Does Christianity Require a belief in Substance Dualism?

[AndyN]

I have always thought that the 'soul' or 'human spirit' as described in the bible is our personality, memory, thoughts - and that all of these things are properties of our brain. (as in the materialist theory of the brain) Traditional Christianity, from what I have seen, teaches of some sort of mysterious substance (as in Cartesian substance Dualism) which exists in us, and survives death.
Thinking about this the other day, it suddenly occured to me that the resurrection is a physical, bodily one, so why would we need this mysterious substance attatched to us, especially when God can raise us from the dead and restore our bodies/brain etc.?

Or am I missing something obvious/famous scriptures!?

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

Substance dualism is merely one option among others, and I certainly don't think Christianity requires that one believe it---though it may nonetheless be true....

[dhpierson]

"I have always thought that the 'soul' or 'human spirit' as described in the bible is our personality, memory, thoughts - and that all of these things are properties of our brain. (as in the materialist theory of the brain) Traditional Christianity, from what I have seen, teaches of some sort of mysterious substance (as in Cartesian substance Dualism) which exists in us, and survives death.
Thinking about this the other day, it suddenly occured to me that the resurrection is a physical, bodily one, so why would we need this mysterious substance attatched to us, especially when God can raise us from the dead and restore our bodies/brain etc.?

Or am I missing something obvious/famous scriptures!?"

I think that's a great question, one I myself have been wondering about recently. I think a lot of traditional/conservative Christians would give a definite "Yes" on that one. I purchased William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland's "Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview" a few months back, and while I've only briefly thumbed through it (it's a rather large book covering a lot of ground), it seems that they're proponents of either substance dualism or property dualism, and are opposed to, e.g. reductive materialism, mental functionalism, or behaviorism.

I certainly don't think a Christian *needs* to be a dualist when it comes to theories of the mind, although I think any definitive conclusion rests on the integration of the Semitic Totality Concept. An article at Tektonics.org states:

"Applied to the individual, the Semitic Totality Concept means that "a man's thoughts form one totality with their results in action so that 'thoughts' that result in no action are 'vain'." [ibid, 60] To put it another way, man does not have a body; man is a body, and what we regard as constituent elements of spirit and body were looked upon by the Hebrews as a fundamental unity. Man was not made from dust, but is dust that has, "by the in-breathing of God, acquired the characteristics of self-conscious being." Thus Paul regards being an unbodied spirit as a form of nakedness (2 Cor. 5). Man is not whole without a body. A man is a totality which embraces "all that a man is and ever shall be."

Now if anything, at least at first glance, dualism seems to be at odds with the Semitic Totality Concept. From my reading (and I'm nothing close to a biblical scholar or expert on the ancient Hebrew way of thinking, so any corrections by qualified individuals are most welcome), the thoughts and actions of a person are so closely intertwined that a nice, clean, sharp distinction between "mind" and "body" seems hopelessly fruitless. I'll see if I can get the author to provide some more insight into this.

[AndyN]

hello there dhpeirson!. I hadn't heard of Semitic Totality before - definately sounds exactly what I have been looking for. Thanks for your thoughts :smile: :teeth:

[dhpierson]

Hey AndyN:


"hello there dhpeirson!. I hadn't heard of Semitic Totality before - definately sounds exactly what I have been looking for. Thanks for your thoughts"

No problem. Hope it helps. The article in full can be found at:

http://www.tektonics.org/baptismneed.html

I asked the author to drop by this thread and give us his thoughts, since he's read up on the STC much, much more than I have.

- D

P.S. Thanks for the pearls. :smile: Take care, AndyN.

[jpholding]

Huzzah folks,

Traditional Christianity, from what I have seen, teaches of some sort of mysterious substance (as in Cartesian substance Dualism) which exists in us, and survives death.

Yes, and this would be in accord wih what the Jews of the day believed as well.

dhpierson:

individuals are most welcome), the thoughts and actions of a person are so closely intertwined that a nice, clean, sharp distinction between "mind" and "body" seems hopelessly fruitless.

