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STR Ambassador
January 5th 2004, 06:18 PM
All Brain, No Mind? by Greg Koukl

I read an article in the July 17 issue of Time Magazine on the mind and the brain entitled "Glimpses of the Mind." The title is somewhat tongue-in-cheek, of course, because the point of the article is to campaign for the idea that the mind is merely the brain; what you have going on inside your head are just chemical reactions governed by very physicalistic processes.
That which we mistakenly understand to be the "mind" or the "soul" is simply the brain, and consciousness a mere property of the brain that kind of rides on top of the physical substance of the brain much like wetness rides on top of water. It supervenes upon the brain. It is temporarily produced by the brain and dependent on the brain. But there is nothing akin to what we would call a "soul." Indeed, there is nobody in there. (I'll get to that particular point in a minute because the article makes a radical jump into metaphysics when it concludes that one thing we know for sure is that there is no one in there. Essentially, there is no soul.)
A couple of weeks after the article appeared, I grabbed the Letters to the Editor and saw that there was quite a response. To show you why this is such a significant conversation, I would like to read a short piece by one of the respondents.
Some of you might think that this is just one of those philosophical discussions that Koukl likes to get into, like talking about the number of angels that can dance on the head of a pin. I warn you that this is not an inconsequential discussion. The article in Time is not at all without metaphysical and theological significance. That is witnessed to by the fact that casual readers understood the implications of the article. One reader writes in the August 7 issue of Time:
"You do not mention the profound religious consequences of the scientific investigation of consciousness. If it turns out to be true that consciousness, the soul, is not a separate reality but a consequential phenomenon of the material world, then a fundamental truth of Christianity is shown not to be true because the concepts of heaven and hell and eternal life are based on the immateriality and indestructibility of the soul. The scientific demonstration of the material basis of consciousness would seem to mean the end of Christianity."
Ladies and gentlemen, it does just that. Think about it for a minute. If there is no soul, if you are your only your body, then when your body dies, you die. When your body decays, you decay. When your body disappears, you are gone. There is no sense to any discussion about the reality of life after death, if you die with your body.
Though this would not solve the question of whether God exists—because certainly there could be a God even if there were no eternally-existing souls in human beings—it certainly does end discussion about the relevance of Christianity. Christianity is false, period—end of issue; end of story—if we have no soul; if there is not a substantial, human, rational soul; a "you" that is not your body, but instead interacts with your body, controls your body, has a deep unity with your brain, but is not the same thing as your brain and is not identical to your brain.
It's all over for Christianity, because all of Christianity is dependent on the notion that you survive the death of your body and that you, as a substantial soul, have to answer for the deeds done, as the Scriptures say, in the flesh. ("In the flesh" means in the physical body.) That's the point.
C.S. Lewis has made a comment that I think applies well to this particular issue. He says in the book, God in the Dock, "In the old days it was supposed that when a thing seemed obviously true to a hundred men, then it was probably true in fact." Not so anymore, ladies and gentlemen. The things that seem so obvious to us—one being that we have a soul—are so obvious that we don't even reflect on them because they're self-evident for a variety of reasons.
I am not going into all the reasons right now for why they are self-evident, but I am going to count on the fact that you have a self-conscious awareness of your own consciousness as being something different from your physical body. I am going to give you some evidence for why I think that is true. But I just want to say that this is the most commonsense approach to reality with regard to human beings. We just seem to know it to be the case.
Indeed, for those who believe differently, they have to be talked out of the obvious witness of their own self-reflection and their own experience. This is why I think that, as philosopher John Searle put it, the prevailing opinions in the science of mind are obviously false. You don't need to be a philosopher to figure this out. A few moments of reflection will do that. You don't need to be a scientist because you know something that a scientist couldn't possibly know.
Before I go any further, I want to make a recommendation to you. You really need to take about three hours of your time and read a book. It's not out of your reach, but you are going to have to go slowly and pay attention to what is being said. But once you do, you will never be up-ended about these kinds of articles again with regard to your faith and the nature of the soul and the brain.
The book is entitled, Immortality, the Other Side of Death, (Thomas Nelson) by J.P. Moreland and Gary Habermas. Moreland gives his defense of what is known in philosophy as "substance dualism," the idea that you have a substantial body and a substantial soul. The two work together, but they are separate. You cannot reduce the soul and all mental activity to mere activity of the brain. (The rest of the book is excellent as well.)
If you feel intimidated in dealing with this issue because you are not a neurologist, I want to put your fears to rest because you know something that scientists don't know. What the scientists know has to do with the brain. But my discussion now is not principally about the brain; it is about the mind. There is only one person who has access to your mind. You. No one else knows your thoughts. No one else knows your feelings. No one else knows what it's like to be you. Technically, it is called de se knowledge. In other words, you have entirely private, first-person access to your own consciousness.
