a good that I’d consider greater than eternal salvation. But the eternal salvation, in the Christian sense of the word, presupposes the existence of free will.

POWELL:
Are you sure? What if a man lives a sinless life in the body of an obedient robot or an instinct-controlled animal. Does He still need the Atonement?

PATE:
I’m not sure at all that "salvation" of robots without freedom would be a very great good.

POWELL:
Perhaps not, but it's looking good to me.

PATE:
And again, I think that your question "Wouldn't you be willing to sacrifice free will on Earth for ASSURED eternal salvation with God?" is mistaken, in a way that somewhat resembles the question "would you be annoyed if you didn’t exist?". I don’t think that I, a being who has free will, could possibly exist if there would be no free will.

POWELL:
Why not? Can't the spirit of man occupy a robot body or an instinct-driven animal?

POWELL:
Perhaps the knowledge of God isn't so much superior to ours than you think. Given science problem passages in the Bible (for example, Gen 1), it appears that God didn't understand some things as well as we do today.

PATE:
I don’t think that the issues of Biblical interpretation and errancy/inerrancy are very essential to our current discussion.

POWELL:
Ok for now.

PATE:
Finally, we'll return to the issue of an additional challenge that an atheist has to face if he or she intends to use the problem of evil as an argument against the existence of God:

On what basis do you make the value judgement that some things are evil. What is the standard of good and evil?

POWELL:
Our moral codes, which are based on our genetics and experience with the universe, in particular with each other. We each look at a thing and judge its "goodness / badness." The subjective standard is that for each individual. The objective standard is what is common for large groups, specifically of expert authorities. The larger the group which agrees, the more "objective" the standard. Universal standards are those which all expert authorities agree with.

PATE:
Any man-made moral codes are not truly objective.

POWELL:
In the way you define "objective" perhaps not, but they can be in the way I define "objective" and, I think, in the way almost all people use the term "objective."

PATE:
They are more or less widely held subjective opinions.

POWELL:
Right. Absolutely subjective (perhaps the opinion of a single person) and absolutely Objective or universal (the agreed upon opinion of every single person) are opposite ends of a spectrum. As more and more people agree with a moral principle, that principle becomes less subjective and more objective. Objectivity comes in degrees.

PATE:
They express personal preferences, some of which are more widely held than others. There would not be truly binding moral truths, not objective moral obligations or rights.

POWELL:
Fine. I've resigned myself to that for the present.

PATE:
Clearly certain action in certain context cannot be both objectively right and objectively wrong, even if some some people expert authorities believe it to be "right" and others "wrong".

POWELL:
By your definition maybe not.

Why don't you imagine going back in time and asking the Midianites and Amalekites whether it would be morally right, according to their pagan god, for the Jews to kill them as the Bible records it.

PATE:
If morality is merely subjective, there is not morally binding obligations that a person can impose to another. A person can threaten another with consequences enforced by a society as a result of certain action, of course, but that’s a different matter.

POWELL:
That's what we have. Welcome to the real world.

POWELL:
The theist seems to decide that one specific being's subjective opinion, namely God's, is the standard. That's a choice the theist can make, to rely on the opinion of a single expert authority, but it seems to be statistically / objectively inferior to using lots of apparently moral human beings.

PATE:
Given that God is the ultimate ground of all existence and has perfect knowledge, I dare to doubt your claim that he’s "objectively inferior" to human authorities.

POWELL:
Given the apparent behavior of God in the Bible (e.g., Num 31:17-18 and 1 Sam 15:2-3), God appears to be less moral than the average human being of our day.

PATE:
A detailed discussion of this matter is probably outside the scope of this discussion. It’s far from clear that these examples present God as "less moral than average human being of our day" (you’re assuming objective moral standard again, by the way).

POWELL:
I don't think I'm doing that. I think I'm assuming our "subjective" (as you say) morality of today as the moral standard.

PATE:
And in any case, because I’m not very committed to the doctrine of inerrancy, there’s always the easy way out of this problem available for me, as well as for anyone who doesn’t think that Inerrancy is a necessary belief for a Christian.

POWELL:
It is easier for errantists, that's true, but it might not be quite as easy as you think.

PATE:
You can find quite exhaustive discussion of issues of this kind from Glenn Miller’s site. See for example http://www.christian-thinktank.com/qamorite.html I also believe that J. P. Holding may be willing to discuss this issue in detail with you, if that’s something that you want to do. It might be better to start a new thread for that discusion, however.

POWELL:
I have to wait my turn for James.

PATE:
I don't see how such a concept can fit the atheistic worldview. Therefore, if the atheist insist that there are instances of real, objective evil in the world, he/she is, perhaps without realizing it, actually putting forward a theistic, not an atheistic argument. That argument runs as follows:

1. If God does not exist, then objective moral values do not exist.
2. Evil exists.
3. Therfore, objective moral values do exist.
4. Therefore, God exists.

POWELL:
There's a missing conditional needed to make this a valid deductive argument.

POWELL:
Are you going to fix your argument, Pate, to make it valid or did you have another purpose in proposing an invalid argument?

POWELL:
By "objective" I mean based on the opinions of expert authorities. It is expected that they will base their opinions on the correspondence of those opinions to reality, in other words, truth. Unfortunately, that's not always the case. Welcome to the real world.

PATE:
I wouldn’t accept your definition of "objective", as I have already made clear. If we also take it as a given that talk about evil is meaningful only if there is objective standard for moral values, then it’s clear that one can’t rationally accept the premises of this argument without accepting its conclusion. Maybe I should have presented these concepts in a more detailed fashion in the context of this argument in my previous post.

POWELL:
What is your definition of "objective"?

If you believe there are absolute objective moral standards / values could you name a few that are

1. absolute
2. objective
and
3. moral?

Thanks.

John Powell

Pereynol of Sheer Dread

March 6th 2003, 08:27 AM

John,
You're definitely losing my interest in a big way; if all you've got is equivocations about "hypotheticals" and taunts about the law of identity, mixed with a little malicious psychobabble---well, I'll pass....

But on a more serious note: you may well still be saved, even if you think you've blasphemed the Spirit.

psychopath

March 6th 2003, 02:47 PM

You said:

"Do you agree with the following argument?

If AN ELECRON exists, isn't it, by default, necessary? If it was unnecessary, then there would be a possibility of it not being so; however, since it exists, it must be so - it is necessary. Therefore, God wouldn't be able to remove an unnecessary ELECTRON, because such doesn't exist."

Yes.

You said:

"In the present context, however, I think we're referring to "necessary to fulfill God's purposes" or something like that."

So would you consider this a fair rendering of your original argument? (I'm basically just plugging in the phrase you provided for "unnecessary evil.")

1. If an OmniGod existed then no evil not necessary to fulfill his purposes would exist.

2. If God is all-powerful then He would have the power to remove all evil not necessary for the fulfillment of his purposes.

3. If God is all-good then He should remove all evil not necessary to fulfill his purposes.

4. Because of our free will to do or not do evil, there is, with high probability, at least one case of evil not necessary to fulfill God's purposes.

5. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that an OmniGod exists.

I will abstain from critiquing this form of the argument until you affirm that it is a correct representation of what you mean.

Peace.

mattbballman19

March 6th 2003, 04:54 PM

howdy john

I don’t think that last sentence follows, Matt. Is a child absolutely obligated to live the moral standards of his parents? I don’t think so. Children usually do follow the moral standards of their parents to some extent and they are often punished for trying to live their own moral standards. In a way parents "create" their children. Why should it be different for us and God? Even if God did create us, that shouldn’t absolutely obligate us to follow His morals, especially if we’re smart enough to figure out better ones.

Sure, I’ll admit that our parents created un “in a way”, but I don’t see how that way completely corresponds to ‘way’ in which the creative relationship exists between two ontologically different beings. So, this idea of ontological separation, in my mind, counts as a sufficient reason for saying that the creative relationship between us and God is different than children and their parents. I also see that this specific ontological separation, which was overcome in God’s creative decree to make the human ontology to involve (this being extrapolated from biblical notions) a kind of imprinting of the creator’s image upon the created (specifically human beings). I believe that this ‘image’ is sufficient for us to conclude a kind of moral finger-print (which Paul expounds upon in the first two chapters in Romans). This moral implanting is somewhat different than any arbitrary standards that are attempted to be upheld by an authority of equal ontology. Absolute obligation, I think, is something which we don’t have a choice. Even in your complaint, you say that things shouldn’t be the way you think they are now. This implies that there is a way there should be: and I think that this ’should be’ is the very thing that you’re objecting to; namely God’s standard. So, you cut off the branch you’re sitting on by complaining about something, which consists in your very privileges to complain in the first place. Also, your idea of our discovering ‘better’ values than the ones given to us by the cause of not only these values, but also the cognitive faculties designed to find this alleged ‘better’ values entails the absurd philosophical notion that an effect can be greater than a cause, which I see no good reason to except.

Considering the kinds of things God evidently thought was moral to do (e.g., Num 31:17-18 and 1 Sam 15:2-3), our morals seem to be better than His already.

I have never really seen the sense of just hurling verses out into the open expecting that whatever your conclusion is to magically be made evident. I’m not going to look at these verses and say, “Darn! That does it, I’m converting to atheism right now!”

For Numbers, a site that helped me was: http://www.christian-thinktank.com/midian.html

For 1 Sam: see http://www.christian-thinktank.com/rbutcher1.html and http://www.tektonics.org/mercy.html

matt

Pereynol of Sheer Dread

March 6th 2003, 09:47 PM

03-06-2003 @ 02:05 AM
John Powell:

POWELL:
You evaded again, Pereynol! This is distressing.

POWELL:
Are you suggesting, Pereynol, that merely valid deductive arguments are not substantive? Aren't you aware that merely valid deductive arguments are hypotheticals? Are you saying that you only wish to use sound deductive arguments? What are you saying, Pereynol?

Why won't you even consider examining hypotheticals that might make your God look bad? Is the risk that great?

I'm going to illustrate a few nuances of language and logic for John's benefit, as he needs some instruction. John needs to recognize the difference between a hypothetical "scenario" and a hypothetical argument, since he has been equivocating the two.

The following is a hypothetical "scenario":

Let us suppose that the moon is made of green cheese.

There is no argument here---merely a suggestion that we indulge in a bit of fantasy, either just for fun, or for some hitherto unrevealed purpose. But in either case, there is no argumentation involved. However, we could easily convert the above into a true hypothetical statement of the "if/then" variety, thus:

If the moon is made of green cheese, then the pixies have plenty to eat.

Now we still don't have much of an argument, but we do have an assertion which could become a premise in a hypothetical syllogism, a modus ponens, or a modus tollens, or a more complex argument. We'll go for the hypothetical syllogism, in order to illustrate what a hypothetical argument is:

If the moon is made of green cheese, then the pixies have plenty to eat.

If the pixies have plenty to eat, then the pixies belch green dust.
___________________________________________________
Therefore, if the moon is made of green cheese, then pixies belch green dust.

When translated into symbolic form, the above argument looks like this:

M > E
E > D
_____
M > D

What John just did above was to say that, since I complained about his use of hypothetical "scenarios" and asked that he dispense with these scenarios and present his substantial ideas plainly, I have therefore asked that he refrain from making hypothetical arguments, as if the two were the same thing. Since the two aren't the same thing, John was fallaciously equivocating them. My little illustration above is intended to make John's equivocating clear.

What I want from John is for him to dispense with the hypothetical "scenario," which is a rhetorical device, and just make plain arguments, hypothetical or otherwise. I don't expect him to convert all his statements into strict logical forms necessarily, but I'd like him to just come out and say what he thinks. I don't know if John was equivocating because he knows no better, or because he thought that doing so was a good obfuscating tactic that might be to his advantage. Either way, it doesn't help his case.

Evidently in order to avoid having to hypothesize about God lying, Pereynol, you wouldn't even assert that the identity statement is true. Are you so scared I'll help open doubt in your mind that you won't even concede the most basic of philosophical truth statements, namely A = A? What is wrong here?

Here's another bit of ostensible blather from John. This time, he's making assumptions about why I didn't respond to one of his increasingly tedious and vacuous pieces of rhetoric. To make his assumption sound more solid, John turns it into a taunt and couches it in the most remedial bits of logic, that of the law of identity. Because I am getting plumb tired of John's games, I didn't answer---not because I'm afraid, as he assumes, not because I have denied the law of identity, as he hints, but because I'm getting bored by John's mounting lack of substance which he is veiling underneath this kind of nonsense.

As yet, there's much I have posted that John has neglected to answer, but I'll not insist that the reason for this lies in that he is so obtuse that he can't recognize some basic logical concept or that he's so scared of me he's nearly about to soil himself. I think John's an intelligent guy, and I'm not out to insult him. I'm only asking that he refrain from these inane rhetorical tactics of his.

What'ya say John, can we be straight with one another?

John Powell

March 6th 2003, 10:12 PM

POWELL:
Comments to Pereynol only.

pereynol:
John,
You're definitely losing my interest in a big way; if all you've got is equivocations about "hypotheticals" and taunts about the law of identity, mixed with a little malicious psychobabble---well, I'll pass....

POWELL:
But, Pereynol, merely valid deductive arguments are hypotheticals! Didn't you know that? Are you saying you refuse to consider such arguments when God might be seen in bad light?

Why didn't you answer my simple question about whether "if P then P" is a valid deductive argument, Pereynol? I would like for you to concede to that before I go the next step with you.

You seem to have put your mind into a vice grip: I WON'T CONSIDER HYPOTHETICALS IF GOD MIGHT LOOK BAD! You're not letting your mind free to consider alternatives, Pereynol. How can a hypothetical hurt God? How can words make God change? They can't!

It would be nice if I could bash your brain a few times to free you from the lock you've put on your mind. Unfortunately, you would probably refuse the treatment, so I guess the smilie will have to do.:bonk:

If you refuse to even answer this simple question about the identity principle, I guess you will have proven to be the better prophet than I.

PEREYNOL:
In any event, after having read tons of arguments pro and con on both issues, it is my firm conviction that two intelligent and informed opponents can only reach a stalemate in the end.

POWELL:
Argument from ignorance. You don't know me.

POWELL:
The stalemate in our case appears to be that you will not budge from your philosophical position that if God is used in a valid deductive argument or a hypothetical scenario in possibly bad light then a believer cannot, with good conscience, even consider the argument or the scenario without risking eternal damnation. Isn't that right, Pereynol?

Apparently, the prophecy will have been fulfilled in a contrived way by your own desire to insulate your beliefs about God from scrutiny.

PEREYNOL:
But on a more serious note: you may well still be saved, even if you think you've blasphemed the Spirit.

POWELL:
Fine. Unless I really did blaspheme, rather than just thought I did, then it might be pardonable. Is that your point?

When you feel secure enough in your beliefs, more willing to seriously consider valid deductive arguments or hypotheticals in which God might possibly look bad, come see me, ok? I don't want to force you here to do something that is against your objective moral code even if I think it could be good for you. That could be a violation of my own subjective moral code.

John Powell:hi:

John Powell

March 6th 2003, 10:34 PM

POWELL:
Do you agree with the following argument?

If AN ELECRON exists, isn't it, by default, necessary? If it was unnecessary, then there would be a possibility of it not being so; however, since it exists, it must be so - it is necessary. Therefore, God wouldn't be able to remove an unnecessary ELECTRON, because such doesn't exist.

PSYCHOPATH:
Yes.

POWELL:
Then you are being consistent, Psychopath. That's good. Your meaning of "necessary" (a kind of logical necessity) does not appear to match mine in the argument.

POWELL:
In the present context, however, I think we're referring to "necessary to fulfill God's purposes" or something like that.

PSYCHOPATH:
So would you consider this a fair rendering of your original argument? (I'm basically just plugging in the phrase you provided for "unnecessary evil.")

1. If an OmniGod existed then no evil not necessary to fulfill his purposes would exist.

2. If God is all-powerful then He would have the power to remove all evil not necessary for the fulfillment of his purposes.

3. If God is all-good then He should remove all evil not necessary to fulfill his purposes.

4. Because of our free will to do or not do evil, there is, with high probability, at least one case of evil not necessary to fulfill God's purposes.

5. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that an OmniGod exists.

POWELL:
I think so, yes, except I try to always capitalize divine pronouns. It's to avoid lightning, you know. :wink:

I should have made that "to fulfill God's purposes" explicit in my original arguments, but I hadn't thought enough about it. I may need to change the argument even more since some people are arguing that good can exist without evil. In that case, we probably shouldn't have any evil at all.

JOKE:
A priest was skipping Mass to play golf. The Reverend Mother went out to the course to try to bring him to his senses. As she approached him, he sliced one.

"Damn, I missed," the priest said.

"You must return to your duties, father," the Reverend Mother insisted.

The priest ignored her and hit another ball. This one he pulled badly. "Damn, I missed."

"What is wrong with you? I wish I had some soap to wash out your mouth. Please come back to the church."

He ignored her and hit a third ball. This one dropped in the water.
"Damn, I missed."

"God will strike you down, Father."

Just then a thunder storm quickly developed. Soon a lightning bolt came out of a nearby cloud and struck the Reverend Mother dead. Out of the clouds was heard a voice, "Damn, I missed.":lol:

If you can't laugh about the divine and about yourself, you're probably suffering unnecessary psycho-emotional difficulties.

PSYCHOPATH:
I will abstain from critiquing this form of the argument until you affirm that it is a correct representation of what you mean.

Peace.

POWELL:
That's considerate of you.

John Powell

John Powell

March 7th 2003, 12:24 AM

MATTBALLMAN19:
howdy john

POWELL:
Howdy, Matt.

POWELL:
I don't think that last sentence follows, Matt. Is a child absolutely obligated to live the moral standards of his parents? I don't think so. Children usually do follow the moral standards of their parents to some extent and they are often punished for trying to live their own moral standards. In a way parents "create" their children. Why should it be different for us and God? Even if God did create us, that shouldn't absolutely obligate us to follow His morals, especially if we're smart enough to figure out better ones.

MATTBALLMAN19:
Sure, I'll admit that our parents created un "in a way", but I don't see how that way completely corresponds to ‘way' in which the creative relationship exists between two ontologically different beings.

POWELL:
What's your definition of "ontological," Matt?

Are we and God so different, Matt, that analogies such as I gave aren't helpful? When you pray, Matt, and when the vast majority of people pray to God is there a human face at the other end?

MATTBALLMAN19:
So, this idea of ontological separation, in my mind, counts as a sufficient reason for saying that the creative relationship between us and God is different than children and their parents.

POWELL:
Well, yes different, but are they different enough? "Different" comes in degrees, doesn't it?

MATTBALLMAN19:
I also see that this specific ontological separation, which was overcome in God's creative decree to make the human ontology to involve (this being extrapolated from biblical notions) a kind of imprinting of the creator's image upon the created (specifically human beings). I believe that this ‘image' is sufficient for us to conclude a kind of moral finger-print (which Paul expounds upon in the first two chapters in Romans).

POWELL:
What is your definition of "image," Matt?

MATTBALLMAN19:
This moral implanting is somewhat different than any arbitrary standards that are attempted to be upheld by an authority of equal ontology. Absolute obligation, I think, is something which we don't have a choice. Even in your complaint, you say that things shouldn't be the way you think they are now. This implies that there is a way there should be: and I think that this 'should be' is the very thing that you're objecting to; namely God's standard.

So, you cut off the branch you're sitting on by complaining about something, which consists in your very privileges to complain in the first place.

POWELL:
Perhaps.

MATTBALLMAN19:
Also, your idea of our discovering ‘better' values than the ones given to us by the cause of not only these values, but also the cognitive faculties designed to find this alleged ‘better' values entails the absurd philosophical notion that an effect can be greater than a cause, which I see no good reason to except.

POWELL:
Couldn't parents be considered the "cause" of the existence of their children, Matt? Couldn't these children, these "effects," become GREATER than their cause, namely their parents? By analogy, why can't we, the spirit children of God (according to Mormons), become greater than God our parent? Why does God use the "parent-child" analogy if He doesn't expect us to use it as much as possible to better understand our relationship to Him?

POWELL:
Considering the kinds of things God evidently thought was moral to do (e.g., Num 31:17-18 and 1 Sam 15:2-3), our morals seem to be better than His already.

MATTBALLMAN19:
I have never really seen the sense of just hurling verses out into the open expecting that whatever your conclusion is to magically be made evident. I'm not going to look at these verses and say, "Darn! That does it, I'm converting to atheism right now!"

For Numbers, a site that helped me was: http://www.christian-thinktank.com/midian.html

For 1 Sam: see http://www.christian-thinktank.com/rbutcher1.html and http://www.tektonics.org/mercy.html

matt

POWELL:
Those articles are surprisingly long for such a simple question, was God justified? I wonder if the authors thought that they could win the day simply by tiring the readers into agreement.

If you want to defend the three articles you gave links for, Matt, I am at your service. Post what you are willing to defend that you think justifies your God and I will reply.

Here are the "facts" and arguments in a nutshell as I see them.

Midianites. Num 31:17-18

God orders the Midianites killed (for whatever evil the adults had done). God also orders killed innocent fetuses and male children. Why? He orders that the innocent girl virgins be given as wives to the Israelite men. Why, if it wasn't to make babies for them? God could have come up with a better plan, I would think, but didn't. Why not?

If God were omniscient, He should have been able to figure out a better plan (assuming there was one). If God were omnipotent, He could have executed a better plan. If God were omnibenevolent, He should have executed a better plan. God did not execute a better plan, so He probably is not be an Omnibeing.

Amalekites. 1 Sam 15:2-3

God orders the Amalekites killed for something their ancestors had done about 400 years earlier. God also orders killed not only the innocent fetuses and male children, but also the virgin girls. Why didn't God come up with a better plan?

If God were omniscient, He should have been able to figure out a better plan (assuming there was one). If God were omnipotent, He could have executed a better plan. If God were omnibenevolent, He should have executed a better plan. God did not execute a better plan, so He probably is not be an Omnibeing.

Here's some background for a scenario.

1 Kings 22:19-23 (similar to II Chr 18:18-22):
19 And he said, Hear thou therefore the word of the LORD: I saw the LORD sitting on his throne, and all the host of heaven standing by him on his right hand and on his left.

20 And the LORD said, Who shall persuade Ahab, that he may go up and fall at Ramoth-gilead? And one said on this manner, and another said on that manner.

21 And there came forth a spirit, and stood before the LORD, and said, I will persuade him.

22 And the LORD said unto him, Wherewith? And he said, I will go forth, and I will be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets. And he said, Thou shalt persuade him, and prevail also: go forth, and do so.

23 Now therefore, behold, the LORD hath put a lying spirit in the mouth of all these thy prophets, and the LORD hath spoken evil concerning thee.

SCENARIO FOR MATT:
Now, Matt, imagine that you are a spirit called to the presence of God. God asks what He should do about the Midianites and the Amalekites. He indicates that He wants an answer that will demonstrate His greatness to skeptics of 1000s of years into the future.

What are some things you might suggest that God do, Matt? Is killing innocent fetuses and male children, but giving the innocent girl virgins as compulsory wives something you would suggest? Is killing the innocent children for the sins of their parents or their ancestors something you would suggest?

Use that great mind of yours, Matt, and try to come up with some solutions to God's problem. Please do not refuse to try because to even try would degrade God and would put you at risk of eternal damnation. Give it an honest chance before you admit God is wiser than you are. Surely, God won't be offended, would He?

John Powell

psychopath

March 7th 2003, 01:58 AM

You said:

"If you can't laugh about the divine and about yourself, you're probably suffering unnecessary psycho-emotional difficulties."

I admit it; I laughed.

Now, on to your slightly revised form of the argument from evil.

1. If an OmniGod existed then no evil not necessary to fulfill his purposes would exist.

2. If God is all-powerful then He would have the power to remove all evil not necessary for the fulfillment of his purposes.

3. If God is all-good then He should remove all evil not necessary to fulfill his purposes.

4. Because of our free will to do or not do evil, there is, with high probability, at least one case of evil not necessary to fulfill God's purposes.

5. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that an OmniGod exists.

The evil that you seem to be implying exists and is not necessary to fulfill God's purposes comes from the actions of men, i.e., is moral evil (as opposed to natural disasters, etc.). I gather this from statement #4, in which you mention man's "free will to do or not do evil." (Oh yeah, let me know if I'm misrepresenting your point of view.) So I think the argument, ultimately, goes back to why the God of the Bible created man, and whether he could have realized the goals for which he created them without allowing for the possibility of moral evil.

If God is perfect, he cannot have needs - such would imply some sort of lack, in which case he would be imperfect. However, I see no problem with him having wants. A need implies lacking something one cannot exist without; a want implies not having something that one can exist without, but that one would rather exist with. I think God has wants, two of which he fulfilled in the creation of man: to be glorified, and to have a familial relationship with other beings.

So, in order to fulfill these wants (or, to switch to your term, purposes), what choices did God have with respect to man's free will or lack thereof? I think, ostensibly, there are 3 possibilities:

1) God creates man without free will. Men are forced to glorify God and to engage in a familial relationship with him.

2) God creates man with a free will, but in such a way that they always choose the course of action that best furthers the fulfillment of the aforementioned purposes.

3) God creates man with a free will, with the ability to choose courses of action that work against the fulfillment of those purposes. That is, God allows for the possibility of the existence of moral evil.

#1 will not allow for the fulfillment of God's purposes of being glorified and having a familial relationship with man, because we are essentially his dummies to "ventriloquize." One is not truly being glorified or entering into a relationship if he is also the one doing the glorifying and acting on the other end of the relationship.

#2, IMO, is actually the same as #1. If God creates humans so they always choose the course of action that fulfills his purposes, there really is no choice. If I choose to do something, it is implied that I could have done otherwise. But if man is created so he always "chooses" in accordance with God's purposes, then one does NOT have the ability to do otherwise - God programmed him without this ability. Thus, though this option would seem different than #1, I think it is exactly the same situation, and the same explanation I gave for #1 applies.

