The Problem of Suffering (Carr versus Pate) commentary [Archive]

Chuck_D

March 8th 2003, 12:17 PM

03-07-2003 @ 02:50 PM
ACFaith.Com:

natural evil is difficult. Many Christians might attribute suffering to the fall of man but if Pate argues that I am sure Carr will blast him on it. The garden story is no longer a tenable excuse for the problem of natural suffering.

I'd like to hear more of your thoughts on this Vinnie.

I do believe that natural evil is in some sense related to the Fall. The Bible tells us that the earth is "cursed" as a direct result of the fall (Gen. 3:17). So it seems that moral evil has some sort of metaphysical consequence that manifests as natural evil (among other things). Of course I can't prove this without an a priori belief that the Bible is reliable on metaphysical stuff, but it at least seems to be internally consistent about this.

Anyway, my own thoughts on the problem of evil are that

1) God has a good reason for allowing moral and natural evil. I don't know what that reason is, but I'm willing to give Him the benefit of the doubt because He allowed Himself to suffer like us. He would've spared Himself if he could. The fact that He didn't makes me think that He has a pretty compelling reason for letting it happen. The preist and Levite (P&L) don't get that benefit. They had no power to stop the things that happened to them anymore than the victim did, so the fact that they suffered too doesn't give them any "street credit."

2) It's ok that He allows suffering for whatever purpose because He's capable of infinitely compensating us for our relatively brief struggles down here with eternal life with Him where all sorrow, death, pain, etc will be no more. For those who aren't saved, they were gonna get it anyway. (I'm not nearly as flippant about that as I sound). Again, not available to the P&L.

I will say that Carr's use of the Good Samaritan is pretty creative. I haven't heard that particular formulation of the PoE before. It doesn't make the PoE any more compelling, but I thought it was pretty inventive.

stevencarrwork

March 9th 2003, 12:49 PM

03-08-2003 @ 04:17 PM
Chuck_D:

1) God has a good reason for allowing moral and natural evil. I don't know what that reason is, but I'm willing to give Him the benefit of the doubt because He allowed Himself to suffer like us. He would've spared Himself if he could. The fact that He didn't makes me think that He has a pretty compelling reason for letting it happen. The preist and Levite (P&L) don't get that benefit. They had no power to stop the things that happened to them anymore than the victim did, so the fact that they suffered too doesn't give them any "street credit."

The priest and the Levite had no power to stop suffering?

I'm sure that Pate and I will investigate whether suffering is the result of human freewill choices, which would not occur if humans chose differently.

Thanks for your comments.

John Powell

March 9th 2003, 03:16 PM

johnransom

March 11th 2003, 06:25 PM

03-09-2003 @ 10:49 AM
stevencarrwork:
...Thanks for your comments.

Naughty boy, Steve, although I imagine unintentionally. Check Dee Dee's initial post; you're not supposed to post here until after the debate is over.

johnransom

March 11th 2003, 06:45 PM

03-09-2003 @ 01:16 PM
John Powell:

POWELL

Pate counters Steven's analogy of God walking on the other side by claiming that God is too different to be able to be made part of that analogy. How then can a mere mortal tell that God isn't an evil Demon if he can't use analogies like the Good Samaritan applied to God?

The parable was not intended to present an analogy of God. It is given in response to the question "Who is my neighbor?" and is clearly meant to demonstrate good human behavior towards others. The term "neighbors" also implies a degree of peer status, so the application of the parable to God is flawed from the outset. Pate should not have answered it any further than that.

When we see people appear to lie we call them liars. When we see God appear to lie we're supposed to assume He has a good reason. When we see politicians appear to order the slaughter of innocent people we call them butchers. When we see God appear to order the slaughter of innocent people we're supposed to assume He has a good reason.

Both statements include ungranted assumptions. There is no evidence of lying on God's part. The innocence or guilt of humans is for an impartial judge to decide.

What if God really were an evil Demon who has no intention of fulfilling His promises, but is going to send every one to hell except those atheists who were smart enough to see through his game? How would any of us know He isn't evil if He sometimes behaves in ways that appear evil?

That imposes on you a definition of evil that excludes God as a yardstick and subsumes Him as subject to it.

I appreciated that Pate offered a possible good reason for suffering using his own reasoning, rather than just calling it a mystery, that God just must have a good reason for appearing to be less than an Omnibeing for allowing the suffering. The reason was that free will might be worth the suffering. I think the worth of free will is overstated.

A mere opinion, though. And I think Pate did use an argument based on mystery, in that he cited the epistemic gulf between man and God.

Imagine that your Bill Gates-type father told you in High School that once you graduated you would have the choice of living 4 years in the military under very harsh conditions, but at the end you would be given a billion dollars regardless of where you ranked in the military as long as you never go to college or you could skip the military and go to a large university for 4 years but you would get no inheritance afterwards unless you were the top student in the university in which case you would get a billion dollars. How many of you would choose the military? Although I would hate being in the military and I was the top student in my little high school, I would opt for the sure thing, the military route. I'm no dummy.

Sez you. You assume of course that a billion is of equal worth to all observers. It could be that a child of Gates' absolutely detests his father's money. Especially if the kid uses Microsoft products. And in any event, the military option is hardly a "sure thing"? A dead billionaire soldier is still a dead soldier. Ditto for maiming. The kid could also merely believe that education is of greater value than money. Or, maybe he's inherited his father's ability to make gobs of cash and doesn't really need it. There are many good reasons to reject the second option.

Now, imagine God offered you these two choices:

1. Free will on Earth with the opportunity to be saved in heaven and to do many good things and develop many good skills, but with the distinct likelihood that you would go to hell forever despite all your efforts because you'd be born in the home of a Mormon or a Jehovah's Witness or a Buddhist or an atheist or whatever.

or

2. No free will on Earth and assured eternal salvation and free will in heaven and opportunities to learn at least some of the things, perhaps not as well, that you missed on Earth.

Which would you choose if such were offered to you? I can't understand why people would pick 1 unless they were certain they'd be saved. What good on Earth is worth risking going to hell forever for?

Your options are invalid. From a Calvinist POV, personal situations are irrelevant; your salvation is pre-determined. From an Arminian POV, you will have at least general revelation regardless of your situation and are equally without excuse.

If God were to remove free will by making us all temporary robots or temporary sub-human animals only while we were on Earth then none of us would deserve hell. If there is only heaven or hell then we should all go to heaven for living sinless lives. It's true that much good that is available to us on Earth only if we have free will would have been made impossible during our Earth life, but perhaps those kinds of things could be learned well enough in the afterlife. If such a world would be amoral then it would only be so for a short while until we all died and went to heaven. Who cares if things are amoral for a while on Earth as long as we are assured of eternal salvation and avoid eternal damnation after we die? I wouldn't.

But your argument is based on your assumption that free will is of little value. What matters is how God values it.

stevencarrwork

March 11th 2003, 09:00 PM

03-11-2003 @ 10:25 PM
johnransom:

Naughty boy, Steve, although I imagine unintentionally. Check Dee Dee's initial post; you're not supposed to post here until after the debate is over.

Oh sorry, I never saw that. Mea culpa.

Am I allowed to post an apology? I hope I don't have to post an apology for this apology. I always hated being stuck in infinite loops.

Anyway, I would like to thank the poster for his comments. I appreciated them.

Alien

March 12th 2003, 07:02 PM

Just a quick one for my first post .... :)

Despite the question that started this thread, the PoE is not about the existence of a god, but the the nature of that god.

The current observed state of the world is perfectly compatible with all sorts of gods, ranging from the totally incompetant through the totally indifferent to the outright nasty.

What the PoE brings into question is the existence of a god which is simultaneously omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent. Remove (or weaken) any of these attributes and the PoE ceases to be a problem.

What I'm not reading so far in the debate is discussion of God's supposed omnipotence. Maybe it will emerge soon. For example, all theist defences along the lines of "there might be some reason for any given example of suffering" suggest that God is incapable of bringing about His desired end without the associated suffering. The usual definition of omnipotence (able to do anything that is not logically impossible, like making square triangles) would suggest that bringing about whatever God's purpose might be is logically impossible without the attendant suffering. This seems unlikely to be true of all examples of suffering, and quite frankly unlikely to be true of any, IMO.

Oh, I'm an atheist, in case anyone hadn't already realised that. :)

John Powell

March 13th 2003, 02:39 AM

POWELL
Pate counters Steven's analogy of God walking on the other side by claiming that God is too different to be able to be made part of that analogy. How then can a mere mortal tell that God isn't an evil Demon if he can't use analogies like the Good Samaritan applied to God?

JOHNRANSOM:
The parable was not intended to present an analogy of God.

POWELL:
Who are you to tell God the extent to which a parable might be usefully applied?

JOHNRANSOM:
It is given in response to the question "Who is my neighbor?" and is clearly meant to demonstrate good human behavior towards others. The term "neighbors" also implies a degree of peer status, so the application of the parable to God is flawed from the outset. Pate should not have answered it any further than that.

POWELL:
So, God is not bound by the same moral code we are, huh?

POWELL:
When we see people appear to lie we call them liars. When we see God appear to lie we're supposed to assume He has a good reason. When we see politicians appear to order the slaughter of innocent people we call them butchers. When we see God appear to order the slaughter of innocent people we're supposed to assume He has a good reason.

JOHNRANSOM:
Both statements include ungranted assumptions. There is no evidence of lying on God's part.

POWELL:
How about when Jesus said:

John 18:20 (KJV):
20 Jesus answered him, I spake openly to the world; I ever taught in the synagogue, and in the temple, whither the Jews always resort; and in secret have I said nothing.

JOHNRANSOM:
The innocence or guilt of humans is for an impartial judge to decide.

POWELL:
How can fetuses and young children be "guilty?" Didn't God order the death of the fetuses and male Midianite children (Num 31:17-18) for something their parents had done and ordered the death of both male and female Amalekite children and fetuses (1 Sam 15:2-3) for something their ancestors had done about 400 years earlier? I need to make some progress discussing this with someone else I brought it up with, but I wanted to mention it here in answer to your question.

POWELL:
What if God really were an evil Demon who has no intention of fulfilling His promises, but is going to send every one to hell except those atheists who were smart enough to see through his game? How would any of us know He isn't evil if He sometimes behaves in ways that appear evil?

JOHNRANSOM:
That imposes on you a definition of evil that excludes God as a yardstick and subsumes Him as subject to it.

POWELL:
If God is that evil Demon, yes. How can you tell that He isn't an evil Demon lying about His promises? Wishful thinking?

POWELL:
I appreciated that Pate offered a possible good reason for suffering using his own reasoning, rather than just calling it a mystery, that God just must have a good reason for appearing to be less than an Omnibeing for allowing the suffering. The reason was that free will might be worth the suffering. I think the worth of free will is overstated.

JOHNRANSOM:
A mere opinion, though. And I think Pate did use an argument based on mystery, in that he cited the epistemic gulf between man and God.

POWELL:
I think you're right that later Pate did that.

POWELL:
Imagine that your Bill Gates-type father told you in High School that once you graduated you would have the choice of living 4 years in the military under very harsh conditions, but at the end you would be given a billion dollars regardless of where you ranked in the military as long as you never go to college or you could skip the military and go to a large university for 4 years but you would get no inheritance afterwards unless you were the top student in the university in which case you would get a billion dollars. How many of you would choose the military? Although I would hate being in the military and I was the top student in my little high school, I would opt for the sure thing, the military route. I'm no dummy.

JOHNRANSOM:
Sez you. You assume of course that a billion is of equal worth to all observers. It could be that a child of Gates' absolutely detests his father's money. Especially if the kid uses Microsoft products. And in any event, the military option is hardly a "sure thing"? A dead billionaire soldier is still a dead soldier. Ditto for maiming. The kid could also merely believe that education is of greater value than money. Or, maybe he's inherited his father's ability to make gobs of cash and doesn't really need it. There are many good reasons to reject the second option.

POWELL:
Perhaps. But JohnRansom, which option would YOU choose?

POWELL:
Now, imagine God offered you these two choices:

1. Free will on Earth with the opportunity to be saved in heaven and to do many good things and develop many good skills, but with the distinct likelihood that you would go to hell forever despite all your efforts because you'd be born in the home of a Mormon or a Jehovah's Witness or a Buddhist or an atheist or whatever.

or

2. No free will on Earth and assured eternal salvation and free will in heaven and opportunities to learn at least some of the things, perhaps not as well, that you missed on Earth.

