Foreknowledge and Free Will (Powell versus Jaltus) Commentary

[dizzle]

This thread is started to discuss the debate found here:


http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?postid=29236#post29236

Grab a hot dog, grab a banana :yipee: , and have fun.

Please note that debate participants are not permitted to post in the comments thread for their particular debates until such debate is over. At that time, they are free to post and address any spectator commentary that they choose.

[Captain Ochre]

Where are the participants? I'm on my ninth bag of peanuts, and I've lost count of the # of cans of Mountain Dew I've chugged waiting for the spectacle to begin.
How come there's no opening band?

Seriously, I thought that John had the steps of his scenario pre-prepared. If that isn't the case, then I rebuke myself for my impatience.
If the sceario is prepared, then I'm ready for the debate!
:yipee: : :fight: :fight: :fight: :fight: :fight: :fight: :fight: :fight:

[The Laughing Man]

I have to admit that I didn't read his whole initial post, but since the crux of his argument is summed up in his little "choose the opposite of what God wrote down" fantasy, I have to wonder why he thinks this example negates either God's foreknowledge or our free-will. I just don't see them as mutually exclusive. Certainly, in the fantasy situation, one would just have to choose whatever one felt like choosing and know that God knew of the choice before it was made. It's still a choice of free-will as God did not force the choice to be made.

It just seems like the old bogus "can God create a rock He can't lift" argument reworked to address a different aspect of God. Any answer to the situation as it is results in a automatic (though suspect) "win" for the person asking it.

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

Jinx is absolutely right. If anyone wants a preview of what's to come, see Powell's last few posts and replies on the Problem of Evil thread in the philosophy section. For Powell to suggest that a fantastic "scenario" will succeed argumentatively where a so-called rigorously developed philosophical argument might fail is pure nonsense. An amorphously expressed "scenario" would possess the same defects as a fully articulated argument; it's just that in a fantastic "scenario," Powell can hide more easily behind ambiguity and rhetoric.

[The Laughing Man]

I guess I can see how someone might mistake foreknowledge (passive) with predestination (active), but I don't see the former precluding free-will.

[Captain Ochre]

03-09-2003 @ 06:47 AM
pereynol:

Jinx is absolutely right. If anyone wants a preview of what's to come, see Powell's last few posts and replies on the Problem of Evil thread in the philosophy section. For Powell to suggest that a fantastic "scenario" will succeed argumentatively where a so-called rigorously developed philosophical argument might fail is pure nonsense. An amorphously expressed "scenario" would possess the same defects as a fully articulated argument; it's just that in a fantastic "scenario," Powell can hide more easily behind ambiguity and rhetoric.

That last is quite true, but it's also one of the reasons that using a story/scenario may be an effective method of rhetoric for John in the debate. Let's not underestimate the power of the paradoxical tale. There are some which do challenge certain aspects of the question, such as apparent "backward causation". While there are some strong hints that John's argument (reduced to its essence) will contain a fallacy of equivocation, we should be on the lookout for something new--or at least a different dimension to the problem.

And, to John's credit, he doesn't insist on leading his opponent through the scenario and then saying "game over" prior to evaluation of the results. He's been upfront about establishing agreeable definitions and guidelines, and himself suggested several rounds of discussion following completion of his planned steps. I think that it's a reasonable approach.

[John Powell]

POWELL:
I'm curious to know who in the bleachers will be the first to figure out what the second and/or third stages probably are. Perhaps Jaltus will beat you all.

Asking Tim Holt would be cheating.

John Powell

[Captain Ochre]

03-09-2003 @ 07:23 PM
John Powell:

POWELL:
I'm curious to know who in the bleachers will be the first to figure out what the second and/or third stages probably are. Perhaps Jaltus will beat you all.

Asking Tim Holt would be cheating.


Are you going to get into it, or is the point to keep us in suspense?:brow:
:smile:

[Captain Ochre]

"If the scenario persuades him to accept that God cannot know the future if we have free will, then I will have shown that in at least this one case a scenario argument is better (more persuasive to Jaltus) than the more formal series-of-propositions argument."

Actually, it will have merely been shown that the scenario approach worked.
You can't say it worked better than the other unless you tried both on Jaltus and found a measurable difference in the results.
Tough experiment with only one Jaltus, I might add.

Question one is irrelevant to the main question, save for giving insight into what Jaltus would personally feel about the situation were he to be put in it.

Question two veers sharply toward a fallacy of equivocation that I see commonly in arguments trumpeting the incompatibility of omniscience and free will. I won't spill the beans so as not to clue Jaltus, and just in case John pulls himself back from the precipice of fallacy. I've had a pm conversation with Tim Holt, so he would know what I'm talking about (Tim knows all?). I didn't fish for additional info on John's scenario, as Tim would surely confirm.

[edit to add]
The scenario also seems to be more about reverse causation than about an incompatibility between omniscience & free will.
Time will tell.
I was also a tad puzzled that John recognized that CT position three affirms a god who is atemporal in some sense, then announced that the scenario is designed for position three while also stipulating that God will be placed in time for purposes of the scenario. I would take that as a clue to keep my eyes open for a straw man, though I'll allow that I could have simply misinterpreted John's intent.

[John Powell]

CAPTAIN OCHRE:
Are you going to get into it, or is the point to keep us in suspense?:brow:
:smile:


POWELL:
No, the point is for you to figure it out. If you can figure it out that would indicate a strong likelihood that you sufficiently understand the argument even if you don't agree with the conclusions. It's difficult to anticipate the other stages, perhaps, but I don't think it's too difficult. After I give the second stage it should be even easier to anticipate the third stage.

I predict that Jaltus will get the third stage before I even present the second stage, so if you want to beat him you better curl that brow. :huh: He might even predict it in his first post.

Now, don't ask for hints. Let's just assume I'm trying to keep the spectators entertained during the lull in the action.

John Powell

[Captain Ochre]

03-09-2003 @ 07:58 PM
John Powell:


Now, don't ask for hints. Let's just assume I'm trying to keep the spectators entertained during the lull in the action.


I don't want any hints; that takes the fun out of it. Additionally, I'm far more interested in the meat of the argument, whatever it turns out to be, rather than my ability to guess your next move and the form it might take. My earlier post reflected my chafing at the delay in getting the discussion underway. Now that you've posted the start of the scenario to this board, I'm quite satisfied for the time being. :smile:

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

For anyone interested in a preview, see the Problem of Evil thread in the philosophy dept., page 5, beginning with post #29075 and the responses to it....

[Tim Holt]

POWELL:
I'm curious to know who in the bleachers will be the first to figure out what the second and/or third stages probably are. Perhaps Jaltus will beat you all.

Asking Tim Holt would be cheating.


HOLT
Asking Tim Holt wouldn't get you anywhere because Tim Holt wouldn't tell...


CAPTAIN OCHRE
I've had a pm conversation with Tim Holt, so he would know what I'm talking about (Tim knows all?). I didn't fish for additional info on John's scenario, as Tim would surely confirm.


HOLT
Indeed. If I remember correctly our pm conversation occurred before my pm conversation with John, so I would only have been able to guess at the second and third stages then anyway.

Glad the debate is up and running. Looking forward to it...

[Captain Ochre]

Judging by what has been presented thus far, I predict that Jaltus will establish that John does not make his case.

I see indications that John will commit one of the standard errors connected with his position (also that he might be mixing in another argument touching reverse causation), and I see indications that Jaltus knows what to look for.
You're solid, Jaltus! :smile:

John Powell's no slouch, though--I leave open the possibility that he will freely choose an elaboration of his scenario that disrupts my perfect knowledge of the future of the debate.:cheers:

[Captain Ochre]

Just finished reading Jaltus' reply. Short & sweet--too short, maybe?
However, use of the Samurai Jack avatar should guarantee victory.
:wink:

[John Powell]

POWELL:
To Ochre and Holt.

Captain Ochre:

Just finished reading Jaltus' reply. Short & sweet--too short, maybe?

However, use of the Samurai Jack avatar should guarantee victory.
:wink:

POWELL:
I suspect Jaltus is partly being accommodating to me by getting through my "beloved" scenario as quickly as possible so that we can focus on the discussion about the scenario and its associated more formal argument and such things.

HOLT
Asking Tim Holt wouldn't get you anywhere because Tim Holt wouldn't tell...


POWELL:
That's nice. I hope you enjoy the discussion / debate, Tim.

I'm trying very hard to keep my mind open to the possibility that I'm missing some critical thing that destroys my scenario, Tim, but it's so hard. It's probably that hard-wired dogmatism that nature seems to have given us.

John Powell

[The Laughing Man]

I'm at a loss. John Powell wrote this:

You seem to be denying that the cause (God's knowledgeable writing) precedes one of its effects (your free choice)

Am I just not reading that right? How is God's foreknowledge a cause and our free-will an effect of that cause? God's foreknowledge doesn't make us do anything. As I stated earlier, there is a distinction between foreknowledge (passive) and predestination (active).

[joelkaki]

The thing that kind of gets me about this whole debate is this:

This is not based around what the Bible teaches. Obviously I know Powell's purpose is to show the supposed logical inconsistency of foreknowledge and free will, but it seems to me that debates like this are a little pointless, because it really doesn't matter how all this reasoning turns out if the Bible specifically teaches one way or the other.

Hopefully someone will take up this same debate dealing rather with the Biblical teaching concerning it.

However, in the debate, Powell seems to assume that foreknowledge causes something. His entire scenario is based around that assumption, and that is not valid, for mere knowledge of something is not causal.

I liked Jaltus' short, sweet, and to the point first reply. No jumping around--just cut to the quick of the issue.

Of course, I disagree with both of em, because I believe in predestination, but hey, it's still a fun debate to follow.

Joel

[John Powell]

POWELL:
I just found out that I'm not supposed to post in this area, so I won't be doing that anymore after this post until the debate is over. I'll begin responding to any questions directed to me here at that time.

John Powell

[Captain Ochre]

03-11-2003 @ 03:50 AM
Jinx72:

Am I just not reading that right? How is God's foreknowledge a cause and our free-will an effect of that cause? God's foreknowledge doesn't make us do anything. As I stated earlier, there is a distinction between foreknowledge (passive) and predestination (active).

Unfortunately, you appear to be reading it accurately. This goes back to one of my earlier observations: Powell had described the third CT (Christian Theistic) view of omniscience/free-will as the target of his scenario, then he proceeds to attack a different target (parts of the scenario would remain relevant anyway, if not for other problems). The third view, you will recall, has God knowing the actual future because he is atemporal in some sense (which is mandatory if the future is to be known in any manner rather than view extrapolations from the beginning state (causal determinism) or via moment-by-moment divine intervention (which might be referred to as Meddlesome or Divine Determinism)).
I'm blurting this out because I cannot conceive of Jaltus missing this; it's simply too obvious.
This second post also further develops the equivocation that I spoke of earlier; that's all the hint I'm giving to Jaltus.

The third stage will assuredly be the addition of a reverse-causation scenario, where our fictional Jaltus will have his actual future revealed, which he is then to attempt to "change". I spilled a few beans already as to how I would respond to that particular stage. The challenge for Jaltus will be to identify the problem specifically and lucidly enough to persuade John that his position is untenable.
I happen to think that I have a persuasive way to illustrate the problem in John's argument. I look forward to Jaltus' attempt.

[Captain Ochre]

03-11-2003 @ 05:02 AM
joelkaki:
However, in the debate, Powell seems to assume that foreknowledge causes something. His entire scenario is based around that assumption, and that is not valid, for mere knowledge of something is not causal.


I disagree. I am practically certain that John sincerely believes that he is/will be presenting a logical case for knowledge causation.
He's incorrect, of course, as we shall see. :smile:


Of course, I disagree with both of em, because I believe in predestination, but hey, it's still a fun debate to follow.

Joel

In that case, you disagree with both of them ultimately because you were predestined to disagree. That you believe in predestination is coincidental (apart from the fact that you were similarly predestined to believe in predestination). :wink:

[joelkaki]

Yes, but back to my point (not to debate here), I believe it because I believe the bible teaches it. All the rationalizations in the world wouldn't matter to me if the Bible teaches on it one way or the other. But then again, I couldn't care less if we don't have free will.

Joel

[dizzle]

Hmm, I think I need to go through and carefully read this through.... (I have just been swamped!!) - but as a budding potential Molinist myself, I find this subject very interesting... my other obse... err, interest though, eschatology, always seems to find a way to overshadow everything else. I still want to read Craig's "Only Wise God" that I bought months ago!! Egad!!

[Captain Ochre]

Jaltus answered round two pretty well, though I think that his conclusion is weak in that he chose "Back to the Future" as an analogy. "Back to the Future" is a poor choice since Marty's time travel leads to alternate universes. If alternate universes are allowed for purposes of argument, then the # of universes might as well be infinite, which makes a mockery of human will as much as does causal determinism.
Better to stick to one actual timeline/one universe, imo. The reason for this will be brought to light eventually.

[Hired Gun]

God's omniscience and man's free will is one of my favorite arguments so I couldn't resist throwing in my two cents. If God's foreknowledge is a record of what has already transpired but that is presented to us from a point prior to the event, then John's scenario is effectively asking, "Can we change the past in any moment of the present?"

Not being able to change the past does not negate free will; Our free will is limited in regards to logic, physical circumstance and our own individual character.

Jesus predicted that Peter would deny Him three times. Peter was determined to prove Him wrong. But when the time came, despite Peter's vow to do the opposite, he did exactly what Christ said he would do. God's foreknowledge did not bind him to the action. Instead, his free will decision to deny his Lord is what bound God to make the prediction. Peter was limited in his capacity to do otherwise by his own fear, but it was his decision to give in to that fear. God knew what Peter would do because, from God's perspective, it had already happened.

Has John presented a false dilemma or a logic trap involving the definition of free will?

Any comments?

A.S.A. Jones

[Captain Ochre]

03-13-2003 @ 02:05 PM
Hired Gun:

Has John presented a false dilemma or a logic trap involving the definition of free will?

Any comments?


Welcome to the discussion, Hired Gun (or is it Mr. Jones?)!
As I mentioned earlier, I see signs that John will eventually rely on equivocation to power his promised syllogism. The scenario itself might be considered a false dilemma in a loose sense. The third stage of the scenario is definitely a source of Denmarkian stench, but I don't want to spoil Jaltus' fun/challenge by infecting his eventual approach with what I would do (I should check to see if the debate responses have been updated, come to think of it).
John has chosen the scenario for purposes of his presentation explicitly for rhetorical efficiency: He believes (if I understand him rightly) that the persuasive force of a scenario is superior to that of dry step-by-step logic.
I (optimistically) anticipate that when the problems with the logic are pointed out in both the scenario and in the subsequent presentation of logic, John will abandon this particular scenario as useless in pressing the issue of the incompatibility between omniscience and free will.
Go, Jaltus! Go, Jaltus!
:yipee:

[Hired Gun]

The logic problem I see here is the proposition that a logical God would present and engage in an illogical 'challenge'. Hence, a false dilemma. In scripture, God is very selective in choosing His prophets and revelations. I wouldn't agree on compromising the selectivity of God for purposes of argument.

[Captain Ochre]

First, I think that it was unfortunate that Jaltus dropped the term "bias" on John--that has resulted in a bit of psychologizing that we didn't really need. I think that Jaltus must have meant that John is importing hidden assumptions. That's the sort of claim that may be supported with evidence now or later. Bias is irrelevant to the argument unless it affects the soundness of the argument, afaics.

John essentially confessed that he has allowed his argument to drift from its purpose:

POWELL:
I didn't say God could not exist in some time-strange universe. What I'm saying is that when God interacts with our universe by writing on pieces of paper and speaking words and such things, then those specific events must obey the time-normal rules of our universe.

We'll see whether or not John supports this claim, but it is clearly not the same as saying that free will and omniscience are logically incompatible, which is the proposition that John elected to defend.

I agree with John's criticisms of the time travel analogy, but there's nothing wrong with a time travel analogy that doesn't introduce irrelevant factors (such as parallel universes) to the mix.

To me, it looks like John was just a wee bit flustered by Jaltus' reply--if only in the fact that Jaltus doesn't appear to be playing along wholeheartedly (more on that later). The argumentation related to free will/omniscience subsequent to noting Jaltus' response to the scenario establishes no logical progression, while giving a foretaste of the whole variety of errors that accompany the case against the compatibility of omniscience (including perfect future knowledge) and free will.

Why would Jaltus not "get into" the second stage of the scenario? Jalthus, I empathize completely! Having, as you do, the view that God's future knowledge of your future action reflects the actual event itself, and bearing in mind that Satan won't necessarily tell you the truth anyway, the second stage is a yawner unless you happen to think that you can trick Satan into giving something away.
John offers that Satan's pattern of response could be observed--which is true enough, but the scenario had originally appeared to be a one-shot deal, iirc.
Better to scoot forward to the third stage; the one on which John's scenario hinges, and the one that will eventually resist sound translation into syllogistic form (with respect to omniscience/free will).
As the third stage has been fairly obvious since the introduction of the second (or earlier!), I have no additional comments on it at this time. Good luck, Jaltus--hit a home run!

[Tim Holt]

CAPTAIN OCHRE
I don't want to spoil Jaltus' fun/challenge by infecting his eventual approach with what I would do


HOLT
This is my concern with the Arena section. Are we meant to be posting our own rebuttals of John's argument here or not? If so, it hardly seems fair.

[Captain Ochre]

03-13-2003 @ 03:28 PM
Tim Holt:

HOLT
This is my concern with the Arena section. Are we meant to be posting our own rebuttals of John's argument here or not? If so, it hardly seems fair.

Moderator comments in the other sections of the arena seem to clearly indicate that arena participation is unbridled (except for the fact that the actual debate participants can't duke it out in the arena until they're done in the ring).
Perhaps the guidelines should be changed, but otoh either participant can make use of what is submitted to the arena thread. The incompatibility position is not unpopular, even among Christians, so I'm at a loss as to why the arena contains no comments from that pov.

[Tim Holt]

CAPTAIN OCHRE
The incompatibility position is not unpopular, even among Christians, so I'm at a loss as to why the arena contains no comments from that pov.


HOLT
Ah, but we only get the more intelligent and insightful Christians at TWeb... :wink:

[Captain Ochre]

I set up predestined chat for behind-the-scenes discussion. PM me for the password unless I already sent it to you (Tim).
:smile:

[edit to add]
Not to imply that persons apart from Tim are to be excluded. Requirement for password consists of sending me a personal message, possession of interest in the topic, and no Jaltus nor J. Powell until after the bout has run its course.

[The Laughing Man]

Is anyone else confused by Powell's "Stage Three" challenge?

STAGE THREE:

The change that is stage three is that God bypasses Satan and gives the unsealed note directly to you, Jaltus. You get to look at the note and then try to do the opposite of what is written.

Stage 3 test begins.

God writes down His answer and gives it to you, Jaltus. You read what God wrote down. It is "A."

It is now up to you, Jaltus, to try to do the opposite of what you think that God wrote down. God has asked (or commanded, if you prefer) that you do your best to pick the opposite of what you think He wrote down.

Is there a typo in there. Powell initially states that you get to directly look at God's answer on the piece of paper (more on that briefly), but then in that last paragraph, the phrasing seems to indicate that you don't know what God wrote down. So which is it? Do you try to write down the opposite of what you know God wrote down or what you think God wrote down.

As for getting to look at what God wrote down, Powell's argument presupposes that God is a fool. Look at it this way: would you bet $100 that your friend couldn't pick the opposite of what you wrote down, which your friend gets to see before choosing? Of course not! Anyone who would fall for that and actually write down an answer is a fool, as is the person who concocted such a challenge.

[Hired Gun]

In Powell's scenario, God says to Jaltus, "Pick 'A' or 'B'. Jaltus picks 'A'. God then says to Jaltus, "We are going to repeat the experiment, but this time, we can skip you actually picking a letter and I'll just tell you which one you will pick. After I tell you which one you will pick, it is your duty to pick the opposite."

God tells Jaltus that he will pick 'A' and then it is up to Jaltus to try and pick 'B'. If Jaltus picks 'B', it compromises God's omniscience, because, according to God, Jaltus will pick 'A'. If Jaltus picks 'A', it compromises Jaltus' free will, because any rational human being would pick 'B' when instructed to pick the alternate letter.

Jaltus has already attempted to describe to John that God's foreknowledge is based on His being able to present a synopsis of an event that has already taken place, prior to the event. John's dilemma is false because it places both Jaltus and God in real time, but the event of Jaltus initially picking the letter that causes God to write 'A', never takes place. The scenario forces God and Jaltus into an illogical predicament. It makes the assumption that both God and Jaltus can make a second event, based on a past event that never took place; in other words, God and Jaltus are able to re-make the past. The mechanism of foreknowledge, as proposed by Jaltus, does not allow for this assumption.

[The Laughing Man]

So I was right in saying earlier that this was like the old "can God created a rock blah blah blah" question.

[Hired Gun]

Exactly, Jinx, and as my 5 year old daughter said in response to the rock question: "Mom, I can't give you a smart answer to a dumb question."

[doogieduff]

03-15-2003 @ 04:06 PM
Jinx72:

So I was right in saying earlier that this was like the old "can God created a rock blah blah blah" question.

I don't see your parallel here at all!

[doogieduff]

For those of you who believe the traditional view of divine foreknowledge, do you also stand to the fact that if it is true, then every Biblical prophecy from the Lord would have to come true down to the minutest detail? I mean, He's just peering into the future and taking notes right?

[Hired Gun]

Today @ 07:00 PM
doogieduff:



I don't see your parallel here at all!

The parallel is that both are problems that present an illogical condition to be fulfilled by a subject. Once the subject fulfills the condition through choice a or b, the original parameters of the problem are violated, deceptively placing the subject in a catch-22.

In the "Can God create a rock so big that He can't lift it? question, the subject is 'an omnipotent god'. Translating that directly into the statement, the statement would read, "Can a God, who can lift anything and create anything, create a rock that He couldn't lift?"

Choice 'a' would be 'no', choice 'b' would be 'yes'. Either answer results in God's omnipotence being compromised. Some Christians attempt to get out of the catch-22 by answering that God in theory could create such a rock, 'if He wanted to', but this would compromise His immutability because, in effect, they are saying that He COULD compromise His own omnipotence.

The parameter of definition that is being violated is the definition of omnipotence. What this question is asking, given that God is 'all-powerful' and limiting that definition to 'creating and lifting anything', for the purpose of argument, is this: "Can God do the impossible?" In reality, God may indeed be able to do what appears to be impossible. But this logic trap, just as the one that John has set, presents a false dilemma; once God would do the impossible, the original parameter of performing the impossible would no longer apply because at that point, the impossible would become possible.

I don't think that the definition of omnipotence would include the ability to do the logically impossible.

Another familiar logic trap is the "If God is all powerful, can He create a square circle?" Once again, if God could fulfill the parameters set forth in the problem, the original definitions of both 'square' and 'circle' would no longer apply. It is easy to see the nonsense that is being presented here.

[Hired Gun]

Today @ 07:02 PM
doogieduff:

For those of you who believe the traditional view of divine foreknowledge, do you also stand to the fact that if it is true, then every Biblical prophecy from the Lord would have to come true down to the minutest detail? I mean, He's just peering into the future and taking notes right?


I guess that would all depend on how well the prophet was hearing Him and how well the spirit was letting me hear what His prophet had to say
:brow:

[Hired Gun]

For an example of a logic trap that doesn't involve God, consider the fairness of the following:

If you are truly a genius, then you should be able to pass any test successfully, including one that would qualify you as an idiot.

See the fallacy?

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 12:39 AM
Hired Gun:
The parameter of definition that is being violated is the definition of omnipotence. What this question is asking, given that God is 'all-powerful' and limiting that definition to 'creating and lifting anything', for the purpose of argument, is this: "Can God do the impossible?" In reality, God may indeed be able to do what appears to be impossible. But this logic trap, just as the one that John has set, presents a false dilemma; once God would do the impossible, the original parameter of performing the impossible would no longer apply because at that point, the impossible would become possible.


Exactly. Put another way, if being omnipotent includes the ability to do the logically impossible, then an omnipotent could certainly exist despite being logically impossible.
The silly question has an excellent (if equally silly) answer.


I don't think that the definition of omnipotence would include the ability to do the logically impossible.


Agreed.

[doogieduff]

Today @ 05:39 PM
Hired Gun:



The parallel is that both are problems that present an illogical condition to be fulfilled by a subject. Once the subject fulfills the condition through choice a or b, the original parameters of the problem are violated, deceptively placing the subject in a catch-22.

In the "Can God create a rock so big that He can't lift it? question, the subject is 'an omnipotent god'. Translating that directly into the statement, the statement would read, "Can a God, who can lift anything and create anything, create a rock that He couldn't lift?"

Choice 'a' would be 'no', choice 'b' would be 'yes'. Either answer results in God's omnipotence being compromised. Some Christians attempt to get out of the catch-22 by answering that God in theory could create such a rock, 'if He wanted to', but this would compromise His immutability because, in effect, they are saying that He COULD compromise His own omnipotence.

The parameter of definition that is being violated is the definition of omnipotence. What this question is asking, given that God is 'all-powerful' and limiting that definition to 'creating and lifting anything', for the purpose of argument, is this: "Can God do the impossible?" In reality, God may indeed be able to do what appears to be impossible. But this logic trap, just as the one that John has set, presents a false dilemma; once God would do the impossible, the original parameter of performing the impossible would no longer apply because at that point, the impossible would become possible.

I don't think that the definition of omnipotence would include the ability to do the logically impossible.

Another familiar logic trap is the "If God is all powerful, can He create a square circle?" Once again, if God could fulfill the parameters set forth in the problem, the original definitions of both 'square' and 'circle' would no longer apply. It is easy to see the nonsense that is being presented here.

Still having trouble with your parallel. I can see how the rock example would compromise God either way, but I don't see how John Powell's arguement would do this. He's not trying to compromise any part of God (omniscience, omnipresence, or omnipotence). If he is, then let em know, but I don't see it. Joh Powell is establishing free will. If the person can't do differently from what God knows, then he doesn't have free will. If the person can do differently, then the person has free will, but doesn't prove God to be a liar if God indeed does not the future. This idea is biblical. God thought Israel would bear fruit, but indeed they did not. John Powell's example provides a completely biblical and logical idea which does not compromise God in any way. So I'll stick to my point that your parallel does not make sense.

[doogieduff]

Today @ 05:45 PM
Hired Gun:




I guess that would all depend on how well the prophet was hearing Him and how well the spirit was letting me hear what His prophet had to say
:brow:

Man, let's make this simple since you want to be difficult. Is the Bible the inspired, innerant, infallible word of God? I mean, is it 100% true in it's account of what happened? If you don't think that it is, then there's no point in going into this discussion.

[doogieduff]

Does anybody know what happened to Jaltus? According tot he rules (I believe) his five days to respond are up today. Powell's last response was on the 12th and today is the 17th. Any insight as to what's going on? (Or can I say I shouldn't have figured any differently...) :no:

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 03:42 AM
doogieduff:

Does anybody know what happened to Jaltus?


He's one of the most active moderators on TWeb, so he's around.


According tot he rules (I believe) his five days to respond are up today.


I'd guess that the rules are more indicative of an allowance for five 24-hour periods before Jaltus' reply is due. He's got about three hours by my calculations, and he usually posts early AM, iirc.


Powell's last response was on the 12th and today is the 17th. Any insight as to what's going on? (Or can I say I shouldn't have figured any differently...) :no:

Powell's last response was on the 13th @ approximately 5:30 AM, unless the date was tampered with.

This is the first response where Jaltus' needs to deliver an outstanding response, imo. The issue will be easily decided in Jaltus' favor (unless he unexpectedly fails to post); the key is how convincingly he makes his case to Powell.
Certainly there's little enough reason to expect Jaltus to fail to rebut Powell--this commentary thread has provided an unfair amount of material showing that Powell's attempt is seriously lacking.
If you still don't understand what's wrong with stage three after Jaltus' posts, then I'll be happy to assist Hired Hand in explaining it to you.
If you think that Jaltus' delay in replying has anything to do with the strength of good Mr. Powell's argument, then I'd say you're in for a rude awakening.

[Captain Ochre]

Now I'll have to agree with doogie that it appears that Jaltus has forfeited.
So, I guess we'll see how the moderators handle this sort of thing.

[edit to add]

Jaltus was goofing off in the dormitory about 2:30AM. Must have guzzled too many root beers and let the debate slip his mind.
:smile:

[The Laughing Man]

Yesterday @ 07:33 PM
Hired Gun:

For an example of a logic trap that doesn't involve God, consider the fairness of the following:

If you are truly a genius, then you should be able to pass any test successfully, including one that would qualify you as an idiot.

See the fallacy?

:rofl: :rofl: :rofl:

That's hilarious! I love it. Thanks. :thumb:

[The Laughing Man]

Yesterday @ 11:35 PM
Captain Ochre:

Now I'll have to agree with doogie that it appears that Jaltus has forfeited.
So, I guess we'll see how the moderators handle this sort of thing.

Unless he's going by Dee Dee's post, which is dated 2 days (roughly) after Powell's post. Perhaps she should have stated that - as of her post - he had 3 days (roughly) to respond.

Or maybe his response just hasn't been approved and posted by Dee Dee yet. I don't entirely know how the debate moderation works here, though, so I can't really say for sure.

[Hired Gun]

Yesterday @ 10:39 PM
doogieduff:



Still having trouble with your parallel. I can see how the rock example would compromise God either way, but I don't see how John Powell's arguement would do this. He's not trying to compromise any part of God (omniscience, omnipresence, or omnipotence). If he is, then let em know, but I don't see it. Joh Powell is establishing free will. If the person can't do differently from what God knows, then he doesn't have free will. If the person can do differently, then the person has free will, but doesn't prove God to be a liar if God indeed does not the future.

John's scenario has God telling Jaltus what the future outcome of Jaltus' decision will be.

This idea is biblical. God thought Israel would bear fruit, but indeed they did not. John Powell's example provides a completely biblical and logical idea which does not compromise God in any way. So I'll stick to my point that your parallel does not make sense.

The Bible claims that God knows the end from the beginning. Powell would be amused to learn that his example has provided a completely biblical and logical idea which does not compromise God in any way. You are welcome to continue to think that my parallel does not make sense. Perhaps it compromises some aspect of your faith that has become important to you. However, I don't debate brothers or sisters.

[Hired Gun]

Today @ 01:09 AM
Jinx72:



:rofl: :rofl: :rofl:

That's hilarious! I love it. Thanks. :thumb:

Here's another one, then. I like thinking up these types of things to confuse my husband.

If you are a really good marksman, you should be able to aim at nothing and still hit it.

[doogieduff]

Today @ 03:05 AM
Hired Gun:

The Bible claims that God knows the end from the beginning.

Where is this? It says that God "declares the end from the beginning" but I don't remember a verse that says He knows the end from the beginning. A referee declares the end from the beginning in a football game, yet ahs no idea what will happen in between...

[Hired Gun]

Today @ 08:57 AM
doogieduff:



Where is this? It says that God "declares the end from the beginning" but I don't remember a verse that says He knows the end from the beginning. A referee declares the end from the beginning in a football game, yet ahs no idea what will happen in between...

I won't debate a brother or sister.

[Jaltus]

For the record, I posted a long time ago and was waiting for approval.

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 04:24 PM
Jaltus:

For the record, I posted a long time ago and was waiting for approval.

Okie-dokie!
I admit that it stretched my credulity that you would have been as active on the board as you are yet let the deadline slip by!
Should there be a mechanism for keeping the time of the post open to the public while still permitting the mods to do appropriate screening?
Pardon me while I dash off to see your response, Jaltus!

Oh, and my apologies for allowing appearances to deceive me into doubting you.

[Captain Ochre]

Jaltus has done well, imo. Maybe not a home run, but a solid double in the gap, stretched to a triple by a combination of the batter's speed on the basepaths combined with a weak outfielder's arm.

Jaltus hit all the key points, imo, and added in one that I hadn't taken note of (the removal of free will from a scenario that should have free will as a basic premise).
His clarity is a mild disappointment--I foresee John Powell sustaining his argument because he won't comprehend the sense of Jaltus' position.
In particular, the objection to the absurdity of the third stage lacks rhetorical punch. Yes, it's a closed time-loop. Why is that bad? Yes, it's similar to the "can god create a rock so heavy that he cannot lift it" type of absurdity. How, exactly?
To me, it would make sense to emphasize that the first two stages do not cause any problem for a compatibility between foreknowledge and free will. Thus, John himself is providing scenarios where free will and foreknowledge appear compatible--in effect constructing a counterexample to his own side of the argument. So, what is wrong with the third stage. The problem is that John provides us with no apparent way in which God could have had knowledge that A was chosen rather than B (the opposite of what God knew would be chosen). With God's knowledge being actual, God would also be aware of the challenge that led to the choice. There is no logical way that the third scenario can justify its own suggested outcome.
As I mentioned to Tim Holt in private conversation, it is as if the challenge portion of the third stage itself takes place in an alternate universe rather than the actual. The third stage ends up being a pointless exercise asking the question: What if God were wrong about the future? The answer would be that God is not omniscient as a result, but the scenario doesn't prove anything whatsoever with respect to the compatibililty of omniscience and free will.
Since John Powell himself has provided scenarios which accord with the compatibility of free will and omniscience, it must be judged that Jaltus has the better of the debate.
It will probably get worse for John, since it is more difficult to hide improper presuppositions in the form of a syllogism. I have a particular expectation regarding the error that we'll see once the syllogism is unveiled.
Given Jaltus' performance so far, I have good reason to think that he will have no problem evaluating the syllogism for error.

Good work, Jaltus.
John, I respect your sincerity and willingness to enter into discussion--but you're going to take some lumps on this issue. You'll change your view within 30 days unless you're not as willing to examine your own views as I believe you to be.

[doogieduff]

Good post by Jaltus, I will admit. But can he now prove that the future exists? I don't think he can. His logic was that if the future did indeed exist, God must know it, because God knows all that is knowable. I would agree. But I don't believe the future exists. Can anyone change my mind?

[doogieduff]

Today @ 07:17 AM
Hired Gun:



I won't debate a brother or sister.

Whatever dude. I wasn't asking for debate. You said the Bible said something, and I wanted to know where exactly that was. Sounds more like discussion to me, but whatever....

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 10:54 PM
doogieduff:

Good post by Jaltus, I will admit. But can he now prove that the future exists? I don't think he can. His logic was that if the future did indeed exist, God must know it, because God knows all that is knowable. I would agree. But I don't believe the future exists. Can anyone change my mind?

Does the past exist?

[edit to add]
I should point out that Jaltus need not establish anything apart from the compatibility of omniscience and free will. Knowledge of the future will be assumed to be a part of omniscience unless/until somebody can suggest a non-fallacious reason as to why future knowledge shouldn't be included part of omniscience.

[Rubens]

Today @ 08:56 AM
doogieduff:



Whatever dude. I wasn't asking for debate. You said the Bible said something, and I wanted to know where exactly that was. Sounds more like discussion to me, but whatever....

Hi everybody, I'm crashing this bleacher party, even tho this whole thing is probably way above me.

DoogieDuff I presume you refer to Isaiah 46:10 "I make known the end from the beginning, from ancient times, what is still to come" (NIV). The KJV says "Declaring the end from the beginning". This is pretty conclusive I'd say! Digging into the Hebrew doesn't say much more, other than to elaborate on "Declaring" as "to inform, avow, acknowledge".. etc

The point is, Hired Gun is right...we occasionally put God into a
box restricted by our own known dimensions. God sits outside of our time/space dimension. He lives in eternity. We keep thinking of eternity as "a very long time" but it is in fact the total absence of time. Everything that for us hasn't happened yet, has been viewed by Him.

A good website to mull over is www.khouse.org (http://) - filter thru some of the articles and you'll find some interesting, scientifically-grounded perspectives on the whole "eternity" thing, dimensions, the physicality of time, and stuff.

Having said all that, I have tried to rationalise the "outside time" thing and ended up with a headache. That's why this whole debate is an exercise in mental gymnastics!!

Fun though.
:argh:

[dizzle]

FYI - and I did not know this before, when a post is in "limbo" awaiting approval, once it gets posted it retains the time stamp of when it was originally submitted so the time and dates on the debate thread are accurate for tracking timeliness in response.

[dizzle]

FYI - and I did not know this before, when a post is in "limbo" awaiting approval, once it gets posted it retains the time stamp of when it was originally submitted so the time and dates on the debate thread are accurate for tracking timeliness in response.

[doogieduff]

Yesterday @ 03:56 PM
Captain Ochre:



Does the past exist?

[edit to add]
I should point out that Jaltus need not establish anything apart from the compatibility of omniscience and free will. Knowledge of the future will be assumed to be a part of omniscience unless/until somebody can suggest a non-fallacious reason as to why future knowledge shouldn't be included part of omniscience.

The past did exist! That is the point. Therefore God has perfect knowledge of the past. I don't think God can go back and change the past. Why should I believe God knows the future, when He never claims to, and I can't even be shown hat the future exists or has existed. (How's that?)

[doogieduff]

Today @ 04:48 AM
Rubens:





Hi everybody, I'm crashing this bleacher party, even tho this whole thing is probably way above me.

DoogieDuff I presume you refer to Isaiah 46:10 "I make known the end from the beginning, from ancient times, what is still to come" (NIV). The KJV says "Declaring the end from the beginning". This is pretty conclusive I'd say! Digging into the Hebrew doesn't say much more, other than to elaborate on "Declaring" as "to inform, avow, acknowledge".. etc

The point is, Hired Gun is right...we occasionally put God into a
box restricted by our own known dimensions. God sits outside of our time/space dimension. He lives in eternity. We keep thinking of eternity as "a very long time" but it is in fact the total absence of time. Everything that for us hasn't happened yet, has been viewed by Him.

A good website to mull over is www.khouse.org (http://) - filter thru some of the articles and you'll find some interesting, scientifically-grounded perspectives on the whole "eternity" thing, dimensions, the physicality of time, and stuff.

Having said all that, I have tried to rationalise the "outside time" thing and ended up with a headache. That's why this whole debate is an exercise in mental gymnastics!!

Fun though.
:argh:

Like my referee analogy, declaring the end from the beginning and foreseeing it from the beginning of time are two way different things. Even if the verse says God knows the end from the beginning, that does nothing for me. It doesn't say He knew it from before the beginning of creation. If you asked me what "knowing the end from the beginning" meant, do you know what my first answer would be? That God can tell the difference between the end and the beginning! Isn't that what "knowing the end from the beginning" really means? Think about it. Ask a child this question: "Do you know the end from the beginning in a race?" His answer: "Sure, the end is where the finish line is, and the beginning is the painted line."