In terms of making an identity distinction between the two, I don't see that that would be the case. Semitic Totality means that there is no moral or "action" difference between what the mind thinks and what the body does. It does NOT maintain that we can't distinguish between the two entities conceptually or in actuality.

Something else of relevance here may be what I have at http://www.tektonics.org/sleepy.html -- what is shown is that consciousness is possible in the intermediate state (we do not "sleep") and so the spirit is capable of action independent of the body -- albeit, in a way that could be called severely handicapped.

Ya'll philosophy folks will have to decide what that means in terms of your discussion. :smile:

[Solly]

Andy, I put some thoughts together here ---> http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&threadid=14853, basically holding to the idea of Holistic Dualism. Don't know if that matches with JP's semitic totality or not.

[AndyN]

Very useful thanks. I am reading it now and will get back to you if I have any questions :teeth:

[C. D. Ward]

AndyN: you might also take a look at writings by Dr. John Polkinghorne. Probably not orthodox, but Dr. Polkinghorne is an Anglican cleric with a PhD in physics. His personal opinion (taken from Belief in God in an Age of Science (http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0300099495/qid=1073581349/sr=1-3/ref=sr_1_3/103-3473257-8548606?v=glance&s=books)) is that all the relevant "facts" that comprise our personality & nature (our "soul") will be "reconstituted" by God at the resurrection. Thus he is able to square a non-dualist account of mind with a Christian belief in resurrection.

The book is well-written and Polkinghorne offers a reasoned approach to reconciling what may often seem to be discord between science and faith.

[Kenny]

Nancey Murphy, a professor at Fuller Theological Seminary (where I attend) who has several publications, is a non-reductive physicalist. Basically, she believes that human beings exist as holistic physical systems, with no distinct non-physical aspect. I disagree with her as I am more of a holistic dualist like Solly, but I am convinced that her position is orthodox if not standard. Frankly, even though I think that Murphy’s view is false, I think it is a good corrective for opposite extremes. We are intertwined body/soul units, not independent Cartesian spirits. As Christians we should affirm the meaning and value of the body with respect to our personhood as this is what the doctrine of the resurrection of the body entails. I think a lot of the church’s past hang ups with such things as sexuality, asceticism, lack of appropriate concern for social justice in terms of meeting material needs, etc. stem from an overly dualistic notion of the human person as something entirely distinct from the body.

In Christ,
Kenny

[Xavier]

Pay no heed to this :bump:....

It is for another thread's sake...

[Spokoina]

Isnt the question more accurately, which is the central, or unchanging "existence" versus the fact that both exist?

By this I mean: We know material exists. We also know our body exists. We also have learned that matter is simply this: energy..organized in an unchanging proportion .. e=mc squared. IF the speed of light would change, (which I heard it is ..but ever ever ever so slow), certainly it would effect matter. MATTER exists because of an unchanging, and intangible mathmatical priniciple.

Same with all laws. Plants: biological law, ANimals, laws plus instinct, and Man, MIND..not brain, as the brain is part of the body.

Question for me would be, then, what is the unchanging part..character and form?

Materialists go the other way, by the way. They say that matter is primary, and therefore imply as matter goes, so does the internal world get impacted..."internal world" means the invisible, 'spiritual', metaphysical, non material aspects we can sense...but I just dont see matter changing any unchanging law. Gravity is still the same principle, even if the matter changes, and it changes the amount of the force, the proportion of the force to the amount of matter is an unchanging guide. Crush a plant, you will not have changed the law of plant growth or photosynthesis one iota, and cut your arm off, you have not taken out a part of your "mind", intelligence, awareness even of that arm. HMM>

The brain seems to me to be the transmitter between the body and the mind. Break a transmitter, it effects the transmissions but not the thoughts.I knew a young girl with spinal bifida and brain damage. You could see how hard and how frustrated she was because her mind..intelligence part of the brain was still healthy, but the damage in the brain to the parts that controlled her body were gone. Tears would roll from her eyes, because she knew, even without the ability to move her body, that her mind was aware and alive and wanted it to conform, but the transmission was broken.


