POE arg - for John

[BrianB]

Ok, I'm going to try this again. This post refers to the "Problem from evil argument" post started by John Powell in the Philosophy Dept.


John, the crux of the issue is:

1. You made an assertion in your argument without giving arguments to support that assertion ("4. Because of our free will to do or not do evil, there is, with high probability, at least one case of unnecessary evil.")

2. Because it's simply an assertion, I can deny it without requiring a justification for my denial. My denial of your assertion requires zero support (no burden of proof) because your assertion is gratuitous. "What is gratuitously asserted may be gratuitously denied."

3. Your argument does not succeed if you do not support the disputable premises, and you have not supported premise #4, so your argument does not succeed.

That is the heart of the matter.


Now, in your last post you are basically demanding that I give you an argument to support the dictum "What is gratuitously asserted may be gratuitously denied." and you want to dispute that the person who makes the assertion has the full burden of proof.

See here:

---begin quote from Post# 28478---
BRIAN:
Have you ever heard the phrase "what is gratuitously asserted may be gratuitously denied"? It means I don't have to support my denial of your assertion, both are gratuitous.

POWELL:
I have heard the phrase now. It sounds familiar.

Please prove that maxim true if you believe it is, Brian. Also, please prove that my argument contained "gratuitous assertions." [snip]
---end quote---

and

---begin quote from Post# 28478---
POWELL:
Well then, Brian, if you can justifiably do that, then so can I. I deny your assertion that the burden of proof is entirely upon the person who makes the claim, with the burden of proof now remaining on you, Brian, to support your claim that the burden of proof is entirely upon the person who makes the claim. Is that ok?
---end quote---

To be blunt, this shows you are ignorant in the methods of rational discussion and disputation. This is not an insult to you, since ignorance (unless it's willful) says nothing about your character, but it does mean that you need to take some time and learn how to argue properly.

If you choose to persist in this type of irrational approach to discourse as you have shown in the "Problem from evil argument" thread, then I will simply dismiss you as not worth the time to engage. However, if you show an honest attempt to try and learn _how to properly argue_ then I will continue the discussion with you.

Regards,
Brian

[Captain Ochre]

03-06-2003 @ 07:26 PM
BrianB:

Ok, I'm going to try this again. This post refers to the "Problem from evil argument" post started by John Powell in the Philosophy Dept.


John, the crux of the issue is:

1. You made an assertion in your argument without giving arguments to support that assertion ("4. Because of our free will to do or not do evil, there is, with high probability, at least one case of unnecessary evil.")

2. Because it's simply an assertion, I can deny it without requiring a justification for my denial. My denial of your assertion requires zero support (no burden of proof) because your assertion is gratuitous. "What is gratuitously asserted may be gratuitously denied."


Good observations, Brian.
I'd like to add something that bothered me from the first in John's presentation: The term "necessary" in the phrase "necessary evil". In logic, necessary things cannot be otherwise. In terms of logic, it appears to me that if only logically necessary evil existed, then moral free will would be (as John likes to say) extremely unlikely, as it would involve invariably good decisions on the part of however many beings possess free will.
I don't think that John means "logically necessary" when he uses the term "necessary"; on the contrary, I think that he means "unjustified" or the like.
Since allowing the possibility for "free will" itself provides justification for allowing unnecessary evil (like the time ages past when I stole a candy bar from Publix), the argument from evil is placed in the practically impossible situation of sitting in judgement of God's future (not to mention past) treatment of the unnecessary evil which (made likely by the creation of beings with free moral will).
John does have the option of arguing that allowing "free will" was bad (evil, unjustifiable, whatever), of course.

[John Powell]

BRIAN B:
Ok, I'm going to try this again. This post refers to the "Problem from evil argument" post started by John Powell in the Philosophy Dept.


POWELL:
I appreciate your patience with me, Brian.

BRIAN B:
John, the crux of the issue is:

1. You made an assertion in your argument without giving arguments to support that assertion ("4. Because of our free will to do or not do evil, there is, with high probability, at least one case of unnecessary evil.")


POWELL:
Are you sure I didn't give any arguments in support, Brian?

The following appears satisfactory to me in the present context:

www.dictionary.com
Argument
1a A discussion in which disagreement is expressed; a debate.

[Middle English, from Old French, from Latin argumentum, from arguere, to make clear. See argue.]

Synonyms: argument, dispute, controversy

These nouns denote discussion involving conflicting points of view. Argument stresses the advancement by each side of facts and reasons intended to persuade the other side:


POWELL:
Didn't I "advance" or supply "discussion" on an issue "involving conflicting points of view" in order to "make clear" in order to "persuade the other side" when the other side did not immediately accept my conclusions?

What's your definition of "argument," Brian?

BRIAN B:
2. Because it's simply an assertion, I can deny it without requiring a justification for my denial. My denial of your assertion requires zero support (no burden of proof) because your assertion is gratuitous. "What is gratuitously asserted may be gratuitously denied."


POWELL:
Yes, you CAN and you MAY deny it Brian, but would you be JUSTIFIED in denying it without supporting your assertion? This is how I understood you were using the dictum. I thought you were justifying your denial, not just exercising your right as a being with free will.

Who told you, Brian, that the dictum "what is gratuitously asserted may be gratuitously denied" means that one is justified to not believe under those conditions? Who told you that the person making an assertion has all the burden to prove it, but someone denying that assertion has no burden to prove their denial? Why did you believe them when they told you these things? Did you demand them to prove their "gratuitous assertions"? If you didn't demand them to prove their assertions to you, Brian, why do you demand that of others? If you won't defend your assertions to me, why are you demanding me to prove my assertions to you? Why are you appearing so hypocritical?

What is your meaning of "gratuitous," Brian?

Did you understand my bigot joke?

If I claim that the universe exists, Brian, would you be justified in denying it just because I don't supply supporting arguments and because you choose to call it a "gratuitous assertion"? Don't you think the naysayer has some burden to demonstrate justification for their denial?

BRIAN B:
3. Your argument does not succeed if you do not support the disputable premises, and you have not supported premise #4, so your argument does not succeed.


POWELL:
Are you sure I didn't provide supporting discussion / arguments?

What's your definition of "disputable," Brian?

Perhaps you accepted the "gratuitous" and "burden of proof" assertions without requiring supporting arguments. According to your argument 3, doesn't that mean they fail?

BRIAN B:
That is the heart of the matter.


POWELL:
Isn't that an assertion you need to prove, Brian, or am I just supposed to accept it on your say-so? (Just kidding) :wink:

The "heart of the matter" as I see it, Brian, is that you've accepted as true on some people's say-so things like the "gratuitous" and "burden of proof" assertions without, evidently, ever having those claims sufficiently justified. Now, you seem to expect me to accept them on your mere say-so. Isn't this an appeal to authority you're using?

BRIAN B:
Now, in your last post you are basically demanding that I give you an argument to support the dictum "What is gratuitously asserted may be gratuitously denied." and you want to dispute that the person who makes the assertion has the full burden of proof.


POWELL:
Yes, you demanded it of me, so I'm demanding it back at you. Isn't that fair?

Actually, I don't care that much about the dictum. I should have pointed out at the beginning that "may" does not necessarily mean "may justifiably." I took the meaning of the dictum as you seemed to be taking it rather than what the words most likely mean. You're using the dictum to support an action that the dictum doesn't support based on the most literal reading of the dictum. That's my opinion.

What I'm more interested in having you demonstrate, Brian, is your burden of proof claim, that the claimant has all the burden to support the original assertion and the critic has no burden to support their denial. I seriously doubt that you can do so persuasively to an informed opponent like myself.

I'm trying to persuade you, Brian, to alter your opinions to be more like my own.

I believe that the person making the assertion has perhaps most, but certainly not all, of the burden to demonstrate the assertion. I also believe that it's NOT true that there is no burden whatsoever on the person denying the original assertion to support their denial. How much burden each party has may depend on a number of factors.

Perhaps this is a better dictum: "Assertions and denials both need to be sufficiently supported to justify acceptance." I just came up with that, so it probably needs some more work.

Where's Tim Holt when I need him?

Evidently, I'm not succeeding at persuading you, Brian. I wonder if anyone else is being persuaded by my arguments / discussion?

BRIAN B:
See here:

---begin quote from Post# 28478---
BRIAN B:
Have you ever heard the phrase "what is gratuitously asserted may be gratuitously denied"? It means I don't have to support my denial of your assertion, both are gratuitous.

POWELL:
I have heard the phrase now. It sounds familiar.

Please prove that maxim true if you believe it is, Brian. Also, please prove that my argument contained "gratuitous assertions." {snip}
---end quote---

and

---begin quote from Post# 28478---
POWELL:
Well then, Brian, if you can justifiably do that, then so can I. I deny your assertion that the burden of proof is entirely upon the person who makes the claim, with the burden of proof now remaining on you, Brian, to support your claim that the burden of proof is entirely upon the person who makes the claim. Is that ok?
---end quote---

BRIAN B:
To be blunt, this shows you are ignorant in the methods of rational discussion and disputation. This is not an insult to you, since ignorance (unless it's willful) says nothing about your character, but it does mean that you need to take some time and learn how to argue properly.


POWELL:
Perhaps you are right, Brian. Thanks for the advice.

BRIAN B:
If you choose to persist in this type of irrational approach to discourse as you have shown in the "Problem from evil argument" thread, then I will simply dismiss you as not worth the time to engage. However, if you show an honest attempt to try and {to} learn _how to properly argue_ then I will continue the discussion with you.

Regards,
Brian


POWELL:
I'm not taking this approach with others because they haven't promoted yet the radically unfair (in my opinion) position on burden of proof.

Isn't this an appeal to authority, Brian? Aren't you arguing that since smart, logical people appear to support your view on the burden of proof, it must be true?

Isn't this also an argument from ignorance, Brian? Aren't you arguing that since no one has successfully rebutted to you your opinion on the burden of proof, therefore, your position is true?

And, isn't this an appeal to force you're using, Brian? Aren't you essentially saying the following?

POWELL (putting words in Brian's mouth):
If you don't accept on my say-so what I tell you as true about who has the burden of proof then something bad will happen to you. I won't talk to you anymore and I will call you names like "unworthy." If, however, you accept what I tell you as true on my say-so then I'll be nice to you and continue speaking to you and call you nice names like "honest." It's your choice.

POWELL:
Is it possible, Brian, that you also "need to take some time and learn how to argue properly"?

Regards,

John Powell

[John Powell]

BRIAN B:

Ok, I'm going to try this again. This post refers to the "Problem from evil argument" post started by John Powell in the Philosophy Dept.


John, the crux of the issue is:

1. You made an assertion in your argument without giving arguments to support that assertion ("4. Because of our free will to do or not do evil, there is, with high probability, at least one case of unnecessary evil.")

2. Because it's simply an assertion, I can deny it without requiring a justification for my denial. My denial of your assertion requires zero support (no burden of proof) because your assertion is gratuitous. "What is gratuitously asserted may be gratuitously denied."

<snipped>

CAPTAIN OCHRE:
Good observations, Brian.


POWELL:
Does that mean, Capn Ochre, that you agree with Brian that the claimant of an assertion has ALL of the burden to prove his assertion, but the critic who denies the assertion has ZERO burden to support his denial?

CAPTAIN OCHRE:
I'd like to add something that bothered me from the first in John's presentation: The term "necessary" in the phrase "necessary evil". In logic, necessary things cannot be otherwise.


POWELL:
That seems unlikely.

"Necessary" CAN mean "cannot be otherwise" but it doesn't have to in logic. If you insist that every use of "necessary" in a sentence, analyzed using logic, must have that meaning then logic loses most of its relevance.