I have yet to see biblical evidence for a God outside of time. Is time something to be outside of? I don't think so. It's just a unit of measurement we humans have created.

Revelation 8:1 "When He opened the seventh seal, there was silence in heaven for about half an hour."

What is this? Time in heaven it presumes. But wait, God exists outside of time! Or does HE? I already know how you'll respond to this verse, and it will only go to prove my point...

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 03:01 PM
doogieduff:



The past did exist! That is the point.


Oh, really? You doubted that the future could be known because it doesn't exist. I simply pointed out that (via rhetorical question) that the past doesn't "exist" per se either.
So, now your objection would seem to be that the past could be known because it existed in the past, while the future cannot be known because it exists in the future.
Why aren't you guilty of the fallacies of special pleading and/or circular reasoning?


Therefore God has perfect knowledge of the past. I don't think God can go back and change the past. Why should I believe God knows the future, when He never claims to, and I can't even be shown hat the future exists or has existed. (How's that?)

As the fallacy of argument from ignorance, it's pretty good (since it hasn't been proven that god knows the future, therefore god doesn't know the future)!

You don't need to believe that God knows the future. What you believe is up to you. With respect to the argument for incompatibility between omniscience and free will, we typically assume that future knowledge is part of omniscience according to the definition of omniscience which encompasses all facts which may logically be known. Since there is no reason to exclude future events from that which may logically be known (argument from ignorance is insufficient), we keep it for the sake of argument. Am I repeating myself, or what?

[doogieduff]

Today @ 08:17 AM
Captain Ochre:

With respect to the argument for incompatibility between omniscience and free will, we typically assume that future knowledge is part of omniscience according to the definition of omniscience which encompasses all facts which may logically be known. Since there is no reason to exclude future events from that which may logically be known (argument from ignorance is insufficient), we keep it for the sake of argument.

I changed my wording, didn't you see it? Why would God know something that doesn't either exist or has existed? Prove to me the future exists dude! I know the past existed because I was there! I know the present exists because I am here! There is nothing else that logically exists yo!

Why do you assume that future knowledge is part of omniscience. That's a huge leap man. I could in turn say that I assume that God's omniscience includes that He knows I can drive south to Denver when in fact it is north of me. But God knows everything right? Well, all that is knowable. I find it interesting how you turn so quick from the so-called "stupid arguments." You say that John Powell's arguement is not helpful because it's like saying "Can God make a square circle?" Now look at your arguement, your saying God must know the future because He knows everything. You don't even know if the future exists (much less knowable!), but "Hey, He's God and knows everything, so we must include it into His omnicscience." This is what you're saying right?

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 03:38 PM
doogieduff:

I changed my wording, didn't you see it?


I'm not sure. Which wording are you referring to?


Why would God know something that doesn't either exist or has existed?


One more time: If omniscience is taken to mean that the omniscient being knows all that it is possible to know, simply claiming that the future doesn't exist (or exist "yet" or whatever) doesn't justify excluding it.


Prove to me the future exists dude!


Why? I've already explained to you that your belief regarding the existence or nonexistence of the future is irrelevant to the current debate. Do you disagree? If so, why do you disagree?


I know the past existed because I was there!


For all of it?


I know the present exists because I am here! There is nothing else that logically exists yo!


Nothing else that logically exists? May I assume that you are able to support that point via a syllogism or the like?


Why do you assume that future knowledge is part of omniscience. That's a huge leap man.


Sure, and so is thinking that omnipotence grants the ability to make something out of nothing. Do you have a problem with that, also? If not, then why not?

It's not a huge leap at all. The definitions were developed for the sake of argument, and we have gone centuries without a reasonable rationale for excluding future knowledge in the case of omniscience.


I could in turn say that I assume that God's omniscience includes that He knows I can drive south to Denver when in fact it is north of me. But God knows everything right? Well, all that is knowable.


Good, then we can dispense with the straw man. Why isn't the future knowable?
Do you know what a counterexample is, in logic? Let's suppose that an omnipotent being creates a deterministic universe, where every event in future history is established via natural law. Is the future knowable?


I find it interesting how you turn so quick from the so-called "stupid arguments." You say that John Powell's arguement is not helpful because it's like saying "Can God make a square circle?" Now look at your arguement, your saying God must know the future because He knows everything.


Now, I'm not trying to be mean, but you don't appear to understand the nature of the argument. John is accepting that the future is knowable for the sake of argument. He wants to show that future knowledge leads to an absurdity, which would in turn show that future knowledge would not be possible if certain conditions (free will) attend. If we do not assume that future knowledge is possible for the sake of argument, then how would we establish that it is not logically possible without assuming the conclusion (which is a logical fallacy)?

John will fail in demonstrating the absurdity, btw.


You don't even know if the future exists (much less knowable!), but "Hey, He's God and knows everything, so we must include it into His omnicscience." This is what you're saying right?

Not at all. I'm saying that we grant future knowledge for the sake of argument, just as John Powell does. Beyond that, I will affirm that I believe that I can demonstrate the error in any argument that claims to show that future knowledge is impossible. If there is no sound argument showing the impossibility of future knowledge, then it is absurd to assume that omniscience cannot include knowledge of the future (except maybe for the sake of some different argument).

:cheers:

[Hired Gun]

Captain Ochre,

Where were you when I debated as an atheist? Your clear thinking and concise writing could have provided me with a humbling experience much sooner. :thumb:

[doogieduff]

Today @ 10:23 AM
Captain Ochre:

One more time: If omniscience is taken to mean that the omniscient being knows all that it is possible to know, simply claiming that the future doesn't exist (or exist "yet" or whatever) doesn't justify excluding it.

I would strongly disagree here. Does Los Angeles, Colorado exist? Of course not. So you're saying just because Los Angeles doesn't exist, that doesn't justify excluding it from God's knowledge? Give me a break.




Why? I've already explained to you that your belief regarding the existence or nonexistence of the future is irrelevant to the current debate. Do you disagree? If so, why do you disagree?

Sure it does! Jaltus said that we must include the future in God's omnicsience, so i asked if he could prove the future exists. If I told you that God knows about Los Angeles, Colorado, what's the first thing you would ask me? "Prove to me that Los Angeles exists!"


Good, then we can dispense with the straw man. Why isn't the future knowable?
Do you know what a counterexample is, in logic? Let's suppose that an omnipotent being creates a deterministic universe, where every event in future history is established via natural law. Is the future knowable?

You bet. But this isn't the case at all. Apparently you are Calvinist. This would mean that we're just robots. Why did God create us? He wanted fellowship and a true loving relationship. A deterministic universe is foolish. (And not biblical I might add.)

[Captain Ochre]

Yesterday @ 08:54 PM
doogieduff:



I would strongly disagree here. Does Los Angeles, Colorado exist? Of course not. So you're saying just because Los Angeles doesn't exist, that doesn't justify excluding it from God's knowledge? Give me a break.


Sorry, no quarter for you. :smile:
The key for knowledge regarding the future is truth. If it is true that Los Angeles, Colorado exists on January 10, 2101 A.C.E., then that proposition is true at all times, and in all places (we'll suppose that the Mormons took over Colorado and purchased the Western seaboard when the US got tired of dealing with them, then abolished the old state lines). Anything actual is capable, in principle, as being described as a propositional truth (an absolute truth, as a matter of fact). Using a non-actual counterexample as you do fails, since I can appeal to an actual future described in terms of specific propositions.


Sure it does!

Uh, "sure it does" does not appear to address anything that I wrote--at least not in a grammatically recognizable way.


Jaltus said that we must include the future in God's omnicsience, so i asked if he could prove the future exists. If I told you that God knows about Los Angeles, Colorado, what's the first thing you would ask me? "Prove to me that Los Angeles exists!"


Nonsense. I wouldn't be fooled by your (unintentional, I'm sure) confusion between the non-actual and the actual. We have an excellent idea that a future exists. Those of us who are not omniscient just don't know for sure which actual future exists.

Last post, I gave a counterexample using a causally determined future, then asked if the future could be known . . .


You bet. But this isn't the case at all.


That doesn't matter. You just admitted that a non-existent future was knowable. Thus, your rationale for rejecting future knowledge has been shredded (have you got another one?).


Apparently you are Calvinist.


No. I just know a good counterexample when I see one.


This would mean that we're just robots. Why did God create us? He wanted fellowship and a true loving relationship. A deterministic universe is foolish. (And not biblical I might add.)

You missed the point. Now that you've admitted that a deterministic future may be known even if it doesn't exist, we find that you have the impossibility of future knowledge in a free-will universe as a default (unjustified) belief (iow, you beg the question on the issue).
On top of that, you still don't seem to understand that John Powell is assuming accurate future knowledge in conjunction with free will for the sake of his argument against the compatibility of the two.

Sit back, relax, and read through the arguments (those past and those to come). John has a good idea of what he's doing (not well enough to succeed, but he'll make a game attempt).
Once we get through the debate and the discussion to follow, I'll try to deal with any remaining questions that you have.
:cheers:

[Rubens]

DoogieDuff
Revelation 8:1 "When He opened the seventh seal, there was silence in heaven for about half an hour."

Fair quote. The only response I have at this point is that most commentaries list the silence as the angels' silence. Angels are created beings. Also, Revelation involves the "invasion" into our physical world of God's heavenly realm, therefore for descriptive purposes some of the prophesies had to be put into the dimension of time.

What I am attempting to imply is that God created time, along with everything else.

Hebrews 1:2-3 (Amplified Bible) in the last of these days He has spoken to us in [the person of a] Son, Whom He appointed Heir and lawful Owner of all things, also by and through Whom He created the worlds and the reaches of space and the ages of time-[that is] [He made, produced, built, operated, and arranged them in order]. He is the sole expression of the glory of God-[the Light-being, the out-raying or radiance of the divine],-and He is the perfect imprint and very image of [God's] nature, upholding and maintaining and guiding and propelling the universe by His mighty word of power..."

I have used the Amplified Bible, (yes, you won't find that verbatim in the KJV or NIV) because it expands the Greek word for "worlds" namely "aion": which means perpetuity of time, eternity, the worlds, universe, period of time, age.
I'm confident that digging deeper into many verses relating to God's power can reveal clear indications that God created time.
[B]DoogieDuff:
I have yet to see biblical evidence for a God outside of time. Is time something to be outside of? I don't think so. It's just a unit of measurement we humans have created.

I don't expect you to accept my previous verse as "biblical evidence for a God outside time", it's more a challenge for you to dig deeper and see just how "big" God really is. Is time something to be outside of- you don't think so? Don't be so sure! The scientific perspective is even more fascinating. Ever since Einstein's T.O.R. scientists have been compelled to view time as a "fourth dimension", having physicality which can be altered. Yes, time is a very constant entity (i.e. time only goes forward and we can only look back) but it can be affected by gravity, the speed of light, and so on.

If you can handle that, read
www.khouse.org/articles/technical/19971001-29.html (http://)

The point is, if time is a "dimension", with physical properties, and God created the physical universe, then could it stand to reason that God created time, ergo He exists outside of it?

I suppose it gets down to how much you think we are meant to understand, and how much you accept we simply cannot!

Hired Gun , I loved your short, conundrum, paradoxical quotes, here's one of mine;

One wise man knows many things.
Another wise man knows he cannot know everything.
Who is wiser?

[Hired Gun]

I'm very disappointed that John is taking an accepted premise of the argument (That God does know the future) that is allowing this debate to take place and then attempting to argue his point by denying it. It is illogical to present a scenario in which God knows the future, make the assertion that knowledge of the future negates man's free will, and then argue that God can't know the future within the confines of the same argument.

[Captain Ochre]

The debate is panning out pretty much as I predicted. John Powell's responses are scattered and ultimately confused, partly stemming from Jaltus' difficulty in stanching the pathways of wrong-thinking in the previous round.
Previewing Jaltus' next post to the debate, he's probably going to be forced to sum up the rambling portions of John's post in order to maintain an orderly and forceful presentation.

John referenced the arena commentary, but he has failed notably, imo, to take the meaning to heart.
The most notable failure on his part remains the fact that he has left his fundamental proposition unsupported in his subsequent argumentation: He is arguing that reverse causation is impossible, not that omniscience and free will are incompatible, yet continues to assert the alleged incompatibility without support. That is a pretty serious confusion, imo.

The syllogism contains precisely the fallacy that I was expecting (pats self on back-ouch! ouch!).
The error is severe, but again Jaltus will be challenged to make his presentation clear to the audience, let alone Mr. Powell, since the issue contained in the error involves some degree of subtlety.
Go, Jaltus! Go, Jaltus!

P.S.: I already gave the counterexample to John's argument in favor of the impossibility of future knowledge*, but maybe John didn't get a chance to read it prior to composing his debate submission.

*D'oh! Nevermind, Hired Gun! I see what you're talking about, now. Yet another example of John's difficulty in developing a focus on the supposed purpose of the debate.

[Hired Gun]

Here Captain! Analyze this! (Actually, I am hoping that Powell gets a better understanding of Jaltus' position if he reads this)

Consider the following hypothetical mechanism for God's foreknowledge to take place:

God IS in the past; God IS in the present; Man, however, ONLY is in the moment of the present (special exceptions, such as my dear old auntie who insists on living in the past, excluded). Man does 'X' in the moment of the present. God, who is present in the present moment, is also present in the past. God sees man doing 'X' in the moment of the present, but because God is also present in the past, he knows about man doing 'X' , in His dimension of eternal time, before man actually does 'X' in man's own relative time frame. When God reveals man doing 'X' from a past vantage point, this appears to man to be a prediction of an event that has yet to occur, but to God, it has already occurred.

Taking God out of the picture:
Let's say there is a series of funhouse mirrors in outerspace and one is visible from earth. You float in front of one of these mirrors at the far end of the universe. You decide it would be funny to make an obscene gesture, and you do. The people on earth see you perform this gesture in the visible mirror and think you are a naughty boy. They receive the image of you doing this thousands of years after you actually do it, because of the time it takes light to reach the earth from that part of the universe. But what if we ran the image of you flipping us the bird through a superstring, rotating cylinder or worm hole or some other warpage of space that results in your image being transmitted faster than the speed of light? People on earth could feasibly see your middle finger being flashed at them prior to the point in your own time frame where you actually did it. Does their knowledge of what you DID remove your free will from the moment of the present in which you decided to flip earth the bird?

The answer is 'no' , for those who can't add. When we take God out of the picture, the farfetched suddenly becomes a little more reasonable to those who don't believe in His existence.

John's syllogism doesn't take into account the mechanism of foreknowledge that I have demonstrated above. I believe that this is exactly the same mechanism that Jaltus has proposed. In John's scenario, the following situation is expounded:

1. God tells Jaltus, "I will ask you to pick 'A' or 'B'. You will pick 'A'."
2. "Now, we are going to skip this actual event of Me asking and you picking,"
3. "I want you to pick the opposite of what I told you that you would pick."

To make the fallacy more clear, let's substitute the following actions:

1. God tells Jaltus, "I will ask you to drop a glass of milk and clean it up with either a towel or a napkin. You will choose a napkin."
2. "Now, we are going to skip this actual event of me asking you to drop a glass of milk and you choosing to clean it up with either a towel or a napkin."
3. "I want you to clean up the milk with a towel."

The only problem here, is there is no milk to clean up. The event never took place and therefore the milk can't be cleaned up because it was never spilled. In the original scenario, God never asks Jaltus to make the initial decision that allows an opposite choice and the prediction of it to be had. His syllogism doesn't take these matters into account.

As a scientist, I know the folly of looking at something from only man's perspective. If we never took into account different perspectives, we would still see the sun as revolving around the earth. John is looking at the issue of omniscience and free will only from the perspective of man from a relativistic time frame. You have to think outside of the box of man's time frame to understand what is being said here.

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 05:50 PM
Hired Gun:

Here Captain! Analyze this! (Actually, I am hoping that Powell gets a better understanding of Jaltus' position if he reads this)

Consider the following hypothetical mechanism for God's foreknowledge to take place:

God IS in the past; God IS in the present; Man, however, ONLY is in the moment of the present (special exceptions, such as my dear old auntie who insists on living in the past, excluded). Man does 'X' in the moment of the present. God, who is present in the present moment, is also present in the past. God sees man doing 'X' in the moment of the present, but because God is also present in the past, he knows about man doing 'X' , in His dimension of eternal time, before man actually does 'X' in man's own relative time frame. When God reveals man doing 'X' from a past vantage point, this appears to man to be a prediction of an event that has yet to occur, but to God, it has already occurred.


Exactly! That's why it was puzzling as to why John would acknowledge the atemporal nature of God in the view of those to whom he directed his argument while constructing a scenario that neglects that aspect of God.


Taking God out of the picture:
Let's say there is a series of funhouse mirrors in outerspace and one is visible from earth. You float in front of one of these mirrors at the far end of the universe. You decide it would be funny to make an obscene gesture, and you do. The people on earth see you perform this gesture in the visible mirror and think you are a naughty boy. They receive the image of you doing this thousands of years after you actually do it, because of the time it takes light to reach the earth from that part of the universe. But what if we ran the image of you flipping us the bird through a superstring, rotating cylinder or worm hole or some other warpage of space that results in your image being transmitted faster than the speed of light? People on earth could feasibly see your middle finger being flashed at them prior to the point in your own time frame where you actually did it. Does their knowledge of what you DID remove your free will from the moment of the present in which you decided to flip earth the bird?

The answer is 'no' , for those who can't add. When we take God out of the picture, the farfetched suddenly becomes a little more reasonable to those who don't believe in His existence.

John's syllogism doesn't take into account the mechanism of foreknowledge that I have demonstrated above. I believe that this is exactly the same mechanism that Jaltus has proposed.


I would argue that no mechanism of foreknowledge is necessary; only the recognition that the knowledge of the future is actual and not a mere prediction or extrapolation.
It's prediction only in the sense that the knowledge precedes the action according to our time frame.


In John's scenario, the following situation is expounded:

1. God tells Jaltus, "I will ask you to pick 'A' or 'B'. You will pick 'A'."
2. "Now, we are going to skip this actual event of Me asking and you picking,"
3. "I want you to pick the opposite of what I told you that you would pick."

To make the fallacy more clear, let's substitute the following actions:

1. God tells Jaltus, "I will ask you to drop a glass of milk and clean it up with either a towel or a napkin. You will choose a napkin."
2. "Now, we are going to skip this actual event of me asking you to drop a glass of milk and you choosing to clean it up with either a towel or a napkin."
3. "I want you to clean up the milk with a towel."

The only problem here, is there is no milk to clean up. The event never took place and therefore the milk can't be cleaned up because it was never spilled. In the original scenario, God never asks Jaltus to make the initial decision that allows an opposite choice and the prediction of it to be had. His syllogism doesn't take these matters into account.


Yes, and Powell's notion of "changing" the future is nonsensical. If the future doesn't exist, as Powell maintains, then there is nothing to change. If the future is propositionally actual (as I think Jaltus would maintain), then change is impossible--only determining the future (through action) is possible.


As a scientist, I know the folly of looking at something from only man's perspective. If we never took into account different perspectives, we would still see the sun as revolving around the earth. John is looking at the issue of omniscience and free will only from the perspective of man from a relativistic time frame. You have to think outside of the box of man's time frame to understand what is being said here.

Correct, and I remain puzzled as to why John deliberately (afaics) dropped the atemporality of God that he had recognized in his earlier statements.

[Rubens]

Captain Ochre
Exactly! That's why it was puzzling as to why John would acknowledge the atemporal nature of God in the view of those to whom he directed his argument while constructing a scenario that neglects that aspect of God.

Hired Gun
I know the folly of looking at something from only man's perspective. If we never took into account different perspectives, we would still see the sun as revolving around the earth. John is looking at the issue of omniscience and free will only from the perspective of man from a relativistic time frame. You have to think outside of the box of man's time frame to understand what is being said here.

AMEN

You guys rock!!!! :rockon:

[doogieduff]

Yesterday @ 09:22 PM
Captain Ochre:



Nonsense. I wouldn't be fooled by your (unintentional, I'm sure) confusion between the non-actual and the actual. We have an excellent idea that a future exists. Those of us who are not omniscient just don't know for sure which actual future exists.


My confusion in all of this is summed up by this statement right here. You have yet to give me any reason that the future exists. Give me any evidence that the future exists. I'd be willing to bet that there is more evidence for aliens than there is for the future, and I bet you don't believe in aliens...Which leads me to believe that you believe in a future so your beliefs about God would be true. This is exactly opposite of what we are supposed to do. The Bible is God's word, and in it He told us all wwe need to know about Him right now. Of course it's not everything, but He has told us a lot about Himself, including the fact that He doesn't know the future from the foundation of the world.

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 02:42 AM
doogieduff:



My confusion in all of this is summed up by this statement right here. You have yet to give me any reason that the future exists.


Rather, I explained to you why giving your a reason why the future "exists" is beside the point. You admitted that the future could be known, and you should admit that the future may be described propositionally. You also admitted that the past doesn't exist.
Why do you still think that I need to prove to you that the future exists?


Give me any evidence that the future exists.


On March 22, 2003, the moon continues to orbit the Earth.

Let me know when the above statement becomes true.


I'd be willing to bet that there is more evidence for aliens than there is for the future, and I bet you don't believe in aliens...Which leads me to believe that you believe in a future so your beliefs about God would be true.


This is a red herring, kiddo. You've already admitted that a causally determined future may be known, now you're shifting the burden of proof with respect to our discussion.


This is exactly opposite of what we are supposed to do. The Bible is God's word, and in it He told us all wwe need to know about Him right now. Of course it's not everything, but He has told us a lot about Himself, including the fact that He doesn't know the future from the foundation of the world.

Red herring. You can take that to the threads dealing with the Open View of God and get trounced there. It's off-topic in this thread, which is about the supposed incompatibility between omniscience and free will. If you have an argument regarding either the impossibility of accurate future knowledge or scripture that circumscribes the knowledge of God, I would be delighted to read it, and enthusiastic about sharing my comments.
Now, relax and follow the debate.

[Captain Ochre]

Jaltus showed extreme good humor and patience by dealing with John Powell's rabbit trails.
Personally, I would have ignored most everything except for the syllogism, emphasizing that John never gets around to arguing his end of the topic. John is literally arguing a different issue than the one the debate is supposed to be about.

I don't carry the same respect for John's syllogism that Jaltus apparently does. I find it deeply flawed, and I detect the flaw earlier in the syllogism than does Jaltus.
That said, Jaltus' analogy from known actions of the past strongly illustrates that flaw without fingering its occurence within the syllogism.
Jaltus takes Round 4 quite clearly, imo, though the syllogism hasn't been as totally obliterated as perhaps it should have been.
I'm sure that our good John Powell will answer the bell for the next round!

[psychopath]

I don't know want to give anything away right now, but am I right in assuming you see a seemingly major flaw in P2?

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 07:56 PM here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=41849#post41849)
psychopath:

I don't know want to give anything away right now, but am I right in assuming you see a seemingly major flaw in P2?

Hmmm. Too bad you've got PMing disabled, or I could be more specific. It is too much to assume that I see a major flaw specifically in premise two. Suffice it to say that the first two premisses are employed inappropriately considering the conclusion that John desires to reach thereby--in my humble opinion.

[psychopath]

I enabled PMing. If you still want to describe your view more specifically, I'd like to hear what you're thinking.

But I do agree with the cursory explanation regarding the first 2 premises, and think I see what you're getting at.:wink:

[themuzicman]

Captain Ochre said:

Nonsense. I wouldn't be fooled by your (unintentional, I'm sure) confusion between the non-actual and the actual. We have an excellent idea that a future exists. Those of us who are not omniscient just don't know for sure which actual future exists.


We do? Isn't that a pretty rash assumption? I would assert that free will requires that the future NOT exist.

Michael

[doogieduff]

Today @ 01:41 PM here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=41879#post41879)
themuzicman:



We do? Isn't that a pretty rash assumption? I would assert that free will requires that the future NOT exist.

Michael

This is exactly what I'm saying. Captain Ochre likes to be difficult though. He says, "Well the past doesn't exist either!" Which is a stupid arguement because it did exist, therefore God know it perfectly. Then he asks if a deterministic future is knowable. Of course it would be to God because no one can thwart a determined future from an all-powerful God. He then thinks that I admit the future exists because of this, yet it still doesn't. It's knowable if it's deterministic, but it still doesn't exist. Then I ask him for evidence that the future does exist, and he gives me this stuff about what the moon will be doing tomorrrow, which proves nothing. BUt then again, what do I expect?...

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 08:41 PM here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=41879#post41879)
themuzicman:



We do? Isn't that a pretty rash assumption?


No.


I would assert that free will requires that the future NOT exist.

Michael

That's nice, Michael, but as soon as you try to back up your assertions, you'll find that you're committing logical fallacies. Or, at least I will find that you're committing logical fallacies.

Now, pipe down or we'll steal Jaltus' thunder.

[Captain Ochre]

Yesterday @ 09:02 PM here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=41896#post41896)
doogieduff:
This is exactly what I'm saying. Captain Ochre likes to be difficult though.


It depends on whom I'm talking to, and what they are saying.
:smile:


He says, "Well the past doesn't exist either!" Which is a stupid arguement because it did exist, therefore God know it perfectly.


Well, you're leaving out the most important part: You had claimed that the future could not be known because it doesn't exist. When I point out that the past doesn't exist either, this destroys your rationale (if you believe that the past can be known), forcing you to either come up with a different rationale, or to give up the argument.
Now you say that God was in the past--but on what basis do you rule out God's being in the future (atemporal/omnipresent)? You appear to simply assume this to be the case.


Then he asks if a deterministic future is knowable. Of course it would be to God because no one can thwart a determined future from an all-powerful God.


Again, you had flatly claimed that the future cannot be known, so I bent over backwards to refute you with a second counterexample, which promptly forced you to admit that the future can be known.
Now, you apparently don't even realize that you're in the position of begging the question that John is trying to resolve using logic.


He then thinks that I admit the future exists because of this, yet it still doesn't.


Your recounting is inaccurate.
You admitted that the future could be known, and you admitted that the past doesn't exist. You've been refuted by counterexample.
See Universal Statements and Counterexamples(3/4 down)
http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/rfreeman/CHAPTER2.html


It's knowable if it's deterministic, but it still doesn't exist.


Reminder: You had said that the future couldn't be known because it doesn't exist.


Then I ask him for evidence that the future does exist, and he gives me this stuff about what the moon will be doing tomorrrow, which proves nothing. BUt then again, what do I expect?...

You were asked a question regarding the propositional truth having to do with the moon. My method of discussion frequently dips into the Socratic school, where I'll ask you a question that gets us to a different level of the discussion. Going step-by-step, you can do the reasoning on your own until you end up agreeing with me.
And what a glorious day that will be! :wink:

[Hired Gun]

Back to John's argument:

I think that Jaltus has done an excellent job. The original debate was : Does God's foreknowledge negate free will. John tried to confuse the issue by adding a compelling influence. When God requests Jaltus to pick the opposite of what he had picked before, not only does it violate the past, as I have previously attempted to demonstrate, but it also changes the circumstances under which the original choice was made.

John could have simplified the scenario: God comes to Jaltus and says: In 2 minutes, you will put on a French maid's uniform and begin dancing the can can on top of your kitchen table. If Jaltus doesn't do this, God is wrong. If Jaltus does do this, he either does not have free will or there is a side to him of which we at theology web are not aware!

The absurdity in my presentation is no less the absurdity being presented in John's scenario. John's syllogism is sound, but the syllogism itself is based on a false dilemma.

The bottom line is this; God only has foreknowledge of that which has already taken place. John's scenario logically cannot take place. Neither can mine. Therefore, God would have never revealed either future to Jaltus.

This argument is sophistry in action.

I forgot to include this.

Going back to one of the examples I gave: A genius should be able to successfully pass any test that is given to him, including one that would qualify him as an idiot.

Syllogism:
1. A genius can pass any test.
2. There are tests that qualify people as idiots.
3. A genius can be qualified as an idiot.

Never mind the details! This argument is as sound as John's. :huh:

[themuzicman]

Yesterday @ 05:02 PM here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=41937#post41937)
Captain Ochre:
That's nice, Michael, but as soon as you try to back up your assertions, you'll find that you're committing logical fallacies. Or, at least I will find that you're committing logical fallacies.

Now, pipe down or we'll steal Jaltus' thunder.

Well, let's go back to your previous post:


We have an excellent idea that a future exists. Those of us who are not omniscient just don't know for sure which actual future exists.


You assumed that the future does in fact already exist. No proof of beyond your assertion.

Maybe you should follow your own standards.

Michael

Here's the problem with Jaltus' argument that foreknowledge does not require cause. While his assertion is true, it fails to acknowledge other factors:

1) Foreknowledge requires that the future be inevtiable, meaning unavoidable and unpreventable. If the known events of the future could be changed, then there would be no foreknowledge, but foreguessing.

2) In order to retain inevitability, every "decision" taken must be known before it happens, which means it is not a decision at all, but an unavoidable response to a previous cause.

3) Since each action is caused and inevitable, they must domino back to a root cause or causes which were not foreknown.

4) The root cause(s) could only have been initiated by God.

Thus, in the closed view, there cannot be free will.

Michael

[Hired Gun]

It's intriguing to me how there can be two sets of intelligent people who can't seem to see the other's point of view ( I am not excluding myself). If foreknowledge is based on the knowledge of what has already happened, but is presented from a point prior to the event, it does not negate free will.

While our present argument deals with position in time, we can see the effect of foreknowledge in respect to spatial positioning. If a sunspot appears on the sun, we are aware of it 8 minutes after it actually occurs. If we could position ourselves closer to the sun, we could become aware of the sunspot say 6 minutes sooner than those on earth could see it. If we could report this information to earth faster than it would take the light of the sun to reach earth, we would be making a prediction of the sunspot. In no way did our prediction cause the sunspot to take place; we are merely reporting what we see from a position in space closer to the actual event.

As far as I know, time travel is THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE. The idea that foreknowledge would be based on an event that has already actually occurred is also a possibility. And a possibility is all that is needed to conquer the incompatibility argument.

[themuzicman]

Today @ 12:20 PM here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=42456#post42456)
Hired Gun:

It's intriguing to me how there can be two sets of intelligent people who can't seem to see the other's point of view ( I am not excluding myself). If foreknowledge is based on the knowledge of what has already happened, but is presented from a point prior to the event, it does not negate free will.


Foreknowledge, in and of itself, does not. It is the other conditions that surround foreknowledge, specifically it's scope and potential causes for the inevitable that negate free will.


While our present argument deals with position in time, we can see the effect of foreknowledge in respect to spatial positioning. If a sunspot appears on the sun, we are aware of it 8 minutes after it actually occurs. If we could position ourselves closer to the sun, we could become aware of the sunspot say 6 minutes sooner than those on earth could see it. If we could report this information to earth faster than it would take the light of the sun to reach earth, we would be making a prediction of the sunspot. In no way did our prediction cause the sunspot to take place; we are merely reporting what we see from a position in space closer to the actual event.


However, the actual event DID happen 8 minutes ago. The fact that we only now percieve it doesn't change when it happened. On the other hand, since we are the decision makers, if we truly have free will, then when we make a decision, there is no way for that decision to be existentially known before it was made.


As far as I know, time travel is THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE. The idea that foreknowledge would be based on an event that has already actually occurred is also a possibility. And a possibility is all that is needed to conquer the incompatibility argument.

Actually, the open view is unaffected by time travel. If anything, time travel causes a greater problem for the closed view.

If the future is foreknown, then it cannot change. However, if we go back in time, we will change the future from the point of time that we went back to. Thus, at some point, either the first or second time through, that which was foreknown was not what actually happened.

Michael

[Hired Gun]

I disagree. In a closed system, one wouldn't be able to change the past, just as the past cannot be changed here. Going back to the example of the boy flipping us the bird; all of the dates in the following are dates given from earth's perspective and time frame:

Earth receives the image of the boy in 2005. The boy flips the bird from planet X in 3005. For purposes of argument, everysingle event that happens becomes recorded in a history book. Whatever is recorded in the history book cannot be changed because it is part of the past and the past cannot be changed.

Say that we on earth, minutes after we see the image in 2005, send the boy a message (faster than the speed of light) saying that is not polite to make such a gesture. Planet X can receive that message prior to, or after the event.

If planet X receives the message in 3003, no one will know what the message means, but it will become part of planet x's documented history. "In June of 3003, we received an odd message from earth that a boy from our planet flipped them the bird. These earthlings are obviously crazy." Two years later, in planet x's time frame, a boy, who either does or does not have knowledge of this strange message, decides to make the obscene gesture in the mirror.

For whatever reason, no one from planet x in any given year up to the end of time (yes, a closed system has an end to time) ever decided to flip the bird in the mirror prior to 2005. If they had, it would have become part of earth's documented history. This isn't to say that the capability did not exist. But no one ever took the option.

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 04:57 PM here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=42436#post42436)
themuzicman:

Well, let's go back to your previous post:



You assumed that the future does in fact already exist. No proof of beyond your assertion.


No, I didn't make any assumption. I made an assertion that I have already backed up by referring to our ability to make well-formed propositions concerning the future that have apparent truth value. Beyond that, it should be clear to you that I am restraining myself owing to the in-progress debate between Powell and Jaltus.


Maybe you should follow your own standards.


I do.


Here's the problem with Jaltus' argument that foreknowledge does not require cause. While his assertion is true, it fails to acknowledge other factors:

1) Foreknowledge requires that the future be inevtiable, meaning unavoidable and unpreventable. If the known events of the future could be changed, then there would be no foreknowledge, but foreguessing.


Here's the problem with your first objection: If there is no foreknowledge, then the future is inevitable, meaning unavoidable and unpreventable.


2) In order to retain inevitability, every "decision" taken must be known before it happens, which means it is not a decision at all, but an unavoidable response to a previous cause.


Incorrect (and argument by assertion, to boot).


3) Since each action is caused and inevitable, they must domino back to a root cause or causes which were not foreknown.


Non-sequitur (fallacy).


4) The root cause(s) could only have been initiated by God.


Argument by assertion (fallacy).


Thus, in the closed view, there cannot be free will.


Conclusion does not follow from the premisses.
Wait for the debate to end, and we'll hash this out thoroughly.

[Captain Ochre]

Am I going to be blocked from posting? The arena should be an exception, imo, since we're responding to posts in the boxing ring.

John Powell has evidently entered the debate with a substantial handicap: He hasn't had the opporunity to test his thinking against an able opponent (shame on that other bulletin board!).

I see some hints that John is tailoring his response somewhat to Arena comments, but he's done little more than paper over some major errors. He's correct to sense an appropriate challenge to the early premisses of his syllogism.
IMO, John is set up pretty well for Jaltus to enter and score a KO, or a TKO. I'm expecting more the latter since I expect Jaltus to lavish many words on the syllogism instead of putting his finger on a big fat whopper of an error.
Prove me wrong, Jaltus!

I had already posted to the Arena thread the opinion that "changing the future" is nonsensical, yet John is resting a substantial portion of his argument on the idea--I'm not sure how he intends to show that the future doesn't exist without begging the question.
One more thing; Powell has tried to get centered back on the central proposition of the debate, but he's still missing it by a dozen acres. A demonstration of the non-existence of the future does not establish that the future cannot be known if free will exists, unless the non-existence of the future is based entirely on the existence of free will. I don't see any indication that John is cognizant of this. So, once again John is wandering away from the proposition that he is supposed to be advancing.

I hope that the weakness of John's position is indicative of the fact that he's become uncertain as to how to advance his point. If this isn't the case, then my earlier 30 day projection regarding a change of opinion for our good Mr. Powell is likely far too optimistic.
Go, Jaltus! Go, Jaltus!

[doogieduff]

Today @ 10:43 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=44378#post44378)
Captain Ochre:

I had already posted to the Arena thread the opinion that "changing the future" is nonsensical, yet John is resting a substantial portion of his argument on the idea--I'm not sure how he intends to show that the future doesn't exist without begging the question.


You make no sense. He can easily show that the future doesn't exist becasue there's not one shred of evidence for it! There's AMPLE AMPLE AMPLE evidence for the past and the present, yet not one single shred of evidence for the future. BTW, you have yet to give me evidence for the future even though you said that evidence exists. We're still waiting...

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 05:53 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=44388#post44388)
doogieduff:



You make no sense. He can easily show that the future doesn't exist becasue there's not one shred of evidence for it!


That's the fallacy of argumentum ad ignorantiam, pure and simple.
Get over it, or I'll have an extraordinarily difficult time taking you seriously.
http://www.intrepidsoftware.com/fallacy/ig.htm


There's AMPLE AMPLE AMPLE evidence for the past and the present, yet not one single shred of evidence for the future. BTW, you have yet to give me evidence for the future even though you said that evidence exists. We're still waiting...

It's okay with me if you elect to deal with my reference to the apparent truth of well-formed propositions regarding the future only after the formal debate has concluded.
:bonk:

[Hired Gun]

Concerning Powell's last post:

A lot of words but nothing profound. I always considered foreknowledge compatible with free will, which is why I never argued the point as an atheist. Congrats to Jaltus. I see a glaring error in Powell's last post. I'm taking Ochre's lead because I feel that I am giving away the end to a novel that others haven't read.

[doogieduff]

Yesterday @ 11:13 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=44396#post44396)
Captain Ochre:



That's the fallacy of argumentum ad ignorantiam, pure and simple.
Get over it, or I'll have an extraordinarily difficult time taking you seriously.
http://www.intrepidsoftware.com/fallacy/ig.htm






Argument from Ignorance
(argumentum ad ignorantiam)

To put this fallacy into english, it basically means "lack of proof is not proof." Correct me if I'm wrong but this is what you're doing, not me. I'm looking for proof for the future, yet your lack of proof is good enough for you to believe that the future exists. BTW, you seem real gung ho about all these fallacies. They're your answer to everything. Ever considered what the scripture says? Is our omnipotent God not above your philosophical ideas?

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 03:05 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=44529#post44529)
doogieduff:




Argument from Ignorance
(argumentum ad ignorantiam)

To put this fallacy into english, it basically means "lack of proof is not proof." Correct me if I'm wrong but this is what you're doing, not me.


Yes, you're obviously wrong, and if you can't see it in your quotation following, juxtaposed with definition to follow, then I can't see wasting my time to discuss this topic with you:
"He can easily show that the future doesn't exist becasue there's not one shred of evidence for it!"
"Conversely, such an argument may assume that since something has not been proven true, it is therefore false."

Again, Powell and I are assuming that both omniscience (including foreknowledge) and free will exist for the sake of argument.
There is absolutely nothing wrong with that, so long as we do not present conclusions that have begged the question.
You have committed a fallacy, and I have not. End of story. Get with the program.