This leaves only #3, which allows for the existence of moral evil. Therefore, in order for God's purposes to be fulfilled, I believe that the existence of moral evil, i.e., "our free will to do or not do evil," is necessary. And this explanation does indeed allow for God's purposes to be fulfilled: man can truly choose to glorify God, and enter into a familial relationship with him.

So, to bring this all together, I would deny your 4th premise, because evil deriving from the moral action of men is necessary for the fulfillment of God's purposes.

Excuse me if someone else has already raised this objection; I didn't take the time to read through the entire thread.

Peace.

Pate

March 7th 2003, 02:41 AM

John,

It may take a while before I have time to respond, but please don't take this as an indication that I'm backing out. I do want to continue our discussion. But like I already said before, my debate with Steven Carr must be my number one priority in this forum right now and I'm not sure how much time I've got for other discussions here. I have a life outside of TWeb also. :smile:

John Powell

March 7th 2003, 03:15 AM

POWELL:
You evaded again, Pereynol! This is distressing.

POWELL:
Are you suggesting, Pereynol, that merely valid deductive arguments are not substantive? Aren't you aware that merely valid deductive arguments are hypotheticals? Are you saying that you only wish to use sound deductive arguments? What are you saying, Pereynol?

Why won't you even consider examining hypotheticals that might make your God look bad? Is the risk that great?

PEREYNOL:
I'm going to illustrate a few nuances of language and logic for John's benefit, as he needs some instruction. John needs to recognize the difference between a hypothetical "scenario" and a hypothetical argument, since he has been equivocating the two.

POWELL:
I'm a fast learner, Pereynol, so go ahead and teach me.

PEREYNOL:
The following is a hypothetical "scenario":

Let us suppose that the moon is made of green cheese.

There is no argument here---merely a suggestion that we indulge in a bit of fantasy, either just for fun, or for some hitherto unrevealed purpose. But in either case, there is no argumentation involved. However, we could easily convert the above into a true hypothetical statement of the "if/then" variety, thus:

If the moon is made of green cheese, then the pixies have plenty to eat.

Now we still don't have much of an argument, but we do have an assertion which could become a premise in a hypothetical syllogism, a modus ponens, or a modus tollens, or a more complex argument.

POWELL:
If you think M.P. is a fine argument, Pereynol, then you have a fine argument with just the conditional because you're not really linguistically saying anything more by converting it into M.P. All you'd be doing essentially is adding "if the moon is made of green cheese" as a second premise and "then the pixies have plenty to eat" as the conclusion, making an essentially circular argument. Perhaps you'd like to consider the arguments I've already posted on this matter.

Maybe I could teach you something.

PEREYNOL:
We'll go for the hypothetical syllogism, in order to illustrate what a hypothetical argument is:

If the moon is made of green cheese, then the pixies have plenty to eat.

If the pixies have plenty to eat, then the pixies belch green dust.
___________________________________________________
Therefore, if the moon is made of green cheese, then pixies belch green dust.

When translated into symbolic form, the above argument looks like this:

M > E
E > D
_____
M > D

POWELL:
Was there a question you wanted to ask me about these pixies, Pereynol? What did you want me to do about them? Did you want me to pretend I'm one and tell you how I feel about belching green dust? I'LL DO IT if that's what you want from me so that you'll feel more willing to do the God-related scenarios that you seem to think are flights of fantasy.

PEREYNOL:
What John just did above was to say that, since I complained about his use of hypothetical "scenarios" and asked that he dispense with these scenarios and present his substantial ideas plainly, I have therefore asked that he refrain from making hypothetical arguments, as if the two were the same thing. Since the two aren't the same thing, John was fallaciously equivocating them. My little illustration above is intended to make John's equivocating clear.

POWELL:
Do you think you succeeded in making this clear, Pereynol?

PEREYNOL:
What I want from John is for him to dispense with the hypothetical "scenario,"; which is a rhetorical device, and just make plain arguments, hypothetical or otherwise. I don't expect him to convert all his statements into strict logical forms necessarily, but I'd like him to just come out and say what he thinks. I don't know if John was equivocating because he knows no better, or because he thought that doing so was a good obfuscating tactic that might be to his advantage. Either way, it doesn't help his case.

POWELL:
What I want from you, Pereynol, is for you to define your terms. I keep asking you to define your philosophical terms and you keep refusing to answer. Now, I'm asking you: what is an "argument" according to you?

Here's a definition that seems fine for my present purposes.

www.dictionary.com
Argument
1a A discussion in which disagreement is expressed; a debate.

[Middle English, from Old French, from Latin argumentum, from arguere, to make clear. See argue.]

Synonyms: argument, dispute, controversy

These nouns denote discussion involving conflicting points of view. Argument stresses the advancement by each side of facts and reasons intended to persuade the other side:

POWELL:
Wouldn't my scenarios, Pereynol, even if they were not put into a more formal argument form such as a syllogism, still constitute the "advancement" of a "discussion in which disagreement is expressed" perhaps even "of facts and reasons" in order to "make clear" in order to "persuade the other side"?

POWELL:
Evidently in order to avoid having to hypothesize about God lying, Pereynol, you wouldn't even assert that the identity statement is true. Are you so scared I'll help open doubt in your mind that you won't even concede the most basic of philosophical truth statements, namely A = A? What is wrong here?

PEREYNOL:
Here's another bit of ostensible blather from John. This time, he's making assumptions about why I didn't respond to one of his increasingly tedious and vacuous pieces of rhetoric. To make his assumption sound more solid, John turns it into a taunt and couches it in the most remedial bits of logic, that of the law of identity. Because I am getting plumb tired of John's games, I didn't answer---not because I'm afraid, as he assumes, not because I have denied the law of identity, as he hints, but because I'm getting bored by John's mounting lack of substance which he is veiling underneath this kind of nonsense.

As yet, there's much I have posted that John has neglected to answer, but I'll not insist that the reason for this lies in that he is so obtuse that he can't recognize some basic logical concept or that he's so scared of me he's nearly about to soil himself.

POWELL:
I'm behind in replying to you. I'll get to them.

PEREYNOL:
I think John's an intelligent guy, and I'm not out to insult him. I'm only asking that he refrain from these inane rhetorical tactics of his.

What'ya say John, can we be straight with one another?

POWELL:
Sure, Pereynol. When will you give me sincere responses to my scenarios rather than "rejections"? I must think they're important, so why won't you indulge me if they don't take too long to answer? If you have scenarios that you'd like me to give my serious attention to then post them. They can even be about green dust belching pixies who have plenty to eat on a Moon made of green cheese. If you want me to give serious consideration to it, I'll do it.

Here's a scenario/argument put into informal and formal forms. I hope you'll seriously consider it and post your reply.

Informal foreknowledge-free-will Scenario:
Imagine a theist named Peter with free will who is skeptical of God's foreknowledge. He has a choice of A or B. He asks God, "Since people claim you know the future, God, please tell me, will I pick A or B? Let me warn you that whatever you tell me, I'm going to do the opposite."

God says . . .

If God says "B" then Peter does A and God is wrong.

However, if God says "A" then Peter does B and God is wrong.

Regardless whether God says "A" or "B" God will be wrong if Peter does the opposite. Therefore, God could not know whether Peter would do A or B if Peter has free will. Therefore, in at least this case, God could not know the future. At most God could predict what Peter might do. What do you think, Pereynol? Are you persuaded to accept that God cannot know the future if we have free will?

More Formal foreknowledge-free-will Argument:
1. If P has free will then P can choose A or B despite what G foretells.
2. If G knows the future and if G honestly foretells A or B then G will be right.
3. If G foretells B and P chooses A then G will not be right.
4. If G foretells A and P chooses B then G will not be right.
5. Therefore, G either does not know the future or G is not honest or P does not have free will.

More symbolically:
1. If FW then A or B
2. If NF and HF then R
3. If A then not R
4. If B then not R
5. therefore, not NF or not HF or not FW

What do you think, Pereynol? Are you persuaded to accept that God cannot know the future if we have free will?

The formal argument took a whole lot longer to come up with than the informal scenario and may ultimately be less persuasive because of possible problems with it.

John Powell

Pereynol of Sheer Dread

March 7th 2003, 09:45 AM

03-07-2003 @ 02:15 AM
John Powell
If you think M.P. is a fine argument, Pereynol, then you have a fine argument with just the conditional because you're not really linguistically saying anything more by converting it into M.P.

No. The conditional alone is not equivalent to the entire argument. Here is a modus ponens:

If P then Q
P
---------------
Therefore Q

To say that adding the second premise adds nothing to the conditional is patently wrong. The conditional alone only asserts the relation between P and Q; it doesn't tell us whether we actually have P or Q. The second premise tells us that we actually have P, so because we know that the if/then relation is true from the conditional, we can then conclude "Q." But without the second premise, we can draw no conclusion at all. You cannot move from "If P then Q" directly to "Therefore Q" without "P." It cannot be done.

Morevoer, modus ponens isn't just a syllogistic structure, it is also a rule of inference! So, by the way, is the hypothetical syllogism. You have confused the two below:

All you'd be doing essentially is adding "if the moon is made of green cheese" as a second premise and "then the pixies have plenty to eat" as the conclusion, making an essentially circular argument.

My example was a Hypothetical syllogism, not an MP, and every logician uses both MP and HS as rules of inference. In the HS proper, the conclusion is also a conditional. (See above.)

The fact that you think a mere conditional statement = MP, and the fact that you failed to distinguish MP from HS explains a lot with respect to your former assertions about "hypotheticals." It also makes sense that you cannot seem to distinguish the diffierence between a hypothetical "scenario" and a valid argument.

Pereynol of Sheer Dread

March 7th 2003, 11:34 AM

03-07-2003 @ 02:15 AM
John Powell:

Informal foreknowledge-free-will Scenario:
Imagine a theist named Peter with free will who is skeptical of God's foreknowledge. He has a choice of A or B. He asks God, "Since people claim you know the future, God, please tell me, will I pick A or B? Let me warn you that whatever you tell me, I'm going to do the opposite."

God says . . .

If God says "B" then Peter does A and God is wrong.

However, if God says "A" then Peter does B and God is wrong.

Regardless whether God says "A" or "B" God will be wrong if Peter does the opposite. Therefore, God could not know whether Peter would do A or B if Peter has free will. Therefore, in at least this case, God could not know the future. At most God could predict what Peter might do. What do you think, Pereynol? Are you persuaded to accept that God cannot know the future if we have free will?

More Formal foreknowledge-free-will Argument:
1. If P has free will then P can choose A or B despite what G foretells.
2. If G knows the future and if G honestly foretells A or B then G will be right.
3. If G foretells B and P chooses A then G will not be right.
4. If G foretells A and P chooses B then G will not be right.
5. Therefore, G either does not know the future or G is not honest or P does not have free will.

More symbolically:
1. If FW then A or B
2. If NF and HF then R
3. If A then not R
4. If B then not R
5. therefore, not NF or not HF or not FW

What do you think, Pereynol? Are you persuaded to accept that God cannot know the future if we have free will?

The formal argument took a whole lot longer to come up with than the informal scenario and may ultimately be less persuasive because of possible problems with it.

John,
Thanks for posting an entire argument rather than rhetorical fragments. There are several weaknesses here, and your symbolism needs help, but the most problematic thing about this argument is that all your premises are conditionals and your conclusion does not follow. I imagine that these difficulties partly arise from your misunderstandings which I detailed in my previous post.

Since all your premises are conditionals, your conclusion cannot really work the way it currently stands. Ideally, you'd need the sort of premises which you've previously seen no need for, like the kind found in the second premise of a MP. As the argument stands now, you could conclude another conditional, but that wouldn't tell us anything about God's actual knowlege, his actual honesty, or whether or not Peter actually has free will. A second option would be to replace a conditional with a disjuction by the rule of material implication. But, though you have indeed concluded a disjunction, it doesn't follow the rule. Further, if you did succeed in replacing a conditional conclusion with a disjunction, you'd still have the same problems I mentioned earlier, that is, your conclusion would entail that either God does have foreknowledge or that he does not, but such a conclusion tells us nothing about God's actual knowledge, only about the either/or relation.

Formal concerns aside, the "scenario" behind the argument seems terribly unlikely, as it assumes that God would directly communicate a "prediction" to a "theist" who overtly intends to defy him. If God chose not to communicate such needed information, presumably his foreknowledge would remain intact, and the whole scenario would fail.

Moreover, if certain brands of compatibilism were true, it might be the case that Peter would lack the power to defy God anyway, because his desires would be determined by God, causing his will to follow suit, especially if Peter really were a theist.

And lastly, there remain varieties of theist that do not believe God has the sort of foreknowledge you are trying to debunk, so your argument would be irrelevant to them. As I have been saying all along, your characterization of God is too narrow, and your argumentation insufficient, for you to achieve your goals.

mattbballman19

March 7th 2003, 12:39 PM

Are we and God so different, Matt, that analogies such as I gave aren’t helpful? When you pray, Matt, and when the vast majority of people pray to God is there a human face at the other end?

(i) I believe analogies are helpful to a certain point, but then, under scrutiny, every analogy falls apart, in essence.

(ii) I’m not sure that God would actually have a human face, since God is spirit, and human faces are only distinguishable, from what I can tell, on material beings. But even if God did possess a human face, this in no way precludes the ontological schism that separates us. I know some friends who have bad burns as a result of a fire. There face is no longer recognizable. It is no longer an official ‘human face’. But does that take away from their humanness? I don’t see how it does. So, even if God possessed a human face, nothing would be taken away from his Godness, and, therefore, the ontological gap remains.

What's your definition of "ontological," Matt?

Well, THE (not really my) definition of ontological, and I don't know any other way it is used, is: its a metaphysical term designating attention to various natures/essences of a given being. So we say that there are natural beings and that there are supernatural beings: that is an ontological distinction. Its saying that one being is of a higher order (in its nature) than another being.

Well, yes different, but are they different enough? "Different" comes in degrees, doesn't it?

Sure. I would say that the difference is enough, since no other difference spans from the infinite to the finite. The difference between me an a dog is not as great as the difference between me and God.

What is your definition of "image," Matt?

Commentary Critical and Explanatory on the Whole Bible gives a definition I am in agreement with:

And in what did this image of God consist? Not in the erect form or features of man, not in his intellect, for the devil and his angels are, in this respect, far superior; not in his immortality, for he has not, like God, a past as well as a future eternity of being; but in the moral dispositions of his soul, commonly called original righteousness (Ecclesiastes 7:29). As the new creation is only a restoration of this image, the history of the one throws light on the other; and we are informed that it is renewed after the image of God in knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness (Colossians 3:10, Ephesians 4:24).

Couldn't parents be considered the "cause" of the existence of their children, Matt? Couldn't these children, these "effects," become GREATER than their cause, namely their parents? By analogy, why can't we, the spirit children of God (according to Mormons), become greater than God our parent? Why does God use the "parent-child" analogy if He doesn't expect us to use it as much as possible to better understand our relationship to Him?

Because the analogy is used (and if you don’t mind, scripture sites would be useful) to describe our interacting relationship (the communicating/caring/nurturing aspect), not the ontological equality of to beings in the relationship.

Also, when we use ‘cause’ and ‘greater’, they are being used in a way not applicable to this subject. Sure the effect of the child could possibly be greater than the parent. But what do we mean by ‘greater’?: strength (not the way I’m using it), intellect (true, but not the way I’m using it). What about ontological greatness? The child can’t become more human/natural than it’s parent, can it? So, when we speak of a parent causing it’s child, the kind of cause would be an efficient cause. This cause produced it’s effect using already existing material of the same ontological greatness to produce it’s effect along the same ontological playing field. I can create an atom bomb using different material things that are ontologically beneath me. These material things, no matter how much I gather, will never be ontologically greater than me. So, even if this bomb is greater than humans in that it can destroy us; it can’t think, which is the ontological key to being greater than being just material: and that’s what makes humans greater than the bomb. Ontological greatness is the greatest ‘greater’.

So the reason we humans can’t rise above God is because we are fixed in the ontological position of humanness, which can’t ever go to the next level of Godness. Any philosophy or theology which claims that, I think is mistaken in it’s inspiration or it’s thought.

Those articles are surprisingly long for such a simple question, was God justified? I wonder if the authors thought that they could win the day simply by tiring the readers into agreement.

If you want to defend the three articles you gave links for, Matt, I am at your service. Post what you are willing to defend that you think justifies your God and I will reply.

Awww. Is Johnny going to have to read a little:smile: Seriously though, you can't just conclude that these are simple questions by the shortness of the question! Your question was great, which is why I didn't attempt to spell out an answer, which I knew had been answered in more detail and with better care in the links I gave. The burden of proof is on you, since you hurled the verses out in the open. Those links were given, because I thought that you'd be interested in the answers given.

If you want to defend the fact that these verses support your conclusion, 'you're' going to have to go through those articles and pick out why specific reasons given aren't sufficient to rebutt you complaints.

You're argument in a nutshell IS answered in those links. Are you just too lazy to read them :no: If it is then I believe that's your problem. If you don't care about the answers, don't ask the question and hurl verses, which have already been answered sufficiently by other people on different sites.

Use that great mind of yours, Matt, and try to come up with some solutions to God's problem.

I don't need to, solutions have already been given in the links. Why don't you put to use your reading/comprehension skills and read them:argh:

Please do not refuse to try because to even try would degrade God and would put you at risk of eternal damnation.

:eww: Oh please, John, this is getting funny. Only someone who doesn't take the time to read provided links, and complain about length as an excuse for a non-answer would say something as rediculous as that :duh:

Jaltus

March 7th 2003, 12:42 PM

1. If P has free will then P can choose A or B despite what G foretells. That is an invalid assumption. You are already negating foreknowledge as a possibility in your first premise. You cannot assume your conclusion in order to prove it.

John Powell

March 7th 2003, 04:06 PM

Jaltus:
That is an invalid assumption. You are already negating foreknowledge as a possibility in your first premise.

POWELL:
You are a smart one, Jaltus, for seeing that the first conditional is so crucial to the argument. Are you sure I'm negating foreknowledge? Maybe I'm just saying "if the conditional were true . . ." Am I claiming my argument is sound or merely valid or what?

Now, please repeat to me your definition of free will, Jaltus, where "outside force" becomes God's foreknowledge or His honest foretelling of the future or something like that. Wouldn't that definition of yours reasonably match my first conditional?

Perhaps I need another premise in the argument that equates "outside force" that might prevent free will with "God's honest foretelling" or something like that.

JALTUS:
You cannot assume your conclusion in order to prove it.

POWELL:
Why not? Isn't a circular merely-valid argument one of the most certain kinds to be correct? If P is true then P is true. What could be more certain?

If I want to persuade you to accept as true the conclusion P then I have to persuade you that the premise P is true. In that case I'm no longer considering a deductive argument to be merely valid, but sound. Once you accept that the premises are true and if the argument is a valid form then you should accept the conclusion to be true.

I believe that arguments of the M.P. form that are merely claimed to be valid are essentially circular arguments in which you are claiming that if your premises are true then your premises are true. Check out my arguments in support of this that merely valid Modus Ponens is essentially a circular argument.

Please rebut it if you can.

John Powell

Jaltus

March 7th 2003, 04:31 PM

I have absolutely no training in philsophy, so when you tell me an argument is sound, I assume you mean it is in wave form (I did part of my undergrad in physics, so obviously this is a physics-nerd joke).

Now, please repeat to me your definition of free will, Jaltus, where "outside force" becomes God's foreknowledge or His honest foretelling of the future or something like that. Wouldn't that definition of yours reasonably match my first conditional?The definition of free will is moot. What you are doing is assuming the God's foreknowledge is not caused by the outcome of the event. Thus, you are making sure that there can only be foreknowledge due to determintave reasons, negating free will before we are out of the box.

Perhaps I need another premise in the argument that equates "outside force" that might prevent free will with "God's honest foretelling" or something like that.Actually, you need a lot more than just a single premise in the argument. You make a ton of assumptions within the first premise, such as the grounds of God's knowledge, His interaction with time, what causation entails, etc.

Jaltus

March 7th 2003, 04:37 PM

Perhaps a better way of stating the case would be:

1. If P has free will then P can choose A or B .
2. If G knows the future and if G honestly foretells A or B then G will be right.
3. If G foretells B and P chooses A then G will not be right.
4. If G foretells A and P chooses B then G will not be right.
5. Therefore, G either does not know the future or G is not honest or P does not have free will.

The next problem is that your conclusion is not correct either. With someone intentionally picking after already knowing the solution, you create a time paradox, with the choice causing the knowledge causing a different choice which would cause different knowledge which would cause a different choice.

In other words, it is a false time loop. You are again assuming the knowledge is NOT based on the choice, and hence you are assuming determinism in order to prove your point that free will and omniscience do not go hand in hand, which means it is assumed from the beginning.

psychopath

March 7th 2003, 05:35 PM

Yep, I think you're right on the money there. There are so many other things that must be considered, such as God's relationship to our time reference, in order to determine whether divine foreknowledge and human free will are incompatible.

John Powell

March 7th 2003, 05:37 PM

POWELL:
Comments to Matt only.

POWELL:
Are we and God so different, Matt, that analogies such as I gave aren't helpful? When you pray, Matt, and when the vast majority of people pray to God is there a human face at the other end?

MATTBALLMAN19:
(i) I believe analogies are helpful to a certain point, but then, under scrutiny, every analogy falls apart, in essence.

POWELL:
In essence, yes, in that the analogy can never be the thing it is an analogy for. There will always be some difference. The important question is not this philosophical truth, however, but the practical truth as to whether the difference is SIGNIFICANT.

MATTBALLMAN19:
(ii) I'm not sure that God would actually have a human face, since God is spirit, and human faces are only distinguishable, from what I can tell, on material beings.

POWELL:
When Jesus visited the apostles after the resurrection, didn't He encourage them to touch His human-looking body to assure themselves that He wasn't merely a spirit who looked like a man, but that He had a physical body? Evidently, the apostles believed that spirits could have human-like appearance.

MATTBALLMAN19:
But even if God did possess a human face, this in no way precludes the ontological schism that separates us. I know some friends who have bad burns as a result of a fire. There face is no longer recognizable. It is no longer an official ‘human face'. But does that take away from their humanness? I don't see how it does. So, even if God possessed a human face, nothing would be taken away from his Godness, and, therefore, the ontological gap remains.

POWELL:
So, a human with a badly burned face no longer has a human face. Right?

Couldn't the same thing be said about any two faces, Matt? Couldn't you say that since one face is never exactly the same as another face that there is an ontological gap between them? If not, why not?

POWELL:
What's your definition of "ontological," Matt?

MATTBALLMAN19:
Well, THE (not really my) definition of ontological, and I don't know any other way it is used, is: its a metaphysical term designating attention to various natures/essences of a given being. So we say that there are natural beings and that there are supernatural beings: that is an ontological distinction. Its saying that one being is of a higher order (in its nature) than another being.

POWELL:
What do you mean by "THE definition"? Are you suggesting that you or I can't use our own definitions for the word?

www.dictionary.com
Ontological
The branch of metaphysics that deals with the nature of being.

POWELL:
So, you're saying that since natural beings are different from supernatural beings that this difference is an ontological difference because it deals with a difference in the nature of their being? Is that it? Couldn't the same be said about the difference between male and female things or Joe's and Jack's faces? Wouldn't those be ontological differences too? My background is science, so I'm not too familiar with what you're talking about.

POWELL:
Well, yes different, but are they different enough? "Different" comes in degrees, doesn't it?

MATTBALLMAN19:
Sure. I would say that the difference is enough, since no other difference spans from the infinite to the finite. The difference between me an a dog is not as great as the difference between me and God.

POWELL:
Do you think God is infinitely different from you or just more different then, say, you are different from a dog? Why would God create beings that were infinitely different from Himself? Wouldn't He prefer company at least reasonably similar to Himself?

POWELL:
What is your definition of "image," Matt?

MATTBALLMAN19:
Commentary Critical and Explanatory on the Whole Bible gives a definition I am in agreement with:

And in what did this image of God consist? Not in the erect form or features of man, not in his intellect, for the devil and his angels are, in this respect, far superior; not in his immortality, for he has not, like God, a past as well as a future eternity of being; but in the moral dispositions of his soul, commonly called original righteousness (Ecclesiastes 7:29). As the new creation is only a restoration of this image, the history of the one throws light on the other; and we are informed that it is renewed after the image of God in knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness (Colossians 3:10, Ephesians 4:24).

POWELL:
So, Matt, your definition of "image" when used in the Bible means something like "moral dispositions of the soul" or "original righteousness" and it means "knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness" is that right? If a scripture says A has the image of B then this means that A and B have the same moral disposition of the soul, the same original righteousness, and the same knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness, is that right? I don't think this is what you mean. Please clarify.

Here are some dictionary definitions for "image"

www.dictionary.com
Image
1. A reproduction of the form of a person or object, especially a sculptured likeness.

2. Physics. An optically formed duplicate, counterpart, or other representative reproduction of an object, especially an optical reproduction formed by a lens or mirror.

3. One that closely or exactly resembles another; a double: He is the image of his uncle.

4a. The opinion or concept of something that is held by the public.

4b. The character projected to the public, as by a person or institution, especially as interpreted by the mass media.

5. A personification of something specified: That child is the image of good health.

6. A mental picture of something not real or present.

7a. A vivid description or representation.

7b. A figure of speech, especially a metaphor or simile.

7c. A concrete representation, as in art, literature, or music, that is expressive or evocative of something else: night as an image of death.

8. Mathematics. A set of values of a function corresponding to a particular subset of a domain.

9. Computer Science. An exact replica of the contents of a storage device, such as a hard disk, stored on a second storage device, such as a network server.

10. Obsolete. An apparition.

POWELL:
Which of these dictionary definitions is closest to your Biblical one?

Mormons think that we are in God's image because we look like Him.