Some logic discussion could define "necessary" in that way, but that doesn't obligate logical speakers to use "necessary" in that way in other places.

CAPTAIN OCHRE:
In terms of logic, it appears to me that if only logically necessary evil existed, then moral free will would be (as John likes to say) extremely unlikely, as it would involve invariably good decisions on the part of however many beings possess free will.


POWELL:
Good points.

CAPTAIN OCHRE:
I don't think that John means "logically necessary" when he uses the term "necessary"; on the contrary, I think that he means "unjustified" or the like.


POWELL:
I should have explained "necessary" as "necessary to fulfill God's purposes" or something like that because I meant it to be associated with His omnibenevolence.

I'm thinking now that my argument depends upon the relationship of good to evil.

If good can exist without evil as I was surprised to learn some believe then I should probably argue that no evil is necessary since good can exist without it. There's no need for it to fulfill God's all-good purposes. An all-good God would be expected to not have purposes that required evil if evil wasn't logically necessary for there to be good.

If, however, good must have evil to logically exist because they are opposites of a spectrum, for example, then there must be enough evil so good can logically exist. Then the "necessary" evil issue becomes relevant. There shouldn't be any more evil than is necessary to logically allow for good.

Well, not quite. If by allowing some evil even more good would result, then that would be preferable. Perhaps God must calculate the difference good minus evil and maximize it. Since some good is better than other good and some bad is worse than other bad, God must assign perfectly accurate weighting factors to each example of good and evil everywhere in the universe and all other planes of existence before doing the calculation. If the weighting factors are time dependent then God might have to do the calculations over and over again every moment of time to be sure He has maximized the good minus bad difference. Perhaps God is fast enough and interested enough to do that every moment for all eternity.

It would be much easier on God if He weren't expected to be an all-good being and so He could produce a universe that was acceptably good rather than being required to produce the absolutely best possible universe in terms of good minus bad at every moment of time, don't you agree?

CAPTAIN OCHRE:
Since allowing the possibility for ""free will" itself provides justification for allowing unnecessary evil (like the time ages past when I stole a candy bar from Publix), the argument from evil is placed in the practically impossible situation of sitting in judgement of God's future (not to mention past) treatment of the unnecessary evil which (made likely by the creation of beings with free moral will).


POWELL:
I like that "practically impossible." All I need is one agreed upon example of unnecessary evil and the argument might be won. One little case of shoplifting that God didn't need to fulfill His purposes.

CAPTAIN OCHRE:
John does have the option of arguing that allowing "free will" was bad (evil, unjustifiable, whatever), of course.


POWELL:
I have been arguing along those lines.

Without free will there would be a lot LOT more good (more saved persons) and a lot less evil (due to free will). An unresolved question is whether the good that only exists in the presence of free will could shift the balance back in favor of free will. I think I can persuasively argue that no combined good produced by free will can sensibly match the good of eternal salvation minus the (or plus the negative) bad eliminated by removing free will.

Something that might be argued is that salvation cannot be obtained by sinless beings unless they have achieved sinlessness with free will.

My rebuttal?

Do you mean not logically possible or it's logically possible, but too difficult for God or God just won't allow it or something else? If it's logically impossible I would want to see the arguments for that. If it's because God could logically, but He's too weak, then He must not be all-powerful. If He won't allow it then He must not be all-good.

John Powell

[Captain Ochre]

03-06-2003 @ 10:42 PM
John Powell:

POWELL:
Does that mean, Capn Ochre, that you agree with Brian that the claimant of an assertion has ALL of the burden to prove his assertion, but the critic who denies the assertion has ZERO burden to support his denial?


In a given argument, yes.
More specifically, if somebody wants somebody else to accept their propositional truth, only the advocate bears the burden of proof.
The critic bears the proof only for that which he expects acceptance. If he is countering an affirmative position (such as yours), he bears the burden of proof for showing that you have not met your burden of proof (which could be as simple as correctly noting that you had argued by assertion). Formal debate is different, since debate is judged by the performance of each participant: Both are expected, within that format, to make a case for their respective position.
Also, claims which run counter to accepted wisdom will tend to draw the burden of proof.
John, if you come up to me and announce that you've been declared King of the World and therefore I need to give you 1/2 of my possessions as a tax, the burden of proof is solely on you.

"I'm King of the World."
"No, you're not."
The response above is sufficient until the initial claim is supported.


POWELL:
That seems unlikely.


Oh, I agree (as you saw below).

(I said blah blah blah--but made it sound much better than that!)

POWELL:
Good points.


Thanks.


POWELL:

I'm thinking now that my argument depends upon the relationship of good to evil.

If good can exist without evil as I was surprised to learn some believe then I should probably argue that no evil is necessary since good can exist without it.


Agreed. Christian theology customarily teaches that he creation wasn't necessary at all. God is what is left, and God is Good (it is said). But then you go & say . . .


There's no need for it to fulfill God's all-good purposes.
An all-good God would be expected to not have purposes that required evil if evil wasn't logically necessary for there to be good.


That doesn't quite follow, I'm afraid. Try "An all-good God would be expected to not have purposes that allowed the possibility of evil if the possibility of evil wasn't logically necessary fo there to be good."


If, however, good must have evil to logically exist because they are opposites of a spectrum, for example, then there must be enough evil so good can logically exist. Then the &quot;necessary&quot; evil issue becomes relevant. There shouldn't be any more evil than is necessary to logically allow for good.


Seems like you drifted back to a dualistic understanding of good/evil, to me.


Well, not quite. If by allowing some evil even more good would result, then that would be preferable. Perhaps God must calculate the difference good minus evil and maximize it. Since some good is better than other good and some bad is worse than other bad, God must assign perfectly accurate weighting factors to each example of good and evil everywhere in the universe and all other planes of existence before doing the calculation. If the weighting factors are time dependent then God might have to do the calculations over and over again every moment of time to be sure He has maximized the good minus bad difference. Perhaps God is fast enough and interested enough to do that every moment for all eternity.


If anybody could do it, an omnipotent/omniscient being could. :wink:


It would be much easier on God if He weren't expected to be an all-good being and so He could produce a universe that was acceptably good rather than being required to produce the absolutely best possible universe in terms of good minus bad at every moment of time, don't you agree?


Not really. I don't think that omnipotent power requires means. Would it have been "easier" for an omnipotent being to create one atom rather than a whole universe teeming with atoms?
It's only "difficult" if it's not logically possible, afaics.


POWELL:
I like that &quot;practically impossible.&quot; All I need is one agreed upon example of unnecessary evil and the argument might be won. One little case of shoplifting that God didn't need to fulfill His purposes.


I fail to appreciate your hopeful attitude, though I admire your zest for the task!
If granting free moral agents the opportunity to make multiple decisions for good or ill is one of God's good purposes, how would you find any evil decision by any of God's creatures unnecessary?


POWELL:
I have been arguing along those lines.

Without free will there would be a lot LOT more good (more saved persons) and a lot less evil (due to free will).


Technically there would be far fewer saved persons--what would they have been saved from? Suppose that acts of self-sacrificial heroism are "gooder" than the average good, for the sake of argument. Let's suppose that God created a ringworld populated with billions of ("human"?) automata who go about smelling lovely flowers all day long while the birdies sing.
Where's the opportunity for the greater good of self-sacrificing heroism?


An unresolved question is whether the good that only exists in the presence of free will could shift the balance back in favor of free will. I think I can persuasively argue that no combined good produced by free will can sensibly match the good of eternal salvation minus the (or plus the negative) bad eliminated by removing free will.


Persuasively, maybe, but non-fallaciously? :wink:
(not a slam, simply an observation that flawed arguments are sometimes effectively persuasive)


Something that might be argued is that salvation cannot be obtained by sinless beings unless they have achieved sinlessness with free will.


There'd be me arguing that. :smile:


My rebuttal?


I have some uncertainty as to what you're rebutting below.

Do you mean not logically possible or it's logically possible, but too difficult for God or God just won't allow it or something else? If it's logically impossible I would want to see the arguments for that. If it's because God could logically, but He's too weak, then He must not be all-powerful. If He won't allow it then He must not be all-good.


I assume you're referring to my suggestion that free will itself provides the justification for unnecessary (iow otherwise unjustified) evil.
It is logically impossible for automata to act in a heroic or noble manner, since automata are not responsible for their own actions.
Freedom is necessary for the greater goods of heroism and responsibility (the latter is one of the G of E mandates for Adam and Eve). I would go so far as to suggest that perhaps the most significant aspect of the "likeness of God" is the fact that man was given responsibility over the world. Responsibility is meaningless without consequences for action. If I hit little Billy in the head with a baseball bat, and Luvvy Duvvy Gawd makes it so that the blow does not affect the lad at all (not even the fear of being attacked lingers thanks to LDG!), for example, then what type of responsibility is possible for me? That particular bicycle has unremovable chariot-sized training wheels and a seat belt (as well as guidance system that prevents me from going astray, and momentum controls that keep me moving at the right speed). Looky! I can ride a bike!

[John Powell]

POWELL:
Comments to Ochre.

POWELL:
Does that mean, Capn Ochre, that you agree with Brian that the claimant of an assertion has ALL of the burden to prove his assertion, but the critic who denies the assertion has ZERO burden to support his denial?

CAPTAIN OCHRE
In a given argument, yes.


POWELL:
Bummer.

CAPTAIN OCHRE:
More specifically, if somebody wants somebody else to accept their propositional truth, only the advocate bears the burden of proof.

The critic bears the proof only for that which he expects acceptance.


POWELL:
If the critic won't support his denial, Capn Ochre, why should anyone accept it to be justified? Merely because he voiced it? Wouldn't this be an argument by assertion?

CAPTAIN OCHRE:
If he is countering an affirmative position (such as yours), he bears the burden of proof for showing that you have not met your burden of proof (which could be as simple as correctly noting that you had argued by assertion).


POWELL:
So, Capn Ochre, you're saying that the critic DOES HAVE BURDEN OF PROOF to support his denial. That's what I'm trying to explain to Brian.

CAPTAIN OCHRE:
Formal debate is different, since debate is judged by the performance of each participant: Both are expected, within that format, to make a case for their respective position.


POWELL:
If in formal debate both sides are expected to defend their positions if they intend to persuade their listeners, Capn Ochre, why wouldn't that be true in informal debates? Are informal debaters usually unconcerned whether their arguments or rejections of arguments persuade anyone?

CAPTAIN OCHRE:
Also, claims which run counter to accepted wisdom will tend to draw the burden of proof.


POWELL:
Perhaps the shared burden of proof balance between the original claimant and the critic might vary depending upon certain factors. Whether the claim was in line with accepted wisdom or not could be just such a factor.

CAPTAIN OCHRE:
John, if you come up to me and announce that you've been declared King of the World and therefore I need to give you 1/2 of my possessions as a tax, the burden of proof is solely on you.

"I'm King of the World."
"No, you're not."
The response above is sufficient until the initial claim is supported.


POWELL:
I would say that the burden of proof for that debate was by far on the claimant. Let's say 99% claimant, 1% critic.

If, however, the debate was

"Japan still exists."
"No it doesn't."

Then the burden of proof would shift almost entirely the other way, wouldn't you agree?

In other words, the burden of proof is ALWAYS shared between the claimant and the critic, but how much burden is upon each depends on a number of factors, including how close the claim is to being in line with what the typical listeners to the debate would believe.

rest of response next page.

John Powell

[John Powell]

POWELL:
That seems unlikely.

CAPTAIN OCHRE:
Oh, I agree (as you saw below).

(I said blah blah blah--but made it sound much better than that!)

POWELL:
Good points.

CAPTAIN OCHRE:
Thanks.