That in itself would be a good defense for the idea that the soul is not the body, that the mind is not the brain, because the brain and all other physical objects have no first-person priority or privileged access. They all have third-person access. Anybody can look at any physical thing and have the same kind of access to it as anyone else. That's a different argument. I'm not going into it now.
The main point I want to make is that you know some things about your own consciousness because you have first-person access. Just what you know, the limited amount you happen to know, is enough to let you know that you are not the same as your brain.
I think Paul is even on to this in 1 Corinthians 2:11. He mentions essentially the same thing: "For who among men knows the thoughts of a man" is talking about spirit in the context of the soul. He is using it synonymously with the inner man.
An important distinction to understand is between identity and constant correlation. I mentioned earlier that I think the article makes a very powerful point. Certain physical states of the brain certainly influence the soul. But, in identifying this fact, the neurologists have drawn the mistaken conclusion that since certain brain states are correlated with your soulish functions—memory, thinking, choices, feelings—that means there is no self, no soul. There is just a brain state. That's a big mistake. They are not the same thing.
You can know for sure with just a moment's reflection that your brain is not your soul. The headline in the article says, "A memory is nothing more than a few thousand brain cells firing in a particular pattern." In other words, they're saying that a memory is identical to brain cells firing in a pattern. It is not correlated with a mind state such that the brain cells firing causes your mind or soul to have a memory. It's saying that’s all it is.
That's like saying that a movie is nothing more than light shining through a piece of celluloid. A movie requires light shining through a piece of celluloid and then you can see it projected on the screen. But to say that it is nothing more than that misses something very obvious.
Did you ever go upstairs in a movie theater and look through the window of the projection room? There is a giant disc spinning, the celluloid goes through an apparatus, and there's hot light.
Now, what if I were to tell you that that is the movie right there. The movie is the physical action that I can see happening. You'd think it was ridiculous. A movie is much more than the physical mechanism, the machinery with the celluloid passing through it with a sharp, bright light behind it. Rather, the movie is the image being projected on the screen, and more than just an image. There is a story, dialogue, characterization. There are all these other things that go beyond just the physical representation.
When one tries to limit mental activity to the physical processes that produce the mental activity, but isn't the activity itself, it's the same as trying to say that a movie is merely the shining of a light through a celluloid strip. You can't capture the movie at all by looking at light shining through celluloid, which shows that a physicalistic explanation of what a movie amounts to falls far short of what the movie really is. What's more, if you only look at the light on the celluloid, you will never even see the movie.
This is a very apt metaphor because of a statement made in the article: "Using sensitive electrodes inserted deep into the gray matter of test animals, researchers have watched vision as it percolates inward from the eye's retina to the inner brain." See what it says there? It says that the researchers have watched vision. It goes on to say, "Scientists watch a thought taking place. They can see the red glow of fear erupting from the structure known as the amygdala or note the telltale firing of neurons as a long-buried memory is reconstructed."
They say they can watch the thought, they can watch vision, but what are they actually seeing when they are watching that physical activity? They are watching the retina and the inner brain respond, but they are not seeing what the test animal sees. They are not watching vision. In other words, they are not watching the movie; they are watching the celluloid go past the light.
When they say they watch a thought taking place because they can see the red glow of fear erupting from a structure known as the amygdala, are they seeing a thought? No, they are seeing a part of the brain. When the doctors look at the brain, they can't see the thoughts, just like by looking at the film in the celluloid, you can't see the movie. The scientists apparently can turn the projector on, but they can't see your movie no matter how many electrodes they have in your brain. Even in these scientific tests, you must have a viewer to know what the memory consists of. Can they put electrodes in my brain, stimulate a memory, and tell me what the memory is? No. Why? They cannot see the projection on the screen. Only I can see that on the inside.
If it was all physical, they should be able to see all the physical stuff, including the memory. But they can't see the memory. They can't see the projection. They can't see the movie. Why? The movie is not physical. It's the physical things they watch that produce an image in my mind, an image that no one else can see. Why? All they can see are physical things, and your mind is not physical.
There's a caption under a picture that says, "Mind probe. The pet scan. A key tool of brain research lets scientists watch mental processes as they happen." But what does it watch? It watches physical changes. It can't see your thoughts. It can't see your images, nor can it feel your feelings.