I'm looking for proof for the future, yet your lack of proof is good enough for you to believe that the future exists. BTW, you seem real gung ho about all these fallacies. They're your answer to everything. Ever considered what the scripture says? Is our omnipotent God not above your philosophical ideas?

I have provided evidence that the future exists based on the apparent truth of well-formed propositions regarding the future. You have seen fit to respond to that avenue of argumentation via ridicule and by ignoring it.
Again, whether or not future knowledge is compatible with free will has literally nothing to do with the Bible, so your appeal is a red herring, albeit worthy of its own thread. Why don't you run along and start that thread? I'll see you there.

[Snowball]

Jaltus' last post was brilliant! I love how he finally brought up a scriptural reference for molinism here:


In terms of scriptural support for God knowing what people would do in a specific, unrealized circumstance, I offer Matthew 11:21-24:

21 "Woe to you, Korazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida! If the miracles that were performed in you had been performed in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes.
22 But I tell you, it will be more bearable for Tyre and Sidon on the day of judgment than for you.
23 And you, Capernaum, will you be lifted up to the skies? No, you will go down to the depths. If the miracles that were performed in you had been performed in Sodom, it would have remained to this day.
24 But I tell you that it will be more bearable for Sodom on the day of judgment than for you."

You’ll note that the words in bold are formulaic for the Molinistic account of reconciling God’s foreknowledge with man’s free will in a way denied by every single other system.



Another great example is in 1 Samual 23:12 & 13, where David was taking shelter in Keilah.


'Then David said, "Will the men of Keilah surrender me and my men into the hand of Saul?" And the LORD said, " They will surrender you." Then David and his men, about six hundred, arose and departed from Keilah, and they went wherever they could go. When it was told Saul that David had escaped from Keilah, he gave up the pursuit.

It is clear from this passage also that God knows futures that aren't ever going to be realized.

Ted Dekker tackled this in his new book "Blink." It was great.

[Captain Ochre]

I score two knockdowns and a standing eight count for Jaltus.
John "Rocky" Powell will still be around for round six.

Jaltus was very effective in showing how John has beaten around the bush regarding the proposition that he is advancing (incompatibility of omniscience and free will). Wandering from the topic, even when it's to nearby related topics, is not a good debate strategy and Jaltus is correct to make this an issue. I consider the point regarding the supposed impossibility of future knowledge irrespective of free will to be a particularly strong rhetorical point in Jaltus' favor.

Regarding John's newer syllogism,

1. If the future exists as something certain to be then the future cannot be changed.
2. The future can be changed.
3. Therefore, the future does not exist as something certain to be.

I actually disagree with Jaltus on one particular, though I agree with him that the whole thing is problematic. As I contended earlier in the commentary thread, the notion of the future changing is nonsensical. If the future is causally determined, then the future cannot change. If the future is indeterminate, then what is it supposedly changing from? Jaltus makes this same point more obliquely in his later commentary, but appears to grant the future can change--which I disagree with.

Jaltus scores another knockdown when commenting on John's attempt to explain away knowledge of a causally determined future.
I say, if God changes his mind, was the future really causally determined? Powell begs the question on this issue.

I'll gently chastise Jaltus for indulging in the supposition that John is arguing as he does to hide the weakness of his argument. Confessedly, I have a strong sympathy for Jaltus' impression, but I do think that John is sincere in his presentation (though I availed myself of evidence for this that Jaltus wouldn't be privy to).
A person who argues from sincere (and apparently reasoned) belief will perhaps intuitively "hide" the weakness of his argument--or else his beliefs might be expected to be different than they are. :smile:

Here's the weakest part of Jaltus' post:

Again, how did the foreknowledge bring about those results? you need to answer the how question, and you cannot since knowledge in and of itself can have no agency. How can knowledge be responsible for anything? Do we need to define responsibility in order for you to acknowledge that it, too, entails an actant?


. . . and it's not all that bad.
I think that it would be enough for John to show that foreknowledge really did eliminate the conditions for free will (I'm as certain as could be that this wasn't accomplished, and Jaltus hasn't hinted at my reason for saying so--that'll wait until the debate is over). John shouldn't have to do anything more than that. Jaltus' words could, otoh, favorably be taken as a challenge to John for the latter to establish his claim that foreknowledge results in causation.

The latter portion of Jaltus' post has Jaltus in the better position, but laboring a bit to drive the point home. For example:
"But what do we learn from this? Nothing! This tells us that John has defined free will and foreknowledge as incompatible, it does not tell us that free will and foreknowledge actually are incompatible."

It's clear that John has defined foreknowledge and free will as essentially incompatible, but it hasn't been pinpointed exactly why the definitions are inappropriate, afaics. Certainly, if foreknowledge and free will are actually incompatible by definition, John would have a strong case. :smile:

In closing, I find that Jaltus is again being more accomodating with John Powell's argument than I would be. Jaltus bothers to show that John doesn't make his case for asserting that foreknowledge isn't possible, while I would dismiss that contention as a case of question-begging with respect to the side of the issue that John is supposed to be supporting. If foreknowledge isn't possible, then it isn't compatible with anything including free will, freedom fries, and water.

[Captain Ochre]

John doesn't present much that's new in his closing argument. His best bits have to do with a subject that runs outside the predetermined(!) parameters of the debate; that is, the issue of whether or not foreknowledge is possible if free will is excercised.

The topic that John comes closest to defending is the (contradictory nature of the) notion of reverse causation. The problem here stems from the agreed-upon (for the sake of argument) premiss of an atemporal being. Thus, it isn't clear that the fallacy invoked by John (fallacy of reverse causation) doesn't beg the question, and it is questionable as to whether that fallacy applies if there is more than one framework for time, or even if the chronological implications of relativity apply.

So, it would certainly be premature to suppose that John has made an effective case against the type of omniscience that an atemporal being might possess.

So: Jaltus is left to snip the loose ends or answer them as he sees fit. Jaltus has already demonstrated that John hasn't established his case, imo, but could have done better by locating the key error in John's syllogism--and even better than that by helping John to see it!
Allowing the foundational error to persist allowed the debate to linger on slightly more peripheral issues which in turn allowed the weakness of John's position to stay obscured by ambiguity (even as Jaltus' stamped out the corollary sparks of error).
So now we have to wait for practically a whole week for the debate to fully spill over into the arena?
:argh:

[GakuseiDon]

2) In order to retain inevitability, every "decision" taken must be known before it happens, which means it is not a decision at all, but an unavoidable response to a previous cause.
Then, if God foresees our free-will action, and by seeing it makes it inevitable, then that resolves down to "we have no choice but to choose our free-will action", which is still free will, if the decision that God foresees is a free-will decision.

[AtheistArchon]

- Lots of heavy stuff here (and in the ring, too). However, I can't help but think that it could be simplified a little.

- For example, the debate has taken the form of "does god possess omniscience if we have free will" instead of "do we have free will if god has omniscience". I personally would have argued via the latter position, even though there might not end up being much of a difference come the details. :smile:

- Additionally, I think one important aspect has been omitted thus far. I admit that I've only skimmed, so I may be just wrong here, but I didn't see the inclusion of the fact that god is said to not only possess omniscience, but also is the creator of the universe (and all that this entails). While this doesn't necessarily mean that god himself necessarily lacks free will (he could exist both in and out of time... however that works), I think it does necessarily mean than we, as his creations, lack free will.

- I'll elaborate, if anyone wishes. :smile:

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 07:53 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=49591#post49591)
AtheistArchon:

- Additionally, I think one important aspect has been omitted thus far. I admit that I've only skimmed, so I may be just wrong here, but I didn't see the inclusion of the fact that god is said to not only possess omniscience, but also is the creator of the universe (and all that this entails). While this doesn't necessarily mean that god himself necessarily lacks free will (he could exist both in and out of time... however that works), I think it does necessarily mean than we, as his creations, lack free will.

- I'll elaborate, if anyone wishes. :smile:

Welcome to the discussion.
Yes, you would need to elaborate. Your implication would seem to be that if God creates the universe, then the universe must be causally deterministic in nature. If that isn't your implication, then perhaps you're suggesting that God should know what free will agents who do not exist would actually do if they did exist. That would appear to be logically impossible, afaics--unless the "free will agents" are actually causally determined (which would beg the question). Also, whether or not God himself has free will is a separate issue as opposed to the mere compatibility between free will and omniscience.
Feel free to expand on your points, but do try to observe our point of decorum: We're trying not to trample the boxing ring version of the debate (Powell/Jaltus). That discussion should conclude near the end of the week, so we can let fly all of our various methods of argument after that time.

[AtheistArchon]

Feel free to expand on your points, but do try to observe our point of decorum: We're trying not to trample the boxing ring version of the debate (Powell/Jaltus). That discussion should conclude near the end of the week, so we can let fly all of our various methods of argument after that time.

- In that case, I will abstain for the time being, lest I make a mess of things and end up confusing myself in the process. I'll broach this subject afterwards.

- Besides, I'm anxious to see how the debate ends as well. :smile:

[geebob]

This is an interesting debate. I don't know that I'd ever try the same approach that powel is using as I'd prefer to use examples from ordinary life and simply show that the definition of libertarian free will is in fact incompatible with definite foreknowledge. But Powel's approach seems to have merit.

I think Powel made two mistakes. ONe is admitting that God really doesn't have foreknowledge in the examples. That is not necessary because though foreknowledge would lead to incoherency in his arguement, that is precisely the goal. The notion that it is not fair because it is an illogical situation is quite an empty one criticism. secondly is insisting on bringing God into time for the scenereo. I don't see that this was necessary either because regardless of whether God is in time or not, these examples can still show that foreknowledge and free will are incompatible and you could plug timeless foreknowledge into the example as well and show that it is also absurd. Furthermore, If timelessness in God necessitates that he knows all of time timelessly, the example could also drag timelessness down into incoherence.

The way Powell could have made time irrelevent to the situation is to suggest that God either writes his foreknown results on a paper or in his timeless state, timelessly causes the content of his knowledge to be written on a peice of paper at the time of the scenereo.

Jaltus' claim on the self defeating nature of the 3rd scenereo is interesting. If he has to choose the opposite of what's on God's paper and he cannot break the rules, then he is not free. I don't know what to think of this move, but certainly, one way for Powel to respond is to take Jaltus out of the scenereo here and insert me. :brow: I'd be happy to pick the opposite what God wrote, and just to show jaltus I was free, I'd pick some of what God wrote and the opposite of what God wrote (if instead of one letter, there are a series of letters to choose from).



ochre

the notion of the future changing is nonsensical. If the future is causally determined, then the future cannot change. If the future is indeterminate, then what is it supposedly changing from?

there are several ways in which the notion could be intelligible. to answer your last question, if the future is indeterminate, changing the future would entail changing it from the indefinite to the definite as aspects of it are determined in the present.

Another way in which we could say that the future is changed is in terms of where things were headed but now are headed in a different direction.

and finally, though this may be somewhat related to the last, we could say that some of the truth about the future is in the form of what are called soft facts. soft facts are facts that are within someone's power to change the truth value from true to false or vice versa.

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 07:17 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=#post)
geebob:

This is an interesting debate. I don't know that I'd ever try the same approach that powel is using as I'd prefer to use examples from ordinary life and simply show that the definition of libertarian free will is in fact incompatible with definite foreknowledge. But Powel's approach seems to have merit.


With all due respect, it doesn't have merit with respect to the debate topic. It has some merit, perhaps, with respect to related topics.


I think Powel made two mistakes. ONe is admitting that God really doesn't have foreknowledge in the examples. That is not necessary because though foreknowledge would lead to incoherency in his arguement, that is precisely the goal.


Correct, albeit your mistake estimate is a bit on the conservative side.


The notion that it is not fair because it is an illogical situation is quite an empty one criticism.


Geebob, it depends on how the absurdity is brought in as to whether or not the absurdity relates to the alleged incompatibility. In this case, there is no relationship between the absurdity and the supposedly incompatible premisses. The absurdity was that future X (the one supposedly known by God) happens without the conditions which might bring about X ever happening.
That is, assuming that the scenario "Jaltus" wouldn't cheat. As soon as Powell permitted "Jaltus" to go against God's request to do the opposite, he removed the absurdity (restore free will as a premise, and the absurdity shrinks down to a manageable level).


secondly is insisting on bringing God into time for the scenereo. I don't see that this was necessary either because regardless of whether God is in time or not, these examples can still show that foreknowledge and free will are incompatible and you could plug timeless foreknowledge into the example as well and show that it is also absurd.


I don't think that it's as easy as you make it out to be. :wink:


Furthermore, If timelessness in God necessitates that he knows all of time timelessly, the example could also drag timelessness down into incoherence.


Again, we'd have to see it done. If our example proves to be absurd based on the premiss of atemporality, then maybe you've got a case. Simply not understanding how atemporality works would not be sufficient, of course.


The way Powell could have made time irrelevent to the situation is to suggest that God either writes his foreknown results on a paper or in his timeless state, timelessly causes the content of his knowledge to be written on a peice of paper at the time of the scenereo.


Isn't "timelessly" writing something at a given time itself incoherent? Afaics, there is no obvious problem with an atemporal being acting in time, which--to the atemporal being--is "all at once", or at least perceived with the infinite leisure of omnipotence.


Jaltus' claim on the self defeating nature of the 3rd scenereo is interesting. If he has to choose the opposite of what's on God's paper and he cannot break the rules, then he is not free. I don't know what to think of this move, but certainly, one way for Powel to respond is to take Jaltus out of the scenereo here and insert me. :brow: I'd be happy to pick the opposite what God wrote, and just to show jaltus I was free, I'd pick some of what God wrote and the opposite of what God wrote (if instead of one letter, there are a series of letters to choose from).


If you reach your conclusion based on a projection of your actions rather than by doing as you are "forced" to do by foreknowledge, then you would be begging the question that the scenario tries to tackle. You'd be just as effective by declaring "I'm going to do the opposite of what God foreknows right now". There's no way to verify whether or not you succeeded.

(Geebob quoted my contention that "changing the future" is nonsensical)
there are several ways in which the notion could be intelligible. to answer your last question, if the future is indeterminate, changing the future would entail changing it from the indefinite to the definite as aspects of it are determined in the present.

Isn't that just broadening the term into monstrous ambiguity? I think I'll "change" a cake from "not made" to "made"! My wife and I will "change" our child from "unconceived" to "conceived".
With respect to logical argument, ambiguity is an enemy. Seem to me that you're doing no more than claiming that the present alters probabilities for the future. If you die childless, right now, it radically increases the possibility that the future is absent Geebob's progeny. That's identical to the version of "future-building" that I have suggested is completely compatible with omniscient knowledge of the future, afaics.


Another way in which we could say that the future is changed is in terms of where things were headed but now are headed in a different direction.


I'm not sure that your second suggestion is significantly different than the first, unless maybe your first suggestion was sillier than I first took it to be--you weren't claiming in your first suggestion that we "change" the future by making it the present--were you?


and finally, though this may be somewhat related to the last, we could say that some of the truth about the future is in the form of what are called soft facts. soft facts are facts that are within someone's power to change the truth value from true to false or vice versa.

Sounds like special pleading, on the surface. If the last suggestion is relevant, then I'm sure that I'll hear more about it later. :smile:

[geebob]

With all due respect, it doesn't have merit with respect to the debate topic.

are we talking about powel's scenereo? :huh: I have no clue how you could make that estimate or where you are coming from.

Correct, albeit your mistake estimate is a bit on the conservative side.

it's a huge debate and I'm commenting near the end. So yeah, I'm speaking of the things that stuck out to me.

Geebob, it depends on how the absurdity is brought in as to whether or not the absurdity relates to the alleged incompatibility.

God foreknows that jaltus would do one thing and jaltus does another (albeit recognizing our handicap of course that we haven't substituted geebob for jaltus and jaltus said he'd really pick what God indicated...) because he is able to do another thing (because free will entails that ability), I'd say that absurdity is precisely placed upon the alleged incompatibility.

Isn't "timelessly" writing something at a given time itself incoherent?

He wouldn't be timelessly writing something at a given time. He'd be acting in such a way that would cause the writing in question to manifest at a certain time.

Again, we'd have to see it done.

I think it's obvious as it was a minor adjustment with the same results (results that are perfectly in line with the adjustment- the results I'm refering to of course is God's answers on the peice of paper). But I'll grant your contention that we'd have to see it done and I'll say that for the time being, I'm too lazy to do it.

there is no obvious problem with an atemporal being acting in time

If he acts in time he's not timeless. But allegedly, (to which I know of no significant challenge) he can act timelessly and those actions though not in time could have results in time.

If you reach your conclusion based on a projection of your actions rather than by doing as you are "forced" to do by foreknowledge

maybe Powell thinks it is forced but I don't think it is necessary to go that far to show the alleged incompatibility

then you would be begging the question that the scenario tries to tackle.

the scenario relies on projecting someone's choices into the future, and the thing is, the choices I projected into the future are not wholy determined but still free with respect to which answers in the sequence would agree with God's foreknown answers provided like I said that we were dealing with a sequence of answers instead of just one (which seems like a reasonable adjustment to the scenario to me).

You'd be just as effective by declaring "I'm going to do the opposite of what God foreknows right now". There's no way to verify whether or not you succeeded.

the 3rd part of the scenario provides exactly just that, a way to see whether you've succeded. God gives you a peice of paper that tells what your future answer will be. Obviously if you pick the opposite, you have proof positive that you succeeded in picking the opposite of what God foreknew.

Isn't that just broadening the term into monstrous ambiguity?

the indefinite is not definite. thus for something to go from indefinite to the definite necessarily implies change.

I think I'll "change" a cake from "not made" to "made"! My wife and I will "change" our child from "unconceived" to "conceived".

more specifically, if the future was indifferent with regard to baking a cake, the change wouldn't be from made to not made (in terms of changing the future) because the cake that wasn't made wasn't a feature of the future either.

I'm not sure that your second suggestion is significantly different than the first, unless maybe your first suggestion was sillier than I first took it to be

The difference now is that you have a plan to make the cake and you're getting ready to do it, so in a sense, the future is sort of taking form, but then you change your mind. Perhaps the future wasn't changed, but in a sense, "the future was changed".

you weren't claiming in your first suggestion that we "change" the future by making it the present--were you?

things in the some things in the future become determined in the present so that isn't necessary.

Sounds like special pleading, on the surface. If the last suggestion is relevant, then I'm sure that I'll hear more about it later.

I don't know what you mean by special pleading.

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 03:20 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=#post)
geebob:

are we talking about powel's scenereo? :huh: I have no clue how you could make that estimate or where you are coming from.


I would suggest that John Powell, despite a game effort, has produced no reasonable argument establishing the incompatibility of foreknowledge and omniscience.



God foreknows that jaltus would do one thing and jaltus does another (albeit recognizing our handicap of course that we haven't substituted geebob for jaltus and jaltus said he'd really pick what God indicated...) because he is able to do another thing (because free will entails that ability), I'd say that absurdity is precisely placed upon the alleged incompatibility.


The foundational absurdity in the scenario is that there is no plausible way that Jaltus, given the lead-in to his decision, would choose what God supposedly foreknew (I find it implausible that Jaltus would cheat and try to do other than what he has been instructed: Choose what he thinks God predicted he would do).
That foundational absurdity has nothing to do with the compatibility of foreknowledge and free will. It distracts from the real issue, and that's why John cannot get his syllogism to work.


He wouldn't be timelessly writing something at a given time. He'd be acting in such a way that would cause the writing in question to manifest at a certain time.


Okay. If you say so! :smile:


I think it's obvious as it was a minor adjustment with the same results (results that are perfectly in line with the adjustment- the results I'm refering to of course is God's answers on the peice of paper). But I'll grant your contention that we'd have to see it done and I'll say that for the time being, I'm too lazy to do it.


I'll be here, Lord willing.


If he acts in time he's not timeless.


Why not?


But allegedly, (to which I know of no significant challenge) he can act timelessly and those actions though not in time could have results in time.


I agree (I think!).


maybe Powell thinks it is forced but I don't think it is necessary to go that far to show the alleged incompatibility


Your opinion is duly noted; forgive me if I don't accept it as gospel without the more rigorous presentation. :wink:


the scenario relies on projecting someone's choices into the future, and the thing is, the choices I projected into the future are not wholy determined but still free with respect to which answers in the sequence would agree with God's foreknown answers provided like I said that we were dealing with a sequence of answers instead of just one (which seems like a reasonable adjustment to the scenario to me).


I don't think that I explained what I meant adequately. Assuming that you will choose differently than God foreknew doesn't demonstrate that God didn't really know your future action. All it demonstrates is a begged question.
I don't know if that will clear things up, but I'll dare to hope.


the 3rd part of the scenario provides exactly just that, a way to see whether you've succeded. God gives you a peice of paper that tells what your future answer will be. Obviously if you pick the opposite, you have proof positive that you succeeded in picking the opposite of what God foreknew.


As already mentioned, the third part of the scenario is absurd because it is unbelievable that anybody would choose A over B when they only have a motivation to choose B. God's knowledge of the choice of A stands in the context of time, which would naturally include the challenge scenario.
I cannot overemphasize the fact that this absurdity has nothing to do with the alleged incompatibility of omniscience and free will.
Take away the certainty of what you supposedly must do along with the certain motivation to do the opposite, and the irrelevant absurdity disappears as in the first two stages, which are both essentially unproblematic for compatibility between foreknowledge and free will. I'll also emphasize that the first two stages make pretty good cases for compatibility--all the more reason to look for the "trick" in stage three.
I guarantee you that a sound syllogism cannot be fashioned to support the conclusion you take from stage three (does that motivate you to try one? :smile:).


the indefinite is not definite. thus for something to go from indefinite to the definite necessarily implies change.

I'll continue to maintain that you're obscuring the problem in ambiguity. Is there such a thing as an existing indefinite thing? If it exists, doesn't it exist as a definite something? I think that "indefinite" is a synonym for "unknown". If something goes from known to unknown, that something itself doesn't change.
Feel free to clarify your thought--I encourage you not to rest in ambiguity!


more specifically, if the future was indifferent with regard to baking a cake, the change wouldn't be from made to not made (in terms of changing the future) because the cake that wasn't made wasn't a feature of the future either.


"indifferent"="indefinite"?
I agree with you, afaics. Did the cake change?


The difference now is that you have a plan to make the cake and you're getting ready to do it, so in a sense, the future is sort of taking form, but then you change your mind. Perhaps the future wasn't changed, but in a sense, "the future was changed".


Is it changed in a sense that allows relevance to the foreknowledge/free will debate? I predict "no". When the terms are used with the precision needed for a syllogism, the fallacy will show through.


things in the some things in the future become determined in the present so that isn't necessary.


Mmmm-kay.


I don't know what you mean by special pleading.

I'm talking about the fallacy, but I wouldn't pin it on you until your argument is developed so that I don't have to guess at the fallacy.

[Jaltus]

You guys plan on dealing with my last post? John and I are now able to post in here since the debate is over.

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 05:30 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=#post)
Jaltus:

You guys plan on dealing with my last post? John and I are now able to post in here since the debate is over.

Jaltus finally gets around to treating the modal fallacy that occurs in so many arguments against the incompatibility of omniscience and free will! I thought you were solid, Jaltus, but you had me wondering if you would ever get around to it. I would have done so much earlier, and I'm sure that John would have appreciated the chance to comment.
If the reader follows Jaltus' argument regarding the alleged necessity of merely actual events, then that reader is likely to be convinced that John Powell's various syllogisms do not work, and Jaltus has already treated various weaknesses in John's three-part scenario.
Jaltus wins the debate hands-down, afaics, though of course I may be biased.
I would be delighted to assist in answering questions of those who do not agree that Jaltus left only the faintest of hopes that foreknowledge and free will are incompatible.

I'm going to add that I disagree with the concept of "soft" facts that Jaltus presented. Afaict, the term is only useful in referring to future unknowns. Is this a distinction without a difference except for the fact that we happen to be talking about the future?

[geebob]

Jaltus, where are you coming from on soft facts. I thought you mentioned it once in reference to plantinga. Is there a specific writting of his you have in mind?

[geebob]

2nd post, scroll up


3 things stuck out to me Jaltus.

Thus, soft facts can only have future truth value and not current truth value, making your query no longer pertinent. A statement about the future by definition cannot be false now. Thus, foreknowledge is the perfect record of soft fact utterances. This means they cannot be determinative for they have not truth value until the future. Try to figure out how many things can be non-truth claims and be determinative, and the answer you will arrive at is zero.

In making this distinction, it almost seems that you make a tacit admission that if the facts of the future have present tense truth, the incompatibility of foreknowledge and free will would be an accurate assesment. yes no?

1. IF J has free will THEN it is possible that J chose B.
2. IF G knows the past and G tells that J chose A THEN it is not possible that J chose B.
3. It is not the case that both it is possible that J chose B AND it is not possible that J chose B.
4. therefore, it is not the case that both J has free will AND G knows the past and G tells that J chose A.

I think this rewording fails to make your point for the following. Notice,

1. IF J has free will THEN it is possible that J chose B.

the tense of having freedom has to line up with the tense of the the action in the following way: the freedom must be temporally prior to the the action. No one is ever free with regard to their past actions. Maybe they were free but they are not free now. So the first part of the sentence "J has freedom" really is not relevent to the second part that "[J possibly] choose B"

As I have already commented on my lazyness to ochre, I will merely assert this, that the tenses in the rest of the sentence ought to be fixed to reflect the temporal nature of free will and if that is done, your point may not be made.

Now regarding your arguement vouching for the compatibility of reverse causation and free will, I find it suspect for this reason: it could also be applied to forward causation, where your actions are caused and yet can still be considered free.

all you have to do is flip flip some of the terms here.

1’. Necessarily, if the effect has occurred, then the cause will occur.
2’. The effect has occurred.
3’. Therefore, the cause will occur.

It is no longer necessary for the cause to occur, it just will occur.

into

1’. Necessarily, if the cause [of how the free agent will choose, ] has occurred, then the effect[the free agent chooses the way she was effectually caused to choose] will occur.
2’. The cause has occurred.
3’. Therefore, the effect will occur.

It is no longer necessary for the effect to occur, it just will occur.

But the fact of the matter is that there is a necessity here. The necessity is stated in the first premise. The effect is not necessary in and of itself, but it is necessary in light of the cause. yes 3 is not necessary all by its lonesome and the of course the necessity shouldn't be stated in 3, but in the presence of the second and first premise it is necesary

The same would apply to 1a' through 3a'.

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 07:32 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=#post)
geebob:

Removed some stuff directed particularly at Jaltus.

I think this rewording fails to make your point for the following. Notice,

1. IF J has free will THEN it is possible that J chose B.

the tense of having freedom has to line up with the tense of the the action in the following way: the freedom must be temporally prior to the the action. No one is ever free with regard to their past actions. Maybe they were free but they are not free now. So the first part of the sentence "J has freedom" really is not relevent to the second part that "[J possibly] choose B"


Irrespective of what Jaltus wrote, it is preposterous to call into question the freedom of past action merely because it is past. The syllogism would provide you even greater fits, if such a thing were possible (the greater fits, that is).
I agree with Geisler that all truth is ultimately absolute. If particular action X is free at time T, then action X is free at time T for all people in all times and in all places. For instance, if George Washington freely cut down a cherry tree, that act is/was/will be free from whatever chronological vantage point.


As I have already commented on my lazyness to ochre, I will merely assert this, that the tenses in the rest of the sentence ought to be fixed to reflect the temporal nature of free will and if that is done, your point may not be made.


Nitpicking, the act is temporal. Free will is an abstract describing that act, and as I mentioned above it is absolutely true if it is true at all.


Now regarding your arguement vouching for the compatibility of reverse causation and free will, I find it suspect for this reason: it could also be applied to forward causation, where your actions are caused and yet can still be considered free.

all you have to do is flip flip some of the terms here.



Jaltus will correct me if I'm wrong, but his example was actually a counterexample showing that Powell's proof was unsound. No matter how many additional counterexamples you provide showing that Powell's form leads to unsound conclusions, the conclusion remains unsound--if not more so!



It is no longer necessary for the effect to occur, it just will occur.

But the fact of the matter is that there is a necessity here. The necessity is stated in the first premise. The effect is not necessary in and of itself, but it is necessary in light of the cause. yes 3 is not necessary all by its lonesome and the of course the necessity shouldn't be stated in 3, but in the presence of the second and first premise it is necesary


If you waded through the whole of the commentary thread, you would have encountered my contention that this supposed inevitability of known action is simply tautological. That inevitability exists in all possible worlds. Thus, if that inevitability has the consequence of negating free will, then you have proven that free will does not exist.
Of course, it proves no such thing, since the tautologies may only affirm their own self-evident truth, such as "you will do tomorrow what you will do tomorrow".
By way of illustration, we can put the inevitability argument based on foreknowledge just like shoes on a fish:
"If god knows that you will do x tomorrow, then you will do (what god knows you will do) x tomorrow."

The valiant John Powell took a pounding in this debate. I don't envy you the burden of proof if and when you buckle down to try to make your case.

[geebob]

Irrespective of what Jaltus wrote, it is preposterous to call into question the freedom of past action merely because it is past.

no its not. No one is free with respect to the past. maybe they were free, but they are not free now with respect to past actions. It is not within my power to refrain from actions that I have already taken. maybe it was possible, but it is not possible now. And it is not possible for me to take action instead of where I had refrained. maybe it was possible, but it isn't now. past tense actions can only be described with past tense freedom.

For instance, if George Washington freely cut down a cherry tree, that act is/was/will be free from whatever chronological vantage point.

granting this, it does not effect my claim. perhaps washington freely cut it down, but after the fact, he is no longer free with respect to what he already did.

I agree with Geisler that all truth is ultimately absolute. If particular action X is free at time T, then action X is free at time T for all people in all times and in all places.

Well then, It's hard to imagine how God was free with respect to creating the world since his creating is not contingent on his free action but is absolute. I agree with William Lane craig that God did not know anything about the world until he created it thus truths about the world are not absolute but contingent at some point.

Jaltus will correct me if I'm wrong, but his example was actually a counterexample showing that Powell's proof was unsound.

I understood that and if it succeeds, then it also succeeds in negating the necesity of actions described by compatibilism.

Thus, if that inevitability has the consequence of negating free will, then you have proven that free will does not exist.


and I choose to believe in free will over that inevitability. If you'd like to insist that the real debate is over the compatibility of free will and inevitability, I am all to happy with that assesment.

That inevitability exists in all possible worlds.

well there's two ways to handle this:

1 It doesn't exist in possible worlds where the truth of certain future details does not extend into the past

2 the actual world in it's ontologically special status does not reflect any particular complete purduring possible world but can go in several directions as reflected by the fact that their are many possible worlds that are identical to the actual world up to the present moment but differ in the various aspects of the future.

Of course, it proves no such thing, since the tautologies may only affirm their own self-evident truth, such as "you will do tomorrow what you will do tomorrow".

I will do what I will do tomarrow and as of today, for several actions, what I will do is general and has no definition until I give it that definition tomarrow or in what I determine today for tomorrow. There is no doubt a certain range of possibilities, but as there is a range, and as the possibilities are truly accessible from this present, the truth reflects that those possibilities are accessible in a way that an exhaustive set of certainties cannot.

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 12:11 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=#post)
geebob:

Geebob insists that past choices cannot be free--or something like that ... after I said that such a claim was preposterous

no its not. No one is free with respect to the past. maybe they were free, but they are not free now with respect to past actions. It is not within my power to refrain from actions that I have already taken.


Then free will is impossible, in your view, except for actions in the future. Since actions in the future don't exist, therefore we have no free will. You are begging the question.
Can you make a choice in the present? As soon as the choice is made, it is irrevocable. The present is the killing ground for freedom (in the Geebob view) and the past is the graveyard.

On the contrary, sir, any passable definition of free will allows choices in the past and present (or future, I would maintain) to be free: A decision uncoerced where more than one option is/was/will be possible (sorry for the redundancy, but I'm making a point).


maybe it was possible, but it is not possible now.


You're reproducing the modal fallacy that brings Powell's syllogisms crashing.
Other actions in the past are possible now. They simply aren't actual. That's what choice amounts to: Taking two or more possibilities and making one of them an actuality in addition to its being a possibility. I had Coke instead of Pepsi yesterday. Is it possible now that I could have had Pepsi then?--of course it is, unless I was kidding about my choice between Coke and Pepsi in the first place.


And it is not possible for me to take action instead of where I had refrained.


The definition of choice includes the concept of either. Your (whimsical, imo) concept of free choice apparently emphasized and. If you could pick A and B, then you would allow for freedom, afaics. There's a giant drawback to that view, however: If you must pick A and B to have freedom, then aren't you actually not free at all since you don't have the freedom to not take one or more of your options?
Honestly, your view seems so staggeringly problematic that it's hard to describe the problems forcefully enough.


maybe it was possible, but it isn't now. past tense actions can only be described with past tense freedom.


Oh, yeah? Watch me.
My choice of Coke over Pepsi is an example of a free will choice. It is possible even now that I could have chosen Pepsi. Tomorrow I will choose Coke--but even though I will definitely choose Coke, it remains possible to choose Pepsi, instead.

Geebob, it is true now that I made that choice.
If I had freedom then, then it is appropriate throughout time--forward and backward--to describe the action as free.


granting this, it does not effect my claim. perhaps washington freely cut it down, but after the fact, he is no longer free with respect to what he already did.


Dare I put this bluntly? What a shameless goal-post mover you are! You're making a mockery of the concept of choice which is A or B orC, etcetera.
As I pointed out above, you're pushing freedom into your own chronological Never-Never Land.
http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/swartz/freewill2.htm#might


Well then, It's hard to imagine how God was free with respect to creating the world since his creating is not contingent on his free action but is absolute. I agree with William Lane craig that God did not know anything about the world until he created it thus truths about the world are not absolute but contingent at some point.


Your statement above seems to suggest that God didn't know what he was creating when he created the Universe.
I find it hard to believe that Craig would advocate that sort of nonsense. Point me to a relevant quotation, so that I may make proper sense of your remark?


I understood that and if it succeeds, then it also succeeds in negating the necesity of actions described by compatibilism.


I doubt that that consequence would amount to any skin off the nose of even the most hyper Calvinist.


and I choose to believe in free will over that inevitability. If you'd like to insist that the real debate is over the compatibility of free will and inevitability, I am all to happy with that assesment.


My point is that there isn't any real debate at all. :wink:


well there's two ways to handle this:

1 It doesn't exist in possible worlds where the truth of certain future details does not extend into the past


A tautology is true in all possible worlds, by definition. Trying to find exceptions is an exercise in futility. This site, in fact, claims that tautologies are true in all worlds, possible or not.
http://www.pages.drexel.edu/faculty/bachcn/BegLogic/hndlog3.htm
See number nine (numerological Beatles reference incidental).


2 the actual world in it's ontologically special status does not reflect any particular complete purduring possible world but can go in several directions as reflected by the fact that their are many possible worlds that are identical to the actual world up to the present moment but differ in the various aspects of the future.


Well, what you wrote looks like flat-out nonsense, but it doesn't really matter anyway, because your only real option is to admit that tautologies are always true.
You look as though you're coming close to invoking infinte universes--but I'm willing to give you the benefit of the doubt.


I will do what I will do tomarrow and as of today, for several actions, what I will do is general and has no definition until I give it that definition tomarrow or in what I determine today for tomorrow.


So, supposing that you drink orange juice at 6 AM tomorrow, it would not be true for me to say "Geebob drinks orange juice at 6 AM on Tuesday (as of this writing!) April 8, 2003"?
I don't see how you can argue that my statement isn't true until you drink the juice without arguing by assertion, or some other handy fallacy. Surprise me?


There is no doubt a certain range of possibilities, but as there is a range, and as the possibilities are truly accessible from this present, the truth reflects that those possibilities are accessible in a way that an exhaustive set of certainties cannot.

By "certainty" do you mean "actuality" or do you mean "necessity"? If we assume more than one actual future, then we're bound for chaotic discussion. If there one actual future that isn't necessary, then your statement doesn't appear to follow.

Are you quite certain that you're too lazy to become embroiled in this discussion? :smile:

[geebob]

Then free will is impossible, in your view, except for actions in the future. Since actions in the future don't exist, therefore we have no free will. You are begging the question.

we are free with regard to actions we are about to make. Those actions were free if from the past, it was possible to do otherwise.

As soon as the choice is made, it is irrevocable.

which can consitute a libertarian free action provided it was proceeded by a moment when the other choice was possible and truly accessable. Freedom has a minimum of two temporal parts. There is the moment when more than one choice is possible and the subsequent action when one of those choices is laid down.

On the contrary, sir, any passable definition of free will allows choices in the past and present (or future, I would maintain) to be free:

that isn't contrary to what I said. any choice in the past present or future can be free provided you were free when it happened, but after the choice is made, you are no longer free with regard to the choice. You were free with regard to that choice but you aren't any longer. Now you can be free with choices that lie ahead of you.

The definition of choice includes the concept of either. Your (whimsical, imo) concept of free choice apparently emphasized and.

in no way shape or form am I doing this.

Other actions in the past are possible now.

really? okay, were you free with regard to posting your last post? then demonstrate that by not posting that post you just posted. I'm not asking you to deleate it, that would be something you'd do in the present. I'm asking you not to post it earlier this morning. Is it currently within your power not to post that earlier this morning? I'm inclined to think that it was within your power, but I don't see how it is in your power now.

My choice of Coke over Pepsi is an example of a free will choice. It is possible even now that I could have chosen Pepsi. Tomorrow I will choose Coke--but even though I will definitely choose Coke, it remains possible to choose Pepsi, instead.

are you talking about a choice that you already made or one that you will make? When I say that you are not free with regard to the past, I don't mean that we aren't free with regard to the future. sure I'll submit that you may be free with regard to your choice tomarrow, but what did you do yesterday? Did you have coke? Well I submit that you are no longer free with regard to that choice. If you choose coke yesterday, then I challenge you to choose pepsi yesterday instead of coke. But I'm inclined to think that it is no longer within you power. Now you may insist that you have the power to choose pepsi or coke tomarrow, and with that, I have no qualms.

Geebob, it is true now that I made that choice.

and it is no longer within your power to refrain from making the coice that you already choosen.

I doubt that that consequence would amount to any skin off the nose of even the most hyper Calvinist.

good, the arguement wasn't against their view.

Your statement above seems to suggest that God didn't know what he was creating when he created the Universe.

when he knew what he was creating when he created it, but God wasn't always creating. His ontological independence necessitates that God was without creation was without creation at a point (a point which no longer exists). Furthermore, his plans are not a fundamental and ontologically necessary part of him, thus he was once without them as well. So he knew of creation as soon as he planned it.