POWELL:
Couldn't parents be considered the "cause" of the existence of their children, Matt? Couldn't these children, these "effects," become GREATER than their cause, namely their parents? By analogy, why can't we, the spirit children of God (according to Mormons), become greater than God our parent? Why does God use the "parent-child" analogy if He doesn't expect us to use it as much as possible to better understand our relationship to Him?

MATTBALLMAN19:
Because the analogy is used (and if you don't mind, scripture sites would be useful) to describe our interacting relationship (the communicating/caring/nurturing aspect), not the ontological equality of to beings in the relationship.

Also, when we use ‘cause' and ‘greater', they are being used in a way not applicable to this subject. Sure the effect of the child could possibly be greater than the parent. But what do we mean by ‘greater'?: . . .

POWELL:
What do you mean by greater?

MATTBALLMAN19:
. . . strength (not the way I'm using it), intellect (true, but not the way I'm using it). What about ontological greatness? The child can't become more human/natural than it's parent, can it?

POWELL:
Sure. It depends upon what your definitions for "human" and "natural" are. Are those with genetic defects just as human as those without them? Are some of us more like our ape-like ancestors than others? Doesn't the Bible encourage one to become less natural and more spiritual; less human, more divine?

Perhaps I am talking about greatness in things like strength and intellect and such, not "ontological" greatness.

Mormon theology allows for the child of God to one day possibly surpass Him. Jesus, for example, might do that eventually.

MATTBALLMAN19:
So, when we speak of a parent causing it's child, the kind of cause would be an efficient cause. This cause produced it's effect using already existing material of the same ontological greatness to produce it's effect along the same ontological playing field.

POWELL:
So, are you claiming that God made us out of nothing?

Mormon theology argues that we are made out of pre-existing materials, so the analogy I'm trying to make seems to work under their theology.

MATTBALLMAN19:
I can create an atom bomb using different material things that are ontologically beneath me.

POWELL:
Excuse me. Are you saying that the protons, neutrons, and electrons in your body are "ontologically superior" to the scientifically indistinguishable protons, neutrons, and electrons in something like an atom bomb? What happens when an electron in your "ontologically superior" body switches with one in the atom bomb? Does the nature of those two electrons change significantly in that process?

MATTBALLMAN19:
These material things, no matter how much I gather, will never be ontologically greater than me.

POWELL:
What is the significant difference between the sub-atomic particles in your body, what you are, and that of any other physical object in the universe? If you know of an experiment that can demonstrate this "ontological" distinction please let me know.

MATTBALLMAN19:
So, even if this bomb is greater than humans in that it can destroy us; it can't think, which is the ontological key to being greater than being just material: and that's what makes humans greater than the bomb. Ontological greatness is the greatest ‘greater'.

POWELL:
What makes you ontologically superior to the atom bomb, Matt? If every electron, proton, and neutron in your body were instantaneously switched with the same number of those particles in the atom bomb would you or the atom bomb change, ontologically speaking, in the process?

MATTBALLMAN19:
So the reason we humans can't rise above God is because we are fixed in the ontological position of humanness, which can't ever go to the next level of Godness.

POWELL:
Then why did God make it sound like we could? Why does the Bible speak of us as being gods, sons of God, heirs to God, if we can never really be like God? Why does the Bible say that we will be like God? Didn't Jesus show us that this is possible? Didn't the Son of God claim that He could be God, in fact, was God?

MATTBALLMAN19:
Any philosophy or theology which claims that, I think is mistaken in it's inspiration or it's thought.

POWELL:
Perhaps the Bible is wrong then or I misread it as a believing Mormon.

continued next post.

John Powell

John Powell

March 7th 2003, 05:46 PM

POWELL:
Those articles are surprisingly long for such a simple question, was God justified? I wonder if the authors thought that they could win the day simply by tiring the readers into agreement.

If you want to defend the three articles you gave links for, Matt, I am at your service. Post what you are willing to defend that you think justifies your God and I will reply.

MATTBALLMAN19:
Awww. Is Johnny going to have to read a little:smile: Seriously though, you can't just conclude that these are simple questions by the shortness of the question! Your question was great, which is why I didn't attempt to spell out an answer, which I knew had been answered in more detail and with better care in the links I gave. The burden of proof is on you, since you hurled the verses out in the open. Those links were given, because I thought that you'd be interested in the answers given.

If you want to defend the fact that these verses support your conclusion, 'you're' going to have to go through those articles and pick out why specific reasons given aren't sufficient to rebutt you complaints.

POWELL:
I would be more than willing to do that IF you could persuade the authors to join this forum. Since YOU are the one here, Matt, I ask you to please post what YOU are willing to defend that you think justifies God. If you aren't willing to defend those posts, that's your decision.

If you'd prefer then I could challenge you to a debate on it. Perhaps the issue would be something like the following "The articles X, Y, and Z which purport to justify God's actions with regards to the Midianites of Num 31 and the Amalekites of 1 Sam 15 do, in fact, justify God's actions in those two events." You would affirm. I would deny. Would you be interested in that debate or would you rather just discuss them here or what?

Rather than going through the whole thing, I could pick out some of the conclusions that I think fail to justify God. Would you be interested in discussing that?

MATTBALLMAN19:
You're argument in a nutshell IS answered in those links. Are you just too lazy to read them :no: If it is then I believe that's your problem. If you don't care about the answers, don't ask the question and hurl verses, which have already been answered sufficiently by other people on different sites.

POWELL:
No, I'm not too lazy.

Are you willing to defend your claim, Matt, that my questions "have already been answered sufficiently by other people on different sites."?

POWELL:
Use that great mind of yours, Matt, and try to come up with some solutions to God's problem.

MATTBALLMAN19:
I don't need to, solutions have already been given in the links. Why don't you put to use your reading/comprehension skills and read them:argh:

POWELL:
I will if necessary. I was hoping I wouldn't have to.

POWELL:
Please do not refuse to try because to even try would degrade God and would put you at risk of eternal damnation.

MATTBALLMAN19:
:eww: Oh please, John, this is getting funny. Only someone who doesn't take the time to read provided links, and complain about length as an excuse for a non-answer would say something as rediculous as that :duh:

POWELL:
You wouldn't even try, Matt! Did the spirits in the presence of God in the passage I posted refuse to try to give God answers? Evidently, no. Then why are you? I can give possible solutions without reading those long essays. Can't you do the same? :huh:

John Powell

Jaltus

March 7th 2003, 05:59 PM

A slight problem you have, John, is that you rely on a standard dictionary for definitions which are specialized.

In other words, you are better off looking up a special type of definition for the different words were are using. For example, your use of the word argument, which we all know has another meaning that is specialized to debate and philsophy/writing.

Jason Clark

March 8th 2003, 08:57 AM

:argue:

:help:

Philosophy makes my head hurt. Give me arm wrestling any day.

There is no problem with suffering.

Accept it, get over it.

:argh:

Pereynol of Sheer Dread

March 8th 2003, 09:12 AM

Aside from my two posts above, another simple way to refute John's argument against God's foreknowledge would be to recognize that John's argument requires God's help. The only way God's foreknowledge could be thwarted is through another act of God. But God would have to willingly act against himself---something he's not likely to do.

mattbballman19

March 8th 2003, 02:18 PM

When Jesus visited the apostles after the resurrection, didn't He encourage them to touch His human-looking body to assure themselves that He wasn't merely a spirit who looked like a man, but that He had a physical body? Evidently, the apostles believed that spirits could have human-like appearance.

Good point. I guess the distinction must be made between the pre-incarnate and the incarnate Christ. And a further distinction between the pre-resurrected incarnate Christ and the resurrected incarnate Christ. When explicated on the spiritual I was expounding on the pre-incarnate Christ (from the point of view of time-bound creatures). But you are right in stating that if my analogy was moved to the post-resurrecting incarnate Christ, then it seems that God has a human face; at least God the Son. I would be prone to say it the other way around though: since God is the maker of man, then men would seem to have a resemblence to the divine face, so it doesn't seem like God is copying the created (which is something intuitively wrong to me).

Be that as it may, though, I don't think that supports your conclusion, since it doesn't take away from the ontological gap I noted.

So, a human with a badly burned face no longer has a human face. Right? Couldn't the same thing be said about any two faces, Matt? Couldn't you say that since one face is never exactly the same as another face that there is an ontological gap between them? If not, why not?

I should have qualified that with the word 'normal'. I think we can conclude that after the face of a human has been burned, it can no longer be labeled as a 'normal' human face. So your comparison involving the fact that every single face that has come into existence would constitute billions of variations from the human face is mis-led. My point was that variations from a normal human face (or even similarities) does not give sufficient justification for ontological transformation. That Christ has a human face, does not mean that Christ possesses the ontological status of humanness (and visa versa)

So, you're saying that since natural beings are different from supernatural beings that this difference is an ontological difference because it deals with a difference in the nature of their being? Is that it? Couldn't the same be said about the difference between male and female things or Joe's and Jack's faces? Wouldn't those be ontological differences too? My background is science, so I'm not too familiar with what you're talking about.

Your comparison with Joe and Jack (the variations on the faces is dealt with above) fails because Joe and Jack's difference does not constitute a change in the 'kind' of nature they have. Sure there are two natures, but these natures on both on the same ontological level of humanness. They have the properties which are the necessary and sufficient conditions for being a human being. For there to be a significant ontological transition, there would have to be a transition on the level of their 'nature'. Take away reason, abstract through, etc . . . you drop an ontological level to the animals and so on. If you add on the supernatural (omniscience, omnipotence, etc . . . you step up a level) You went from the level of being a human (or what it is in your nature that makes you a human, to being a God). In the case of the animal, you went from the level of what it took for you to be considered a human being to possessing those necessary and sufficient condition for being an animal. Ontology answers the question of 'kind' (divine, human, animal, insect, plant, etc . . .), Science answers the question of 'how/what' (I believe, I could be wrong on that). So, I don't think science is sufficient to account for the various ontological variety, which is evident in these particular comparisons.

Do you think God is infinitely different from you or just more different then, say, you are different from a dog? Why would God create beings that were infinitely different from Himself? Wouldn't He prefer company at least reasonably similar to Himself?

(i)With regard to your first question; the former.

(ii) Don't really know. Does it matter? That it is, is more important than why it is, in this case, I believe.

(iii) I don't think we are using 'infinite difference' in the same way. Yes, it seems that God is prefer to create us (humans) who were reasonable similar to himself (in the sense that He created us in His image). The 'infinite difference' I was talking about was, again, ontological. God is qualitatively infinitely different than us in that He, being a qualitatively infinite being, crossed an infinite ontological gap to create the finite humans that we are.

So, Matt, your definition of "image" when used in the Bible means something like "moral dispositions of the soul" or "original righteousness" and it means "knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness" is that right? If a scripture says A has the image of B then this means that A and B have the same moral disposition of the soul, the same original righteousness, and the same knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness, is that right? I don't think this is what you mean. Please clarify.

Did I say that everytime image is used in the Bible, it must mean 'moral dispositions of the soul' or ' knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness'? I don't think I said that spefically at all. I isolated the meaning of 'image' within the context of the first two chapters of Genesis.

The hebrew word used in Genesis is "tselem", which simply means an image/likeness. I don't anything in this definition of this specific transliteration indicating that this must mean 'the same ontological image or likeness.

As to your comments about similarities between A and B in the Bible, you would have to look at the context. You can't just look at the way the word was used in Genesis, and generalize fallaciously from those particulars, to say that 'image' means that way in all places of the Bible where it says the English word 'image'. You have to look at the original language(the different ways in which the English word image is explicated using a variety of Hebrew and/or Greek words) and the literary context (the surrounding verses which give you a reasonably competant idea of what is going on). Just simple elementary hermanuetics would do the trick.

So your listing of the various definitions steming from a Westernized source doesn't do justice to what I said above.

Mormons think that we are in God's image because we look like Him.

I don't see any biblical justification for this.

What do you mean by greater?

:duh: Ontolgical greatness for the 13497923479237 time. :wink:

Are those with genetic defects just as human as those without them? Are some of us more like our ape-like ancestors than others? Doesn't the Bible encourage one to become less natural and more spiritual; less human, more divine?

(i) Yes
(ii) Ontologically speaking, no.
(iii)Yes, speaking of our becoming more spiritual (relationally and/or in personality). Again more divine (in our actions and relations with God and other people). It's not speaking of ontology here.

So, are you claiming that God made us out of nothing?

Yes.

Excuse me. Are you saying that the protons, neutrons, and electrons in your body are "ontologically superior" to the scientifically indistinguishable protons, neutrons, and electrons in something like an atom bomb? What happens when an electron in your "ontologically superior" body switches with one in the atom bomb? Does the nature of those two electrons change significantly in that process?

Fallacy of composition. Just because the parts of a being are equal to an ontologically inferior extistent, doesn't make the whole such. Besides the specific protons and all of that isn't what separates us form the bombs anyway. It's that we can reason and/or we have a soul.

What is the significant difference between the sub-atomic particles in your body, what you are, and that of any other physical object in the universe? If you know of an experiment that can demonstrate this "ontological" distinction please let me know.

We have a soul. :duh: You can't demonstrate this scientifically, since it's not a scientific question; it's a philosophical one. We're in the same boat. You are going to have to attack the veriticality of the existence of our souls philosophically; you can't say that because it can't be demonstrated scientifically, then it can't be true, since that in and of it's self isn't a scientific statement. That's a philosophical statement about science.

Then why did God make it sound like we could? Why does the Bible speak of us as being gods, sons of God, heirs to God, if we can never really be like God? Why does the Bible say that we will be like God? Didn't Jesus show us that this is possible? Didn't the Son of God claim that He could be God, in fact, was God?

Jesus is described as God's only begotten son -- all others are sons of God via other means (whether by adoption or by authority).

matt

mattbballman19

March 8th 2003, 02:27 PM

Rather than going through the whole thing, I could pick out some of the conclusions that I think fail to justify God. Would you be interested in discussing that?

Alright, I gave you the links, so pick'em out.

John Powell

March 9th 2003, 06:31 AM

POWELL:
This is an overdue response to Pereynol.

POWELL:
Couldn't God have made us non-free-will robots that obeyed His will perfectly? That way there would be a lot less evil.

PEREYNOL:
This doesn't work because any world devoid of free moral agents would be, properly speaking a-moral, rendering a moral comparison between say, World A, in which there are free moral agents, and World A', in which there are only "non-free-will robots" impossible. There would be no way to make such an evaluation because the evaluative act requires a moral point of view, which cannot be applied to an a-moral world. It would be like asking if a world only populated by tomatos would be morally superior to our world, in the light of the fact that tomatos tend not to commit criminal or immoral acts....

POWELL:
How many free moral agents do we need before we can call the world "moral" enough to make a comparison? Could we be justified in making a comparison if we only had a few moral agents and the rest were robots? How about 50 / 50? How about if there was even one less moral agent, who was made into a robot instead. Wouldn't these alternatives to a 100% free - will - for - normal - adults world still produce less evil?

Besides, why would you think a world filled with obedient things would be neither good nor bad, but neutral? It seems to me that a world filled with obedient things would be better, more good, than a world that has billions of disobedient humans.

Animals obey God, such as 2 she bears (2 Kings 2:23-24), Balaam's ass (Num 22), and the lions (Dan 6:22, 24), and a worm (Jonah 4:7), etc.

Plants obey God, such as the sycamine tree (Luke 17:6), a fig tree (Mark 11:13-14), a gourd (Jonah 4:6), etc.

The elements obey God, such as the wind (Jonah 4:8), the winds and the sea (Mark 4:41), the rain (Gen 7:11-12), etc.

The rocks obey God (Luke 19:40).

Even the Earth obeys God (Rev 12:16, Gen 1).

Was it neutral, neither good nor bad, what these non-human things did in obedience to God? Don't you think God thought what they did was good?

This robot-like state would only prevail while we lived on Earth. Once we died we could get our free will. We would have lived without sin so we would not deserve hell. Wouldn't that be good?

John Powell

John Powell

March 9th 2003, 07:25 AM

Pereynol-1a

POWELL:
Here is an overdue reply to Pereynol.

POWELL:
This could be a more acceptable argument if God were less than all-powerful. An all-powerful God, however, would not be expected to have to work within the constraints of such things as human genealogies.

PEREYNOL:
Actually, what you and I expect God to do in terms of working within constraints, granting free agency, mode of creation by means of human lines of decent, etc, are quite different. I think God's choices to work within certain parameters are in accordance with his goals. And his goals are only partially revealed in the natural world. The mere fact that you have expectations that God should work differently is not at all alarming.

POWELL:
Even if He chose to do so, an all-powerful God could cause to not be born the unnecessarily evil persons and allow to exist only the necessary evil ones and the good ones.

PEREYNOL:
Geneologically speaking, you ought to know as a scientist that all your forebears would have been "necessary" to produce you. You should also realize that your exact life experiences, the society in which you have lived, the time range between your birth and death, and all the minutia of your personal experience come together to make you who you are.

POWELL:
Perhaps you would argue that every single evil person exists because they are necessary to fulfill God's purposes. I would argue that if I were God, my purposes would be better, require less evil.

PEREYNOL:
I think every person who has existed has done so within the context of God's purposes. And we don't know what God's purposes are in any exhaustive sense. Further, your claim to have comparatively "better" purposes that "require less evil" are as yet undemonstrated. It is my prediction that they will remain so.

POWELL:
Perhaps God's purposes aren't that good. Even if we were to accept that God's current purposes (whatever they are) are the best, I suspect that if I were God I could accomplish those same purposes with at least one less evil than He required.

PEREYNOL:
You speculate that God's purposes "aren't that good" without any viable ethical standard to make such speculations. You also admit your ignorance concerning God's "current purposes." Then you "suspect" that if you were divine, you could accomplish these same purposes (of which you are ignorant), reducing the overall quanta of evil by at least one. I must say I find such claims inordinate as stated.

POWELL:
You tell me what you think is one of the goals or purposes of God (for example: avoid Midianite or Amalekite corruption of the Jewish people so God orders the non-Jews killed.) and I'll try to explain how I might accomplish it with less evil than there apparently is in our universe or described in the Bible or, perhaps, I will argue that THAT particular purpose you claim for God is inferior to another related purpose I might have if I were God.

PEREYNOL:
As I said before, and as you have admitted above, we are not aware of the full scope of God's goals, nor are we fully aware of what history would have been like had this war not been conducted as it had. And if you are ignorant of these things, it is simply not apparent how you could substantiate the superiority of an alternative proposal. It doesn't work to say, though I'm not entirely aware of what someone else is doing or why they are doing it, I am entirely confident I could do a superior job. This is nonsensical.

POWELL:
I prefer the word "bold."

Are there purposes of God you might suggest we consider? For example, is it one of God's purposes to automatically save to heaven children or fetuses who die before the age of accountability regardless of who their parents are and regardless whether they would have been expected to grow up to be too wicked to save or not? Also, is it one of God's purposes to damn child or fetus killers who do so on their own prerogative? Will you assert these to be two of God's purposes?

POWELL:
Argument to use a better method.
1. If there were at least one method to accomplish God's good purposes that required less evil than the method that God currently uses then an OmniGod would use that other method.
2. If God were all-powerful He could use such a method.
3. If God were all-good He should use such a method.
4. If there is such a method then God is probably not an Omnibeing.

PEREYNOL:
Again, without knowing the entirety of God's purposes and without grasping the mechanistic complexity of his methods such that we could hope to duplicate them, how do you propose we make the evaluations suggested above?

POWELL:
By comparing what God has done with what our subjective moral code suggests He should have done.

Do you disagree with any of those 4 propositions?

PEREYNOL:
Moreover, as I have alluded, the common athesitic conception of an "Omnibeing" doesn't accord with many theologies; there are differing conceptions of God's power and how he deploys it, his knowledge and how he obtains it, as well as his emotions and the extent to which they are anthropopathic.

POWELL:
What is your definition of "anthropopathic?" I'd rather argue only one opposing God idea at a time if possible. What is your view on the attributes of God relevant to knowledge, power, goodness, and transcendence?

PEREYNOL:
There remain also several divergent takes on how ethics obtain with respect to God, what evil is, etc, some of which I've elaborated. The complexity of theological and philosophical discourse about God's nature is much greater than you seem to realize, and, as I've said, your simplistic conceptions as stated within your arguments fail to do justice to that complexity.

POWELL:
Perhaps the reality is not as complex as these philosophical theologians seem to think.

POWELL:
If you support the notion that God has the right to do whatever He wants regardless of whether it might appear bad to us, please answer the following scenario you evaded:

PEREYNOL:
Your responses to what I've said have been fairly selective as well, and your characterization that I've "evaded" this scenario of yours is not accurate---rather, I rejected it. Instead of reproducing my former reply here, I'll invite you to read it again if you wish by consulting my earlier response. I haven't changed my mind.

POWELL:
You pressure me to turn my scenarios into arguments, Pereynol. That makes my job harder. Fortunately, in this case the more formal argument is not that hard to produce.

1. If God were to annihilate today everything except for Pereynol then God would have broken some of His promises.
2. If God were to have broken some of His promises then that would be doing bad.
3. If God were to be doing bad then He could not be all-good.

Do you disagree with any of those propositions, Pereynol?

Is the following a valid deductive argument, Pereynol?

1. If God does bad then God is not all good.
2. God does bad.
3. therefore, God is not all good..

POWELL:
Why are they imagining all this about God? Apparently, different people are inventing their own kind of God to fit their personal philosophical ideal. If the OmniBeing really exists and is as nice and willing to answer questions as people claim, why don't they just ask Him to tell us all in such a way that we can understand and accept? That's what I would have done if I were God. Would I have been a better God than the one you believe in?

PEREYNOL:
This rhetoric has no rigor. You've not substantiated the roles of imagination or invention or idealization within theology, and you are beginning to address issues outside the boundaries of the problem of evil. Human experience of God is another topic which we can discuss if you'd like, and the fact that your experiences don't meet your expectations of how you suppose God should have revealed himself to you specifically or within history may well be poignant to why you are an atheist. I know that my own experiences of God, personally speaking, have driven me to conclusions opposite yours. Though I have an acute interest in the theistic arguments and other issues in the philosophy of religion, these matters remain ancillary to my undeniable relationship with God.

POWELL:
Couldn't it be the other way around? Are you suggesting that things existed in space before that empty space even existed? Perhaps things in space is a corruption of the natural order.

PEREYNOL:
I'm not following you here, as I suspect you're not understanding the privatio boni. I'm suggesting nothing about "space." I was rather using the broken pottery analogy to illustrate the conception of evil as a privation of substantial goodness.

POWELL:
What makes "being" good? Maybe pure empty space is the ideal and things occupying that space destroys the perfection. Isn't that possible?

POWELL:
It sounds like a sneaky trick to argue that good can exist independently from evil by using a term for evil that means change for the worse. Couldn't I counter argue that good really means change for the better, so there must be a bad for good to be the better of, so bad can exist independently of good?

PEREYNOL:
This idea fails because good is equated with being.

POWELL:
Fine, then let's equate "being" with bad. Empty space is the ideal. Being disrupts the perfection of that nothingness. Let me claim that empty space existed before God and that God destroyed the perfection that existed before He came along. God is bad. Nothingness, nonbeing is good. We're all sinners for existing, even God.

PEREYNOL:
And while one might indeed make improvements on something that has being, ie, one could make a "better" pot by adding a handle, widening the spout, etc, so that the pot would meet the goal for which it was created more efficiently, it doesn't therefore follow that the pot was "evil" in its former, unimproved state. You are pressing the analogy too far; the analogy itself was not meant to illustrate comparative degrees of efficiency by defining good as "change for the better" and evil as "change for the worse." Instead, the analogy was drawn to compare evil with damage or corruption of something substantially good. "Evil" itself, according to the privatio boni, cannot exist independently of the thing it corrupts.

POWELL:
The philosopher is evidently trying to define good and evil in such a way that they satisfy his view of reality. How do other talented people use the terms "good" and "bad," specifically the expert authorities?

PEREYNOL:
Of course Augustine is working within the context of his own worldview! None can escape this. As to other opinions of evil, we have discussed several already, including your own.

POWELL:
So, Pereynol, my question is what do the majority, or perhaps vast majority of expert authorities think about the meanings of "good" and "bad?" Do they consider them to be opposites or no? What do the dictionaries suggest is the common usage?

POWELL:
I think that if you had stuck with the terms "good" and "bad" rather than bringing in corruption in the way you did, this additional unnecessary problem would have been avoided. "Corrupt" does not necessarily mean "bad," so using it to define bad as you did does not appear advisable.

PEREYNOL:
From your vantage point, it is easy to see why the privatio would seem "unadvisable," but, the arg has a most respectable theological and philosophical pedigree despite your lack of enthusiasm.

POWELL:
So it has a respectable pedigree. Is that pedigree as respectable as that of considering "good" and "evil" as opposites? What do the dictionaries suggest, Pereynol?

John Powell

Pereynol of Sheer Dread

March 9th 2003, 08:35 AM

03-09-2003 @ 05:31 AM
John Powell:

POWELL:
This is an overdue response to Pereynol.

We at least agree on the fact that your response is overdue.

How many free moral agents do we need before we can call the world "moral" enough to make a comparison? Could we be justified in making a comparison if we only had a few moral agents and the rest were robots? How about 50 / 50? How about if there was even one less moral agent, who was made into a robot instead. Wouldn't these alternatives to a 100% free - will - for - normal - adults world still produce less evil?

A world containing no free moral agents couldn't be morally compared to a world containing free moral agents in order to quantify evil because the first world would be a-moral, having zero evil with respect to sentient beings within it. And if God's goal was to create a world of sentient beings with free moral agency, a world of robots would not satisfy that goal. As to the number of beings with free moral agency, that's neither here nor there, but a world with even one free moral agent would be qualitatively different from a world without any.

If the purposes of God were to create an a-moral world, then he, as a free moral agent, could create and evaluate such a world under the criteria of his intentions to judge whether his a-moral world fulfilled those intentions.