Which would you choose if such were offered to you? I can't understand why people would pick 1 unless they were certain they'd be saved. What good on Earth is worth risking going to hell forever for?

JOHNRANSOM:
Your options are invalid.

POWELL:
I guess they would be beyond God's power to offer, huh?

JOHNRANSOM:
From a Calvinist POV, personal situations are irrelevant; your salvation is pre-determined.

POWELL:
Mere opinion of the Calvinists. God never confirmed they were right, did He? Even if they were right, God could change that. God has free will doesn't He?

JOHNRANSOM:
From an Arminian POV, you will have at least general revelation regardless of your situation and are equally without excuse.

POWELL:
I don't understand: Without excuse? But, you wouldn't do any sin needing to be excused for!

POWELL:
If God were to remove free will by making us all temporary robots or temporary sub-human animals only while we were on Earth then none of us would deserve hell. If there is only heaven or hell then we should all go to heaven for living sinless lives. It's true that much good that is available to us on Earth only if we have free will would have been made impossible during our Earth life, but perhaps those kinds of things could be learned well enough in the afterlife. If such a world would be amoral then it would only be so for a short while until we all died and went to heaven. Who cares if things are amoral for a while on Earth as long as we are assured of eternal salvation and avoid eternal damnation after we die? I wouldn't.

JOHNRANSOM:
But your argument is based on your assumption that free will is of little value. What matters is how God values it.

POWELL:
Is free will while living on the Earth more valuable than assured salvation in the kingdom of heaven? I wouldn't think so. If you could have assured eternal salvation by merely not having free will on Earth, that sure sounds like a good deal to me.

John Powell

johnransom

March 13th 2003, 01:24 PM

03-13-2003 @ 12:39 AM
John Powell:
Who are you to tell God the extent to which a parable might be usefully applied?
No one. I never claimed that I was. And I could equally ask you the same question, so it has no probative force. All I am saying is that the extent of the parable’s application can be deduced from its context.
So, God is not bound by the same moral code we are, huh?
Of course he is. But no one can be expected to comply with those parts of the moral code that cannot apply to them. Since this is about relationships with peers, and God has no peers, the parable cannot apply to Him. Equally, there are portions of the moral code that can apply only to God and not to humans (such as, I suppose, how He is to treat humans).
How about when Jesus said:

John 18:20 (KJV):
20 Jesus answered him, I spake openly to the world; I ever taught in the synagogue, and in the temple, whither the Jews always resort; and in secret have I said nothing.
Context, context, context! Christ’s point here is a jab at his accusers – he is pointing out that the trial is illicit and that its illicitness is being hidden by holding it in secret. He made public statements in public; they are making them in secret. This really has little to do with what he taught his disciples in private (which I assume is the basis for your charge of lying), which any teacher of that era was expected to do anyway.
How can fetuses and young children be "guilty?" Didn't God order the death of the fetuses and male Midianite children (Num 31:17-18) for something their parents had done and ordered the death of both male and female Amalekite children and fetuses (1 Sam 15:2-3) for something their ancestors had done about 400 years earlier? I need to make some progress discussing this with someone else I brought it up with, but I wanted to mention it here in answer to your question.
I try to tread very carefully when answering questions like this. Atheists use this angle of attack a lot, and Christians frequently do themselves a disservice, IMO, with their answers and often end up presenting what appear to be cold-hearted rationalizations. Most people lack the time and resources to investigate these issues as carefully as they deserve. On the Midianite incident, Glenn Miller’s site has a very detailed document here (http://www.christian-thinktank.com/midian.html), which you may want to look at (it’s long, though). As for the Amalekites, God was completing his judgment issued on them in the Exodus, so one might as well ask, why did he wait so long to execute that judgment? Technically, the people wiped out in Samuel had no right to exist at all, so it is just as valid to argue that God acted graciously towards Amalek for 400 years. Does that sound like a cold-hearted rationalization? Overall, a better answer is, simply, I don’t know why God did this, but I do however know that he is just and holy and has valid and sufficient reasons for all He does. Now that may sound pat and dismissive of a very difficult issue, but it has at least the virtue of being true.
If God is that evil Demon, yes. How can you tell that He isn't an evil Demon lying about His promises? Wishful thinking?
As I have said in a separate thread, an evil god is a contradiction in terms.
Perhaps. But JohnRansom, which option would YOU choose?
I don’t know. I am not greatly motivated by money, but it is a serious temptation.
I guess they would be beyond God's power to offer, huh?
But since He didn’t, it’s irrelevant.
Mere opinion of the Calvinists. God never confirmed they were right, did He? Even if they were right, God could change that. God has free will doesn't He?
I’m not a Calvinist and do not defend Calvinist theology. I merely presented it because there are two primary lines of thought in Christianity and I would be remiss not to mention one of them.
I don't understand: Without excuse? But, you wouldn't do any sin needing to be excused for!
The sin of rejecting God. The ultimate sin.
Is free will while living on the Earth more valuable than assured salvation in the kingdom of heaven? I wouldn't think so. If you could have assured eternal salvation by merely not having free will on Earth, that sure sounds like a good deal to me.
My point was that neither of us is qualified to judge God’s economy.

John Powell

March 13th 2003, 05:07 PM

POWELL:
Who are you to tell God the extent to which a parable might be usefully applied?

JOHNRANSOM:
No one. I never claimed that I was. And I could equally ask you the same question, so it has no probative force.

POWELL:
Of course it applies to me too, but I don't think that justifies you in speaking as if you know the mind of God or the writer of the Bible.

POWELL:
All I am saying is that the extent of the parable's application can be deduced from its context.

POWELL:
Don't you mean the PROBABLE application? Since neither of us knows the mind of God or the writer, we can't be sure what God's or the writer's full purpose was.

POWELL:
So, God is not bound by the same moral code we are, huh?

JOHNRANSOM:
Of course he is.

POWELL:
Are you sure? This seems to be a point skeptics have trouble getting theists to agree to. Theists tend to argue that whatever God might do is good regardless of whether it looks bad to us. Perhaps your position is that we and God are bound by the same moral code, but we just don't fully understand it. God does. For God to order the death of "innocents" can be good, but for us to do the same thing cannot be good unless it was done by order of God. For God to punish someone for the sins of another is good, but for us to do the same thing is bad unless God orders us to do so.

JOHNRANSOM:
But no one can be expected to comply with those parts of the moral code that cannot apply to them. Since this is about relationships with peers, and God has no peers, the parable cannot apply to Him. Equally, there are portions of the moral code that can apply only to God and not to humans (such as, I suppose, how He is to treat humans).

POWELL:
Fine. If we agree that this parable has those features then perhaps it doesn't apply to God. This assumes that God has no peers. Perhaps when the Bible writer claimed there was no other God beside Him, He was using typical religious hyperbole. Maybe God and the writer meant that there were no other Gods besides Him relevant to Earth, but there are other Gods of other planets or other universes. Could be, right?

POWELL:
How about when Jesus said:

John 18:20 (KJV):
20 Jesus answered him, I spake openly to the world; I ever taught in the synagogue, and in the temple, whither the Jews always resort; and in secret have I said nothing.

JOHNRANSOM:
Context, context, context! Christ's point here is a jab at his accusers he is pointing out that the trial is illicit and that its illicitness is being hidden by holding it in secret. He made public statements in public; they are making them in secret. This really has little to do with what he taught his disciples in private (which I assume is the basis for your charge of lying), which any teacher of that era was expected to do anyway.

POWELL:
Perhaps I see. So Jesus was using typical religious hyperbole and alternative meaning. His words did NOT mean that He ALWAYS gave His important teachings in public places like the synagogue and temple and His words did NOT mean that He NEVER gave important teachings in secret. What His words really meant was that He was criticizing His accusers for behaving unseemly for suggesting that having secret teachings is wrong, but asking Him secretly about His secret teachings. He was merely pointing out their hypocrisy, not really saying something literally true about the publicity / secrecy of His teachings. Is that what you're saying, JohnRansom?

Couldn't Jesus have accomplished that task without the need for so much exaggeration? Couldn't Jesus have said something more like the following:

REWORDED BY POWELL:
Jesus answered him, I spake openly to the world; I taught in the synagogue, and in the temple, whither the Jews resort; and in secret have I said LITTLE.

Perhaps that wouldn't produce the right effect because then the priest might reply with "Well, this secret inquiry is one of the few times we have done things in secret."

POWELL:
How can fetuses and young children be "guilty?" Didn't God order the death of the fetuses and male Midianite children (Num 31:17-18) for something their parents had done and ordered the death of both male and female Amalekite children and fetuses (1 Sam 15:2-3) for something their ancestors had done about 400 years earlier? I need to make some progress discussing this with someone else I brought it up with, but I wanted to mention it here in answer to your question.

JOHNRANSOM:
I try to tread very carefully when answering questions like this. Atheists use this angle of attack a lot, and Christians frequently do themselves a disservice, IMO, with their answers and often end up presenting what appear to be cold-hearted rationalizations. Most people lack the time and resources to investigate these issues as carefully as they deserve. On the Midianite incident, Glenn Miller's site has a very detailed document here, which you may want to look at (it's long, though).

POWELL:
I suspect that's partly on purpose to tire his readers into avoiding contest. Do you support Miller's conclusions relevant to the children and fetuses?

JOHNRANSOM:
As for the Amalekites, God was completing his judgment issued on them in the Exodus, so one might as well ask, why did he wait so long to execute that judgment? Technically, the people wiped out in Samuel had no right to exist at all, so it is just as valid to argue that God acted graciously towards Amalek for 400 years. Does that sound like a cold-hearted rationalization?

POWELL:
Yes, but it's a lot better than the non-answers I usually get to the question.

JOHNRANSOM:
Overall, a better answer is, simply, I don't know why God did this, but I do however know that he is just and holy and has valid and sufficient reasons for all He does.

POWELL:
Ok. It looks bad, but it must be good because it's in the Bible. If the exact same thing were in the Quran it would have to be bad.

JOHNRANSOM:
Now that may sound pat and dismissive of a very difficult issue, but it has at least the virtue of being true.

POWELL:
". . . virtue of being what I firmly believe to be true." I think is a more appropriate ending. You're a good man to discuss these kinds of things with, JohnRansom.

POWELL:
If God is that evil Demon, yes. How can you tell that He isn't an evil Demon lying about His promises? Wishful thinking?

JOHNRANSOM:
As I have said in a separate thread, an evil god is a contradiction in terms.

POWELL:
Not according to most ancient theologies.

How can you reliably tell the difference between an Omnibeing God and a very powerful, knowledgeable evil Demon pretending to be an Omnibeing God?

POWELL:
Perhaps. But JohnRansom, which option would YOU choose?

JOHNRANSOM:
I don't know. I am not greatly motivated by money, but it is a serious temptation.

POWELL:
I'm liking you more and more, JohnRansom.

POWELL:
I guess they would be beyond God's power to offer, huh?

JOHNRANSOM:
But since He didn't, it's irrelevant.

POWELL:
Back to the "irrelevant since God didn't or wouldn't do it" response. You strongly believe God didn't and wouldn't do it, but you don't absolutely know He didn't or wouldn't.

POWELL:
Mere opinion of the Calvinists. God never confirmed they were right, did He? Even if they were right, God could change that. God has free will doesn't He?

JOHNRANSOM:
I'm not a Calvinist and do not defend Calvinist theology. I merely presented it because there are two primary lines of thought in Christianity and I would be remiss not to mention one of them.

POWELL:
I don't understand: Without excuse? But, you wouldn't do any sin needing to be excused for!

JOHNRANSOM:
The sin of rejecting God. The ultimate sin.

POWELL:
Why would they reject God? They are compelled to do only good, no evil. Surely "accepting God" and not "rejecting God" would be one of the things they would do while having no free will.

POWELL:
Is free will while living on the Earth more valuable than assured salvation in the kingdom of heaven? I wouldn't think so. If you could have assured eternal salvation by merely not having free will on Earth, that sure sounds like a good deal to me.

JOHNRANSOM:
My point was that neither of us is qualified to judge God's economy.

POWELL:
"Qualified" is a relative term. Are we qualified ENOUGH to judge God's economy? I think we are. You probably think we aren't. You probably think there must be some mysterious - to - us reasons that doing things the way God is currently doing them that are logically superior to the no - free - will - on - Earth suggestion I've been promoting.