I find it hard to believe that Craig would advocate that sort of nonsense. Point me to a relevant quotation, so that I may make proper sense of your remark?

I can't point to a quotation. I can tell you who I got it from, and if you'd like his email I can give it to you. It is David Woodruff's assessment and he is familier enough with Craig to make that judgement as he is a philosopher who deals with these subjects and has edited a recent book with Craig as one of the authors.

It is quite a natural conclusion from craig's view of middle knowledge as God's knowledge is based upon which particular possible world to actualize and outside of that action, there is no basis for his foreknowledge.

A tautology is true in all possible worlds, by definition. Trying to find exceptions is an exercise in futility.

I don't see where you are coming from on this issue with tautolgies. I know you've explained it, but it still isn't clear to me how you have made an effect arguement against our case.

You look as though you're coming close to invoking infinte universes--but I'm willing to give you the benefit of the doubt.

one actual world with several possible worlds describing all the various future paths which the actual world can take is enough for me. note that I don't take possible worlds exactly in the same way that craig does but it is not like there is only one correct way to express possible worlds ontology that is clearly the best way as there are many philosophers who use them in different ways. David lewis for example who is one of the philosophers who originally worked out the semantics for possible world's ontology does in fact think that all of the possible worlds are in fact actual. He's a materialist so he has to think that if he is to ascribe to the ontology.

So, supposing that you drink orange juice at 6 AM tomorrow, it would not be true for me to say "Geebob drinks orange juice at 6 AM on Tuesday (as of this writing!) April 8, 2003"?

that is pretty close. if I or someone/something else determine today that I will drink ornage juice tomorrow at 6 then the statement will have truth, but apart from that, the statement will not be true (either because it has no truth value or because it is false because a statement about the uncertainty of the event is true in it's place, which is my preferred way of looking at it).

If I determine it today, then the libertarian moment when it was possible for me either to drink it or not has been resolved and there is only the last part of the free act to be carried out, which is the act itself. But it isn't always the case that I determine things that far ahead.

I don't see how you can argue that my statement isn't true until you drink the juice without arguing by assertion, or some other handy fallacy. Surprise me?

it's not true now because there is still an accessible possibility that I will have cranberry juice instead. Once the possibility is actualized, or is determined, it will become true.

By "certainty" do you mean "actuality" or do you mean "necessity"?

a certainty is a possibility that excludes other possibilities in describing the actual world. For some future details, there is no exclusive possibility that excludes the chance that other possibilities will come to pass.

Are you quite certain that you're too lazy to become embroiled in this discussion?

only to become embroiled where i don't care to be embroiled. I'm sticking with my two criticisms of Jaltus' last post.

[geebob]

2nd post, scroll up


lucky me, I found a quote from craig from of all places, here at tweb,

"God exists before creation. Since time is a physical dimension, there is no time until creation. Creation occurs, and at that exact instant God knows everything that will ever happen and how He will react to it in order to instantiate the world He wants."

it's from here

http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?postid=56482#post56482

[John Powell]

POWELL:
A few comments about the debate and to Capn Ochre and Geebob.

A. To Capn Ochre:
Please have more patience with Geebob. I think he has some important points to consider especially about the impossibility of changing the past. You may have had free will in the past, but in times future to that choice you no longer have free will to do different from what you did.

Also, although free will is often defined in terms of a disjunction "A or B" this doesn't seem to translate properly to truth value functions since "A or B" is true even if only A is available, where B is not a possible choice. Tim Holt brought this to my attention and suggested that a conjunction like "A is possible and B is possible" might work. I ran with a variation of that without realizing the existence of modal problems.

B. To Geebob:
I agree with much of what you're saying, but I strongly encourage you to spell better. Please?!

Other comments about the debate:

C. I still think my scenario is the best part of my argument.

Given the problems I've had with converting the claims of that scenario into a syllogism, I'm suspicious that whatever the syllogisim ends up being (with the help of those here), it won't be as persuasive as the scenario.

I realize now that my current syllogism has modal problems, but I'm hopeful they can be resolved and the syllogism can be appropriately revised. I wish Jaltus had brought this modal problem up sooner.

Perhaps I was misled to think that the following are valid deductive arguments:

1. If p then possibly / probably / necessarily q
2. p
3. therefore, possibly / probably / necessarily q.

In a reversal to my claim in the debate and in opposition to Jaltus's concession, I no longer think my current syllogism is a valid argument. I believe the form of my argument is invalid because of the use of the non-absolute term "possibly."

Evidently, it is NOT the case that any meaningful substitution from the natural language (e.g., English) for the variables p and q in Modus Ponens - like arguments results in a valid deductive argument.

Counterexample to the form of my current syllogism:

C1. If J is a man then it is possible that J is a husband.
C2. If J is a bachelor then it is not possible that J is a husband.
C3. It is not the case both that (it is possible that J is a husband and it is not possible that J is a husband)
C4. therefore, it is not the case both that (J is a man and J is a bachelor).

The conclusion in this case is false because someone could both be a man and a bachelor. The conclusion C4 does NOT follow from the previous premises because premise C1 uses the non-absolute term "possibly."

I thought that my original premise 3 was the strongest part of the argument followed by the inference to the conclusion. Now, I suspect that the inference is the weakest part of the argument.

I'm still working on an improved syllogism.


D. Based on the meanings of the certain term "will"

Necessarily de dicto, if G knows that E will occur then E will occur, cannot NOT occur.

In that case, E could not be other than what it was foreknown to be.

In order to allow for the "future to change" we should use terms something like "might will happen."


E. Is Jaltus suggesting that M.P. really means the following?

1. Necessarily, if p then q
2. p
3. therefore, q.

I would think that M.P. means something more like

1. If p then necessarily de dicto q
2. p
3. therefore, necessarily de dicto (of premise 1) q

This could have implications to my argument that M.P. is essentially a circular argument.

F. I noticed one of the LDS Apostles this past week characterize God as having foreknowledge, with the past, present, and future before him in the ever present now or something like that. Evidently, he believes that foreknowledge and free will are compatible. I, as a believing Mormon, did not believe this.

I'll make some more comments about Jaltus's concluding post later.

John Powell

[Jaltus]

1. If p then necessarily de dicto q
2. p
3. therefore, necessarily de dicto (of premise 1) q

This could have implications to my argument that M.P. is essentially a circular argument.


I think what fits better, and is more accurate, would be:

1. If p then necessarily de dicto q
2'. necessarily p
3. therefore, necessarily de dicto (of premise 1) q


If you miss the necessarily, the syllogism still falls flat.

John,

I highly recommend William Lane Craig's The Only Wise God and William Hasker's God, Time, and Knowledge. Craig is a Molinist and Hasker does not believe that EDF and LFW can go together, but they are both wonderful reads dealing with the same issue, and in fact talking back and forth to each other.

[John Powell]

POWELL:
This modal logic issue seems to be more complicated and of more modern development than I realized.

For one thing, modal arguments apparently can't be reduced to the usual truth tables until "other worlds" axioms are introduced.

Evidently, since a typical axiom of modal logic is that

box (A rightarrow B) rightarrow (box A rightarrow box B),

where box = necessarily and rightarrow = implies (that is, "if . . . then"), therefore the correct form of a modal-type modus ponens would be something like

1. Necessarily (if p then q)
2. Necessarily p
3. therefore, necessarily q.

I thought the "necessarily" could be omitted from premise 2 if "necessarily" was understood as "necessarily de dicto," but perhaps I was wrong.

A question I have is what should be the conclusion of the following modal syllogism?

4. necessarily (if p then q)
5. p
6. therefore, ?

Could the conclusion be just "q"? Or, should it be something like "necessarily q"? If "necessarily" implies it is true in all possible worlds and if "p" could be translated as "happen to have p in world w," which seems plausible if the argument is only claimed to be valid, not sound, then should the conclusion be "happen to have q in world w"?

The statement "possibly P" in modal logic evidently means something like "not necessarily not P."

John Powell
Student of Philosophical Logic.

[John Powell]

JALTUS:

I think what fits better, and is more accurate, would be:

1. If p then necessarily de dicto q
2'. necessarily p
3. therefore, necessarily de dicto (of premise 1) q

If you miss the necessarily, the syllogism still falls flat.


POWELL:
Apparently, you are in agreement with modal logicians. If the "necessarily" is removed from premise 2, what, if anything, can be properly concluded? Would merely "q" be a correct conclusion in that case?

Doesn't the conditional in Modus Ponens, "if p then q," imply some sort of "necessarily"? Otherwise, I would think you could be justified in interpreting "then" as something weaker like "almost certainly then" or "probably then" or "possibly then" since these amplifications of meaning would be allowed by the natural language of English.

JALTUS:
John,

I highly recommend William Lane Craig's The Only Wise God and William Hasker's God, Time, and Knowledge. Craig is a Molinist and Hasker does not believe that EDF and LFW can go together, but they are both wonderful reads dealing with the same issue, and in fact talking back and forth to each other.

POWELL:
Thank you. I have strong desires to read those two books. I hope they will help me to better understand the way people like you and Capn Ochre are thinking about these issues.

This could be a fruitful exercise also because my ability to criticize the writings of others surpasses my ability to promote my own ideas. Whether I will be able to present justified criticisms of their substantive arguments has yet to be determined. This isn't known yet since IMO the future is a concept more properly thought of as things that "might will be" rather than that "certainly will be". :brow:

John Powell

[geebob]

B. To Geebob:
I agree with much of what you're saying, but I strongly encourage you to spell better. Please?!

thank you for the advice, but I'm afraid that you will find that I am quite the slob.

Also, I'd agree with Jaltus' book recomendations. If you want an excellent formal arguement, you should take a look at hasker's example of clarence and his omlet found in God, Time, and Foreknowledge. I may post it sometime in the theology 101 section.

Also, I'd like to point out that we have many discussions related to this issue in the theology 101 section. We frequently discuss open theism there which is a theological position that argues among other things that God does not know our future free actions as certain. More importantly, it emphasizes the personhood of God and the free nature of our relationship to him.

If you are not familier with open theism, I'd like to recomend www.opentheism.org

[John Powell]

GEEBOB:
thank you for the advice, but I'm afraid that you will find that I am quite the slob.


POWELL:
Bummer.

GEEBOB:
Also, I'd agree with Jaltus' book recomendations. If you want an excellent formal arguement, you should take a look at hasker's example of clarence and his omlet found in God, Time, and Foreknowledge. I may post it sometime in the theology 101 section.


POWELL:
Posting that would be nice.

GEEBOB:
Also, I'd like to point out that we have many discussions related to this issue in the theology 101 section. We frequently discuss open theism there which is a theological position that argues among other things that God does not know our future free actions as certain. More importantly, it emphasizes the personhood of God and the free nature of our relationship to him.


POWELL:
I need to check out that section of tweb.

GEEBOB:
If you are not familier with open theism, I'd like to recomend www.opentheism.org


POWELL:
Thanks. I read several of the pages, including some by the opposition. Interesting.

I wonder how Mormonism fits in this debate. As a believing Mormon I came to conclude on my own that God could not foreknow the future. Philosophical-type questions such as "Is foreknowledge compatible with free agency" are rare in LDS talks. This I think is largely because the Gospel, according to the Mormons, should be plain and simple. As soon as arguments become complicated (like philosophy) then you've entered the realm of the "mysteries" which aren't necessary to understand for salvation and leaders want to steer the discussion elsewhere.

John Powell
A former believer in Mormonism.
Now an athe-ist or strong atheist.

[geebob]

I believe Pinnock has spoken at brigham young. My knowledge of mormonism is limited but I imagine that they would like alot of the conclusions of open theism though they would in general, go further than open theists in the degree of reality depiction of certain anthropomorphisms.

[Captain Ochre]

04-07-2003 @ 04:25 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=58018#post58018)
geebob:



we are free with regard to actions we are about to make. Those actions were free if from the past, it was possible to do otherwise.


That's convoluted enough to be slightly ambiguous.
It still looks like all of our free decisions are in the future, which doesn't exist (in your view). Therefore, free decisions do not exist?


which can consitute a libertarian free action provided it was proceeded by a moment when the other choice was possible and truly accessable. Freedom has a minimum of two temporal parts. There is the moment when more than one choice is possible and the subsequent action when one of those choices is laid down.


Yet I would argue that both choices are possible beyond the moment of choosing. Your rejoinder has appeared to suggest that once you make a decision, you have no freedom regarding that decision. That seems like ridiculous statement, to me. The decision in the past remains every bit as much a decision as it was when you made it. Yet you seem to want to say that ther is no freedom respecting that past decision. Isn't that because there is no more decision to make, coerced or otherwise?


that isn't contrary to what I said. any choice in the past present or future can be free provided you were free when it happened, but after the choice is made, you are no longer free with regard to the choice.


See above. Aren't you talking about the same lack of freedom that I have with respect to whether one-sided triangles are possible? Free past decision meet every criterion for freedom, afaics. You appear to wish to describe an addition one that isn't typically relevant (and I'm prepared to argue that it remains irrelevant).


You were free with regard to that choice but you aren't any longer. Now you can be free with choices that lie ahead of you.


Why am I not free with respect to free decision X (A, ~B), exactly? Because I cannot choose both? That's what you deny that you're saying. Since when (no pun intended) does any passage of time negate my freedom now with respect to my past decision?

The only way that I can conceive of maintaining enduring freedom by your definition is by choosing both A and B--which simply isn't a logically consistent option, and even if it were, I couldn't choose ~B if I chose both A and B.


in no way shape or form am I doing this.


What are you doing, then? Is there any practical application to your contention that I am not free with respect to past decisions apart from a flirtation (and perhaps consummation with) the modal fallacy?


really? okay, were you free with regard to posting your last post? then demonstrate that by not posting that post you just posted. I'm not asking you to deleate it, that would be something you'd do in the present. I'm asking you not to post it earlier this morning. Is it currently within your power not to post that earlier this morning?


You don't see how you're confusing possibility with actuality? You really don't?
If I could actually do two things at once, then I would have done the impossible (unless we allow multiple or infinte universes, which would sort of beg the question anyway).
My non-actual option, if it was ever possible, remains possible in perpetuity unless you believe in altering the past (which leads us right back to the multiple universe thingie which is rightly rejected for purposes of this argument, imo). You still look like you want A and B for freedom to exist. If an impossibility must be possible to permit freedom, then wouldn't you agree that freedom is impossible?


I'm inclined to think that it was within your power, but I don't see how it is in your power now.


Geebob (translated/paraphrased to maximize ironic effects): You can't make more than one choice per decision! Nyah, nyah! Therefore, your past decisions are not free!
:wink:

My past free decision, if it was free, is some of the best possible evidence that I am free to choose now if I were again given the same options under the same conditions.


are you talking about a choice that you already made or one that you will make?


Both, of course. Your view deserves to be challenged as directly as possible.


When I say that you are not free with regard to the past, I don't mean that we aren't free with regard to the future.


I know that you don't intend that consequence--it merely follows from your argument that that facts regarding the future do not exist. Right now, you are not free respecting past decision. You cannot do other than what you are doing right now. Your future doesn't exist. Does your freedom exist? I cannot locate it within your worldview except as a spectre in your future that slips away from you toward the chronological horizon with every ticking second.


sure I'll submit that you may be free with regard to your choice tomarrow, but what did you do yesterday? Did you have coke? Well I submit that you are no longer free with regard to that choice.


What is that supposed to mean?
That I cannot choose both A and ~A, and that if I cannot choose both A and ~A then I am therefore not free regarding any particular choice? Sorry to keep guessing the option you deny you're putting forth, but I can't see any way around it, from your view. Tell me what you mean, such that I cannot successfully equate it with what you say you're not saying.


If you choose coke yesterday, then I challenge you to choose pepsi yesterday instead of coke. But I'm inclined to think that it is no longer within you power. Now you may insist that you have the power to choose pepsi or coke tomarrow, and with that, I have no qualms.


The key to freedom is not with my ability to make more than one option actual, but with my ability to make one actual out of two or more possibilities. How does the passage of time remove possibility with respect to the option(s) not taken? I suggest that the passage of time does no such thing. If you take the opposite position, then you're eventually (I predict) going to have your position identified as a modal fallacy.


and it is no longer within your power to refrain from making the coice that you already choosen.


How would you define "freedom" such that the inability to bring about two different actualities regarding the same decision results in a lack of freedom?
I don't think that you can do it without dipping deeply of absurdity.


good, the arguement wasn't against their view.


Your closest target nonetheless, afaics (hypercalvinists).


when he knew what he was creating when he created it, but God wasn't always creating.


Oh, that sure clears it up!:sarcasm:
:smile:


His ontological independence necessitates that God was without creation was without creation at a point (a point which no longer exists). Furthermore, his plans are not a fundamental and ontologically necessary part of him, thus he was once without them as well. So he knew of creation as soon as he planned it.


That's better, but it somewhat contradicts what you wrote earlier (perhaps only because of ambiguity?).
Still, it seems nearly nonsensical to attempt to plan something when you have no knowledge of it. How do you go about planning something that you're ignorant about? Shall we plan a Bussard Ramjet, you and I? :wink:


It is quite a natural conclusion from craig's view of middle knowledge as God's knowledge is based upon which particular possible world to actualize and outside of that action, there is no basis for his foreknowledge.


That statement tiptoes the line between "God knows the future because He caused it" and "God knows the future because he knows the actual future." If it supports both statements, then I suggest that is isn't relevant to the debate.


I don't see where you are coming from on this issue with tautolgies. I know you've explained it, but it still isn't clear to me how you have made an effect arguement against our case.


I'm saying that the argument that supposedly relies on a nebulous effect of foreknowledge is actually a tautology with a vestigial augmentation:

If God knows what you will do, then you cannot do other than what you will do.
You cannot do other than what you will do (you will do what you will do).

Or, "If [God knows that] you will do X, then you will do X."
Take away the bracketed portion, and you've got the tautology.
"If you will do X, then you will do X."
Neither one has any effect on free will whatsoever, any more than "If a birdie sings and you will do X, then you will do X" means that birdsong negates free will.


one actual world with several possible worlds describing all the various future paths which the actual world can take is enough for me.


If we figure that time won't come to an end, and we figure just two alternate universes per week, then how many alternate universes do we have? Do past alternate universes that never were become even more nonexistent with the passage of time (iow as they move from future to present to past)?


note that I don't take possible worlds exactly in the same way that craig does but it is not like there is only one correct way to express possible worlds ontology that is clearly the best way as there are many philosophers who use them in different ways. David lewis for example who is one of the philosophers who originally worked out the semantics for possible world's ontology does in fact think that all of the possible worlds are in fact actual. He's a materialist so he has to think that if he is to ascribe to the ontology.


If all possible worlds are actual, then free will is as dead as it would be if causal determinism were true (or more so). The only thing Geebob doesn't do is that which is impossible. You get to choose A and ~A--just in alternate universes. Maybe infinite Geebob's are unsaved, but (fortunately) infinite Geebob's are saved, too!



that is pretty close. if I or someone/something else determine today that I will drink ornage juice tomorrow at 6 then the statement will have truth, but apart from that, the statement will not be true (either because it has no truth value or because it is false because a statement about the uncertainty of the event is true in it's place, which is my preferred way of looking at it).


Did you just answer (in effect) "yes and no"? 'Cause that's what it looks like to me.


it's not true now because there is still an accessible possibility that I will have cranberry juice instead. Once the possibility is actualized, or is determined, it will become true.


Does "accessible possibility"="hasn't happened yet"? If so, you're assuming your conclusion (begging the question).
"Once the possibility is actualized, or is determined, it will become true"="Actual things are true things". I can't argue with that, but how do you know that the future isn't actual? "It hasn't happened yet" will not suffice as an answer (see above).


a certainty is a possibility that excludes other possibilities in describing the actual world.


If all possible worlds are actual, then what you wrote above is utter nonsense. Agreed?


For some future details, there is no exclusive possibility that excludes the chance that other possibilities will come to pass.


Translate that one for me? I forecast that my attempt would make yet another one of your statements appear unreasonable.

[geebob]

It still looks like all of our free decisions are in the future, which doesn't exist (in your view). Therefore, free decisions do not exist?

The future exists. but not like the present does. A simplistic explanation of presentism, one that can give someone a decent understanding of presentism is that the present exists but not the past or future. I would repeat this explanation to someone new to the issue to get them to think about the nature of time. A more accurate way to put it though is to say that the present is ontologically special and the past and future exist sufficiently to where we can talk about them, but their existence is not to be placed on the same ontological level as the present. Possible world's ontology can provide us a means for making true statements about the future and past and it can go further and explain the ontological difference between the future and past beyond their relation to the present and that of course is in worlds where indeteterminism, specifically the kind that enables free will holds sway. The free will decision exists as an aspect of the actual world where a rational concious active being can consciously apprehend the possibilities available to the future of the actual world and determine independently of outside determining factors which possibility will be accessable.

Your rejoinder has appeared to suggest that once you make a decision, you have no freedom regarding that decision. That seems like ridiculous statement, to me.

I find it hard to believe that right now it is within your power to do in the past other than what you did in the past. It's reasonable to say that you could have done something in the past other than what you did in the past.

If you can still do in the past other than what you have done, then why don't you right now refrain from sinning in the past. Why didn't samuel tell saul to go back and refrain from offering a sacrifice to God? That would have erased the action and there would be no reason for God to be angry with saul because it would then be true that he never offered a sacrifice.

Why didn't God tell Adam and Eve to refrain from the act that they had already taken so that they would no longer have sin in the history of their lives. The past is irrevocable.

The decision in the past remains every bit as much a decision as it was when you made it.

they don't remain. They are past. They were. But now, they aren't. It remains only in it's results left in the present and what can be said truthfully about them.

Perhaps you are confusing the choice of coke that you made yesterday identifying it with the choice you will make tomarrow. Well they are the same type of choice. You could say that they share the universal of a choice between coke and pepsi, but they are not the same tokens of that choice (a token is a particular that shares the same universal as another particular). you are only free with regard to specific tokens of choices, thus that you are free to choose pepsi or coke does not mean that you are always free with that choice (perhaps the coke was spilled on the ground and your state of mind is such that you would not consider drinking the coke. In such a sitution, you are not libertarian free with regard to that choice).


Perhaps this will further clear up the confusion. We have been throwing the term free without close attention to how it is applied to different entities. If you are free being (in the libertarian sense) then you are someone who is in general free with regard to various specific actions. If you are free with regard to an action, then you have the power to perform that action and you have the power to refrain from that action and this is an action at a specific moment in time. If we don't throw in that part about time, then we could say that you were free to choose a coke all your life when you were some iraqi who's never seen a coke until the last year of his life when US sanctions were lifted and the coca cola company started selling wares in that country. Now a free action is an action performed by a free being and it is an action that that free beings could refrain from (and the same goes for the a free action of omission, by which I mean the refraining from that action). For all of these uses of freedom, we are, or at least I am speaking of the libertarian view.

The key to freedom is not with my ability to make more than one option actual, but with my ability to make one actual out of two or more possibilities.

That has not been my position that freedom is the ability to make more than one choice actual. Not the way that you are thinking of it. This is another thing to be cleared up. in a sense you were right that I was making freedom a both/and deal and not an either/or, but I was right to deny what you said because I knew what you meant by it.

As John Powell has noted, correctly from what tim holt pointed out, there is a problem with the notion of defining freedom as simply the ability to do A or -A because according to the truth conditions that make that statement work you only need the power to do one of those things and not both. To give an example of why this fails to portry libertarian freedom, no libertarian in his right mind would say that you are free with regard to flying to the moon simply by flapping your arms. However you can refrain from that action, and you have the ability to not fly to the moon by flapping your arms. the statement "you are free with respect to flying to the moon by flapping your arms if it is within your power to do so or within your power to refrain from doing so." is true even if you can only refrain from flying to the moon according to the truth conditions necessary for a disjunction to be true. That is wholy inadequate for the purposes of the libertarian.

Alvin Plantinga, who subscribes to the compatibility of edf and lfw via middle knowledge defines libertarian free will this way;

If a person is free with respect to a given action, then he is free to perform the action and free to refrain from performing it; no antecedent conditions and/or causal laws determine that he will perform the action, or that he won't...It is within his power, at the time in question, to take or perform the action and within his power to refrain from it.

Does Plantinga here mean that the person has the power to both refrain and act at the same time? come now. He is a serious Philosopher and currently the most respected christian Philosopher in the world (pardon my gratuitous ad hominem). He means as I have intended at all times in this thread that one who is libertarian free has the power act and not refrain as well as refrain and not act and not both at the same time. The potentials are what exists there simultaneously.

That statement tiptoes the line between "God knows the future because He caused it" and "God knows the future because he knows the actual future."

It's not my problem, I don't like middle knowledge. But I answered your appeal to authority with regard to the claim that all truth is absolute truth with an authority who has more respect amongst real philosophers. (and by real philosophers, I do not mean only ones who I agree with).

Your closest target nonetheless, afaics (hypercalvinists).

My arguement is that the arguement that Jaltus put foward could be used to defend (and not attack) a view that Jaltus is opposed to, thus my target is Jaltus' claim.

Oh, that sure clears it up!:sarcasm:

I don't often double check before posting and sometimes a legitimately nonsensical statement gets by.

Still, it seems nearly nonsensical to attempt to plan something when you have no knowledge of it. How do you go about planning something that you're ignorant about?

You can't be ignorant of something that has no truth to be ignorant of. God in planning to create really was being creative. He was making something that was not and was establishing the reality of it (and consequently the truth of it).

If God knows what you will do, then you cannot do other than what you will do.
You cannot do other than what you will do (you will do what you will do).

even if our arguement could be reduced to this, you could not use the emptiness of this statement against our arguement as in reducing many of the arguements for incompatibility of edf and lfw to this takes too much significant information out of the arguement.

As for the first part, why is it that you cannot do other than what God knows? Because God's foreknowledge cannot fail. Why does it matter that you could not do other than what God foreknew what you would do? Because to say that one has libertarian free with respect to an action is to say that he could have done other than what he did.

Or, "If [God knows that] you will do X, then you will do X."
Take away the bracketed portion, and you've got the tautology.

that "If" takes the force out of this critisizm. If you will do something, you will do it. sure. The question that we are concerned with is when it is true that you will do what is claimed that you will do. As soon as it is true, the libertarian moment is over and if it was always true, there never was a libertarian moment (the libertarian moment is of course the first temporal part of the libertarian free action where acting and refraining are both possible). the question of when this is true is essential and taking that question away, you don't have a full acount of the incompatibility, thus again this tautogy fails to convey an essential part of the arguement.

If we figure that time won't come to an end, and we figure just two alternate universes per week, then how many alternate universes do we have? Do past alternate universes that never were become even more nonexistent with the passage of time (iow as they move from future to present to past)?

I don't understand what this has to do with what I said. As I said, one actual world is enough for me. I don't believe that there are multiple actual worlds.

If all possible worlds are actual, then free will is as dead as it would be if causal determinism were true (or more so).

I don't believe all possible worlds are actual. I was defending the limited amount of liberty that I was taking with possible worlds by citing an example of one who takes possible world's ontology significantly differently than William Lane Craig, one who in fact is one of the originators of possible worlds ontology. I don't agree with him either. Lewis says all possible worlds are actual which makes speach of the actual world an indexical where the speaker merely identifies the world that he is in. Craig also would say that the actual world is a particular possible world but the actual world is an ontologically special one in that it is the only possible world that obtains. The way in which I use possible worlds, it is not entirely correct to call the actual world a particular possible world because I speak of possible world's as having complete futures and the future has not arived yet in the actual world. And this is reasonable once you consider that possible worlds are descriptions of how the actual world could be or could have been. Thus as the actual world is used to define what a possible world is, it is wrong to call the actual world a possible world. The description of the actual world is not a description of how the actual world could have been or could be.

Does "accessible possibility"="hasn't happened yet"? If so, you're assuming your conclusion (begging the question).

Assuming my conclusion in what arguement? neither side of your equation is an explicit statemtent of the incompatibility of free will and foreknowledge. Without an explicit statement of the conclusion in the premises, you do not question begging. implications of the conclusion are necessarily part of deductive arguements as Deductive arguements are arguements that draw the implicit out of the explicit.

from me:For some future details, there is no exclusive possibility that excludes the chance that other possibilities will come to pass.

ochre: Translate that one for me? I forecast that my attempt would make yet another one of your statements appear unreasonable.

for some aspects of the future, there are several possibilities that could obtain. An aspect such as whether I will have orange juice or not. the possibility that I will have orange juice is accessible because it could be actualized as an aspect of the actual world and for the same time in question, the possibility that I won't drink orange juice and will instead drink cranberry juice is also accesable because it might turn out that I will do that. That both of these possibilities are accessible to the actual world entails that everything in the actual world is consistent with both possibilities, including God's knowledge.

[John Powell]

POWELL:
I'm sorry to be behind in contributing here. I have been working on rebutting some essays by Swartz who brings out some modal problems. This was a link suggested by Capn Ochre. :thumb:

In the philosophy section I've presented my arguments that essentially invalidate valid deductive arguments, but that's only tangential to the modal problem. What I'm really after here is to show that the modal complaints to "If foreknowledge then no free will" arguments as usually phrased may be justified, but the problems can be resolved.

Furthermore, I'm finding more cases where "scenarios" are sometimes preferred to "syllogisms." I need to give examples.

John Powell

[John Powell]

POWELL:
I think I've resolved the modal difficulties with my syllogism.

1. IF in the possible world w, J has free will to choose A or B THEN it is NOT necessarily the case in w that J chooses A.

2. IF in the possible world w, G foreknows that J will choose A THEN it IS necessarily the case in w that J chooses A.

3. It is not the case that both (it is NOT necessarily the case in w that J chooses A) AND (it IS necessarily the case in w that J chooses A).

4. Therefore, it is not the case that both (in the possible world w, J has free will to choose A or B) AND (in the possible world w, G foreknows that J will choose A).

This syllogism, as worded, does not argue that G cannot know the future (period). Given that A and B are reversible, it argues that in cases where G knows what J will do, J does not have free will to do otherwise. This means that in those specific cases either G knows the future or J has free will, but not both. This is just what people mean when they speak of foreknowledge and free will being incompatible.

My husband-bachelor type counter-example appears to be disanalgous because in it I'm using the closely inter-related definitions of husband = married male and bachelor = unmarried male, whereas the definitions of free will and foreknowledge are not closely inter-related in a similar enough way.

I'm still working on replying to Swartz's essays on these and related topics.

John Powell

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 06:02 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=66297#post66297)
John Powell:

POWELL:
I think I've resolved the modal difficulties with my syllogism.

1. IF in the possible world w, J has free will to choose A or B THEN it is NOT necessarily the case in w that J chooses A.

2. IF in the possible world w, G foreknows that J will choose A THEN it IS necessarily the case in w that J chooses A.

3. It is not the case that both (it is NOT necessarily the case in w that J chooses A) AND (it IS necessarily the case in w that J chooses A).

4. Therefore, it is not the case that both (in the possible world w, J has free will to choose A or B) AND (in the possible world w, G foreknows that J will choose A).

This syllogism, as worded, does not argue that G cannot know the future (period).

(Bold emphasis added by C.O., comment on bold portion to follow)
True! Minor congratulations are in order for that! :smile:


Given that A and B are reversible, it argues that in cases where G knows what J will do, J does not have free will to do otherwise.


Your new syllogism doesn't deal in free will, afaics.
Point three appears to confuse an event "necessary" in a particular possible world with a "necessary" event. A necessary event could not be otherwise. The very fact that you're dealing with a mere possible world indicates that it could be otherwise.
Still looks like the modal fallacy to me, in fact. It is nearly nonsense to speak of necessary events in merely possible worlds.
Rather, if God knows event X, then event X is actual, not necessary.
"The fallacy consists in taking a necessary condition (p) of knowledge (Kxp) to be necessary (p) 'on its own'."
--Norman Swartz



This means that in those specific cases either G knows the future or J has free will, but not both. This is just what people mean when they speak of foreknowledge and free will being incompatible.


That's a non-sequitur. You cannot make any decision without making one of two or more possible options actual (if you make a decision, it is necessary that one possible option becomes actual). We know prior to your choice that one option will become actual, though we might not know which one. That doesn't lessen your free will, assuming that free will exists.

In your example, we still have possible options, and if a choice is made, then one of the options is going to be actual. We could say (using your turn on the term "necessary") that if a choice is made, then it is necessary for one of the possibilities to become actual.
Again, the supposed inevitability is found regardless (read:irregardless if you're Farrell Till) of free will or foreknowledge.


My husband-bachelor type counter-example appears to be disanalgous because in it I'm using the closely inter-related definitions of husband = married male and bachelor = unmarried male, whereas the definitions of free will and foreknowledge are not closely inter-related in a similar enough way.

I'm still working on replying to Swartz's essays on these and related topics.


What is your rationale right now for maintaining that free will and foreknowledge are logically incompatible? Is it a faith-stance related to your perception the the notion is counter-intuitive, or are you certain that your syllogism is sound (though as I've noted it doesn't get around to actually addressing free will)?

Note to Geebob: I'm not diving into my response to you at this time. The fact that my earlier response to you ended up divided mol into individual sentences for purposes of your response gives me the impression that I'm going to have to practically rewrite the earlier post in order to (re)explain stuff to you, as well as taking the time to refute your various citations.
I may not have that block of time set aside anytime soon. I'm leaning toward extensive revision of the format your post steers me toward.

[edit to add]

D'oh! I didn't read your syllogism closely enough, John, with its emphasis on possible world w carried over into point three. However, I found a bigger error in your syllogism.

In point one, you declare that it is not neccesarily the case in world w that A is chosen if a person has free will.
In point two, you declare that it is necessarily the case in world w that A is chosen if a person has free will.
In point three, you pretend that "not necessarily" and "necessarily" are A and ~A, in effect--iow you declare that both cannot be true at the same time. That's a non-sequitur.

If in possible world w I am the parent of Bobby, then I am not necessarily Bobby's father.
If in possible world w I am the male parent of Bobby, then I am necessarily Bobby's father.
I cannot both "not necessarily" be Bobby's father and necessarily Bobby's father in possible world w, can I?

I apologize for not finding the more obvious problem sooner.

[John Powell]

POWELL:
To Capn Ochre.

POWELL:
I think I've resolved the modal difficulties with my syllogism.

<snipped>

This syllogism, as worded, does not argue that G cannot know the future (period).

CAPN OCHRE:
(Bold emphasis added by C.O., comment on bold portion to follow)
True! Minor congratulations are in order for that!


POWELL:
I hope that gets me some points.

POWELL:
Given that A and B are reversible, it argues that in cases where G knows what J will do, J does not have free will to do otherwise.

CAPN OCHRE:
Your new syllogism doesn't deal in free will, afaics.

Point three appears to confuse an event "necessary" in a particular possible world with a "necessary" event. A necessary event could not be otherwise. The very fact that you're dealing with a mere possible world indicates that it could be otherwise.


POWELL:
Oh really? Tell me about Modus Ponens then.

1. if p then q
2. p
3. therefore, q

Is it true that q is necessarily true in the world / situation that "if p then q" is true and "p" is true? I should think yes.

I suggest what is meant by Modus Ponens is the following:

1'. IF in world w, p THEN necessarily in world w, q.
2'. In world w, p
3'. therefore, necessarily in world w, q.

If M.P. doesn't mean that then what confidence should someone have that q is true? Is q only possibly true in the world in which "if p then q" and "p" are both true?

CAPN OCHRE:
Still looks like the modal fallacy to me, in fact. It is nearly nonsense to speak of necessary events in merely possible worlds.


POWELL:
Then how do you respond to Copi and Cohen's description of what constitutes a deductive argument?

Copi & Cohen (pg. 45):
A deductive argument is one whose conclusion is claimed to follow from its premisses with absolute necessity, this necessity not being a matter of degree, and not depending in any way on whatever else may be the case.


POWELL:
If "q" in M.P. is not necessarily true in the world / situation in which "if p then q" and "p" are both true, then why should any one consider M.P. to be a valid inference?

CAPN OCHRE:
Rather, if God knows event X, then event X is actual, not necessary.


"The fallacy consists in taking a necessary condition (p) of knowledge (Kxp) to be necessary (p) 'on its own'."
--Norman Swartz



POWELL:
That's if you don't use the possible worlds approach. You and Swartz are correct that it is not necessarily the case, in general, that q is true. It's not true that in all possible worlds that q is true even if "if p then q" and "p" were both true on some worlds. However, in the world that "if p then q" and "p" are both true then in that world it is necessarily the case that q is true, right?

Likewise, in the world / situation in which G foreknows that J will pick A then, necessarily in that world, J will pick A, cannot pick B, even if J wanted to do otherwise, even if God tried to use His almighty power to force J to pick B. Otherwise, G didn't really foreknow that J will pick A.

POWELL:
This means that in those specific cases either G knows the future or J has free will, but not both. This is just what people mean when they speak of foreknowledge and free will being incompatible.

CAPN OCHRE:
That's a non-sequitur.


POWELL:
Perhaps.

CAPN OCHRE:
You cannot make any decision without making one of two or more possible options actual (if you make a decision, it is necessary that one possible option becomes actual). We know prior to your choice that one option will become actual, though we might not know which one. That doesn't lessen your free will, assuming that free will exists.


POWELL:
Right. If you foreknow that J will make a decision then you foreknow that one of the options will become actual.

If J has free will to choose in world w then it is NOT necessarily the case in world w that J chooses A, even if someone merely claims they have foreknowledge. It's possible for J to choose B in that world. Once a choice is made actual, as you say, then I say it's no longer possible to choose. That choice is in the unchangeable past.

On the other hand, if G foreknows what J will do in world w, then in world w, J does not have free will to do otherwise.

CAPN OCHRE:
In your example, we still have possible options, and if a choice is made, then one of the options is going to be actual. We could say (using your turn on the term "necessary") that if a choice is made, then it is necessary for one of the possibilities to become actual.

Again, the supposed inevitability is found regardless (read:irregardless if you're Farrell Till) of free will or foreknowledge.


POWELL:
Kudos for catching Farrell in a grammatical mistake! That's hard to do.

You don't really have options if G knows which option you will take. You can only do what you will do. You may think you have options, but if G really knows you will choose A, you cannot choose B, even if He told you that you will choose A and He ordered you to choose B.

POWELL:
My husband-bachelor type counter-example appears to be disanalgous because in it I'm using the closely inter-related definitions of husband = married male and bachelor = unmarried male, whereas the definitions of free will and foreknowledge are not closely inter-related in a similar enough way.

I'm still working on replying to Swartz's essays on these and related topics.

CAPN OCHRE:
What is your rationale right now for maintaining that free will and foreknowledge are logically incompatible? Is it a faith-stance related to your perception the the notion is counter-intuitive, or are you certain that your syllogism is sound (though as I've noted it doesn't get around to actually addressing free will)?