Think about your feelings for just a moment. A feeling is not just a chemical reaction. How do I know? Chemical reactions don't hurt, but feelings do. Feelings have a quality about them. What could be more obvious? As a matter of fact, it's so obvious that I feel silly even talking about it because you know this as well as I know this. Feelings have a particular texture to them that can't be captured in a chemical description. But someone in a white coat wants to tell you that you are not having a feeling, you're having a chemical reaction. As one person told me: If it is just a chemical reaction, then why does it hurt so much?
C.S. Lewis wrote in God in the Dock: "It is disastrous when instead of merely attending to a rose, we are forced to think of ourselves looking at the rose with a certain type of mind and a certain type of eyes. It is disastrous because if you are not careful, the color of the rose gets attributed to our optic nerves and its scent to our noses and in the end, there is no rose left."
Lewis is on to something here because, if you follow this article to its logical conclusion, in the end there is no feeling left. There is no love, no pain, no compassion, no comfort, no beauty. There are no roses, no Mona Lisas, no Beethoven sonatas, no teenage puppy love. All that’s left are chemical reactions, light waves and vibrating molecules. You know better, ladies and gentlemen. You know better.
The article is basically an assessment of the physical capabilities of the brain, which is fine. I think it's great to map out the brain. I think it's great to look at what the brain can do, and I think it's very helpful in many cases to see the correlation between brain activity and mental activity. My deep concern, though, is that this work on the brain by scientists and by science has an additional agenda behind it, much like the agenda that evolutionary science in its birth and subsequent development has had also. It wasn't just science it was interested in. There were theological, philosophical, metaphysical aspects to it.
Darwin's attempt was to get God out of the picture with regard to the issues of origins, and I suspect that much of what is going on in neurology is an attempt to get rid of the mind so that all you have left is the brain. That's why, even though all of this assessment is interesting, and I think contributes greatly to our understanding of the relationship of the brain to the mind, there is certainly a tenor in this magazine article that is trying to give you a scientific explanation in order to argue that our belief that we exist as a center of consciousness, as a rational soul, is just simply mistaken.
Here's my final point on this issue: If the mind is reduced to the brain, pretty soon everything is lost. Feelings become chemical reactions, beautiful objects become light waves, and beautiful music is reduced to vibrating molecules. Where did the music go? Where did the beauty go? Where did the feeling go? It's all gone. It ought to be obvious to us that this reduction is insane. It can't be made. It isn't valid. It's misleading.
Of course I think you know better than to accept this, but you may be intimidated by scientists in white coats telling you that you aren't really feeling love, you're just having a chemical reaction. You're not really seeing something beautiful, just light of various wave lengths. You're not really hearing something wonderful, it is just vibrating molecules.
But there is a deeper problem. If consciousness is just a property created by the brain, when you make a decision, who or what does the deciding? If consciousness is a mere effect of chemical reactions in the brain, then your conscious act of deciding is not a free will act of your own; it is a result of some physical process that came before it. Your choices are controlled by physical events outside of your will. To put it more bluntly, you have no will at all. Not really. Why not? According to this view, physical states produce particular mental states which produce particular physical states, all following one after another in a determined pattern just like railroad cars following an engine. Guess what? You have not only lost the rose and Beethoven and your teenage puppy love, you've lost you, too. And, by the way, that is exactly what this article says.
Let me read it to you: "Despite our every instinct to the contrary, [which is a tacit admission that we already know what is right and have to deny it] there is one thing that consciousness is not: Some entity deep inside the brain that corresponds to the self; some kernel of awareness that runs the show as the man behind the curtain manipulating the illusion of a powerful magician in the Wizard of Oz. After more than a century of looking for it, brain researchers have long since concluded that there is no conceivable place for such a self to be located in the physical brain and that it simply doesn't exist."
That is the most bizarre statement I've heard in a long time. It's like the man looking for the invisible rabbit. He said, I have looked high and low and I can't find it, therefore it doesn't exist. If there are invisible rabbits, you're not going to find them anywhere. Why not? They are invisible. That doesn't prove they do exist, it simply points out that you can't disqualify the existence of something by looking for it in a way that won't turn it up.
You don't look for the mind in the brain and try to find a location for it because the mind is not something physical by definition. You can't conclude that it doesn't exist because you haven't found it after a century of looking. You don't find it that way. You infer it from other things, and we have inferred it very directly and very successfully with a couple of very simple arguments. (There are more in Moreland's book on immortality.)
Lewis put it this way and really captured it: "I see no reason for believing that one accident should be able to give me a correct account of all other accidents. It's like expecting that the accidental shape taken by the splash when you upset a milk jug should give you a correct account of how the jug was made and why it was upset."
Do you see the price that you have to pay to buy this point of view? Everything gets lost. Even you. Even the scientists that think they're thinking these conclusions. They're gone too. So, why trust the conclusions?