Besides, why would you think a world filled with obedient things would be neither good nor bad, but neutral? It seems to me that a world filled with obedient things would be better, more good, than a world that has billions of disobedient humans.

A "thing," a non-sentient being can only be "obedient" in a metaphorical sense. Have you ever taught a rock to fetch? Are you married? How'd you like to substite a rock for your spouse? You could celebrate your anniversary by looking deeply into its crevices and when you kiss its unresponsive surface, you'd have the pure joy of getting iron deposits in your teeth. You wouldn't have love or any kind of reciprocated feeling, but hey, you'd have a poetically obedient rock. If you can't differentiate the value of reciprocated love and the consequent relationship that comes only from a sentient being possessing free moral agency, then, by all means, content yourself with the society of rocks. As a bonus, you'd win all your arguments by default without having to spew such continuously poor excuses for arguments.

Animals obey God, such as 2 she bears (2 Kings 2:23-24), Balaam's ass (Num 22), and the lions (Dan 6:22, 24), and a worm (Jonah 4:7), etc.

And my dog obeys me; she also seems to understand scolding and punishment. I think some animals can be morally accountable to an extent, but they lack the capacity for the highly developed morality humans possess. It seems that animals can take on moral characteristics by association with humans, but it has been customary to assert otherwise. How moral would a world of dogs or comparable creatures be? That would depend upon God's creative intentions. Again, I suppose you could test your theory by trading in your close human relationships for life in the kennel; let me know how this experiment satisfies you....

Plants obey God, such as the sycamine tree (Luke 17:6), a fig tree (Mark 11:13-14), a gourd (Jonah 4:6), etc.

Plants do "obey" God metaphorically, they can even be "punished" as in the story of Jesus and the fig tree. They wouldn't get away with "resisting" God though. But, as before, you're grasping at straws here; if a tree fell on someone and he died, would you prosecute the tree for murder, incarcerate it perhaps, or maybe put it in the electric chair?

Moreover, while some folks do indeed associate with trees, preferring their companionship to that of humans, it's not a widespread practice. But please---the forests are before you!

The elements obey God, such as the wind (Jonah 4:8), the winds and the sea (Mark 4:41), the rain (Gen 7:11-12), etc.

Do you know what metaphor is? Do you understand poetry? How about eqivocation?

The rocks obey God (Luke 19:40).

Please see my earlier remarks concerning rocks; I've already dealt with them.

Even the Earth obeys God (Rev 12:16, Gen 1).

Was it neutral, neither good nor bad, what these non-human things did in obedience to God? Don't you think God thought what they did was good?

Yes, it was good according to God's purposes, but a-moral essents can only "obey" in a metaphorical sense. An a-moral thing cannot be evaluated as a moral being; it can only be judged according to whether it fulfills the purposes of a moral being by a moral being. Even these fantastic speculations of yours require that one being with free moral agency exist---ie. God---so that evaluation itself may take place. If you think otherwise, try it out by seeking the council of rocks or trees or dogs the next time you find yourself in need of moral advice.

This robot-like state would only prevail while we lived on Earth. Once we died we could get our free will. We would have lived without sin so we would not deserve hell. Wouldn't that be good?

It is not apparent that an a-moral being would be in any meaningful sense identitical with another being who somehow received free moral agency after death. How exactly could an a-moral being who live and died be considered identical with another being who obtained free moral agency after death? How would a robot gain sentience, intentionality, and freedom and still be itself? How would a robot "deserve" or "not deserve" anything at all?

Pereynol of Sheer Dread

March 9th 2003, 09:12 AM

03-09-2003 @ 06:25 AM
John Powell:

Pereynol-1a

Are there purposes of God you might suggest we consider? For example, is it one of God's purposes to automatically save to heaven children or fetuses who die before the age of accountability regardless of who their parents are and regardless whether they would have been expected to grow up to be too wicked to save or not? Also, is it one of God's purposes to damn child or fetus killers who do so on their own prerogative? Will you assert these to be two of God's purposes?

I won't assert something I don't know. How would I be privy to such information?

By comparing what God has done with what our subjective moral code suggests He should have done.

It is not apparent that our "subjective moral code" would suffice to render judgment with respect to any of God's acts, especially if we don't know what his purposes are.

What is your definition of "anthropopathic?"

The word combines the Greek roots for "man" and "suffering," denoting the idea of an analogy between the emotions of human beings and comparable qualities/ feelings in God. It's like the related concept of anthropomorphism. Various theologies have different takes on how God feels as compared with how we expereince emotions.

I'd rather argue only one opposing God idea at a time if possible.

Really? I've never seen you restrict yourself thus before. Exactly which "opposing God idea" would you like to isolate?

What is your view on the attributes of God relevant to knowledge, power, goodness, and transcendence?

I tend to keep my options open rather than insisting upon one view at the expense of others. Being conversant with a breadth of options in philosophy and historical theology, I try to consider them all. There remain a variety of coherent positions and possibilities, and I'm not a sectarian.

Perhaps the reality is not as complex as these philosophical theologians seem to think.

Then again, perhaps the reality is beyond the scope of the human intellect or the human ability to morally evaluate....

You pressure me to turn my scenarios into arguments, Pereynol. That makes my job harder. Fortunately, in this case the more formal argument is not that hard to produce.

1. If God were to annihilate today everything except for Pereynol then God would have broken some of His promises.
2. If God were to have broken some of His promises then that would be doing bad.
3. If God were to be doing bad then He could not be all-good.

Do you disagree with any of those propositions, Pereynol?

While this argument is formally valid, I disagree with the content of premise 1. Even if God did annihilate everything except me, he could easily bring everything back into existence and keep his promises without skipping a beat.

Is the following a valid deductive argument, Pereynol?

1. If God does bad then God is not all good.
2. God does bad.
3. therefore, God is not all good..

Yes, it is. But you have a long way to go to declare such an argument sound.

What makes "being" good? Maybe pure empty space is the ideal and things occupying that space destroys the perfection. Isn't that possible?

Again, such a situation would have to entail a change of intention on the part of a creator. We've been over this before. A change of intention would also entail different evaluative criteria.

Fine, then let's equate "being" with bad. Empty space is the ideal. Being disrupts the perfection of that nothingness. Let me claim that empty space existed before God and that God destroyed the perfection that existed before He came along. God is bad. Nothingness, nonbeing is good. We're all sinners for existing, even God.

Again, a change of the divine intention, requiring a consequent change in evaluative criteria, would also alter the final evaluation, rendering the situation good.

So, Pereynol, my question is what do the majority, or perhaps vast majority of expert authorities think about the meanings of "good" and "bad?" Do they consider them to be opposites or no? What do the dictionaries suggest is the common usage?

The privatio boni does not exclude the concept of opposites; it just redefines the sense in which good and evil oppose one another. As to the ethical "experts," there isn't an obvious consensus, as I've already said---please read my previous posts again, especially the ones you've yet to respond to, becuase I've given you an answer to this charge already. As for the dictionary, well, it's at your disposal....

So it has a respectable pedigree. Is that pedigree as respectable as that of considering "good" and "evil" as opposites? What do the dictionaries suggest, Pereynol?

As I said, the two are by no means mutually exclusive.

Pereynol of Sheer Dread

March 9th 2003, 09:20 AM

Perhaps you could be so good as to answer my recent posts in response to your fallacious argument concerning God and foreknowledge....

John Powell

March 9th 2003, 09:36 AM

Pereynol-2a

POWELL:
Have you seriously considered the possibility that people might already accept the antithetical / binary concepts like good / bad or big / small before they come up with words to represent those instinctive / experiential concepts?

PEREYNOL:
When considering binary oppositions, whether experience temporally preceeds language or vice versa one can yet distinguish the epistemological relation of the terms from the ontological relation of their referrents.

POWELL:
What's your definition of "epistemological"? So what if someone can do that, does that mean that "good" and "bad" or "big" and "small" are not opposites?

POWELL:
I prefer the second, but wish to avoid the assertion that it is universal in your sense of the term. Are you asking why it is that every single human being agrees that good and bad are opposites? Evidently, they don't. Didn't you give me a counter example? However, I think the vast majority of people do because it seems to work better than other conceptual frameworks. Do you think good is the opposite of bad?

PEREYNOL:
Binary oppositions themselves are constructs of the perceiving mind and the opposing terms have an epistemological relationship which may or may not imply an ontological relationship. The relation "is the opposite of" which might obtain between X and Y, is precisely an epistemological or conceptual relation. So, if commonly suppose that good and evil stand in such a relation, we'd best elaborate these terms within a metaethical context. If good and evil are concepts without any extramental existence, then their mode of existence is mental; that is, they exist only as ideas within minds. Whether they denote preferences, commands, or goals, they have absolutely no ontological status apart from minds. And apart from minds, there would be no evaluations, no ethics, and no evaluative criteria, however that criteria may be divergently conceived.

When a person makes an evaluation of whether objective conditions in the physical world outside her mind constitute "good" or "bad," she is evaluating physical conditions in relation to herself or some other mind, or some mental state. And she tends to oppose the two terms because states of affairs in the physical world tend to be ostensibly beneficial or not, preferable or not, a violation of some command or not, an impediment to some goal or not, etc. Note, however, that all such evaluations inhere within a mental context. A world without minds would be a world without intentionality, without subject/object relations, and hence, without morality. That means, that without minds, terms like "good" and "evil" wouldn't exist, and so, without minds, good and evil would have absolutely zero ontological status.

POWELL:
This is making more sense to me now.

PEREYNOL:
In an atheistic cosmos, good and evil did not exist prior to the evolution of sentient beings like human beings. But, in a theistic cosmos (or an idealistic one), mind is the primary reality. Reductive materialism entails no mind, but thesim and idealism do. Thus, the two conceptions of the ontological status of a binary opposition like good/evil would vary enormously with respect to atheism and theism. There are many questions surrounding these issues. Among which is whence comes mind?

POWELL:
I'm pretty sure it's a function of the brain. What part of the body do you think it's a function of? The Bible writers seemed to think it was tied to the blood pumping organ, but that's highly unlikely, wouldn't you agree?

PEREYNOL:
Even within the most staunch naturalism or reductive materialism, there's the apparent anomaly to be explained as to why matter has the tendency to give rise to mind. Is mind somehow inherent within matter? Are ethical relations?

POWELL:
I don't know. I hope some people are working on that problem. If God existed and was willing to answer such questions we should be able to just ask him. Instead, I suspect we'll have to wait for scientists to come up with the answers. If you think your religion or your philosophy has an answer please recommend a scientific quality experiment to verify your explanation.

I have come to the conclusion that if science doesn't have the objective answer to a general-type question, such as what were the conditions before the Big Bang or what exactly happened to cause life to begin on Earth or is love beautiful then no one really does. The best you have is the opinions of the expert authorities, but in the case of science, those opinions are generally based on solid experimental quantitative evidence. The same can't be said about the opinions of non-scientific fields. When those other fields can support their opinions with scientific-quality evidence, then they'll become sciences themselves. In case you didn't notice, Pereynol, I just slammed philosophy with the hammer of science.

PEREYNOL:
When you assume an eternal dualism between good and evil (as you have), you seem to violate your own worldview in that you must move beyond the evolutionary understanding of mind in order to posit a metaphysical or ontological relation which has existence independently of mind, before language, experience, or persons evolved. If you reject the privatio boni on the amorphous grounds that you suppose good and evil have a more fundamental existential relation beyond goals, preferences, or intentionality, then where does that leave you?

POWELL:
Subjectivism, I suppose.

PEREYNOL:
You seem to do just this when you posit a metaphyscial dualism or insist on a codependency between epistemologcal and ontological relations between the terms of the binary opposition good/evil.

POWELL:
Ok. Things are neither good nor bad inherently. Being is neither good nor bad inherently. God is neither good nor bad inherently. Things just exist. The mind of God and the minds of men assign the values of "good" and "bad" to things. Minds which favor the opposition view treat "good" and "bad" as opposites. This appears to be the vast majority of people on our planet. A minority prefer a view in which good can exist independently of evil and is not the opposite of evil. Is that ok?

PEREYNOL:
John,
As I read through the rest of your second reply to me, I see more of the same reiteration of your "difficult scenario" type examinations, the most insistent of which is your "demon" thing. I also note the "evasion" accusation repeated again because you find it unpleasant that I reject these devices. You have, in turn, repeated the invitation into what you suppose an ethical quagmire involving the passages in Numbers and I Samuel, despite my former remarks. I know you are eager to guide our conversation along proscribed lines, but, as I said, I have other thoughts, which I shall elaborate upon in my own fashion rather than be led Socratically down the ruts in the road worn by traditional debates about the problem of evil. Perhaps later, we'll talk more of Numbers and I Samuel, but for now, consider: What might this mean?

In Isaiah 45:7, we find:

"I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace and create evil: I the LORD do all these things."

POWELL:
Perhaps the writer correctly or mistakenly believed that God created moral evil. Perhaps the evil is physical calamity rather than moral evil.

Alright, here's the demon scenario in a more formal presentation.

1. If God behaves like an evil Demon then God probably is an evil Demon.
2. God behaves like an evil Demon.
3. therefore, God probably is an evil Demon.

Is that argument above a valid deductive argument?

POWELL:
Good point. Perhaps the Jews and Christians weren't that special after all.

PEREYNOL:
This kind of rhetoric is a good example of your sort of selective response.

POWELL:
Do you agree with me then that the events described in Num 31 and 1 Sam 15 could NOT have been ordered or sanctioned by an OmniGod?

PEREYNOL:
As I stated earlier, is it not possible that God could have undisclosed purposes for endorsing ancient wars?

POWELL:
Sure, but in the case of the Amalekites, God gave the reason to kill even the innocents, it was for something their ancestors had done about 400 years earlier. Does that seem fair to you, to kill babies for the sins of their ancestors of 400 years before? Apparently it does because your God ordered it and your God must have a good reason when He apparently behaves like an evil Demon. Your objective moral standard tells you this. I, on the other hand, rely on my subjective moral standard and consider what God evidently ordered done to the Amalekties to be grossly unfair.

PEREYNOL:
And as I also have stated earlier, I believe that your characterization of an "OmniGod" becomes far too narrow.

POWELL:
Ok, let's put things in a more formal argument.

1. If X has ordered the killing of innocent children and fetuses by the sword then X is bad.
2. X has ordered the killing of innocent children and fetuses by the sword.
3. Therefore, X is bad.

Is this (above) a valid deductive argument? Do you agree with premise 1 unless X = God or one of God's representatives? Do you agree with premise 2 if X = God?

Here's another one. Is it another valid deductive argument?

1. If X has ordered his subordinates to forcibly marry and allowed them to forcibly have sex with innocent virgin girls after those girls watched their family and friends and baby brothers be killed by the swords of those subordinates then X is bad.
2. X has ordered his subordinates to forcibly marry and allowed them to forcibly have sex with innocent virgin girls after those girls watched their family and friends and baby brothers be killed by the swords of those subordinates.
3. therefore, X is bad.

Do you agree with premise 1 unless X = God or one of God's representatives? Do you agree with premise 2 if X = God?

POWELL:
Do you agree with me that it's significantly easier to persuade men to do your bidding if they believe that they will be rewarded greatly after they die for doing so?

PEREYNOL:
While this has been rehashed again and again, it is possibly a truism, yet, it is not apparent that the essence of any religion is encapsulated by such a rule. It is also a truism to declare that men can be equally, if not more effectively, manipulated to do someone else's bidding if they are led to expect that they shal be rewarded greatly in the here and now under the auspices of some worldly ideology or political agenda. But such a declaration wouldn't serve to reduce the essence of ideologies or political agendas in general to a clandestine relationship between manipulation and rewards.

POWELL:
I think the good point you're making is that atheists and theists can be equally criticized for offering worldly rewards for doing evil on someone else's behest.

The important difference, as you suggest is a possibility, is that atheists can't offer eternal rewards of bliss with 72 virgins (for the Muslims) or otherwise. Nor can they expect success with atheists by claiming that the all-powerful creator of the universe orders them to do the desired action. Atheists can't promise as much as theists can.

continued next post as Pereynol-2b

John Powell

John Powell

March 9th 2003, 09:37 AM

Pereynol-2b

POWELL:
Insufficient to disprove ANYTHING? What is your definition of "prove" and "disprove"?

PEREYNOL:
I think that there are various definitions of proof and disproof. I largely believe that a "proof" is an attempt to persuade by argument, and that the success or failure of this enterprise becomes person-relative, such that different arguments have varying power to convince individuals with respect to the noetic structures of those individuals.

POWELL:
What is your definition of noetic? I wish you would define your less common terms.

Given your definition for "proof," apparently it's possible for me to "prove to you" something if I can persuade you to accept it as true.

PEREYNOL:
Some arguments actually compel the assent of nearly all rationally minded people, but, as we can see, quite a few arguments lack that power.

POWELL:
I would call such arguments "objectively proven" because a lot of people were persuaded. One can never be absolutely certain that something has been "objectively" (in your sense of the word) proven. The agreement of expert authorities is about the best we have.

PEREYNOL:
In the case of propagandistic manipulation mentioned above, as I have said, whether or not one can verify the presence of propagandistic manipulation (and whether it entails promises of rewards or not), does nothing to substantiate truth or falsity. A position could well be true in spite of the fact that there might be propagandistic manipulation perpetrated by its adherents, and conversely, a position may well be false, even though it involved no manipulation. The nature or essence of a particular belief or position, be it religious or political or whatever else, simply cannot be ascertained by using the presence or absence of propagandistic manipulation as a litmus test.

POWELL:
Interesting. If every one on the planet was in agreement that some proposition were true, should you consider it to be true? I would say yes. Does the fact that every one is in agreement change at all the reality of whether it is "true" in a correspondence to reality sort of way? No, but the universal opinion of expert authorities is the best we have as to what is true and what isn't.

POWELL:
Even if you can't tell me the "objective" answer, meaning (to me) what all expert authorities would judge if they were in your shoes, you could have still told me what YOU would probably think given your imperfect understanding. Will you at least do that?

PEREYNOL:
Again, John, I find your whole scenario an irrelevant fantasy. God is not going to destroy everything except me after I read your posts. (I've read them several times, just to be sure.) Obviously you want me to admit of my hypothetical ability to sit in judgement upon God should he commit some wrong, so that later, when you suppose you can claim he has done so---perhaps with respect to those passages in Numbers or I Samuel---you may press me to acquiesce. My intent is to save us both the tedium by stating my rejection of your whole line of thought. To wit, God is not going to indulge your fantasy, and, being ignorant as you are of God's purposes in ostensibly endorsing past violence or present evils, you cannot substantiate that he has commited, is commiting, or will commit "unnecessary evils."

POWELL:
Who are you to tell God what He will or will not do? Satan challenged Him concerning Job, didn't he? Who are you to tell God that He can't do evil if God decides to? Who are you to tell God what His attributes are? God can do anything He wants, can't He? He's God isn't He? Who will stop Him? You?

It looks to me like you've imagined what God will do and then insist God will live up to the ideal you've invented. How do you know what you think about God is true? Maybe you're wrong.

Please answer this question, Pereynol.

Q: Is it possible that you could be wrong about God being able to know the future if we have free will?

Will you concede that you could be wrong or will you insist that on that question you cannot be wrong? I will admit that I could be wrong about this. Will you admit the same?

PEREYNOL:
This is so because you lack the evaluative criteria to make such judgments, as the apprehension of such criteria would require your complete grasp of God's teleology, his goals and knowledge, etc.

POWELL:
So, if God lies to me, I can't justifiably call it a lie, is that it? Is this because I first must have a complete grasp of God's teleology?

1. If God lies then God is a liar.
2. God lies.
3. therefore, God is a liar.

Is this (above) a valid deductive argument? Do you agree with premise 1?

POWELL:
What is counterintuitive about it? If someone does bad, that's bad right? Certainly, I'm doing this for a purpose. For one thing, I'm trying to show you that YOUR sense of right and wrong is based on your experiences and genetics.

PEREYNOL:
Do you really suppose I'm not aware of how experience affects morality? The role of genetics is also worth exploring; what precisely do you mean?

POWELL:
I was worried you overly discounted experience. Genetics determines the brain. The functioning of the brain affects what we think about everything, including morality.

PEREYNOL:
Nevertheless, none of this excludes God's involvement in determining morality as well. As I keep saying, there are many different conceptions of morality, and there are obviously disagreements---if there were not, there'd be no need for ethical discourse at all.

POWELL:
That's an argument that God is not an Omnibeing.

1. If God is an Omnibeing then everyone knows God's views on important ethical issues.
2. If God is all-knowing He knows how to make everyone know His views.
3. If God is all-powerful He can make everyone know His views.
4. If God is all-good He should make everyone know His views.
5. Not everyone knows God's views on important ethical issues.
6. therefore, God is not an Omnibeing.

Is this (above) a valid deductive argument? You seem to agree with at least with premise 5.

POWELL:
This sounds like evasion to me. If God lies can we call Him a liar? Yes or no or something else, Pereynol? Would Kierkegaard evade that question too?

PEREYNOL:
God has not lied. Why indulge in fantasy? Cut to the chase.

POWELL:
I already responded to this.

POWELL:
Based on statistics. In general, the more experience someone has the more likely their opinion is to be correct. We should seek the advice of experts. On the other hand, those who are considered to be authorities by others regardless of their experience are likely to be more reliable than those who aren't experts and aren't considered to be authorities. We should seek the advice of authorities. The best advice, statistically speaking, is from expert authorities.

PEREYNOL:
In discussing emotivism, imperativalism, a goal-driven ethics, or some kind of ethical realism, we must realize that there are, as I said, "experts" who hold all these divergent views; there is no consensus such that we may appeal to it and settle disagreements. Some "experts" are theists who hold to moral realism, and there are many other "expert" opinions with which you would not agree, statistics or no. You would do well to bone up on these things....

POWELL:
In that case, if there isn't unanimity, or even a clear majority, then which distinct position on these issues has the most expert authorities (weighted) as supporters? Statistically speaking that position has the highest probability of being the correct one. Do you have a feeling or estimation for what position on these issues probably holds that position of being the "mode" or most common value?

POWELL:
In science if there's one datum more certain than the others, that still doesn't justify completely ignoring other good data. You should weight (apply weighting factors to) the other data and average the weighted data.

PEREYNOL:
I think you could benefit from further study in the history of philosophy, particularly with respect to the rise, apogee, and fall of logical positivism and how this movement affected the study of metaphysics and ethics. In any event, it isn't quite apparent how one might apply the scientific method to ethics in the way you seem to be proposing. How would you go about doing such a thing? What comprises "data" and how does one go about evaluating it in the face of a multiplicity of ethical positions---a disparate range of imcompatible opinions generated by sharply disagreeing "experts?"

POWELL:
Perhaps you could group them into opinion categories based upon their responses to a well-designed survey instrument, preferably in a manner that has been done similarly in the past and for which serious criticism of the methodology has not been expressed. You could assign weighting factors based upon factors such as years as an ethicist. You could identify the mode as the best choice for a non-expert to accept. I don't see why this has to be so difficult unless the expert authorities refuse to cooperate. It's not absolutely reliable, of course, but what is? This survey method should result in a more efficient determination of truth than merely picking one expert authority, the one you happen to have had as an instructor, for example.

As the expert authorities holding minority views see themselves without adherents, like a company with a less popular product, they may feel a strong desire to put more effort into persuading their fellow expert authorities to their point of view. Scientific-quality experiments and arguments should be sought for where ever possible since science is the most reliable source of truth today. There will likely be a stronger effort to reach a consensus as is done in science rather than so much pride in themselves for being different without much justification. In case you didn't notice, Pereynol, I just slammed philosophy with the hammer of science.

POWELL:
Perhaps you would argue that God's opinion is so much superior to anyone else's that it should weighted so highly that all others would be insignificant by comparison. Is that your position?

PEREYNOL:
Of course I believe God's opinions are superior. I don't think that human opinions are "insignificant," however; all well-conceived thinking is worthy of examination....

POWELL:
If other opinions aren't insignificant then they should be weighted and averaged with that of God's superior opinion. We shouldn't just adopt God's opinion any more than we should just adopt the most reliable datum as the most probable value.

John Powell

Pereynol of Sheer Dread

March 9th 2003, 10:05 AM

03-09-2003 @ 08:36 AM
John Powell:

Pereynol-2a

POWELL:
What's your definition of "epistemological"? So what if someone can do that, does that mean that "good" and "bad" or "big" and "small" are not opposites?

If you don't know the meanings of philosophical terms, I'd suggest you consult an introductory text on the subject. Generally speaking, "epsitemology" denotes theory or discourse of knowledge, and how we know what we know. Why would you suppose that big an small aren't opposites?

I'm pretty sure it's a function of the brain. What part of the body do you think it's a function of? The Bible writers seemed to think it was tied to the blood pumping organ, but that's highly unlikely, wouldn't you agree?

Our minds may indeed be a function of our brains, or not. There are a variety of options concerning the philosophy of mind with respect to the mind/body problem, and some theists are mind/body physicalists. I think the references to the heart are instances of phenomenological language.

I don't know. I hope some people are working on that problem. If God existed and was willing to answer such questions we should be able to just ask him. Instead, I suspect we'll have to wait for scientists to come up with the answers. If you think your religion or your philosophy has an answer please recommend a scientific quality experiment to verify your explanation.

God's existence is hardly predicated upon whether or not he reveals such things to human beings at all, in any degree of detail.

I have come to the conclusion that if science doesn't have the objective answer to a general-type question, such as what were the conditions before the Big Bang or what exactly happened to cause life to begin on Earth or is love beautiful then no one really does.

If scientific investigation doesn't have these answers, I've come to the conclusion that the methods of science are severly limited, as are the cognitive powers of mortal men. Moreover, the recognition of the limitations of scientific investigation scarcely exclude the viable possibility that answers to these and other significant questions might well be found elsewhere.

The best you have is the opinions of the expert authorities, but in the case of science, those opinions are generally based on solid experimental quantitative evidence. The same can't be said about the opinions of non-scientific fields. When those other fields can support their opinions with scientific-quality evidence, then they'll become sciences themselves. In case you didn't notice, Pereynol, I just slammed philosophy with the hammer of science.

