Is Intelligent Design compatible with methodological naturalism?

[QED]

Someone here posted the complaint that methodological naturalism ruled out "intelligence" (read intelligent causes) a priori, and therefore was flawed. In another post, this person asserted that forensic science (a methodologically naturalistic form of investigation) was able to deduce "intelligence". Which is correct?

It turns out that the latter is correct. Natural intelligence and its products are well within the purview of a methodological naturalism.

Proponents of Intelligent Design theory are usually very adamant that the nature of the intelligence involved is unspecified, and do not rely on supernaturalistic explanations. If this is true, and if naturalism does not rule out consideration of intelligent causes, then what is the difficulty with considering Intelligent Design a naturalistic hypothesis? Conversely, why does Intelligent Design movement's central figure (Phillip Johnson), and many of its proponents, rail against the naturalistic method?

To answer the first:
There is no difficulty in theory with considering Intelligent Design a naturalistic hypothesis. On the other hand, there is scientific problem with taking it seriously: there is precious little model available for testing. The hypothesis seems to be that an intelligent agent directed by some means the development of life on earth. It does not tell us what those means are, robbing us of the chance to devise a test that will detect their presence or absense. It does not tell us anything about the intelligent agent, robbing us of the chance to devise a test that will detect its presence or absence. So we are left with the vague hope of detecting design directly, by identifying features of life on earth that uniquely inform us of intelligent design. So what are these features?

Candidates offerred by IDists include "specified complexity", and "irreducible complexity", along with means of testing for them. This is it. If either form of complexity is actually uniquely characteristic of design, and if we can identify examples of them in nature, then we have hope of testing the ID hypothesis naturalistically. Logically, our first line of attack will be to ensure that candidate complexities are uniquely products of intelligent design. Yet the proponents have been unable to demonstrate that either of these candidate features does indeed uniquely identify design! Without them, there is nothing for which to test, and the ID theory is consigned to the boneyard of untestable hypotheses and pure speculation.

In fact, ID is not a supernaturalistic theory - it is unscientific (untestable) for other reasons, but that isn't to say that its reputation as a supernaturalistic movement is unearned. Certainly, the ubiquitous protestations that the intelligent agent need not be supernatural must be heard critically, especially in light of the political and cultural ties ID has with certain religious groups. Critics are wise to suggest the possibility that ID is nothing more than attempt to get a "wedge" in the door that will afford supernaturalistic hypotheses a chance to follow and assume the mantle of science.

On to the second question, what is the complaint IDists hold against methodological (or even metaphysical) naturalism, if their theory is naturalistic?

What is the answer? The answer is that IDists are also creationists. They believe that the designer of the ID hypothesis is supernatural, and is God. If they did not have personal supernatural beliefs that they hoped to cloak in the mantle of science, they would never have bothered postulating and promoting an untestable "intelligent designer," at just that time in history when nature seems ready to yield even the secrets of life to those using the tools of naturalistic science. This situation won't do, if creationism is to have any hope of scientific credibility. To quote Phil Johnson, "If creation is admitted as a serious possibility, Darwinism cannot win, and if it is excluded a priori Darwinism cannot lose." (Evolution as Dogma: The Establishment of Naturalism (http://www.arn.org/docs/johnson/pjdogma1.htm))

Johnson's hope that Darwinism would lose if his supernaturalistic explanations were admitted as a 'serious' possibility - meaning admitted as a possible scientific explanation - might be correct. The heliocentric model of the solar system, and the germ theory of disease might also lose, but I doubt that Johnson cares about that.

Does all this mean that creation as a religious doctrine must be scientifically wrong? Of course not. Unfortunately, Johson paints those who hold this position, while still embracing the methods of science, with the tainted brush of "creationism".

"All persons who affirm that 'God creates' are in an important sense creationists, even if they believe ... that God created gradually through evolution over billions of years." Johnson, Evolution as Dogma (Ellipsis in place of the words "that Genesis is a myth", since this would be a mischaracterization of many theistic evolutionists.)

What these people have done to earn the name of "creationist" is unclear, but Johson apparently wants us to think that methodological naturalists are in disagreement with those people on some point of science. In fact, we are not - and it is creation-ism which Johnson hopes to salvage with his wedge and untestable hypothesis of design. Thus his every attempt to conflate metaphysical naturalism with methodological naturalism and his prodigiously vocal criticism of "scientific naturalism".

[QED]

Just a friendly little ^Bump^. In case this thread deserves a second chance.