POWELL:
Confidence in my scenario and my ability to understand logic.

Remember, Capn Ochre, that when an atheist proposes an argument in which God is an element, the atheist is unlikely to consider it to be sound. Validity is what I'm after. If it is valid and you think the premises are true then you should accept that the argument is sound.

CAPN OCHRE:
[edit to add]

D'oh! I didn't read your syllogism closely enough, John, with its emphasis on possible world w carried over into point three. However, I found a bigger error in your syllogism.


POWELL:
I already mentioned this problem. It's my bachelor-husband counter-example.

CAPN OCHRE:
In point one, you declare that it is not neccesarily the case in world w that A is chosen if a person has free will.


POWELL:
Yes.

CAPN OCHRE:
In point two, you declare that it is necessarily the case in world w that A is chosen if a person has free will.


POWELL:
You meant to say ". . . if G has foreknowledge," right?

CAPN OCHRE:
In point three, you pretend that "not necessarily" and "necessarily" are A and ~A, in effect--iow you declare that both cannot be true at the same time. That's a non-sequitur.


POWELL:
So, you're saying that something can be both "necessarily the case in world w" and "not necessarily the case in world w" at the same time? Wouldn't that violate the LNC?

CAPN OCHRE:
CC1) If in possible world w I am the parent of Bobby, then I am not necessarily Bobby's father.


POWELL:
Don't you need to add "in w" in the consequent? Otherwise there's no compelling reason to accept the conditional. The consequent is true regardless what the antecedent is. In another world you might not be Bobby's father.

CAPN Ochre:
CC2) If in possible world w I am the male parent of Bobby, then I am necessarily Bobby's father.


POWELL:
Again, you need to add "in w" in the consequent. Otherwise, it suffers a modal problem. Just because you are the male parent of Bobby in world w does not mean you are Bobby's father in all possible worlds.

CAPN OCHRE:
I cannot both "not necessarily" be Bobby's father and necessarily Bobby's father in possible world w, can I?


POWELL:
Exactly. I'm going to assume "in w" is added to the each of the consequents above.

CC1'. If in possible world w I am the parent of Bobby, then I am not necessarily in w, Bobby's father.

CC2'. If in possible world w I am the male parent of Bobby, then I am necessarily in w, Bobby's father.

In the world in which you are the male parent of Bobby, necessarily in that world you are Bobby's father. In that world, premise CC1' is a false conditional. The antecedent is true, but the consequent is false.

However, in the world in which G foreknows that J will choose A, premise 1 of the revised free will syllogism is true. The antecedent and the consequent of premise 1 will be false which makes a true conditional. The behavior is different.

To make the free-will premise 1 a false conditional, I think you would have to assert that J has free will in w, yet it is necessarily the case in w that J chooses A. J cannot choose B in w, even if commanded to do so in w. Perhaps that's your position, but it seems to violate the meaning of free will.

CAPN OCHRE:
I apologize for not finding the more obvious problem sooner.


POWELL:
I might be embarrassed if it wasn't for the fact that I discovered and posted this kind of flaw already.

POWELL:
C1. If J is a man then it is possible that J is a husband.
C2. If J is a bachelor then it is not possible that J is a husband.
C3. It is not the case both that (it is possible that J is a husband and it is not possible that J is a husband)
C4. therefore, it is not the case both that (J is a man and J is a bachelor).


POWELL:
If this were converted to the possible worlds form then it would show, like your argument, that in the world in which J is a bachelor then the corrected premise C1 would be a false conditional in that world. The antecedent would be true, but the consequent would be false.

These two counter-examples (yours and mine) appear to be disanalogous to my free-will syllogism. For the two counter-examples, Premise 1 is a false conditional when premise 2 corresponds to the world w. However, in my free-will syllogism premise 1 is a true conditional when premise 2 corresponds to the world w.

Furthermore, just because an argument FORM is invalid does NOT necessarily mean that the original linguistic argument is invalid. Sometimes essential information is lost in the conversion to logical symbols and such things. If, however, the argument form is valid then one can be confident that the original argument is valid too since if the "reduced" argument is valid, the more complete one should be too.

For example, denying the antecedent is considered an invalid form:

4. if p then q
5. ~p
6. therefore ~q

because many counter-examples exist. However, the following argument is valid despite the fact that it follows the "denying the antecedent" invalid form.

4'. If J is a husband then J is a married man.
5'. J is not a husband.
6'. therefore, J is not a married man.

This happens here because husband = married man is a special relationship between p and q that other substitutions of p and q won't be expected to obey.

The point here is that even if invalid examples of the FORM of my argument are discovered, that does not necessarily mean my foreknowledge-free-will argument is invalid. The counter-examples must be sufficiently analogous. Since the counter-examples you and I have presented so far appear to be disanalogous to the free-will syllogism, they don't count. We need to come up with counter-examples that fit the logical properties of the free-will syllogism.

Here's the beginning of another possible counter-example.

7. If in w, J is a bachelor then not necessarily in w, J is a parent
8. If in w, J is a father then necessarily in w, J is a parent

In this case, if premise 8 corresponds to the world w, namely that J is a father / parent then the consequent of premise 7 is false. However, it's unknown what the truth value of the antecedent of the conditional 7 is in that case. It could be either. So, if premise 8 corresponds to the world w, then the conditional 7 may be a false conditional (if antecedent true, consequent false) or a true conditional (if antecedent false, consequent false).

Again, this behavior is different from that of my free-will syllogism so it suffers the flaw of being disanalogous.

John Powell

[Captain Ochre]

I'm going right to what I perceive as the problem analogous to the bachelor problem, rather than taking up time by working through the rest of your post (including your treatment of an approach that I had mol discarded in the midst of my earlier post).


1. IF in the possible world w, J has free will to choose A or B THEN it is NOT necessarily the case in w that J chooses A.




Is the above a fair description of free will?
If in possible world z I chose coke over pepsi yesterday, I--in possible world z--necessarily chose coke yesterday. Was my decision a free will decision?
The term "necessarily" doesn't appear to mean what it should mean. Necessarily means that it couldn't be otherwise in possible world w. Yet, if I choose A in that possible world, I necessarily choose A in that possible world.
The truth is that if I have a choice between A and B and I actually make that choice, I necessarily choose A or B.

Let's take this a step further:


1. IF in the possible world w, J has free will to choose A or B THEN it is NOT necessarily the case in w that J chooses A.



2. IF in possible world w, J has free will to choose A or B THEN it is necessarily the case in w that J chooses A or B.


It will be noted that a choice is implicitly made, thus it would be evasion (or at least nit-picking) to point out that a choice isn't necessarily made at all. :smile:

A possible world where A is chosen is a possible world where A is necessarily chosen.
John's first premise begs the question because it assumes that the possible world w in which A is chosen is not necessarily the same possible world in which free will exists (where A is not necessarily chosen).

The syllogism would only work if possible world w is the same in both cases. It clearly isn't. The second possible world w should be termed possible world w(1) since it reflects one of two possible worlds descended from the first possible world w.

I assert that if "world w" changes meaning in the midst of the syllogism, then the syllogism is not valid.

[edit to add]
The upshot of this, I believe, is that your first premise is a false conditional, properly analogous to both of our counterexamples.

[John Powell]

CAPN OCHRE:
I'm going right to what I perceive as the problem analogous to the bachelor problem, rather than taking up time by working through the rest of your post (including your treatment of an approach that I had mol discarded in the midst of my earlier post).


POWELL:
What does "mol" mean? I appreciate whatever consideration you can give me on this issue. I hope you don't mind if I seek your responses to the rest of my post at another time.

POWELL:
1. IF in the possible world w, J has free will to choose A or B THEN it is NOT necessarily the case in w that J chooses A.

OCHRE:
Is the above a fair description of free will?


POWELL:
It does not represent all the characteristics, some of the features of free will could be lost in the statement, but I think it is satisfactory for the present purposes.

CAPN OCHRE:
If in possible world z I chose coke over pepsi yesterday, I--in possible world z--necessarily chose coke yesterday. Was my decision a free will decision?


POWELL:
Perhaps. If "chose x over y" implies a free will decision then yes. However, the mere fact that you chose coke does not imply you did so freely. Maybe pepsi wasn't available to choose. Or, you were forced by God or something to choose coke.

What you did in the past in w, from the perspective of the now, the present (future to that choosing), necessarily in w you did in the past. It is not possible now to change what you did then.

CAPN OCHRE:
The term "necessarily" doesn't appear to mean what it should mean. Necessarily means that it couldn't be otherwise in possible world w.

POWELL:
It's meaning seems fine to me. Without "world w," "necessarily" means true in all possible worlds. It could not be differently (period). With "world w," the strong modal term "necessarily" means it could not be differently in world w.

CAPN OCHRE:
Yet, if I choose A in that possible world, I necessarily choose A in that possible world.


POWELL:
Yes. If you choose A in that possible world, it is not possible in that world for you to not choose A. Otherwise, the LNC would be violated.

Similarly, if you chose A in w, then it is not possible, it is necessarily the case in w, that you chose A. Also, if you will choose A in w, then it is not possible, it is necessarily the case in w, that you will choose A.

However, the following is not true: If I (chose / choose / will choose) A in w then I necessarily (chose / choose / will choose) A. This suffers the modal problem. In another world w' you might (have chosen / chose / will choose) differently than what you (did / do / will do) in w.

CAPN OCHRE:
The truth is that if I have a choice between A and B and I actually make that choice, I necessarily choose A or B.


POWELL:
Yes, provided you rewrite it or at least understand it to mean something like the following:

"The truth is that if I have a choice in w between A and B and I actually make that choice in w, then I necessarily in w choose A or B."

You may have had a choice yesterday. You now no longer have a choice to undo what you did. Today in world w, you cannot decide to drink pepsi yesterday if you drank coke yesterday in w.

I'm repeating, I think, points that Geebob brought up.

That's why foreknowledge is a problem. If foreknowledge exists then the person does not have a choice on the matter that was foreknown. It's as if the future event has already taken place in the past.

CAPN OCHRE:
Let's take this a step further:

POWELL:
1. IF in the possible world w, J has free will to choose A or B THEN it is NOT necessarily the case in w that J chooses A.

2. IF in possible world w, J has free will to choose A or B THEN it is necessarily the case in w that J chooses A or B.


POWELL:
Premise 2 is false. Just because you have free will to choose A or B doesn't mean you actually make that choice. You might choose to walk away.

CAPN OCHRE:
It will be noted that a choice is implicitly made, thus it would be evasion (or at least nit-picking) to point out that a choice isn't necessarily made at all.


POWELL:
I guess I'm evading or nit-picking to you, but it doesn't look that way to me. The point of the syllogism is that you can't make a choice to do other than what was foreknown. You can't choose B if it was foreknown by someone that you would pick A even if God tried to use His almighty power to compel you to choose B.

CAPN OCHRE:
A possible world where A is chosen is a possible world where A is necessarily chosen.


POWELL:
Fine.

It is possible that someone claims they have foreknowledge and tells you that you'll do A and you choose to use your free will to go along with them. That's a possible scenario, but not discriminatory. It doesn't indicate whether or not there's a problem with foreknowledge and free will. The discriminatory condition is when the alleged foreknower claims you will do A and then you try to use free will to do the opposite. If it is possible for you to succeed (whether you try or not) then they did not have foreknowledge. If it is not possible that you succeed (whether you try or not) then you did not have free will.

CAPN OCHRE:
John's first premise begs the question because it assumes that the possible world w in which A is chosen is not necessarily the same possible world in which free will exists (where A is not necessarily chosen).


POWELL:
Just because A was chosen doesn't mean B was an available choice.

Are you claiming that it is necessarily the case (true for all possible worlds) that the world w in which A is chosen is the same world w in which there is free will? In other words, are you saying that there is no possible world w in which either 1) free will does not exist to choose A or B or 2) where free will exists, but the choice is B?

The syllogism assumes that both Free Will and Foreknowledge could be true, but then shows they contradict so they both can't both be true in world w.

CAPN OCHRE:
The syllogism would only work if possible world w is the same in both cases. It clearly isn't.


POWELL:
That's exactly the point, Capn Ochre. They can't be the same world because they are contradictory. The syllogism argues that foreknowedge of the choice and free will to choose other than what was foreknown can't exist in the same world w. If it is foreknown in w that J will choose A then A must choose in world w, A. Even if God ordered J to choose B or if God tried to use His almighty power to compel J to choose B, such efforts would fail.

CAPN OCHRE:
The second possible world w should be termed possible world w(1) since it reflects one of two possible worlds descended from the first possible world w.

I assert that if "world w" changes meaning in the midst of the syllogism, then the syllogism is not valid.


POWELL:
Do you consider incorrect the logical methodology of assuming contradictory things are both true to prove that they can't both be true?

If you do then please supply a valid deductive syllogism that demonstrates that "J is a bachelor" and "J is a husband" are contradictory statements.

CAPN OCHRE:
[edit to add]
The upshot of this, I believe, is that your first premise is a false conditional, properly analogous to both of our counterexamples.


POWELL:
How is that? Are you saying that the truth value of the antecedent "J has free will in w" is true and the truth value of the consequent "not necessarily in w, J chooses A" is false? Are you saying that J necessarily in w, chooses A (perhaps because he happens to choose in w, A), even though he has free will in w, to choose B?

What happens if J chooses B, instead? That's possible, it's true in some possible worlds, don't you think, if J has free will in those worlds?

What my syllogism argues is that it is not the case that J has free will to choose B in the same world that G foreknows J will choose A. If J doesn't have free will to choose B, then he doesn't have free will to choose A or B.

For a conditional "p --> q" to be false, the antecedent p must be true at the same time that the consequent q is false. The other three possibilities result in a true conditional.

.p. . .q. . . .p --> q
--- . --- . --------
0. . . .0. . . . .1
0. . . .1. . . . .1
1. . . .0. . . . .0
1. . . .1. . . . .1

John Powell

[Captain Ochre]

Yesterday @ 07:37 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=67946#post67946)
John Powell:

POWELL:
What does &quot;mol&quot; mean?


More-or-less.


I appreciate whatever consideration you can give me on this issue. I hope you don't mind if I seek your responses to the rest of my post at another time.


My response would be selective, since my lack of familiarity with some of the languages of logic would necessitate a greater investment of time than is either practical or necessary.


POWELL:
Perhaps. If &quot;chose x over y&quot; implies a free will decision then yes. However, the mere fact that you chose coke does not imply you did so freely. Maybe pepsi wasn't available to choose. Or, you were forced by God or something to choose coke.


Agreed; but I thought that it might be clear nonetheless that if I had freely chosen X in world w, then I necessarily chose X in world w. That's regardless of foreknowledge, of course.


POWELL:
It's meaning seems fine to me. Without &quot;world w,&quot; &quot;necessarily&quot; means true in all possible worlds. It could not be differently (period). With &quot;world w,&quot; the strong modal term &quot;necessarily&quot; means it could not be differently in world w.


I'm trying to say that the world w with free will isn't taken as the same world w with foreknowledge. In the first, world w has no truth value for the decision between A and B. Is the free world w truncated in time, or what? The other world w has a truth value for the decision between A and B. IOW, you never showed that free will and omniscience couldn't exist in the same world w. Instead you constructed two worlds w with a substantial difference, invalidating your syllogism.


POWELL:
Yes. If you choose A in that possible world, it is not possible in that world for you to not choose A.
Otherwise, the LNC would be violated.


"Not possible in that world"=not actual in that world.
In any actual world, there are other possible worlds unless that actual world is itself absolutely necessary (the only possible world).


Similarly, if you chose A in w, then it is not possible, it is necessarily the case in w, that you chose A.


Moo? Typo? Necessary things are always possible.


Also, if you will choose A in w, then it is not possible, it is necessarily the case in w, that you will choose A.


Again, only a possible world could be necessary.


POWELL:
Yes, provided you rewrite it or at least understand it to mean something like the following:

&quot;The truth is that if I have a choice in w between A and B and I actually make that choice in w, then I necessarily in w choose A or B.&quot;


Of course. My editor has been sacked (of course, I had to rehire him since I have no alternative).


You may have had a choice yesterday. You now no longer have a choice to undo what you did. Today in world w, you cannot decide to drink pepsi yesterday if you drank coke yesterday in w.

I'm repeating, I think, points that Geebob brought up.


Hopefully you won't assert their relevance to the question of foreknowledge and free will. :smile:


That's why foreknowledge is a problem. If foreknowledge exists then the person does not have a choice on the matter that was foreknown. It's as if the future event has already taken place in the past.


Afaics, you're justifying the alleged problem on the misperception that "necessary in world w" means that other possible worlds do not exist. That's equivalent to asserting that "necessary in world w" is "world w is necessary". It's the same modal fallacy, afaics. You don't remove the relevant possibility of doing otherwise by noting the actuality of necessities limited to specific possible worlds. All you end up saying is that the actual could not be otherwise (the actual is the actual), which is the truth of a tautology, or the truth of identity, if you prefer.



POWELL:
Premise 2 is false. Just because you have free will to choose A or B doesn't mean you actually make that choice. You might choose to walk away.


You haven't studied your Rush lyrics dutifully enough. :wink:
Walking away is a choice. If walking away isn't a choice, then the whole thing is moot. You could rephrase the scenario as a choice between A (coke), B (pepsi), or C (walk away).


POWELL:
I guess I'm evading or nit-picking to you, but it doesn't look that way to me. The point of the syllogism is that you can't make a choice to do other than what was foreknown.


That particular point doesn't get you anywhere. You cannot choose other than what you will choose in any possible world whether or not foreknowledge exists.


You can't choose B if it was foreknown by someone that you would pick A even if God tried to use His almighty power to compel you to choose B.


In the sense relevant to free will (the realm of possibility), you can choose B before during or after any free will choice. No reasonable version of free will would demand more than one actual outcome (that would violate the LNC).


POWELL:
It is possible that someone claims they have foreknowledge and tells you that you'll do A and you choose to use your free will to go along with them. That's a possible scenario, but not discriminatory. It doesn't indicate whether or not there's a problem with foreknowledge and free will. The discriminatory condition is when the alleged foreknower claims you will do A and then you try to use free will to do the opposite. If it is possible for you to succeed (whether you try or not) then they did not have foreknowledge. If it is not possible that you succeed (whether you try or not) then you did not have free will.


John, you're confusing possibility with actuality again (at least in your use of language above).
If I actually will choose A, then of course I will actually choose A, and it could not be otherwise in the possible world w where I choose A.
Free will exists (iow is not contradicted) if there is a possible and non-actual world y where I could have done otherwise.


POWELL:
Just because A was chosen doesn't mean B was an available choice.

Are you claiming that it is necessarily the case (true for all possible worlds) that the world w in which A is chosen is the same world w in which there is free will?


Not quite, afaics. I'm saying that your syllogism must attempt to reconcile free will and foreknowledge in the same possible world where A is chosen prior to declaring the impossibility of achieving that reconciliation. By extension, I'm also claiming that if you do A then you will do A in all possible worlds.


In other words, are you saying that there is no possible world w in which either 1) free will does not exist to choose A or B or 2) where free will exists, but the choice is B?


I'm saying that possible world w where free will is exercised in the choosing of A is not the same as possible world w where free will could result in choosing either A or B.
IOW, despite your (undoubtedly) dedicated efforts to avoid it, you cheated.


The syllogism assumes that both Free Will and Foreknowledge could be true, but then shows they contradict so they both can't both be true in world w.


You allowed a doppelganger to stand in for world w for one of your premisses.


POWELL:
That's exactly the point, Capn Ochre. They can't be the same world because they are contradictory.


You never showed a contradiction because you never allowed world w to be the same with free will or omniscience. In one world w there was no choice made between A and B. In the other world w, A was chosen.


The syllogism argues that foreknowedge of the choice and free will to choose other than what was foreknown can't exist in the same world w.


If you mean that foreknowledge demands an actual world rather than two non-actual possible worlds w(A) and w(B), then you're right--but you would also be begging the question by proposing a world w which has no actual B nor an actual A, since accurate foreknowledge consists of actuality concerning the future.


If it is foreknown in w that J will choose A then A must choose in world w, A.


More importantly, if in w J will choose A then J must choose in world w, A--regardless of foreknowledge, and regardless of free will.


Even if God ordered J to choose B or if God tried to use His almighty power to compel J to choose B, such efforts would fail.


Is there a point in supposing an possible world in which an omnipotent being cannot alter the actual such that the actual is non-actual? Hadn't we agreed to limit omnipotence to that which is logically possible?


POWELL:
Do you consider incorrect the logical methodology of assuming contradictory things are both true to prove that they can't both be true?


No, I consider you to have failed to implement that methodology.
Try using a possible world w where you choose A and seeing whether or not it is compatible with a possible world where an omniscient being knows you will choose A.


POWELL:
How is that? Are you saying that the truth value of the antecedent &quot;J has free will in w&quot; is true and the truth value of the consequent &quot;not necessarily in w, J chooses A&quot; is false? Are you saying that J necessarily in w, chooses A (perhaps because he happens to choose in w, A), even though he has free will in w, to choose B?


No, I'm saying that as soon as you admit a truth value for the decision between A and B later in your syllogism you have altered world w. The possible world w where A is chosen (necessarily, in world w) is not the same world w where A is not necessarily chosen, just as world w where I am merely a parent of child z is not the same world w where I am (in fact) the male parent of child z.


What happens if J chooses B, instead?


Then we'd have possible world w(B) where an omniscient being knows that J will choose B.


That's possible, it's true in some possible worlds, don't you think, if J has free will in those worlds?


Sure, but we can't call all of those possible worlds "possible world w" without equivocating if they appear in the course of our syllogism.


What my syllogism argues is that it is not the case that J has free will to choose B in the same world that G foreknows J will choose A.


That was the aim, I'm sure, but you could just as well have argued that it is not the case that J has free will to choose B in the same world that J will choose A.
It's vacuous in both cases.


If J doesn't have free will to choose B, then he doesn't have free will to choose A or B.


True, but you don't establish the nonexistence of other possible worlds simply by talking about possible world w. Freedom of the will simply requires other possible worlds, not other actual worlds.


For a conditional &quot;p --&gt; q&quot; to be false, the antecedent p must be true at the same time that the consequent q is false. The other three possibilities result in a true conditional.

.p. . .q. . . .p --&gt; q
--- . --- . --------
0. . . .0. . . . .1
0. . . .1. . . . .1
1. . . .0. . . . .0
1. . . .1. . . . .1


Which symbol corresponds to "possible world w"?

[geebob]

Jaltus, did you see my question on page 8? I'd like to know what publications and authors you're using with regard to your take on soft facts.

[John Powell]

POWELL:
To CAPN OCHRE. It took longer than usual to reply because I needed to read up on categorical propositions to confirm I'm doing it right.

CAPN OCHRE:
My response would be selective, . . .


POWELL:
I meant to say "responses to some of the rest. . ." I'm particularly interested in whether you agree with my "other worlds" formulation of Modus Ponens.

POWELL:
Perhaps. If "chose x over y" implies a free will decision then yes. However, the mere fact that you chose coke does not imply you did so freely. Maybe pepsi wasn't available to choose. Or, you were forced by God or something to choose coke.

CAPN OCHRE:
Agreed; but I thought that it might be clear nonetheless that if I had freely chosen X in world w, then I necessarily chose X in world w. That's regardless of foreknowledge, of course.

POWELL:
It's meaning seems fine to me. Without "world w," "necessarily" means true in all possible worlds. It could not be differently (period). With "world w," the strong modal term "necessarily" means it could not be differently in world w.

CAPN OCHRE:
I'm trying to say that the world w with free will isn't taken as the same world w with foreknowledge. In the first, world w has no truth value for the decision between A and B.


POWELL:
They are assumed to be the same, but certain features described by the conditionals indicate they can't be the same world.

I would like to carefully distinguish the various worlds where there's free will, not free will, foreknowledge, A is chosen, B is chosen, etc. to argue that the worlds in which there is foreknowledge of the choice are not in the set of worlds in which there is free will to choose.

The conclusion I think I want is the "E" categorical proposition

No w_KA (worlds in which it is Known that J will choose A) are w_F (worlds in which J has Free will to choose A or B).

However, in preparation to do that I've had to read the categorical chapters of my logic book to learn about the methodology. The only four Boolean-based valid forms with an E conclusion are EAE-1 (Celarent), AEE-2 (Camestres), EAE-2 (Cesare), and AEE-4 (Camenes). I use Celarent in the syllogism below.

Let me remind you, that just because a categorical propositional FORM is invalid, does not imply that all natural language arguments of that form are invalid. Sometimes crucial information is lost in the translation.

CAPN OCHRE:
Is the free world w truncated in time, or what?


POWELL:
Perhaps.

CAPN OCHRE:
The other world w has a truth value for the decision between A and B. IOW, you never showed that free will and omniscience couldn't exist in the same world w. Instead you constructed two worlds w with a substantial difference, invalidating your syllogism.


POWELL:
What does "IOW" mean?

In a sense I tried to show that they could not exist in the same world.

POWELL:
Yes. If you choose A in that possible world, it is not possible in that world for you to not choose A. Otherwise, the LNC would be violated.

CAPN OCHRE:
"Not possible in that world"=not actual in that world.


POWELL:
I don't understand your purpose here. Are you suggesting I revise what I wrote or what?

CAPN OCHRE:
In any actual world, there are other possible worlds unless that actual world is itself absolutely necessary (the only possible world).


POWELL:
Fine.

POWELL:
Similarly, if you chose A in w, then it is not possible to not choose A in w, it is necessarily the case in w, that you chose A.

CAPN OCHRE:
Moo? Typo? Necessary things are always possible.


POWELL:
Yes, typo. I've added the revision.

What does "MOO" mean?

POWELL:
Also, if you will choose A in w, then it is not possible to not choose A in w, it is necessarily the case in w, that you will choose A.

CAPN OCHRE:
Again, only a possible world could be necessary.


POWELL:
The revision is added here too.

POWELL:
Yes, provided you rewrite it or at least understand it to mean something like the following:

"The truth is that if I have a choice in w between A and B and I actually make that choice in w, then I necessarily in w choose A or B."

CAPN OCHRE:
Of course. My editor has been sacked (of course, I had to rehire him since I have no alternative).


POWELL:
I'm having my own editorial problems as you've pointed out.

POWELL:
You may have had a choice yesterday. You now no longer have a choice to undo what you did. Today in world w, you cannot decide to drink pepsi yesterday if you drank coke yesterday in w.

I'm repeating, I think, points that Geebob brought up.

CAPN OCHRE:
Hopefully you won't assert their relevance to the question of foreknowledge and free will.


POWELL:
I'm sorry that I may have to disappoint you.

POWELL:
That's why foreknowledge is a problem. If foreknowledge exists then the person does not have a choice on the matter that was foreknown. It's as if the future event has already taken place in the past.

CAPN OCHRE:
Afaics, you're justifying the alleged problem on the misperception that "necessary in world w" means that other possible worlds do not exist. That's equivalent to asserting that "necessary in world w" is "world w is necessary". It's the same modal fallacy, afaics. You don't remove the relevant possibility of doing otherwise by noting the actuality of necessities limited to specific possible worlds. All you end up saying is that the actual could not be otherwise (the actual is the actual), which is the truth of a tautology, or the truth of identity, if you prefer.


POWELL:
I think I'm in agreement with the last part. I'm saying that if A (was / is / will be) true in world w then, by logical necessity, A (was / is / will be) true in w. Conditions in w could not be otherwise in w without violating LNC. I am not saying that there is no other world w' in which A (was / is / will be) different than what it (was / is / will be) in world w.

POWELL:
Premise 2 is false. Just because you have free will to choose A or B doesn't mean you actually make that choice. You might choose to walk away.

CAPN OCHRE:
You haven't studied your Rush lyrics dutifully enough.

Walking away is a choice. If walking away isn't a choice, then the whole thing is moot. You could rephrase the scenario as a choice between A (coke), B (pepsi), or C (walk away).

POWELL:
I guess I'm evading or nit-picking to you, but it doesn't look that way to me. The point of the syllogism is that you can't make a choice to do other than what was foreknown.

CAPN OCHRE:
That particular point doesn't get you anywhere. You cannot choose other than what you will choose in any possible world whether or not foreknowledge exists.


POWELL:
RIGHT!

You cannot choose, you don't have free will, to do otherwise than what you (chose / choose / will choose). Free will, if it exists, is operative immediately before the choosing. Once the choice is made, free will to change that no longer exists. You cannot change what you chose. Likewise, you cannot change what you will choose, but if no one foreknows what you will choose then you might have free will to choose. As long as no one knows the truth value of "J will choose A," then J might have free will to choose A or B. If someone knows that the truth value of "J will choose A" is true, however, then at times prior to the choosing, when free will is generally operative, J cannot choose B, J has no free will to choose B. In fact, J doesn't even have free will to choose A! J is compelled / forced / caused, in some strange way, to choose A.

Let me try an end-run by clarifying or redefining free will.

T1 is before the choice when free will may exist. The choice occurs at T2. Free will to choose A or B at T2 does not exist in times future to T2.

IF at time T1 BOTH (it is possible that J will choose A at later time T2) AND (it is possible that J will choose B at T2) THEN we can justifiably say that J has free will at T1 to choose A or B at the future time T2. However, IF at T1 it is not possible that J will choose B at T2 then J does not have free will at T1 to choose A or B at T2. Likewise, If at T1 it is not possible that J will choose A at T2 then J does not have free will at T1 to choose A or B at T2.

Does this clarification / redefinition work? Consider a time T3 later than T2. Does J have free will at T3 to choose A or B at time T2? No, since T2 is not later than T3.

Now, what if it is foreknown that J will choose A at T2? Then at prior time T1 it is not possible that J will choose B at T2, so J does not have free will at T1 to choose A or B at T2.

Let's put that into a syllogism with the other worlds formalism. I'll give separate names to the worlds to help avoid equivocation.

Let's assume that both A and B are physically available to choose and that one or the other, but not both, is chosen.

Let's assume that the choosing occurs at time T2 and that T2 is later than T1 which is later than T0.

Let's define w(AB) as the set of worlds in which, at T1, A or B will be chosen at T2. This is all worlds of interest in this discussion. Every other set here is a subset of w(AB). From the temporal view of T3 later than T2, w(AB) is the set of worlds in which A or B was chosen at T2.

w(A) is the subset of w(AB) if, at T1, A will be chosen. All w(A)_x are subsets of w(A). From T3, w(A) are the subset of worlds w(AB) in which A was chosen for whatever reason.

w(B) is the subset of w(AB) if, at T1, B will be chosen. All w(B)_x are subsets of w(B). From T3, these are the worlds in which B was chosen.

w(AB)_F is the subset of w(AB) for which free will exists at T1 to choose A or B at T2. From T3, these are the worlds in which A or B was chosen freely.

w(A)_F is the subset of worlds w(A) in which, at T2, A is chosen freely, that is, when it is possible at T1 that B might will be chosen at T2, but just will not in actuality. From T3, these are the worlds in which A was chosen freely. B could have been chosen, just wasn't in actuality.

w(B)_F is the subset of worlds w(B) in which, at T2, B is chosen freely, that is when it is possible at T1 that A might will be chosen at T2, but just will not in actuality. From T3, these are the worlds in which B was chosen freely. A could have been chosen, just wasn't in actuality.

w(AB)_~B is the subset of worlds w(AB) for which it is not possible at T1 that B will be chosen at T2. From T3, these are the worlds in which it was not possible that B be chosen. A had to be chosen.

w(AB)_KA is the subset of worlds w(AB) for which it is known at T0, prior to T1, that A will be chosen at T2. From T3, these are the worlds in which it was foreknown that A would be chosen.

So

Perhaps non-controversial categorical propositions:

"A" or universal affirmative propositions:
A1. All w(AB)_~B are w(A)
A2. All w(AB)_KA are w(A)
A3. All w(A)_F are w(AB)_F
A4. All w(B)_F are w(AB)_F

"E" or universal negative propositions:
E1. No w(A) are w(B).
E2. No w(A)_F are w(B)_F
E3. No w(AB)_~B are w(B)_F
E4. No w(AB)_KA are w(B)_F

Possibly controversial categorical propositions:
A5. All w(AB)_KA are w(AB)_~B
E5. No w(AB)_~B are w(AB)_F

Controversial categorical propositions.
CE1. No w(AB)_KA are w(AB)_F
CE2. No w(AB)_KA are w(A)_F

Categorical syllogism (EAE-1, Celarent):
1) No w(AB)_~B are w(AB)_F. . . . . .(by E5)
2) All w(AB)_KA are w(AB)_~B. . . . . .(by A5)
3) therefore, No w(AB)_KA are w(AB)_F. . . . . .(which is CE1)

Now, let's consider a syllogism using this clarification / redefinition and associated possible worlds formulation.

R1) IF at time T1 in w(AB) BOTH (it is possible that J will choose A at T2 in w(A)) AND (it is possible that J will choose B at T2 in w(B)) THEN we can justifiably say that J has free will in w(AB)_F at T1 to choose A or B at T2. . . . . . . . . . (redefinition of free will).

R2) IF at T1 in w(AB) it is not possible that J will choose B at T2 then J does not have free will at T1 in w(AB)_~B to choose A or B at T2. . . . . . . . . .{redefinition of not free will. In other words, NO w(AB)_~B ARE w(AB)_F}

R3) If G foreknows at T0 in w(AB) that J will choose A at T2 then it is not possible at T1 in w(AB)_KA that J will choose B at T2. . . . . . . . . .(in other words, ALL w(AB)_KA ARE w(AB)_~B).

R4) Therefore, J does not have free will at T1 in w(AB) to choose A or B at T2. . . . . . . . . .(in other words, NO w(AB)_KA ARE w(AB)_F).

Yes, this is very complicated. I'm still thinking my scenario is more persuasive.

POWELL:
You can't choose B if it was foreknown by someone that you would pick A even if God tried to use His almighty power to compel you to choose B.

CAPN OCHRE:
In the sense relevant to free will (the realm of possibility), you can choose B before during or after any free will choice. No reasonable version of free will would demand more than one actual outcome (that would violate the LNC).


POWELL:
As I've clarified / redefined free will, you have free will to choose A or B at T1 (immediately prior to the choosing) if it is both possible to pick A at the later time T2 and possible to pick B at T2. If it's only possible to pick A at T2, then you do not have free will at T1 to choose A or B.

POWELL:
It is possible that someone claims they have foreknowledge and tells you that you'll do A and you choose to use your free will to go along with them. That's a possible scenario, but not discriminatory. It doesn't indicate whether or not there's a problem with foreknowledge and free will. The discriminatory condition is when the alleged foreknower claims you will do A and then you try to use free will to do the opposite. If it is possible for you to succeed (whether you try or not) then they did not have foreknowledge. If it is not possible that you succeed (whether you try or not) then you did not have free will.

CAPN OCHRE:
John, you're confusing possibility with actuality again (at least in your use of language above).

If I actually will choose A, then of course I will actually choose A, and it could not be otherwise in the possible world w where I choose A.

POWELL:
I seem to be in agreement with your last sentence.

CAPN OCHRE:
Free will exists (iow is not contradicted) if there is a possible and non-actual world y where I could have done otherwise.


POWELL:
It is my contention that there are no common members of the possible worlds w(AB)_KA, in which it is foreknown at T0 that J will pick A at T2, with the set of worlds w(AB)_F in which the choice to choose A or B is free at T2. Namely, no w(AB)_KA are w(AB)_F. Also, I contend that No w(AB)_KA are w(A)_F.

POWELL:
Just because A was chosen doesn't mean B was an available choice.

Are you claiming that it is necessarily the case (true for all possible worlds) that the world w in which A is chosen is the same world w in which there is free will?

CAPN OCHRE:
Not quite, afaics. I'm saying that your syllogism must attempt to reconcile free will and foreknowledge in the same possible world where A is chosen prior to declaring the impossibility of achieving that reconciliation. By extension, I'm also claiming that if you do A then you will do A in all possible worlds.


POWELL:
That may be ill-advised given that it is my contention that the world in which it is known that J will choose A is not the same possible world in which J has free will to choose.

POWELL:
In other words, are you saying that there is no possible world w in which either 1) free will does not exist to choose A or B or 2) where free will exists, but the choice is B?

CAPN OCHRE:
I'm saying that possible world w where free will is exercised in the choosing of A is not the same as possible world w where free will could result in choosing either A or B.
IOW, despite your (undoubtedly) dedicated efforts to avoid it, you cheated.


POWELL:
Perhaps my more careful identification of the possible worlds (above) will help me avoid accusations of cheating.

POWELL:
The syllogism assumes that both Free Will and Foreknowledge could be true, but then shows they contradict so they both can't both be true in world w.

CAPN OCHRE:
You allowed a doppelganger to stand in for world w for one of your premisses.


POWELL:
What's a doppelganger?

POWELL:
That's exactly the point, Capn Ochre. They can't be the same world because they are contradictory.

CAPN OCHRE:
You never showed a contradiction because you never allowed world w to be the same with free will or omniscience. In one world w there was no choice made between A and B. In the other world w, A was chosen.


POWELL:
Perhaps my reformulation above resolves some of these criticisms.

POWELL:
The syllogism argues that foreknow{l}edge of the choice and free will to choose other than what was foreknown can't exist in the same world w.

CAPN OCHRE:
If you mean that foreknowledge demands an actual world rather than two non-actual possible worlds w(A) and w(B), then you're right--but you would also be begging the question by proposing a world w which has no actual B nor an actual A, since accurate foreknowledge consists of actuality concerning the future.

POWELL:
If it is foreknown in w that J will choose A then A must choose in world w, A.

CAPN OCHRE:
More importantly, if in w J will choose A then J must choose in world w, A--regardless of foreknowledge, and regardless of free will.

POWELL:
Even if God ordered J to choose B or if God tried to use His almighty power to compel J to choose B, such efforts would fail.

CAPN OCHRE:
Is there a point in supposing an possible world in which an omnipotent being cannot alter the actual such that the actual is non-actual? Hadn't we agreed to limit omnipotence to that which is logically possible?


POWELL:
I think so, yes.

My point is that if an entity G (not necessarily God) foreknows that J will pick A then presumably G could write that future down on a piece of paper and give it to J or to God. Even if J tries to pick B after reading the note, J logically could not. Even if God tries to force J to pick B after reading the note, God logically could not. I'm suggesting that this scenario makes it look like J does not have free will and that God is impotent to act in ways one would normally think possible, namely force someone in the present to choose B rather than A. Why can't God force J to pick B as the time T2 approaches? It's because G knew that J would pick A. G could be a little creature easily squashed by the foot of J, but if G knows that J will pick A then neither J nor God can in the time immediately prior to the choosing, cause J to pick B. This scenario makes it look like the foreknowledge of G becomes an active force or cause more powerful than God.