Actually, if the very nature of certain inquiries renders them beyond the scope of the scientific method, such inquiries are not thereby invalidated. To assume otherwise would be a methodological category mistake. Further, without logic (both induction and deduction), and without a philosophical framework of some kind, there couldn't be a scientific method at all.

John Powell

March 9th 2003, 11:08 AM

Pereynol-3a

POWELL:
Of course. We could agree that in the NAZI culture what they did was ok. However, in the wider culture of the world it was wrong. We are members of that wider culture. We agree that what the NAZIs did was wrong. If the NAZIs had developed the A-bomb early enough and forced the US to surrender in WW II and later took over the entire planet, we might never be having this discussion because what they did to the Jews and others might be considered by nearly all of us to be at least acceptable, if not good.

PEREYNOL:
Yes, we can agree that Nazi morality was wrong, but not on the basis of moral or societal relativism. When you set Nazi morality in an antithetical relationship to the morality of the greater civilized world, and yet claim that, had the Nazis won WW II, the current morality of the greater civilized world might in fact have become that of the Nazis, you merely underscore my point.

POWELL:
Do you deny that if the NAZI's had conquered the world that people like you and me would think much more favorably of what was done to the Jews than what people today think of such things?

Do you deny that Americans were supportive of putting Japanese Americans in concentration camps during WW II, that their religiously based morals told them it was ok?

Do you deny that Southerners were supportive of black slavery prior to the Civil War, that their religiously based morals told them it was ok?

Do you deny that society until fairly recently was supportive of male domination over women, that their religiously based morals told them it was ok?

How can you justify serious changes in the morals of society if morals come from an unchanging God?

Do you believe you have a universal objective moral standard, Pereynol? If you do, please list a few examples of that standard that are
1. universal
2. objective
and
3. moral

POWELL:
Welcome to the real world.

PEREYNOL:
Welcome to the real world yourself. Let us be done with patronising contempt.

POWELL:
My point is that the real world doesn't necessarily match your ideal world. Scientists seem to understand that principle better than philosophers do. That may be why scientists spend more time studying the world using quantitative experiments rather than spending so much time thinking about how they would like the world to be, like too many philosopher seem to do. That's another slam on philosophy, Pereynol.

POWELL:
It wasn't that long ago that pretty much everyone knew that slavery was ok and that men were superior to women and other such things. Apparently morality changes.

PEREYNOL:
Do you honestly believe that theists are unaware of moral flux?

POWELL:
I wonder sometimes given their assertions that morals aren't subjective. How then do you explain this moral evolution if God is the source of an unchanging standard? What evidence is there that morals on Earth have ever matched those of God? In the person of Jesus Christ only?

POWELL:
Argument for time-consistent morality
1. Having morality be consistent through out all historical time is a good thing.

PEREYNOL:
On what basis can you make such an evaluation?

POWELL:
On the basis that it should be a standard. One of the key features of a scientific "standard" is its consistency. Is this not a criterion in philosophy? Do philosophers think changing standards are ideal?

POWELL:
2. If morality were God-inspired then one would expect morality to be consistent through out all historical time.

PEREYNOL:
Why?

POWELL:
Because God could and should be consistent with morality.

PEREYNOL:
What if God held that the general progress of human learning and moral development within societies was a good thing?

POWELL:
Then I guess God thinks that morality is not something that is a universal objective standard, but it's something relative to the society.

PEREYNOL:
What if God's purposes in creating human free moral agents included societal and cultural progress in a way superior in God's mind to a static world with unchanging morality?

POWELL:
Then I guess God created the world so that morality would be relative, subjective to the views of the free moral agents figuring things out on their own.

PEREYNOL:
And finally, what if God had different purposes with respect to people who have lived in different epochs?

POWELL:
Then I guess morality is subjective to the culture involved.

PEREYNOL:
If God's goals changed or progressed, so might morality.

POWELL:
Well then perhaps God is a changeable God.

On the other hand, perhaps morals have changed because people's views have changed and God had nothing to do with it.

POWELL:
3. If God were all-powerful He could cause morality to remain consistent through out all historical time.

PEREYNOL:
It is not apparent how God could cause morality to remain static in a world involving truly free human moral agents without coercing them. And if God intended to respect our free moral agency by design, it is not unreasonable to suppose he wouldn't coerce our actions.

POWELL:
In that case, I guess it's something beyond His power. He can't both respect our free moral agency AND cause morality to remain consistent.

POWELL:
4. If God were all-good He should cause morality to remain consistent through out all historical time.

PEREYNOL:
Again, perhaps not.

POWELL:
Well, I suppose if having free will was so much more good than having a consistent moral code, maybe you're right.

POWELL:
5. If morality has not been sufficiently consistent throughout all historical time then it's unlikely that morality is God-inspired.

PEREYNOL:
Some morality is God-inspired, and some is unchanging. Yet, God might favor moral and societal progress, and he may well grant the possibility of such progress as an integral part of human free agency. There are indeed moral shifts and developments for the worse within a society, just as there are bad individual moral choices. Both stem from the abuse of free moral agency.

POWELL:
How do you "abuse" free moral agency, by doing things that reduce your future options?

POWELL:
Why not? Each person has a right to their own opinion. Isn't this what the historical record suggests has happened? Why don't we have slaves anymore in the U.S.? Is it because it was always immoral or is it because it BECAME immoral to enough people that in the 19th century the U.S. people fought a war over it (and other issues) or something else? According to the Bible, what does God think about slavery? Has God changed His opinion since then?

PEREYNOL:
Moral flux is indeed a reality in history, and possibly within the goals of God as well. But your assumption that this somehow ices your argumentative cake remains triumphalistically premature.

POWELL:
I'm learning.

POWELL:
I think that's what we have. Welcome to the real world. If I had been born into ancient Jewish society I might have seen no problem in hacking or stabbing to death neighboring peoples including pregnant mothers and male children, but taking one of the virgin girls as a war-booty wife and forcing her to have sex with me. But living today, I feel differently about such things. Morality apparently has changed over time. Wouldn't you agree? Is that what you would expect if morality came from an OmniGod?

PEREYNOL:
And if you had reached the prime of life as a Gestapo agent, you might find yourself gassing Jews, or if you were raised in some contemporary Muslim environments, you might find yourself strapping on a bomb. If you were an American during the late 1770's, you might find yourself shooting at redcoats, and if you were an American male in the 1940's, you might find yourself participating in the invasion of Normandy, etc, etc, etc. Some of these pursuits are morally justifiable by different available ethical positions and some are not. Some of these pursuits may be morally justifiable in the eyes of God, while some others are merely the fruit of human evil and miscalculation.

POWELL:
Good examples! The historical record suggests that morals are subjective, not objective in the way you think.

How can one tell what God thinks about such things, the Bible? The God of the Bible seems to think stabbing pregnant mothers and children to death and taking young girls as war brides is ok. The God of the Bible seems to think it is justifiable to kill children for the sins of their ancestors of 400 years before. If God thinks those things are ok, why should we think God has a problem with killing the ancestors of those who killed Jesus Christ?

PEREYNOL:
And while you could indeed have participated in each of these historical currents had you lived during the periods in question, it remains equally true that you could have declined to participate by an exercise of your free moral agency.

POWELL:
Excuse me. How would I have known what modern ethicists would consider to be moral if such views were unavailable during those ancient times? Do you expect me to have come up with it all on my own? Maybe I could have if God would have revealed it to me. Allegedly God did reveal His will to ancient prophets, but the morals we see in the Bible aren't always obviously praiseworthy.

Holy people of the Bible seemed to think slavery and male domination were ok. What chance would I have had to discover the modern "truths" that slavery is bad and men should not dominate over women? I think you're asking too much of me, Pereynol. My ethics are strongly affected by what I have experienced, learned from others. If I were born in ancient times I would likely believe as they did and SO WOULD YOU!

PEREYNOL:
As to your conception of an"OmniGod" and whether all morality can be ascribed to him, well, I've already responded to that. I think your conception of divinity (and divine teleology) much too narrow and your conception of moral flux overly simplistic.

POWELL:
Perhaps. On the other hand, perhaps your conception of divinity and such things is too broad and your conception of moral flux overly complex.

John Powell

Pereynol of Sheer Dread

March 9th 2003, 05:14 PM

03-09-2003 @ 10:08 AM
John Powell:

Pereynol-3a

POWELL:

How can you justify serious changes in the morals of society if morals come from an unchanging God?

As I have said, I don't justify all "serious changes in the morals of society," and I emphatically deny that all such changes come from God.

Do you believe you have a universal objective moral standard, Pereynol? If you do, please list a few examples of that standard that are
1. universal
2. objective
and
3. moral

Obviously, if I did believe I had a universal moral standard, I wouldn't have told you that God's purposes could change relative to people living in different epochs, now would I?

POWELL:
My point is that the real world doesn't necessarily match your ideal world.

Since I have neither posited or described any conception of an "ideal world," and since I haven't yet sought to delineate the "real world" in contradistinction to some ideal, it would be fair for me to ask you what in the world you're talking about.

Scientists seem to understand that principle better than philosophers do. That may be why scientists spend more time studying the world using quantitative experiments rather than spending so much time thinking about how they would like the world to be, like too many philosopher seem to do. That's another slam on philosophy, Pereynol.

All your "slams on philosophy" so far stem from your rather substantial ignorance of philosophy. What "principle" are you talking about? There are, moreover, thinkers who embrace both fields---do you really suppose that science and philosophy are two hermetically distinct autonomous realms?

POWELL:
I wonder sometimes given their assertions that morals aren't subjective. How then do you explain this moral evolution if God is the source of an unchanging standard?

Why do you continue to harp on this "unchanging standard" of yours? As for the explanation of "moral evolution," well, evidently you're not paying much attention to our discussion as I've already answered this question.

What evidence is there that morals on Earth have ever matched those of God? In the person of Jesus Christ only?

Again, conscience, natural law, and pervasiveness of the moral point of view can suggest a divine reference point as well as a human one, but neither side of the debate is able to provide conclusive disproof of the other. What one side sees as evidence, the other sees as anomaly.

POWELL:
On the basis that it should be a standard. One of the key features of a scientific "standard" is its consistency. Is this not a criterion in philosophy? Do philosophers think changing standards are ideal?

No human discipline, whether science or philosophy, or anything else associated with societal development has remained static; if there is any consistency in progess or development, it is measured against the backdrop of change. As learning, technology, and the humanities advance, so must morals.

POWELL:
Because God could and should be consistent with morality.

Or maybe human beings ought to stop confusing progress with undue license or liberty without constraint some of the time. We have a two-way street, not a one-way thoroughfare.

POWELL:
Then I guess God thinks that morality is not something that is a universal objective standard, but it's something relative to the society.

In some respects that's true; perhaps you're catching on....

POWELL:
Then I guess God created the world so that morality would be relative, subjective to the views of the free moral agents figuring things out on their own.

It's quite probable that God gave men free moral agency so that they could actually use it and participate with him in contributing to an improving world of an increasing moral caliber---in keeping with other forms of progress and creativity, etc.

POWELL:
Then I guess morality is subjective to the culture involved.

It has been, sometimes for good, and sometimes for ill, in keeping with the God-given responsibility for human beings to exercise their free moral agency along with all their other God-given faculties.

POWELL:
Well then perhaps God is a changeable God.

On the other hand, perhaps morals have changed because people's views have changed and God had nothing to do with it.

Or perhaps God is unchanging in his nature but nevertheless has progressive purposes for mankind.

POWELL:
In that case, I guess it's something beyond His power. He can't both respect our free moral agency AND cause morality to remain consistent.

Or maybe God deliberately chooses to limit the excercise of his power so that we can have a genuine and meaningful cooperation with him if we so choose.

POWELL:
Well, I suppose if having free will was so much more good than having a consistent moral code, maybe you're right.

Thanks for the concession; I'm glad you're able to see this.

POWELL:
How do you "abuse" free moral agency, by doing things that reduce your future options?

No. Any commitment involves a kind of self-limiting with respect to our faculties of choice, but this is largely a virtue, not a vice or an abuse. Our commitments make us who we are; they define us. And while they can become a vehicle for moral abuse, they needn't be.

John Powell

March 9th 2003, 06:51 PM

POWELL:
To Psychopath.

POWELL:
If you can't laugh about the divine and about yourself, you're probably suffering unnecessary psycho-emotional difficulties.

PSYCHOPATH:
I admit it; I laughed.

POWELL:
Make fun of me or my atheism in a talented way and I'll probably laugh.

PSYCHOPATH:
Now, on to your slightly revised form of the argument from evil.

1. If an OmniGod existed then no evil not necessary to fulfill his purposes would exist.

2. If God is all-powerful then He would have the power to remove all evil not necessary for the fulfillment of his purposes.

3. If God is all-good then He should remove all evil not necessary to fulfill his purposes.

4. Because of our free will to do or not do evil, there is, with high probability, at least one case of evil not necessary to fulfill God's purposes.

5. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that an OmniGod exists.

The evil that you seem to be implying exists and is not necessary to fulfill God's purposes comes from the actions of men, i.e., is moral evil (as opposed to natural disasters, etc.). I gather this from statement #4, in which you mention man's "free will to do or not do evil." (Oh yeah, let me know if I'm misrepresenting your point of view.)

POWELL:
Yes, I guess I'm talking about moral evil. The Carr-Pate debate is about suffering which apparently would include physical evil like natural disasters.

PSYCHOPATH:
So I think the argument, ultimately, goes back to why the God of the Bible created man, and whether he could have realized the goals for which he created them without allowing for the possibility of moral evil.

If God is perfect, he cannot have needs - such would imply some sort of lack, in which case he would be imperfect. However, I see no problem with him having wants. A need implies lacking something one cannot exist without; a want implies not having something that one can exist without, but that one would rather exist with.

POWELL:
Given your definitions, Mormons would argue that man doesn't have needs either because he (i.e. his spirit and intelligence) lacks for nothing to exist. To exist as a an embodied spirit or as a resurrected being, man has needs, but not just to exist as something.

PSYCHOPATH:
I think God has wants, two of which he fulfilled in the creation of man: to be glorified, and to have a familial relationship with other beings.

So, in order to fulfill these wants (or, to switch to your term, purposes), what choices did God have with respect to man's free will or lack thereof? I think, ostensibly, there are 3 possibilities:

1) God creates man without free will. Men are forced to glorify God and to engage in a familial relationship with him.

2) God creates man with a free will, but in such a way that they always choose the course of action that best furthers the fulfillment of the aforementioned purposes.

3) God creates man with a free will, with the ability to choose courses of action that work against the fulfillment of those purposes. That is, God allows for the possibility of the existence of moral evil.

#1 will not allow for the fulfillment of God's purposes of being glorified and having a familial relationship with man, because we are essentially his dummies to "ventriloquize." One is not truly being glorified or entering into a relationship if he is also the one doing the glorifying and acting on the other end of the relationship.

#2, IMO, is actually the same as #1. If God creates humans so they always choose the course of action that fulfills his purposes, there really is no choice. If I choose to do something, it is implied that I could have done otherwise. But if man is created so he always "chooses" in accordance with God's purposes, then one does NOT have the ability to do otherwise - God programmed him without this ability. Thus, though this option would seem different than #1, I think it is exactly the same situation, and the same explanation I gave for #1 applies.

POWELL:
For #2, God could create beings whose devotion to Him was like that of Jesus. These could be beings willing and able to do God's will despite the fact that they could sin if they chose to. They just don't want to. If God loves Jesus, how much more He would love a thousand or a million or a billion separate individuals who were just as sinless as Jesus, but each with their own unique personality and talents.

PSYCHOPATH:
This leaves only #3, which allows for the existence of moral evil. Therefore, in order for God's purposes to be fulfilled, I believe that the existence of moral evil, i.e., "our free will to do or not do evil," is necessary. And this explanation does indeed allow for God's purposes to be fulfilled: man can truly choose to glorify God, and enter into a familial relationship with him.

POWELL:
There's a time factor you seem to be ignoring. What if God makes us without free will ONLY WHILE WE ARE ON EARTH? Then He can give us free will and salvation after we die.

Who wouldn't be willing to give up free will on Earth for free will and assured eternal salvation in heaven after we die?

PSYCHOPATH:
So, to bring this all together, I would deny your 4th premise, because evil deriving from the moral action of men is necessary for the fulfillment of God's purposes.

POWELL:
I see. Did God tell you He needed every little moral evil I might commit to fulfill His purposes, that if I don't do one I had planned on doing that I would frustrate His purposes / wants?

Imagine I consider doing an evil thing.

A) I decide to do the evil thing and after doing it ask you if it was necessary to fulfill God's purposes / wants. You say, "That moral evil thing you did must have been necessary."

B) I decide not to do the evil thing and ask you whether the thing I contemplated doing was necessary to fulfill God's purposes / wants? You say, "No, that moral evil thing you didn't do must not have been necessary."

Well, Psychopath, which is it? Let's bring God in.

"God, is this morally evil thing I'm thinking of doing necessary to fulfill your purposes, your wants?"

God truthfully says . . .

If God says "Yes, it's a necessary evil." and I refuse to do it would I be frustrating the purposes / wants of God? Can free moral agents frustrate the purposes of God by NOT DOING THE EVIL HE WANTS THEM TO DO? More weird still, should these free moral agents be PUNISHED for NOT doing that evil and consequently frustrating His purposes / wants? :huh:

On the other hand, if God says "No, it's not a necessary evil." and I do it would I be doing an evil that isn't necessary to fulfill God's purposes and, thus, demonstrating at least one example of an evil that wasn't necessary to fulfill God's purposes / wants? :hrm:

Perhaps you'll have to choose, Psychopath, between a God who can be frustrated by free moral agents who DON'T do the evil He wants them to do or a God who allows evil that isn't necessary to fulfill His purposes / wants. :no:

PSYCHOPATH:
Excuse me if someone else has already raised this objection; I didn't take the time to read through the entire thread.
Peace.

POWELL:
Thanks.

John Powell

John Powell

March 9th 2003, 06:56 PM

PATE:
John,

It may take a while before I have time to respond, but please don't take this as an indication that I'm backing out. I do want to continue our discussion. But like I already said before, my debate with Steven Carr must be my number one priority in this forum right now and I'm not sure how much time I've got for other discussions here. I have a life outside of TWeb also. :smile:

POWELL:
No problem. Give the debate your best given your circumstances! I'm watching from the bleachers.

I think anyone involved in a current debate at tweb should be given some slack on replying elsewhere at tweb. (hint hint).

John Powell

John Powell

March 9th 2003, 07:20 PM

POWELL:
To Pereynol only.

John Powell
If you think M.P. is a fine argument, Pereynol, then you have a fine argument with just the conditional because you're not really linguistically saying anything more by converting it into M.P.

PEREYNOL:
No. The conditional alone is not equivalent to the entire argument. Here is a modus ponens:

If P then Q
P
---------------
Therefore Q

POWELL:
Are you claiming this to be a sound deductive argument or a merely valid deductive argument, Pereynol? It makes a difference.

PEREYNOL:
To say that adding the second premise adds nothing to the conditional is patently wrong. The conditional alone only asserts the relation between P and Q; it doesn't tell us whether we actually have P or Q.

POWELL:
That's if you're claiming the argument is sound, Pereynol, but not if you're claiming it's merely valid. If you're claiming the argument is merely valid then you're saying

If "if p then q" and (or then) if "p" then "q"

which is essentially the same thing as

If "if p then q" then "if you have p then you have q."

If, on the other hand, you're claiming the argument is sound then you're saying

"If p then q" is true and "p" is true and, since the form is valid and the premises are true, "q" is true.

The syllogism form is ambiguous whether the argument is being claimed to be sound or merely valid.

PEREYNOL:
The second premise tells us that we actually have P, so because we know that the if/then relation is true from the conditional, we can then conclude "Q." But without the second premise, we can draw no conclusion at all.

POWELL:
On the contrary, if the conditional is true then you can conclude that "if you have p then you'll have q", don't you agree?

PEREYNOL:
You cannot move from "If P then Q" directly to "Therefore Q" without "P." It cannot be done.

POWELL:
I didn't mean to do that.

PEREYNOL:
Morevoer, modus ponens isn't just a syllogistic structure, it is also a rule of inference!

POWELL:
M.P., when claimed to merely valid, is essentially a circular argument. I demonstrate this in another thread. Why don't you go there and show me where I'm mistaken?

PEREYNOL:
So, by the way, is the hypothetical syllogism. You have confused the two below:

POWELL:
All you'd be doing essentially is adding "if the moon is made of green cheese" as a second premise and "then the pixies have plenty to eat" as the conclusion, making an essentially circular argument.

PEREYNOL:
My example was a Hypothetical syllogism, not an MP, and every logician uses both MP and HS as rules of inference. In the HS proper, the conclusion is also a conditional. (See above.)

The fact that you think a mere conditional statement = MP, and the fact that you failed to distinguish MP from HS explains a lot with respect to your former assertions about "hypotheticals." It also makes sense that you cannot seem to distinguish the diffierence between a hypothetical "scenario" and a valid argument.

POWELL:
I see. Is it possible that you could be wrong and that M.P., when claimed to be merely valid, is essentially a circular argument that says

If the conditional "if p then q" is true then "if you have p then you have q"?

John Powell

John Powell

March 9th 2003, 07:58 PM

POWELL:
To Pereynol.

POWELL:
Informal foreknowledge-free-will Scenario:
Imagine a theist named Peter with free will who is skeptical of God's foreknowledge. He has a choice of A or B. He asks God, "Since people claim you know the future, God, please tell me, will I pick A or B? Let me warn you that whatever you tell me, I'm going to do the opposite."

God says . . .

If God says "B" then Peter does A and God is wrong.

However, if God says "A" then Peter does B and God is wrong.

Regardless whether God says "A" or "B" God will be wrong if Peter does the opposite. Therefore, God could not know whether Peter would do A or B if Peter has free will. Therefore, in at least this case, God could not know the future. At most God could predict what Peter might do. What do you think, Pereynol? Are you persuaded to accept that God cannot know the future if we have free will?

More Formal foreknowledge-free-will Argument:
1. If P has free will then P can choose A or B despite what G foretells.
2. If G knows the future and if G honestly foretells A or B then G will be right.
3. If G foretells B and P chooses A then G will not be right.
4. If G foretells A and P chooses B then G will not be right.
5. Therefore, G either does not know the future or G is not honest or P does not have free will.

More symbolically:
1. If FW then A or B
2. If NF and HF then R
3. If A then not R
4. If B then not R
5. therefore, not NF or not HF or not FW

What do you think, Pereynol? Are you persuaded to accept that God cannot know the future if we have free will?

The formal argument took a whole lot longer to come up with than the informal scenario and may ultimately be less persuasive because of possible problems with it.

PEREYNOL:
John,
Thanks for posting an entire argument rather than rhetorical fragments.

POWELL:
You're welcome.

PEREYNOL:
There are several weaknesses here, and your symbolism needs help, . . .

POWELL:
What's wrong with my symbolism? I use English words and abbreviations for words that are more likely to be understood by the general reader then logical symbols would be.

PEREYNOL:
. . . but the most problematic thing about this argument is that all your premises are conditionals and your conclusion does not follow.

POWELL:
What's wrong with having all conditionals as premises? Didn't you do that with your pixie syllogism? Even your conclusion was a conditional.

What do you mean the conclusion doesn't follow? Please try asserting NF and HF and FW all true at the same time and go through the conditionals. Don't you come up with contradictions?

PEREYNOL:
I imagine that these difficulties partly arise from your misunderstandings which I detailed in my previous post.

POWELL:
Perhaps. I'm not so sure I'm misunderstanding what you think I'm misunderstanding. I'm still waiting for you to show me where my "M.P., when claimed to be merely valid, is essentially circular" argument is flawed.

PEREYNOL:
Since all your premises are conditionals, your conclusion cannot really work the way it currently stands.

POWELL:
Why not? Again, try asserting NF and HF and FW all true at the same time and see if contradictions result. It looks to me that one of those three have to be false.

PEREYNOL:
Ideally, you'd need the sort of premises which you've previously seen no need for, like the kind found in the second premise of a MP.

POWELL:
That might be true if I were claiming the argument is sound. I don't even know if the argument is valid for sure. You don't seem to think it is.

PEREYNOL:
As the argument stands now, you could conclude another conditional, but that wouldn't tell us anything about God's actual knowlege, his actual honesty, or whether or not Peter actually has free will.

POWELL:
What the argument concludes is that it can't be true that God knows the future and God is honest and Peter has free will. That's all I want to prove. Which of the premises do you disagree with?

PEREYNOL:
A second option would be to replace a conditional with a disjuction by the rule of material implication. But, though you have indeed concluded a disjunction, it doesn't follow the rule. Further, if you did succeed in replacing a conditional conclusion with a disjunction, you'd still have the same problems I mentioned earlier, that is, your conclusion would entail that either God does have foreknowledge or that he does not, but such a conclusion tells us nothing about God's actual knowledge, only about the either/or relation.

POWELL:
I suspect it won't be as good a match to my scenario. Would you like to make the suggested disjunction or other changes? Please use English words instead of logical symbols, ok?

PEREYNOL:
Formal concerns aside, the "scenario" behind the argument seems terribly unlikely, as it assumes that God would directly communicate a "prediction" to a "theist" who overtly intends to defy him.

POWELL:
Why would that bother God? He presumably knows whether the challenge will succeed or fail. IF God is an OmniBeing He'll presumably want everyone to know whether He can foretell the future if there's free will, wouldn't you think? Surely He won't refuse just so we'll remain ignorant of His true attributes.

PEREYNOL:
If God chose not to communicate such needed information, presumably his foreknowledge would remain intact, and the whole scenario would fail.

POWELL:
That could be viewed as a deception if God doesn't really have foreknowedge, but just great predictive / guessing ability and great power to make good His promises.