Stand to Reason - training Christian ambassadors in the areas of knowledge, wisdom, and character - www.str.org - http://www.str.org/free/commentaries/philosophy/nomind.htm

chickenman
January 6th 2004, 05:31 AM
If it was all physical, they should be able to see all the physical stuff, including the memory. But they can't see the memory. They can't see the projection. They can't see the movie. Why? The movie is not physical. It's the physical things they watch that produce an image in my mind, an image that no one else can see. Why? All they can see are physical things, and your mind is not physical.
what an absolutely terrible argument, I mean, honestly

ask yourself whether an engineer at intel can see the images on the computer screen by looking at the electrical activity of the processor that produces them

Here's my final point on this issue: If the mind is reduced to the brain, pretty soon everything is lost. Feelings become chemical reactions, beautiful objects become light waves, and beautiful music is reduced to vibrating molecules. Where did the music go? Where did the beauty go? Where did the feeling go? It's all gone. It ought to be obvious to us that this reduction is insane. It can't be made. It isn't valid. It's misleading.
yes its all very sad, but the truth doesn't have to be nice

But there is a deeper problem. If consciousness is just a property created by the brain, when you make a decision, who or what does the deciding? If consciousness is a mere effect of chemical reactions in the brain, then your conscious act of deciding is not a free will act of your own; it is a result of some physical process that came before it. Your choices are controlled by physical events outside of your will. To put it more bluntly, you have no will at all. Not really. Why not? According to this view, physical states produce particular mental states which produce particular physical states, all following one after another in a determined pattern just like railroad cars following an engine.
bummer huh?

until someone can demonstrate in some falsifiable way that a mind can exist apart from a physical thing called a brain, then i'm not inclined to believe that theres any supernatural jiggerypokery involved

AndyN
January 6th 2004, 05:42 AM
haha, funnily enough, I just asked a question about this yesterday....

http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?threadid=16549&goto=newpost

....asking if substance dualism was really necessary (after rubbishing it in a recent philosophy exam). I have always believed that the 'soul' is purely material patterns of the mind - thoughts, attitude, memories, opinions....in other words, your personality. the 'soul' does not need to survive death, as the bible teaches a PHYSICAL resurrection!

Da Lone-Warrior
January 6th 2004, 10:18 PM
chickenman:

until someone can demonstrate in some falsifiable way that a mind can exist apart from a physical thing called a brain, then i'm not inclined to believe that theres any supernatural jiggerypokery involved

Um, why would the existence of a spiritual dimension to us as individuals need to be separable from the physical dimension?

As I understand it, until the enlightenment, humanity had been pretty much unaminous in its belief in the coexistence of both dimensions, with the spiritual dimension often believed to be predominant.

There is much that we cannot see or falisfy, but which we believe exists.

I'm sure your familiar with the anthropological argument. It argues from the mere fact we long for meaning, for reality to be about more than just the "truth" you mentioned above, is itself bizarre, since for most of our longings:food, water, sex, beauty there exists objects. However, if we are but molecules in motion then our desire for meaning for our lives is ultimately without a true fulfillment beyond our concocted delusions.

dlw

ephphatha
January 7th 2004, 04:53 AM
Andy,

You say that a soul doesn't need to survive death since resurrection is physical. But it seems to me that there can be no resurrection at all unless the soul survives the death of the body. Well, I should probably clarify that. There can be a resurrection, but there can't be a resurrection of the same person unless the soul survives the death of the body. The reason I say that is because a resurrection must involve a rebuilding of a body, and not all of the parts of that body can be part of the original body since there is such a thing as canabalism. If one person ate another person and then died shortly afterwards (which surely has happened) and both people get raised from the dead, which one gets the molecules that were digested? To rebuild both of them, at least one of them has to get new molecules, so the bodies can't be completely composed of the same material. Resurrection, then, involves rebuilding a new body, at least in part. But if the physical body of the resurrection is no identical with the body that died, then it's not the same body. It's a different body with different parts. And if all we are is the sum of our physical parts (with no soul), then the person who is raised is not the same person who died. That means none of us will be raised at the resurrection. At the most, exact copies of us will be raised. It seems to me that if we are to have any hope of a resurrection, our souls must survive the deaths of our bodies. That's the only way we can maintain identity between death and resurrection. If you're interested, I argued this point in more detail on this thread (http://www.beliefnet.com/boards/message_list.asp?discussionID=162487).

ephphatha

ephphatha
January 7th 2004, 05:17 AM
Chickenman,

ask yourself whether an engineer at intel can see the images on the computer screen by looking at the electrical activity of the processor that produces them

Of course he will say "no," which is precisely Koukl's point. The image is not in the processor. The image doesn't exist at all until the processor is attached to a monitor that can turn the electrical signals into an image that can be projected onto the screen. There is no such monitor in the brain. There are only the electrical signals. So there can be no such image. And even if there were an image, there would be nobody in there to see the image.

until someone can demonstrate in some falsifiable way that a mind can exist apart from a physical thing called a brain, then i'm not inclined to believe that theres any supernatural jiggerypokery involved

I don't see why it would be necessary to demonstrate that a mind can exist apart from a brain in order to have reason to believe the mind and the brain are not the same thing. Afterall, it's entirely possible that the mind and the brain are distinct substances, and yet the mind cannot survive apart from the brain. It's possible that man is a duality of body and soul, and yet the soul cannot survive the death of the body. So substance dualism can be demonstrated entirely apart from any argument for the survival of the soul after physical death.