It's a tough philosophy to break through, this Christianity. When the Christian thinks he has a good answer to a problem posed by a skeptic he's very willing to supply it. However, when he doesn't think there is a good answer to a problem he argues that there is, nevertheless, a good solution, but it's not known to Christians. He feels justified in holding to this position partly because there were in the past cases where "unsolvable" problems were later "solved." Apparently, the Christian cannot seriously consider that maybe the reason no Christian can come up with a good solution today is because there really isn't one.

It sure would be nice if God would come down and answer these mysteries for us, don't you think JohnRansom? Probable answer: not necessary. God has revealed enough.

John Powell

wienerdog

March 16th 2003, 05:14 PM

To ignore the ongoing discussion and just make a comment about the actual debate:

I have heard it said that God allows evil in order to bring about a corresponding good that he couldn't have otherwise brought about (presumably because it required the free acts of creatures). I have also heard it said that God allows evil in order to prevent even greater evils.

This second point is significant, I think. We can always argue that it's just inconceivable for there to be a counterbalancing good for the Holocaust. But what if the option was an even worse Holocaust? The objection seems to ask why God didn't prevent it from happening. But what if by preventing it, an even worse scenario unfolded? I don't see why this isn't at least possible. So my response when someone asks how a good God could allow the Holocaust would be to ask them to imagine a Holocaust involving twice as many people. Between that and the actual Holocaust, which is less evil?

johnransom

March 16th 2003, 11:09 PM

Today @ 03:14 PM
wienerdog:

To ignore the ongoing discussion and just make a comment about the actual debate:

I have heard it said that God allows evil in order to bring about a corresponding good that he couldn't have otherwise brought about (presumably because it required the free acts of creatures). I have also heard it said that God allows evil in order to prevent even greater evils.

This second point is significant, I think. We can always argue that it's just inconceivable for there to be a counterbalancing good for the Holocaust. But what if the option was an even worse Holocaust? The objection seems to ask why God didn't prevent it from happening. But what if by preventing it, an even worse scenario unfolded? I don't see why this isn't at least possible. So my response when someone asks how a good God could allow the Holocaust would be to ask them to imagine a Holocaust involving twice as many people. Between that and the actual Holocaust, which is less evil?

WD, this is actually a shading on a very old argument that states that this is in fact the very best possible world. From this one might therefore argue that evil is actually at a minimum in this world. Which makes one shudder at what other possible worlds might look like.

John Powell

March 17th 2003, 05:20 AM

POWELL:
Comments about Pate and to Weinerdog and JohnRansom.

Pate admits that he would push the button to cure childhood cancer. I applaud his human sense of morality, but I question his religious logic. If God hasn't pushed that button, then wouldn't it be terribly wrong for Pate to push it? Perhaps by pushing it Pate would cause untold misery that is prevented precisely because children have cancer. In fact, how can Pate think it right to do ANY act of good since by doing so it might frustrate God's purposes and cause more evil to exist. To attempt to prevent evil that God has not chosen to prevent would be expected to make the universe worse, right?

WEINERDOG:
To ignore the ongoing discussion and just make a comment about the actual debate:

I have heard it said that God allows evil in order to bring about a corresponding good that he couldn't have otherwise brought about (presumably because it required the free acts of creatures). I have also heard it said that God allows evil in order to prevent even greater evils.

POWELL:
Then it appears that God is maximizing the weighted difference GOOD - EVIL. In that case the meaning of "omnibenevolent" would be more like "maximum good, minimum evil" rather than "all good, no evil."

WEINERDOG:
This second point is significant, I think. We can always argue that it's just inconceivable for there to be a counterbalancing good for the Holocaust. But what if the option was an even worse Holocaust?

POWELL:
I think Steven's argument would be that there could have been at least a few less killed at the holocaust to achieve that goal.

WEINERDOG:
The objection seems to ask why God didn't prevent it from happening. But what if by preventing it, an even worse scenario unfolded? I don't see why this isn't at least possible.

POWELL:
I can see a better way. Take away free will while people live on Earth. If they get free will after they die and are admitted into heaven then it's less likely they'll blow it because they'll see God and heaven and hell are all real rather than possibly just the fantastic stories of some fanatics. If they do blow it in heaven after getting their free will (sort of like Satan maybe did), that would be their own decision, based on a lot better knowledge than we have.

WEINERDOG:
So my response when someone asks how a good God could allow the Holocaust would be to ask them to imagine a Holocaust involving twice as many people. Between that and the actual Holocaust, which is less evil?

POWELL:
The actual would be better than one with twice as many dead. However, if even one less had to suffer that would be better than the actual. Suffering would be reduced even more, I think, if free will did not exist while people lived on Earth.

JOHNRANSOM:
WD, this is actually a shading on a very old argument that states that this is in fact the very best possible world.

POWELL:
Ok.

JOHNRANSOM:
From this one might therefore argue that evil is actually at a minimum in this world. Which makes one shudder at what other possible worlds might look like.

POWELL:
I heard similar arguments after 9/11. Religious skeptics were making a big deal claiming that God wasn't there, that God did nothing. Some theist apologists claimed that God was there, doing good, so things weren't as bad as they otherwise might be.

The idea was that God prevented worse things from happening than would have if He hadn't been involved. For example, the planes might have crashed into a school. It didn't happen because God prevented that. The President might have been at the Pentagon and been killed. He wasn't because God prevented it.

My counter argument to that is two-pronged.

1. It denegrates the worthiness of those who died.

God-fearing "saved" people died in those towers and the airplanes. Why didn't God do more to help them out? Any of us probably would if we were God. Why didn't God answer their prayers when they prayed to Him in their most desperate moment of need?

2. It is an argument that could be presented virtually REGARDLESS of how bad the universe were.

One could nearly always claim that things could have been worse if God had not intervened even if God never intervened at all. For example, if a rogue object destroyed Earth then the survivors on the Moon could praise God that He had prevented the object from doing worse than just killing everyone on Earth. The point is that an OmniGod who cared about us presumably wouldn't allow that sort of thing or other less extreme unnecessary catastrophes to befall us.

God too often, I think, gets credit for doing good that is done by mortals or is just luck and too often God doesn't get blamed for evil that His plan or His created spirits supposedly cause.

John Powell.

johnransom

March 17th 2003, 12:15 PM

Today @ 03:20 AM
John Powell:
Pate admits that he would push the button to cure childhood cancer. I applaud his human sense of morality, but I question his religious logic. If God hasn't pushed that button, then wouldn't it be terribly wrong for Pate to push it? Perhaps by pushing it Pate would cause untold misery that is prevented precisely because children have cancer. In fact, how can Pate think it right to do ANY act of good since by doing so it might frustrate God's purposes and cause more evil to exist. To attempt to prevent evil that God has not chosen to prevent would be expected to make the universe worse, right?

But the counter to that would be that if God really didn't want the button pushed, it wouldn't get pushed. IOW, it is impossible to thwart an onnipotent God's purposes.

Then it appears that God is maximizing the weighted difference GOOD - EVIL. In that case the meaning of "omnibenevolent" would be more like "maximum good, minimum evil" rather than "all good, no evil."

IOW, there is a necessary amount of evil that must exist in order for God to bring about certain purposes, whatever they may be. I don't see a logical problem with that.

I think Steven's argument would be that there could have been at least a few less killed at the holocaust to achieve that goal.

Then he would be presuming greater knowledge than God.

I can see a better way. Take away free will while people live on Earth. If they get free will after they die and are admitted into heaven then it's less likely they'll blow it because they'll see God and heaven and hell are all real rather than possibly just the fantastic stories of some fanatics. If they do blow it in heaven after getting their free will (sort of like Satan maybe did), that would be their own decision, based on a lot better knowledge than we have.

Now you are presuming greater knowledge than God.

The actual would be better than one with twice as many dead. However, if even one less had to suffer that would be better than the actual. Suffering would be reduced even more, I think, if free will did not exist while people lived on Earth.

I can see it would be very easy for no suffering to exist in a world without free will. The question is - is this the kind of world that God considers optimal? That is, is the existence of free will in the world precisely the kind of divine purpose that requires the presence of evil?

...My counter argument to that is two-pronged.

1. It denegrates the worthiness of those who died.

God-fearing "saved" people died in those towers and the airplanes. Why didn't God do more to help them out? Any of us probably would if we were God. Why didn't God answer their prayers when they prayed to Him in their most desperate moment of need?

I don't see this at all. As far as the believing victims are concerned, on a personal level they actually end up infinitely better off. As for the non-believers, they are under the curse anyway. Everyone goes to their appointed reward. Moreover, their deaths may result in extensive good, as can also the suffering that results directly from their deaths. The story of Todd and Lisa Beamer is a case in point. Or, further afield, the well-known (in Christian circles at least) case of the murders of missionary Jim Elliott and his four associates, which resulted in the conversion of an entire people. Elliott also is credited with saying "He is no fool, who gives what he cannot keep, to gain what he cannot lose." Which sums up this argument nicely.

2. It is an argument that could be presented virtually REGARDLESS of how bad the universe were.

One could nearly always claim that things could have been worse if God had not intervened even if God never intervened at all. For example, if a rogue object destroyed Earth then the survivors on the Moon could praise God that He had prevented the object from doing worse than just killing everyone on Earth. The point is that an OmniGod who cared about us presumably wouldn't allow that sort of thing or other less extreme unnecessary catastrophes to befall us.

It is, I agree, essentially an argument from ignorance. But in this case it is a valid argument, which derives from Pate's epistemic gulf.

As I see it, for the atheist, the problem of evil is an all or nothing proposition. The moment one admits of the valid existence of even the smallest amount of evil, the logic comes crashing to the floor.

John Powell

March 17th 2003, 04:49 PM

POWELL:
Thanks for the dialogue JohnRansom.

POWELL:
Pate admits that he would push the button to cure childhood cancer. I applaud his human sense of morality, but I question his religious logic. If God hasn't pushed that button, then wouldn't it be terribly wrong for Pate to push it? Perhaps by pushing it Pate would cause untold misery that is prevented precisely because children have cancer. In fact, how can Pate think it right to do ANY act of good since by doing so it might frustrate God's purposes and cause more evil to exist. To attempt to prevent evil that God has not chosen to prevent would be expected to make the universe worse, right?

JOHNRANSOM:
But the counter to that would be that if God really didn't want the button pushed, it wouldn't get pushed. IOW, it is impossible to thwart an onnipotent God's purposes.

POWELL:
Remember that claim "It is impossible to thwart an Omnipotent God's purposes." I might want to debate it sometime.

So, if the button existed and God didn't want it pushed, God would prevent it from being pushed. If that's what you're saying, wouldn't that be violating someone's free will? Why would God prevent that apparent good, but not prevent someone from doing the apparent evil of pushing the nuclear button or signing the "final solution" orders for the holocaust or flying airplanes into defenseless towers? The "free will is an ultimate good" argument would suggest that God WOULD let Pate push that button regardless of whether it would result in other good or evil because free will itself is an ultimate good vastly more important (much higher "weighted") than the minor amount of good or evil that might result from pushing the button.

Given the appropriate premises, my conclusion would be that God would be doing great good by making that button available to Pate right now and encouraging Pate to push it. That way Pate would be using his free will (an ultimate good) to do a lesser good (eliminating cancer suffering in children). Why doesn't God do this? I think it's because He doesn't exist or doesn't have the attributes people have claimed. You probably think because the evil that would result must outweigh the good.

POWELL:
Then it appears that God is maximizing the weighted difference GOOD - EVIL. In that case the meaning of "omnibenevolent" would be more like "maximum good, minimum evil" rather than "all good, no evil."

JOHNRANSOM:
IOW, there is a necessary amount of evil that must exist in order for God to bring about certain purposes, whatever they may be. I don't see a logical problem with that.

POWELL:
The problem is that it is my understanding that the term "all-good" or omnibenevolence early on meant "all good / no evil" not "as much good minus evil as is logically possible." Theologians, I suspect, have changed the meaning of "all-good" after centuries of debate has shown them that the original meaning is untenable. The nature of this attribute given to God has changed. Presumably God didn't change just because theologians changed the meaning of "all good."

This is similar to the meaning of "all-powerful" changing from meaning something like "able to do anything, even that which a mortal might think is impossible" to something like "able to do anything logically possible" after centuries of "rock too large to lift" kinds of arguments convinced them of the error of the earlier meaning.

POWELL:
I think Steven's argument would be that there could have been at least a few less killed at the holocaust to achieve that goal.

JOHNRANSOM:
Then he would be presuming greater knowledge than God.

POWELL:
I understand why you would think that. From the skeptics point of view it's not presuming to know more than God, but knowing more than men who claim to represent God.