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

The interesting thing about this issue is that naturalism, whether methodological or metaphysical, is just as much of an assumption as theism is. One cannot conclusively test for naturalism anymore than one can conclusively test for theism, so, to exclude either possibility at the outset becomes pretty suspicious. The often repeated objection from naturalistic quarters that admitting theistic hypotheses would be tantamount to resorting to a superstitious "God did it" pseudo-explanation which must bring true scientific inquiry to a halt is belied by the very history of scientific development in the west. Part of the difficulty lies in a vague supposition that one would have to resort to some kind of "methodological theism" if one were to abandon methodological naturalism. But, it is often rightly maintained that scientific inquiry did in fact take root within the context of a largely theistic western culture, and scientific progress was by no means fatally restricted by this fact. It is simply not the case that the scientific method requires the assumption of an essential naturalism---history tells us otherwise---and it is likewise untrue that theistic assumptions or hypotheses must somehow barr genuine scientific progress. Assumptions of both sorts, whether theistic or naturalistic, remain equally axiomatic, and whatever the merits of ID, any objection to theistic hypotheses on the mere grounds that they are theistic becomes obviously vacuous.

[QED]

Yesterday @ 06:24 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=59971#post59971)
pereynol:

The interesting thing about this issue is that naturalism, whether methodological or metaphysical, is just as much of an assumption as theism is.

Theism is not an assumption per se. It is a belief (of the religious or philosophical variety), that generally is based on faith-type personal experience. What distinguishes religious faith from science is that it has a strong component of subjectivity (i.e. personal experience), and that its object is itself untestable by any objective and empirical means (i.e. is supernatural).

Metaphysical naturalism is not an assumption per se. It is a belief (also of the religious or philosophical variety), that generally is based on the application of reason alone to a hypothesis that can only be accepted by faith. It speaks to an epistemology that rules out faith as a proper means of knowing.

Most emphatically, methodological naturalism is not an assumption at all - though it does rely on one. Most emphatically, methodological naturalism is a method, and a key one in any scientific endeavor. The naturalistic method is to search for an explanation for observed phenomena within the regularities of natural law.

The assumption upon which methodological naturalism rests is that there is hope of finding such explanations, and once found of being able to evaluate their merits on objective criteria.

It was methodological naturalism that led Newton to search for the reasons of planetary movement in the regularities of natural law, rather than in the action of angels.

It was methodological naturalism that led Pasteur to search for the causes of disease in the slide of a microscope, rather than in a book of demonology.

This list goes on and on, forever. The point is that neither of these people had any "assumption" that God, angels, or devils were absent, or that they had no power over planetary movement or sickness and health. In fact, both believed quite the contrary. Yet their science was methodologically naturalistic - because they held this one assumption: that if we look, we may find an explanation in nature. They hoped to find such an answer, because an answer of this kind is:
a) testable - we can evaluate its merits objectively, using the methods of science
b) useful - it confers knowledge useful knowledge. We can apply such knowledge to help us travel to the planets and cure disease. More importantly, perhaps, we can use this knowledge as a springboard from which to acquire new knowledge of things that we could not hope to understand without this basic knowledge.
c) deep - Both Newton and Pasteur both believed they already knew the "Who?" of planetary movement and health and sickness (essentially God and his spiritual creation). Upon finding a natural explanation, they have deepened their knowledge. Instead of trying to change their knowledge of "Who?" from the area of faith to the area of scientific knowledge - which would be impossible anyway - they gained new knowledge, with regards to the question "How?"


One cannot conclusively test for naturalism anymore than one can conclusively test for theism, so, to exclude either possibility at the outset becomes pretty suspicious.

One cannot test for a method. Naturalism is a method - theism is a belief (aka conclusion). The correct comparison with naturalism would not be "theism", but rather "revelation" or "faith" (or other supernaturalistic methodologies, such as "divination"). Clearly Christians believe there is a role for revelation and faith, and clearly most of them believe there is a role for naturalistic investigation. The former gives religious knowledge of the supernatural, the latter gives scientific knowledge of the natural.

Below is your eloquent defense of a large world-view which has room for both natural and supernatural explanations:


The often repeated objection from naturalistic quarters that admitting theistic hypotheses would be tantamount to resorting to a superstitious "God did it" pseudo-explanation which must bring true scientific inquiry to a halt is belied by the very history of scientific development in the west. Part of the difficulty lies in a vague supposition that one would have to resort to some kind of "methodological theism" if one were to abandon methodological naturalism. But, it is often rightly maintained that scientific inquiry did in fact take root within the context of a largely theistic western culture, and scientific progress was by no means fatally restricted by this fact. It is simply not the case that the scientific method requires the assumption of an essential naturalism---history tells us otherwise---and it is likewise untrue that theistic assumptions or hypotheses must somehow barr genuine scientific progress.