POWELL:
I'm thinking now that my argument depends upon the relationship of good to evil.

If good can exist without evil as I was surprised to learn some believe then I should probably argue that no evil is necessary since good can exist without it.

CAPTAIN OCHRE:
Agreed. Christian theology customarily teaches that he creation wasn't necessary at all. God is what is left, and God is Good (it is said). But then you go & say . . .

POWELL:
There's no need for it to fulfill God's all-good purposes.

An all-good God would be expected to not have purposes that required evil if evil wasn't logically necessary for there to be good.

CAPTAIN OCHRE:
That doesn't quite follow, I'm afraid. Try "An all-good God would be expected to not have purposes that allowed the possibility of evil if the possibility of evil wasn't logically necessary fo there to be good."


POWELL:
Yes, that's better. Thanks. I was confused. I was thinking that if good and evil were opposites, requiring each other, then there had to exist evil for there to exist good. All that is needed it seems is the concept or understanding of evil, the possibility of evil, for there to be good if good and evil are logical opposites. Likewise, evil could exist in this case as long as good was possible.

POWELL:
If, however, good must have evil to logically exist because they are opposites of a spectrum, for example, then there must be enough evil so good can logically exist. Then the "necessary" evil issue becomes relevant. There shouldn't be any more evil than is necessary to logically allow for good.

CAPTAIN OCHRE:
Seems like you drifted back to a dualistic understanding of good/evil, to me.


POWELL:
Yes.

However, now I probably need to revise that because it's based on my confusion about HAVING evil so there can be its opposite good and having the CONCEPT of evil. I need to think some more about this.

POWELL:
Well, not quite. If by allowing some evil even more good would result, then that would be preferable. Perhaps God must calculate the difference good minus evil and maximize it. Since some good is better than other good and some bad is worse than other bad, God must assign perfectly accurate weighting factors to each example of good and evil everywhere in the universe and all other planes of existence before doing the calculation. If the weighting factors are time dependent then God might have to do the calculations over and over again every moment of time to be sure He has maximized the good minus bad difference. Perhaps God is fast enough and interested enough to do that every moment for all eternity.

CAPTAIN OCHRE:
If anybody could do it, an omnipotent/omniscient being could.


POWELL:
Let me try to illustrate this even more. God might would have to consider in his mind the existence of every thing in the universe and all planes of existence adding possibly time-variant weighting factors to every one of them to do this calculation perhaps every tiny fraction of a second, every thousandth, millionth, billionth, trillionth, quadrillionth of a second. The enormity of the challenge doesn't seem to bother you, Capn Ochre. Furthermore, God might have to do this for all eternity.

Most people dislike doing simple arithmetic. A minority of people enjoy solving difficult math problems. Nobody likes the repetition of repeating the same problem over and over again. But here, apparently, we have God forced to do that to preserve His Omni-status, doing the exact same calculation every moment of every day for the rest of eternity.

Doesn't that sound like hell to you?

POWELL:
It would be much easier on God if He weren't expected to be an all-good being and so He could produce a universe that was acceptably good rather than being required to produce the absolutely best possible universe in terms of good minus bad at every moment of time, don't you agree?

CAPTAIN OCHRE:
Not really. I don't think that omnipotent power requires means. Would it have been "easier" for an omnipotent being to create one atom rather than a whole universe teeming with atoms? It's only "difficult" if it's not logically possible, afaics.


POWELL:
Interesting.

If it's just as easy for God to create a universe as to create the tiniest part of the universe then what does "power" mean? A horse is said to have more power than a man because it can do the same job (pull the plough from one end of a field to the next) in less time than a man could. Now apparently, you have God able to do every task regardless of the "difficulty" in exactly the same amount of time. He simply wills the thing and it happens, I guess. I'll have to think about this some more.

POWELL:
I like that "practically impossible." All I need is one agreed upon example of unnecessary evil and the argument might be won. One little case of shoplifting that God didn't need to fulfill His purposes.

CAPTAIN OCHRE:
I fail to appreciate your hopeful attitude, though I admire your zest for the task!

If granting free moral agents the opportunity to make multiple decisions for good or ill is one of God's good purposes, how would you find any evil decision by any of God's creatures unnecessary?


POWELL:
Perhaps I can't. I think I need to focus on eliminating free will to maximize the good.

POWELL:
I have been arguing along those lines.

Without free will there would be a lot LOT more good (more saved persons) and a lot less evil (due to free will).

CAPTAIN OCHRE:
Technically there would be far fewer saved persons--what would they have been saved from?


POWELL:
Sin. Hell.

CAPTAIN OCHRE:
Suppose that acts of self-sacrificial heroism are "gooder" than the average good, for the sake of argument. Let's suppose that God created a ringworld populated with billions of ("human"?) automata who go about smelling lovely flowers all day long while the birdies sing.
Where's the opportunity for the greater good of self-sacrificing heroism?


POWELL:
Not there. However, if by not having free will while on their ringworld those automata are assured eternal salvation in heaven, the loss of the good of heroism and other goods which require there be free will would surely be worth the exchange. What is even close to being as good as eternal salvation?

POWELL:
An unresolved question is whether the good that only exists in the presence of free will could shift the balance back in favor of free will. I think I can persuasively argue that no combined good produced by free will can sensibly match the good of eternal salvation minus the (or plus the negative) bad eliminated by removing free will.

CAPTAIN OCHRE:
Persuasively, maybe, but non-fallaciously?
(not a slam, simply an observation that flawed arguments are sometimes effectively persuasive)


POWELL:
An appeal to authority is invalid but it's one of the best arguments there are.

POWELL:
Something that might be argued is that salvation cannot be obtained by sinless beings unless they have achieved sinlessness with free will.

CAPTAIN OCHRE:
There'd be me arguing that.


POWELL:
On what basis? They would never have sinned, so they didn't need repentance or the atonement. God couldn't condemn them to hell because they did no wrong, they did exactly what they forced to do.

POWELL:
My rebuttal?

CAPTAIN OCHRE:
I have some uncertainty as to what you're rebutting below.


POWELL:
I didn't make it as clear as I should have. I'm rebutting the claim that salvation cannot be obtained by sinless beings unless they have achieved sinlessness with free will.

The question is whether "cannot" means logically impossible, physically impossible for God, or merely contrary to God's wishes.

POWELL:
Do you mean not logically possible or it's logically possible, but too difficult for God or God just won't allow it or something else? If it's logically impossible I would want to see the arguments for that. If it's because God could logically, but He's too weak, then He must not be all-powerful. If He won't allow it then He must not be all-good.

CAPTAIN OCHRE:
I assume you're referring to my suggestion that free will itself provides the justification for unnecessary (iow otherwise unjustified) evil.


POWELL:
No. I'm rebutting the statement that "salvation cannot be obtained by sinless beings unless they have achieved sinlessness with free will."

CAPTAIN OCHRE:
It is logically impossible for automata to act in a heroic or noble manner, since automata are not responsible for their own actions.

Freedom is necessary for the greater goods of heroism and responsibility (the latter is one of the G of E mandates for Adam and Eve). I would go so far as to suggest that perhaps the most significant aspect of the "likeness of God" is the fact that man was given responsibility over the world. Responsibility is meaningless without consequences for action. If I hit little Billy in the head with a baseball bat, and Luvvy Duvvy Gawd makes it so that the blow does not affect the lad at all (not even the fear of being attacked lingers thanks to LDG!), for example, then what type of responsibility is possible for me?


POWELL:
None. Beings without free will can't be blamed for their actions.

CAPTAIN OCHRE:
That particular bicycle has unremovable chariot-sized training wheels and a seat belt (as well as guidance system that prevents me from going astray, and momentum controls that keep me moving at the right speed). Looky! I can ride a bike!


POWELL:
My argument seems to need it to be possible for beings without free will to be able to gain eternal salvation and it needs eternal salvation to be much more valuable (have a much larger weighting factor assigned to it) than the sum of all good that requires the use of free will minus the evil that would be removed by not having free will.

John Powell

[dizzle]

You guys might be interested in a debate that just started in our one on one area in the gym...


the debate is here:

http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?postid=28219#post28219

Spectator commentary is welcome here:

http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?postid=28220#post28220

[BrianB]

Re: Post 28714

Capt. Ochre,

Thanks for the comments. When I read John's original post I took "unnecessary evil" meaning "not needed in order to accomplish God's goals" which would be the same as your use of "unjustified." The claim boils down to:

"God didn't need to allow [some specific evil or a group of evils] to occur in order to accomplish his goals."

which begs the question:
"How did you acquire the ability to see what evils God should and should not allow?"

I think this would be what you describe as the 'practically impossible position' of judging God's actions with respect to evil.

Regards,
Brian

[BrianB]

Re: Post 28753

Hi again John,

You said:
---begin quote---
POWELL:
Are you sure I didn't give any arguments in support, Brian?
---end quote---

Well, I have to admit that I haven't read through everything that you've posted, only the first article and the content of your responses to me. If you provided support for #4 (the assertion in dispute) somewhere else, then I probably missed it. If this is so, could you please copy-and-paste what you consider to be your argument in support of premise #4 so that I can evaluate it? Thanks.

---begin quote---
POWELL:
Yes, you CAN and you MAY deny it Brian, but would you be JUSTIFIED in denying it without supporting your assertion? This is how I understood you were using the dictum.
---end quote---

You understood exactly right. I am justified in denying it without supporting my denial. That's exactly how "what is gratuitously..." works.

---begin quote---
Who told you, Brian, that the dictum "what is gratuitously asserted may be gratuitously denied" means that one is justified to not believe under those conditions? Who told you that the person making an assertion has all the burden to prove it, but someone denying that assertion has no burden to prove their denial?
---end quote---

These are standard assumptions that people who want to have rational discussions bring to the table. If you want to dispute these you can go ahead with someone else, but I am not interested in defending what is accepted by just about everyone as standard fare in presenting arguments. I assumed in this discussion that you were going to abide by the normal rules of argumentation and not 'go maverick' against how everyone else argues. Might as well run around waving your arms challenging me to 'prove' the law of non-contradiction.

You ask what I expect of you? What I expect, if you really want _serious_ discussions here, is that you will abide by the same rules everyone else does. If you want to argue about these accepted rules of argumentation, you can do that with someone else.

Regards,
Brian

[John Powell]

BRIANB:

Hi again John,


POWELL:
Hi again, BrianB.

BRIANB:
You said:

POWELL:
Are you sure I didn't give any arguments in support, Brian?

BRIANB:
Well, I have to admit that I haven't read through everything that you've posted, only the first article and the content of your responses to me. If you provided support for #4 (the assertion in dispute) somewhere else, then I probably missed it. If this is so, could you please copy-and-paste what you consider to be your argument in support of premise #4 so that I can evaluate it? Thanks.


POWELL:
Well, Brian, what about the first post in the thread?

THEIST:
I deny premise 4. There is no unnecessary evil.

ATHEIST:
Are you claiming this for certain or do you mean that there very probably is no case anywhere in the universe ever of unnecessary evil? If you're making the extraordinary claim that there is absolutely or very probably no case of unnecessary evil anywhere in the universe ever in all eternity then shouldn't you defend that?

Are you saying that I can't do an unnecessary evil right now if I wanted to? Are you saying that if I chose to do an evil thing right now then it must have be a necessary evil? What if I were to choose not to do that necessary evil thing? Would this frustrate the will of God because He wanted me to do that evil thing because it was a necessary evil? How can a merely finite being hope to frustrate the will of an OmniGod?

Isn't the more logical conclusion that, because of our free will to do or not do evil, that there is very probably at least one case of unnecessary evil and, therefore, it's highly unlikely that God is an Omnibeing?