POWELL:
I can see a better way. Take away free will while people live on Earth. If they get free will after they die and are admitted into heaven then it's less likely they'll blow it because they'll see God and heaven and hell are all real rather than possibly just the fantastic stories of some fanatics. If they do blow it in heaven after getting their free will (sort of like Satan maybe did), that would be their own decision, based on a lot better knowledge than we have.

JOHNRANSOM:
Now you are presuming greater knowledge than God.

POWELL:
Again, I understand what you're saying, but from my point of view it's not presuming to know more than God, but more than men claiming to represent God, for example, Joseph Smith and those who helped him come up with Mormonism.

POWELL:
The actual would be better than one with twice as many dead. However, if even one less had to suffer that would be better than the actual. Suffering would be reduced even more, I think, if free will did not exist while people lived on Earth.

JOHNRANSOM:
I can see it would be very easy for no suffering to exist in a world without free will. The question is - is this the kind of world that God considers optimal? That is, is the existence of free will in the world precisely the kind of divine purpose that requires the presence of evil?

POWELL:
It sure looks superior to me to the free-will world we have.

POWELL:
...My counter argument to that is two-pronged.

1. It denegrates the worthiness of those who died.

God-fearing "saved" people died in those towers and the airplanes. Why didn't God do more to help them out? Any of us probably would if we were God. Why didn't God answer their prayers when they prayed to Him in their most desperate moment of need?

JOHNRANSOM:
I don't see this at all. As far as the believing victims are concerned, on a personal level they actually end up infinitely better off.

POWELL:
In that case, what would be wrong in killing as many good people as we can, especially children? They would be assured of eternal life with God without the risk of sinning later in life. If we let those people live they might sin, in fact certain children have a high risk of never making it to heaven (Mormon children, Muslim children, etc.) Perhaps they would cheer us on as a kinds of saviors to them in the afterlife. You and I both feel certain this is wrong, to kill innocent people especially children, but the religious doctrine you seem to be supporting suggests that it would be a good thing to kill people before they have opportunities to use their free will to sin more.

This was an argument I came up with early on as a young adult Mormon that was never answered to my satisfaction. The possible solutions I came up with contradict Mormon doctrine.

JOHNRANSOM:
As for the non-believers, they are under the curse anyway. Everyone goes to their appointed reward. Moreover, their deaths may result in extensive good, as can also the suffering that results directly from their deaths. The story of Todd and Lisa Beamer is a case in point. Or, further afield, the well-known (in Christian circles at least) case of the murders of missionary Jim Elliott and his four associates, which resulted in the conversion of an entire people. Elliott also is credited with saying "He is no fool, who gives what he cannot keep, to gain what he cannot lose." Which sums up this argument nicely.

POWELL:
The fact that one can identify a tiny minority of cases where it appears that more good resulted from the evil than might be expected if the evil never occurred does NOT justify the claim that the vast majority of normal cases satisfy that same condition. On the contrary, it's difficult to see that more good results from evil except in rare circumstances. In the case of 9/11 two of these alleged "more good" things was a temporary surge in church attendance and American patriotism.

I wish God had asked those who were going to die if they would prefer dying so there would be this surge in attendance and patriotism or if they would prefer living longer doing good among their own families and friends. God, perhaps you'll say, knows better what is good for them than they do. Perhaps true, but part of free will is to have choices.

POWELL:
2. It is an argument that could be presented virtually REGARDLESS of how bad the universe were.

One could nearly always claim that things could have been worse if God had not intervened even if God never intervened at all. For example, if a rogue object destroyed Earth then the survivors on the Moon could praise God that He had prevented the object from doing worse than just killing everyone on Earth. The point is that an OmniGod who cared about us presumably wouldn't allow that sort of thing or other less extreme unnecessary catastrophes to befall us.

JOHNRANSOM:
It is, I agree, essentially an argument from ignorance. But in this case it is a valid argument, which derives from Pate's epistemic gulf.

POWELL:
Pate's CLAIMED epistemic gulf. From my point of view it's not the knowledge of men who don't believe in God versus the knowledge of God, but versus the knowledge of men who believe in God.

JOHNRANSOM:
As I see it, for the atheist, the problem of evil is an all or nothing proposition. The moment one admits of the valid existence of even the smallest amount of evil, the logic comes crashing to the floor.

POWELL:
It depends upon the definition of evil and the meanings of the words defining evil. If the atheist concedes that objective evil exists in the way the Christian believes and if that objective evil can only exist if the Christian God exists then the morality-based atheist arguments against the existence of the Christian God probably crash to the floor. However, if the atheist considers "evil" to be a somewhat subjective term then the danger might evaporate away.

John Powell

Alien

March 17th 2003, 06:17 PM

Today @ 09:15 AM
johnransom:

But the counter to that would be that if God really didn't want the button pushed, it wouldn't get pushed. IOW, it is impossible to thwart an onnipotent God's purposes.

And I would ask, whither free will?

If everything we do is God's will, regardless of our own choices, what does that do to the argument that all this nastyness is necessary to accomplish God's purpose and one of those purposes is that we have free will? Is this not contradictory? I've heard it argued that God wants us to have free will so we can make a free choice to love/follow/obey Him, this free choice being more valuable to Him than if He simply created us in the desired form. I repeat, how can this value be attained if everything we do is pretty much controlled anyway?

IOW, there is a necessary amount of evil that must exist in order for God to bring about certain purposes, whatever they may be. I don't see a logical problem with that.

Two thoughts:

First, it seems to limit God. I would have thought that an even half-way omnipotent God could simply "poof" everything into existence as it "will" be without actually having to go through all the intervening steps. This could include memories of all the bad stuff that was required to build our characters or whatever, and make it so that all the people that failed to learn and went to hell never existed in reality.

Before you say that I am "second-guessing" God, I'm just putting forward a possibility; I'm sure a real omnipotent God could come up with something better.

Second, it seems wrong to consider that evil done to one person can be balanced against good done to another. For example, there must have been at least one person killed in the holocaust that ended up in hell. To say that can be subtracted from a greater good that resulted to another person leaving a net good is simply immoral. (According to our morality at least. God seems to write His own rules from what I am reading here). Or are you suggesting that God's purpose may have nothing to do with our wellbeing at all? Like torturing millions of innocent rats to find a cure for cancer?

Then he would be presuming greater knowledge than God.

I'll use this as an anchor for my thoughts on the "We are not qualified to judge God" argument.

I wonder if those that use it realise that it applies equally to themselves? In short, if a conclusion (from the OT, for example) that God seems more like a petty, jealous human potentate with limited powers than an all-loving superbeing is invalid because humans are not qualified to make such judgements, lacking the knowledge intelligence and perspective possessed by God, then is not the Christian's conclusion that God is good and loving equally invalid?

And if so, where does this leave us? Neither theists nor atheists really have any clue what God is like! Which means we might as well reject all discussion as futile and go home. This seems wrong, as we do in fact make decisons based on partial knowledge and our own intelligence, however flawed, and necessarily so. So we're back to discussing what God seems to be like based on the evidence we have ... which is probably all we can do.

johnransom

March 18th 2003, 02:46 PM

Yesterday @ 04:17 PM
Alien:
And I would ask, whither free will?

If everything we do is God's will, regardless of our own choices, what does that do to the argument that all this nastyness is necessary to accomplish God's purpose and one of those purposes is that we have free will? Is this not contradictory? I've heard it argued that God wants us to have free will so we can make a free choice to love/follow/obey Him, this free choice being more valuable to Him than if He simply created us in the desired form. I repeat, how can this value be attained if everything we do is pretty much controlled anyway?
It is not free will that is limited by this argument in any fashion - it is freedom of action.

First, it seems to limit God. I would have thought that an even half-way omnipotent God could simply "poof" everything into existence as it "will" be without actually having to go through all the intervening steps. This could include memories of all the bad stuff that was required to build our characters or whatever, and make it so that all the people that failed to learn and went to hell never existed in reality.

Before you say that I am "second-guessing" God, I'm just putting forward a possibility; I'm sure a real omnipotent God could come up with something better.
Since your idea stinks, I am sure He could. It is in any event arguable as to whether God can do what you propose. Since what you suggest involves an illusion of reality, this would essentially be a deception, and God is incapable of deception, then presumably He can't do this.

Second, it seems wrong to consider that evil done to one person can be balanced against good done to another. For example, there must have been at least one person killed in the holocaust that ended up in hell. To say that can be subtracted from a greater good that resulted to another person leaving a net good is simply immoral. (According to our morality at least. God seems to write His own rules from what I am reading here). Or are you suggesting that God's purpose may have nothing to do with our wellbeing at all? Like torturing millions of innocent rats to find a cure for cancer?
Again, not necessarily so. Your argument assumes all sorts of conditions not necessarily accepted. First, you have equated “evil” with “suffering”, which is not a valid definition. Replace the word “evil” with “punishment” and you will see how your objection makes no sense. Forget also the idiotic idea that God being all-loving implies He is all-nice and all-tolerant and all-warm-and-fuzzy. It certainly does not. As for God’s purposes having nothing to do with our well-being – if by well-being you mean a risk-free terrestrial existence, then the answer is most certainly not. And don’t go all PETA on us.

I'll use this as an anchor for my thoughts on the "We are not qualified to judge God" argument.

I wonder if those that use it realise that it applies equally to themselves? In short, if a conclusion (from the OT, for example) that God seems more like a petty, jealous human potentate with limited powers than an all-loving superbeing is invalid because humans are not qualified to make such judgements, lacking the knowledge intelligence and perspective possessed by God, then is not the Christian's conclusion that God is good and loving equally invalid?

And if so, where does this leave us? Neither theists nor atheists really have any clue what God is like! Which means we might as well reject all discussion as futile and go home. This seems wrong, as we do in fact make decisons based on partial knowledge and our own intelligence, however flawed, and necessarily so. So we're back to discussing what God seems to be like based on the evidence we have ... which is probably all we can do.
Being unqualified to judge God does not by any stretch of the imagination mean we cannot know certain key facts about Him. Since we have adequate evidence to conclude the existence of a personal creator and certain of his attributes (including his goodness and benevolence), we don’t have a problem.

Alien

March 18th 2003, 06:19 PM

Today @ 11:46 AM
johnransom:

It is not free will that is limited by this argument in any fashion - it is freedom of action.

Free will when there is only one choice doesn't seem very free to me.

Since your idea stinks, I am sure He could.

Thank you.

It is in any event arguable as to whether God can do what you propose. Since what you suggest involves an illusion of reality, this would essentially be a deception, and God is incapable of deception, then presumably He can't do this.

Ok, then just create us in the final form He desires, or do what I suggested and tell us about it. My example was very much off the top of my head and only intended to suggest that an omnipotent being might have a lot of options that didn't include all this suffering.

Again, not necessarily so. Your argument assumes all sorts of conditions not necessarily accepted. First, you have equated “evil” with “suffering”, which is not a valid definition. Replace the word “evil” with “punishment” and you will see how your objection makes no sense.

OK, make it undeserved suffering. That would be evil, wouldn't it?

Forget also the idiotic idea that God being all-loving implies He is all-nice and all-tolerant and all-warm-and-fuzzy. It certainly does not. As for God’s purposes having nothing to do with our well-being – if by well-being you mean a risk-free terrestrial existence, then the answer is most certainly not.

(Sigh) Now I'm idiotic.

There's a huge gap between a risk-free environment and what happens to some perfectly innocent people that is certainly not caused by any fault or choice of theirs.

And what I meant by God's purposes having nothing to do with our well being was the logical possibility that a superbeing might have a purpose that was not related to anything that we might choose, wish, approve of or enjoy.

And don’t go all PETA on us.

I'll say whatever I choose, within the posting guidelines.

Being unqualified to judge God does not by any stretch of the imagination mean we cannot know certain key facts about Him. Since we have adequate evidence to conclude the existence of a personal creator and certain of his attributes (including his goodness and benevolence), we don’t have a problem.

Yes it does. If God is half as powerful as He's cracked up to be, He would have no trouble creating any semblance of goodness, benevolence or anything else, and you would have no way whatsoever to determine if this was accurate or artifice.

Concerning evidence (of goodness and benevolence), I have heard many claims to that effect, but on examination these have always turned out to be highly subjective or dependant on selected subsets of what is observed. If you have something better I'd be very interested to hear it.

johnransom

March 20th 2003, 03:11 PM

03-18-2003 @ 04:19 PM
Alien:
Free will when there is only one choice doesn't seem very free to me.
Who said there is only one choice? I was talking about ability, not choice. It is perfectly feasible (albeit irrational) to will to do things one is incapable of doing. Similarly, one is able to exercise free will so long as it does not conflict with God's will (and whether one subscribes to the multiple will theory or not does not affect this). God's purposes and plans hardly need be one-dimensional; there is no reason that they should not be fully adaptive.