Without conflating assumptions (or beliefs) from one's world-view with "assumptions of science", this is well-said. However, by your use of the phrase "theistic assmptions or hypotheses", I am afraid that you have not made the proper distinction. Allow me a demonstration of the proper distinction:

1) "God created the earth" - theistic belief as part of theistic world view - based on faith.
2) "God created the earth 6,000 years ago" - theistic belief as part of theistic world view - based on faith.
2a) "God created the earth, and the earth is demonstrably about 6,000 years old" - two different beliefs expressed in the same sentence - one a faith, the other a (falsified) scientific hypothesis - see 3 & 4 below.)
3) "The earth is 6,000 years old" - naturalistic hypothesis subject to testing by scientific method - a valid scientific hypothesis (albeit a falsified one).
4) "The earth is about 4.5 billion years old" - naturalistic hypothesis subject to testing by scientific method - a valid scientific hypothesis, which has not been falsified, and which has the overwhelming support of the available evidence.

Note that theistic belief 1) is perfectly compatible with theistic belief 2), and also with scientific hypotheses 3) & 4).
On the other hand, theistic belief 2) is incompatible with scientific hypothesis 4).

Here is where the rubber meets the road. A person who holds strongly to theistic belief 2) and understands the power of science (and therefore accepts the scientific hypothesis which has the weight of the evidence on its side - number 4) ) - has a puzzle. They have two different kinds of beliefs about the same question.

There are few people who can follow the methods of science and humbly accept its conclusions from a scientific perspective while holding a contradictory view on the basis of faith. Some will abandon naturalistic science in favor of AiGesque pseuodo-science. Some will decide that they are not compelled by revelation or inspiration to believe in a 6,000 year old earth and will abandon that position while still holding belief #1). And a few will recognize that they have two different answers to the same question, and be content to leave the puzzle unsolved, pursuing their religious beliefs and their scientific inquiry separately.

Now that the distinction is made, we have yet still more to discuss. I will allow you to introduce the next discussion with your own quote:


Assumptions of both sorts, whether theistic or naturalistic, remain equally axiomatic, and whatever the merits of ID, any objection to theistic hypotheses on the mere grounds that they are theistic becomes obviously vacuous.

There is one very valid grounds for objecting to the "theistic" hypotheses of ID. That grounds is that - inasmuch as they are "theistic" - they are untestable: they are not a natural explanation of the sort that science is engaged in finding and evaluating. That doesn't mean that they are not "true": merely that if they are "true", there is no hope of us knowing it scientifically, the way we understand gravity or disease scientifically. This is not a general objection to the possibility of such hypotheses, but a pragmatic objection to the introduction of unscientific hypotheses into the halls of scientific research.

Let us move this out of the abstract and into the real debate. For the creation of the first life, we have two kinds of methods - revelation/inspiration, and scientific investigation.

For a Christian, revelation and inspiration answer the question, without any question, that God is responsible for the creation of the first life on earth. This answers the "Who" from a perspective of faith without further qualification.

For a scientist, the question of "Who?" may be insoluble. If indeed the "Who?" is a supernatural agent, then we know that science cannot discover this. If the question of "Who?" is some other, natural entity, there may be future hope of a scientific answer, but there is not enough data now to even begin to speculate.

For some Christians, the answer of "When?", and "How?" are arguably answered "6,000 years ago", and "ex nihilio". Other Christians feel that the Bible never intended to answer the questions of "When?" and "How?", and the common answers to those questions are based on an improper interpretation of scripture.

For scientist, the answers of "When?", and "How?" might well be found in nature. Almost all scientists agree that the evidence confirms that the answer to "When?" is about 3.5 billion years ago (give or take a couple of hundred million years). The answer to "How?" (naturalistically speaking) is beyond the reach of science at present, but most scientists agree that it is worth looking for the answer, and the search so far has produced some very interesting results.

I could break this down in terms of the arrival of humans on the planet as well, but I will not do so. I do just want to make clear that for this question science has a very firm answer as to "how", in terms of common descent by neo-darwinian evolution. At present this is the only unfalsified explanation that can be evaluated objectively. The question of "Who?" (or even "Why?") remains far outside the ability of science to answer, and remains very much answerable only in terms of faith and revelation.

The underlying subtext of this entire post is this, and it is this that you should take with you if nothing else:

The reason science "rules out" supernatural explanations, is that science lacks the methods of objectively testing them and evaluating their merits! A hypothesis, where it depends on events not subject to natural law, can never be falsified by appeal to natural observation, and is therefore not a subject that science has the tools to address. An objection to science's inability to address the supernatural is akin to an objection to literary criticism's inability to address issues of auto repair!

[Vorkosigan]

To get back to the original post, I do not see ID as necessarily opposed to or ruled out by methodological naturalism. There is no reason why some sort of super-alien could not have made our universe using naturalistic principles. There's just no evidence for it, and no reason to think so.

Great post, QED, BTW.

Vorkosigan