With matter and biological law, it seems the law itself, metaphysical and yet impacting the matter, is the unchanging part, and all the energy/matter and 'stuff' has to conform to that.

Same with our body, no? YOu lose an arm, you dont lose a piece of your mind.

In a relationship between mind and body, certainly the circular give and take plays off each other both ways. However, the body perhaps too is reflecting our mind, and not the other way.

So for the "eternity part" of that issue raised, laws principles, the invisible unchanging world impacts the "stuff"..energy/matter. So goes with the body.

Anyways, just my two cents.

[Xavier]

Spok... I should warn you that this is a somewhat dated thread, which I bumped for the purposes of another thread.

Please don't be alarmed if the thread participants don't get back to you.

Yours,
Xavier

[barryrob]

I have always thought that the 'soul' or 'human spirit' as described in the bible is our personality, memory, thoughts - and that all of these things are properties of our brain. (as in the materialist theory of the brain) Traditional Christianity, from what I have seen, teaches of some sort of mysterious substance (as in Cartesian substance Dualism) which exists in us, and survives death.
Thinking about this the other day, it suddenly occured to me that the resurrection is a physical, bodily one, so why would we need this mysterious substance attatched to us, especially when God can raise us from the dead and restore our bodies/brain etc.?

Or am I missing something obvious/famous scriptures!?

*** w68 9/1 pp. 518-520 Is Your Soul Immortal? ***


WHAT IS THE "SOUL"?


The Bible’s teaching about the soul is very clear. It says that when man is animated by the breath of life from God, man becomes "a living soul." At Genesis 2:7 it is written: "And Jehovah God proceeded to form the man out of dust from the ground [elements found in the earth] and to blow into his nostrils the breath of life, and the man came to be a living soul." You will note that this passage does not say the soul was created before the body. Neither does it say the soul was "given to" or "put into" man. Nor does it say that the "breath of life" was the soul. Instead, it says that when man came alive, beginning to breathe, "man came to be a living soul."


The Biblical dictionary edited by Westphal referred to above had to admit this, despite the fact that it is so different from what Christendom teaches. It notes that, according to the Bible, man’s being resides "in the body animated by the breath of the Lord, thus becoming a living soul (compare Gen. 2:7)." It also said that "this soul is inseparable from the body, a fact that explains why sometimes the Old Testament uses the word ‘soul’ for man . . . and sometimes the word ‘flesh’ . . . without the meaning being essentially different."6


Thus, as used in the Bible, the word "soul" means a living, breathing, sense-possessing creature. This is why the Bible also calls animals "souls," though it does not use this word for plants.


CAN IT DIE?


If, as the above-mentioned Protestant authority recognizes, "the soul is inseparable from the body," does this mean that when you die your soul dies? Yes. The Bible speaks of souls as dying, and as being struck fatally, killed, destroyed or devoured. And it uses the specific term "dead soul."


It may further surprise many persons to know that, exactly opposite to what is taught in modern catechism classes and Sunday schools, Jesus’ own disciples said that the soul dies. In their gospels, epistles and other writings that are now included in the Christian Greek Scriptures of the Bible, the words "soul" and "souls" appear more than fifty times. Yet not one single time is the word "immortal" associated with them. Not even once does the Bible use the common expression "immortal soul."


Instead, Jesus’ disciple James showed that a sinning soul dies. He wrote: "Know that he who turns a sinner back from the error of his way will save his soul from death." (Jas. 5:20) In the apostle John’s vision of God’s anger "every living soul died, yes, the things in the sea."—Rev. 16:3.


Further, Jesus and his apostles accepted, believed, and frequently quoted from the earlier books of the Bible. In those inspired books you can read: "The soul that is sinning—it itself will die." (Ezek. 18:4) Indeed, that differs from the ideas of the ancient Greeks—and from the ideas that modern Christendom inherited from them and now teaches in her churches.