When you say "bummer" after Koukl's explanation of how a denial of the existence of the soul leads to determinism, I take it you agree with that conclusion? And since you deny the existence of the soul (or you seem to anyway), I take it you also agree that determinism is true? If that's your position, then I would be interested to know whether or not you consider your belief in determinism to be rational. The reason I ask is because C.S. Lewis, in his book on Miracles made what I thought was a pretty good argument that if all of our thoughts and beliefs are determined in the cause and effect sense, then they cannot be rational since they were not arrived at in the ground and consequent sense. If asked, "Why do you believe in determinism?" it wouldn't be correct to answer, "Because the belief is the consequence of good rational grounds," but rather, it would be correct to say, "Because the belief is the effect of deterministic causes." He argues that the "cause and effect" sense of because and the "ground and consequent" sense of because are mutually exclusive. What do you think about that? Can we really say that our beliefs are the result of good sound reasoning and therefore can be held to be rational when, in reality, our beliefs are deterministically caused? If you have a correct belief, and I have an incorrect belief, how can we say that one of our beliefs is more rational than the other when they were both brought about by chemical reactions that neither of us had any control over?

ephphatha

NeilUnreal
January 7th 2004, 11:03 AM
Another possibility is that the need for dualities such as mind/soul or deterministic/non-deterministic is itself a form of illusion (or at best a tool for coping with the world). That's the approach of Zen philosophy.

-Neil

ephphatha
January 7th 2004, 07:40 PM
Neil,

My philosophy teacher is a Buddhist, so I've had an opportunity to learn a little about Zen Buddhism. (I'm not sure if he's a Zen Buddhist himself.) I've noticed that according to Buddhist philosophy, there are lots of things that, although they seem obvious to us, they are actually illusions. For example, the whole notion that we are individuals is an illusion because in reality, we're all one. The problem I have with the whole philosophy that all these obvious things are illusions is that it subverts our rationality. There are certain things our cognative faculties automatically tell us. They just seem obvious to us. It's obvious to me that I'm me, and you're you, and I'm not you, and you're not me. It's also obvious to me that I have a will. I can raise or lower my arm, and the control of my arm isn't something entirely outside of me. If all these things that seem obvious to me are really just illusions, then my cognitive faculties aren't working right. They're deceiving me. That means I can't trust them. But if I can't trust my cognitive faculties, then I'm in no position to say that ordinary experience is an illusion and the Buddhist experience is real rather than vice versa. So the whole philosophy of doubting the obvious (which seems to predominate eastern philosophies) strikes me as being self-defeating.

ephphatha

Gilgaron
January 7th 2004, 09:06 PM
The modern theories of mind I've read seem to claim that the brain is not the mind, but rather that the mind is due to the brain in a relationship in which the brain is like hardware and the mind like software. This avoids the species chauvinism that you would run into declaring that the brain is the mind, since it is conceivable that a creature could have different organ structure and not have a brain while being intelligent and having a mind. It also allows for the possibility of artificial intelligence.

Now, does such a theory lead to determinism? Not necessarily, since not everything is deterministic, due to randomness on small levels. Additionally, the brain is imperfect, and would unreliably deviate from reacting the same way to identical stimulus.

The objection to physical resurrection being precluded by cannibalism is silly. If Yahweh is going to go about resurrecting everyone, it would be trivial to go ahead and copy some of their requisite molecules, since as creator of the universe he would be free to create, or move from other planets, any materials required with the appropriate properties to replace those that ended up in multiple people over time.

ephphatha
January 8th 2004, 01:46 AM
Gilgaron,

When you say that the emergent property view of the mind avoids species chauvinism, I'm not clear on why you would think any other view (such as the substance dualism view) would cause species chauvinism. Could you elaborate on that?

I can see that if things are really random on some level that the emergent property view wouldn't necessarily lead to determinism. However, if things were random, that wouldn't lead to free will either. Whether our minds are caused by random chemical reactions or by law-like chemical reactions, all of our mental activity is still caused by those chemical reactions, and so the will, which is an aspect of the mental properties that would emerge, is itself caused by the chemical reactions and isn't free.

That being said, I doubt that events, even at the subatomic level, really are random. They may be unpredictable, but that's an epistemological issue, not an ontological issue.