Ok, then just create us in the final form He desires, or do what I suggested and tell us about it. My example was very much off the top of my head and only intended to suggest that an omnipotent being might have a lot of options that didn't include all this suffering.
But that assumes knowledge of the mind of God, namely that the end result is only thing He considers of value. Why should the process leading to that end result not have some intrinsic value to Him?

Further, I am not so sure that God has any options in creation. Since He is perfect, and has no tolerance for imperfection, then it follows that if He is to create a world, it must be perfect. That is, we're back to the best of all possible worlds argument.

OK, make it undeserved suffering. That would be evil, wouldn't it?
Yes, but that too presumes facts not in evidence.

There's a huge gap between a risk-free environment and what happens to some perfectly innocent people that is certainly not caused by any fault or choice of theirs.
Ditto

And what I meant by God's purposes having nothing to do with our well being was the logical possibility that a superbeing might have a purpose that was not related to anything that we might choose, wish, approve of or enjoy.
??That seems to contradict somewhat the context of your statement. Its juxtaposition against the cancerous rats example seems to suggest that your point was that God's purposes might run counter to our well-being, not be unrelated to it at all. So I really don't see what you're trying to say. However, if it helps, I would say that our eventual well-being is certainly an objective of God, but our interim well-being only inasmuch as it is helpful to our final condition (since it may actually dispose us against the intended result, e.g., physical comfort now can easily cause us to develop indifference towards out eternal comfort) and/or that of others.

Yes it does. If God is half as powerful as He's cracked up to be, He would have no trouble creating any semblance of goodness, benevolence or anything else, and you would have no way whatsoever to determine if this was accurate or artifice.
Is it possible to create and maintain a "semblance" of goodness, without it actually being good?

Concerning evidence (of goodness and benevolence), I have heard many claims to that effect, but on examination these have always turned out to be highly subjective or dependant on selected subsets of what is observed. If you have something better I'd be very interested to hear it.
I think you're on quite the wrong track becuse the kinds of evidences I was thinking of are largely deductive and are not observable as such.

Alien

March 20th 2003, 11:45 PM

Today @ 12:11 PM
johnransom:
Who said there is only one choice? I was talking about ability, not choice. It is perfectly feasible (albeit irrational) to will to do things one is incapable of doing. Similarly, one is able to exercise free will so long as it does not conflict with God's will (and whether one subscribes to the multiple will theory or not does not affect this). God's purposes and plans hardly need be one-dimensional; there is no reason that they should not be fully adaptive.

To get back to your remark that started this, ....

But the counter to that would be that if God really didn't want the button pushed, it wouldn't get pushed. IOW, it is impossible to thwart an onnipotent God's purposes.

This suggested to me that, even though the subject of the example might appear to have two choices (to push the button or not), in reality he will make the decision that God wants him to make. Therefore, in this example at least, there is only a semblance of choice. This is not analogous to wanting to do something that one is incapable of doing, as you suggest, because both pressing or not pressing a button are quite possible under other circumstances.

I'm not sure what you mean by "one-dimensional" and "fully adaptive", perhaps you mean that some of our decisions are truly free (because they their results fall inside the parameters for God's plan), while others are strictly controlled. If so, my point becomes that some at least of what we perceive as free will is in fact not free. This leaves the rest of free will untouched, certainly, but I would submit it is about control rather than ability.

But that assumes knowledge of the mind of God, namely that the end result is only thing He considers of value. Why should the process leading to that end result not have some intrinsic value to Him?

Good point. Of course the process could (and probably would be) valuable to Him. As the part of the process we are discussing is suffering, though, it seems to make the problem even more .... problematic? .... as it suggests that suffering has some intrinsic value to God, rather than being an unavoidable by-product of the attainment of some other goal.

Further, I am not so sure that God has any options in creation. Since He is perfect, and has no tolerance for imperfection, then it follows that if He is to create a world, it must be perfect. That is, we're back to the best of all possible worlds argument.

The one you said made you shudder? :)

The problem with the word "perfect" IMO is that it doesn't mean a thing until you get the answer to the question "perfectly what?". What can perhaps be extracted from your supposition is that the nature of the world must reflect the nature of God, which is a worrying thought ... "an inordinate fondness for beetles"?

??That seems to contradict somewhat the context of your statement. Its juxtaposition against the cancerous rats example seems to suggest that your point was that God's purposes might run counter to our well-being, not be unrelated to it at all. So I really don't see what you're trying to say.

I think I need to be more precise in my choice of words. :)

What I meant by "unrelated" was that we could be no more than a means to an end. One could imagine an experiment to determine what circumstances would create the most happiness in rats. That would not be counter to their well-being, but the common factor would be that the scientist (in his capacity as experimenter at least) doesn't really care how the rats feel, and the experiment in which the rats suffer and that in which they feel good have the same end (in this case the attainment of knowledge).

However, if it helps, I would say that our eventual well-being is certainly an objective of God, but our interim well-being only inasmuch as it is helpful to our final condition (since it may actually dispose us against the intended result, e.g., physical comfort now can easily cause us to develop indifference towards out eternal comfort) and/or that of others.

Again, that makes sense, but has limited application. It is not difficult to find real world examples of suffering where the "educational" element seems to be totally missing. A child that is born with a painful condition and dies shortly afterwards, is an easy example.

Is it possible to create and maintain a "semblance" of goodness, without it actually being good?

Oh yes! Ask any confidence trickster. I realise you said "and maintain", and maybe you meant "maintain forever" (in which case I would agree with you). We don't know about the "forever" part though. We could be in the "grazing in green pastures" part of the process and the slaughterhouse bit might be still to come. :)

(Sorry about the human/animal analogies, it does seem to illustrate the God/human relationship sometimes.)

I think you're on quite the wrong track becuse the kinds of evidences I was thinking of are largely deductive and are not observable as such.

Fair enough. I wasn't trying to exclude any type of evidence you might wish to put forward, just mentioning a couple of categories I have heard before. I'd say that deductive arguments have to be grounded in something observable or they tend to lack force. Nevertheless, I'd be interested to hear your evidence. A link would be OK if you have set them out before.

John Powell

March 21st 2003, 08:02 PM

POWELL:
I'm not happy with the "epistemic gulf" argument. It is true that if God existed then there would be such a gulf. The problem for me is whether that gulf would be as large as Pate seems to imply or more like what Steven suggests. If it would be very wide perhaps the gulf could be wide enough to allow the dialetheist theist to justifiably argue his position.

DIALETHEIST THEIST:
God is omnipotent. That means God can do anything, even what mortals might imagine to be impossible.

Mark 10: 27 (KJV):
27 And Jesus looking upon them saith, With men it is impossible, but not with God: for with God all things are possible.

DIALETHEIST THEIST:
This does NOT mean that God can only do what men think is logically possible. God CAN create a stone so large that He can't lift it and He could lift that stone! God CAN create square circles and God CAN create a God more powerful than He is. God DOES know the future so that we can't do opposite of what He knows, but we also have free will to do opposite of what God foresaw.

You may not be able to understand how this is all possible because of the epistemic gulf between man and God. You must just accept it as true like the Trinity doctrine.

In school we are taught that 1 does not equal 3, but the Bible is clear that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are God, so that's 3. However, the Bible also clearly states there is only one God. God is 3 Gods and God is 1 God. Theologians who introduce words like "persons" to try to understand the mystery of the Trinity are merely relying on their own understanding rather than relying on the Word of God.

Prov. 3: 5 (KJV):
5 Trust in the LORD with all thine heart; and lean not unto thine own understanding.

DIALETHEIST THEIST:
We must trust the Bible whenever we see contradictions.

Judas did not personally buy the field of blood, but threw the 30 pieces of silver into the temple and then he died by hanging AND Judas personally bought the exact same field of blood with the thirty pieces of silver and died by falling headlong into the field and bursting.

Mary named her son Immanuel AND she didn't, but named Him Jesus. Joseph was the father of Jesus AND he wasn't. Jesus rode two animals into Jerusalem AND He only rode one.

The problem with so many of my mistaken fellow theists is that they've been trained to accept the law of non-contradiction as true even when applied to God. This is a lie of Satan to encourage disbelief in the mysteries of God. God is not bound by such man-made philosophical ideas. God is a dialetheism, a true logical contradiction. Just live with it.

POWELL:
What can a more liberal Christian who believes in a vast epistemic gulf between logical man and God say in counter-argument to such an argument that doesn't appear to be merely quibbling over the size of the gulf.

John Powell
A former believer in Mormonism,
Now an athe-ist or strong atheist

hellznrg

April 1st 2003, 11:32 AM

Here is a paraphrase of Boyd's vieew on omnipotence in Letters From a Skeptic:

“

Before Creation, God was the only being in existence and thus had all the power that there was. But with the creation of free creatures, God necessarily surrendered a degree of power. Or perhaps, it is better to say God delegated some of his power. Our freedom is a little bit of controlling power lent to us by God. God voluntarily gives us a portion of his power and thereby surrenders his opportunity to "always get his way." It has to be this way. For it is utterly impossible for God to always be in control and yet allow free beings to exercise some control.

What is important to realize is that this surrender is a voluntary act of God. If there is a limit on God's power it is there by his decision, not some power outside of himself. If God at some point can't do something (e.g. rid the world of a particular evil) its only because he decided to create a world in which there would be times when he could do nothing. Only if some power outside of God limited God could he be said to not be omnipotent (all powerful). God is all powerful though now, he chooses not to be. The reason being that he desires a creation capable of love and it must be "free" (have some power of its own).

Boyd made all of that up... none of that is in the bible. your argument falls flat on it's face... :P

dizzle

April 1st 2003, 06:34 PM

Say how you really feel.

George Blaisdell

April 3rd 2003, 11:44 AM

Dee Dee Warren: writes

"Say how you really feel."

What a lead in! But fortunately for all, I am temporarily graced with a modicum of self denial...

Imagine a world with no suffering - Where no matter what we did, we would feel only joy and pleasure. Killing would bring joy, and getting killed pleasure, fasting pleasure, and gluttony joy.

Where sin feels good, and so does virtue, where to spit upon and to be spat upon bring equal joy and pleasure...

Will we ever regain the Garden in such a world? Will we ever find God in such conditions?

geo

psychopath

April 10th 2003, 07:03 PM

I think Carr's argument is flawed. From his first post:

There is suffering. Some of this suffering can be reduced. For example, if somebody is ill, curing that person will reduce his suffering.

People try to reduce the suffering of the people they love, and sometimes they can do that.

God loves us. Therefore, God will also try to reduce our suffering, and He can do even more than people can do.

Therefore, if there is suffering which can be reduced, and we can see that it is not reduced, we can conclude there is no omnipotent being who wants to reduce our suffering.

To render his argument syllogistically:

A1. If God exists, he would have reduced all suffering that could possibly be reduced.

A2. There exists suffering that could possibly be reduced.

A3. Therefore, God does not exist.

This seems to be his essential argument. Now, here's a possible counterargument:

B1. If A1 is true, then if the God of the Bible exists, he would have reduced all suffering that could possibly be reduced.

B2. If the God of the Bible exists, then it is not the case that he would have reduced all suffering that could possibly be reduced. (Reducible suffering seems to exist in the Bible.)

B3. It is not the case that A1 is true (from B1 & B2).

B4. If it is not the case that A1 is true, then argument A is unsound.

B5. Therefore, argument A is unsound.

QuietSun

April 11th 2003, 01:28 PM

To move the issue of the problem of suffering from the philosophical to the practical you might ask yourself one question.

Are you glad you're alive? If you say yes, then you are saying even with all the evil and suffering in the world, the good out weighs the bad, and you are happy to be alive.

If the world is as bad (evil) as atheists like to make it seem when using the PoE against Christians, then I would think the answer to the question would assuredly be no.

winstonjen

April 12th 2003, 07:23 PM

I find Pate's arguments to be very unconvincing. He fails to explain why a loving and just god would value the free will of criminals more highly than the free will of their victims. And saying that police stop the crimes SOMETIMES because god lets them doesn't cut it with me.I find Pate's arguments to be very unconvincing. He fails to explain why a loving and just god would value the free will of criminals more highly than the free will of their victims. And saying that police stop the crimes SOMETIMES because god lets them doesn't cut it with me. If he truly cared, he would stop all cruel acts from occuring.