Certain religious leaders recognize that the Bible uses the word "soul" in a manner far different from the way today’s churches use it. The Bible dictionary edited by Westphal says that the Hebrews did not imagine the soul "without a body to support it."7 This Protestant authority adds: "Man is therefore an indivisible whole; without the body the soul remains inconceivable, and without the soul the body is only an inert mass."7


Sincere Catholics and Protestants alike, who have assumed that the idea that the soul is immortal is supported in the writings of Jesus’ apostles, may be shocked to read what a major new Catholic reference work says about this. The New Catholic Encyclopedia (bearing the imprimatur of the archbishop of Washington; published in 1967 by the Catholic University of America) admits (Vol. 13, page 467): "The notion of the soul surviving after death is not readily discernible in the Bible."


Showing how the Hebrew word that the Bible uses for "soul" differs from Christendom’s modern concept, that encyclopedia says:


"Nepes [or néphesh] is a term of far greater extension than our ‘soul,’ signifying life (Ex 21.23; Dt 19.21) and its various vital manifestations: breathing (Gn 35.18; Jb 41.21), blood [Gn 9.4; Dt 12.23; Ps 140 (141). 8], desire (2 Sam 3.21; Prv 23.2). The Soul in the OT [Old Testament] means not a part of man, but the whole man—man as a living being. Similarly, in the NT [New Testament] it signifies human life; the life of an individual, conscious subject (Mt 2.20; 6.25; Lk 12.22-23; 14.26; Jn 10.11, 15, 17; 13.37)."


The Encyclopedic Dictionary of the Bible, by A. van den Born, points out that at Job 13:14 (a Hebrew poetical passage in which the same statement is made in different words on two lines parallel with each other) "my nefes" is found parallel with "my flesh."


It says that when the part of the Bible written before our Common Era "speaks of rescuing or delivering a man’s nefes from the nether world (Ps 30,4 [3]; 86,13; 89,49 [48]; 116,4; Is 38,17; Prv 23,14), it means no more than that this man is saved from dying (cfr. Ps 33,19; 56,14 [13]; 78,50; Jb 33,18. 22. 28) or that he is snatched from mortal danger; in all these cases the man’s nefes is merely a synonym for the man himself."—Columns 2287, 2288.


It also says that psykhé, the word used for "soul" in the Christian Greek Scriptures of the Bible, "frequently designates physical life."—Column 2288.

Barryrob

[Seasanctuary]

So, Barry, do you have any thoughts on the topic?

[greyphilosophy]

If I recall my hebrew correctly, in genesis the word used for "breath of life" _is_ the same word used for soul in other places. Nephesh or something like that (it's been a while).

Anyway, my view on the subject: I think the only way a soul can be said to exist is the same way it can be said that an idea exists. In both cases we're talking about something immaterial. Well, otherwise we get into questions about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. As far as mind/body dualism goes I would have to agree that christianity is compatible with various views, but Christ's resurrection was a bodily one. Whatever state happens to exist between death and resurrection doesn't matter to me because after resurrection the mind and body will be connected. The "soul" might die, but the does not mean the "soul" is not resurrected.

~Grey

[ephphatha]

Personally, I think that if resurrection is true, then substance dualism must also be true. If nothing of us survives the death of our bodies, then we cease to exist when we die, and whatever begins to exist at the resurrection is just a replica of us, but not us ourselves. Substance dualism at least provides a way to maintain continuity of identity between death and resurrection.

I went into this in more detail on a beliefnet message board. The thread is called spirit and resurrection (http://www.beliefnet.com/boards/message_list.asp?discussionID=162487).

[wwatts]

Whats the big difference between substance dualism and property dualism? Some people don't even believe in substances anyway, only bundles of properties. You still believe in two fundamental kinds of entities.

[Seasanctuary]

Personally, I think that if resurrection is true, then substance dualism must also be true. If nothing of us survives the death of our bodies, then we cease to exist when we die, and whatever begins to exist at the resurrection is just a replica of us, but not us ourselves. Substance dualism at least provides a way to maintain continuity of identity between death and resurrection.
That depends on how one feels about the Teleporter Problem.

[barryrob]

So, Barry, do you have any thoughts on the topic?