POWELL:
Do you consider incorrect the logical methodology of assuming contradictory things are both true to prove that they can't both be true?

CAPN OCHRE:
No, I consider you to have failed to implement that methodology.

Try using a possible world w where you choose A and seeing whether or not it is compatible with a possible world where an omniscient being knows you will choose A.


POWELL:
It is. However, as I said before that case is not discriminatory. Such a scenario is also compatible with a false claimant to foreknowledge.

POWELL:
How is that? Are you saying that the truth value of the antecedent "J has free will in w" is true and the truth value of the consequent "not necessarily in w, J chooses A" is false? Are you saying that J necessarily in w, chooses A (perhaps because he happens to choose in w, A), even though he has free will in w, to choose B?

CAPN OCHRE:
No, I'm saying that as soon as you admit a truth value for the decision between A and B later in your syllogism you have altered world w. The possible world w where A is chosen (necessarily, in world w) is not the same world w where A is not necessarily chosen, just as world w where I am merely a parent of child z is not the same world w where I am (in fact) the male parent of child z.

POWELL:
What happens if J chooses B, instead?

CAPN OCHRE:
Then we'd have possible world w(B) where an omniscient being knows that J will choose B.


POWELL:
What if G claims to have foreknowledge and writes down that J will choose A, but J chooses B instead? Wouldn't that indicate that the claim to foreknowledge was false?

Is J able to choose B after reading that G wrote down that He would do A? If no, then how can you say J has free will to choose B?

Consider again the examples of the naming of the Virgin's son and David in Keilah.

If God said "The virgin will have a son and she will call his name Immanuel" and God ordered Mary "Call your son, Jesus." Could Mary obey God or would she be logically compelled to call her son Immanuel as God had foretold? (Isa 7:14, Luke 1:30-31).

If David were to ask God, "Will the men of Keilah deliver me up to Saul and will Saul come down?" and God replied "They will deliver you up" and "Saul will come down" could David then leave Keilah and avoid Saul and Saul decide not to come down or would David be logically compelled to be delivered up to Saul and Saul logically compelled to come down as God had foretold? (1 Sam 23:9-13).

POWELL:
That's possible, it's true in some possible worlds, don't you think, if J has free will in those worlds?

CAPN OCHRE:
Sure, but we can't call all of those possible worlds "possible world w" without equivocating if they appear in the course of our syllogism.

POWELL:
What my syllogism argues is that it is not the case that J has free will to choose B in the same world that G foreknows J will choose A.

CAPN OCHRE:
That was the aim, I'm sure, but you could just as well have argued that it is not the case that J has free will to choose B in the same world that J will choose A.

It's vacuous in both cases.

POWELL:
If J doesn't have free will to choose B, then he doesn't have free will to choose A or B.

CAPN OCHRE:
True, but you don't establish the nonexistence of other possible worlds simply by talking about possible world w. Freedom of the will simply requires other possible worlds, not other actual worlds.

POWELL:
For a conditional "p - - > q" to be false, the antecedent p must be true at the same time that the consequent q is false. The other three possibilities result in a true conditional.

.p. . .q. . . .p - - > q
--- . --- . ----------
0. . . .0. . . . .1
0. . . .1. . . . .1
1. . . .0. . . . .0
1. . . .1. . . . .1

CAPN OCHRE:
Which symbol corresponds to "possible world w"?


POWELL:
It depends on which conditional and what the truth values of the antecedent and consequent are. For the conditional "If God knows that J will choose A then J does NOT have free will," p = "God knows that J will choose A" and q = "J does NOT have free will." For this conditional the first two rows are possible worlds in which God does not have foreknowledge. In row 1, J does have free will. In row 2, J does NOT have free will. Row 3 is the world I claim does not logically exist in possibility, the one in which God has foreknowledge and J has free will. Row 4 is the possible world in which God has foreknowledge and J does NOT have free will.

John Powell

[GakuseiDon]

To John Powell:My point is that if an entity G (not necessarily God) foreknows that J will pick A then presumably G could write that future down on a piece of paper and give it to J or to God. Even if J tries to pick B after reading the note, J logically could not. Even if God tries to force J to pick B after reading the note, God logically could not.
The problem is that you are assuming omniscience in advance. At T0, is G omniscient? Potentially, yes, but omniscience isn't known until after T2, after J chooses. G is only omniscient if he is right. To assume correctness a priori doesn't address free-will, since you are also assuming J's action. While J only has free-will at T2, G only can be known to be omniscient at T2 as well.

Another example. G is always correct. G is asked "what is 2 + 3?" G replies "6". Does the answer suddenly become "6" is actuality, or is the definition of "G is always correct" wrong?

On the paper problem: God writes down J's choice and gives it to J.

God writes A, and gives it to J and foresees that J will do the opposite, B. So God writes B, and foresees that J chooses A. In both cases, what God writes on the paper is incorrect.

You'll notice that omniscience isn't the problem. The paper is wrong - but no-one claims that the piece of paper is omniscient. In both cases, God can foresee the results (so is omniscient) - He just can't put it down on a piece of paper. This goes towards God's omnipotence, and the ability to do the logically impossible. It isn't a problem with omniscience.

[John Powell]

POWELL:
Welcome GAKUSEIDON! :cheers:

GakuseiDon
Paper is not omniscient


POWELL:
I didn't say it was. What I am saying is if G knows what J will do and G writes it down on a piece of paper then what is written down is what J will do.

POWELL:
My point is that if an entity G (not necessarily God) foreknows that J will pick A then presumably G could write that future down on a piece of paper and give it to J or to God. Even if J tries to pick B after reading the note, J logically could not. Even if God tries to force J to pick B after reading the note, God logically could not.

GAKUSEIDON:
The problem is that you are assuming omniscience in advance.


POWELL:
I'm trying to deny omniscience in advance. I'm trying to argue that "omniscience" can no more be knowledge of the future (something logically impossible in the presence of free will) than "omnipotence" is the power to create triangular circles.

GAKUSEIDON:
At T0, is G omniscient? Potentially, yes, but omniscience isn't known until after T2, after J chooses.


POWELL:
GREAT! That means no entity, even an omniscient one, could know at T0 what J will do at T2 if it's the sort of thing J has free will to choose.

GAKUSEIDON:
G is only omniscient if he is right. To assume correctness a priori doesn't address free-will, since you are also assuming J's action. While J only has free-will at T2, G only can be known to be omniscient at T2 as well.


POWELL:
To be technical, J does NOT have free will at T2, but he has free will at T1 immediately prior to T2.

By the meaning of the terms, you do not have free will to change what you did do or you didn't really do it. Nor, can you change what you will do or it's not really what you will do. You could change what you might will do. Furthermore, you cannot change what you are doing or it's not really what you are doing. If "J chooses A at T2" is a true statement then J cannot change that to "J chooses B at T2." By free will, what I mean is that at T1, times immediately prior to the choosing at T2, since it is not known what J will do, it is possible at T1 that J will choose A at T2 and it is possible at T1 that J will choose B at T2. Whatever J will do cannot be changed, but no one knows what J will do, so his decision to choose A or B is not pre-determined.

GAKUSEIDON:
Another example. G is always correct. G is asked "what is 2 + 3?" G replies "6". Does the answer suddenly become "6" is actuality, or is the definition of "G is always correct" wrong?


POWELL:
It depends upon whether you think 2 + 3 = 6. If you accept "G is always correct" and "G says that 2 + 3 = 6" then, given those assumptions, "2 + 3 = 6" is a correct statement.

Here's the valid deductive argument:

1) If G says X, then X, where X is any statement.
2) G says "2 + 3 = 6"
3) therefore, "2 + 3 = 6"

If the mathematical relationship "2 + 3 = 6" is true, then presumably it has always been true.

Although now we're talking about free will choices, not "fixed" mathematical relationships, this might still hold true. If "J chooses A at T2" is a true statement, then presumably it always was and always will be a true statement. However, if no one foreknew this then J could have had a free will choice to choose B.

GAKUSEIDON:
On the paper problem: God writes down J's choice and gives it to J.

God writes A, and gives it to J and foresees that J will do the opposite, B. So God writes B, and foresees that J chooses A. In both cases, what God writes on the paper is incorrect.


POWELL:
Exactly. My scenario does not allow God to know what J will choose and tell him if J is intending to use his free will to do the opposite. A God who knows the future about other things, in this scenario would need to say something like "I don't know which J will choose."

GAKUSEIDON:
You'll notice that omniscience isn't the problem. The paper is wrong - but no-one claims that the piece of paper is omniscient. In both cases, God can foresee the results (so is omniscient) - He just can't put it down on a piece of paper.


POWELL:
I thought about it this way early on. My "write down what J will do" scenario does not disallow G knowing the future per se, just not knowing it and then telling anyone who might tell the free agent J about the future event. Because anyone with free will who knows what God said that J would do might tell J about it, God can't know the future choice of J if He tells anyone who has free will to tell J.

However, since God Himself might tell J, God can't tell Himself what He foreknows about J's decision unless God doesn't have free will to tell J.

I now think that even if God tells no one (except Himself?), just knows, then J does not have free will to choose because what J will do would then be fixed at the time T0 that God first knows what J will choose.

GAKUSEIDON:
This goes towards God's omnipotence, and the ability to do the logically impossible. It isn't a problem with omniscience.


POWELL:
I'm avoiding omnipotence here. I think it's a logical problem with omniscience. At no point am I allowing God to use His omnipotence at T1 to compel J to choose a certain way at T2. What I'm saying is if G knows at T0 that J will choose A at T2 then it is logically necessary that J will choose A at T2 in the world in which that foreknowledge exists. At the intermediate time, T1, it is not possible then that J will choose B at T2, so J does not have free will at T1 to choose at T2.

John Powell

[GakuseiDon]

POWELL:
Welcome GAKUSEIDON! Thanks, John! :smile:

Don >>>While J only has free-will at T2, G only can be known to be omniscient at T2 as well.<<<

POWELL:
To be technical, J does NOT have free will at T2, but he has free will at T1 immediately prior to T2. Oops! My mistake. You're right, I should have said T1.

But to build on that: at T1, J has free-will. At T2, J doesn't have free will with respect to his choice (as he has made his selection). I'm assuming this is also true in a world without omniscience?

So, God seeing T2, but (somehow) not T1, would allow God to always see the actual outcomes of T1, without interfering with free-will? OK, that sounds a little weird, but it seems to work.

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 03:21 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=74559#post74559)
GakuseiDon:

Thanks, John! :smile:

Oops! My mistake. You're right, I should have said T1.

But to build on that: at T1, J has free-will. At T2, J doesn't have free will with respect to his choice (as he has made his selection). I'm assuming this is also true in a world without omniscience?


Yes, and I'd go further to say the the attempt to always locate free will prior to the choice made is nonsensical, afaics. Free will prior to choice is actually irrelevant (pun intended). The relevant free will is the actual exercise of free will at T2. Free will only requires other possible options, and the passage of time does not remove possibility (only actuality).
The attempt to locate free will always prior to decisions makes free will a never-present future ghost of a hope. There is no good reason to concede the impossibility of true present/past free will to the free will/omniscience incompatibilists, afaics.


So, God seeing T2, but (somehow) not T1, would allow God to always see the actual outcomes of T1, without interfering with free-will? OK, that sounds a little weird, but it seems to work.

Omniscience that doesn't see T1 is a strange sort of omniscience. In such an instance, foreknowledge is the better descriptor, but (again) a sceario that proposes that A will actually be chosen should either provide some reason why A might be chosen or else it argues against itself (as with part three of John's debate scenario).

[John Powell]

POWELL:
To Gakuseidon and Capn Ochre.

GAKUSEIDON:
While J only has free-will at T2, G only can be known to be omniscient at T2 as well.

POWELL:
To be technical, J does NOT have free will at T2, but he has free will at T1 immediately prior to T2.

GAKUSEIDON:
Oops! My mistake. You're right, I should have said T1.

But to build on that: at T1, J has free-will. At T2, J doesn't have free will with respect to his choice (as he has made his selection). I'm assuming this is also true in a world without omniscience?


POWELL:
That's a correct assumption, GakuseiDon.

GAKUSEIDON:
So, God seeing T2, but (somehow) not T1, would allow God to always see the actual outcomes of T1, without interfering with free-will? OK, that sounds a little weird, but it seems to work.


POWELL:
Perhaps it seems, and Capn Ochre I think would agree with you, but it doesn't work IMO.

If G foreknows at T0 that J will choose A at T2 then it is not possible at T1 for J to choose B at T2. That violates the condition for free will as I've clarified / redefined it.

In terms of categoricals of possible worlds:

No w_KA are w_F.

There are no possible worlds in which G knows at T0 that J will choose A at T2, w_KA, that are in the set of possible worlds in which J has free will at T1 to choose A or B at T2, w_F.

GakuseiDon:
Thanks, John!

Oops! My mistake. You're right, I should have said T1.

But to build on that: at T1, J has free-will. At T2, J doesn't have free will with respect to his choice (as he has made his selection). I'm assuming this is also true in a world without omniscience?

CAPN OCHRE:
Yes, and I'd go further to say the the attempt to always locate free will prior to the choice made is nonsensical, afaics.


POWELL:
I look forward to opportunities to persuade you to think otherwise, Capn Ochre.

CAPN OCHRE:
Free will prior to choice is actually irrelevant (pun intended). The relevant free will is the actual exercise of free will at T2.


POWELL:
Once J chooses at T2, J is no longer able to unchoose that. It is only prior to T2, at T1, that J has free will to choose A or B at T2.

CAPN OCHRE:
Free will only requires other possible options, . . .


POWELL:
That's an important issue. If it is not possible at T1 that J will choose B at T2 then J does not have free will at T1 to choose A or B at T2. Such an impossibility arises if G knows at T0 that J will choose A at T2.

There are possible worlds in which J chooses B at T2. These include worlds in which J chooses B freely, w_FB, and worlds in which he is compelled to choose B either because G knew at T0 that J would choose B, w_KB, or A was physically unavailable. However, none of these are in the set of worlds in which G knows J will choose A. w_KA. In fact, even worlds in which J freely chooses A, w_FA, are not in the set of worlds in which G knows J will choose A, w_KA.

CAPN OCHRE:
. . . and the passage of time does not remove possibility (only actuality).


POWELL:
I'm not sure what you mean, Capn Ochre. The passage of time does remove possibility in some ways. If at T2, J chooses A then at T3 it is no longer possible that B was chosen at T2.

CAPN OCHRE:
The attempt to locate free will always prior to decisions makes free will a never-present future ghost of a hope.


POWELL:
Just because we might wish free will to be something it's not doesn't make it so. Reality is often harsh and uncompromising towards our wishful thinking.

CAPN OCHRE:
There is no good reason to concede the impossibility of true present/past free will to the free will/omniscience incompatibilists, afaics.


POWELL:
How about typical human experience? A person who chooses A at T2 cannot choose B at T2. That opportunity is passed, it's in the past.

GAKUSEIDON:
So, God seeing T2, but (somehow) not T1, would allow God to always see the actual outcomes of T1, without interfering with free-will? OK, that sounds a little weird, but it seems to work. ”

CAPN OCHRE:
Omniscience that doesn't see T1 is a strange sort of omniscience. In such an instance, foreknowledge is the better descriptor, but (again) a sceario that proposes that A will actually be chosen should either provide some reason why A might be chosen or else it argues against itself (as with part three of John's debate scenario).


POWELL:
How again does my part 3 scenario argue against itself? Is it that G alleges to know what J will do, but it's obvious He can't know that if J reads what G wrote down that J will do and if J has free will to do the opposite? If J cannot do B if G foretells that J will do A then J does not have free will to do A or B. If J can only do A, then that's not free will.

John Powell

[Captain Ochre]

Yesterday @ 08:32 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=76843#post76843)
John Powell:

POWELL:
To Gakuseidon and Capn Ochre.

POWELL:
Perhaps it seems, and Capn Ochre I think would agree with you, but it doesn't work IMO.

If G foreknows at T0 that J will choose A at T2 then it is not possible at T1 for J to choose B at T2. That violates the condition for free will as I've clarified / redefined it.


Possible doesn't need to be actual. The non-actual "could have been" remains within the realm of possibility, which is exactly where it should be to fulfill proper conditions of free will.
If you try to alter that as you redefine "free will" I'll expect you to open up your position to another charge of question-begging.


In terms of categoricals of possible worlds:

No w_KA are w_F.

There are no possible worlds in which G knows at T0 that J will choose A at T2, w_KA, that are in the set of possible worlds in which J has free will at T1 to choose A or B at T2, w_F.


That's the conclusion, not an argument (if it's an argument, then the conclusion is assumed).


POWELL:
I look forward to opportunities to persuade you to think otherwise, Capn Ochre.


I look forward to a hint of an admission that your effort is futile (in terms of arguing your point without fallacy).
About now is when I was expecting you to reconsider your pre-debate position. The post-debate discussion has been slightly less vigorous than I anticipated, and at least some of that may be blamed on me. :smile:


POWELL:
Once J chooses at T2, J is no longer able to unchoose that. It is only prior to T2, at T1, that J has free will to choose A or B at T2.


Is this part of the redefinition of free will? If so, free will is a thing of the future. If the future doesn't exist as fact, which seems to be the position of the foreknowledge/free will incompatibilists, then free will does not exist as you describe it. There are no examples of free will decisions in the past. Nor are there examples of free will decisions in the present.
Guess what? The question has been begged. No free will, no point in arguing incompatibility between free will and anything else, including caterpillars, quartz crystals, and squamps.

If you will not admit to instances of free will in the past, then I challenge you to justify your (for-the-sake-of-argument) free will. Moment by moment, are you not eradicating your hope of free will as you march toward death making irrevocable decision after irrevocable decision?
If, otoh, you allow instances of free will in the past (which is certainly what you ought to do, if only for the sake of argument), then compatibility may be easier for you to accept.


POWELL:
That's an important issue. If it is not possible at T1 that J will choose B at T2 then J does not have free will at T1 to choose A or B at T2. Such an impossibility arises if G knows at T0 that J will choose A at T2.


Incorrect. You just committed the modal fallacy except in plain English, where it is expressed as an equivocation. It is always logically impossible to do other than what you actually do (via tautology). Since the tautology is true in worlds that include omniscient beings, we should not be troubled by application of the tautology in such a world, yet utilization of the tautology is exactly how you go about trying to demonstrate incompatibility.
The fact that it is impossible to do other than what you will do had nothing to do with free will, and does not relegate any possible worlds to the realm of impossibility.

The elements for freedom remain: You could have done otherwise, and that otherwise could have been similarly known.


There are possible worlds in which J chooses B at T2. These include worlds in which J chooses B freely, w_FB, and worlds in which he is compelled to choose B either because G knew at T0 that J would choose B, w_KB, or A was physically unavailable. However, none of these are in the set of worlds in which G knows J will choose A. w_KA. In fact, even worlds in which J freely chooses A, w_FA, are not in the set of worlds in which G knows J will choose A, w_KA.


John, you're making an absolutely elementary error. If the foreknowledge is that of an actual world throughout time, then of course no non-actuality is actual in terms of what is known, just as no non-actuality is actual [period]. If the non-actual must be actual to permit freedom, then freedom relies on an impossibility for its existence.
Again, your definitions result in absurdity, afaics (when you're not begging the question). Borrow some sensible ones, like mine? :smile:


POWELL:
I'm not sure what you mean, Capn Ochre. The passage of time does remove possibility in some ways.


"{I}n some ways." Not in the way that affects freedom or possible worlds, only the way that affects actuality/actual worlds. That's the expression of the modal fallacy.


If at T2, J chooses A then at T3 it is no longer possible that B was chosen at T2.


IOW, it is not actual that B was chosen at T2.
Obviously (please excuse the use of boldface type for emphasis), If A and B were possibilities at T2, they are now possibilities at T2. The fact that one became actual doesn't make the other option impossible except via contradiction (A and B both true at the same time and in the same sense)--but we knew that was impossible regardless of free will and/or omniscience before any decision was consummated, didn't we now?
The definition of a decision is the choice of one option to the exclusion of others. A free decision is unforced, with the power for the decision resting with the cause of that decision. The fact that options are excluded logically is part of the free decision process. You, John, are trying to bend that definition in against itself in order to say that the decision once made could not be otherwise as though that mere fact has consequences for freedom of the will.
If you will take care to categorize the possible and the actual at each juncture of your scenarios, I think that the problem (or lack thereof) will become clearer for you.
Or so I hope. :smile:


POWELL:
Just because we might wish free will to be something it's not doesn't make it so. Reality is often harsh and uncompromising towards our wishful thinking.


No question, but I wrote to emphasize that you grant the existence of free will for the sake of argument, then you've got to make more than a half-hearted attempt to develop a non-contradictory version of it, or else your proof is a sham.


POWELL:
How about typical human experience? A person who chooses A at T2 cannot choose B at T2. That opportunity is passed, it's in the past.


So, if I could make the decision again, such that I could choose A [b]and B (~A) at the same time and in the same sense, then I would truly have free will?

The requirement of free will could do otherwise is nonsensical when we speak of the actual. If you confuse the actual with the possible, you'll never make sense of the problem, afaics.
Will you continue to locate the free will that you need for the sake of legitimate argumentation in a future Never-Neverland?


POWELL:
How again does my part 3 scenario argue against itself? Is it that G alleges to know what J will do, but it's obvious He can't know that if J reads what G wrote down that J will do and if J has free will to do the opposite? If J cannot do B if G foretells that J will do A then J does not have free will to do A or B. If J can only do A, then that's not free will.


I thought that this had been explained to you to such an extent that you understood it.
The omniscient being knows the actual world head to tail, right?
So, our scenario for such a being would first demand supposition of one actual world, different for each moment of time. Your third stage strongly suggests an alternate reality where pseudoJaltus innocently did A, and a second reality where the conditions surrounding that decision are radically different from the supposed "actual". If you had been true to the one actual world requirement, John, then you would be asking us to believe that a person entirely motivated to pick B would pick A instead. You hemmed & hawed a bit over that point, and you granted that pseudoJaltus could disobey God and pick exactly what God had predicted if he wanted. As soon as you did that, you made your third stage okay for the compatibility of foreknowledge and free will, but still leaving the intuitive impression that something must be wrong simply owing to the fact that its hard to believe that somebody could have every motivation for choosing A yet choose B instead.
It is that fact alone, and nothing to do with the supposed incompatibility between foreknowledge and free will, that powered your scenario.
Worthy of being called smoke & mirrors, imo. Sorry to be a bit on the harsh side, but your view doesn't have anything to recommend it so far, imo, and I'd seen plenty of "your" view prior to our discussion.
I don't think that you've run across anything new, and I think that it's time for you to consider the possibility that you will not.

[John Powell]

POWELL:
You've been a reliable correspondent, Capn Ochre. I did not anticipate that the third stage of my free will scenario would ever be rejected to the extent and with the philosophical backing that it has.

POWELL (to Gakuseidon):
Perhaps it seems, and Capn Ochre I think would agree with you, but it doesn't work IMO.

If G foreknows at T0 that J will choose A at T2 then it is not possible at T1 for J to choose B at T2. That violates the condition for free will as I've clarified / redefined it.

CAPN OCHRE:
Possible doesn't need to be actual. The non-actual "could have been" remains within the realm of possibility, which is exactly where it should be to fulfill proper conditions of free will.
If you try to alter that as you redefine "free will" I'll expect you to open up your position to another charge of question-begging.


POWELL:
I agree, but I don't think my clarification violates that.

If at T0 it is foreknown that J will choose a certain way at T2 then from that time T0 forward it is not possible that J chooses otherwise. It becomes logically impossible for J to choose otherwise just as logically impossible as it would be for him to change the past. There is no option for J to choose otherwise in the world / situation in which G foreknows what J will choose at T2.

Are you saying that if, at T0, G foreknows that J will choose a certain way at T2 then J still has the power at T1 to do otherwise at T2, that it is still possible at T1 for J to choose otherwise at T2?

If the answer is no, then I claim that J does not have free will at T1 to choose at T2. There is only one option, whatever was foreknown. Otherwise it really wasn't foreknown.

If the answer is yes, then how can you claim that G foreknew because if J does do otherwise (as in my stage 3 scenario) then G must not have foreknown, but could only have been guessing, predicting, or compelling.

If choice B is reasonably possible even though G always foretells A and you repeat the experiment over and over again you would expect that choice B would become actual sometimes, otherwise you should conclude that it is not reasonably possible.

You seem to be retaining foreknowledge-free-will compatibility partly because you assume that every time J could do otherwise he chooses not to. Why do you make that assumption?

How is that scenario any different from a G who doesn't have foreknowledge at all, but can persuade or compel J to go along with whatever G predicts or guesses?

POWELL:
In terms of categoricals of possible worlds:

No w_KA are w_F.

There are no possible worlds in which G knows at T0 that J will choose A at T2, w_KA, that are in the set of possible worlds in which J has free will at T1 to choose A or B at T2, w_F.

CAPN OCHRE:
That's the conclusion, not an argument (if it's an argument, then the conclusion is assumed).


POWELL:
Yes, it's a proposition. You think it's false, right?

POWELL:
I look forward to opportunities to persuade you to think otherwise, Capn Ochre.

CAPN OCHRE:
I look forward to a hint of an admission that your effort is futile (in terms of arguing your point without fallacy).


POWELL:
I haven't reached that point. I assume you mean seriously fallacious.

Because, Capn Ochre, all arguments are fallacious to some degree. They are all invalid. My discussion supporting this position are in "invalidating validity."

Nothing you or I or anyone else says is absolutely certain true in a correspondence sort of way.

Just because an argument appears to be valid does not mean it is. Just because everyone in the world believes an argument is valid doesn't mean it is. Just because I may not persuade you to accept this position does not mean it's necessarily wrong.

Any time you use language to present an argument you suffer the inherent ambiguities of meaning involved. This problem cannot be completely avoided, but only reduced in its effects. Logic is very useful, but it does not result in absolutely reliable truth. The same is true about science.

CAPN OCHRE:
About now is when I was expecting you to reconsider your pre-debate position. The post-debate discussion has been slightly less vigorous than I anticipated, and at least some of that may be blamed on me.


POWELL:
Due to the resistance I had to my scenario in other forums, I was pleased that Jaltus agreed to go through it. I anticipated that he would be persuaded to agree with me by stage 3. I was very surprised he was not and had logical arguments for why he didn't need to. I had forgotten that when I thought about the scenario long before that I had decided that the scenario allowed for God to know the future as long as He didn't tell J.

I was not familiar with the modal problem. When I heard about it I thought I must have a serious problem. After reading Swartz and others and thinking about the problem, however, I concluded that the modal problem was not as serious as I first thought. It was resolved for me by merely being careful about staying in the same world / situation.

I started, but haven't finished, my comments about Swartz.

Let me try to persuade you that the modal problem is not as serious as you seem to think.

COPI & COHEN:
For logicians, therefore, the term validity is applicable only to deductive arguments. To say that a deductive argument is valid is to say that it is not possible for its conclusion to be false if its premisses are true. Thus we define "validity" as follows: A deductive argument is valid when, if its premisses are true, its conclusion must be true.

. . .

A deductive argument is one whose conclusion is claimed to follow from its premisses with absolute necessity, this necessity not being a matter of degree and not depending in any way on whatever else may be the case.


POWELL:
Isn't this saying, Capn Ochre, that for the following argument that the conclusion must be absolutely necessarily true, cannot be false?

1. if p then q
2. p
3. therefore, (must be absolutely necessarily) q.

Q. Doesn't this mean, Capn Ochre, that so-called valid deductive arguments of the M.P. form suffer the modal fallacy?

If yes, then why do you make a big deal about my free will argument suffering the same fallacy?

If no, because the "absolutely necessarily" doesn't belong there at least implicitly then why should anyone have complete confidence in the inference of a so-called valid deductive argument? Does this mean it only means "probably q"? Otherwise if no, please explain.

POWELL:
Once J chooses at T2, J is no longer able to unchoose that. It is only prior to T2, at T1, that J has free will to choose A or B at T2.

CAPN OCHRE:
Is this part of the redefinition of free will? If so, free will is a thing of the future. If the future doesn't exist as fact, which seems to be the position of the foreknowledge/free will incompatibilists, then free will does not exist as you describe it.


POWELL:
Good point. I'm saying that free will can only exist at T1 prior to the choosing at T2.

If, at T1, J decides to choose A but then A or J or the universe cease to exist before T2 arrives then J really didn't have free will to make that choice. As long as A and B and J and the universe continue to exist then free will can continue to operate provided also that there are choosing times T2 following free will times T1. I don't think this is the problem you think it is.

CAPN OCHRE:
There are no examples of free will decisions in the past.


POWELL:
Yes, in the sense that at T3, J does not have free will to choose at T2.

CAPN OCHRE:
Nor are there examples of free will decisions in the present.


POWELL:
Yes, in the sense that at T2, J does not have free will to choose at T2. It is only at T1 that J has free will to choose at T2. However, there is free will at T1.

CAPN OCHRE:
Guess what? The question has been begged. No free will, no point in arguing incompatibility between free will and anything else, including caterpillars, quartz crystals, and squamps.


POWELL:
I'm not saying there is no free will at any time, Capn Ochre. I'm saying there is free will at T1 to choose at T2, but only if what is chosen at T2 is not foreknown at T0.

CAPN OCHRE:
If you will not admit to instances of free will in the past, then I challenge you to justify your (for-the-sake-of-argument) free will.

POWELL:
I am not saying there was not free will in the past. For example, if yesterday at 1:59:59 p.m. you choose to begin to drink Pepsi at 2:00:00 p.m. then you had free will at 1:59:59 p.m. to choose to begin to drink Pepsi at 2:00:00 p.m. What I'm saying is that at 2:00:01 p.m. you did not have free will to begin to drink Pepsi at 2:00:00 p.m.

CAPN OCHRE:
Moment by moment, are you not eradicating your hope of free will as you march toward death making irrevocable decision after irrevocable decision?


POWELL:
I don't think so. I seem to be missing your point.

CAPN OCHRE:
If, otoh, you allow instances of free will in the past (which is certainly what you ought to do, if only for the sake of argument), then compatibility may be easier for you to accept.


POWELL:
Perhaps it should, but it isn't.

POWELL:
That's an important issue. If it is not possible at T1 that J will choose B at T2 then J does not have free will at T1 to choose A or B at T2. Such an impossibility arises if G knows at T0 that J will choose A at T2.

CAPN OCHRE:
Incorrect. You just committed the modal fallacy except in plain English, where it is expressed as an equivocation.


POWELL:
I disagree.

CAPN OCHRE:
It is always logically impossible to do other than what you actually do (via tautology). Since the tautology is true in worlds that include omniscient beings, we should not be troubled by application of the tautology in such a world, yet utilization of the tautology is exactly how you go about trying to demonstrate incompatibility.


POWELL:
Right. What I see is that if it is foreknown what J will choose then free will is eliminated by this tautology. Foreknowing causes the indeterminate future that allows for free will to become determinate.

CAPN OCHRE:
The fact that it is impossible to do other than what you will do had nothing to do with free will, and does not relegate any possible worlds to the realm of impossibility.


POWELL:
I agree, if what you will do is not foreknown. When it is foreknown, however, then it becomes impossible to do otherwise. What would otherwise have been possible worlds that allowed for free will become worlds that don't allow for free will.

CAPN OCHRE:
The elements for freedom remain: You could have done otherwise, and that otherwise could have been similarly known.


POWELL:
You logically could not have done otherwise if it was foreknown what you would do. Otherwise, it really wasn't foreknown.

POWELL:
There are possible worlds in which J chooses B at T2. These include worlds in which J chooses B freely, w_FB, and worlds in which he is compelled to choose B either because G knew at T0 that J would choose B, w_KB, or A was physically unavailable. However, none of these are in the set of worlds in which G knows J will choose A. w_KA. In fact, even worlds in which J freely chooses A, w_FA, are not in the set of worlds in which G knows J will choose A, w_KA.

CAPN OCHRE:
John, you're making an absolutely elementary error.


POWELL:
I hope not.

CAPN OCHRE:
If the foreknowledge is that of an actual world throughout time, then of course no non-actuality is actual in terms of what is known, just as no non-actuality is actual [period]. If the non-actual must be actual to permit freedom, then freedom relies on an impossibility for its existence.


POWELL:
I don't mean to say that. I mean to say that there must be the possibility of the non-actual might be future. What was non-actual in the past cannot be changed to be actual in the past. What is non-actual now can't be changed to be actual now. Also, What will be non-actual in the future cannot be changed to be actual either. However, as long as what will be actual or non-actual in the future is not foreknown then there is the possibility of free will. Once it is foreknown what will be actual in the future then there is no free will to have otherwise.

CAPN OCHRE:
Again, your definitions result in absurdity, afaics (when you're not begging the question). Borrow some sensible ones, like mine?


POWELL:
I still think my most recent ones are quite good.

POWELL:
I'm not sure what you mean, Capn Ochre. The passage of time does remove possibility in some ways.

CAPN OCHRE:
"{I}n some ways." Not in the way that affects freedom or possible worlds, only the way that affects actuality/actual worlds. That's the expression of the modal fallacy.


POWELL:
Perhaps the modal fallacy is over-rated.

POWELL:
If at T2, J chooses A then at T3 it is no longer possible that B was chosen at T2.

CAPN OCHRE:
IOW, it is not actual that B was chosen at T2.


POWELL:
Right.

What does "IOW" mean?

CAPN OCHRE:
Obviously (please excuse the use of boldface type for emphasis), If A and B were possibilities at T2, they are now possibilities at T2. The fact that one became actual doesn't make the other option impossible except via contradiction (A and B [B=~A] both true at the same time and in the same sense)--but we knew that was impossible regardless of free will and/or omniscience before any decision was consummated, didn't we now?


POWELL:
In the world, w_A, in which A was chosen at T2 it was not possible that B was chosen. To say that B was possible at T2 means that there was a possible world, w_B, in which B was chosen at T2 instead of A. I'm claiming that w_A and w_B are separate worlds.

My main claim is that in the set of possible worlds w_KA in which it is foreknown that J will choose A there are no common members of the set of worlds w_F in which J chooses freely. In the worlds w_KA there was only one choice J could make, namely A.

CAPN OCHRE:
The definition of a decision is the choice of one option to the exclusion of others. A free decision is unforced, with the power for the decision resting with the cause of that decision. The fact that options are excluded logically is part of the free decision process. You, John, are trying to bend that definition in against itself in order to say that the decision once made could not be otherwise as though that mere fact has consequences for freedom of the will.


POWELL:
I'm trying to say that if it is foreknown what the decision will be then all other options become logically excluded, not excluded by the free will choice of J.

CAPN OCHRE:
If you will take care to categorize the possible and the actual at each juncture of your scenarios, I think that the problem (or lack thereof) will become clearer for you.

Or so I hope.


POWELL:
I don't see how this distinction helps. Maybe I'm missing something. When I speak of possible worlds I mean those that could possibly be actual. I'm saying there can be no actual worlds in which both there is foreknowledge what J will choose at T2 and free will for J to choose at T2.

POWELL:
Just because we might wish free will to be something it's not doesn't make it so. Reality is often harsh and uncompromising towards our wishful thinking.

CAPN OCHRE:
No question, but I wrote to emphasize that you grant the existence of free will for the sake of argument, then you've got to make more than a half-hearted attempt to develop a non-contradictory version of it, or else your proof is a sham.

POWELL:
How about typical human experience? A person who chooses A at T2 cannot choose B at T2. That opportunity is passed, it's in the past.

CAPN OCHRE:
So, if I could make the decision again, such that I could choose A and B (~A) at the same time and in the same sense, then I would truly have free will?


POWELL:
No.

I'm saying that to have free will it must be possible to choose A and possible to choose B, but not both at the same time. I'm saying that if it is foreknown that J will choose A then it becomes impossible to choose B in that same world, therefore it isn't free will to choose.

It's true that the world in which A is chosen at T2 can't be the same world in which B is chosen at T2, but at time T1 before the choice, if it isn't foreknown which J will choose then both choices are possible until a choice is made at T2. The world w_A and w_B could be indistinguishable until the choice is made and then they separate. This isn't the case if it is foreknown at T0 that J will choose A at T2 because then there is no possible bifurcation into w_A and w_B, there is only w_A.

CAPN OCHRE:
The requirement of free will could do otherwise is nonsensical when we speak of the actual. If you confuse the actual with the possible, you'll never make sense of the problem, afaics.


POWELL:
Perhaps I'm missing the relevance of this.

CAPN OCHRE:
Will you continue to locate the free will that you need for the sake of legitimate argumentation in a future Never-Neverland?


POWELL:
The future is a never-neverland we never exist in, but only will exist in.

POWELL:
How again does my part 3 scenario argue against itself? Is it that G alleges to know what J will do, but it's obvious He can't know that if J reads what G wrote down that J will do and if J has free will to do the opposite? If J cannot do B if G foretells that J will do A then J does not have free will to do A or B. If J can only do A, then that's not free will.

CAPN OCHRE:
I thought that this had been explained to you to such an extent that you understood it.


POWELL:
I don't think it ever was.

CAPN OCHRE:
The omniscient being knows the actual world head to tail, right?
So, our scenario for such a being would first demand supposition of one actual world, different for each moment of time. Your third stage strongly suggests an alternate reality where pseudoJaltus innocently did A, and a second reality where the conditions surrounding that decision are radically different from the supposed "actual". If you had been true to the one actual world requirement, John, then you would be asking us to believe that a person entirely motivated to pick B would pick A instead. You hemmed & hawed a bit over that point, and you granted that pseudoJaltus could disobey God and pick exactly what God had predicted if he wanted. As soon as you did that, you made your third stage okay for the compatibility of foreknowledge and free will, but still leaving the intuitive impression that something must be wrong simply owing to the fact that its hard to believe that somebody could have every motivation for choosing A yet choose B instead.


POWELL:
I allowed that J might freely choose A just to be agreeable to what was written down, but I tried to put so much pressure on him that he would be unlikely to do that. I couldn't force J to choose B or that would destroy his free will. My point was that J should be able to choose B if he had free will. This compatible situation you seem to be thinking about does not appear to discriminate from a scenario in which G doesn't have foreknowledge, but just persuades or compels J to do whatever G writes down.

Would you believe that I have foreknowledge if every time I write down what a friend will do, he reads it and then does it just to make me look good? If no, then why would you think God has foreknowledge if that's how He would demonstrate it in my scenario?

To really tell if G has foreknowledge, J should try to do the opposite. If J can do the opposite then G does not have foreknowledge. If J cannot do the opposite then G has foreknowledge or the power of compulsion.