To say that suffering is necessary for some 'higher purpose' is to admit that god is not omnipotent - he could simply skip the suffering and cause the 'higher purpose' straight away. Therefore, an omnipotent being who allows suffering wants suffering for its own sake.

As for suffering being necessary, here is what a disabled person has to say about it - I have yet to ever hear a handicapped individual ascribe to the line of nonsense you theists are espousing. The only folks I've ever heard using those smug and self-righteous arguments are the able-bodied.

dizzle

April 16th 2003, 10:25 PM

Now that the debate is over, the participants are free to post in this commentary thread.

themuzicman

April 17th 2003, 04:48 PM

03-06-2003 @ 11:18 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=29000#post29000)
ACFaith.Com:

The problem for Christians is this: For some reason God chooses not to act. This has largely swept me into a more deist camp (though I am not a deist). I do not think God has any sort of habit of intervening with world events aside from personal transformation. This is why I deny "petionary prayer". A God who stands by during the Holocaust but chooses to heal little Timmy from cancer is very hard to rationalize. It makes no sense to me whatsoever and I think the atheists certainly are justified in pointing out these problems.

I think atheists have the "slot machine" view of God, whereby any injustice or pain should be alleviated or resolved by God immediately, even though He is under no compulsion to do so.

If you go back and read the OT prophets (and I suggest it highly), you'll find that God frequently handed the Isrealites (Jews) over to evil empires as judgement for their wandering ways.

The prophet Habakkuk lamented to God that He was going to judge Isreal using the most violent, most blasphemous nation on earth: Babylon. And Isreal was taken by them. But God also restored the nation of Isreal.

Now, I'm not saying that the holocaust was a judgement of the Jewish people. If you go back to the days from Joseph to Moses, you find that God's people were enslaved for 400 years, before God rescued them.

But God did rescue them.

So, if you take a somewhat bigger picture view of what's happening beyond the immediate suffering, you find that God is working in His own time to bring both judgement and mercy at the right moment.

If you'll recall, Isreal was given back it's homeland in 1948, after the holocaust.

Michael

John Powell

April 17th 2003, 11:01 PM

PSYCHOPATH:
I think Carr's argument is flawed. From his first post:

CARR:
There is suffering. Some of this suffering can be reduced. For example, if somebody is ill, curing that person will reduce his suffering.

People try to reduce the suffering of the people they love, and sometimes they can do that.

God loves us. Therefore, God will also try to reduce our suffering, and He can do even more than people can do.

Therefore, if there is suffering which can be reduced, and we can see that it is not reduced, we can conclude there is no omnipotent being who wants to reduce our suffering. ”

PSYCHOPATH:
To render his argument syllogistically:

A1. If God exists, he would have reduced all suffering that could possibly be reduced.

POWELL:
This would be better, I think:

A1'. If God exists, then he would cause that that there exist no suffering that could possibly be reduced.

Otherwise, you might be allowing the existence of reducible suffering that is unjustified.

PSYCHOPATH:
A2. There exists suffering that could possibly be reduced.

A3. Therefore, God does not exist.

This seems to be his essential argument. Now, here's a possible counterargument:

B1. If A1 is true, then if the God of the Bible exists, he would have reduced all suffering that could possibly be reduced.

B2. If the God of the Bible exists, then it is not the case that he would have reduced all suffering that could possibly be reduced. (Reducible suffering seems to exist in the Bible.)

B3. It is not the case that A1 is true (from B1 & B2).

B4. If it is not the case that A1 is true, then argument A is unsound.

B5. Therefore, argument A is unsound.

POWELL:
As I said elsewhere, Psychopath, when atheists are making religious arguments they should be seeking validity, not soundness.

This is an interesting argument of yours. So, you're saying that there is suffering in the Bible that could have been reduced. What passages were thinking about?

Are you saying that since reducible suffering exists in the Bible and the Biblical God exists, the Biblical God is allowing to exist reducible suffering?

Are you saying that regardless of how much suffering God allows, it's ok? Are you saying that regardless of how evil God appears to be to us, it's ok?

How can you distinguish an all-good God from an evil Demon if they behave identically the same, as far as you can tell?

The answer is: you probably can't.

John Powell

psychopath

April 18th 2003, 03:16 PM

As I'm sure you've noticed, this argument of mine is almost identical to the one I proposed on the AoE thread. I will make the changes I did there, by rewording some of the premises in accordance with your suggestions.

Carr's argument:
A1. If God exists, there would exist no suffering that could possibly be reduced.

A2. There appears to exist suffering that could possibly be reduced.

A3. Therefore, it is unlikely that God exists.

My counterargument:
B1. If A1 is true, then if the God of the Bible exists, there would exist no suffering that could possibly be reduced.

B2. If the God of the Bible exists, then it is not the case that there does not exist any suffering that appears to be possibly reducible. (Reducible suffering seems to exist in the Bible.)

B3. It is not the case that A1 is true (from B1 & B2).

B4. If it is not the case that A1 is true, then argument A is not strong.

B5. Therefore, argument A is not stong.

This is an interesting argument of yours. So, you're saying that there is suffering in the Bible that could have been reduced. What passages were thinking about?

I am not wholeheartedly defending this argument yet, because I think there are other ways of getting around the PoE and PoS without accepting B2. However, I think it is a good argument against the atheist, because he will almost always agree with B2, and as such it seems to expose an inconsistency in his rationale. But, as I explained similarly on the other thread, if I were to defend B2 I would point to a passage like Deuteronomy 7:2.

Oh yeah, I must admit that this is not my original argument. It's called the Expectations Defense, and I first saw it posted a few days ago by a Christian philosopher named Chris McHugh, in a debate he's currently undergoing over at II. I need to see some counterarguments and McHugh's responses (or any viable responses) to them before I can assess whether ED is definitely worth using, but it seems pretty powerful on the surface.

Are you saying that regardless of how much suffering God allows, it's ok? Are you saying that regardless of how evil God appears to be to us, it's ok?

I don't think this follows from the argument. All ED claims is that if the Christian God exists, we would expect to see suffering and evil that appear to be reducible.

How can you distinguish an all-good God from an evil Demon if they behave identically the same, as far as you can tell?

The answer is: you probably can't.

Of course, other aspect of the Christian God woud still distinguish him from an Evil-Demon. By mercifully allowing us to join him in heaven some day if we accept him, when we all deserve to be punished for our sinful acts, he surely portrays himself as an all-good God, as opposed to an Evil Demon.

dizzle

April 19th 2003, 12:24 AM

Now that the debate is over, the participants are free to post in this commentary thread.

Pate

April 19th 2003, 05:30 AM

Yes, I'm going to post to this thread, but not earlier than monday or tuesday.

winstonjen

April 20th 2003, 11:26 PM

Now that the debate is over, I have some questions I would like to ask Pate (related to the problem of suffering).

1. If someone caused childhood suffering, and offered as an excuse, "I wanted people to to grow morally through suffering," would you acquit him of all wrongdoing?

2. If suffering allows moral growth, then surely the relief of suffering prevents this, so why don't you support inflicting suffering on children and others so that others can 'grow?'

Lastly, you have not addressed this point (I'm not sure if Steven has mentioned this in the debate) - an omnipotent being requires no intermediate steps to accomplish an end - he can simply cause the moral growth without the need for suffering. The only reason why there would be suffering if an omnipotent being existed was because the being wanted suffering in the first place.

Pate

April 21st 2003, 03:37 AM

I'll start with answers to winstonjen's latest questions. I'm planning to read through this thread and try to answer everything that needs to be answered, but it will be helpful if others who want to ask something, will pose direct questions here.

WINSTONJEN:
If someone caused childhood suffering, and offered as an excuse, "I wanted people to to grow morally through suffering," would you acquit him of all wrongdoing?

I would not accept this kind of excuse, because no human being is in such a position that (s)he can reliably predict in advance that some particular instance of suffering has overall positive effect. We have not been given a right to inflict to others such suffering which we could avoid. And even if it's the case that certain amount of suffering in the world will increase humanity's moral and spiritual growth, it would seem to be better if this suffering is caused by nature, not directly by human actions. This seems to be so because obviously the suffering that humans cause to each other will have a damaging effect to their love and respect for each other, as well as to the moral responsibility of the person causing it.

That raises the question of why God allows suffering that's caused by human free choices. But the question really answers itself, when the word 'free' is included in it. If God wants us to have genuine freedom, he can't make us choose the right courses of action. That would negate our freedom.

But this also raises another point that could explain why God allows some of those sufferings that are caused by nature (which are usually thought to be most problematic for theists, because it's not as obvious that free will defense can explain them). It seems quite plausible to think that there would be more suffering caused by human actions in a world where all the natural suffering was lacking. And if this is so, then God has one more good reason to create a world where there is natural suffering.

WINSTONJEN:
If suffering allows moral growth, then surely the relief of suffering prevents this, so why don't you support inflicting suffering on children and others so that others can 'grow?'

This is partly already answered above, but I'll add this.

It's not the case that just any amount of suffering will be helpful to the individual and collective moral and spiritual growth. If we assume that suffering can sometimes have positive effect, then the question arises, as to what quality and quantity of suffering is optimal. I wrote in my response to Steven that "Not only the suffering itself, but also the process of freely working to eliminate the suffering, can contribute to this cause." If we help each other, doing our best to relieve the sufferings of fellow humans, that certainly can help us to grow in our moral responsibility. I suppose that at least you can agree with this, even if you deny that the suffering itself can contribute to this cause.

So, it really boils down to this. If it's the case that both suffering and the human effort to relieve the suffering, are helpful in the process of human moral and spiritual growth, then it would seem to be best with regard to these goals, if there would be certain amount of suffering, and humans would be encouraged to do their best to work and co-operate in order to relieve the sufferings.

WINSTONJEN:
Lastly, you have not addressed this point (I'm not sure if Steven has mentioned this in the debate) - an omnipotent being requires no intermediate steps to accomplish an end - he can simply cause the moral growth without the need for suffering. The only reason why there would be suffering if an omnipotent being existed was because the being wanted suffering in the first place.

I disagree. It's logically impossible to make someone do something freely. Moral growth is caused by a process of making free choices in different situations. God's omnipotence does not guarantee that he can create a world where there are creatures endowed with free will, who never choose any morally wrong choices.

I think that significant part of the moral and spiritual effect that life in this world can have to us, is the experiential knowledge of what it's like to be away from God's immediate presence. I see no implausibility in the idea that this kind of experiential knowledge of the consequences of living in a world where humans do not love God with all their being and their neighbour as themselves, as well as the opportunity to respond freely to God's offer to save us from this condition, are needed if we are to be able to once live in God's presence forever, without ever again choosing to rebel against Him.

winstonjen

April 21st 2003, 04:01 AM

Today @ 08:37 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=74472#post74472)
Pate:

I'll start with answers to winstonjen's latest questions.

Thank you for your response.

That raises the question of why God allows suffering that's caused by human free choices. But the question really answers itself, when the word 'free' is included in it. If God wants us to have genuine freedom, he can't make us choose the right courses of action. That would negate our freedom.

What about the freedom of murder, rape, and child abuse victims?!?! I suppose they FREELY CHOOSE to be abused in those ways? :whack:

But this also raises another point that could explain why God allows some of those sufferings that are caused by nature (which are usually thought to be most problematic for theists, because it's not as obvious that free will defense can explain them). It seems quite plausible to think that there would be more suffering caused by human actions in a world where all the natural suffering was lacking. And if this is so, then God has one more good reason to create a world where there is natural suffering.

I disagree. It's logically impossible to make someone do something freely. Moral growth is caused by a process of making free choices in different situations. God's omnipotence does not guarantee that he can create a world where there are creatures endowed with free will, who never choose any morally wrong choices.

Then your god is not all-powerful.

I think that significant part of the moral and spiritual effect that life in this world can have to us, is the experiential knowledge of what it's like to be away from God's immediate presence. I see no implausibility in the idea that this kind of experiential knowledge of the consequences of living in a world where humans do not love God with all their being and their neighbour as themselves, as well as the opportunity to respond freely to God's offer to save us from this condition, are needed if we are to be able to once live in God's presence forever, without ever again choosing to rebel against Him.

Does that growth from suffering means that we should seek it out? After all, the parable of the lost sheep indicates that the stray sheep that comes back is worth more than the 99 who didn't run away. So to be more valuable, we must sin, even though god hates that. :ahem:

Pate

April 21st 2003, 04:49 AM

WINSTONJEN:
Thank you for your response.