THE SOUL HAS TO "PUT ON IMMORTALITY"!




What does the Bible say a regarding "Immortality", for this we can read what the apostle Paul recorded 1 Corinthians 15:53-54 (N.W.T.) here the Apostle Paul is talking of the resurrection and said:-

"For this which is corruptible must put on (Gk. endusasqai) incorruption, and this which is mortal must put on (Gk. endusasqai) immortality. But when [this which is corruptible puts on incorruption and] this which is mortal puts on (Gk. endushtai) immortality, then the saying will take place that is written: "Death is swallowed up forever.""

This raise a number questions;

(1) Now if Paul is talking of the innately IMMORTAL soul why would he say it must "PUT ON IMMORTALITY" if the Soul is intrinsically immortal?

To "put on" is translated from the Greek word "endusasqai" what does this word and phrase mean? The following are various scholastic and theological definitions on how this Greek word should be used and therefore its meaning.

Greek word study, note underlining:

"endusasqai aor. mid. inf. enduw to put on, to put on as clothing."-Lingustic key to the Greek New Testament by Fritz Rienecker & Cleon Rogers p.445

"en-dusasqai aor. inf. -duomai (mid.) wear, aor. put on oneself as a garment."-A grammatical analysis of the Greek New Testament by Max Zerwick S.J. & Mary Grosvenor. Editrice Pontificio Istituto Biblico Roma 1996 p.531

"Must put on (dei endusasthai). Aorist (ingressive) middle infinite, put on as a garment. . . ."-Word Pictures in the New Testament by A. T. Bobertson Vol. IV p.198

"Put on (endusasqai). The metaphor of clothing. Compare 2 Cor. v. 2-4. Incorruption and immortality are to invest the spiritually-embodied personality like a garment."-Vincent's word studies of the New Testamant p.286





In all of the above observations on the Greek word "endusasqai" they show that "immortality" has to be "put on" like an item of clothing, thus "immortality" could not be an innate part of our human nature otherwise why would it have to be "put on" or donned like a coat or some other item of clothing that was previously not on ones body or missing? Therefore as "immortality" is not an innate , the missing part of human nature, (due to death through Sin) as it has to be "put on", how can anyone in the form of a disembodied soul (or spirit) live on in 'eternal torment is hell' "immortality" or forever being punished by the 'fires of hell' if to live forever, or "immortality" has to be "put on" and to live forever is only for believers in Jesus to have or "put on" as he said at:





John 3:36 "He that exercises faith in the Son has everlasting life; he that disobeys the Son will not see life, but the wrath of God remains upon him."


John 5:24 "Most truly I say to YOU, He that hears my word and believes him that sent me has everlasting life."


John 8:51 "Most truly I say to YOU, If anyone observes my word, he will never see death at all.""


So if a person is not a believer in Jesus Christ the person is thus unable to have "immortality" or "eternal life" to "put" it "on" consequently cannot live on after death, must therefore go out of existence, as the person has no right to go on living whom does not believe in Jesus, so as to receive a resurrection back to life as at:-





John 11:25-26 "Jesus said to her: "I am the resurrection and the life. He that exercises faith in me, even though he dies, will come to life; and everyone that is living and exercises faith in me will never die at all. Do you believe this?""





Therefore if a person does not believe or "exercises faith"their can be no resurrection for him into the so-called after life!!



Just a few thoughts



Barryrob

[ephphatha]

That depends on how one feels about the Teleporter Problem.
Well, I guess it's pretty obvious how I feel about it. How do you feel about it?

[Kenny]

Personally, I think that if resurrection is true, then substance dualism must also be true. If nothing of us survives the death of our bodies, then we cease to exist when we die, and whatever begins to exist at the resurrection is just a replica of us, but not us ourselves.

If I take a bookshelf apart in order to move and then reassemble it, is it the same bookshelf?

[Seasanctuary]

If I take a bookshelf apart in order to move and then reassemble it, is it the same bookshelf? More like...if you make careful notes of the arrangement and contents of a bookshelf...then throw it in a bonfire...then make a perfect replica. Is it the same bookshelf?