POWELL:
Can't these comments by ATHEIST be considered "arguments in support" of premise 4?

POWELL:
Yes, you CAN and you MAY deny it Brian, but would you be JUSTIFIED in denying it without supporting your assertion? This is how I understood you were using the dictum.

BRIANB:
You understood exactly right. I am justified in denying it without supporting my denial. That's exactly how "what is gratuitously..." works.


POWELL:
But, Brian, the dictum says "can be." That does NOT necessarily imply "can justifiably." You're assuming this dictum is correct. Don't you feel any obligation to justify it or am I justified in denying it since you offer it gratuitously without sufficient support?

POWELL:
Who told you, Brian, that the dictum "what is gratuitously asserted may be gratuitously denied" means that one is justified to not believe under those conditions? Who told you that the person making an assertion has all the burden to prove it, but someone denying that assertion has no burden to prove their denial?

BRIANB:
These are standard assumptions that people who want to have rational discussions bring to the table.


POWELL:
Isn't that an appeal to custom or an appeal to authority, BrianB? Don't you feel any need to support your assertions? I think you have accepted exaggerated dictums as true.

BRIANB:
If you want to dispute these you can go ahead with someone else, but I am not interested in defending what is accepted by just about everyone as standard fare in presenting arguments.


POWELL:
I see, I think. Since you believe this dictum IS WIDELY ACCEPTED that, therefore, YOU DON'T HAVE THE FULL BURDEN OF PROOF to defend it, but, on the contrary, I HAVE MOST OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF to rebut it, if I disagree. Is that what you're suggesting, BrianB? Isn't this my position on what the burden of proof principle really means?

BRIANB:
I assumed in this discussion that you were going to abide by the normal rules of argumentation and not 'go maverick' against how everyone else argues.


POWELL:
I think you're the one misunderstanding what the "normal rules of argumentation are," BrianB. Despite what sloppy-writing people have told you, it's not that the claimant has absolutely 100% of the burden of proof and the critic absolutely zero burden of proof and can justifiably reply to every one of their assertions, well-supported or otherwise, with "denied" without further support. I think people have exaggerated it to you and you have believed them without requiring them to defend their exaggerated claims. You gratuitously assert it to me without sufficient support and then expect me to prove to you my assertions. That's well, hypocritical, don't you think?

BRIANB:
Might as well run around waving your arms challenging me to 'prove' the law of non-contradiction.


POWELL:
Don't tempt me. Have you ever heard of dialetheism?

BRIANB:
You ask what I expect of you? What I expect, if you really want _serious_ discussions here, is that you will abide by the same rules everyone else does. If you want to argue about these accepted rules of argumentation, you can do that with someone else.

Regards,
Brian


POWELL:
Appeal to force. If I don't accept your unsupported assertion concerning who has the burden of proof and that "can" in the "gratuitious" dictum must mean "justifiably can" and how well-accepted these views are among people who have serious discussions then something bad will happen to me. You will call me bad names like "not serious" and refuse to discuss things with me. If, on the other hand, I accept your unsupported assertions on these matters merely on your say-so then you will call me nice names like "serious" and discuss things with me.

Interesting.

John Powell

[Captain Ochre]

03-07-2003 @ 11:23 AM
John Powell:

POWELL:
Comments to Ochre.
POWELL:
Bummer.


(John is bummed by the prospect having 100% of the BoP at times).
Cuts down on frivolous claims taking up serious debate time.


POWELL:
If the critic won't support his denial, Capn Ochre, why should anyone accept it to be justified?


Denial of an argument by assertion doesn't need to be justified. The denial is just a shorthand way of saying that you haven't really provided an argument (argument by assertion is an argument only in a loose sense).
Likewise, using controversial premisses is not the way to bring others over to your pov.


Merely because he voiced it? Wouldn't this be an argument by assertion?


Yes, merely because he voiced it if a controversial premise or an argument by assertion is involved. You're trying to convince your opponent, remember? He doesn't need to convince you of anything; it is his belief that is at issue (in that you are trying to change it).
Yes, it's argument by assertion, and you are not bound to believe what he tells you any more than he is bound to believe the argument by assertion that he is (I suppose) responding to.
You're trying to convince him of something, remember?


POWELL:
So, Capn Ochre, you're saying that the critic DOES HAVE BURDEN OF PROOF to support his denial. That's what I'm trying to explain to Brian.


Not quite. If he asserts that you're arguing by assertion, or asserts that he does not accept a given premise, it's up to you to either develop an argument that has adequate support, or that has acceptable premisses.


POWELL:
If in formal debate both sides are expected to defend their positions if they intend to persuade their listeners, Capn Ochre, why wouldn't that be true in informal debates?


Occasionally it is true of informal debate. To make it the standard rule of informal debate would give a serious advantage to question-begging types ("prove i'm begging the question!" "prove it's a straw man!" etcetera). Formal debates are formal debates precisely because both sides agree to bear their burdens of proof. Otherwise it falls to the positive claimant.


Are informal debaters usually unconcerned whether their arguments or rejections of arguments persuade anyone?


If somebody asserts that somebody else has argued by assertion, I'm well-capable of verifying the claim. The respondent would have done enough to convince me. His burden is light; the burden of the positive claimant is heavy.


POWELL:
Perhaps the shared burden of proof balance between the original claimant and the critic might vary depending upon certain factors. Whether the claim was in line with accepted wisdom or not could be just such a factor.


Agreed.


POWELL:
I would say that the burden of proof for that debate was by far on the claimant. Let's say 99% claimant, 1% critic.


Maybe less than that on the critic. :wink:


If, however, the debate was

&quot;Japan still exists.&quot;
&quot;No it doesn't.&quot;

Then the burden of proof would shift almost entirely the other way, wouldn't you agree?


Not at all. Consider:
Why is the positive claimant pressing a claim that Japan exists? If he knows that his audience doesn't believe it, then he has two options:
1) If they believe that Japan no longer exists and they expect him to believe it, then he can rightly rest from his BoP and let them prove that Japan doesn't exist.
2) If they believe that Japan doesn't exist and they don't care whether or not he agrees with them, then the argument is over unless he wishes to convince them that they are wrong about the nonexistence of Japan. He carries the burden in that instance.
You can't give a BoP to somebody who doesn't want to convince the other party that his view is right.
When the issue is the validity of a given argument, the critic doesn't even have to take a position other than finding flaws in the positive claimant's argument. His only BoP is to point out such flaws.


In other words, the burden of proof is ALWAYS shared between the claimant and the critic, but how much burden is upon each depends on a number of factors, including how close the claim is to being in line with what the typical listeners to the debate would believe.


Not at all, John. An informal debate participant can merely state that he doesn't accept your argument, and it fails the test of persuasiveness (I intend to make use of your preference for utility over substance!). The content doesn't even matter in such a case.

[John Powell]

POWELL:
Comments to Capn Ochre with some references to BrianB.

I DON'T ACCEPT YOUR ARGUMENT, CAPN OCHRE. :wink:

There, your argument has failed to be persuasively useful and I have no burden of proof to justify my rejection.

More seriously, because I think I do have some burden of proof, let's continue.

POWELL:
Bummer.

CAPN OCHRE:
(John is bummed by the prospect having 100% of the BoP at times). Cuts down on frivolous claims taking up serious debate time.


POWELL:
Sort of. I was bummed that you apparently didn't agree with me. It now appears to me that you agree with me more than it might appear to the readers.

POWELL:
If the critic won't support his denial, Capn Ochre, why should anyone accept it to be justified?

CAPN OCHRE:
Denial of an argument by assertion doesn't need to be justified.


POWELL:
If the claimant and the critic and the readers all essentially agree concerning argument by assertion, then yes, no justification beyond something like the mere statement "This is an argument by assertion" would be required. However, in other cases, I think more might be required to justify the criticism. For example, if a person asks "What does 'argument by assertion' mean? Can you supply a link to an authoritative website of fallacies?" If the critic refuses to answer those two questions then to some readers he will not have sufficiently supported his criticism, so the original assertion remains somewhat intact.

CAPN OCHRE:
The denial is just a shorthand way of saying that you haven't really provided an argument (argument by assertion is an argument only in a loose sense).


POWELL:
That parenthetical comment is something to agree upon. :yipee:

CAPN OCHRE:
Likewise, using controversial premisses is not the way to bring others over to your pov.


POWELL:
Ok.

POWELL:
Merely because he voiced it? Wouldn't this be an argument by assertion?

CAPN OCHRE:
Yes, merely because he voiced it if a controversial premise or an argument by assertion is involved. You're trying to convince your opponent, remember? He doesn't need to convince you of anything; it is his belief that is at issue (in that you are trying to change it).

Yes, it's argument by assertion, and you are not bound to believe what he tells you any more than he is bound to believe the argument by assertion that he is (I suppose) responding to.

You're trying to convince him of something, remember?


POWELL:
Doesn't this go both ways? When the critic criticizes the argument, wouldn't that indicate an effort by him to persuade the original claimant that she is wrong?

POWELL:
So, Capn Ochre, you're saying that the critic DOES HAVE BURDEN OF PROOF to support his denial. That's what I'm trying to explain to Brian.

CAPN OCHRE:
Not quite.


POWELL:
Bummer. It looks like we're so close to agreement and then you say things like this. :bawl:

CAPN OCHRE:
If he asserts that you're arguing by assertion, or asserts that he does not accept a given premise, it's up to you to either develop an argument that has adequate support, or that has acceptable premisses.


POWELL:
Yes, to persuade her critic. However, for the critic to persuade the original claimant, he might need to elaborate on what he finds unacceptable.

POWELL:
If in formal debate both sides are expected to defend their positions if they intend to persuade their listeners, Capn Ochre, why wouldn't that be true in informal debates?

CAPN OCHRE:
Occasionally it is true of informal debate. To make it the standard rule of informal debate would give a serious advantage to question-begging types ("prove i'm begging the question!" "prove it's a straw man!" etcetera).


POWELL:
EXACTLY! Why should the claimant accept that she has used a fallacious argument if her critic refuses to support his assertion that she has? It is incumbent upon those two to agree what question begging is, what a straw man is and how unacceptable they are in the course of their debate or she is justified, I think, in requiring her critic to support his criticisms on those counts.

A good example of this problem is the appeal to authority / argumentum ad verecundiam. The very definition of "this" fallacy is controversial. This is an invalid argument regardless whether the source is speaking seriously on a non-controversial subject he is an expert authority in or not, but it is probably more persuasively effective than any other argument. I have seen too many cases where one debater will tell the other their argument is invalid because it's an appeal to authority, but then will shamelessly use appeals to authority in their own arguments.

CAPN OCHRE:
Formal debates are formal debates precisely because both sides agree to bear their burdens of proof. Otherwise it falls to the positive claimant.


POWELL:
I would agree if you mean that the burden falls more on the positive claimant, how much more depending on the acceptability of the claim. An outrageous claim would put a heavier burden on the claimant than a nearly universally accepted claim.

POWELL:
Are informal debaters usually unconcerned whether their arguments or rejections of arguments persuade anyone?

CAPN OCHRE:
If somebody asserts that somebody else has argued by assertion, I'm well-capable of verifying the claim. The respondent would have done enough to convince me. His burden is light; the burden of the positive claimant is heavy.


POWELL:
YES! :yipee:

Thank you for using relative terms like "heavy" and "light" rather than absolute terms like "all" and "none."

That's what I'm trying to persuade BRIANB to accept. I'm not trying to say I have very little burden to prove my assertions, only that there is some burden on the critic, however small that burden might be.

POWELL:
Perhaps the shared burden of proof balance between the original claimant and the critic might vary depending upon certain factors. Whether the claim was in line with accepted wisdom or not could be just such a factor.