I'm not sure I understand your objection to my canabalism argument. The point of bringing up canabalism was to show that in the case of raising two people where one ate the other, at least one of them will have to have a body that is created without all of its original parts, and so the body that rises is not identical with the body that dies. You just said that Yaweh could take material from anywhere else to reconstruct the body, or he could create new material. That is consistent with my point, so I don't understand exactly what your objection is.

ephphatha

chickenman
January 8th 2004, 09:15 AM
Of course he will say "no," which is precisely Koukl's point. The image is not in the processor. The image doesn't exist at all until the processor is attached to a monitor that can turn the electrical signals into an image that can be projected onto the screen. There is no such monitor in the brain. There are only the electrical signals. So there can be no such image. And even if there were an image, there would be nobody in there to see the image.
the image is an emergent property of the electrical signals of the brain - there is nothing supernatural involved in the perception of the image - the image is perceived because of the neurological activity in the occipital cortex

perception is entirely dependent on neurons and their connectivity- this is beautifully demonstrated by eye rotation experiments in frogs

Gilgaron
January 8th 2004, 08:19 PM
ephphatha:

Gilgaron,

When you say that the emergent property view of the mind avoids species chauvinism, I'm not clear on why you would think any other view (such as the substance dualism view) would cause species chauvinism. Could you elaborate on that?

I was responding to Koukl's statement where he states the argument at hand being that the mind is the brain. This physicalist stance would present species chauvinism. Dualism doesn't, as far as I know, unless one shares Descartes' view of animals. I'm sorry I wasn't clear.

I can see that if things are really random on some level that the emergent property view wouldn't necessarily lead to determinism. However, if things were random, that wouldn't lead to free will either. Whether our minds are caused by random chemical reactions or by law-like chemical reactions, all of our mental activity is still caused by those chemical reactions, and so the will, which is an aspect of the mental properties that would emerge, is itself caused by the chemical reactions and isn't free.

That being said, I doubt that events, even at the subatomic level, really are random. They may be unpredictable, but that's an epistemological issue, not an ontological issue.

I'm comfortable with the idea of limited will. I disagree that it would follow that the decision making process being controlled by physical processes that free will is impossible, though. Any informed decision is dependent upon inputs.

I'm not sure I understand your objection to my canabalism argument. The point of bringing up canabalism was to show that in the case of raising two people where one ate the other, at least one of them will have to have a body that is created without all of its original parts, and so the body that rises is not identical with the body that dies. You just said that Yaweh could take material from anywhere else to reconstruct the body, or he could create new material. That is consistent with my point, so I don't understand exactly what your objection is.

ephphatha

Under an emergent property view, the physical brain need not be constructed of the same physical atoms to run the same software of whatever person we're talking about. Even in the physicalist mind=brain view, swapping out carbon atoms will not change the brain's function in any way and will leave the person intact without needing dualism.

ephphatha
January 9th 2004, 05:57 AM
Chickenman,

If the image is an emergent property of the brain activity, why do you think it is that the only one who can see the image is the one who owns the brain? In every other example of an emergent property (like wetness in water), once the property emerges, it's observable to everybody. You can search a brain all day and never see the image in there. If it wasn't for the fact that we know we have images in our own brains, we could never know that any other brain had image properties at all just by observing them. The only way we know that other brains have images in them is either because (1) the people who own those brains tell us or (2) we just assume they do because our own do. But nothing about the brain itself can tell us that. Doesn't that strike you as odd given the emergent property view? And it isn't just that there's an invisible image in there that nobody can see. It's also that fact that somebody is seeing it. Yet this somebody who is seeing the image is ALSO an emergent property.

It just strikes me as odd that a person can vividly percieve a green field with their brain, and it's entirely the brain that produces the image of this green field, and it all happens in the brain, and this whole green field image is an emergent property, that you can look in the brain and there's nothing green in there at all.

At least with a computer monitor, once the image is produced, everybody can see it. Not so with the brain.

ephphatha

ephphatha
January 9th 2004, 06:23 AM
Gilgaron,

I'm comfortable with the idea of limited will.
But how do you account for it on your view? On my view, the reason there can be such a thing as a will is because you have a soul/mind that can act on and move electrons, and those electrons can, in turn, send signals to the body to cause it to move. So the beginning of the chain of causes is the will, which is a property of the mind. But in your view, the will can't cause anything at all since it is just a property which itself is caused by the brain chemistry. So the beginning of causes in your view is the brain chemistry, and it's the brain chemistry that causes the perception of a will, but the will doesn't cause anything. If the will is caused by brain chemistry, but the will cannot itself cause brain chemistry, then how can the will be free in any sense?

Under an emergent property view, the physical brain need not be constructed of the same physical atoms to run the same software of whatever person we're talking about. Even in the physicalist mind=brain view, swapping out carbon atoms will not change the brain's function in any way and will leave the person intact without needing dualism.