[Seasanctuary]

Well, I guess it's pretty obvious how I feel about it. How do you feel about it?
I think that our concept of a persistent self may be an illusion. The relationship of a teleported person to her pre-teleportation state may be the same as the relation of me to my state two minutes ago. Our "self" may be being continuously regenerated from our physical state.

[Kenny]

More like...if you make careful notes of the arrangement and contents of a bookshelf...then throw it in a bonfire...then make a perfect replica. Is it the same bookshelf?

No, I would say it is merely a replica, but not the same bookshelf.

But, that's not quite what I have in mind, since I believe that the resurrection will involve a (high degree of, not necessarily a full) continuity of matter between our bodies at the last moment of death and our bodies the moment after they are raised. So say that you utterly vaporize the bookshelf but then God (or some other sufficiently powerful being) manages to track down all (or most?) of the original matter and reassembles it into the same configuration as the bookshelf had before you vaporized it. Is it the same bookshelf?

My answer is "yes," it is the same bookshelf. I explain some of my rational a bit down below.


I think that our concept of a persistent self may be an illusion. The relationship of a teleported person to her pre-teleportation state may be the same as the relation of me to my state two minutes ago. Our "self" may be being continuously regenerated from our physical state.

I have (tentatively) adopted a perdurantist view of temporal persistence. On the standard four dimensional interpretation of relativity, objects are not only extended in three spatial dimensions, but they are extended into a time dimension as well. My body, then, is not a three dimensional object but a temporally extended four dimensional object. The three dimensional slices we see of my body at any given moment are not identical to my body itself but are merely three dimensional cross sections of it. The body I had yesterday is the same body that I have today, not in virtue of my body today being numerically identical to my body yesterday, but in virtue of my body yesterday and my body today being different temporal parts of the same four dimensional whole (so the relevant "sameness" relation is not the relation of identity but a "different-parts-to-an-identical-whole" relationship).

As my body persists through time, it traces out a distinctive four dimensional space-time path (its world line, in relativity terminology). As my body gradually replaces its original matter, the space-time paths of the original matter diverge from the main path my body traces out and the space-time paths of other bits of matter converge with it for a while, so that even after all of the original matter in my body is replaced I can still see that my later body is four dimensionally connected with earlier body, by virtue of being linked to the same four-dimensional path, and so I can still assert a "different-parts-to-an-identical-whole" sameness relationship between them.

Now here's my problem with the teleporter case. The body that emerges from the other end of the teleporter consists of entirely different matter than the body that entered, so there is no connection between the space-time path of the pre-teleported body and the post-teleported body. Thus, they are not temporal parts of an identical whole in the same way that my body now and my body five minutes ago are. This lack of space-time connectedness, in my estimation, means that they are two different bodies. But, since I think that bodily continuity is an essential ingredient of personal continuity, I must also conclude that the person who emerges from the teleporter is a different person that the one who went in. The post-teleported person is just a replica of someone who was killed when her matter was ripped apart by the teleport device.

Now, send the original matter along and use it in the reconstruction process (like they do in Star Trek – at least that's the "official" version even though some of the episodes are inconsistent with it) and I'm fine with it, because then the post-teleported body and the pre-teleported body are four-dimensionally linked together by virtue of being connected to each other through the space-time paths traced out by the matter which is sent along. The body itself may cease to exist momentarily, and so it is a temporally scattered rather than a temporally continuous object, but that doesn't bother me so much, since our bodies are already spatially scattered anyway (i.e. we know from physics that the fundamental particles of which our bodies consist are spatially discontinuous to each other) and yet still rightfully considered a single object.

God Bless,
Kenny.

[Seasanctuary]

Kenny, what happens when one human dies containing some of the same components an earlier human died with?

Is there a certain percent of replacement parts that it's ok to have and you're the "same person?"

[Kenny]

Kenny, what happens when one human dies containing some of the same components an earlier human died with?