CAPN OCHRE:
It is that fact alone, and nothing to do with the supposed incompatibility between foreknowledge and free will, that powered your scenario.


POWELL:
Ok, Capn Ochre. Please tell me what J does when he reads the note from God that says J will choose A. Does J have to choose what is written down that God foretold, namely A, or can J obey God by choosing the opposite, namely B?

Also, Capn Ochre, please tell me what Mary does. Does she name her son Immanuel as God foretold that she would or does she name her son Jesus as God commanded her to?

Also, Capn Ochre, please tell me what David does. Does David get turned over to Saul as God foretold he would or does David escape?

Lastly, Capn Ochre, please tell me what Saul does. Does Saul go down to Keilah as God foretold he would or does Saul do otherwise?

CAPN OCHRE:
Worthy of being called smoke & mirrors, imo. Sorry to be a bit on the harsh side, but your view doesn't have anything to recommend it so far, imo, and I'd seen plenty of "your" view prior to our discussion.

I don't think that you've run across anything new, and I think that it's time for you to consider the possibility that you will not.


POWELL:
Perhaps it's a good time to have a rematch debate on this issue, this time with you.

Given the helpful criticisms, especially by Jaltus and you, I think my position is new and improved.

John Powell

[Captain Ochre]

04-30-2003 @ 11:07 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=83477#post83477)
John Powell:
You've been a reliable correspondent, Capn Ochre. I did not anticipate that the third stage of my free will scenario would ever be rejected to the extent and with the philosophical backing that it has.


This isn't the first time you've admitted this, and I give you full credit for doing so, while remaining mildly puzzled that you maintain the same basic view as before. :wink:


CAPN OCHRE:
Possible doesn't need to be actual. The non-actual "could have been" remains within the realm of possibility, which is exactly where it should be to fulfill proper conditions of free will.
If you try to alter that as you redefine "free will" I'll expect you to open up your position to another charge of question-begging.

POWELL:
I agree, but I don't think my clarification violates that.


I think that your clarification continues to violate it. :smile:


If at T0 it is foreknown that J will choose a certain way at T2 then from that time T0 forward it is not possible that J chooses otherwise. It becomes logically impossible for J to choose otherwise just as logically impossible as it would be for him to change the past. There is no option for J to choose otherwise in the world / situation in which G foreknows what J will choose at T2.


You're still rampantly confusing possibility with actuality. Nothing is determined causally at T0, afaics. The event that makes it logically impossible (iow cannot be actual) to choose ~A is the fact that A is chosen at the same time & in the same sense. Nothing more. IOW(In Other Words) foreknowledge has nothing to do with it.


Are you saying that if, at T0, G foreknows that J will choose a certain way at T2 then J still has the power at T1 to do otherwise at T2, that it is still possible at T1 for J to choose otherwise at T2?


Absolutely, since I'm not confusing possibility with actuality. If it is actual that A will be chosen, then it will not be actual that ~A will be chosen, and it remains possible throughout time that ~A was a viable (possible) choice: Possible in the realm of possibility, which is the only one relevant to free will.


If the answer is no, then I claim that J does not have free will at T1 to choose at T2. There is only one option, whatever was foreknown. Otherwise it really wasn't foreknown.


You have no basis for making your claim, since you're resting it on the impossibility of choosing two mutually contradictory options. Free will does not, should not, depend on the ability to do the impossible, and demonstrating the impossibility of free will (which is what your approach above would accomplish, if it accomplished anything) is not a satisfactory way of establishing the incompatibility of foreknowledge and free will. It's a great way to beg the question, however.
Your last sentence is a non-sequitur. Foreknowledge doesn't even enter into the scenario you've presented above, so far--not really, anyway.


If the answer is yes, then how can you claim that G foreknew because if J does do otherwise (as in my stage 3 scenario) then G must not have foreknown, but could only have been guessing, predicting, or compelling.


The answer is yes, and if the other option is chosen, then the foreknowledge was inaccurate, which is a great way to do a scientific experiment, and a question-begging way to conduct a thought-experiment. If you don't honestly present accurate foreknowledge in your scenario, then you are begging the question. You don't prove that foreknowledge is impossible by musing "What if such knowledge were inaccurate?"


If choice B is reasonably possible even though G always foretells A and you repeat the experiment over and over again you would expect that choice B would become actual sometimes, otherwise you should conclude that it is not reasonably possible.


You're confusing thought-experiment with scientific experiment, imo.
Science leads to descriptive law. It isn't impossible for something to fall up, it would merely contradict a descriptive law. The scientific method that you seem to be trying to import to the foreknowledge/free will debate doesn't belong. You could as easily use the approach to argue that neither free will nor foreknowledge may reasonably be taken to exist, and you'd still be begging the question by taking naturalism for granted.


You seem to be retaining foreknowledge-free-will compatibility partly because you assume that every time J could do otherwise he chooses not to. Why do you make that assumption?


Because it keeps me from begging the question by assuming that either of my basic premisses (free will and omniscience exist for the sake of argument) are false.
Would that you would join me! :wink:


How is that scenario any different from a G who doesn't have foreknowledge at all, but can persuade or compel J to go along with whatever G predicts or guesses?


You may have lost me here, but if we're on the same topic and same scenario as above, the my answer is: The string-pulling God when introduced to the scenario begs the question by removing the free will that we should have for the sake of argument. If we remove free will as a premise, then we're doomed to beg the question.


Yes, it's a proposition. You think it's false, right?


Right.


I haven't reached that point. I assume you mean seriously fallacious.


Your assumption is correct.


Because, Capn Ochre, all arguments are fallacious to some degree. They are all invalid. My discussion supporting this position are in &quot;invalidating validity.&quot;


I'll assume that the argument supporting the invalidity of argument is invalid?
:smile:
Seriously, do you think that your point has a particular relevance, here?


Nothing you or I or anyone else says is absolutely certain true in a correspondence sort of way.


Except for your statement above?
:smile:

I'm approaching your logic discussion with the intent of deleting it if it doesn't appear relevant to me. If it interests me sufficiently, I'll drop in on the other thread.

Okay, so I didn't have to remove much at all. Thanks.


Due to the resistance I had to my scenario in other forums, I was pleased that Jaltus agreed to go through it. I anticipated that he would be persuaded to agree with me by stage 3. I was very surprised he was not and had logical arguments for why he didn't need to. I had forgotten that when I thought about the scenario long before that I had decided that the scenario allowed for God to know the future as long as He didn't tell J.

I was not familiar with the modal problem. When I heard about it I thought I must have a serious problem. After reading Swartz and others and thinking about the problem, however, I concluded that the modal problem was not as serious as I first thought. It was resolved for me by merely being careful about staying in the same world / situation.


I don't think that you resolved it at all. I think that you've hidden it from yourself (which isn't good enough, if I'm right).


Let me try to persuade you that the modal problem is not as serious as you seem to think.


Certainly, try.


Isn't this saying, Capn Ochre, that for the following argument that the conclusion must be absolutely necessarily true, cannot be false?

1. if p then q
2. p
3. therefore, (must be absolutely necessarily) q.

Q. Doesn't this mean, Capn Ochre, that so-called valid deductive arguments of the M.P. form suffer the modal fallacy?


Good grief! No!
[had to edit here to correct my own mistake]

The key is to distinguish what is being argued. In your example, the point isn't that ~q isn't possible. The point is that p entails q and if q, then q. Your comparison is not an example of the modal fallacy, since in free will argumentation it is q (action X is performed) that entails p since knowledge is inextricably linked to actuality.


If no, because the &quot;absolutely necessarily&quot; doesn't belong there at least implicitly then why should anyone have complete confidence in the inference of a so-called valid deductive argument? Does this mean it only means &quot;probably q&quot;? Otherwise if no, please explain.


The second premise, "p" is a statement of actuality, not necessity, thus the conclusion is of the same order: actuality, not necessity.
With respect to a decision, we can just as easily say, "If I pick A, then it is impossible for me to pick ~A" which is equivalent to the foreknowledge/free will version of the statement. It's vacuous, since it actually tries to turn the definition of a choice against itself. Incidentally, that's why your definition of free will is unsuitable, to say the least.


Good point. I'm saying that free will can only exist at T1 prior to the choosing at T2.


I don't see how you can claim that at all. Free will of that type cannot be exercised in making a decision. The decision removes free will every time. Free will is the puddle before you on the highway that you never get to drive through.
Free will is a decision that you never get to make, afaics.


If, at T1, J decides to choose A but then A or J or the universe cease to exist before T2 arrives then J really didn't have free will to make that choice. As long as A and B and J and the universe continue to exist then free will can continue to operate provided also that there are choosing times T2 following free will times T1. I don't think this is the problem you think it is.


In this case, my opinion is better than yours. :wink:
What is this free will that you speak of? It seems to be a name given to decision that either haven't been made yet (or decisions whose outcomes are unknown via foreknowledge, when it comes to that). Using your definition, show me a decison that reflects free will in action.
I don't think that you can do it, John. The challenge of supporting your view forces you to forge an absurd view of free will.


Yes, in the sense that at T3, J does not have free will to choose at T2.
Yes, in the sense that at T2, J does not have free will to choose at T2. It is only at T1 that J has free will to choose at T2. However, there is free will at T1.


That's nice, except that there's no decision at T1.
No decision, no free will decision. No free will decision, no non-absurd definition of free will.


I'm not saying there is no free will at any time, Capn Ochre.


Agreed, but what you are doing is just as bad: You have removed free will from the very thing it was designed to explain, that is the choice between A or B.


I'm saying there is free will at T1 to choose at T2, but only if what is chosen at T2 is not foreknown at T0.


If your definition of free will doesn't allow free will to exist at T2 when the decision is actually made, then there's no point in bringing foreknowledge into the picture at all, and here's why:
Take that same decision at T2, in the absence of foreknowledge. At T1, only one of the options at T2 is "possible" in the sense of becoming actual. The others are "impossible" in that same sense. We just don't know which one, without foreknowledge, but the relationship of possibility to actuality is identical, and that's the key point to the whole debate.


I am not saying there was not free will in the past. For example, if yesterday at 1:59:59 p.m. you choose to begin to drink Pepsi at 2:00:00 p.m. then you had free will at 1:59:59 p.m. to choose to begin to drink Pepsi at 2:00:00 p.m. What I'm saying is that at 2:00:01 p.m. you did not have free will to begin to drink Pepsi at 2:00:00 p.m.


I know exactly what you're saying, unfortunately. Free will exists in the past, but you cannot point me to an exercise of free will, since "free will" is simply a name you give to the state which exists prior to a given decision where more than one option is possible.
Thus, free will only exists "in the past" with respect to each decision in which a state of free will preceded the decision.
I do call that definition absurd.


I don't think so. I seem to be missing your point.


Pardon me, I had reverted momentarily to the traditional definition rather than the one you're peddling. It's understandable for confusion to result. Using your definition, isn't it true that every decision you make results in a specific limiting (removal) of your free will?
I'll put it this way: Your variety of free will cannot be exercised!
There is no such thing as a "free will decision", but only a state prior to various decisions earns the term "free will"--in the Powell version, anyway.


I disagree.


That's just tough, because where you said "impossibility" what you really meant was "non-actuality".
My opinion has the logical support, but yours remains mired in various fallacies.


Right. What I see is that if it is foreknown what J will choose then free will is eliminated by this tautology.


Tautologies bear no truth apart from that borne in their self-evident redundancy.


Foreknowing causes the indeterminate future that allows for free will to become determinate.


I think I mentioned to Tim Holt that I have witnessed an epistemic "determined" passed off as a causal "determined" in many past discussions. You couldn't be doing that, could you, John? Assuming a lack of equivocation, allow me to translate your preceding statement, with my version in italics:
Foreknowing causes the unknown future that allows for free will to be known.
Doesn't that beg the question?
Or, assuming that caual determinism is intended . . .
Foreknowing causes the unDetermined future that allows for free will to be Determined.
If you're not equivocating, then you're begging the question either way by presenting your conclusion sans logical progression.


I agree, if what you will do is not foreknown. When it is foreknown, however, then it becomes impossible to do otherwise. What would otherwise have been possible worlds that allowed for free will become worlds that don't allow for free will.


Pfah! Your version of free will, perhaps, which is ridiculous, if I may speak (type) frankly.
The key point remains the accurate identification of actual and possible worlds. Your strategy was to note that in actual world X, possible world Y necessarily (in actual world X) isn't the case at all. That's smoke and mirrors, and that's all it is.
Possible world Y, stemming (yet not actual) from past decision P (past decision P held in common with actual world X except for the actual choice) remains possible, thus the conditions for free will exist.
Free will as a exercise of decision, of course, not as a nebulous state preceding certain types of decisions.
You've got me wondering, now--don't computers have free will, if their decisions aren't known beforehand? :wink:


You logically could not have done otherwise if it was foreknown what you would do. Otherwise, it really wasn't foreknown.


True, but without consequences for free will, contrary to what you continue to maintain.
Assuming no foreknowledge, if it is true that I will choose A, then logically I cannot do otherwise*. Foreknowledge simply supports and agrees with the truth of an obvious tautology. Again, the elements for freedom remain, and that's the basic issue.

*I haven't forgotten the modal fallacy into which these types of statements are commonly pressed, I'm simply ignoring it for the moment while I make a separate point.


I don't mean to say that. I mean to say that there must be the possibility of the non-actual might be future. What was non-actual in the past cannot be changed to be actual in the past. What is non-actual now can't be changed to be actual now. Also, What will be non-actual in the future cannot be changed to be actual either. However, as long as what will be actual or non-actual in the future is not foreknown then there is the possibility of free will. Once it is foreknown what will be actual in the future then there is no free will to have otherwise.


By now you're quite familiar with my assessment of your view of "free will". It doesn't pass muster. As you see by your own examples, the very act of making a decision nullifies free will as surely as does foreknowledge according to your claims.


I still think my most recent ones are quite good.


I vehemently disagree. The errors are like Cyrano's nose, to me.


Perhaps the modal fallacy is over-rated.


Perhaps, and maybe all statements of propositional truth are false--but I don't think so, and logic helps my case, afaics.


Right.


Therefore, vacuous with respect to free will/foreknowledge.
Albeit, you don't see it quite yet.


What does &quot;IOW&quot; mean?


In Other Words.


POWELL:
In the world, w_A, in which A was chosen at T2 it was not possible that B was chosen. To say that B was possible at T2 means that there was a possible world, w_B, in which B was chosen at T2 instead of A. I'm claiming that w_A and w_B are separate worlds.


Yowza! You could hardly confuse actuality and possibility more thoroughly. My translation of what you wrote follows, in italics:
In the world, w_A, in which A was chosen at T2 it was not actual that B was chosen. To say that B was actual at T2 means that there was a possible world, w_B, in which B was chosen at T2 instead of A. I'm claiming that w_A and w_B are separate worlds

Now, I'll translate/alter it so that it actually makes sense, and John will want to repudiate the result:
In the world, w_A, in which A was chosen at T2 it was possible that B was chosen. To say that B was possible at T2 means that there was a possible world, w_B, in which B could have been chosen at T2 instead of A. I'm claiming that w_A and w_B are separate worlds

Keep the terms from drifting in meaning inappropriately, and the problems simply disappear. If you don't confuse actuality with possibility in the above, there's nothing to suggest that foreknowledge is problem for free will (or vice versa).


My main claim is that in the set of possible worlds w_KA in which it is foreknown that J will choose A there are no common members of the set of worlds w_F in which J chooses freely. In the worlds w_KA there was only one choice J could make, namely A.

There's modal fallacy swept under the carpet in what you wrote above. You sweep it under the carpet by simply omitting mention of possible worlds where B was chosen and B was foreknown. Reviewing what was discussed above, it simply begs the question to suppose inaccurate foreknowledge, so the fact that all possible worlds in which free will and omniscience (for the sake of argument) exist and A is chosen is simply a statement of the obvious, and without any demonstrable consequences for free will. (23500 characters! Watch out for the editor's scissors!)


I'm trying to say that if it is foreknown what the decision will be then all other options become logically excluded, not excluded by the free will choice of J.


You can't say that; not without a fallacy, imo.


I don't see how this distinction helps. Maybe I'm missing something. When I speak of possible worlds I mean those that could possibly be actual.


Good so far . . . would you care to be more specific? I think it could help. Why couldn't my past world where I drank Pepsi not Coke not be actual? Because it's not?


I'm saying that to have free will it must be possible to choose A and possible to choose B, but not both at the same time. I'm saying that if it is foreknown that J will choose A then it becomes impossible to choose B in that same world, therefore it isn't free will to choose.


It's "impossible" for any actual world to be other that what it is. Foreknowledge (again) doesn't even figure into it.


It's true that the world in which A is chosen at T2 can't be the same world in which B is chosen at T2, but at time T1 before the choice, if it isn't foreknown which J will choose then both choices are possible until a choice is made at T2.


In terms of possibility, both are possible even during and after the choice. You use "possible" sometimes when you mean "actual", with disastrous results (fallacy).


The world w_A and w_B could be indistinguishable until the choice is made and then they separate. This isn't the case if it is foreknown at T0 that J will choose A at T2 because then there is no possible bifurcation into w_A and w_B, there is only w_A.


The bifurcation is possible, just not actual. Not a problem at all.


Perhaps I'm missing the relevance of this.


Review the interlude piece by Swartz on possibility, actuality, and necessity. He's not up against his character limit.


I allowed that J might freely choose A just to be agreeable to what was written down, but I tried to put so much pressure on him that he would be unlikely to do that. I couldn't force J to choose B or that would destroy his free will. My point was that J should be able to choose B if he had free will. This compatible situation you seem to be thinking about does not appear to discriminate from a scenario in which G doesn't have foreknowledge, but just persuades or compels J to do whatever G writes down.


So what? What place does a premise of causal determinism have in an argument about the compatibility of foreknowledge and free will? If we don't assume free will, then we beg the question, no?


Would you believe that I have foreknowledge if every time I write down what a friend will do, he reads it and then does it just to make me look good?


No, but I wouldn't count the results of the experiment against you, either.


If no, then why would you think God has foreknowledge if that's how He would demonstrate it in my scenario?


Because it's assumed for the sake of argument--unless we wish to beg the question?

(removed a string of questions to get under the character limit again--post them to in their own thread or privately, and I'll be happy to answer each one).


Perhaps it's a good time to have a rematch debate on this issue, this time with you.


I wouldn't shrink from it, but I feel you'd be better off re-examining your position yet more deeply.


Given the helpful criticisms, especially by Jaltus and you, I think my position is new and improved.


It's got new makeup and a 'do, afaics. IOW, the changes are cosmetic.

[John Powell]

POWELL:
This only covers the first part of your reply.

CAPN OCHRE:
Possible doesn't need to be actual. The non-actual "could have been" remains within the realm of possibility, which is exactly where it should be to fulfill proper conditions of free will.
If you try to alter that as you redefine "free will" I'll expect you to open up your position to another charge of question-begging.

POWELL:
I agree, but I don't think my clarification violates that.

CAPN OCHRE:
I think that your clarification continues to violate it.


POWELL:
This seems to be something I'm still not understanding about your arguments. What do you mean by the "actual" world? The only actual world I know of is the one in which you and I are having this conversation. There is no Powell scenario with God writing down answers for J to choose from in the actual world. There may not even be a God with or without foreknowlege in the actual world, this is controversial.

I'm speaking of logically possible worlds, worlds that might have been actual under other circumstances or might be actual in the future. I'm not talking about "actual" worlds as if there could be more than the one that exists right now.

POWELL:
If at T0 it is foreknown that J will choose a certain way at T2 then from that time T0 forward it is not possible that J chooses otherwise. It becomes logically impossible for J to choose otherwise just as logically impossible as it would be for him to change the past. There is no option for J to choose otherwise in the world / situation in which G foreknows what J will choose at T2.

CAPN OCHRE:
You're still rampantly confusing possibility with actuality. Nothing is determined causally at T0, afaics. The event that makes it logically impossible (iow cannot be actual) to choose ~A is the fact that A is chosen at the same time & in the same sense. Nothing more. IOW(In Other Words) foreknowledge has nothing to do with it.


POWELL:
But, Capn. Ochre, at T0 it is foreknown that A will be chosen at T2. Doesn't that make it logically impossible for ~A to be chosen at T2?

POWELL:
Are you saying that if, at T0, G foreknows that J will choose a certain way at T2 then J still has the power at T1 to do otherwise at T2, that it is still possible at T1 for J to choose otherwise at T2?

CAPN OCHRE:
Absolutely, since I'm not confusing possibility with actuality. If it is actual that A will be chosen, then it will not be actual that ~A will be chosen, and it remains possible throughout time that ~A was a viable (possible) choice: Possible in the realm of possibility, which is the only one relevant to free will.


POWELL:
How can it be logically possible for ~A to be chosen at T2 when, as early as T0, it was foreknown that A would be chosen at T2?

POWELL:
If the answer is no, then I claim that J does not have free will at T1 to choose at T2. There is only one option, whatever was foreknown. Otherwise it really wasn't foreknown.

CAPN OCHRE:
You have no basis for making your claim, since you're resting it on the impossibility of choosing two mutually contradictory options. Free will does not, should not, depend on the ability to do the impossible, and demonstrating the impossibility of free will (which is what your approach above would accomplish, if it accomplished anything) is not a satisfactory way of establishing the incompatibility of foreknowledge and free will. It's a great way to beg the question, however.

Your last sentence is a non-sequitur. Foreknowledge doesn't even enter into the scenario you've presented above, so far--not really, anyway.

POWELL:
If the answer is yes, then how can you claim that G foreknew because if J does do otherwise (as in my stage 3 scenario) then G must not have foreknown, but could only have been guessing, predicting, or compelling.

CAPN OCHRE:
The answer is yes, and if the other option is chosen, then the foreknowledge was inaccurate, which is a great way to do a scientific experiment, and a question-begging way to conduct a thought-experiment. If you don't honestly present accurate foreknowledge in your scenario, then you are begging the question. You don't prove that foreknowledge is impossible by musing "What if such knowledge were inaccurate?"


POWELL:
Ok, let's assume foreknowledge exists. G foreknows at T0 that J will choose A at T2. Is it possible at T1 for J to choose ~A at T2? I would say no or G could not have had foreknowledge.

POWELL:
If choice B is reasonably possible even though G always foretells A and you repeat the experiment over and over again you would expect that choice B would become actual sometimes, otherwise you should conclude that it is not reasonably possible.

CAPN OCHRE:
You're confusing thought-experiment with scientific experiment, imo. Science leads to descriptive law. It isn't impossible for something to fall up, it would merely contradict a descriptive law. The scientific method that you seem to be trying to import to the foreknowledge/free will debate doesn't belong. You could as easily use the approach to argue that neither free will nor foreknowledge may reasonably be taken to exist, and you'd still be begging the question by taking naturalism for granted.

POWELL:
You seem to be retaining foreknowledge-free-will compatibility partly because you assume that every time J could do otherwise he chooses not to. Why do you make that assumption?

CAPN OCHRE:
Because it keeps me from begging the question by assuming that either of my basic premisses (free will and omniscience exist for the sake of argument) are false. Would that you would join me!

POWELL:
How is that scenario any different from a G who doesn't have foreknowledge at all, but can persuade or compel J to go along with whatever G predicts or guesses?

CAPN OCHRE:
You may have lost me here, but if we're on the same topic and same scenario as above, the my answer is: The string-pulling God when introduced to the scenario begs the question by removing the free will that we should have for the sake of argument. If we remove free will as a premise, then we're doomed to beg the question.


POWELL:
Uh oh, perhaps this is part of the problem. Are you saying that to disprove the compatibility of free will and foreknowledge I must assume they both exist at the same time, in other words that they are compatible?

That could be ok provided I can then reject their compatibility if the assumption of compatibility results in a logical contradiction. I think my scenario illuminates that problem.

If G foreknows that J will choose A then J cannot choose ~A.
If J has freewill then J can choose ~A.

Either J can choose ~A or J cannot choose ~A, but not both.

POWELL:
It [the modal problem] was resolved for me by merely being careful about staying in the same world / situation.

CAPN OCHRE:
I don't think that you resolved it at all. I think that you've hidden it from yourself (which isn't good enough, if I'm right).

POWELL:
Let me try to persuade you that the modal problem is not as serious as you seem to think.

CAPN OCHRE:
Certainly, try.

POWELL:
Isn't this saying, Capn Ochre, that for the following argument that the conclusion must be absolutely necessarily true, cannot be false?

1. if p then q
2. p
3. therefore, (must be absolutely necessarily) q.

Q. Doesn't this mean, Capn Ochre, that so-called valid deductive arguments of the M.P. form suffer the modal fallacy?

CAPN OCHRE:
Good grief! No!
[had to edit here to correct my own mistake]

The key is to distinguish what is being argued. In your example, the point isn't that ~q isn't possible. The point is that p entails q and if q, then q. Your comparison is not an example of the modal fallacy, since in free will argumentation it is q (action X is performed) that entails p since knowledge is inextricably linked to actuality.


POWELL:
You meant "The point is that p entails q and if p, then q." right?

Then, are you saying in my argument that ~q is possible even if the conditional "if p then q" were true and the premise "p" were true?

Copi & Cohen:
For logicians, therefore, the term validity is applicable only to deductive arguments. To say that a deductive argument is valid is to say that it is not possible for its conclusion to be false if its premisses are true. Thus we define "validity" as follows: A deductive argument is valid when, if its premisses are true, its conclusion must be true.

POWELL:
Do you disagree with Copi and Cohen on this point?

Yet, aren't they saying in essence that it is not possible ~q in the world in which "if p then q" and "p" are true? Aren't I making a similar modal claim, that it is not possible to choose ~A in the world in which it is foreknown that A will be chosen?

If my argument suffers the modal fallacy, doesn't M.P.?

POWELL:
If no, because the "absolutely necessarily" doesn't belong there at least implicitly then why should anyone have complete confidence in the inference of a so-called valid deductive argument? Does this mean it only means "probably q"? Otherwise if no, please explain.

CAPN OCHRE:
The second premise, "p" is a statement of actuality, not necessity, thus the conclusion is of the same order: actuality, not necessity.
With respect to a decision, we can just as easily say, "If I pick A, then it is impossible for me to pick ~A" which is equivalent to the foreknowledge/free will version of the statement. It's vacuous, since it actually tries to turn the definition of a choice against itself. Incidentally, that's why your definition of free will is unsuitable, to say the least.


POWELL:
The second premise "p" is NOT a statement of actuality, but one of hypothetical possibility. If this M.P. form argument were claimed to be merely valid then what I would be saying is

If the conditional premise "if p then q" were true and (or then) if the premise "p" were true then the conclusion "q" would have to be true.

Don't you agree?

If I were claiming it to be a sound argument then what I would be saying is

The conditional premise "if p then q" IS TRUE and the premise "p" IS TRUE, therefore, since this is a valid argument with true premises, the conclusion "q" IS TRUE.

Don't you agree?

POWELL:
Good point. I'm saying that free will can only exist at T1 prior to the choosing at T2.

CAPN OCHRE:
I don't see how you can claim that at all. Free will of that type cannot be exercised in making a decision. The decision removes free will every time. Free will is the puddle before you on the highway that you never get to drive through.

Free will is a decision that you never get to make, afaics.

POWELL:
If, at T1, J decides to choose A but then A or J or the universe cease to exist before T2 arrives then J really didn't have free will to make that choice. As long as A and B and J and the universe continue to exist then free will can continue to operate provided also that there are choosing times T2 following free will times T1. I don't think this is the problem you think it is.

CAPN OCHRE:
In this case, my opinion is better than yours.

What is this free will that you speak of? It seems to be a name given to decision that either haven't been made yet (or decisions whose outcomes are unknown via foreknowledge, when it comes to that). Using your definition, show me a decison that reflects free will in action.
I don't think that you can do it, John. The challenge of supporting your view forces you to forge an absurd view of free will.


POWELL:
Let's suppose I perform an experiment to test whether J has free will. At every minute mark J is supposed to push button A or button B with the instruction to do the opposite of what appears on a screen he can see.

If I input random screen values then I would expect J's responses to be nearly equally random answers opposite of what was displayed except that sometimes he might pick what is on the screen either in error or merely because he wanted to violate the rules. If I always display "A" then I would expect him to almost always display "B" unless again he chose to violate the rule.

A computer program would more reliably "choose" the opposite of what was displayed. If we have free will, perhaps computers do too.

However, if I input what was foreknown to be the response then I would expect J's answers or those of the computer program WITHOUT EXCEPTION to be exactly what was displayed.

POWELL:
Yes, in the sense that at T3, J does not have free will to choose at T2.
Yes, in the sense that at T2, J does not have free will to choose at T2. It is only at T1 that J has free will to choose at T2. However, there is free will at T1.

CAPN OCHRE:
That's nice, except that there's no decision at T1.
No decision, no free will decision. No free will decision, no non-absurd definition of free will.


POWELL:
The decision to choose can be at T1 but the choosing can't be until T2.

POWELL:
I'm not saying there is no free will at any time, Capn Ochre.

CAPN OCHRE:
Agreed, but what you are doing is just as bad: You have removed free will from the very thing it was designed to explain, that is the choice between A or B.

POWELL:
I'm saying there is free will at T1 to choose at T2, but only if what is chosen at T2 is not foreknown at T0.

CAPN OCHRE:
If your definition of free will doesn't allow free will to exist at T2 when the decision is actually made, then there's no point in bringing foreknowledge into the picture at all, and here's why:

Take that same decision at T2, in the absence of foreknowledge. At T1, only one of the options at T2 is "possible" in the sense of becoming actual. The others are "impossible" in that same sense. We just don't know which one, without foreknowledge, but the relationship of possibility to actuality is identical, and that's the key point to the whole debate.


POWELL:
I don't think so.

If A will be chosen at T2 then A will be chosen at T2, that logcially can't be changed. However, if it is not foreknown that A will be chosen then at T1 logically ~A might be chosen at T2. It is not the case that ~A might be chosen if it is foreknown that A will be chosen. On the other hand, if at T1 ~A might be chosen at T2 then it could not have been foreknown at T0 that A will be chosen at T2.

POWELL:
I am not saying there was not free will in the past. For example, if yesterday at 1:59:59 p.m. you choose to begin to drink Pepsi at 2:00:00 p.m. then you had free will at 1:59:59 p.m. to choose to begin to drink Pepsi at 2:00:00 p.m. What I'm saying is that at 2:00:01 p.m. you did not have free will to begin to drink Pepsi at 2:00:00 p.m.

CAPN OCHRE:
I know exactly what you're saying, unfortunately. Free will exists in the past, but you cannot point me to an exercise of free will, since "free will" is simply a name you give to the state which exists prior to a given decision where more than one option is possible.

Thus, free will only exists "in the past" with respect to each decision in which a state of free will preceded the decision.

I do call that definition absurd.


POWELL:
Right, if there is free will then it's at times T1 prior to the choosing at T2. I make this temporal distinction to avoid the logical problem of changing what you choose. You logically cannot undo what you did or undo what you are doing or undo what you will do.

Let's stop here for now.

John Powell

[Captain Ochre]

05-04-2003 @ 11:08 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=87113#post87113)
John Powell:

POWELL:
This seems to be something I'm still not understanding about your arguments. What do you mean by the &quot;actual&quot; world? The only actual world I know of is the one in which you and I are having this conversation. There is no Powell scenario with God writing down answers for J to choose from in the actual world. There may not even be a God with or without foreknowlege in the actual world, this is controversial.


If you propose that scenario Z takes place, then you propose that scenario Z is actual for the sake of argument.

In terms of actualities, it is counterintuitive that pseudoJaltus could be apparently fully motivated to choose B while choosing A nonetheless. That's why your third stage seems like a problem to you afaics. It doesn't have anything to do with the supposed incompatibility of foreknowledge and free will.


I'm speaking of logically possible worlds, worlds that might have been actual under other circumstances or might be actual in the future. I'm not talking about &quot;actual&quot; worlds as if there could be more than the one that exists right now.


Good; I'm glad to hear you affirm it, but despite your well-intentioned claim, I believe that your third stage contained an implied revision of history.



POWELL:
But, Capn. Ochre, at T0 it is foreknown that A will be chosen at T2. Doesn't that make it logically impossible for ~A to be chosen at T2?


Firstly, not in any causal sense, because the view that you have chosen to refute in the debate was the one that has foreknowledge based on future actuality. Our model of foreknowledge demands some concept of atemporality and as a result of that requirement, arguments that complain that X happens before Y therefore a causal relationship would be implied (between related events) ends up begging the question, since it assumes that the view that is being challenged is false rather than accomplishing a demonstration of falsehood.


POWELL:
How can it be logically possible for ~A to be chosen at T2 when, as early as T0, it was foreknown that A would be chosen at T2?


Are we going in circles, or what?
What does it mean for something to be logically possible? Of course it is logically possible for ~A to be chosen. It simply isn't actual that ~A would be chosen. This feeds directly back to your unacceptable (imho) recent definition of free will (in that you would apparently contend that all past decisions are not free will decisions since those actual past events could not be otherwise).


POWELL:
Ok, let's assume foreknowledge exists. G foreknows at T0 that J will choose A at T2. Is it possible at T1 for J to choose ~A at T2? I would say no or G could not have had foreknowledge.


Again, you're confusing possibility with actuality. Why isn't it possible to choose other than the actual choice? Since when are the sets of the possible and the actual identical?


POWELL:
Uh oh, perhaps this is part of the problem. Are you saying that to disprove the compatibility of free will and foreknowledge I must assume they both exist at the same time, in other words that they are compatible?


Yes, in effect. Only by taking those two things as foundational premisses can you arrive at a reduction to absurdity that doesn't beg the question by assuming that one of the supposedly incompatible elements isn't possible (or actual) a priori--afaics.


That could be ok provided I can then reject their compatibility if the assumption of compatibility results in a logical contradiction.


Exactly.


I think my scenario illuminates that problem.


If we overlook the fallacies, maybe.
:wink:


If G foreknows that J will choose A then J cannot choose ~A.
If J has freewill then J can choose ~A.


The above is too ambiguous a rendering of the issue to be valuable, imo. What does "cannot choose" mean? That a choice of ~A will not be actual? If so, what offense is there to the concept of free will? See what you write below:


Either J can choose ~A or J cannot choose ~A, but not both.


The above is true whether or not foreknowledge exists (and whether or not free will exists, ftm--depending on your definition of free will). Where is the offense to free will?
I challenge you to find that offense (and I am) confident that you are unable to do so.


POWELL:
You meant &quot;The point is that p entails q and if p, then q.&quot; right?


Actually, I meant just what I said, though I could have made virtually the same point with your suggestion.
I was trying to make a point through redundancy. In hindsight, I probably should have done differently. :smile:


Then, are you saying in my argument that ~q is possible even if the conditional &quot;if p then q&quot; were true and the premise &quot;p&quot; were true?


Exactly.
Take the definition of a perfect sphere.
Accept the premise that there are no actual examples of perfect spheres.
Do we conclude that perfect spheres are logically impossible, that is, outside the realm of possibility? Despite our premise, which might lead to a conclusion like "all spheroid objects are imperfect"--which is statement of propositional truth (or actuality), it remains possible for perfect spheres to exist.
That non-actual possibility is the stuff of free will, otherwise your definition of free will is absurd.


Copi &amp; Cohen:
For logicians, therefore, the term validity is applicable only to deductive arguments. To say that a deductive argument is valid is to say that it is not possible for its conclusion to be false if its premisses are true. Thus we define &quot;validity&quot; as follows: A deductive argument is valid when, if its premisses are true, its conclusion must be true.

POWELL:
Do you disagree with Copi and Cohen on this point?


In their context, no. In the context of possible worlds I reject the application of what they wrote. If it is true that all peas are green, purple peas are not therefore a logical impossibility. It is simply an incompatible state of affairs to have all green peas and some purple peas (it is not a contradiction to have free will decisions that are actual, and which, being actual "cannot be otherwise"--and that's what you apparently object to).
Your complaint against the compatibility between foreknowledge and free will does, in fact, boil down to the objection that the actual cannot be otherwise, therefore actual decisions cannot be free will decisions. This is richly illustrated by your view of past and present actual decisions, which do not qualify as free according to your definition.
It is a mistake (a fallacy) to conclude that the actual is necessary in the logical sense without an appropriate demonstration of causality, and that is precisely what your argument lacks (among other things).


Yet, aren't they saying in essence that it is not possible ~q in the world in which &quot;if p then q&quot; and &quot;p&quot; are true? Aren't I making a similar modal claim, that it is not possible to choose ~A in the world in which it is foreknown that A will be chosen?


That claim, as far as it goes, is not a problem, and it isn't the modal fallacy. The fallacy occurs because the actual and possible worlds are conflated. If Copi and Cohen concluded that If A, then not ~A, therefore ~A is logically impossible, then they would be reproducing a modal fallacy.


If my argument suffers the modal fallacy, doesn't M.P.?


No, not necessarily.


POWELL:
The second premise &quot;p&quot; is NOT a statement of actuality, but one of hypothetical possibility.


Poppycock. The premise is suggests that a certain state of affairs be considered actual for the sake of argument. Let's not split hairs, John.


If this M.P. form argument were claimed to be merely valid then what I would be saying is

If the conditional premise &quot;if p then q&quot; were true and (or then) if the premise &quot;p&quot; were true then the conclusion &quot;q&quot; would have to be true.

Don't you agree?


Sure. I do, seriously. However, the examples are incomparable since you don't stop at saying that if it is known that X will be chosen then X will be chosen, you go on to state that a certain condition for free will is removed thereby, yet you are unable to describe which one without ultimately betraying your fallacy.

What you and others who hold to your view uncannily seem to do is to conduct a sort of semantic shell-game that effectively hides the (obvious, imo) problems of your argument from your very selves.
I find this both amusing and irritating.
:smile:


If I were claiming it to be a sound argument then what I would be saying is

The conditional premise &quot;if p then q&quot; IS TRUE and the premise &quot;p&quot; IS TRUE, therefore, since this is a valid argument with true premises, the conclusion &quot;q&quot; IS TRUE.

Don't you agree?


Yeppers (and still irrelevant, afaics).


POWELL:
Let's suppose I perform an experiment to test whether J has free will.


Let's not and say we did?
There's no point in pretending to do a methodologically naturalistic "experiment" in the current debate, afaics. Kindly justify your attempts or refrain from them.


POWELL:
The decision to choose can be at T1 but the choosing can't be until T2.


Are you missing the point? If we talk about the decision regarding what to decide at T1, then we're talking about a different decision (since as you've noted, one may change one's mind). What you call the "decision to choose" is a choice just as much as is the choice to subsequently act. Review Rush lyrics again.
Just as with the choice at T2, the "decision" at T1, in your view, cannot be a manifestation of free will, since whatever is actually mentally arrived at as the mental option cannot be otherwise, having become actual at T1. Let's terminate the infinite regress immediately, shall we?