Okay, I think I understand what you're saying now. You don't equate the "person" with the physical body. You equate the person with the pattern the physical body makes. So a brain with every molecule just so would produce a mind with mental states that were just so. And if you took completely different molecules, you would arrive at the exact same mental state as before provided those molecules were arranged in an identical pattern as the ones before. Is that right?

Assuming that's right, I think it still causes problems with identity. If God raises us from the dead by reconstructing a brand new body out of brand new parts, and God fixes it to where every feature of the new person, including every particle of their brain, is just like the person who died, you wouldn't be able to tell this person from the person who died. This person wouldn't even be able to tell himself from the person who died because he'd even have the same memories. But it seems to me he would still only be a copy, and not the original person.

There are a couple of thought experiments that I think illustrate this point. First, since we basically cease to exist when we die, God is creating us at the resurrection entirely from his perfect memory of us. But God's knowledge of us is just as exhaustive before we die as it is after we die. That means God could resurrect us before we die. Whatever particles he intended to create us out of at the resurrection, he could just do that right now. Then there would be two of us with identical thoughts, feelings, memories, and everything. But obviously, if there are two of us, we're not the same person. One of us is the original, and the other is an exact duplicate. But this duplicate God makes wouldn't all of a sudden really become me just because he waited until after I was dead before he made it. It would still just be a copy.

Here's another thought experiment that is much like the first. Let's say I'm dead already. When God raises me from the dead, he basically just recreates me from his memory out of brand new material. But if God is capable of doing that, then he could just as easily make two of me at the same time. He could make them both out of his perfect memory. But obviously, they wouldn't both be the same person. Well how do you tell which one is me and which one is just a copy? Since they're both made in the same way, then it seems to me they are BOTH copies. Neither one is me! Perhaps you might say that God wouldn't do that, but I don't think that helps any. A resurrected Sam wouldn't be an original Sam just because only one of them was made.

That's why I think a soul that survives the death of the body is necessary to maintain continuity of identity between death and resurrection.

ephphatha

Gilgaron
January 9th 2004, 02:44 PM
ephphatha:

Gilgaron,


But how do you account for it on your view? On my view, the reason there can be such a thing as a will is because you have a soul/mind that can act on and move electrons, and those electrons can, in turn, send signals to the body to cause it to move. So the beginning of the chain of causes is the will, which is a property of the mind. But in your view, the will can't cause anything at all since it is just a property which itself is caused by the brain chemistry. So the beginning of causes in your view is the brain chemistry, and it's the brain chemistry that causes the perception of a will, but the will doesn't cause anything. If the will is caused by brain chemistry, but the will cannot itself cause brain chemistry, then how can the will be free in any sense?

The will is then the balance of a wide variety of stimuli and data, but you also have biofeedback in which mental states effect the brain chemistry further. For example, putting yourself in a depressed state or meditating. So, the will can cause brain chemistry even if it results from it.

Okay, I think I understand what you're saying now. You don't equate the "person" with the physical body. You equate the person with the pattern the physical body makes. So a brain with every molecule just so would produce a mind with mental states that were just so. And if you took completely different molecules, you would arrive at the exact same mental state as before provided those molecules were arranged in an identical pattern as the ones before. Is that right?

Sounds right to me. Water is water whatever particular hydrogen atoms are attached to the oxygen.

Assuming that's right, I think it still causes problems with identity. If God raises us from the dead by reconstructing a brand new body out of brand new parts, and God fixes it to where every feature of the new person, including every particle of their brain, is just like the person who died, you wouldn't be able to tell this person from the person who died. This person wouldn't even be able to tell himself from the person who died because he'd even have the same memories. But it seems to me he would still only be a copy, and not the original person.

Well, without getting terribly philosophical, it would depend on how you defined the individual. You do not contain the same particles as you did when you were a child, but we still would refer to that entity in the past as you, while you now are a copy of that past entity we called you involving some of the same parts and replaced parts. If you are still you now, then you can still be you resurrected physically.

There are a couple of thought experiments that I think illustrate this point. First, since we basically cease to exist when we die, God is creating us at the resurrection entirely from his perfect memory of us. But God's knowledge of us is just as exhaustive before we die as it is after we die. That means God could resurrect us before we die. Whatever particles he intended to create us out of at the resurrection, he could just do that right now. Then there would be two of us with identical thoughts, feelings, memories, and everything. But obviously, if there are two of us, we're not the same person. One of us is the original, and the other is an exact duplicate. But this duplicate God makes wouldn't all of a sudden really become me just because he waited until after I was dead before he made it. It would still just be a copy.

This objection only helps dualism if there isn't a causal interaction from the body to the soul. Since sin affects the soul and the soul can also be cleansed, we know this not to be the case under Christian theology. You then run into the same problems as to what state your soul has been restored to.

Here's another thought experiment that is much like the first. Let's say I'm dead already. When God raises me from the dead, he basically just recreates me from his memory out of brand new material. But if God is capable of doing that, then he could just as easily make two of me at the same time. He could make them both out of his perfect memory. But obviously, they wouldn't both be the same person.