My pleasure. Thank you for your questions.

What about the freedom of murder, rape, and child abuse victims?!?! I suppose they FREELY CHOOSE to be abused in those ways?

Of course not. In such horrible events, it's not the will of a person that is compromised, but the ability to achieve what one wills, because the other person has chosen to misuse his greater strength.

Now you may say that God could use his even greater strength to prevent people from committing this kind of horrible actions. But that would not allow genuine moral responsibility. If a person would not commit murder, rape, etc. just because he knew that these would always be prevented by God, if he were to try to commit them, that would not produce a change in his moral values, but only in his behavior. True moral responsibility is possible only when it's also possible to be immoral. Therefore, it's better with regard to human moral growth, that we have responsibility over our own actions, as well as responsibility to co-operate to make our society as good and just as possible, with our free efforts.

Then your god is not all-powerful.

Only if one adheres to such illogical and meaningless version of the concept of omnipotence, which includes the ability to do the logically contradictory. I don't accept such definition of omnipotence. Majority of Christians here at TWeb would probably agree with me on this point. Such a concept may be common among the average Christian believers, but I don't think that it has ever been dominant among more thinking Christians.

Does that growth from suffering means that we should seek it out? After all, the parable of the lost sheep indicates that the stray sheep that comes back is worth more than the 99 who didn't run away. So to be more valuable, we must sin, even though god hates that.

One does not need to sin any more than (s)he inevitably does. If a person were able to be morally blameless in this life, then (s)he probably could maintain that in heaven without the experiential knowledge of the consequences of his/her personal moral failures. Such person would still have experiential knowledge of what it's like to live as a part of humanity that is generally in a 'fallen' state. But I dare to doubt whether any such morally blameles individual actually exists in this world.

DivineOb

April 21st 2003, 09:08 AM

Pate (btw, cool avatar ;))

Is the current state of this world such that, when the ultimate tally of suffering vs ultimately yielded good is taken, this world will have yielded a maximal difference between the two?

George Blaisdell

April 21st 2003, 11:51 AM

Winston writes:

> "Does that growth from suffering means that we should seek it out?"

Christ tells us that in the world, we WILL find tribulation - Not "might" find it... And we are called in repentance to turn from the world, from its cares about pleasures and pains, and to call upon the Name of the Lord... This means at minimum to begin to avoid a life of pleasure seeking and pain avoiding...

The actual road of following Christ is hard and narrow, yet Paul tells us that all the pains of this life are as nothing compared with the glory of the life to come... He tells us this for a reason... That the pains of this life be bourne lightly... That we not get discouraged by them in our walk in Christ...

The early Church was greatly ascetic [with predictable excesses!] - Where askesis meant not only the NOT seeking of pleasure, but its avoidance altogether, the embracing of discomfort so as to be freed of the concerns of the flesh - All of which is NOT to be understood as the punishing of the flesh...

> "After all, the parable of the lost sheep indicates that the stray sheep that comes back is worth more than the 99 who didn't run away."

That is not the meaning -

>So to be more valuable, we must sin, even though god hates that."

This is a logical conclusion from your misapprehension of the meaning...

geo

winstonjen

April 21st 2003, 04:13 PM

Today @ 08:37 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=74472#post74472)
Pate:
I disagree. It's logically impossible to make someone do something freely. Moral growth is caused by a process of making free choices in different situations. God's omnipotence does not guarantee that he can create a world where there are creatures endowed with free will, who never choose any morally wrong choices.

What about heaven? Supposedly, the old things are to pass away. Or does that include free will? Still, to have paradise, I suppose god would have to convince (or deceive us) into being in a blissful state in heaven.

God could have guaranteed no disobedience in Eden if he did not put the Tempting Tree (TM) in the garden, but he did, so he is the real tempter. Further evidence is shown when he told A&E NOT to eat from the tree - how is that not temptation?

Now you may say that God could use his even greater strength to prevent people from committing this kind of horrible actions. But that would not allow genuine moral responsibility. If a person would not commit murder, rape, etc. just because he knew that these would always be prevented by God, if he were to try to commit them, that would not produce a change in his moral values, but only in his behavior. True moral responsibility is possible only when it's also possible to be immoral. Therefore, it's better with regard to human moral growth, that we have responsibility over our own actions, as well as responsibility to co-operate to make our society as good and just as possible, with our free efforts.

Justify it all you want. For me, all it proves is that your god, if he exists, prefers that innocent people suffer in the name of 'moral growth' rather than there be no suffering caused by the strong against the weak. I find it disturbing that you see a world with moral growth and excessive suffering to be more desirable than a world with less moral growth but no suffering. That train of thought has led to the infliction of suffering and the offer of a cure, peddled by numerous religions.

> "After all, the parable of the lost sheep indicates that the stray sheep that comes back is worth more than the 99 who didn't run away."

That is not the meaning -

>So to be more valuable, we must sin, even though god hates that."

This is a logical conclusion from your misapprehension of the meaning...

Really? It says that they celebrate for the lost one that is found, so why would they do that unless they value him more?

Pate

April 22nd 2003, 09:00 AM

Yesterday @ 02:08 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=74532#post74532)
DivineOb:

Pate (btw, cool avatar ;))

Is the current state of this world such that, when the ultimate tally of suffering vs ultimately yielded good is taken, this world will have yielded a maximal difference between the two?

I think I'm inclined to say yes, though I'm not sure that it can be thought to be God's obligation to create the 'best possible world'.

Pate

April 22nd 2003, 09:12 AM

Yesterday @ 09:13 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=74831#post74831)
winstonjen:
What about heaven? Supposedly, the old things are to pass away. Or does that include free will? Still, to have paradise, I suppose god would have to convince (or deceive us) into being in a blissful state in heaven.

I think that this is where the point that I made in my previous message, becomes relevant:

"I think that significant part of the moral and spiritual effect that life in this world can have to us, is the experiential knowledge of what it's like to be away from God's immediate presence. I see no implausibility in the idea that this kind of experiential knowledge of the consequences of living in a world where humans do not love God with all their being and their neighbour as themselves, as well as the opportunity to respond freely to God's offer to save us from this condition, are needed if we are to be able to once live in God's presence forever, without ever again choosing to rebel against Him."

God could have guaranteed no disobedience in Eden if he did not put the Tempting Tree (TM) in the garden, but he did, so he is the real tempter. Further evidence is shown when he told A&E NOT to eat from the tree - how is that not temptation?

There are several issues to be dealt with here, like the issue of how literally we should take the story about Eden. I think that the central point here is exactly that God could not have created humanity directly to the state of heaven, without their gaining the experiential knowledge of the consequences of turning away from God. Otherwise they'd end up rebelling against God in heaven. So this is closely related to what I wrote above.

George Blaisdell

April 22nd 2003, 10:57 AM

[
winstonjen:[ writes:

> Really?

Yes - Really...

> It says that they celebrate for the lost one that is found,

Indeed so - There is great rejoicing in heaven for this event!

> so why would they do that unless they value him more?

Ever hit your thumb with a hammer? That poor wrecked thumb is the MOST important thing EVER for that initial and blinding two or three seconds of star-lit excruciation...

And so with the lost sheep...

But when the thumb heals, it resumes its normal functional relationship to the whole of the Body... It never was more or less important - Just wounded...

"...Heal my soul, for I have sinned against Thee..."

geo [The VERY sore thumb!]

winstonjen

April 22nd 2003, 04:15 PM

Today @ 02:00 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=75359#post75359)
Pate:I think I'm inclined to say yes,

Well, why don't you tell that to people who suffer for no good reason, like child abuse and pedophile victims. Tell that to victims of natural disasters, famine and war, who know of nowhere else to live. For some people, the world would be the best place, for them, but for others, it clearly is not.

So, it really boils down to this. If it's the case that both suffering and the human effort to relieve the suffering, are helpful in the process of human moral and spiritual growth, then it would seem to be best with regard to these goals, if there would be certain amount of suffering, and humans would be encouraged to do their best to work and co-operate in order to relieve the sufferings.

That train of thought is not far off inflicting suffering on others simply to relieve their suffering. Why do I think this? Because your view says that some moral growth, which comes from the relief of suffering, depends on suffering to occur in the first place.

But this also raises another point that could explain why God allows some of those sufferings that are caused by nature (which are usually thought to be most problematic for theists, because it's not as obvious that free will defense can explain them). It seems quite plausible to think that there would be more suffering caused by human actions in a world where all the natural suffering was lacking. And if this is so, then God has one more good reason to create a world where there is natural suffering.

Surely an omnipotent being would think of a way to reduce man-made suffering without the use of natural suffering. For example, we can't choose to fly without using a glider or a plane. Laws against man-made evil could be similar to other natural laws. Or perhaps people who hit people get hit back with the same force, and those who kill others drop dead.

Ever hit your thumb with a hammer? That poor wrecked thumb is the MOST important thing EVER for that initial and blinding two or three seconds of star-lit excruciation...

And so with the lost sheep...

But when the thumb heals, it resumes its normal functional relationship to the whole of the Body... It never was more or less important - Just wounded...

No offense, but I would take you a lot more seriously if you didn't contradict yourself in the same post.

George Blaisdell

April 22nd 2003, 09:07 PM

[b]winston writes:

> No offense, but I would take you a lot more seriously if you didn't contradict yourself in the same post.

OK...

It is the part that is in pain that demands attention - That is what suffering is for... Without any suffering whatsoever - As in a medically possible condition where only pleasure and never pain is all that we could ever experience, which seems to be your ideal, we would not live long...

And your idea that the lost sheep is more important than the 99 not-lost sheep fails, on the grounds that the part in pain and crying out is given attention, so you conclude that it is more important, when it simply needs more immediate care... And great is the rejoicing when the lost is found...

So now I am wondering if I have contradicted myself again - I did not see how I managed it the first time, as you indicate, but do not demonstrate - So I am kind of in the dark as to self-contradiction...

geo

winstonjen

April 23rd 2003, 01:21 AM

Today @ 02:07 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=76038#post76038)
George Blaisdell:

winston writes:

> No offense, but I would take you a lot more seriously if you didn't contradict yourself in the same post.

OK...

It is the part that is in pain that demands attention - That is what suffering is for... Without any suffering whatsoever - As in a medically possible condition where only pleasure and never pain is all that we could ever experience, which seems to be your ideal, we would not live long...

Non-sequitor - there is no reason to suggest that our lifespans would be shorter if we suffered no pain. And even if this was the case, why would it be worse than the world we live in now? Would you rather live 10 blissful years or 100 miserable ones?

And your idea that the lost sheep is more important than the 99 not-lost sheep fails, on the grounds that the part in pain and crying out is given attention, so you conclude that it is more important, when it simply needs more immediate care... And great is the rejoicing when the lost is found...

So now I am wondering if I have contradicted myself again - I did not see how I managed it the first time, as you indicate, but do not demonstrate - So I am kind of in the dark as to self-contradiction...

geo

Well, first you say it is more important:

Ever hit your thumb with a hammer? That poor wrecked thumb is the [B]MOST important thing EVER for that initial and blinding two or three seconds of star-lit excruciation...

and then you claim it is not - It never was more or less important - Just wounded...

George Blaisdell

April 23rd 2003, 10:03 AM

geo:
> > It is the part that is in pain that demands attention - That is what suffering is for... Without any suffering whatsoever - As in a medically possible condition where only pleasure and never pain is all that we could ever experience, which seems to be your ideal, we would not live long...

Winston
> Non-sequitor - there is no reason to suggest that our lifespans would be shorter if we suffered no pain.

Upon this earth, my friend, the ability to suffer pain is an absolutely essential survival requirement - Without it, survivability is zero... Take two aspirin, think about it for 12-13 seconds, and call me in the morning! ':idea:'

> And even if this was the case, why would it be worse than the world we live in now?

It IS the world we now live in, and are ruled by... And it is in the turning away from this world and in the crying out to God that constitutes the essentials of a Christian's code of conduct...

> Would you rather live 10 blissful years or 100 miserable ones?

False alternative.

And I'll receive whatever length of days God gives me. The longer I have, the more time I have to learn worthy repentance...

Without pain, you won't make it even one year, unless you are baby-sat - And even then you will be in grave danger...

And given your devil's alternative, I'll take 100 miserable years to your 10 blissful ones...

If you seriously want the 10 of bliss, [or as many as you can squeeze], then you need to stock up on heroin, ecstacy, marijuana, etc and find someone to keep you medicated and to take care of you until you die

geo:
> > And your idea that the lost sheep is more important than the 99 not-lost sheep fails, on the grounds that the part in pain and crying out is given attention, so you conclude that it is more important, when it simply needs more immediate care... And great is the rejoicing when the lost is found...