CAPN OCHRE:
Agreed.


POWELL:
YES! :yipee:

POWELL:
I would say that the burden of proof for that debate was by far on the claimant. Let's say 99% claimant, 1% critic.

CAPN OCHRE:
Maybe less than that on the critic.


POWELL:
Fine. We can disagree about the balance. What I want here is agreement about the principle.

POWELL:
If, however, the debate was

"Japan still exists."
"No it doesn't."

Then the burden of proof would shift almost entirely the other way, wouldn't you agree?

CAPN OCHRE:
Not at all. Consider:
Why is the positive claimant pressing a claim that Japan exists?


POWELL:
Perhaps as a joke. “Hey, what do you say we visit Japan? Well, that’s assuming Japan still exists, ha ha.” Then she’s shocked when a person nearby replies, “But Japan doesn’t exist anymore.”

CAPN OCHRE:
If he knows that his audience doesn't believe it, then he has two options:
1) If they believe that Japan no longer exists and they expect him to believe it, then he can rightly rest from his BoP and let them prove that Japan doesn't exist.
2) If they believe that Japan doesn't exist and they don't care whether or not he agrees with them, then the argument is over unless he wishes to convince them that they are wrong about the nonexistence of Japan. He carries the burden in that instance.
You can't give a BoP to somebody who doesn't want to convince the other party that his view is right.


POWELL:
If that’s true then haven’t you just said that in some cases (specifically where the claimant doesn’t want to convince the other party) the positive claimant has no burden of proof? In other words, if a critic were to say “You claimed that. You prove it.” I could justifiably reply “I don’t care to convince you at this time, so I have no burden of proof at this time.”

I was assuming this argument was in a normal audience that believed Japan still exists with the critic being one of the rare ones.

CAPN OCHRE:
When the issue is the validity of a given argument, the critic doesn't even have to take a position other than finding flaws in the positive claimant's argument. His only BoP is to point out such flaws.


POWELL:
Yes, if persuasion is not his goal. However, if he wants to persuade the claimant he might need to do more than just point out the flaws in her argument. He might need to offer revisions to the argument, for example.

POWELL:
In other words, the burden of proof is ALWAYS shared between the claimant and the critic, but how much burden is upon each depends on a number of factors, including how close the claim is to being in line with what the typical listeners to the debate would believe.

CAPN OCHRE:
Not at all, John.


POWELL:
Argh! I thought we were agreeing!:bawl:

CAPN OCHRE:
An informal debate participant can merely state that he doesn't accept your argument, and it fails the test of persuasiveness (I intend to make use of your preference for utility over substance!). The content doesn't even matter in such a case.


POWELL:
In that case the critic may have failed to persuade the original claimant that there's a problem with her argument.

John Powell

[BrianB]

Re:
http://theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?postid=38546#post38546

Hi John,

This is my final post to you, as you are unwilling to be rational about your discussions. For that reason it is simply not worth my time to engage you. Hopefully after you've read some introductory texts on logic and argumentation you'll be more prepared to bring _real_ arguments to the table and not just assertions. I know you don’t like the fact that we’re not going to take a burden of disproof for your unsupported assertions, but tantrums will get you nowhere.

The thing that really cracks me up is your displays of this type of thinking:

---begin quote---
BRIANB:
Might as well run around waving your arms challenging me to 'prove' the law of non-contradiction.

POWELL:
Don't tempt me. Have you ever heard of dialetheism?
---begin quote---

If I knew you were going to be so absurd I would have written you off from the beginning. Other Christians may find some edification in running around in circles with you, but it's a waste of my time that could be better spent on other things. Anyway, hopefully you'll eventually gain enough wisdom to engage Christian theists in real discussions. [1]

Regards,
Brian

[1] For those interested, dialetheism is described here:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/dialetheism/
though there are some flaws in the arguments against the LNC

[John Powell]

BRIANB:
Hi John,

This is my final post to you, as you are unwilling to be rational about your discussions. . .


POWELL:
I'll try to respect that, BrianB, by avoiding in the future, where appropriate, references to your discussion on the burden of proof so it doesn't look like I'm trying to take advantage of your gag promise by kicking you when you won't defend yourself.

If / when you repent of this overly condescending and prideful attitude then feel free to re-engage me in conversation. I think you'll find that I forgive fairly easily.

Until then, good luck and goodby. :hi:

John Powell
A nice guy, but hard to budge when he thinks he's right.

[Captain Ochre]

POWELL:
Comments to Capn Ochre with some references to BrianB.

I DON'T ACCEPT YOUR ARGUMENT, CAPN OCHRE.


That is your prerogative. "Coercive proof" isn't necessarily literally coercive. Ever heard of the fallacy of invincible ignorance?
:smile:


There, your argument has failed to be persuasively useful and I have no burden of proof to justify my rejection.


Correct.


More seriously, because I think I do have some burden of proof, let's continue.


You have burden of proof only to the extent that you want me to understand why you reject my explanation.
I'm pushing the red line already, so brace yourself for some possibly less-than-discriminate editing.



POWELL:
If the critic won't support his denial, Capn Ochre, why should anyone accept it to be justified?


It might be self-evident, or at least readily apparent. Alternatively, it might simply be apparent that the positive claimant isn't bearing his rightful BoP. Remember that respondent doesn't necessarily care what anybody else thinks.


POWELL:
If the claimant and the critic and the readers all essentially agree concerning argument by assertion, then yes, no justification beyond something like the mere statement "This is an argument by assertion" would be required. However, in other cases, I think more might be required to justify the criticism. For example, if a person asks "What does 'argument by assertion' mean? Can you supply a link to an authoritative website of fallacies?" If the critic refuses to answer those two questions then to some readers he will not have sufficiently supported his criticism, so the original assertion remains somewhat intact.


No, the original assertion remains a bald, unsupported assertion. That somebody might take the assertion at face value doesn't make it a reasoned presentation (developed argument).


POWELL:
Doesn't this go both ways? When the critic criticizes the argument, wouldn't that indicate an effort by him to persuade the original claimant that she is wrong?


Not at all, and this is important:
It is quite possible (even appropriate) to criticize the presentation of an argument even if the critic agrees with the conclusion.


POWELL:
So, Capn Ochre, you're saying that the critic DOES HAVE BURDEN OF PROOF to support his denial. That's what I'm trying to explain to Brian.

CAPN OCHRE:
Not quite.


To clarify, the critic has zero BoP to support his denial. All BoP for the critic is volunatary, in proportion to the degree to which he expects others to accept his statements.
There is no need to support an offering of opinion, for example. It goes without saying that the proffering of an opinion does, in fact, represent the opinion of the person giving it.


POWELL:
Yes, to persuade her critic. However, for the critic to persuade the original claimant, he might need to elaborate on what he finds unacceptable.


That's true, but it is not incumbent on the critic to change the mind of the original claimant. The primary message that the critic might offer is "You haven't convinced me". Since the original claimant is the guy who is out to change opinion, it remains up to him to revise his argument (or the presentation thereof) to make it attractive to the audience.


POWELL:
EXACTLY! Why should the claimant accept that she has used a fallacious argument if her critic refuses to support his assertion that she has?


The OC (Original Claimant) need not accept the assertion that his argument is fallacious. In fact, the OC might be able to clear his argument from that charge by appeal to definitions, and by clarifying the argument in contradistinction to the alleged fallacy.
Wasn't it nice of the critic to provide a reason why he didn't accept the original claim? He didn't even have to do that!
:smile:


It is incumbent upon those two to agree what question begging is, what a straw man is and how unacceptable they are in the course of their debate or she is justified, I think, in requiring her critic to support his criticisms on those counts.


No, it is the OC's duty to investigate the validity of the criticism (sometimes that doesn't take long at all). If, upon investigation, the OC doesn't understand how the criticism is valid, then it is perfectly appropriate to ask the critic to explain in light of accepted definitions and the like.
The OC can ask the critic to bear a BoP, but with respect to the OC, the critic bears no BoP.


A good example of this problem is the appeal to authority / argumentum ad verecundiam. The very definition of "this" fallacy is controversial. This is an invalid argument regardless whether the source is speaking seriously on a non-controversial subject he is an expert authority in or not,


In my experience, it isn't considered a fallacy unless the expert is outside his area of expertise ("I'm not a doctor, but I play one on TV").


That's what I'm trying to persuade BRIANB to accept. I'm not trying to say I have very little burden to prove my assertions, only that there is some burden on the critic, however small that burden might be.


All of the burdens on the critic are voluntary, if it's not a formal debate. He has every right to expect you to bear sole BoP for a proposition that you expect him to accept.
OTOH, maybe you won't be interested in convincing somebody who won't assist in helping you understand his objections.
:smile:


POWELL:
If, however, the debate was

"Japan still exists."
"No it doesn't."

Then the burden of proof would shift almost entirely the other way, wouldn't you agree?

CAPN OCHRE:
Not at all. Consider:
Why is the positive claimant pressing a claim that Japan exists?

POWELL:
Perhaps as a joke. “Hey, what do you say we visit Japan? Well, that’s assuming Japan still exists, ha ha.” Then she’s shocked when a person nearby replies, “But Japan doesn’t exist anymore.


Do you want to convince that person that Japan still exists, or not? If you don't, then you don't bear a BoP.
I think that you ducked the issue a bit with your example.


CAPN OCHRE:
If he knows that his audience doesn't believe it, then he has two options:
1) If they believe that Japan no longer exists and they expect him to believe it, then he can rightly rest from his BoP and let them prove that Japan doesn't exist.
2) If they believe that Japan doesn't exist and they don't care whether or not he agrees with them, then the argument is over unless he wishes to convince them that they are wrong about the nonexistence of Japan. He carries the burden in that instance.
You can't give a BoP to somebody who doesn't want to convince the other party that his view is right.

POWELL:
If that’s true then haven’t you just said that in some cases (specifically where the claimant doesn’t want to convince the other party) the positive claimant has no burden of proof? In other words, if a critic were to say “You claimed that. You prove it.” I could justifiably reply “I don’t care to convince you at this time, so I have no burden of proof at this time.”


Exactly. That's an excellent way to deodorize a red herring, btw. In fact, you would have noticed me doing that, more or less, in response to doogie when he (don't recollect the gender, actually) pressed me to prove that the future exists.


I was assuming this argument was in a normal audience that believed Japan still exists with the critic being one of the rare ones.


Sorry, I should have realized that--but why are you telling an audience that believes that Japan exists that Japan exists? This isn't a case of argument by assertion on your part. You just happened to state conventional wisdom, afaics, and a critic took issue with that. If that critic wants to convince anybody that Japan doesn't exist, then he bears the BoP. Since your audience accepts what you say, you are free to ignore the critic unless you take it on yourself to convince him that you are right. Then, you bear the BoP for establishing the current existence of Japan.


CAPN OCHRE:
When the issue is the validity of a given argument, the critic doesn't even have to take a position other than finding flaws in the positive claimant's argument. His only BoP is to point out such flaws.

POWELL:
Yes, if persuasion is not his goal. However, if he wants to persuade the claimant he might need to do more than just point out the flaws in her argument. He might need to offer revisions to the argument, for example.


The key word is "if". The critic's BoP is optional and voluntary. Assuming that you're out to change his mind, your BoP is mandatory.


POWELL:
In other words, the burden of proof is ALWAYS shared between the claimant and the critic, but how much burden is upon each depends on a number of factors, including how close the claim is to being in line with what the typical listeners to the debate would believe.

CAPN OCHRE:
Not at all, John.

POWELL:
Argh! I thought we were agreeing!


I think that we do agree, except that you wish to find a mandatory BoP for the critic.
As you have noted, the critic has a BoP if he wants to convince you of something.