They would be two copies of the same person until one diverged from the other in some way.

Well how do you tell which one is me and which one is just a copy? Since they're both made in the same way, then it seems to me they are BOTH copies. Neither one is me! Perhaps you might say that God wouldn't do that, but I don't think that helps any. A resurrected Sam wouldn't be an original Sam just because only one of them was made.

Because of a discontinuity in time?

That's why I think a soul that survives the death of the body is necessary to maintain continuity of identity between death and resurrection.

ephphatha

Those are certainly interesting ideas. There is a short story that I've read that deals with those same ideas. I can't remember it offhand, but I'll post up the author and title when I get a chance for you.

Gilgaron
January 9th 2004, 02:46 PM
ephphatha:

Chickenman,

If the image is an emergent property of the brain activity, why do you think it is that the only one who can see the image is the one who owns the brain? In every other example of an emergent property (like wetness in water), once the property emerges, it's observable to everybody. You can search a brain all day and never see the image in there. If it wasn't for the fact that we know we have images in our own brains, we could never know that any other brain had image properties at all just by observing them. The only way we know that other brains have images in them is either because (1) the people who own those brains tell us or (2) we just assume they do because our own do. But nothing about the brain itself can tell us that. Doesn't that strike you as odd given the emergent property view? And it isn't just that there's an invisible image in there that nobody can see. It's also that fact that somebody is seeing it. Yet this somebody who is seeing the image is ALSO an emergent property.

It just strikes me as odd that a person can vividly percieve a green field with their brain, and it's entirely the brain that produces the image of this green field, and it all happens in the brain, and this whole green field image is an emergent property, that you can look in the brain and there's nothing green in there at all.

At least with a computer monitor, once the image is produced, everybody can see it. Not so with the brain.

ephphatha

It would just be a matter of stimulating the corresponding centers in your own brain to share the same idea someone else is having.

chickenman
January 10th 2004, 12:10 AM
exactly - it simply means we don't have the tool to interpret the images

the monitor interprets signals - the computer doesn't transmit an image which the monitor magnifies - it recieves signals which it then turns into an image

you won't find the image in the CPU anywhere
nor will you find it in the brain

that doesn't mean it isn't represented in these things

Hoosier
March 2nd 2004, 11:57 PM
The modern theories of mind I've read seem to claim that the brain is not the mind, but rather that the mind is due to the brain in a relationship in which the brain is like hardware and the mind like software.

That would be "some" modern theories. Substance and property dualism are both very much alive and active in the present debate. Strict physicalism has a much weaker following.

This avoids the species chauvinism that you would run into declaring that the brain is the mind, since it is conceivable that a creature could have different organ structure and not have a brain while being intelligent and having a mind. It also allows for the possibility of artificial intelligence.

AI advocates promise a lot, but deliver little. I hold to substance dualism. Substance dualism requires that there is a seperate, non-physical, realm in which consciousness and "spiritual beings" have their existence. What you're describing is called property dualism. Property dualism claims that mind is simply a property of brain, and could possibly be a property of a "computer brain", or some other unspecified level of complexity/circuitry as well.

Now, does such a theory lead to determinism? Not necessarily, since not everything is deterministic, due to randomness on small levels. Additionally, the brain is imperfect, and would unreliably deviate from reacting the same way to identical stimulus.

There is no evidence that everything is due to randomness at small levels. In fact, few hold to a realist interpretation of Quantum mechanics, which I assume you're referring to. Even if realism IS warranted though, it doesn't follow that this makes macro events likewise random. Macro events are universally seen to be based on cause and effect (making me suspect that micro events are too, and that our understanding is what limits us to statistical predictions), and any extrapolation is a category error.

If mind is a property of brain, or something "brain like", then it generally follows that brain somehow leads the way. It is the needs of brain, or the organism reliant on it, which mind responds to. Only strict physicalism, that matter only exists, requires determinism. If something other than matter exits (which seems to be the case) it raises yet another profound question about why there is anything at all --- another genesis question. Why would mind emerge? Did it already exist in potentiality, or how else could it obtain? If it existed as a potential, then the universe had a potential for "spirit" latent from the beginning --- not a very comforting idea for the atheist ... though maybe better than spirit being ontologically prior.

The objection to physical resurrection being precluded by cannibalism is silly. If Yahweh is going to go about resurrecting everyone, it would be trivial to go ahead and copy some of their requisite molecules, since as creator of the universe he would be free to create, or move from other planets, any materials required with the appropriate properties to replace those that ended up in multiple people over time.

Actually, none of us have the same bodies now that we had a few years ago. Almost every part is new. The soul is what survives, and the new, glorified body is just that --- new.