> > So now I am wondering if I have contradicted myself again - I did not see how I managed it the first time, as you indicate, but do not demonstrate - So I am kind of in the dark as to self-contradiction...

Winston:
> Well, first you say it is more important:

"Ever hit your thumb with a hammer? That poor wrecked thumb is the [B]MOST important thing EVER for that initial and blinding two or three seconds of star-lit excruciation...”

> and then you claim it is not -

"It never was more or less important - Just wounded..."

Looks like you STILL don't get it...

OK...

You probably don't get the 'woundedness' part, and the connection it has to 'pain' -

You see, in the world, when you hit your thumb with a hammer, you THINK [need I add "wrongly"??] for the time of the pain, that the thumb is more important than the liver... And the brain... Adolescent boys have the same problem when overwhelmed with sensations, yes? The little brain becomes more important than the large one, yes? So that DURING the intensity of sensation immediately following the happer ruining the thumb, the thumb SEEMS more important than the eye - Heck, Winnie! It seems for that initial burst of excruciation that you thumb is more important than GOD!!! Yet I would hope you can join me in affirming that your thumb is not more important than your hand, and that neither is more important than God...

':thumb:'

There, see? The wink, the smile, the thumb's up?? See how they all go together into a whole???

geo

winstonjen

April 23rd 2003, 06:13 PM

Upon this earth, my friend, the ability to suffer pain is an absolutely essential survival requirement - Without it, survivability is zero... Take two aspirin, think about it for 12-13 seconds, and call me in the morning! ':idea:'

Why does pain help us survive? I suppose you mean pain as a warning sign that something bad is happening, but if there was no suffering, why would no pain lead to short lifespans?

> And even if this was the case, why would it be worse than the world we live in now?

It IS the world we now live in, and are ruled by... And it is in the turning away from this world and in the crying out to God that constitutes the essentials of a Christian's code of conduct...

> Would you rather live 10 blissful years or 100 miserable ones?

False alternative.

And I'll receive whatever length of days God gives me. The longer I have, the more time I have to learn worthy repentance...

Without pain, you won't make it even one year, unless you are baby-sat - And even then you will be in grave danger...

And given your devil's alternative, I'll take 100 miserable years to your 10 blissful ones...

Well now, aren't we the masochist? :D

If you seriously want the 10 of bliss, [or as many as you can squeeze], then you need to stock up on heroin, ecstacy, marijuana, etc and find someone to keep you medicated and to take care of you until you die

I can take care of myself, thank you very much. I won't need any drugs or caretakers - I'll just be careful and not hurt myself - that would be my bliss.

Pate

April 24th 2003, 01:42 AM

WINSTONJEN:
Well, why don't you tell that to people who suffer for no good reason, like child abuse and pedophile victims. Tell that to victims of natural disasters, famine and war, who know of nowhere else to live. For some people, the world would be the best place, for them, but for others, it clearly is not.

The main indirect reason for most of these is the existence of human free will. The abuse of free will can have horrible results, like those that you mentioned, but I think it's still better that humans have free will, because it's the prerequisite of nearly all the good things that the world contains, not to mention the greatest good in the world to come.

That train of thought is not far off inflicting suffering on others simply to relieve their suffering. Why do I think this? Because your view says that some moral growth, which comes from the relief of suffering, depends on suffering to occur in the first place.

As far as I'm concerned, I think inflicting suffering on others with motives like those, is completely unacceptable. No human being is in such a position that behavior like that would be justified for him. And from Christian perspective, that kind of behavior would be wrong because it's against the teachings of Jesus and the apostles.

Surely an omnipotent being would think of a way to reduce man-made suffering without the use of natural suffering. For example, we can't choose to fly without using a glider or a plane. Laws against man-made evil could be similar to other natural laws.

I'll just repeat that solutions like those would make genuinely responsible and moral way of living impossible. We'd be God's pets.

Or perhaps people who hit people get hit back with the same force, and those who kill others drop dead.

That would effect one's behavior, not one's values and attitudes. As an analogy, you might praise Saddam Hussein if one of his supporters were pointing a gun at you, but that certainly would not make your real attitude towards him any better.

winstonjen

April 24th 2003, 07:56 PM

Yesterday @ 06:42 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=77279#post77279)
Pate:

The main indirect reason for most of these is the existence of human free will. The abuse of free will can have horrible results, like those that you mentioned, but I think it's still better that humans have free will, because it's the prerequisite of nearly all the good things that the world contains, not to mention the greatest good in the world to come.

Here's the situation:

Murderer: Desires to torture and kill girl.
Girl: Desires to escape and live her life.

Real world result: Murderer is free to choose courses of action that fullfil his desires. Girl is not. Girl has no choice.

Now, suppose god zapped the Murderer dead.

Hypothetical result: Girl is free to fulfill her desires. Murderer is not.

In both cases one person is robbed of their Free Will. The net change in "human free will" from god's intervention is roughly zero.

And this is a balanced scenario. What about September 11? The Free Will of 19 hijackers was maintained, while the Free Will of thousands of other people was quashed. That was a pretty bad day for net human Free Will. Wouldn't some divine intervention have allowed for a lot more Free Will in the world that day?

But, suppose you don't like that argument. Here's another:

Murderer makes Free Will choice to kidnap girl. He is about to begin the torture, but he trips over a banana peel (cleverly placed by god), and is knocked unconscious. The girls escapes.

Now, the Murderer was able to exercise his Free Will. He made the choice to do bad things. The girl also has escaped, thusly exercising her Free Will, and now she gets the rest of her life to continue her Free Will.

This is a win/win. There is a net increase in "human Free Will" over the real-world scenario, because the Murderer got to make his bad choice AND the girl got to exercise her Free Will too.

As far as I'm concerned, I think inflicting suffering on others with motives like those, is completely unacceptable. No human being is in such a position that behavior like that would be justified for him. And from Christian perspective, that kind of behavior would be wrong because it's against the teachings of Jesus and the apostles.

But isn't that what god is doing, with his approval of horrors and suffering for the 'greater good'? :huh: If it's OK for god to do things but not OK for us to do the same things, then morality becomes meaningless.

I'll just repeat that solutions like those would make genuinely responsible and moral way of living impossible. We'd be God's pets.

I still think that would be better than a world with suffering and injustice.

That would effect one's behavior, not one's values and attitudes. As an analogy, you might praise Saddam Hussein if one of his supporters were pointing a gun at you, but that certainly would not make your real attitude towards him any better.

As I mentioned before, I think this would be better than a world with pointless suffering that exists so others can feel 'moral' and better about themselves.

George Blaisdell

April 25th 2003, 10:44 AM

winstonjen: writes:

> Here's the situation:

[I love these situational constructs of those who are complaining about suffering!]

> Murderer: Desires to torture and kill girl.
Girl: Desires to escape and live her life.

An obviously very common situation!

> Real world result: Murderer is free to choose courses of action that fullfil his desires. Girl is not. Girl has no choice.

The binding of Satan certainly seems to favor the choices of the Girl, at the expense of the choices of the satanic murderer...

> Now, suppose god zapped the Murderer dead.

ZAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAPERIEEEEE!!!

> Hypothetical result: Girl is free to fulfill her desires. Murderer is not.

Hooray for the desire fulfillment of the [obviously cute] girl... Who obviously has a crush on Winnie...

> In both cases one person is robbed of their Free Will. The net change in "human free wil" from god's intervention is roughly zero.

Yupper! No difference either way!

> And this is a balanced scenario.

':rofl:'

[Sorreee!!!]

> What about September 11? The Free Will of 19 hijackers was maintained, while the Free Will of thousands of other people was quashed. That was a pretty bad day for net human Free Will. Wouldn't some divine intervention have allowed for a lot more Free Will in the world that day?

People have been dying for thousands of years - As a matter of fact, I will die. So will you. [guaranteed!] So will that youg girl with all her desires you want to have God protect from suffering...

Death is a given... Indeed a gift... But from the point of view of this fallen world of death, our impending death is a great tragedy, and the pain that accompanies it's approach a great injustice - Yet all this is reality, and every death has purpose, as does every life... We simply cannot see beyond our pleasure-pain noses that are so firmly glued, in Sodom and Gomorrah fashion, to our personal desire fulfillment... Well, that is not about the world, my friend, for the world gives you the lie of desires and their fulfillment, and the lie of the promise of life, and then you grow old and decrepit and suffer and die with no desires, no pleasure, and no more illusions about pleasures and desires... A great blessing indeed - I have seen many call for death, and most of these 'go' voluntarily, with gratitude leaving behind the desires of this world that you so ardently embrace...

> But, suppose you don't like that argument. Here's another:

Your vain arguments will not give you Christ's Life, which turns away from such concerns of pleasure, pain, and desire fulfillment...

> Murderer makes Free Will choice to kidnap girl. He is about to begin the torture, but he trips over a banana peel (cleverly placed by god), and is knocked unconscious. The girls escapes.

Boy-o-Boy!! This girl's a-gonna just LOVE her Winnie!!

> Now, the Murderer was able to exercise his Free Will. He made the choice to do bad things. The girl also has escaped, thusly exercising her Free Will, and now she gets the rest of her life to continue her Free Will.

Indeed! WIN-WIN DIE - They both have their impending deaths to look foreward to, and the end of the lies of desire fulfillment, pleasure seeing, and pain avoiding... Many of the early and holy martyrs were children...

> This is a win/win.

':rofl:'

> There is a net increase in "human Free will " over the real-world scenario, because the Murderer got to make his bad choice AND the girl got to exercise her Free Will too.

Cyber sex and cyber murder let you kinda have it all, right??? ':eek:'

> But isn't that what god is doing, with his approval of horrors and suffering for the 'greater good'? :huh: If it's OK for god to do things but not OK for us to do the same things, then morality becomes meaningless.

The truth is you will die...

> I still think that would be better than a world with suffering and injustice.

How just is your death? Or mine? Or anyone's? We live in a fallen world, as a fallen people, whom Christ calls to Himself through the Cross unto God... The great "haves" of 9-11 died fiery deaths, right alongside the "have-not" janitors... Pleasure and desire fulfillment are no defence against the napalm inferno of exploding 767s

> As I mentioned before, I think this would be better than a world with pointless suffering that exists so others can feel 'moral' and better about themselves.

You only understand others through your self-understanding, and until you get beyond self, you will only be able to understand others in terms of their feeling "more moral about themselves" than others by their religion. God knows that is very often true enough, but there is a lot more than that little miserable misunderstanding...

You take care, Winston...

geo

Pate

April 29th 2003, 03:07 AM

WINSTONJEN:
This is a win/win. There is a net increase in "human Free Will" over the real-world scenario, because the Murderer got to make his bad choice AND the girl got to exercise her Free Will too.

You are apparently proposing a scenario where all serious evil acts would be prevented by God, one way or another. This is basically the same as the "natural laws against evil" scenario that you made before, because in all of these cases, the result would be the impossibility of fulfilling the will to do evil. Therefore, I need to just repeat my answer. That solution wouldn't solve the problem of evil human will, just evil deeds. And it would not allow genuine moral responsibility. And these may be very important for the greatest good to be achieved (see below).

WINSTONJEN:
But isn't that what god is doing, with his approval of horrors and suffering for the 'greater good'? If it's OK for god to do things but not OK for us to do the same things, then morality becomes meaningless.

Not at all. The important difference is that God has perfect knowledge, and therefore he can be sure that all of his decisions to allow suffering for greater good, will indeed produce the results that he thinks they will. We don't have that kind of knowledge.

WINSTONJEN:
I still think that would be better than a world with suffering and injustice.

...

As I mentioned before, I think this would be better than a world with pointless suffering that exists so others can feel 'moral' and better about themselves.

Okay, I can understand your point of view. But still, it's not obvious at all that it's better for humanity to be God's pets than persons who have the possibility of morally responsible way of living and the possibility to make a real difference to the world with our free choices. It seems very possible that the kind of world that you're suggesting, would make it impossible to achieve the greatest conceivable good, eternity in heaven as persons endowed with free will. That's because the scenario that you are suggesting would not give to humans the kind of experiential knowledge that I've mentioned in my earlier posts and the kind of moral and spiritual growth that humans can gain in this world, and it seems plausible that all of these are important in God's actualizing his plan of Heaven for us (defined as a state of being where people are freely in the presence of God forever and do not ever choose to rebel against Him).