CAPN OCHRE:
An informal debate participant can merely state that he doesn't accept your argument, and it fails the test of persuasiveness (I intend to make use of your preference for utility over substance!). The content doesn't even matter in such a case.

POWELL:
In that case the critic may have failed to persuade the original claimant that there's a problem with her argument.


I would have to disagree, with respect to the fact that the goal of the argument (changing the mind of the critic) was not achieved. That is an obvious problem with the argument, even if the argument is sound.
You may not care what one critic thinks, otoh, if the rest of the audience is going along with your argument.

[John Powell]

POWELL:
To Capn Ochre.

It appears that you are saying that burden of proof is upon the person who wishes to persuade the other person or the audience. If a person does not wish to persuade others then he has no burden of proof.

In that case, I would expect the critic to say nothing in response to her claim other than an indication that he heard her. If he criticizes her claim this strongly indicates that he has some interest in persuading her or others listening. Otherwise, why communicate anything in criticism?

I would think that if both parties wish to persuade the other that they share some burden of proof. The original claimant (OC), evidently, bears the lion share of the burden if it's something that is not widely accepted, but only the fly's share if it is widely accepted. The critic shares little burden to defend his criticism even if he wants to persuade the OC unless his criticism is not widely accepted and her claim is.

Perhaps I should interprete replies like "You asserted that. Now support it. I have no burden of proof to support my criticism." as saying "If you want to persuade me then you'll have to take the full burden of proof because I don't care in the least if I persuade you or anyone else at this time to my way of thinking. My purpose in communicating this to you is to persuade you to try harder to persuade me or give it up."

POWELL:
I DON'T ACCEPT YOUR ARGUMENT, CAPN OCHRE.

CAPN OCHRE:
That is your prerogative. "Coercive proof" isn't necessarily literally coercive. Ever heard of the fallacy of invincible ignorance?


POWELL:
No, but I think I know what you mean.

POWELL:
There, your argument has failed to be persuasively useful and I have no burden of proof to justify my rejection.

CAPN OCHRE:
Correct.

POWELL:
More seriously, because I think I do have some burden of proof, let's continue.

CAPN OCHRE:
You have burden of proof only to the extent that you want me to understand why you reject my explanation.

I'm pushing the red line already, so brace yourself for some possibly less-than-discriminate editing.


POWELL:
I'm ready.

POWELL:
If the critic won't support his denial, Capn Ochre, why should anyone accept it to be justified?

CAPN OCHRE:
It might be self-evident, or at least readily apparent. Alternatively, it might simply be apparent that the positive claimant isn't bearing his rightful BoP. Remember that respondent doesn't necessarily care what anybody else thinks.

POWELL:
If the claimant and the critic and the readers all essentially agree concerning argument by assertion, then yes, no justification beyond something like the mere statement "This is an argument by assertion" would be required. However, in other cases, I think more might be required to justify the criticism. For example, if a person asks "What does 'argument by assertion' mean? Can you supply a link to an authoritative website of fallacies?" If the critic refuses to answer those two questions then to some readers he will not have sufficiently supported his criticism, so the original assertion remains somewhat intact.

CAPN OCHRE:
No, the original assertion remains a bald, unsupported assertion. That somebody might take the assertion at face value doesn't make it a reasoned presentation (developed argument).

POWELL:
Doesn't this go both ways? When the critic criticizes the argument, wouldn't that indicate an effort by him to persuade the original claimant that she is wrong?

CAPN OCHRE:
Not at all, and this is important:
It is quite possible (even appropriate) to criticize the presentation of an argument even if the critic agrees with the conclusion.


POWELL:
Ok.

POWELL:
So, Capn Ochre, you're saying that the critic DOES HAVE BURDEN OF PROOF to support his denial. That's what I'm trying to explain to Brian.

CAPN OCHRE:
Not quite.

POWELL:
<snipped>

CAPN OCHRE:
To clarify, the critic has zero BoP to support his denial. All BoP for the critic is volunatary, in proportion to the degree to which he expects others to accept his statements.

There is no need to support an offering of opinion, for example. It goes without saying that the proffering of an opinion does, in fact, represent the opinion of the person giving it.


POWELL:
Ok.

POWELL:
Yes, to persuade her critic. However, for the critic to persuade the original claimant, he might need to elaborate on what he finds unacceptable.

CAPN OCHRE:
That's true, but it is not incumbent on the critic to change the mind of the original claimant. The primary message that the critic might offer is "You haven't convinced me". Since the original claimant is the guy who is out to change opinion, it remains up to him to revise his argument (or the presentation thereof) to make it attractive to the audience.


POWELL:
Then why communicate the criticism if it isn't to persuade?

POWELL:
EXACTLY! Why should the claimant accept that she has used a fallacious argument if her critic refuses to support his assertion that she has?

CAPN OCHRE:
The OC (Original Claimant) need not accept the assertion that his argument is fallacious. In fact, the OC might be able to clear his argument from that charge by appeal to definitions, and by clarifying the argument in contradistinction to the alleged fallacy.
Wasn't it nice of the critic to provide a reason why he didn't accept the original claim? He didn't even have to do that!


POWELL:
The original claimant doesn't have to support her bald assertion either, unless she wants to persuade.

POWELL:
It is incumbent upon those two to agree what question begging is, what a straw man is and how unacceptable they are in the course of their debate or she is justified, I think, in requiring her critic to support his criticisms on those counts.

CAPN OCHRE:
No, it is the OC's duty to investigate the validity of the criticism (sometimes that doesn't take long at all). If, upon investigation, the OC doesn't understand how the criticism is valid, then it is perfectly appropriate to ask the critic to explain in light of accepted definitions and the like.

The OC can ask the critic to bear a BoP, but with respect to the OC, the critic bears no BoP.


POWELL:
So, the critic DOES BEAR a BoP with respect to his criticism if persuasion is his goal. That's what I'm trying to agree with.

<snipped appeal to authority comments>

POWELL:
That's what I'm trying to persuade BRIANB to accept. I'm not trying to say I have very little burden to prove my assertions, only that there is some burden on the critic, however small that burden might be.

CAPN OCHRE:
All of the burdens on the critic are voluntary, if it's not a formal debate. He has every right to expect you to bear sole BoP for a proposition that you expect him to accept.

OTOH, maybe you won't be interested in convincing somebody who won't assist in helping you understand his objections.


POWELL:
Right.

POWELL:
If, however, the debate was

"Japan still exists."
"No it doesn't."

Then the burden of proof would shift almost entirely the other way, wouldn't you agree?

CAPN OCHRE:
Not at all. Consider:
Why is the positive claimant pressing a claim that Japan exists?

POWELL:
Perhaps as a joke. "Hey, what do you say we visit Japan? Well, that’s assuming Japan still exists, ha ha." Then she’s shocked when a person nearby replies, "But Japan doesn’t exist anymore."

CAPN OCHRE:
Do you want to convince that person that Japan still exists, or not? If you don't, then you don't bear a BoP.

I think that you ducked the issue a bit with your example.


POWELL:
I'm not perfect, but I try hard not to duck issues. If you phrase it as a question that will make it harder for me to duck.

CAPN OCHRE:
If he knows that his audience doesn't believe it, then he has two options: . . .
1.
2.
You can't give a BoP to somebody who doesn't want to convince the other party that his view is right.

POWELL:
If that’s true then haven’t you just said that in some cases (specifically where the claimant doesn’t want to convince the other party) the positive claimant has no burden of proof? In other words, if a critic were to say "You claimed that. You prove it." I could justifiably reply "I don’t care to convince you at this time, so I have no burden of proof at this time."

CAPN OCHRE:
Exactly. That's an excellent way to deodorize a red herring, btw. In fact, you would have noticed me doing that, more or less, in response to doogie when he (don't recollect the gender, actually) pressed me to prove that the future exists.


POWELL:
You were exercising your free will, but I wish you had chosen otherwise.

POWELL:
I was assuming this argument was in a normal audience that believed Japan still exists with the critic being one of the rare ones.

CAPN OCHRE:
Sorry, I should have realized that--but why are you telling an audience that believes that Japan exists that Japan exists? This isn't a case of argument by assertion on your part. You just happened to state conventional wisdom, afaics, and a critic took issue with that. If that critic wants to convince anybody that Japan doesn't exist, then he bears the BoP.


POWELL:
Exactly. That's the kind of thing I'm trying to agree about.

CAPN OCHRE:
Since your audience accepts what you say, you are free to ignore the critic unless you take it on yourself to convince him that you are right. Then, you bear the BoP for establishing the current existence of Japan.


POWELL:
Ok.

CAPN OCHRE:
When the issue is the validity of a given argument, the critic doesn't even have to take a position other than finding flaws in the positive claimant's argument. His only BoP is to point out such flaws.

POWELL:
Yes, if persuasion is not his goal. However, if he wants to persuade the claimant he might need to do more than just point out the flaws in her argument. He might need to offer revisions to the argument, for example.

CAPN OCHRE:
The key word is "if". The critic's BoP is optional and voluntary. Assuming that you're out to change his mind, your BoP is mandatory.


POWELL:
Right.

POWELL:
In other words, the burden of proof is ALWAYS shared between the claimant and the critic, but how much burden is upon each depends on a number of factors, including how close the claim is to being in line with what the typical listeners to the debate would believe.

CAPN OCHRE:
Not at all, John.

POWELL:
Argh! I thought we were agreeing!

CAPN OCHRE:
I think that we do agree, except that you wish to find a mandatory BoP for the critic.

As you have noted, the critic has a BoP if he wants to convince you of something.


POWELL:
Ok. I should have said the burden of proof is ALWAYS shared between the claimant and the critic IF they both seek to persuade the other. Do you agree?

CAPN OCHRE:
An informal debate participant can merely state that he doesn't accept your argument, and it fails the test of persuasiveness (I intend to make use of your preference for utility over substance!). The content doesn't even matter in such a case.

POWELL:
In that case the critic may have failed to persuade the original claimant that there's a problem with her argument.

CAPN OCHRE:
I would have to disagree, with respect to the fact that the goal of the argument (changing the mind of the critic) was not achieved. That is an obvious problem with the argument, even if the argument is sound.

You may not care what one critic thinks, otoh, if the rest of the audience is going along with your argument.


POWELL:
Yes. If you fail to persuade and persuasion is your goal then that's a problem.

John Powell

[John Powell]

POWELL:
To Capn Ochre on Appeal to Authority.

POWELL:
A good example of this problem is the appeal to authority / argumentum ad verecundiam. The very definition of "this" fallacy is controversial. This is an invalid argument regardless whether the source is speaking seriously on a non-controversial subject he is an expert authority in or not,

CAPN OCHRE:
In my experience, it isn't considered a fallacy unless the expert is outside his area of expertise ("I'm not a doctor, but I play one on TV").


POWELL:
What does argumentum ad verecundiam mean in Latin? Does it mean appeal to non-expert authority?

What do you mean by "fallacy"? Most people equate that with an invalid argument.

Are you suggesting that it's a valid argument to quote the opinion of an expert authority on a subject for which he is an expert authority? In other words, is the following a valid argument?

1. EA is an expert authority on subject S.
2. EA seriously expresses his answer A to question Q.
3. A is a non-controversial answer to question Q in subject S.
4. therefore, A is true.

If it isn't valid, could you revise the syllogism so that the argument is valid?

If you think that quoting the opinion of an expert authority is invalid, but not fallacious, what about argumentum ad populam or quoting the majority opinion of the population? Would those also be invalid, but not fallacious?

I suspect that the philosophical meanings of argumentum ad verecundiam and appeal to authority have changed over the centuries.