It depends on how much of the original matter from the other person that this person died with. Let's take the most extreme case possible; suppose Bob dies and all of the matter in Bob's body winds up being incorporated into John's body by the time that John dies. I have argued that all the matter in one's body can be replaced over time (assuming that it is done so gradually enough) and yet one can still be said to have the same body. So, if God wants to raise both Bob and John, God could do it by first raising Bob, allowing the matter in Bob's body to be gradually replaced until enough matter is available to raise John, and then God could raise John. In other words, God can raise them both; he just can't raise them both simultaneously (or perhaps he could, via some form of time-travel?, something I also believe to be logically possible, even if bizarre). But, I suspect that, given the resources of providence, God could ensure that he need not take such drastic measures by making sure the matter gets widely distributed enough in the first place.


Is there a certain percent of replacement parts that it's ok to have and you're the "same person?"

I think in some cases whether or not it’s the same person is ambiguous. The problem is that "same" in this context is a vague predicate. When is a collection of sand grains a heap? Are two grains enough – no. Are 100 million grains enough-yes. What's the cut off point in the middle? I'm not sure that question has a definitive answer. Yet, we can still meaningfully distinguish between collections of sand that are heaps and collections that are not.

God Bless,
Kenny

[ephphatha]

From what I understand, the matter that makes up our bodies is completely changed out within about every seven years. I think that's another reason to believe in substance dualism. If I myself actually existed more than seven years ago, and yet the body I have now is not the same body I had more than seven years ago, then I am not essentially my body. If we maintain identity through physical change, then our identity must rest in something non-physical.

I'm not sure how I feel about a situation where a person dies, and then God gathers together all the exact same atoms at the resurrection to rebuild the person. I don't know if that would be the same body or not. If it is, then I guess in that case, a person could possibly be raised from the dead even if they had no soul. When I made my post, I was mainly thinking about the Jehovah's Witness concept of resurrection. From what I understand, they don't believe the resurrection has anything at all to do with the body that dies. It's a completely new body with new parts.

I'm not really sure what I think about a person being a four-dimensional object. I would think that such a theory would depend on whether you accepted a static or a dynamic theory of time. I think there's a problem with the static theory of time, in which we are extended in time just as we are extended in space. If it's true, then God didn't create us. If time is static, then I would think that God would exist timelessly in such a way that the whole spectrum of time were layed out before him in the "now." So he would perceive us, not just in terms of spacial dimensions the way we percieve each other, but also in temporal dimension. But if that's so, then there never was a "time" from God's point of view in which we didn't exist. And if there was never a time from God's point of view in which we didn't exist, then God couldn't have brought us into existence. I would think that would apply to everything that is extended in time on a static view of time. I don't know if any of that was clear. Do y'all understand what I'm saying?

ephphatha

[Kenny]

From what I understand, the matter that makes up our bodies is completely changed out within about every seven years. I think that's another reason to believe in substance dualism. If I myself actually existed more than seven years ago, and yet the body I have now is not the same body I had more than seven years ago, then I am not essentially my body.

If your body is a temporally extended four dimensional object, then your body is not identical with the matter out of which is composed at any given moment in time, but rather, the matter that used to compose your body simply overlaps with your body at an earlier temporal interval and diverges from it at later temporal intervals.


If we maintain identity through physical change, then our identity must rest in something non-physical

Only if you are a mereological essentialist (i.e. you believe that it is impossible for a physical object to survive the loss of any of its parts). That's a far from obvious position.


I'm not really sure what I think about a person being a four-dimensional object. I would think that such a theory would depend on whether you accepted a static or a dynamic theory of time.

It does require a static view of time, which is one of the reasons that I hold to it tentatively.


I think there's a problem with the static theory of time, in which we are extended in time just as we are extended in space. If it's true, then God didn't create us. If time is static, then I would think that God would exist timelessly in such a way that the whole spectrum of time were layed out before him in the "now."

I think a static view of time (combined with some standard Christian theological premises) does entail that God (being omniscient and omnipresent) perceives all of time in a single subjective moment. However, that doesn't mean that God doesn't perceive our temporal orderings and our causal sequences (quite the contrary). Furthermore, it doesn't entail that God does not act causally within time.