PEREYNOL:
Moreover, if certain brands of compatibilism were true, it might be the case that Peter would lack the power to defy God anyway, because his desires would be determined by God, causing his will to follow suit, especially if Peter really were a theist.

POWELL:
That would suggest Peter really didn't have free will then, don't you think?

PEREYNOL:
And lastly, there remain varieties of theist that do not believe God has the sort of foreknowledge you are trying to debunk, so your argument would be irrelevant to them.

POWELL:
They aren't my target, Pereynol. Presumably, they've already gone through something like my scenario and agree with me about it. It's people like you I'm trying to educate.

PEREYNOL:
As I have been saying all along, your characterization of God is too narrow, and your argumentation insufficient, for you to achieve your goals.

POWELL:
Perhaps, but it sure is fun trying. :brow:

PEREYNOL:
Aside from my two posts above, another simple way to refute John's argument against God's foreknowledge would be to recognize that John's argument requires God's help. The only way God's foreknowledge could be thwarted is through another act of God. But God would have to willingly act against himself---something he's not likely to do.

POWELL:
Why would God want to deceive us into thinking He can do something He can't, Pereynol? Maybe God would jump at the opportunity to clear up this misunderstanding.

On the other hand, maybe God wants to keep this a mystery. In that case, perhaps you should warn God not to get suckered into one of my scenarios or I'll possibly make Him look bad and clear up the mystery. God might even thank you for the warning. :teeth:

John Powell

Pereynol of Sheer Dread

March 9th 2003, 07:58 PM

03-09-2003 @ 06:20 PM
John Powell:

POWELL:
To Pereynol only.

POWELL:
Are you claiming this to be a sound deductive argument or a merely valid deductive argument, Pereynol? It makes a difference.

John,
This is, as you ought to know, the conventional illustration of the form of a valid example of modus ponens. It illustrates what valid form looks like, but, since the variables do not yet purport to stand for anything, one cannot evaluate the soundness of the illustration. Yet, anytime someone puts the argument to use, meaning that the variables are used to stand for an actual referents of some kind, the argument form comes alive and can then be evaluated as to soundness. Obviously, my earlier "pixie" example was another example intended to illustrate an argument's form without reference to soundness. But, normally, when someone frames an argument that is valid, they also intend that it be sound. I can think of little reason to frame an argument that would be "valid only" without concern for soundness, apart from illustrating how the formal argument should work---ie, as a didactic device.

[b]Why else would someone frame a "merely valid" MP, apart from didactic purposes or mistakes?

POWELL:
That's if you're claiming the argument is sound, Pereynol, but not if you're claiming it's merely valid. If you're claiming the argument is merely valid then you're saying

If "if p then q" and (or then) if "p" then "q"

which is essentially the same thing as

If "if p then q" then "if you have p then you have q."

No, not at all. If an argument is "merely valid," the variables in question don't stand for anything yet, but the intended meaning doesn't thereby change into a mere equivalence of conditionals. Why would you think it does?

If, on the other hand, you're claiming the argument is sound then you're saying

"If p then q" is true and "p" is true and, since the form is valid and the premises are true, "q" is true.

No; the formal meaning doesn't shift because the variables lack referents in a didactic example. But, when the variables do stand for something, the argument can be said to have a specific content which can then be evaluated with respect to soundness.

The syllogism form is ambiguous whether the argument is being claimed to be sound or merely valid.

The only ambiguity involved results from the fact that a didactic example has no referents, but be that as it may, the intended meaning doesn't reduce to the mere equilvalence of conditionals.

POWELL:
On the contrary, if the conditional is true then you can conclude that "if you have p then you'll have q", don't you agree?

John, you're making a fairly elementary mistake here. The truth of a conditional statement, whether its variables have referents or not, doesn't in itself substantiate whether we actually have P or Q or turkey or satiety, etc. That is, when a conditional is said to be true, it only asserts the truth of the relation between antecedent and consequent. To assert the reality of either antecedent or consequent requires another premise to that effect. For example, if I say that the conditional "If we've got any dough, then we can bake bread" is true, it doesn't follow that we actually have any dough in the kitchen. For me to substantiate that, I'd have to go look in the kitchen. If I did find dough, then I could assert the second premise in my MP, We've got dough," and then, I can test the MP for soundness. If I looked for dough and found none, the conditional would still be true, but my MP, though valid as it can be, wouldn't achieve soundness. Nevertheless, the meaning wouldn't have changed, whether the MP was sound or not.

POWELL:
M.P., when claimed to merely valid, is essentially a circular argument. I demonstrate this in another thread. Why don't you go there and show me where I'm mistaken?

I think I already know where you're mistaken.

POWELL:
I see. Is it possible that you could be wrong and that M.P., when claimed to be merely valid, is essentially a circular argument that says

If the conditional "if p then q" is true then "if you have p then you have q"?

Again, why would someone say, apart from didactic purposes or oversight, "Look, I've formulated a modus ponens! It's not sound, only valid---therefore its meaning reduces to the equivalence of conditionals and becomes question-begging! Isn't that cool?"

Pereynol of Sheer Dread

March 9th 2003, 08:33 PM

What do you mean the conclusion doesn't follow? Please try a03-09-2003 @ 06:58 PM
John Powell:

[Quote]
POWELL:
What's wrong with my symbolism? I use English words and abbreviations for words that are more likely to be understood by the general reader then logical symbols would be.

For starters, you're conflating how symbolism works with predicat logic with how it works in propositional logic. However, rather than do your work for you, I'd recommend that you study logic a bit more. I don't mean any of this as an insult, but your arguments would be far better if you had greater mastery of the subject.

POWELL:
What's wrong with having all conditionals as premises? Didn't you do that with your pixie syllogism? Even your conclusion was a conditional.

Nothing's wrong with having all conditionals in itself; that's how hypothetical syllogisms work. But they must be connected in proper logcial form, which yours aren't. (Your arg would be a sorites if it were validly constructed.) In my example, the conclusion was a hypothetical because that, too, is how hypothetical syllogisms work. But notice that a hypothetical conclusion asserts nothing about reality in and of itself; it merely asserts the conditional relation between antecedent and consequent. Your conclusion, however, is an illicitly derived disjunction. As I said, you can validly replace a conditional with a disjunction by several means---namely the rule of material implication or by making a constructive dilemma---neither of which you have done. Moreover, you have somehow got put together a tripple disjunction wherein the disjuncts are all on the negative side of the question, that is, they are all invalidly drawn from the consequents of your conditional premises.

The trouble with concluding a conditional or a disjunction is that you've not really asserted anything beyond conditional or disjunctive relations---that is, in the terms of my last post, you haven't gone into the kitchen, looked for dough, found it , and made an assertion concerning the existence of P or Q or whatever. And while the soundness of a hypothetical syllogism doesn't depend upon an assertion (second premise of a MP) in the way a MP does, it merely asserts the conditional relation between antecedent and consequent as being true. Such an arg won't suit your goals, again, because it doesn't tell us anything about God's actual knowledge, honesty, or anything else. And further, you're not likely to be able to procure such information so that you can make an assertion about your scenario beyond the hypothetical.

For example, suppose I come to you with this hypothetical syllogism:

If John's friend betrays him, then John's friend cannot be trusted.
If John's friend cannot be trusted, then he is no longer worthy to be called John's friend.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Therefore, if John's friend betrays him, he is no longer worthy to be called John's freind.

While this is sound and concludes a conditional, it might not correspond to reality and yet remain true. But you really don't know anything concerning whether your friend has indeed betrayed you until you go into the kitchen, so to speak, and are then able to make an assertion of the type found in premise 2 of a MP. Does this make sense? I hope it helps.

John, you could be making better arguments. I respect your mind, and though we're not going to reach an agreement on this question, I hope you realize what I'm trying to explain....

John Powell

March 9th 2003, 08:53 PM

POWELL:
To Jaltus(2) and Psychopath.

JALTUS:
I have absolutely no training in philsophy, so when you tell me an argument is sound, I assume you mean it is in wave form (I did part of my undergrad in physics, so obviously this is a physics-nerd joke).

POWELL:
So did I and more. Perhaps we'll have more in common than others here.

POWELL
Now, please repeat to me your definition of free will, Jaltus, where "outside force" becomes God's foreknowledge or His honest foretelling of the future or something like that. Wouldn't that definition of yours reasonably match my first conditional?

JALTUS:
The definition of free will is moot. What you are doing is assuming the God's foreknowledge is not caused by the outcome of the event.

POWELL:
The definition of free will is crucial to my first premise.

Where is that assumption evident?

Aren't the premises all conditionals, Jaltus? Aren't the premises merely saying "If X were true". I'm not claiming that X is true am I?

So, Jaltus, are you saying that my first conditional does NOT correlate to an acceptable definition of "free will"?

JALTUS:
Thus, you are making sure that there can only be foreknowledge due to determintave reasons, negating free will before we are out of the box.

POWELL:
What do you mean? What kinds of foreknowledge are you referring to?

POWELL:
Perhaps I need another premise in the argument that equates "outside force" that might prevent free will with "God's honest foretelling" or something like that.

JALTUS:
Actually, you need a lot more than just a single premise in the argument. You make a ton of assumptions within the first premise, such as the grounds of God's knowledge, His interaction with time, what causation entails, etc.

POWELL:
Perhaps, but I think the first premise correlates reasonably well with the definition of free will you provided, better, in fact, than the definition I had come up with on my own.

I don't think my argument cares how God comes to have His knowledge, Jaltus, as long as God informs Peter of the answer so Peter can exercise his free will to do the opposite.

JALTUS:
Perhaps a better way of stating the case would be:

1. If P has free will then P can choose A or B .
2. If G knows the future and if G honestly foretells A or B then G will be right.
3. If G foretells B and P chooses A then G will not be right.
4. If G foretells A and P chooses B then G will not be right.
5. Therefore, G either does not know the future or G is not honest or P does not have free will.

POWELL:
I doubt it, because then the conclusion doesn't seem to follow. A robot compelled to follow instructions can also "choose A or B" on command.

The question here is whether Peter can choose A after seeing that God picked B or choose B after seeing that God picked A. If Peter CAN DO that, He has free will. If Peter CAN'T DO that, then He's some kind of a robot, doesn't have free will.

JALTUS:
The next problem is that your conclusion is not correct either. With someone intentionally picking after already knowing the solution, you create a time paradox, with the choice causing the knowledge causing a different choice which would cause different knowledge which would cause a different choice.

POWELL:
I don't see that, Jaltus.

What I see is that if Peter has free will then he can choose A or B regardless of what God may have written down. On the other hand, if God knows the future then if God honestly writes down what He foresees Peter will do then God must be right, cannot be wrong. However, if God writes that Peter will pick B and Peter then picks A using his free will or vice versa then God will be wrong. If God is wrong about foreseeing, however, then He can't know the future. If God picked A and Peter had to pick A, could not pick B, then Peter doesn't have free will. It sounds like a pretty good argument to me, Jaltus.

JALTUS:
In other words, it is a false time loop. You are again assuming the knowledge is NOT based on the choice, and hence you are assuming determinism in order to prove your point that free will and omniscience do not go hand in hand, which means it is assumed from the beginning.

POWELL:
Why should God's knowledge NOW rely upon Peter's possible choice in the future, Jaltus? Peter hasn't made his choice yet and won't make that choice until the time arrives. Are you saying that the future is causing effects in the past?

Would you please clarify this "false time loop" you're claiming using the examples of Peter, God, foresee A, foresee B, pick A, pick B, etc.? Give me the order of events in chronological order. Remember we're in our universe, not God's transcendent one.

PSYCHOPATH:
To Jaltus

Yep, I think you're right on the money there. There are so many other things that must be considered, such as God's relationship to our time reference, in order to determine whether divine foreknowledge and human free will are incompatible.

POWELL:
I don't think my argument cares about God's transcendent time reference, Psychopath. That's one of the purposes of this argument and its associated scenario, to bring God out of the mysterious transcendent space He's been put by theologians to resist scrutiny by skeptics and drag Him, screaming if necessary, back to the time-normal universe we all live in. :whip:

If God is going to know the future and reveal it to us then that revelation will be in our universe, not just His, right?

My argument just cares that God is honest about His answers and gives them to Peter before Peter decides what to do. God can get those answers anyway He pleases.

John Powell

psychopath

March 10th 2003, 01:02 AM

You posted responses to me in to separate posts. I'll respond to all of it here.

I said:

"If God is perfect, he cannot have needs - such would imply some sort of lack, in which case he would be imperfect. However, I see no problem with him having wants. A need implies lacking something one cannot exist without; a want implies not having something that one can exist without, but that one would rather exist with."

You replied:

"Given your definitions, Mormons would argue that man doesn't have needs either because he (i.e. his spirit and intelligence) lacks for nothing to exist. To exist as a an embodied spirit or as a resurrected being, man has needs, but not just to exist as something."

That was a bad explanation of "needs" on my part; I am willing to better clarify what I meant if you feel that it is important to the central discussion of evil. I was just utilizing it to intoduce the concept of "wants," however, so I don't see it as necessary to get into.

You said:

"For #2 [man with free will, but always choosing that which accords with God's purposes], God could create beings whose devotion to Him was like that of Jesus. These could be beings willing and able to do God's will despite the fact that they could sin if they chose to. They just don't want to. If God loves Jesus, how much more He would love a thousand or a million or a billion separate individuals who were just as sinless as Jesus, but each with their own unique personality and talents."

Actually, my view (and I do not believe I am alone here) is that Jesus could NOT have sinned. Jesus was God. God cannot do that which contradicts his nature as a perfectly moral being. An example of this from the Bible of this is the verse (I forget the reference) that says God cannot lie. A being that you describe, i.e. one that wants to follow God's purposes but still has the ability to sin, would fall into category #3. If it has the ability to sin, it is not created so as to always act in accordance with God's purposes, which was the stipulation for a being of #2 (which I argue is actually synonymous with #1). I'm not sure if you're attempting to introduce another category here; if so, just let me know.

You said:

"There's a time factor you seem to be ignoring. What if God makes us without free will ONLY WHILE WE ARE ON EARTH? Then He can give us free will and salvation after we die.

Who wouldn't be willing to give up free will on Earth for free will and assured eternal salvation in heaven after we die?"

If I exist in heaven with moral free will, God cannot ordain my eternal salvation. God is perfectly just; if I utilized my free will and rejected God, this aspect of his nature would require him to separate myself from his presence. This is, according to Christianity, exactly what happened to Lucifer/Satan. Therefore, I think this scenario fails also.

The Christian view, as I understand it, is that Christians become morally perfect beings in heaven. Thus, in the same way that God cannot sin, Christians will not have the ability to sin in heaven.

You said:

"Did God tell you He needed every little moral evil I might commit to fulfill His purposes, that if I don't do one I had planned on doing that I would frustrate His purposes / wants?"

No. But if God wants to be truly glorified by you, me, or anyone else, he has to create these beings with the ability to choose to do so. Such inevitably entails the possibility that these beings choose the alternative, which would include "little moral evil[s]."

You said:

"Imagine I consider doing an evil thing.

A) I decide to do the evil thing and after doing it ask you if it was necessary to fulfill God's purposes / wants. You say, "That moral evil thing you did must have been necessary."

B) I decide not to do the evil thing and ask you whether the thing I contemplated doing was necessary to fulfill God's purposes / wants? You say, "No, that moral evil thing you didn't do must not have been necessary.""

What I am arguing is that it the decision itself (i.e., your free will) that is necessary to fulfill God's purposes/wants.

You said:

"Let's bring God in.

"God, is this morally evil thing I'm thinking of doing necessary to fulfill your purposes, your wants?"

God truthfully says . . .

If God says "Yes, it's a necessary evil." and I refuse to do it would I be frustrating the purposes / wants of God? Can free moral agents frustrate the purposes of God by NOT DOING THE EVIL HE WANTS THEM TO DO? More weird still, should these free moral agents be PUNISHED for NOT doing that evil and consequently frustrating His purposes / wants?

On the other hand, if God says "No, it's not a necessary evil." and I do it would I be doing an evil that isn't necessary to fulfill God's purposes and, thus, demonstrating at least one example of an evil that wasn't necessary to fulfill God's purposes / wants?"

Well, according to my view, I humbly think that God would say "It is the ACT of deciding that is necessary to fulfill my purposes, not whether it produces evil or not." I think this is different than the two possible responses you provided from God.

You said:

"I don't think my argument [regarding divine foreknowledge and human free will] cares about God's transcendent time reference, Psychopath. That's one of the purposes of this argument and its associated scenario, to bring God out of the mysterious transcendent space He's been put by theologians to resist scrutiny by skeptics and drag Him, screaming if necessary, back to the time-normal universe we all live in."

But I think it is his very ability to transcend our time frame which allows for the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human free will. However, I do not want to get into this argument with you as of yet, because it is already ongoing on the board (specifically, the debate with Jaltus). Maybe afterwards, if I am not satisfied by the defense given by Jaltus.

John Powell

March 10th 2003, 04:03 AM

Re: Pereynol on valid / sound

POWELL:
To Pereynol only.

POWELL:
Are you claiming this to be a sound deductive argument or a merely valid deductive argument, Pereynol? It makes a difference.

PEREYNOL:
John,
This is, as you ought to know, the conventional illustration of the form of a valid example of modus ponens. It illustrates what valid form looks like, but, since the variables do not yet purport to stand for anything, one cannot evaluate the soundness of the illustration.

POWELL:
I appreciate your candor.

PEREYNOL:
Yet, anytime someone puts the argument to use, meaning that the variables are used to stand for an actual referents of some kind, the argument form comes alive and can then be evaluated as to soundness.

POWELL:
"Can be" and "intended to be" can be quite distinct.

PEREYNOL:
Obviously, my earlier "pixie" example was another example intended to illustrate an argument's form without reference to soundness.

POWELL:
Exactly.

PEREYNOL:
But, normally, when someone frames an argument that is valid, they also intend that it be sound.

POWELL:
Perhaps elsewhere, but this is much less often true in discussions between atheists and theists, especially those arguments put into syllogistic form by atheists. For example, if I present an argument in which God is an element, you would be foolish to assume I think the argument is sound, don't you agree? Obviously, I'm claiming it's merely a valid, statistical, or inductive argument or something other than sound, right?

PEREYNOL:
I can think of little reason to frame an argument that would be "valid only" without concern for soundness, apart from illustrating how the formal argument should work---ie, as a didactic device.

POWELL:
Then perhaps you haven't put your self in the shoes of your opponents enough, Pereynol.

If you're right, Pereynol, that it's merely a didactic device then how are atheists supposed to have a technically logical dialogue with you about your beliefs? Surely, you are aware that they don't believe in God and the resurrection and the Bible and such things. Their deductive arguments aren't claimed to be sound. Why would you think they thought they were sound?

I fear that your mind is so trapped in the certainty of your world view, Pereynol, that you have extra trouble considering alternative points of view.

PEREYNOL:
[b]Why else would someone frame a "merely valid" MP, apart from didactic purposes or mistakes?

POWELL:
To have a logical dialogue with someone who holds to beliefs they don't. Does that make sense to you now?

POWELL:
That's if you're claiming the argument is sound, Pereynol, but not if you're claiming it's merely valid. If you're claiming the argument is merely valid then you're saying

If "if p then q" and (or then) if "p" then "q"

which is essentially the same thing as

If "if p then q" then "if you have p then you have q."

PEREYNOL:
No, not at all. If an argument is "merely valid," the variables in question don't stand for anything yet, but the intended meaning doesn't thereby change into a mere equivalence of conditionals. Why would you think it does?

POWELL:
Because that's the way it looks to me, Pereynol. Perhaps you'd like to look at my arguments relevant to this at "Valid-only Modus Ponens is essentially circular."

Then please write out in long English, Pereynol, what Modus Ponens means if it is claimed to be merely valid, not sound, ok?

POWELL:
If, on the other hand, you're claiming the argument is sound then you're saying

"If p then q" is true and "p" is true and, since the form is valid and the premises are true, "q" is true.

PEREYNOL:
No; the formal meaning doesn't shift because the variables lack referents in a didactic example. But, when the variables do stand for something, the argument can be said to have a specific content which can then be evaluated with respect to soundness.

POWELL:
Then, Pereynol, please write out in long English what M.P. means when it is claimed to be sound, ok? You're welcome to put in referents if you like. Let me suggest "p" = "it is raining" and "q" = "the roads are wet." Please post your response to the other thread.

POWELL:
The syllogism form is ambiguous whether the argument is being claimed to be sound or merely valid.

PEREYNOL:
The only ambiguity involved results from the fact that a didactic example has no referents, but be that as it may, the intended meaning doesn't reduce to the mere equilvalence of conditionals.

POWELL:
I disagree. Is the following argument sound? There are referents.

1. If it is raining then the roads are wet.
2. It is raining.
3. therefore, the roads are wet.

POWELL:
On the contrary, if the conditional is true then you can conclude that "if you have p then you'll have q", don't you agree?

PEREYNOL:
John, you're making a fairly elementary mistake here.

POWELL:
That shouldn't surprise you since my background is science, not philosophy.

PEREYNOL:
The truth of a conditional statement, whether its variables have referents or not, doesn't in itself substantiate whether we actually have P or Q or turkey or satiety, etc. That is, when a conditional is said to be true, it only asserts the truth of the relation between antecedent and consequent. To assert the reality of either antecedent or consequent requires another premise to that effect. For example, if I say that the conditional "If we've got any dough, then we can bake bread" is true, it doesn't follow that we actually have any dough in the kitchen.

POWELL:
Perhaps you need to read my posts more carefully, Pereynol. I never said, did I, that "p is true" or that "we have p." I said that if the conditional is true, namely that the following statement is true,

if p then q

then you can (justifiably) conclude that the following statement is true

if you have p then you'll have q

At no time here did I claim that you have p, only that if you have p then you will have q. THE SAME IS TRUE FOR MERELY VALID DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS. However, this is not true for sound arguments.

PEREYNOL:
For me to substantiate that, I'd have to go look in the kitchen. If I did find dough, then I could assert the second premise in my MP, We've got dough," and then, I can test the MP for soundness. If I looked for dough and found none, the conditional would still be true, but my MP, though valid as it can be, wouldn't achieve soundness. Nevertheless, the meaning wouldn't have changed, whether the MP was sound or not.

POWELL:
Are you saying that the meaning of the syllogism doesn't change whether you claim it is sound or merely valid?

POWELL:
M.P., when claimed to merely valid, is essentially a circular argument. I demonstrate this in another thread. Why don't you go there and show me where I'm mistaken?

PEREYNOL:
I think I already know where you're mistaken.

POWELL:
Good. I expect you'll be pointing it out to me soon.

POWELL:
I see. Is it possible that you could be wrong and that M.P., when claimed to be merely valid, is essentially a circular argument that says

If the conditional "if p then q" is true then "if you have p then you have q"?

PEREYNOL:
Again, why would someone say, apart from didactic purposes or oversight, "Look, I've formulated a modus ponens! It's not sound, only valid---therefore its meaning reduces to the equivalence of conditionals and becomes question-begging! Isn't that cool?"

POWELL:
I explained somewhat above.

I thought it was cool. Maybe you will too when I persuade you that I'm right.

In a way I am reminding philosophers that A = A is merely a question of definitions, it's not new information like what scientists try to produce.

John Powell

John Powell

March 10th 2003, 04:42 AM

Re: Pereynol NF-HF-FW

POWELL:
What's wrong with my symbolism? I use English words and abbreviations for words that are more likely to be understood by the general reader then logical symbols would be.

PEREYNOL:
For starters, you're conflating how symbolism works with predicat logic with how it works in propositional logic. However, rather than do your work for you, I'd recommend that you study logic a bit more. I don't mean any of this as an insult, but your arguments would be far better if you had greater mastery of the subject.

POWELL:
Perhaps.

POWELL:
What's wrong with having all conditionals as premises? Didn't you do that with your pixie syllogism? Even your conclusion was a conditional.

PEREYNOL:
Nothing's wrong with having all conditionals in itself; that's how hypothetical syllogisms work. But they must be connected in proper logcial form, which yours aren't.

POWELL:
Please show me or this appears to be a mere assertion.

PEREYNOL:
(Your arg would be a sorites if it were validly constructed.) In my example, the conclusion was a hypothetical because that, too, is how hypothetical syllogisms work. But notice that a hypothetical conclusion asserts nothing about reality in and of itself; it merely asserts the conditional relation between antecedent and consequent. Your conclusion, however, is an illicitly derived disjunction.

POWELL:
Please show me or this appears to be a mere assertion and / or an appeal to authority.

PEREYNOL:
As I said, you can validly replace a conditional with a disjunction by several means---namely the rule of material implication or by making a constructive dilemma---neither of which you have done. Moreover, you have somehow got put together a tripple disjunction wherein the disjuncts are all on the negative side of the question, that is, they are all invalidly drawn from the consequents of your conditional premises.

POWELL:
Are you going to make an appeal to authority or are you going to produce your supporting argument? Why don't you show this explicitly?

PEREYNOL:
The trouble with concluding a conditional or a disjunction is that you've not really asserted anything beyond conditional or disjunctive relations---that is, in the terms of my last post, you haven't gone into the kitchen, looked for dough, found it , and made an assertion concerning the existence of P or Q or whatever.

POWELL:
Who said I wanted to make the argument sound? I don't believe in God so that would be a difficult task. Who said I want to conclude with a conditional?

PEREYNOL:
And while the soundness of a hypothetical syllogism doesn't depend upon an assertion (second premise of a MP) in the way a MP does, it merely asserts the conditional relation between antecedent and consequent as being true. Such an arg won't suit your goals, again, because it doesn't tell us anything about God's actual knowledge, honesty, or anything else.

POWELL:
Are you sure? Did you follow my suggestion to try to have be true Peter's free will and God's foreknowledge and God's honesty and see if it produced contradictions in the argument?

PEREYNOL:
And further, you're not likely to be able to procure such information so that you can make an assertion about your scenario beyond the hypothetical.