John Powell

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 08:53 PM here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=41888#post41888)
John Powell:

POWELL:
To Capn Ochre on Appeal to Authority.

POWELL:
What does argumentum ad verecundiam mean in Latin? Does it mean appeal to non-expert authority?


The meaining in Latin is irrelevant, just as the roots for "lunatic" are irrelevant to its practical application.


What do you mean by &quot;fallacy&quot;? Most people equate that with an invalid argument.


That's acceptable.
Even argumentum ad ignorantiam is non-fallacious in some inductive applications.


Are you suggesting that it's a valid argument to quote the opinion of an expert authority on a subject for which he is an expert authority? In other words, is the following a valid argument?

1. EA is an expert authority on subject S.
2. EA seriously expresses his answer A to question Q.
3. A is a non-controversial answer to question Q in subject S.
4. therefore, A is true.

If it isn't valid, could you revise the syllogism so that the argument is valid?


4. therefore, A is probably true.


If you think that quoting the opinion of an expert authority is invalid, but not fallacious, what about argumentum ad populam or quoting the majority opinion of the population? Would those also be invalid, but not fallacious?


Mu--or something like that. :smile:


I suspect that the philosophical meanings of argumentum ad verecundiam and appeal to authority have changed over the centuries.

That's likely, since "formal" inductive reasoning is a young practice compared to formal deductive reasoning.

[John Powell]

POWELL:
To Capn Ochre.

POWELL:
What does argumentum ad verecundiam mean in Latin? Does it mean appeal to non-expert authority?

CAPN OCHRE:
The meaining in Latin is irrelevant, just as the roots for "lunatic" are irrelevant to its practical application.


POWELL:
Although etymology is usually relevant to definitions, you could be right if you're only concerned with how the term is used today. But, you're probably wrong if you're trying to show that the meaning has changed.

POWELL:
What do you mean by "fallacy"? Most people equate that with an invalid argument.

CAPN OCHRE:
That's acceptable.

Even argumentum ad ignorantiam is non-fallacious in some inductive applications.


POWELL:
I'm interested in that, but you might have misworded things.

My logic text indicates that "valid" and "invalid" only apply to deductive arguments, arguments in which it is claimed there is conclusive grounds for its conclusion. If fallacious is equated with invalid then speaking of "fallacious" or "invalid" inductive arguments is an inappropriate confusion of terms.

POWELL:
Are you suggesting that it's a valid argument to quote the opinion of an expert authority on a subject for which he is an expert authority? In other words, is the following a valid argument?

1. EA is an expert authority on subject S.
2. EA seriously expresses his answer A to question Q.
3. A is a non-controversial answer to question Q in subject S.
4. therefore, A is true.

If it isn't valid, could you revise the syllogism so that the argument is valid?

CAPN OCHRE:
4. therefore, A is probably true.


POWELL:
Excellent.

POWELL:
If you think that quoting the opinion of an expert authority is invalid, but not fallacious, what about argumentum ad populam or quoting the majority opinion of the population? Would those also be invalid, but not fallacious?

CAPN OCHRE:
Mu--or something like that.


POWELL:
Ahem. Who's dodging now? Given your revision to the appeal to authority argument, is the following a valid deductive argument?

1. The vast majority of the world are theists.
2. therefore, theism is probably true. :brow:

POWELL:
I suspect that the philosophical meanings of argumentum ad verecundiam and appeal to authority have changed over the centuries.

CAPN OCHRE:
That's likely, since "formal" inductive reasoning is a young practice compared to formal deductive reasoning.


POWELL:
Right. Deductive reasoning was well developed during Aristotle's time. Inductive reasoning was not well-developed by philosophers and scientists until after Galileo. Right?

John Powell

[Captain Ochre]

03-21-2003 @ 09:39 PM located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=41923#post41923)
John Powell:

POWELL:
To Capn Ochre.

POWELL:
Although etymology is usually relevant to definitions, you could be right if you're only concerned with how the term is used today. But, you're probably wrong if you're trying to show that the meaning has changed.


If it is used differently, then the meaning has changed.
You must be talking about the manner in which it is translated?


POWELL:
I'm interested in that, but you might have misworded things.

My logic text indicates that &quot;valid&quot; and &quot;invalid&quot; only apply to deductive arguments, arguments in which it is claimed there is conclusive grounds for its conclusion. If fallacious is equated with invalid then speaking of &quot;fallacious&quot; or &quot;invalid&quot; inductive arguments is an inappropriate confusion of terms.


We'll be more careful, then. :smile:
http://www.philosophyclass.com/logic.htm
http://www.pc.cc.ca.us/psimons/Speechp101/fallacies%20link.htm


POWELL:
Ahem. Who's dodging now? Given your revision to the appeal to authority argument, is the following a valid deductive argument?

1. The vast majority of the world are theists.
2. therefore, theism is probably true. :brow:


As soon as we change the conclusion to one that is not definitely resting on the premisses ("probably") we no longer have a deductive argument.
Insofar as Captain Ochre doesn't see any necessity to get bogged down in the minutiae of logic, yes I'm dodging.

[Sher]

03-07-2003 @ 02:16 AM located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=29076#post29076)
Captain Ochre:

I would go so far as to suggest that perhaps the most significant aspect of the &quot;likeness of God&quot; is the fact that man was given responsibility over the world. Responsibility is meaningless without consequences for action. If I hit little Billy in the head with a baseball bat, and Luvvy Duvvy Gawd makes it so that the blow does not affect the lad at all (not even the fear of being attacked lingers thanks to LDG!), for example, then what type of responsibility is possible for me? That particular bicycle has unremovable chariot-sized training wheels and a seat belt (as well as guidance system that prevents me from going astray, and momentum controls that keep me moving at the right speed). Looky! I can ride a bike! oh, this was so good it bore repeating ... ::clap, clap:: :thumb:

[John Powell]

SherBear:

oh, this was so good it bore repeating ... ::clap, clap:: :thumb:

POWELL:
Yes, it was well written.

If you were told, Sherbear, that by learning to ride a unicycle you could get a billion dollars, but if you tried and failed you would get none of that money, or you could get the billion dollars if you never try to learn to ride the unicycle, which would you choose? Would you risk learning to ride or take the sure money and never enjoy riding a unicycle?

I'm suggesting that what we might learn on Earth by having free will does not come close to counterbalancing the risk of hell. If we had no free will and thus never sinned and thus were assured of eternal life with God (unless we rejected it after getting our free will in heaven) that would be a better option than to have free will on Earth with the opportunities to learn, but the serious risk of going to hell forever.

What do you think, Sherbear?

If God offered these two options, which would you choose?

A) Free will on Earth. Great chance to learn lots of things that are difficult, if not impossible, to fully learn after you die. Likely chance to go to hell forever.

B) No Free will on Earth. No chance to fully learn certain things on Earth, but some might be partially learned after death. No risk of going to hell. Assured eternal life unless you reject it after getting free will after you die.

John Powell

[John Powell]

Re: Capn Ochre: Appeal To Majority

POWELL:
Although etymology is usually relevant to definitions, you could be right if you're only concerned with how the term is used today. But, you're probably wrong if you're trying to show that the meaning has changed.

CAPN OCHRE:
If it is used differently, then the meaning has changed.
You must be talking about the manner in which it is translated?


POWELL:
Not exactly. I believe that originally argumentum ad verecundiam was intended to be understood as a fallacious argument because it didn't matter how much awe or respect one might have for an authority figure (even if they were an expert authority) using their opinion as a premise would result in an invalid argument.

Today, however, there is an effort to distinguish authority figures who are reliable from those who are not. I suspect this is partly because too many smart-aleck philosophy students, after learning about argumentum ad verecundiam, would argue with their teacher "Why should we believe what you are telling us, Mr. Philosophy Teacher? To do so merely on your say-so would be fallacious even if you are an expert in the field." The teachers want to be able to say "appeal to authority is fallacious only if the authority figure isn't really an expert in the field of question." Unfortunately for them, whether they are an expert or not would not make their opinion a correct premise in a valid argument.

POWELL:
I'm interested in that, but you might have misworded things.

My logic text indicates that "valid" and "invalid" only apply to deductive arguments, arguments in which it is claimed there is conclusive grounds for its conclusion. If fallacious is equated with invalid then speaking of "fallacious" or "invalid" inductive arguments is an inappropriate confusion of terms.

CAPN OCHRE:
We'll be more careful, then.
http://www.philosophyclass.com/logic.htm
http://www.pc.cc.ca.us/psimons/Spee...cies%20link.htm


POWELL:
I'll post comments relative to the first link, but I haven't read the second one yet. I'll do that.

POWELL:
Are you suggesting that it's a valid argument to quote the opinion of an expert authority on a subject for which he is an expert authority? In other words, is the following a valid argument?

1. EA is an expert authority on subject S.
2. EA seriously expresses his answer A to question Q.
3. A is a non-controversial answer to question Q in subject S.
4. therefore, A is true.

If it isn't valid, could you revise the syllogism so that the argument is valid?

CAPN OCHRE:
4. therefore, A is probably true.

POWELL:
Excellent.

POWELL (earlier):
If you think that quoting the opinion of an expert authority is invalid, but not fallacious, what about argumentum ad populam or quoting the majority opinion of the population? Would those also be invalid, but not fallacious?

CAPN OCHRE:
Mu--or something like that.

POWELL:
Ahem. Who's dodging now? Given your revision to the appeal to authority argument, is the following a valid deductive argument?

1. The vast majority of the world are theists.
2. therefore, theism is probably true.

CAPN OCHRE:
As soon as we change the conclusion to one that is not definitely resting on the premisses ("probably") we no longer have a deductive argument.


POWELL:
What is the significant difference between my appeal to majority opinion that you seem to say is invalid and the appeal to expert authority which you claim adding "probably" makes valid?

CAPN OCHRE:
Insofar as Captain Ochre doesn't see any necessity to get bogged down in the minutiae of logic, yes I'm dodging.


POWELL:
One person's minutiae can be another person's philosophical issue.

John Powell

[John Powell]

POWELL:
I have some comments and criticisms of this essay recommended by Capn Ochre.

http://www.philosophyclass.com/logic.htm

PHILOSOPHYCLASS:
LOGIC

Logic has been defined as the study of the rules of correct thinking.


POWELL:
That's the goal. Whether philosophical logicians have achieved it sufficiently well is controversial.

PHILOSOPHYCLASS:
It concentrates on the principles that guide rational thought and discussion. The most fundamental concept in logic is that of an argument. An argument must be distinguished from "arguing", which is a debate or disagreement between different people. The logical concept of an argument is: a set of statements, one of which is the conclusion , the others are premises, and the premises support the conclusion. In other words, it is a statement along with the evidence that supports it.


POWELL:
This obscures the facts. The author should say something like "An argument in the logical sense must be distinguished from an argument in the general sense."

This distinction is ill-advised, I think, because logical terms such as "argumentum ad baculum" don't qualify as arguments according to the author. That's a contradiction of terms. Perhaps he should speak of a "logical argument" or something like that to refer to his specialized definition of the term argument.

Discussion that the author might classify as "not an argument" by his definition, nevertheless might be a statement that has implied evidence in support of it.

PHILOSOPHYCLASS:
Logic plays a key role in philosophy. If there is going to be any rational discussion of different philosophical positions, the discussion must use the rules of logic.


POWELL:
The author is obscuring the circularity of his assertion. He should say that "If there is going to be any logical discussion . . ."

Rational is associated with reason. To reason is to use the mind to come up with reasons whether the method used is considered by philosophical logicians to be rational or logical or not.

Some dictionaries equate rational with logical, but the Merriam-Webster indicates that it can be merely associated with thinking, although "especially in orderly rational ways."