So he would perceive us, not just in terms of spacial dimensions the way we percieve each other, but also in temporal dimension. But if that's so, then there never was a "time" from God's point of view in which we didn't exist.

Sure there is; He sees the part of the timeline which is prior to our existence even as He sees us in the part that includes it.


And if there was never a time from God's point of view in which we didn't exist, then God couldn't have brought us into existence.

Sure He could have, by willing us to exist at some point in the timeline. I should also point out that I think the notion of timeless causation is coherent (think of a weight causing an indendation in a pillow). In fact, I suspect time is metaphysically dependent on causality (that it, in fact, emerges as a consequence of the causal relations that exist in the universe) rather than the other way around.

In Christ,
Kenny

[ephphatha]

Kenny,

I must conceded that on a static view of time, a body can maintain its identity through physical change since whatever physical parts it has in the present are only part of the whole body which is extended in time.

Whether a body can maintain identity with the loss of any of its parts is not, for me, as clear as whether the body can maintain identity with the exchange of ALL of its parts. If I lost my hand, I doubt it would be right to say I had a completely new body. But if every part of me were exchanged, then I WOULD say I had a completely new body.

I lean more toward the dynamic theory of time for the reasons I gave (and also because we percieve time dynamically, and I think we should trust in the general reliability of our perceptions in the absense of good reasons to reject them), but your answers are enough to give me the impression that an argument could be made to support the static view of time, or at the very least to defend it against what appear to me to be problems with it. I'd have to read more on the subject before I can really fix my opinion one way or the other.

ephphatha

[Kenny]

Kenny,

I must conceded that on a static view of time, a body can maintain its identity through physical change since whatever physical parts it has in the present are only part of the whole body which is extended in time.

The ability of this view to handle many standard identity paradoxes is one of the things that attracts me to it. Though there are a few other technical difficulties with it that I haven't seen ironed out yet, and that keeps me from endorsing it whole heartedly.


Whether a body can maintain identity with the loss of any of its parts is not, for me, as clear as whether the body can maintain identity with the exchange of ALL of its parts. If I lost my hand, I doubt it would be right to say I had a completely new body. But if every part of me were exchanged, then I WOULD say I had a completely new body.

Yes, but then we could imagine you losing your parts and having them replaced very gradually (actually, that's what happens), and if each point along the way you concluded that you have the same body, then why, at the end of the process, would you conclude that you had a different body? I'm not saying that you couldn't say that, coherently, BTW. Since I think the sort of "sameness" involved in persistence through time is not the "sameness" of numerical identity, I think that there can be degrees of sameness over time rather than having it be all or nothing, and perhaps you could hold that two closely related temporal stages of your body's existence had a high degree of sameness with respect to each other but not with respect to temporal stages farther away in the sequence. I'm just curious to know what your concept of "sameness" involves.


I lean more toward the dynamic theory of time for the reasons I gave (and also because we percieve time dynamically, and I think we should trust in the general reliability of our perceptions in the absense of good reasons to reject them)

It may be natural for us to think of time dynamically, but I'm not sure that there is anything in our phenomenological experience which really supports a dynamic view of time over a static one. I think our perceptions are just as easily accounted for on a static view.

Furthermore, I think that a static view of time does gain some considerable empirical support from general relativity, though I do not regard such support as definitive (since general relativity has alternate metaphysical interpretations which are consistent with a dynamic view of time).

In Christ,
Kenny

[ephphatha]

Yes, but then we could imagine you losing your parts and having them replaced very gradually (actually, that's what happens), and if each point along the way you concluded that you have the same body, then why, at the end of the process, would you conclude that you had a different body?
It seems obvious to me that if every single part of my body were replaced, I'd have a differerent body. With that in mind, there must be some point between now and then in which I have a different body, or maybe part of one body and part of another. But all those stages inbetween are a gray area for me, and I don't know what to think. Some people think that you need only exchange one part, and you've got a whole new body. Other people say 51%. I personally don't know what to think. I only feel confident in saying that once all the parts are replaced, it's a new body.

ephphatha