POWELL:
Should that surprise someone who doesn't believe one of the elements, God, even exists?

PEREYNOL:
For example, suppose I come to you with this hypothetical syllogism:

If John's friend betrays him, then John's friend cannot be trusted.
If John's friend cannot be trusted, then he is no longer worthy to be called John's friend.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Therefore, if John's friend betrays him, he is no longer worthy to be called John's freind.

While this is sound and concludes a conditional, it might not correspond to reality and yet remain true.

POWELL:
Not so. It is not sound unless your two conditionals ARE TRUE. That would imply that John and his friend are real and that if John's friend betrays John then John's friend can never be trusted under any circumstances and that if John's friend cannot be trusted then he is no longer worthy to be called John's friend under any circumstances. Do you really believe these statements are true?

I think your argument is valid, but it isn't sound. What your VALID argument is saying is

IF the conditional
"If John's friend betrays him, then John's friend cannot be trusted." is true and
IF the conditional
"If John's friend cannot be trusted, then he is no longer worthy to be called John's friend." is true
then (or therefore) the conditional
"if John's friend betrays him, he is no longer worthy to be called John's friend" will be true, cannot be false.

PEREYNOL:
But you really don't know anything concerning whether your friend has indeed betrayed you until you go into the kitchen, so to speak, and are then able to make an assertion of the type found in premise 2 of a MP. Does this make sense? I hope it helps.

POWELL:
It does. But I think you're more confused than you think you are and I'm less confused than you think I am.

PEREYNOL:
John, you could be making better arguments. I respect your mind, and though we're not going to reach an agreement on this question, I hope you realize what I'm trying to explain....

POWELL:
I appreciate the effort. Now, could you get back to my argument and do the truth substitutions I suggested?

John Powell

Jaltus

March 10th 2003, 02:37 PM

I just noticed something. John's argument assumes a LACK of free will for the Person, since it is GOD's CHOICE which DETERMINES the Person's choice. The Person is not choosing by free will, but by determination.

Hence, the argument is invalid anyway.

Pereynol of Sheer Dread

March 11th 2003, 01:04 AM

John,
The mistaken impressions you have about logic almost assuredly all stem from your imprecise knowledge of it. While you're generating some good questions and ideas, they've all been dealt with before in the specialized literature. You may well hit upon some interesting things, but, for you to deprive yourself of a better educational awareness of the history and methodological practices, and most importantly, the accumulated and established facts with which this discipline deals, will keep you at a distinct disadvantage and effectively render the great percentage of your ability to contribute anything to the progress of this field null and void.

I read your bio, and seeing that you are a physicist, I expect you know the kind of effort required to gain competency among one's peers. Suppose a sophomore who dropped out of a physics program intruded into a professional gathering of scholars in your field and started pontificating about some specialized aspect of your discussions, calling into question foundational and elementary aspects of your science---how would you deal with him? If you were charitable, you'd probably try to coax him back to his studies, wouldn't you?

Suppose, however, a scholar from another field entered into a collegial discussion with you and your peers. He might well have only a grasp of your discipline comparable in scope to that of an undergraduate dropout. While you'd probably be gentler with him and more respectful, he might warrant the same advice as the dropout---namely, if you want to become competent in another discipline, you'll need to hit the books. I think that you, as accomplished as you are in your own field, need to hit the books. As it is, you're stuck spinning theories about problems that have been solved already, and you're pretty trenchant about making objections pertaining to an established field of which you are demonstrably ignorant. This is a waste of time, both for you and for those whom you would engage.

That being said, I'll try to address some of your concerns. First, there are several things you should know with respect to conditionals. First, the truth functional definition of a conditional is such that a material conditional is only falsified when its antecendent is true and its consequent false. This means that a conditional whose antecedent and consequent are both false nevertheless remains true.

Moreover, there are different types of conditionals, and some of them are not truth functional in the sense that the truth values of their antecedents and consequents determine the truth of the conditional. Specifically, subjunctive conditionals or contrafactuals may not be truth functional in this way.

Your objection about "valid only" arguments are best regarded under the rubric of contrafactuals or perhaps hypothetical reasoning wherein someone formulates an argument only "for the sake of argument" and doesn't necessarily believe that the objects of discussion are real or factual entities at all. Even if someone frames an arg merely to examine an hypothesis or to consider something he believes contrary to fact, the meanings of the propositions involved do not change. For one thing, what a sceptic might consider contrafactual, an exponent of the opposing view might consider quite factual, and so in practice, one must keep meanings constant. Further, an evaluation of soundness for contrafcatuals or hypothetical reasoning may not rest upon the truth functionality of antecedent and consequent, or even the truth of the hypothesis as a whole, but upon the truth of the conditional relation, as I have said. This becomes particualrly apparent when, in a hypothetical syllogism, one concludes a conditional in which, though antecedent and consequent are both false, or whose truth values remain indeterminate, the conditional is yet true.

As to your MP example:

If it is raining, then the street is wet.
It is raining.
-----------------------------------------------
Therefore the street is wet.

what one sees here is a veiled ambiguity due to the fact that no time or locus is specified. The first premise probably ought to be taken as a general conditional which would imply that:

At any specified location and time, if it is raining, the street is wet.

The conditonal then would refer to a whole bundle of specific cases with attendant places and timeframes, in which the specified condtions apply. So, anytime one filled in the blanks, so to speak, the MP could be checked for soundness.

If it is raining at John's house at one PM, then the street at his house is wet at one PM.
It is raining at John's house at one PM.
--------------------------------------------------------
Therefore, the street at John's house is wet at one PM.

Anyway, hopefully you'll take what I've said to heart in a constructive fashion. No disrespect meant. I'll be out of town for a couple of days, as I've got to attend a funeral. We can resume later, if you like.

John Powell

March 11th 2003, 02:18 AM

PSYCHOPATH:
You posted responses to me in to separate posts. I'll respond to all of it here.

I said:

"If God is perfect, he cannot have needs - such would imply some sort of lack, in which case he would be imperfect. However, I see no problem with him having wants. A need implies lacking something one cannot exist without; a want implies not having something that one can exist without, but that one would rather exist with."

POWELL:
Given your definitions, Mormons would argue that man doesn't have needs either because he (i.e. his spirit and intelligence) lacks for nothing to exist. To exist as a an embodied spirit or as a resurrected being, man has needs, but not just to exist as something.

PSYCHOPATH:
That was a bad explanation of "needs" on my part; I am willing to better clarify what I meant if you feel that it is important to the central discussion of evil.

POWELL:
Actually, I thought is was a possibly useful definition of need. Perhaps we should drop it for now.

PSYCHOPATH:
I was just utilizing it to intoduce the concept of "wants," however, so I don't see it as necessary to get into.

POWELL:
For #2 {man with free will, but always choosing that which accords with God's purposes}, God could create beings whose devotion to Him was like that of Jesus. These could be beings willing and able to do God's will despite the fact that they could sin if they chose to. They just don't want to. If God loves Jesus, how much more He would love a thousand or a million or a billion separate individuals who were just as sinless as Jesus, but each with their own unique personality and talents."

PSYCHOPATH:
Actually, my view (and I do not believe I am alone here) is that Jesus could NOT have sinned. Jesus was God. God cannot do that which contradicts his nature as a perfectly moral being.

POWELL:
If Jesus didn't CHOOSE to do good and refuse evil, but did good and did no evil because He was physically unable to do otherwise, then apparently He didn't have free will. Furthermore, wouldn't that contradict the alleged Messianic prophecy in Isa 7:14-16?

Isa 7:14-16 (KJV):
14 Therefore the Lord himself shall give you a sign; Behold, a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son, and shall call his name Immanuel.

15 Butter and honey shall he eat, that he may know to refuse the evil, and choose the good.

16 For before the child shall know to refuse the evil, and choose the good, the land that thou abhorrest shall be forsaken of both her kings.

POWELL:
What do you think, Psychopath?

PSYCHOPATH:
An example of this from the Bible of this is the verse (I forget the reference) that says God cannot lie.

POWELL:
I think that you're assuming that "God" is the essence of His existence rather than "spirit" or something like that being His essence. Mormons believe "God" is an office. If God lies, according to them, then He ceases to be God, but He wouldn't cease to exist. God has free will to sin, but just chooses not to.

PSYCHOPATH:
A being that you describe, i.e. one that wants to follow God's purposes but still has the ability to sin, would fall into category #3. If it has the ability to sin, it is not created so as to always act in accordance with God's purposes, which was the stipulation for a being of #2 (which I argue is actually synonymous with #1). I'm not sure if you're attempting to introduce another category here; if so, just let me know.

POWELL:
Maybe it should be another category if Jesus is as you say.

POWELL:
There's a time factor you seem to be ignoring. What if God makes us without free will ONLY WHILE WE ARE ON EARTH? Then He can give us free will and salvation after we die.

Who wouldn't be willing to give up free will on Earth for free will and assured eternal salvation in heaven after we die?

PSYCHOPATH:
If I exist in heaven with moral free will, God cannot ordain my eternal salvation.

POWELL:
Why not? You would not have sinned on Earth would you?

PSYCHOPATH:
God is perfectly just; if I utilized my free will and rejected God, this aspect of his nature would require him to separate myself from his presence.

POWELL:
How could you have rejected God if you didn't have free will? God could have made you so you had to accept Him while on Earth. Then, after you die, He could give you free will. You would have free will, but have gone through Earth life without sinning.

PSYCHOPATH:
This is, according to Christianity, exactly what happened to Lucifer/Satan. Therefore, I think this scenario fails also.

POWELL:
So, are you saying that if God were to abolish free will while we lived on Earth, so that we are forced to accept God and live sinless lives while on Earth, and then He gave us free will after we die, that we would choose to reject God and become devils? I suppose some might, but I sure wouldn't. I may be skeptical, but I'm not stupid. What does Satan have to offer that can match what God offers? Who's going to reject God when they're seeing Him face to face?

PSYCHOPATH:
The Christian view, as I understand it, is that Christians become morally perfect beings in heaven. Thus, in the same way that God cannot sin, Christians will not have the ability to sin in heaven.

POWELL:
Then what's the problem with the scenario? We avoid sinning on Earth because free will is abolished. We are forced to do only good on Earth. When we die we go to heaven where we will be unable to sin and are given free will. This looks great.

POWELL:
Did God tell you He needed every little moral evil I might commit to fulfill His purposes, that if I don't do one I had planned on doing that I would frustrate His purposes / wants?

PSYCHOPATH:
No. But if God wants to be truly glorified by you, me, or anyone else, he has to create these beings with the ability to choose to do so. Such inevitably entails the possibility that these beings choose the alternative, which would include "little moral evil{s}.

POWELL:
Why? Why is God glorified only by beings who have free will to sin? Isn't He glorified by those in heaven who you say can't sin? Isn't He glorified by His Son Jesus Christ, who you claim could not sin? Why is the ability to sin glorifying to God?

POWELL:
Imagine I consider doing an evil thing.

A) I decide to do the evil thing and after doing it ask you if it was necessary to fulfill God's purposes / wants. You say, "That moral evil thing you did must have been necessary."

B) I decide not to do the evil thing and ask you whether the thing I contemplated doing was necessary to fulfill God's purposes / wants? You say, "No, that moral evil thing you didn't do must not have been necessary."

PSYCHOPATH:
What I am arguing is that it the decision itself (i.e., your free will) that is necessary to fulfill God's purposes/wants.

POWELL:
So, it's not the lots of good and the minimum of evil acts that God needs to fulfill His purposes, but it's the exercise of free will itself that is all He needs to fulfill His purposes. In other words, it DOESN'T MATTER WHAT any morally free person does, as far as God's purposes are concerned, as long as they are exercising their free will. This surely can't be your position, Psychopath.

POWELL:
Let's bring God in.

"God, is this morally evil thing I'm thinking of doing necessary to fulfill your purposes, your wants?"

God truthfully says . . .

If God says "Yes, it's a necessary evil." and I refuse to do it would I be frustrating the purposes / wants of God? Can free moral agents frustrate the purposes of God by NOT DOING THE EVIL HE WANTS THEM TO DO? More weird still, should these free moral agents be PUNISHED for NOT doing that evil and consequently frustrating His purposes / wants?

On the other hand, if God says "No, it's not a necessary evil." and I do it would I be doing an evil that isn't necessary to fulfill God's purposes and, thus, demonstrating at least one example of an evil that wasn't necessary to fulfill God's purposes / wants?

PSYCHOPATH:
Well, according to my view, I humbly think that God would say "It is the ACT of deciding that is necessary to fulfill my purposes, not whether it produces evil or not." I think this is different than the two possible responses you provided from God.

POWELL:
Then apparently, it doesn't matter whether I or any other free moral agent chooses good or bad because ANYTHING WE MIGHT DO will fulfill God's purposes as long as we do it while exercising our free will. I doubt that this is really your position.

POWELL:
I don't think my argument {regarding divine foreknowledge and human free will} cares about God's transcendent time reference, Psychopath. That's one of the purposes of this argument and its associated scenario, to bring God out of the mysterious transcendent space He's been put by theologians to resist scrutiny by skeptics and drag Him, screaming if necessary, back to the time-normal universe we all live in.

PSYCHOPATH:
But I think it is his very ability to transcend our time frame which allows for the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human free will.

POWELL:
Perhaps yes while God is outside of our universe in His own strange-time one, but NOT WHILE GOD IS INTERACTING WITH OUR TIME NORMAL UNIVERSE. Once God starts telling us in our universe what will happen or writing down on things in our universe what will happen then those events should be understood using the time-normal features of our universe.

PSYCHOPATH:
However, I do not want to get into this argument with you as of yet, because it is already ongoing on the board (specifically, the debate with Jaltus). Maybe afterwards, if I am not satisfied by the defense given by Jaltus.

POWELL:
That sounds fine. Until then.

John Powell

John Powell

March 11th 2003, 02:27 AM

POWELL:
To Jaltus only

Jaltus:
I just noticed something. John's argument assumes a LACK of free will for the Person, since it is GOD's CHOICE which DETERMINES the Person's choice. The Person is not choosing by free will, but by determination.

Hence, the argument is invalid anyway.

POWELL:
Perhaps, Jaltus, but I don't think so. I don't think the argument compels P to contradict G, but only allows P to by virtue of his free will. P could choose what G foresaw or he could choose to contradict that. P has the ability to choose.

What is important is that If P CAN choose to contradict G then G cannot know the future. On the other hand, if G cannot be wrong in the prediction then P cannot have free will since he couldn't contradict G even if he wanted to.

John Powell

John Powell

March 11th 2003, 05:55 AM

pereynol:
John,
The mistaken impressions you have about logic almost assuredly all stem from your imprecise knowledge of it.

POWELL:
Certainly not. It's also from my training as a scientist to disregard much of the nonsense philosophers promote as undeniable truth.

PEREYNOL:
While you're generating some good questions and ideas, they've all been dealt with before in the specialized literature.

POWELL:
Then you shouldn't have too much difficulty presenting those arguments, right?

PEREYNOL:
You may well hit upon some interesting things, but, for you to deprive yourself of a better educational awareness of the history and methodological practices, and most importantly, the accumulated and established facts with which this discipline deals, will keep you at a distinct disadvantage and effectively render the great percentage of your ability to contribute anything to the progress of this field null and void.

POWELL:
I'm still learning, Pereynol. I'll be a student of this universe until the day I die, I imagine.

PEREYNOL:
I read your bio, and seeing that you are a physicist, I expect you know the kind of effort required to gain competency among one's peers. Suppose a sophomore who dropped out of a physics program intruded into a professional gathering of scholars in your field and started pontificating about some specialized aspect of your discussions, calling into question foundational and elementary aspects of your science---how would you deal with him?

POWELL:
It depends on many factors, particularly the likely desires of those around me. If he came to me alone when I wasn't in a hurry, I would seriously consider his claims, I would hope.

PEREYNOL:
If you were charitable, you'd probably try to coax him back to his studies, wouldn't you?

POWELL:
Possibly, yes.

PEREYNOL:
Suppose, however, a scholar from another field entered into a collegial discussion with you and your peers. He might well have only a grasp of your discipline comparable in scope to that of an undergraduate dropout. While you'd probably be gentler with him and more respectful, he might warrant the same advice as the dropout---namely, if you want to become competent in another discipline, you'll need to hit the books. I think that you, as accomplished as you are in your own field, need to hit the books.

POWELL:
I have begun to "hit the books." The college philosophy teacher, Doug Krueger, recommended an introductory logic book for me. I purchased it (our college uses it) and I've begun to read it.

PEREYNOL:
As it is, you're stuck spinning theories about problems that have been solved already, and you're pretty trenchant about making objections pertaining to an established field of which you are demonstrably ignorant.

POWELL:
Then
1) would you please go to my M.P. thread and demonstrate where my logic is wrong and
2) would you please tell me which of the premises of my P free will scenario are false and
3) would you please assume all three elements of the conclusion are true and check to see if that produces contradictions in the premises.

Show me I'm demonstrably ignorant, Pereynol, don't just claim it.

PEREYNOL:
This is a waste of time, both for you and for those whom you would engage.

That being said, I'll try to address some of your concerns. First, there are several things you should know with respect to conditionals. First, the truth functional definition of a conditional is such that a material conditional is only falsified when its antecendent is true and its consequent false. This means that a conditional whose antecedent and consequent are both false nevertheless remains true.

POWELL:
Are you essentially saying the following? Specialized meanings of conditionals such as "if p then q" (namely those English-phrased conditionals that could be replaced by the horseshoe symbol) are only false if p is true and q is false. All other possible truth values of p and q (namely TT, FT, and FF) will be true.

PEREYNOL:
Moreover, there are different types of conditionals, and some of them are not truth functional in the sense that the truth values of their antecedents and consequents determine the truth of the conditional. Specifically, subjunctive conditionals or contrafactuals may not be truth functional in this way.

POWELL:
Could you supply some simple examples?

PEREYNOL:
Your objection about "valid only" arguments are best regarded under the rubric of contrafactuals or perhaps hypothetical reasoning wherein someone formulates an argument only "for the sake of argument" and doesn't necessarily believe that the objects of discussion are real or factual entities at all.

POWELL:
I don't see discussing your religious views as if there was some truth to them as merely arguing for arguments sake.

PEREYNOL:
Even if someone frames an arg merely to examine an hypothesis or to consider something he believes contrary to fact, the meanings of the propositions involved do not change.

POWELL:
They sure seem to change for me. For the believer, certain propositions are treated as truths, whereas for the nonbeliever those same propositions are treated as hypotheticals or "truths for arguments sake" to demonstrate some other point. For example, where the believer might say "Jesus said in . . ." the nonbeliever says or implies "If Jesus said in . . ." That looks to me to be a change in meaning.

PEREYNOL:
For one thing, what a sceptic might consider contrafactual, an exponent of the opposing view might consider quite factual, and so in practice, one must keep meanings constant.

POWELL:
That sounds like a good goal, but how is that possible given that their views on the truth of the propositions are so much in opposition?

PEREYNOL:
Further, an evaluation of soundness for contrafcatuals or hypothetical reasoning may not rest upon the truth functionality of antecedent and consequent, or even the truth of the hypothesis as a whole, but upon the truth of the conditional relation, as I have said. This becomes particualrly apparent when, in a hypothetical syllogism, one concludes a conditional in which, though antecedent and consequent are both false, or whose truth values remain indeterminate, the conditional is yet true.

As to your MP example:

If it is raining, then the street is wet.
It is raining.
-----------------------------------------------
Therefore the street is wet.

what one sees here is a veiled ambiguity due to the fact that no time or locus is specified.

POWELL:
The validity of this argument does not rest on your soundness analysis. It is valid because it has the M.P. form. If I want to persuade you to accept the conclusion all I need to do is persuade you to accept the premises.

PEREYNOL:
The first premise probably ought to be taken as a general conditional which would imply that:

At any specified location and time, if it is raining, the street is wet.

The conditonal then would refer to a whole bundle of specific cases with attendant places and timeframes, in which the specified condtions apply. So, anytime one filled in the blanks, so to speak, the MP could be checked for soundness.

If it is raining at John's house at one PM, then the street at his house is wet at one PM.
It is raining at John's house at one PM.
--------------------------------------------------------
Therefore, the street at John's house is wet at one PM.

Anyway, hopefully you'll take what I've said to heart in a constructive fashion. No disrespect meant. I'll be out of town for a couple of days, as I've got to attend a funeral. We can resume later, if you like.

POWELL:
Sure.

John Powell

Pereynol of Sheer Dread

March 11th 2003, 11:00 AM

03-11-2003 @ 04:55 AM
John Powell:

I have begun to "hit the books." The college philosophy teacher, Doug Krueger, recommended an introductory logic book for me. I purchased it (our college uses it) and I've begun to read it.

Excellent.

POWELL:
Then
1) would you please go to my M.P. thread and demonstrate where my logic is wrong and
2) would you please tell me which of the premises of my P free will scenario are false and
3) would you please assume all three elements of the conclusion are true and check to see if that produces contradictions in the premises.

Show me I'm demonstrably ignorant, Pereynol, don't just claim it.

I've got a better idea; when you gain enough logical competence to recognize your own mistakes in your foreknowledge/free will arg, and when you garner enough humility to admit to those mistakes, we'll proceed from there....

Jaltus

March 11th 2003, 12:28 PM

John,

Did you ever reply to this post (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?postid=29542#post29542)?

If so, could you show me where?

Jaltus

March 11th 2003, 12:30 PM

Oh, I have found John to be quite willing to admit mistakes so far. His humility is not an issue that I can see, at least not from the posts I have read. Knowledge of philsophy, however, is not something I, as an untrained person, can knowledgably discuss.

psychopath

March 12th 2003, 12:30 AM

POWELL:
For #2 {man with free will, but always choosing that which accords with God's purposes}, God could create beings whose devotion to Him was like that of Jesus. These could be beings willing and able to do God's will despite the fact that they could sin if they chose to. They just don't want to. If God loves Jesus, how much more He would love a thousand or a million or a billion separate individuals who were just as sinless as Jesus, but each with their own unique personality and talents."

PSYCHOPATH:
Actually, my view (and I do not believe I am alone here) is that Jesus could NOT have sinned. Jesus was God. God cannot do that which contradicts his nature as a perfectly moral being.

POWELL:
If Jesus didn't CHOOSE to do good and refuse evil, but did good and did no evil because He was physically unable to do otherwise, then apparently He didn't have free will. Furthermore, wouldn't that contradict the alleged Messianic prophecy in Isa 7:14-16?

Isa 7:14-16 (KJV):
14 Therefore the Lord himself shall give you a sign; Behold, a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son, and shall call his name Immanuel.

15 Butter and honey shall he eat, that he may know to refuse the evil, and choose the good.

16 For before the child shall know to refuse the evil, and choose the good, the land that thou abhorrest shall be forsaken of both her kings.

POWELL:
What do you think, Psychopath?

This opens up a whole new can of worms: whether Jesus had the ability to sin or not. I believe the majority of theologians and Biblical scholars do not hold the position that he could; however, the passage you quoted would seem (at least on the surface) to indicate otherwise. Some Christians don't think this is a Messianic prophecy at all, some think it has a double meaning, while still others think it had a double fulfillment. If you're interested in a little background on this issue, here's a link:

http://pw1.netcom.com/~rogh/fulfill/index.htm#Isaiah

But instead of getting into this corollary discussion and trying to convince you of my position, I will assume for the sake of this argument that Jesus did possess the ability to sin.

That being said, suppose God created "beings whose devotion to Him was like that of Jesus." As you further describe, these beings "could be beings willing and able to do God's will despite the fact that they could sin if they chose to." But the very fact that they have the ability to sin opens the door to the possibility of the existence of moral evil. Therefore, such beings would just fall into category #3 as I originally described it. If you are advocating that God should have created beings like this in order to fulfill his wants of being glorified and engaging in a familial relationship with other beings, then you are also implying that God at least allow for the possibility of moral evil. This is the type of being God did create, though - Adam and Eve were originally innocent, with the ability to "sin if they chose to." So it would seem as though the type of being you're talking about is exactly the type God DID create in order to fulfill his wants. I'm probably misunderstanding you, however.

PSYCHOPATH:
A being that you describe, i.e. one that wants to follow God's purposes but still has the ability to sin, would fall into category #3. If it has the ability to sin, it is not created so as to always act in accordance with God's purposes, which was the stipulation for a being of #2 (which I argue is actually synonymous with #1). I'm not sure if you're attempting to introduce another category here; if so, just let me know.

POWELL:
Maybe it should be another category if Jesus is as you say.

If God created beings as I say Jesus was, i.e., without the ability to sin, these beings would not be able to fulfill God's wants of being glorified or of engaging in a relationship with other beings, for the reasons I described in my previous two posts and will describe later in this post.

PSYCHOPATH:
If I exist in heaven with moral free will, God cannot ordain my eternal salvation.

POWELL:
Why not? You would not have sinned on Earth would you?

Quote:
PSYCHOPATH:
God is perfectly just; if I utilized my free will and rejected God, this aspect of his nature would require him to separate myself from his presence.

POWELL:
How could you have rejected God if you didn't have free will? God could have made you so you had to accept Him while on Earth. Then, after you die, He could give you free will. You would have free will, but have gone through Earth life without sinning.

Hmm, I think you missed my point. The fact that God gives me free will in heaven allows for the possibility that I reject him, or try to put myself at or above his level (as Lucifcer supposedly did), etc. This is the case because I have moral free will. But if I do one of these things, God's perfect justice would lead to him throwing me out of heaven and separating me from his presence (as he did with Lucifer). I would no longer be saved. Since this is always a possible scenario, God cannot ordain my eternal salvation. Therefore, I still maintain that your hypothetical is flawed, because as long as I possess moral free will in heaven, my eternal salvation cannot be guaranteed.

So, are you saying that if God were to abolish free will while we lived on Earth, so that we are forced to accept God and live sinless lives while on Earth, and then He gave us free will after we die, that we would choose to reject God and become devils? I suppose some might, but I sure wouldn't. I may be skeptical, but I'm not stupid. What does Satan have to offer that can match what God offers? Who's going to reject God when they're seeing Him face to face?