PHILOSOPHYCLASS:
While logic will not specify what the content of the statements are, it will tell you how to arrange the statements in a logical fashion.


POWELL:
Right. They will tell you how to follow their rules whether those rules are correct or not.

PHILOSOPHYCLASS:
DEDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS

A deductive argument is one in which the conclusion is certain based on the premises.


POWELL:
That's what they're supposed to be, but they don't muster to that high ideal. So-called valid deductive arguments are statistical arguments. The conclusion is only very probably true if the premises are true. I will post arguments supporting this assertion at tweb in the future. Earlier versions of my arguments are available for viewing at www.topica.com at the II-Errancy Annex forum under headings like "Invalidating Validity X" posted Jan 1, 2003.

Please don't attempt to rebut this merely with an argument by assertion, argument from ignorance, appeal to authority, or ad hominem.

PHILOSOPHYCLASS:
In a deductive argument the conclusion is contained in the premises.


POWELL:
I approve of this. It tends to support my assertion that valid deductive arguments are essentially circular.

PHILOSOPHYCLASS:
INDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS

An inductive argument is one in which the conclusion is probable based on the premises. In an inductive argument the conclusion goes beyond the premises.


POWELL:
Science relies heavily on inductive arguments. Inductive arguments can provide new information whereas deductive arguments essentially prove what they assume to be true.

PHILOSOPHYCLASS:
CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISMS

One of the earliest and most common forms of deductive logic was developed by the Greek philosopher Aristotle (384-322 B.C.). A categorical syllogism is a deductive argument containing three statements: two premises and one conclusion. Each of the three statements is a categorical statement. These statements can be of the form: All S are P, No S are P, Some S are P, or Some S are not P. An example of a valid categorical syllogism is:

All humans are mortal.
Socrates is a human.
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.


POWELL:
This classical argument is the one I use most frequently in my "Invalidating Validity" arguments.

PHILOSOPHYCLASS:
ARGUMENT BY ANALOGY

A common form of inductive argument is the argument by analogy. This is an argument in which a conclusion is drawn about a situation based on similarities of this situation (analogies) to previous situations. For example, if we predict that a {sic} since it is snowing today a certain employee will be late because in the past when it was snowing the employee was late, we are making a probabilistic argument based on an analogy, the occurrence of snow.


POWELL:
The example given appears to be more properly considered an inductive argument.

1. Employee E was late yesterday when it was snowing.
2. It is snowing today.
3. Employee E will be late today (implied "probably").

If the weather was different, but similar, such as raining versus snowing then that would be a better example.

4. Employee E was late yesterday when it was raining.
5. It is snowing today.
6. Employee E will be late today (implied "probably" and assumed "snowing and raining are similar in terms of disrupting employee punctuality")

I'm new to studying philosophical logic, my training is in scientific logic, so I could err when criticizing philosophical logic.

PHILOSOPHYCLASS:
MODUS PONENS

Here is a common form of deductive reasoning using the concept of a conditional or hypothetical statement. The name "modus ponens" comes from the Latin word "modus" meaning method, and the Latin word "ponens" meaning affirming.

If it rains, then the sidewalks will be wet.
It is raining.
Therefore, the sidewalks will be wet.


POWELL:
This is poorly worded. It should say

If it is raining, then the sidewalks are wet.
It is raining
Therefore, the sidewalks are wet.

The second premise should be worded identically like the precedent of the conditional or an additional equivalence premise might be needed that says "it rains" = "it is raining."

Also, what "will happen" in the future is uncertain or at least controversial.

Besides, causal conditionals such as the one suggested by the author do not necessarily comply with the horseshoe logical operator. Even if every logician were to agree that the conditional "If it rains, then the sidewalks will be wet" is true, that fact would not necessarily mean that such would happen without fail every time. The sidewalks in at least one case might be too hot to allow the rain to fall onto them.

Logical or semantical conditionals are the ones that might comply with the horseshoe logical operator, not necessarily causal or decisional conditionals (like "If Bush wins re-election, then I will eat my hat).

PHILOSOPHYCLASS:
FALLACIES

Logic also discusses the incorrect ways of reasoning. A set of statements that appears to be an argument but is not is a fallacy.


POWELL:
This is an ill-advised definition of fallacy. Some people equate fallacies with invalid arguments. Others equate it with a mistake in reasoning. This is an example of equating a fallacy with something that isn't an argument at all.

My logic text Introduction to Logic 11th edition by Copi and Cohen supports the "mistake in reasoning" definition for fallacy.

COPI&COHEN Glossary / Index:
FALLACY: A mistake in reasoning; a type of argument that may seem to be correct, but that proves upon examination not to be so. Fallacies may be formal or informal.


POWELL:
According to C&C, a fallacy is an argument, but an incorrect one. Some people consider "appeal to expert authority" to be a fallacy because it's invalid, but C&C do not consider it to be a mistake in reasoning, a fallacy, although they agree that it is an invalid argument.

Copi&Cohen pg. 141:
When we argue that a given conclusion is correct on the ground that an expert authority has come to that judgment, we commit no fallacy. Indeed, such recourse to authority is necessary for most of us on very many matters. Of course, an expert's judgment constitutes no conclusive proof; experts disagree, and even in agreement they may err; but expert opinion surely is one reasonable way to support a conclusion.


POWELL:
Going on with the essay:

PHILOSOPHYCLASS:
There are formal fallacies, which break specific rules of logic, and there are informal fallacies which usually are phrased to appear as an argument but the statements purporting to be premises to do not support the conclusion. One example of this is called a "circular argument", in which the conclusion is used as the premise.

Why is counterfeiting illegal? I'll tell you why. It is because it is against the law!


POWELL:
This author doesn't seem to understand that deductive arguments, when claimed to be merely valid, not sound, are essentially circular arguments. The premise of a circular argument DOES support the conclusion. If counterfeiting is against the law then counterfeiting is illegal if "against the law" = "illegal". What could be more certain than "if A then A"?

PHILOSOPHYCLASS:
Since "illegal" and "against the law" are the same concept, the speaker in the above fallacy is using the fact that counterfeiting is against the law to prove that it is illegal. In effect the speaker is just repeating the same statement two times. Nothing has been proven.


POWELL:
Something HAS been proven. If A then A. If the premise is true that "counterfeiting is against the law" and if "illegal" and "against the law" are the same concept then it must be true, cannot be false, that counterfeiting is illegal.

Why doesn't the author understand this?

Perhaps he has been misled by his philosophy teachers. Maybe he should take more science courses to help clear his mind of some of the confusion.

John Powell
Science rules. Philosophy drools.

[John Powell]

CAPN OCHRE:
We'll be more careful, then. :smile:
http://www.philosophyclass.com/logic.htm
http://www.pc.cc.ca.us/psimons/Speechp101/fallacies%20link.htm


POWELL:
I quickly read the essay associated with this second link. I found I was in agreement with what the essay said. It supports the more usual definition of fallacy as an argument that is invalid. Note that this contradicts the "authoritative" Copi & Cohen definition.

John Powell

[Captain Ochre]

Yesterday @ 09:58 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=45574#post45574)
John Powell:

POWELL:
I quickly read the essay associated with this second link. I found I was in agreement with what the essay said. It supports the more usual definition of fallacy as an argument that is invalid. Note that this contradicts the &quot;authoritative&quot; Copi &amp; Cohen definition.

John Powell

John,
My point in providing the links was to show that "fallacy" applies to both deductive and inductive arguments, but in different ways.

[John Powell]

CAPN OCHRE:
John,
My point in providing the links was to show that &quot;fallacy&quot; applies to both deductive and inductive arguments, but in different ways.


POWELL:
Are you saying that you don't necessarily support the claims of those two sites? Does that mean you might agree with some of my criticisms of the first site?

Well, I didn't see it as that different, but it was something I hadn't noticed before that fallacy might also apply to inductive arguments in the way suggested.

http://www.pc.cc.ca.us/psimons/Speechp101/fallacies%20link.htm

PSIMONS:
A fallacy is, very generally, an error in reasoning. This differs from a factual error, which is simply being wrong about the facts. To be more specific, a fallacy is an "argument" in which the premises given for the conclusion do not provide the needed degree of support. A deductive fallacy is a deductive argument that is invalid (it is such that it could have all true premises and still have a false conclusion). An inductive fallacy is less formal than a deductive fallacy. They are simply "arguments" which appear to be inductive arguments, but the premises do not provided enough support for the conclusion. In such cases, even if the premises were true, the conclusion would not be more likely to be true.


POWELL:
The definition suggests that if the argument argues that the conclusion is absolutely certain (i.e, if it's a deductive argument), but at most supports something less than absolute certainty (i.e., that it's invalid) then that is a fallacy.

Also, this definition suggests that if your argument argues that the conclusion is probably (i.e. more than 50% likely) true (e.g., an inductive argument), but the premises support a lesser likelihood than that then it would be a fallacy.

Is that how you read it?

This could result in what is considered a deductive fallacy not being an inductive fallacy, right? For example, appeal to expert authority and appeal to majority opinion would be deductive fallacies, but possibly strong / cogent inductive arguments.

John Powell

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 03:42 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=45841#post45841)
John Powell:


POWELL:
Are you saying that you don't necessarily support the claims of those two sites? Does that mean you might agree with some of my criticisms of the first site?


Yes, and yes.


POWELL:
The definition suggests that if the argument argues that the conclusion is absolutely certain (i.e, if it's a deductive argument), but at most supports something less than absolute certainty (i.e., that it's invalid) then that is a fallacy.

Also, this definition suggests that if your argument argues that the conclusion is probably (i.e. more than 50% likely) true (e.g., an inductive argument), but the premises support a lesser likelihood than that then it would be a fallacy.

Is that how you read it?


Yes, essentially.


This could result in what is considered a deductive fallacy not being an inductive fallacy, right? For example, appeal to expert authority and appeal to majority opinion would be deductive fallacies, but possibly strong / cogent inductive arguments.


Exactly. Forgive me for not taking up your other posts to this thread in-depth. The investment in time just doesn't appear worth it, to me.

[John Powell]

To Capn. Ochre.

POWELL:
Thanks for what you did reply to.

I have some work to do on a possible modal problem in my free will syllogism.

John Powell

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 01:41 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=49876#post49876)
John Powell:

To Capn. Ochre.

POWELL:
Thanks for what you did reply to.

I have some work to do on a possible modal problem in my free will syllogism.

John Powell

I know.
:wink:

At least you didn't need for me to tell you about it.
:smile:

[John Powell]

CAPN OCHRE:
At least you didn't need for me to tell you about it.
:smile:


POWELL:
Actually, I did.

Mattballman19 explained enough that together with what you or others had briefly mentioned earlier about some "modal problem" led me to look into the issue some more. I'm still thinking about it and researching the issue.

I wish Jaltus had brought it up as soon as I presented the syllogism.

John Powell.

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 03:41 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=49967#post49967)
John Powell:



POWELL:
Actually, I did.

Mattballman19 explained enough that together with what you or others had briefly mentioned earlier about some &quot;modal problem&quot; led me to look into the issue some more. I'm still thinking about it and researching the issue.

I wish Jaltus had brought it up as soon as I presented the syllogism.


I'm not sure that Jaltus noted the problem explicitly. He said a few things that hinted at an awareness of the general character of the problem, but it's possible that he didn't notice it.
Since you're finished with your end of the debate, try doing some of your research here:
http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/swartz/contents.htm
I checked the link and it's down at the moment. Perhaps that will change. If not, the Internet has lost a valuable page.
[edit to add]
It's back up, and I can now provide a more specific link:
http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/swartz/modal_fallacy.htm


Jaltus, you're on your honor not to visit the site above, should you encounter this post prior to closing out your debate argument.