But, as you say, some might. And according to Christianity, some did (Lucifer being their "leader"). Pride and greed can be very coercive and deceptive forces. So with this possibility remaining, God cannot foreordain our eternal salvation.

Then what's the problem with the scenario? We avoid sinning on Earth because free will is abolished. We are forced to do only good on Earth. When we die we go to heaven where we will be unable to sin and are given free will. This looks great.

No. We cannot have moral free will and be unable to sin at the same time. The latter implies a lack of moral free will.

Why? Why is God glorified only by beings who have free will to sin? Isn't He glorified by those in heaven who you say can't sin? Isn't He glorified by His Son Jesus Christ, who you claim could not sin? Why is the ability to sin glorifying to God?

I think a distinction needs to be made between angels in heaven and men in heaven. The former obviously possesses moral free will - the story of Lucifer demonstrates this. Their free will allows them to glorify God. Men in heaven, however, would not seem to possess moral free will. They are guaranteed eternal salvation, and, as I have already described, such is incompatible with also having moral free will. Now, to your questions:

1) I think I've already explained why God cannot fulfill his wants by creating beings to whom he does not give free will. Would you consider yourself truly glorified if you built a robot that always made flattering remarks about you? Do you think you could have a meaningful relationship with this robot, or any other creation of yours that lacks free will?

2) I've already covered angels in heaven. The reason men in heaven can fulfill God's wants of being glorified and engaging in relationships with other beings is because they had free will on Earth, and actively chose, without God determining it whatsoever, to glorify and have a relationship with him.

3) I don't think one can really say God is glorified by Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ is God; that's like saying God is glorified by God. My point is that God wants to be glorified by other beings.

4) The ability to sin, i.e., moral free will, is what allows God to fulfill his aforementioned wants.

So, it's not the lots of good and the minimum of evil acts that God needs to fulfill His purposes, but it's the exercise of free will itself that is all He needs to fulfill His purposes. In other words, it DOESN'T MATTER WHAT any morally free person does, as far as God's purposes are concerned, as long as they are exercising their free will.

Obviously God wants us to to act morally, not immorally. But, insofar as the wants I'm talking about are concerned, our exercise of moral free will is absolutely necessary for fulfillment. This, inevitably, allows for the possibility of moral evil.

I still disagree with regards to the foreknowledge/free will issue, but will let Jaltus carry my end of the debate for now.

Peace.

John Powell

March 12th 2003, 04:18 PM

JALTUS:
John,

Did you ever reply to this post?

If so, could you show me where?

POWELL:
It looks like something I've read before and I remember intending to respond, but I don't remember if I did. No matter, I'll respond now.

JALTUS:
Perhaps a better way of stating the case would be:

1. If P has free will then P can choose A or B .
2. If G knows the future and if G honestly foretells A or B then G will be right.
3. If G foretells B and P chooses A then G will not be right.
4. If G foretells A and P chooses B then G will not be right.
5. Therefore, G either does not know the future or G is not honest or P does not have free will.

POWELL:
The problem with premise 1 in this form is that if a person is forced to choose A then it would still be true that they can choose "A or B", yet that wouldn't mean they have free will. Tim Holt thinks something like "possibly A and possibly B" better represents the meaning of "free will" here and I agree, provided one understands that this does not mean one can pick A and B at the same time only that before picking, it is possible for them to pick one and it is possible for them to pick the other. Translating English words to truth - table - defined - logical terms is not something I've had a lot of practice with, but I would like to try to use that powerful logical tool here. I plan to revise the argument to try to take advantage of the truth-table method of determining valid deductive arguments. I want to introduce this in to our debate as soon as possible after I present stage 3.

JALTUS:
The next problem is that your conclusion is not correct either. With someone intentionally picking after already knowing the solution, you create a time paradox, with the choice causing the knowledge causing a different choice which would cause different knowledge which would cause a different choice.

POWELL:
Perhaps there is a time paradox if the future can be known. If the future cannot be known, as I believe, then I don't think there is a time paradox. The person may have thought they knew the future, but if they thought that, they were wrong. Participating in my scenario (and perhaps seriously considering the associated, corrected, more formal argument) demonstrates this to them.

JALTUS:
In other words, it is a false time loop. You are again assuming the knowledge is NOT based on the choice, and hence you are assuming determinism in order to prove your point that free will and omniscience do not go hand in hand, which means it is assumed from the beginning.

POWELL:
Sneaky, aren't I?

When you find yourself in my scenario realizing that you are able to choose the opposite of what this wannabe - future - knower claims will happen, in essence "already happened in the future," maybe you'll believe more in determinism and the inability of anyone to know the future too.

John Powell

John Powell

March 12th 2003, 04:42 PM

POWELL:
To Pereynol and Jaltus.

POWELL:
I have begun to "hit the books." The college philosophy teacher, Doug Krueger, recommended an introductory logic book for me. I purchased it (our college uses it) and I've begun to read it.

PEREYNOL:
Excellent.

POWELL:
Unfortunately for you, Pereynol, what I read tends to confirm what I suspected before reading it.

POWELL:
Then
1) would you please go to my M.P. thread and demonstrate where my logic is wrong and
2) would you please tell me which of the premises of my P free will scenario are false and
3) would you please assume all three elements of the conclusion are true and check to see if that produces contradictions in the premises.

Show me I'm demonstrably ignorant, Pereynol, don't just claim it.

PEREYNOL:
I've got a better idea; when you gain enough logical competence to recognize your own mistakes in your foreknowledge/free will arg, and when you garner enough humility to admit to those mistakes, we'll proceed from there....

POWELL:
Ad hominem.

Are you suggesting, Pereynol, that the validity of an argument depends upon the humility or logical competency of the person presenting the argument? If the answer is "no," then what difference does it make to the validity of my argument even if I were "logically incompetent" and resistant to admit error? If the answer is "yes" then who was accusing whom of logical incompetency and resistance to admit their errors?

JALTUS:
Oh, I have found John to be quite willing to admit mistakes so far. His humility is not an issue that I can see, at least not from the posts I have read. Knowledge of philsophy, however, is not something I, as an untrained person, can knowledgably discuss.

POWELL:
That's one of the nicest things you could have said, Jaltus. I can be very obstinate even when I'm wrong because I work so hard to be right, but I can be persuaded to change. I'm less obstinate now as an athe-ist than I was as a believing Mormon.

After you've seen enough of this dogmatic scientist-type deal with dogmatic philosopher-types like Pereynol, Jaltus, you might revise your estimate of your competency to discuss philosophy. Your science education may have equipped you better than you realize to deal competently with much of philosophy.

Cheers

John Powell

Jaltus

March 12th 2003, 07:30 PM

John,

Why don't we hash this out in our debate. I think we are doing a little too much "previewing" in this thread.

We can always come back to this if our debate limits us too much.

John Powell

March 18th 2003, 12:40 AM

POWELL:
Given the discussion, I would like to revise the argument from evil.

ATHEIST:
Here's a statistical argument against the existence of an OmniGod based upon the problem of evil.

1. If an OmniGod existed then no evil would exist that was not necessary to fulfill God's purposes.

2. If God is all-powerful then He would have the power to remove all evil that was not necessary to fulfill God's purposes.

3. If God is all-good then He should remove all evil that was not necessary to fulfill God's purposes.

4. Because of our free will to do or not do evil, there is, with high probability, at least one case where evil could exist that isn't necessary for God's purposes.

5. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that an OmniGod exists.

THEIST:
I deny premise 4. There is no evil that can exist that isn't necessary for God's purposes. If the evil exists, it must be necessary for God's purposes.

ATHEIST:
I see. What if I consider doing an evil thing. If I were to do that evil thing I was considering would it be an evil necessary to fulfill God's purposes?

THEIST:
Yes.

ATHEIST:
What if I changed my mind so I didn't do it? Wouldn't that be NOT doing an evil thing that was necessary to fulfill God's purposes?

THEIST:
No, because exercising your free will fulfills one of God's most important purposes.

ATHEIST:
Ok, if exercising free will is a far more important "good" than doing specific good things and avoiding doing specific evil things then does it really matter much to God's purposes how much evil or how little good any one does as long as they do it because of exercising their free will?

THEIST:
Let me think about that.

John Powell

Jaltus

March 18th 2003, 12:59 PM

I deny that you fulfill your own situation. you forget about God being all-just, all-jealous, all-Holy.

In other words you do not have an omni-God, you have an unbalanced God.

John Powell

March 21st 2003, 02:23 AM

POWELL:
ATHEIST:
Ok, if exercising free will is a far more important "good" than doing specific good things and avoiding doing specific evil things then does it really matter much to God's purposes how much evil or how little good any one does as long as they do it because of exercising their free will?

THEIST:
Let me think about that.

JALTUS:
I deny that you fulfill your own situation. you forget about God being all-just, all-jealous, all-Holy.

In other words you do not have an omni-God, you have an unbalanced God.

POWELL:
I'm confused what relevance this is. All-good probably implies all-just and all-holy. Jealous ok, but "all-jealous"?

I'm trying to gain an adequate understanding of this "higher value on free will than individual acts of good or evil" argument.

Is free will such a great thing that it's worth all the evil that apparently comes about by having it? I can't see that as being the case. It seems that things would be much better off by eliminating free will while people live on Earth then, perhaps, giving it to them after they die. If they screw things up after they die at least it will be while having a lot more sure knowledge than they have now.

John Powell

Jaltus

March 21st 2003, 09:39 AM

But John, what is "better":

Temporary evil or eternal evil?

John Powell

March 21st 2003, 08:24 PM

Jaltus:

But John, what is "better":

Temporary evil or eternal evil?

POWELL:
It depends on the calculated result. You have to add them up after properly assigning relative weights.

In general, an infinite evil would be expected to be worse than a temporary evil, but that's not necessarily the case. You can add up an infinite series and get a finite result. A finite result larger than the sum of that infinite series would be larger and, therefore, a "worse" evil or a "better" good.

How would the loss of free will during Earth life produce a smaller "GOOD MINUS EVIL" sum calculated over all time than retaining free will on Earth? I don't think it would. I think it would create a larger sum (i.e., be better) without free will on Earth.

As things are now, free moral agents do good and lots of evil and only a minority of them are expected to be saved, the rest spending eternity in hell.

Without free will on Earth there would be no evil during Earth life, but not much good either, but then a much larger group would both be saved and retain their right to stay in heaven. If free will were given to everyone after they died then probably only a few would exercise that free will to lose their Heavenly privileges like Satan presumably did.

This argument might fall apart if heaven is only slightly better than hell.

Are you suggesting that the evil caused by those few rebels would more than counter-balance all the extra good from the much larger number of saved persons that would result by eliminating free will on Earth?

John Powell

Woman

March 21st 2003, 09:35 PM

POWELL:
I meant evil in the objective sense: what the expert authorities (whoever they are) consider to be evil, rather than the subjective sense: what each individual considers to be evil.

You've just summed up your problem. "expert authorities, (whoever they are)." There aren't any objective authorities. They don't exist.

PSYCHOPATH: Actually, my view (and I do not believe I am alone here) is that Jesus could NOT have sinned. Jesus was God. God cannot do that which contradicts his nature as a perfectly moral being.

Then you've just thrown out the whole concept and meaning of "the temptation of Christ."

PSYCHOPATH: I don't think one can really say God is glorified by Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ is God; that's like saying God is glorified by God. (woman:I take it you're not a Trinitarian)

PSYCHOPATH: My point is that God wants to be glorified by other beings.

Why? This question has plagued me all my life. Wanting, needing to be glorified does NOT sound like the quality of a perfect, benevolent, divine being to me. Rather, it sounds like a very human ego thing.

Socrates

March 21st 2003, 11:24 PM

Woman:Why? This question has plagued me all my life. Wanting, needing to be glorified does NOT sound like the quality of a perfect, benevolent, divine being to me. Rather, it sounds like a very human ego thing.Not at all. It's the fact that God really IS perfect and benevolent and worthy of being glorified. Therefore it is part of His very nature to require that His free creatures treat Him as He truly is.

As C.S. Lewis put it, there are two types of people. One says to God, "Thy will be done", and go to heaven where they will have the pleasure that comes from being united from the ultimatesource of all goodness and light.

The other type are those to whom God says "Thy will be done". Since they want to live their lives apart from God, God will grant them their wish for all eternity. Jesus said to such people "Depart from me", and that is the worst thing about eternal punishment, being apart from the source of goodness.

John Powell

March 22nd 2003, 02:37 AM

POWELL:
I meant evil in the objective sense: what the expert authorities (whoever they are) consider to be evil, rather than the subjective sense: what each individual considers to be evil.

WOMAN OF THE WORLD:
You've just summed up your problem. "expert authorities, (whoever they are)." There aren't any objective authorities. They don't exist.

POWELL:
Then what human beings do you ask advice from, Woman of the world, when you have moral questions? If you don't trust any mortal's opinion then I would argue that you consider yourself to be an expert authority, since surely God doesn't visit you regularly to tell you what He thinks.

PSYCHOPATH:
My point is that God wants to be glorified by other beings.

WOMAN OF THE WORLD:
Why? This question has plagued me all my life. Wanting, needing to be glorified does NOT sound like the quality of a perfect, benevolent, divine being to me. Rather, it sounds like a very human ego thing.

POWELL:
Good question. It sounds like a man's ego thing.

John Powell
A former believer in Mormonism,
Now an athe-ist or strong atheist

Woman

March 22nd 2003, 03:04 AM

POWELL:
I meant evil in the objective sense: what the expert authorities (whoever they are) consider to be evil, rather than the subjective sense: what each individual considers to be evil.

WOMAN:
You've just summed up your problem. "expert authorities, (whoever they are)." There aren't any objective authorities. They don't exist.

POWELL:
Then what human beings do you ask advice from, Woman of the world, when you have moral questions? If you don't trust any mortal's opinion then I would argue that you consider yourself to be an expert authority, since surely God doesn't visit you regularly to tell you what He thinks.

Well, I'll tell you. I have a pretty well defined sense of ethics - I have developed them over the course of my life and of course others have had an influence on that. But there is no one person to whom I would subvert my sense of right and wrong to. And that includes a religious leader. Why? Because, they all have different answers. And everyone, even strict Christians, will modify their beliefs based on experience and what their heart/head tells them. The truth is that no doctine gives the answers for all of life's possible problems. Therefore I have only a few "commandments" that I live by and they are broad. For everything else, I meditate or do contemplative prayer and generally when I figure out what the hardest thing to do is...I've found also what is "right."

psychopath

March 22nd 2003, 11:32 PM

PSYCHOPATH:
Actually, my view (and I do not believe I am alone here) is that Jesus could NOT have sinned. Jesus was God. God cannot do that which contradicts his nature as a perfectly moral being.

Woman:
Then you've just thrown out the whole concept and meaning of "the temptation of Christ."

No. There is a difference between the one tempting and the one being tempted. Satan could tempt Jesus, i.e., try to make him do something that was wrong, without Jesus being able to act on the proposition.

PSYCHOPATH: I don't think one can really say God is glorified by Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ is God; that's like saying God is glorified by God.

(woman:I take it you're not a Trinitarian)

No, I am. The point I was trying to make is that God wants to be glorified other beings. The Trinitarian view is that God is one being and three persons. So if, say, Jesus Christ (one person of the Trinity) glorified God the Father (another person of the Trinity), it doesn't qualify as God being glorified by another being, but, essentially, by Himself.

PSYCHOPATH: My point is that God wants to be glorified by other beings.

Woman:
Why? This question has plagued me all my life. Wanting, needing to be glorified does NOT sound like the quality of a perfect, benevolent, divine being to me. Rather, it sounds like a very human ego thing.

There is nothing wrong or egotistical, in and of itself, with anyone wanting to be recognized or acknowledged for who he is or what he has accomplished. In God's case, such makes even more sense, since he is perfectly deserving of this glorification.

JOHN:

Aside from other objections I've voiced, I have a couple other problems with your argument from evil.

1) I think your argument begs the question. You are trying to prove the non-existence of an OmniGod by positing the existence of evil unnecessary to fulfill such a being's purposes. But in order to show the veracity of the latter, you must first assume that such an OmniGod does NOT exist, because if he does no such unnecessary evil DOES exist (your first premise). You have to assume your conclusion in order to prove it.

2) Your argument posits the existence of evil unnecessary to fulfill God's purposes. But in order to do this, it is first necessary to assume that we can know all of God's purposes and that we can analyze the effects of all these purposes taken as a whole (such as in instances when more than one of God's purposes come into conflict). Now, I would hardly presume to be able to accomplish this feat with a human being, who is much, much more similar to myself than an OmniGod. Is there a particular reason why you think you or anyone else has the ability to sufficiently do this?

Butters

April 1st 2003, 10:40 PM

POWELL:
I have begun to "hit the books." The college philosophy teacher, Doug Krueger, recommended an introductory logic book for me. I purchased it (our college uses it) and I've begun to read it.

So you gonna share the name with us?

Please

Thank you

John Powell

April 2nd 2003, 07:08 PM

Butters:
So you gonna share the name with us?

Please

Thank you

POWELL:
Of course.

Introduction to Logic, Eleventh Edition, copyright 2002, by Irving M. Copi and Carl Cohen, published by Prentice Hall.

John Powell

John Powell

April 2nd 2003, 08:33 PM

To Psychopath.

POWELL:
Psychopath, I seem to have missed responding to one of your earlier posts. I'm very sorry. I've forgotten what we were discussing, so I'll repeat your earlier 3 groups.

PSYCHOPATH:
So, in order to fulfill these wants (or, to switch to your term, purposes), what choices did God have with respect to man's free will or lack thereof? I think, ostensibly, there are 3 possibilities:

1) God creates man without free will. Men are forced to glorify God and to engage in a familial relationship with him.

2) God creates man with a free will, but in such a way that they always choose the course of action that best furthers the fulfillment of the aforementioned purposes.

3) God creates man with a free will, with the ability to choose courses of action that work against the fulfillment of those purposes. That is, God allows for the possibility of the existence of moral evil.

#1 will not allow for the fulfillment of God's purposes of being glorified and having a familial relationship with man, because we are essentially his dummies to "ventriloquize." One is not truly being glorified or entering into a relationship if he is also the one doing the glorifying and acting on the other end of the relationship.

#2, IMO, is actually the same as #1. If God creates humans so they always choose the course of action that fulfills his purposes, there really is no choice. If I choose to do something, it is implied that I could have done otherwise. But if man is created so he always "chooses" in accordance with God's purposes, then one does NOT have the ability to do otherwise - God programmed him without this ability. Thus, though this option would seem different than #1, I think it is exactly the same situation, and the same explanation I gave for #1 applies.

This leaves only #3, which allows for the existence of moral evil. Therefore, in order for God's purposes to be fulfilled, I believe that the existence of moral evil, i.e., "our free will to do or not do evil," is necessary. And this explanation does indeed allow for God's purposes to be fulfilled: man can truly choose to glorify God, and enter into a familial relationship with him.

POWELL:
Ok, now for quotes from your more recent post.

POWELL:
For #2 {man with free will, but always choosing that which accords with God's purposes}, God could create beings whose devotion to Him was like that of Jesus. These could be beings willing and able to do God's will despite the fact that they could sin if they chose to. They just don't want to. If God loves Jesus, how much more He would love a thousand or a million or a billion separate individuals who were just as sinless as Jesus, but each with their own unique personality and talents."

PSYCHOPATH:
Actually, my view (and I do not believe I am alone here) is that Jesus could NOT have sinned. Jesus was God. God cannot do that which contradicts his nature as a perfectly moral being.

POWELL:
If Jesus didn't CHOOSE to do good and refuse evil, but did good and did no evil because He was physically unable to do otherwise, then apparently He didn't have free will. Furthermore, wouldn't that contradict the alleged Messianic prophecy in Isa 7:14-16?

Isa 7:14-16 (KJV):
14 Therefore the Lord himself shall give you a sign; Behold, a virgin shall conceive, and bear a son, and shall call his name Immanuel.

15 Butter and honey shall he eat, that he may know to refuse the evil, and choose the good.

16 For before the child shall know to refuse the evil, and choose the good, the land that thou abhorrest shall be forsaken of both her kings.

POWELL:
What do you think, Psychopath?

PSYCHOPATH:
This opens up a whole new can of worms: whether Jesus had the ability to sin or not. I believe the majority of theologians and Biblical scholars do not hold the position that he could; however, the passage you quoted would seem (at least on the surface) to indicate otherwise. Some Christians don't think this is a Messianic prophecy at all, some think it has a double meaning, while still others think it had a double fulfillment. If you're interested in a little background on this issue, here's a link:

http://pw1.netcom.com/~rogh/fulfill/index.htm#Isaiah

POWELL:
Thanks for the link. I understand Christians differ, so what is your view on Isa 7:14-16?

PSYCHOPATH:
But instead of getting into this corollary discussion and trying to convince you of my position, I will assume for the sake of this argument that Jesus did possess the ability to sin.

That being said, suppose God created "beings whose devotion to Him was like that of Jesus." As you further describe, these beings "could be beings willing and able to do God's will despite the fact that they could sin if they chose to." But the very fact that they have the ability to sin opens the door to the possibility of the existence of moral evil. Therefore, such beings would just fall into category #3 as I originally described it.

POWELL:
Perhaps you're right.

I'm still having troubles sometimes distinguishing between the possibility of moral evil and the existence of it. My scientific bias is such that if something is physically possible then you ought to see it somewhere in the universe. In other words, if there really were a chance that these beings would go against their natural inclinations and sin then some of them would be expected to do so.

PSYCHOPATH:
If you are advocating that God should have created beings like this in order to fulfill his wants of being glorified and engaging in a familial relationship with other beings, then you are also implying that God at least allow for the possibility of moral evil. This is the type of being God did create, though - Adam and Eve were originally innocent, with the ability to "sin if they chose to." So it would seem as though the type of being you're talking about is exactly the type God DID create in order to fulfill his wants. I'm probably misunderstanding you, however.

POWELL:
This may be controversial.

Mormons believe that Adam and Eve did not "sin" in the Garden, but they did commit a transgression. In that sense, I guess it wasn't morally evil for them to eat the fruit, in fact it was a good thing they did because it allowed for the rest of us to live on Earth. It's like getting a ticket for speeding. Speeders aren't necessarily bad people, but they do have to pay a fine if they get caught speeding. However, reckless drivers are bad people.

These comments might overly confuse the issue. You probably have the attitude that the possibility of moral evil results in more good than the impossibility of it. If something results in more good than the alternatives is it evil or good?

PSYCHOPATH:
A being that you describe, i.e. one that wants to follow God's purposes but still has the ability to sin, would fall into category #3. If it has the ability to sin, it is not created so as to always act in accordance with God's purposes, which was the stipulation for a being of #2 (which I argue is actually synonymous with #1). I'm not sure if you're attempting to introduce another category here; if so, just let me know.

POWELL:
That wasn't my purpose, but I allowed for it. I thought that if they always chose to do good, like Jesus presumably did, then they would fall under category 2.

POWELL:
Maybe it should be another category if Jesus is as you say.

PSYCHOPATH:
If God created beings as I say Jesus was, i.e., without the ability to sin, these beings would not be able to fulfill God's wants of being glorified or of engaging in a relationship with other beings, for the reasons I described in my previous two posts and will describe later in this post.

PSYCHOPATH (earlier):
If I exist in heaven with moral free will, God cannot ordain my eternal salvation.

POWELL:
Why not? You would not have sinned on Earth would you?

PSYCHOPATH:
God is perfectly just; if I utilized my free will and rejected God, this aspect of his nature would require him to separate myself from his presence.

POWELL:
How could you have rejected God if you didn't have free will? God could have made you so you had to accept Him while on Earth. Then, after you die, He could give you free will. You would have free will, but have gone through Earth life without sinning.

PSYCHOPATH:
Hmm, I think you missed my point. The fact that God gives me free will in heaven allows for the possibility that I reject him, or try to put myself at or above his level (as Lucifcer supposedly did), etc. This is the case because I have moral free will. But if I do one of these things, God's perfect justice would lead to him throwing me out of heaven and separating me from his presence (as he did with Lucifer). I would no longer be saved. Since this is always a possible scenario, God cannot ordain my eternal salvation. Therefore, I still maintain that your hypothetical is flawed, because as long as I possess moral free will in heaven, my eternal salvation cannot be guaranteed.

POWELL:
Thank you for clarifying that. Yes, you are right. Even if you did not sin on Earth because you had no free will and then you are given free will in heaven, you could rebel like Satan did. Yes, that means your eternal salvation could not be guaranteed.

Now, Psychopath, that means no one in heaven except those who are incapable of rebelling, are guaranteed eternal salvation, right?

My no-free-will-on-Earth plan of salvation is superior to the one Christians seem to be promoting as God's, I think, because those who rebel in heaven would be doing so with MUCH more knowledge of what the consequences are. Here on Earth we have people claiming things about heaven and hell, but after we die, presumably we would have a MUCH better idea of what our rebellion would cause us to lose. I wager that very few would rebel under those circumstances. Certainly a lot fewer would end up in hell that way than the way things currently are with the majority of humans likely to end up in hell.

POWELL:
So, are you saying that if God were to abolish free will while we lived on Earth, so that we are forced to accept God and live sinless lives while on Earth, and then He gave us free will after we die, that we would choose to reject God and become devils? I suppose some might, but I sure wouldn't. I may be skeptical, but I'm not stupid. What does Satan have to offer that can match what God offers? Who's going to reject God when they're seeing Him face to face?

PSYCHOPATH:
But, as you say, some might. And according to Christianity, some did (Lucifer being their "leader"). Pride and greed can be very coercive and deceptive forces. So with this possibility remaining, God cannot foreordain our eternal salvation.

POWELL:
Again, you're right. But then how can God foreordain eternal salvation for anyone who has the ability to rebel in heaven?<