POWELL:
I don't think so.

If A will be chosen at T2 then A will be chosen at T2, that logcially can't be changed. However, if it is not foreknown that A will be chosen then at T1 logically ~A might be chosen at T2.


My thanks for the opportunity for illustration. Pay close attention:
If it is foreknown that A will be chosen then at T1 logically ~A might be chosen at T2.
"Might be" is the realm of possibility. No matter what becomes actual, all of the might-have-beens remain might-have-beens.


It is not the case that ~A might be chosen if it is foreknown that A will be chosen.


Why not? Rather, it is the case that ~A will not be chosen despite the fact that it remains possibility ("might-have-been") before, during, and after the decision.


On the other hand, if at T1 ~A might be chosen at T2 then it could not have been foreknown at T0 that A will be chosen at T2.


Again, why not? Returning to my illustration from the past, is it really impossible now that I could have chosen Pepsi, knowing as we do that I chose Coke?


POWELL:
Right, if there is free will then it's at times T1 prior to the choosing at T2. I make this temporal distinction to avoid the logical problem of changing what you choose.


There is absolutely no need to make that distinction, since we know going in regardless of foreknowledge and free will that you cannot choose both A and ~A at the same time and in the same sense.
Your supposed attempt to safeguard us from the absurdity of making the exact same choice multiple times with the possibility of different outcomes only serves to coax your definition of free will into the realm of total absurdity.


You logically cannot undo what you did or undo what you are doing or undo what you will do.


(At the same time and in the same sense, anyway. If I shoot myself with a paint-ball, I can probably wash the stain out, but I can't both shoot myself and ~shoot myself at the same time and in the same sense).


Let's stop here for now.


Sorry I was a bit slow to reply. I thought that your post was longer than it actually was, and this dampened my enthusiasm for rehashing our same old material.
I'm not sure what's going to make the modal fallacy/possibility & actuality issue clear to you, John.
Maybe you're just going to have to develop a few more fruitless syllogisms before the futility begins to sink in.

I'm a bit reluctant to debate prior to my upcoming vacation, since the preparations are many, but if you're still holding the same view and want to debate this summer, I'd be enthusiastic about participating.
Not to squelch the current discussion, of course. :smile:

[John Powell]

POWELL:
This seems to be something I'm still not understanding about your arguments. What do you mean by the "actual" world? The only actual world I know of is the one in which you and I are having this conversation. There is no Powell scenario with God writing down answers for J to choose from in the actual world. There may not even be a God with or without foreknowlege in the actual world, this is controversial.

CAPN OCHRE:
If you propose that scenario Z takes place, then you propose that scenario Z is actual for the sake of argument.


POWELL:
Do I have to? Can't I just propose it as a possible world?

This seems to be surprisingly similar to the valid vs. sound problem I keep having with philosophers. They can't seem to accept that when you propose an argument it doesn't necessarily mean that you're claiming the propositions to be true.

CAPN OCHRE:
In terms of actualities, it is counterintuitive that pseudoJaltus could be apparently fully motivated to choose B while choosing A nonetheless. That's why your third stage seems like a problem to you afaics. It doesn't have anything to do with the supposed incompatibility of foreknowledge and free will.


POWELL:
Yes. It seems incredible that J would choose what G wrote down given the incentive to do otherwise.

POWELL:
I'm speaking of logically possible worlds, worlds that might have been actual under other circumstances or might be actual in the future. I'm not talking about "actual" worlds as if there could be more than the one that exists right now.

CAPN OCHRE:
Good; I'm glad to hear you affirm it, but despite your well-intentioned claim, I believe that your third stage contained an implied revision of history.


POWELL:
I don't see that. I'm not saying that J of the scenario exists or that G exists or that Satan exists. It's all hypothetical, Capn Ochre. It's all possible at most. None of it is actual. There is only one actual world, the one you and I live in, unless we were to accept the idea of parallel universes. At least there's only one actual world we know about.

POWELL:
But, Capn. Ochre, at T0 it is foreknown that A will be chosen at T2. Doesn't that make it logically impossible for ~A to be chosen at T2?

CAPN OCHRE:
Firstly, not in any causal sense, because the view that you have chosen to refute in the debate was the one that has foreknowledge based on future actuality. Our model of foreknowledge demands some concept of atemporality and as a result of that requirement, arguments that complain that X happens before Y therefore a causal relationship would be implied (between related events) ends up begging the question, since it assumes that the view that is being challenged is false rather than accomplishing a demonstration of falsehood.


POWELL:
Not in a causal sense, but in a logical sense. If A is true then A is true, not in a causal way that A being true CAUSES A to be true, but in a logical way. In order for A to be true then A must be true.

POWELL:
How can it be logically possible for ~A to be chosen at T2 when, as early as T0, it was foreknown that A would be chosen at T2?

CAPN OCHRE:
Are we going in circles, or what?


POWELL:
I hope not, but I think I'm seeing better why we disagree.

CAPN OCHRE:
What does it mean for something to be logically possible? Of course it is logically possible for ~A to be chosen.


POWELL:
No. Capn Ochre. If it is not logically possible for ~A to be chosen then is it not logically possible for ~A to be chosen, yes or no?

You could say, "no," that it IS logically possible for ~A to be chosen, but what you mean is that IN ANOTHER WORLD IT IS POSSIBLE. In the world / situation in which it is NOT logically possible for ~A to be chosen, IN THAT WORLD it is not logically possible for ~A to be chosen, right?

CAPN OCHRE:
It simply isn't actual that ~A would be chosen.


POWELL:
There is only one actual world, Capn Ochre, the one you and I live in. We are talking about possible worlds and impossible worlds, not actual worlds.

CAPN OCHRE:
This feeds directly back to your unacceptable (imho) recent definition of free will (in that you would apparently contend that all past decisions are not free will decisions since those actual past events could not be otherwise).


POWELL:
Not quite. I AM claiming that at T3 you cannot freely choose to undo what was chosen at T2. I am NOT saying that what occurred at T2 was not freely chosen.

POWELL:
Ok, let's assume foreknowledge exists. G foreknows at T0 that J will choose A at T2. Is it possible at T1 for J to choose ~A at T2? I would say no or G could not have had foreknowledge.

CAPN OCHRE:
Again, you're confusing possibility with actuality. Why isn't it possible to choose other than the actual choice? Since when are the sets of the possible and the actual identical?


POWELL:
Again, Capn Ochre, there is only one actual world. You should be asking why one possible world could not have possibly been a different possible world or something like that.

What I'm saying, in effect, is that in the world in which J cannot choose ~A then IN THAT WORLD J cannot choose ~A. I concede that the statement "J cannot choose ~A" by itself could suffer the modal fallacy since there is no logical reason J cannot choose ~A UNLESS you tie it to the world / situation in which J must choose A or ~A is not available or something like that.

POWELL:
Uh oh, perhaps this is part of the problem. Are you saying that to disprove the compatibility of free will and foreknowledge I must assume they both exist at the same time, in other words that they are compatible?

CAPN OCHRE:
Yes, in effect. Only by taking those two things as foundational premisses can you arrive at a reduction to absurdity that doesn't beg the question by assuming that one of the supposedly incompatible elements isn't possible (or actual) a priori--afaics.

POWELL:
That could be ok provided I can then reject their compatibility if the assumption of compatibility results in a logical contradiction.

CAPN OCHRE:
Exactly.

POWELL:
I think my scenario illuminates that problem.

CAPN OCHRE:
If we overlook the fallacies, maybe.

POWELL:
If G foreknows that J will choose A then J cannot choose ~A.
If J has freewill then J can choose ~A.

CAPN OCHRE:
The above is too ambiguous a rendering of the issue to be valuable, imo. What does "cannot choose" mean? That a choice of ~A will not be actual? If so, what offense is there to the concept of free will? See what you write below:


POWELL:
The meaning of the phrase "G foreknows J will choose A" implies that "J will choose A." If J does not choose A then logically it could not have been the case that "G foreknows J will choose A." One is justified in claiming that it is the case that "G foreknows J will choose A" ONLY IF, given that claim to foreknowledge, J cannot choose ~A. Because if J CAN choose ~A then sometimes he might choose ~A, especially if he is well motivated to do so. But, if J can't choose ~A then J does not have free will.

You seem to think there's no problem because under the bizarre situation that J has free will and is well motivated to choose ~A, he nevertheless chooses A, time after time after time. You could threaten him with the death of himself and his loved ones if he chooses A again, but he will still choose A, if that's what G writes down that he will choose. This is bizarre. There is no LOGICAL problem, perhaps, but there's the practical problem that REAL people instead of the strange ones you're apparently thinking about won't reasonably do that. J will probably choose ~A when G claims that J will choose A. It's as simple as that. You're right that it's logically possible that J chooses A, but it's not reasonably possible. If we were to perform this experiment in the ACTUAL world and I were J, I could show you how easy it is to prove G wrong.

POWELL:
Either J can choose ~A or J cannot choose ~A, but not both.

CAPN OCHRE:
The above is true whether or not foreknowledge exists (and whether or not free will exists, ftm--depending on your definition of free will). Where is the offense to free will?

I challenge you to find that offense (and I am) confident that you are unable to do so.


POWELL:
I'm not talking about choosing both A and ~A at the same time. What I mean is that it can't be both possible and not possible to do the same thing in the same sense.

If J cannot choose ~A then J does not have free will to choose ~A.

POWELL:
You meant "The point is that p entails q and if p, then q." right?

CAPN OCHRE:
Actually, I meant just what I said, though I could have made virtually the same point with your suggestion.
I was trying to make a point through redundancy. In hindsight, I probably should have done differently.

POWELL:
Then, are you saying in my argument that ~q is possible even if the conditional "if p then q" were true and the premise "p" were true?

CAPN OCHRE:
Exactly.


POWELL:
I think I'm understanding better why and where we disagree.

CAPN OCHRE:
Take the definition of a perfect sphere.
Accept the premise that there are no actual examples of perfect spheres.
Do we conclude that perfect spheres are logically impossible, that is, outside the realm of possibility? Despite our premise, which might lead to a conclusion like "all spheroid objects are imperfect"--which is statement of propositional truth (or actuality), it remains possible for perfect spheres to exist.
That non-actual possibility is the stuff of free will, otherwise your definition of free will is absurd.


POWELL:
I think I see. It's logically possible for perfect spheres to exist, but not physically possible.

Copi & Cohen:
For logicians, therefore, the term validity is applicable only to deductive arguments. To say that a deductive argument is valid is to say that it is not possible for its conclusion to be false if its premisses are true. Thus we define "validity" as follows: A deductive argument is valid when, if its premisses are true, its conclusion must be true.

POWELL:
Do you disagree with Copi and Cohen on this point?

CAPN OCHRE:
In their context, no.


POWELL:
Not so fast, Capn Ochre. Is it LOGICALLY POSSIBLE for the conclusion of a valid deductive argument to be false? Yes or no? It is true that the conclusion of a valid deductive argument MUST be true, CANNOT POSSIBLY be false? Yes or no?

In other words

1. if p then q
2. p
- - - - - therefore - - - - -
3. q

Does q HAVE TO BE true? I think you should say NO to be consistent with what you've said before. However, then I need to remind you that this argument is not speaking of all possible worlds, but just the world in which premises 1 and 2 are both true. In the possible world in which "if p then q" is true and "p" is true, in that world, q must be true, cannot be false.

CAPN OCHRE:
In the context of possible worlds I reject the application of what they wrote. If it is true that all peas are green, purple peas are not therefore a logical impossibility. It is simply an incompatible state of affairs to have all green peas and some purple peas (it is not a contradiction to have free will decisions that are actual, and which, being actual "cannot be otherwise"--and that's what you apparently object to).

Your complaint against the compatibility between foreknowledge and free will does, in fact, boil down to the objection that the actual cannot be otherwise, therefore actual decisions cannot be free will decisions. This is richly illustrated by your view of past and present actual decisions, which do not qualify as free according to your definition.

It is a mistake (a fallacy) to conclude that the actual is necessary in the logical sense without an appropriate demonstration of causality, and that is precisely what your argument lacks (among other things).


POWELL:
The actual is the way it is. Things cannot be other than the way they are. Things could be different from the way they MIGHT be.

POWELL:
Yet, aren't they saying in essence that it is not possible ~q in the world in which "if p then q" and "p" are true? Aren't I making a similar modal claim, that it is not possible to choose ~A in the world in which it is foreknown that A will be chosen?

CAPN OCHRE:
That claim, as far as it goes, is not a problem, and it isn't the modal fallacy. The fallacy occurs because the actual and possible worlds are conflated. If Copi and Cohen concluded that If A, then not ~A, therefore ~A is logically impossible, then they would be reproducing a modal fallacy.


POWELL:
In the world that it is the case "A" then IN THAT WORLD "~A" is not logically possible. "~A" is possible in other worlds, but not in the same world that it is the case that "A".

POWELL:
If my argument suffers the modal fallacy, doesn't M.P.?

CAPN OCHRE:
No, not necessarily.


POWELL:
Then I think my argument can avoid the modal fallacy the same way that M.P. can avoid it. The key is to restrict the argument to the same world or set of worlds. In the world that "if p then q" and "p" are true, IN THAT WORLD, "q" must be true, cannot be false. Likewise, in the world in which "G foreknows J will choose A," IN THAT WORLD, "J must choose A", cannot choose ~A and, therefore, IN THAT WORLD, J does not have free will.

POWELL:
The second premise "p" is NOT a statement of actuality, but one of hypothetical possibility.

CAPN OCHRE:
Poppycock. The premise is suggests that a certain state of affairs be considered actual for the sake of argument. Let's not split hairs, John.


POWELL:
This is a problem I keep having with philosophers. They don't seem to understand well enough that every argument posed is not necessarily one in which the premises are claimed or assumed to be true.

POWELL:
If this M.P. form argument were claimed to be merely valid then what I would be saying is

If the conditional premise "if p then q" were true and (or then) if the premise "p" were true then the conclusion "q" would have to be true.

Don't you agree?

CAPN OCHRE:
Sure. I do, seriously. However, the examples are incomparable since you don't stop at saying that if it is known that X will be chosen then X will be chosen, you go on to state that a certain condition for free will is removed thereby, yet you are unable to describe which one without ultimately betraying your fallacy.


POWELL:
Ok, let me write it out in long English.

If it were the case that "G foreknows J will choose A" then it would be the case that "J will choose A" and it would be the case that "J cannot choose ~A"

If it were the case that "J has free will to choose A or ~A" then it would be the case that "J CAN choose ~A"

These two propositions contradict, however, since in the same world that "J cannot choose ~A" it is not logically possible in that same world to also be true "J can choose ~A."

CAPN OCHRE:
What you and others who hold to your view uncannily seem to do is to conduct a sort of semantic shell-game that effectively hides the (obvious, imo) problems of your argument from your very selves.

I find this both amusing and irritating.


POWELL:
I'm not trying to be funny, but I think I can imagine what you feel.

POWELL:
If I were claiming it to be a sound argument then what I would be saying is

The conditional premise "if p then q" IS TRUE and the premise "p" IS TRUE, therefore, since this is a valid argument with true premises, the conclusion "q" IS TRUE.

Don't you agree?

CAPN OCHRE:
Yeppers (and still irrelevant, afaics).

POWELL:
Let's suppose I perform an experiment to test whether J has free will.

CAPN OCHRE:
Let's not and say we did?

There's no point in pretending to do a methodologically naturalistic "experiment" in the current debate, afaics. Kindly justify your attempts or refrain from them.


POWELL:
Perhaps it's not justified because I'm testing PHYSICAL possibility and you're arguing LOGICAL possibility.

Using your methodology I should not argue in favor of the speed of light limitation because it's logically possible to travel faster than the speed of light.

Here's one solution. I can merely define foreknowledge and free will to be incompatible (which is what I think is essentially the case already). I can do that and you cannot justifiably refute my argument using my definitions. You would have to propose your own definitions or something like that. How does one judge whether what philosophers argue about in their hypothetical worlds is true in the actual world or not, whether their definitions are useful in the real world? BY DOING PHYSICAL EXPERIMENTS. Otherwise, you can't really have much confidence in what they claim. Without such experiments, it mostly depends on what definitions and rules of logic you accept.

So, you think foreknowledge and free will are compatible. Let's do some BIBLICAL experiments and one hypothetical PHYSICAL experiment.

Here's the Biblical experiment: In the Bible when God said X will happen, did X always happen?

Consider the case of the naming of the Messiah. Was it "Immanuel" like God said the virgin would make it or was it "Jesus" like the virgin was later commanded to make it? You have never resolved this in this thread as far as I can remember. This is surprisingly similar to my scenario. Mary is ordered to call him "Jesus," but God wrote down in Isaiah that she would name him "Immanuel." So, which did Mary do? You know the answer already.

Assuming the essential elements of the story are true, I would say it's because Mary had free will to obey God's command and God was only guessing what Mary would do, He didn't foreknow it. How would you explain it?

Consider the case of David and Saul. Was David and his men turned over to Saul like God said will happen? Also, did Saul come down like God said will happen?

The physical experiment, of course, is my scenario, specifically stage 3.

If your philosophical ideas are true, Capn Ochre, then they should CORRECTLY predict the outcome of these cases. Do they?

POWELL:
The decision to choose can be at T1 but the choosing can't be until T2.

CAPN OCHRE:
Are you missing the point? If we talk about the decision regarding what to decide at T1, then we're talking about a different decision (since as you've noted, one may change one's mind). What you call the "decision to choose" is a choice just as much as is the choice to subsequently act. Review Rush lyrics again.


POWELL:
Well yes, but that's a separate problem.

CAPN OCHRE:
Just as with the choice at T2, the "decision" at T1, in your view, cannot be a manifestation of free will, since whatever is actually mentally arrived at as the mental option cannot be otherwise, having become actual at T1. Let's terminate the infinite regress immediately, shall we?


POWELL:
Yes. Don't go there.

POWELL:
I don't think so.

If A will be chosen at T2 then A will be chosen at T2, that logcially can't be changed. However, if it is not foreknown that A will be chosen then at T1 logically ~A might be chosen at T2.

CAPN OCHRE:
My thanks for the opportunity for illustration. Pay close attention:
If it is foreknown that A will be chosen then at T1 logically ~A might be chosen at T2.
"Might be" is the realm of possibility. No matter what becomes actual, all of the might-have-beens remain might-have-beens.


POWELL:
~A cannot be chosen in the same world in which it is foreknown that A will be chosen, otherwise "foreknows" is denied. ~A can be chosen in some other possible world.

POWELL:
It is not the case that ~A might be chosen if it is foreknown that A will be chosen.

CAPN OCHRE:
Why not?


POWELL:
Because if ~A can be chosen then it cannot be the case that it is foreknown that A will be chosen. You can't foreknow something will happen if it's possible for that foreknowledge to be wrong. It wouldn't really be foreknowledge in that case.

CAPN OCHRE:
Rather, it is the case that ~A will not be chosen despite the fact that it remains possibility ("might-have-been") before, during, and after the decision.


POWELL:
How could it be other than what was foreknown? How is it possible for ~A to be chosen IN THE SAME WORLD that it is known or foreknown that A is the case? If ~A could be true then it could not be true that it is foreknown or known that A is the case.

POWELL:
On the other hand, if at T1 ~A might be chosen at T2 then it could not have been foreknown at T0 that A will be chosen at T2.

CAPN OCHRE:
Again, why not?


POWELL:
Because of the meaning of the words "know" and "foreknow." You can't know something to be true that is false. If it's possible that X is false then you can't know that X is true. You can only know X is true if X is true, cannot be false.

CAPN OCHRE:
Returning to my illustration from the past, is it really impossible now that I could have chosen Pepsi, knowing as we do that I chose Coke?


POWELL:
It is impossible now for you to choose Pepsi in the past if, in fact, you chose Coke in the past. It may have been a free will choice back then, but you no longer have free will to change what you drank.

POWELL:
Right, if there is free will then it's at times T1 prior to the choosing at T2. I make this temporal distinction to avoid the logical problem of changing what you choose.

CAPN OCHRE:
There is absolutely no need to make that distinction, since we know going in regardless of foreknowledge and free will that you cannot choose both A and ~A at the same time and in the same sense.

Your supposed attempt to safeguard us from the absurdity of making the exact same choice multiple times with the possibility of different outcomes only serves to coax your definition of free will into the realm of total absurdity.


POWELL:
I hope not.

POWELL:
You logically cannot undo what you did or undo what you are doing or undo what you will do.

CAPN OCHRE:
(At the same time and in the same sense, anyway. If I shoot myself with a paint-ball, I can probably wash the stain out, but I can't both shoot myself and ~shoot myself at the same time and in the same sense).

POWELL:
Let's stop here for now.

CAPN OCHRE:
Sorry I was a bit slow to reply. I thought that your post was longer than it actually was, and this dampened my enthusiasm for rehashing our same old material.


POWELL:
I think these issues of the actual world, the comparison with modus ponens, and such things are the most crucial problems we disagree about.

CAPN OCHRE:
I'm not sure what's going to make the modal fallacy/possibility & actuality issue clear to you, John.
Maybe you're just going to have to develop a few more fruitless syllogisms before the futility begins to sink in.

I'm a bit reluctant to debate prior to my upcoming vacation, since the preparations are many, but if you're still holding the same view and want to debate this summer, I'd be enthusiastic about participating.
Not to squelch the current discussion, of course.


POWELL:
I think I understand the modal fallacy better than you think I do. I think my argument can avoid the problem in the same way that M.P. can avoid it.

John Powell

[Captain Ochre]

05-18-2003 @ 06:41 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=100136#post100136)
John Powell:



POWELL:
Do I have to? Can't I just propose it as a possible world?


If the hairsplitting process is to continue, sure. What's the point of calling it a "possible world" particularly when your aim is to show that this "possible world" is impossible?
The process of logic proceeds (typically) down a "if X were actual, then Y would result" or something along those lines.


This seems to be surprisingly similar to the valid vs. sound problem I keep having with philosophers. They can't seem to accept that when you propose an argument it doesn't necessarily mean that you're claiming the propositions to be true.


We're calling them true for the sake of argument. If we fail to keep our basic presuppositions--those established for the sake of argument--intact, then there's an excellent chance that the question has been begged.


POWELL:
I don't see that. I'm not saying that J of the scenario exists or that G exists or that Satan exists. It's all hypothetical, Capn Ochre. It's all possible at most. None of it is actual.


It's all actual for the sake of argument.


There is only one actual world, the one you and I live in, unless we were to accept the idea of parallel universes. At least there's only one actual world we know about.


Naturally, I agree. I'll remind you of your statement above, later.


POWELL:
Not in a causal sense, but in a logical sense. If A is true then A is true, not in a causal way that A being true CAUSES A to be true, but in a logical way. In order for A to be true then A must be true.


If A is true, is it true because A is true?
:wink:


POWELL:
I hope not, but I think I'm seeing better why we disagree.


Not sufficiently to satisfy me. :smile:


POWELL:
No. Capn Ochre. If it is not logically possible for ~A to be chosen then is it not logically possible for ~A to be chosen, yes or no?


That's a false dilemma, owing to the fact that possible has shifted in meaning in the midst of your argument (giving you temporary credit for a sensible definition of free will--iow not the one you've been proposing).
Let's assume that I have free will, and I will decide press a button, or not press a button. Is it possible for me to both press the button and not press the button at the same time and in the same sense? Of course not. That's contradictory. So, one of the options is not logically possible. Thus, since only one option is possible, I do not have free will (if a free will choice is between two possible options).
What you still don't seem to have grasped is that your logic is identical to my silly argument above, except that yours is dressed up with temporal niceties. Did you notice that I have no need to invoke foreknowledge to make essentially the same argument that you make?


You could say, &quot;no,&quot; that it IS logically possible for ~A to be chosen, but what you mean is that IN ANOTHER WORLD IT IS POSSIBLE.


Correct, and you should be treating possibility in like manner. What you have done instead is to make free will "impossible" with a tautology that doesn't have free will within its purview.


In the world / situation in which it is NOT logically possible for ~A to be chosen, IN THAT WORLD it is not logically possible for ~A to be chosen, right?


Here, you're using "logically possible" to denote "actual". In the actual world, the non-actual is "impossible" in the sense that it cannot be actual (since being both actual and non-actual in the same time and in the same sense would be absurd).
So, no, not right. In all actual worlds, the set of possible worlds is identical. Or perhaps it would be better to say that the set of possible worlds doesn't give two flips for the set consisting of the actual world. That which is actual does not limit the set of possible worlds in any manner at all.
The basic premise of free will is that actual world at T1 could be either actual world A or actual world B at T2, based on the uncoerced decision of a free agent. Your argument does not touch that concept of free will at all.
Again, we know that actual worlds A and B cannot both be actual (since that's a contradiction), so one of the actual worlds is "impossible" in the sense that it will not be actual. Despite this, all options not taken (where the option was real and not bogus) are/were/will be possible in the sense of being options that were not/are not/will not be actual but were/are/will be possible in the exact sense required for freedom of the will to exist (using a reasonable definition of free will, as above).


POWELL:
Not quite. I AM claiming that at T3 you cannot freely choose to undo what was chosen at T2. I am NOT saying that what occurred at T2 was not freely chosen.


It's not possible to choose other than what is actually chosen, is it? How do you define free will for purposes of your example? Given any choice between two or more options, it is possible to only choose one while the rest are impossible (since you cannot choose other than the actual choice).
I demand that you define free will such that the above absurdity is remedied.


What I'm saying, in effect, is that in the world in which J cannot choose ~A then IN THAT WORLD J cannot choose ~A. I concede that the statement &quot;J cannot choose ~A&quot; by itself could suffer the modal fallacy since there is no logical reason J cannot choose ~A UNLESS you tie it to the world / situation in which J must choose A or ~A is not available or something like that.


There we agree, but I can't help but notice that you've got no argument (so far) based on the above.


POWELL:
The meaning of the phrase &quot;G foreknows J will choose A&quot; implies that &quot;J will choose A.&quot;


Correct, and more precisely if the foreknowledge is accurate for the sake of argument, then the statement reflects actuality. That foreknown state of affairs is the only possible option based on the property of actuality and nothing more. Foreknowledge literally has nothing to do with it. The decision is uncoerced, the the other options remain possible (not actual), thus all the conditions necessary to calling a decision "free" could certainly obtain.


If J does not choose A then logically it could not have been the case that &quot;G foreknows J will choose A.&quot;


Correct, but if we are assuming that accurate foreknowledge exists for the sake of argument, then examples where that knowledge is incorrect offend one of our basic premisses. Just as you say, it is no more possible for accurate foreknowledge to be incorrect than it is for the actual to be non-actual.


One is justified in claiming that it is the case that &quot;G foreknows J will choose A&quot; ONLY IF, given that claim to foreknowledge, J cannot choose ~A.


The modal fallacy is trying to stick its ugly head in the door again.
What does "cannot" mean? That one of the two "possible" options is "impossible" (just as in my example above where foreknowledge is neither mentioned nor a factor)?
You can only mean that the actual cannot be otherwise. The connotation of "cannot" that hints to us that one of the options was never possible (in the sense that would have allowed for free will) does not belong.


Because if J CAN choose ~A then sometimes he might choose ~A, especially if he is well motivated to do so. But, if J can't choose ~A then J does not have free will.


Non sequitur. How many actual worlds are there, again? One? So, how are you going to test the same decision over and again to see if it comes out differently? Oh, it's impossible to do so unless there is more than one actual world? You don't say!

As soon as you admit other possible worlds for repetition of the example (proposing those possible worlds as actualities for the sake of argument), you allow other possible worlds where whatever is actually decided to be known by an omniscient being.
Your inclination will be to truncate the actual world in time & thereby claim that the future is thus determined by the instance of foreknowledge, but in so doing our premise of foreknowledge based on actuality is offended.


You seem to think there's no problem because under the bizarre situation that J has free will and is well motivated to choose ~A, he nevertheless chooses A, time after time after time.


Baloney. I think that there's no problem because the third stage is absurd for reasons that I have already described in some detail. You do me a disservice to hint otherwise, imo.


You could threaten him with the death of himself and his loved ones if he chooses A again, but he will still choose A, if that's what G writes down that he will choose. This is bizarre.


The bizarre aspect of the scenario is that the foreknowledge of the pseudoJaltus decision is apparently blind to the context of the scenario. The foreknowledge seemingly informs God that Jaltus will choose A, but the circumstances (that is, the motivation to choose ~A) are unknown.
The fact is that the scenario is unbelievable whether foreknowledge exists or not. People choose what they are motivated to choose, in our experience. In effect, the scenario asks PseudoJaltus to choose what he doesn't wish to choose, which is absurd in all possible worlds.
I had asked Kyle Gerkin (in a separate thread) whether or not is it possible for a person decide something that he doesn't want to decide (iow to take the option that he doesn't want).
If free will exists, then I would say that it is mandatory that one chooses what one wishes to choose. Your third stage, John, plays to the absurdity of supposing that one could choose other than what one wants to choose.


There is no LOGICAL problem, perhaps, but there's the practical problem that REAL people instead of the strange ones you're apparently thinking about won't reasonably do that. J will probably choose ~A when G claims that J will choose A. It's as simple as that. You're right that it's logically possible that J chooses A, but it's not reasonably possible. If we were to perform this experiment in the ACTUAL world and I were J, I could show you how easy it is to prove G wrong.


Not without offending the premisses of the argument, you couldn't.
You're correct to state that there's no logical problem, imo.
Accurate foreknowledge that is incorrect is not accurate foreknowledge--that's all you'd be proving.
I knew that well before TWeb started up. :wink:


POWELL:
I'm not talking about choosing both A and ~A at the same time. What I mean is that it can't be both possible and not possible to do the same thing in the same sense.

If J cannot choose ~A then J does not have free will to choose ~A.


Since our foreknowledge-endowed being is accepted (for the sake of argument) as knowing the future based on actuality, your actually talking about choosing both A and ~A at the same time.
I cannot choose Pepsi, having chosen Coke at moment M. Therefore, no free will?
You say if J cannot choose ~A then J does not have free will to choose ~A, but I knew before I chose Coke that I could not choose both Coke and Pepsi at the same time and in the same sense. One of the options was "impossible" before I ever chose, even if foreknowledge is impossible.


POWELL:
I think I'm understanding better why and where we disagree.


I look forward to the convincing evidence that you are correct in your impression.


POWELL:
I think I see. It's logically possible for perfect spheres to exist, but not physically possible.


It not the logical vs. physical but the fact that "possible" has changed in meaning. If something is logically possible (perfect circles) then mustn't we accept that a perfect circle is physically possible, just as we accept that it is impossible for a human being to leap over the Empire State Building even while we know that it isn't actually a logical impossibility?


POWELL:
Not so fast, Capn Ochre. Is it LOGICALLY POSSIBLE for the conclusion of a valid deductive argument to be false? Yes or no?


Yes, see below.


It is true that the conclusion of a valid deductive argument MUST be true, CANNOT POSSIBLY be false? Yes or no?

In other words

1. if p then q
2. p
- - - - - therefore - - - - -
3. q

Does q HAVE TO BE true? I think you should say NO to be consistent with what you've said before. However, then I need to remind you that this argument is not speaking of all possible worlds, but just the world in which premises 1 and 2 are both true. In the possible world in which &quot;if p then q&quot; is true and &quot;p&quot; is true, in that world, q must be true, cannot be false.


What you apparently think is an important point is actually a distraction. If it is true that pseudoJaltus chooses A, then pseudoJaltus will choose A--there's no question (to make it clear that I am answering your question: Does q HAVE TO BE true? I think you should say NO to be consistent with what you've said before.
If all fish are dead, then fish are extinct.
All fish are dead.
Therefore, fish are extinct.
It is logically possible that fish are not extinct, and if the premisses are true, then fish are certainly extinct.
IOW, there are possible worlds where fish are not extinct.)
Your argument flops because it fails to maintain consistency in dealing with what is possible, again touching your problem in arriving at an acceptable definition of free will.
Here's the reduction to absurdity again:

If Bill chooses Coke, then he cannot choose Pepsi.
Bill chooses Coke
Therefore,
Bill cannot choose Pepsi.

If Bill cannot choose Pepsi, then he has no free will in the scenario above, no?


POWELL:
The actual is the way it is. Things cannot be other than the way they are. Things could be different from the way they MIGHT be.

In the world that it is the case &quot;A&quot; then IN THAT WORLD &quot;~A&quot; is not logically possible.


Suddenly "not logically possible" means not actual. Only this isn't the first time.


&quot;~A&quot; is possible in other worlds, but not in the same world that it is the case that &quot;A&quot;.


It's not possible to do other than what you actually do, even in worlds where omniscient beings and accurate foreknowedge exist. And again, the set of the actual places no limitation on the set of the possible (in a slightly different sense).


POWELL:
Then I think my argument can avoid the modal fallacy the same way that M.P. can avoid it. The key is to restrict the argument to the same world or set of worlds. In the world that &quot;if p then q&quot; and &quot;p&quot; are true, IN THAT WORLD, &quot;q&quot; must be true, cannot be false. Likewise, in the world in which &quot;G foreknows J will choose A,&quot; IN THAT WORLD, &quot;J must choose A&quot;, cannot choose ~A and, therefore, IN THAT WORLD, J does not have free will.


Whenever you'll deign to tell us why J doesn't have free will, I'll be able to explain why your logic doesn't follow--unless you succeed in using language that I don't understand.


Ok, let me write it out in long English.

If it were the case that &quot;G foreknows J will choose A&quot; then it would be the case that &quot;J will choose A&quot; and it would be the case that &quot;J cannot choose ~A&quot;


(okay so far . . .)


If it were the case that &quot;J has free will to choose A or ~A&quot; then it would be the case that &quot;J CAN choose ~A&quot;


Nope. "CAN" and "cannot" don't mean anywhere near the same thing (apart from their opposition).
Apart from foreknowledge, if I choose A I cannot choose ~A, even if a chronologically subsequent possible world could contain the ~A decision. This would render free will impossible if it weren't ridiculous.


These two propositions contradict, however, since in the same world that &quot;J cannot choose ~A&quot; it is not logically possible in that same world to also be true &quot;J can choose ~A.&quot;


Incorrect, since the sense of the words has drifted. In my past, it remains possible to have chosen Pepsi rather than Coke even while it is impossible to reconcile the actual choosing of Pepsi with my actual choosing of Coke at the same time and in the same sense.


POWELL:
I'm not trying to be funny, but I think I can imagine what you feel.


You've admitted a modal fallacy, and you've conceded that your scenario doesn't manifest a logical problem in its third stage.
Are you able to identify my hangup, the one that amuses and irritates you?
John, I believe that your study and understanding of logical theory & language is better than mine, but otoh I think that I've worked on this particular problem more fully than you have. If I haven't played all of the angles yet, I'm getting pretty close. You're caught on your definition of what "cannot" be done (somewhere in the realm of either possibility or actuality) and on your definition of free will. When you shore up one sinking point, you leave another area to sag.
Proof is in the pudding.


POWELL:
Perhaps it's not justified because I'm testing PHYSICAL possibility and you're arguing LOGICAL possibility.


Isn't "PHYSICAL possibility" the same as actuality?
The claim that foreknowledge is incompatible with free will is a claim touching a(n allegedly) logically impossible state of affairs (coexistence of foreknowledge and free will), is it not?


Using your methodology I should not argue in favor of the speed of light limitation because it's logically possible to travel faster than the speed of light.


Is it logically possible? Faster-than-light travel creates paradoxes, does it not?


Here's one solution. I can merely define foreknowledge and free will to be incompatible (which is what I think is essentially the case already). I can do that and you cannot justifiably refute my argument using my definitions. [...] How does one judge whether what philosophers argue about in their hypothetical worlds is true in the actual world or not, whether their definitions are useful in the real world? BY DOING PHYSICAL EXPERIMENTS. Otherwise, you can't really have much confidence in what they claim. Without such experiments, it mostly depends on what definitions and rules of logic you accept.


This is basically a red herring, since we probably can't prove the existence/nonexistence of either of our foundational premisses using methodological naturalism.
I won't duck the material; I'll reply to you on these points via private message, and you have permission in advance to publish my reply.


If your philosophical ideas are true, Capn Ochre, then they should CORRECTLY predict the outcome of these cases. Do they?


I expect my views to be consistent with the examples you give, but I'd consider guarding myself against eisegesis and other problems of interpretation which might bias the "experiment".


POWELL:
~A cannot be chosen in the same world in which it is foreknown that A will be chosen, otherwise &quot;foreknows&quot; is denied. ~A can be chosen in some other possible world.


The latter fulfills the requirements for free will, assuming that the road not taken was a legitimate fork from the actual road. Remember that there's one actual world, however, and not a branching tree of possibilities. The actual looks straight, unbranched, undifferentiated. Things couldn't be other than what they actually are except in the realm of possibility, where the branching is.



Because if ~A can be chosen then it cannot be the case that it is foreknown that A will be chosen.


Non sequitur. Think about it, or revise your language to say what you really mean.


You can't foreknow something will happen if it's possible for that foreknowledge to be wrong. It wouldn't really be foreknowledge in that case.


Correct. It's impossible for accurate foreknowledge to be wrong, by definition. OTOH, the set of the possible is far greater than the set of the actual. IOW, the fact that the actual couldn't be otherwise doesn't mean that there are no other possible worlds.


How could it be other than what was foreknown?


In the realm of possibility, rather than that of actuality.


How is it possible for ~A to be chosen IN THE SAME WORLD that it is known or foreknown that A is the case?


That would be the actual world you're talking about, right? Remember how you told me you weren't saying that it freedom demands choosing both A and ~A at the same time and in the same sense? How am I supposed to believe you when you type the sort of stuff you just did?


If ~A could be true then it could not be true that it is foreknown or known that A is the case.


What does "could be true" mean? Actual, or possible? It must mean "could be actual", no? And possible is prerequisite for actuality, isn't it?
Your language still finds a comfortable ambiguity between possible and actual, imo. Repair the ambiguity, and your fallacy will come to light (apart from the fallacy of ambiguity, that is).


POWELL:
Because of the meaning of the words &quot;know&quot; and &quot;foreknow.&quot; You can't know something to be true that is false. If it's possible that X is false then you can't know that X is true. You can only know X is true if X is true, cannot be false.


Rather, if it's actual that X is false, then you can't know that X is true (or actual).
Not that what you wrote is incorrect, I'm just illustrating how ambiguous it is with respect to our topic.


It is impossible now for you to choose Pepsi in the past if, in fact, you chose Coke in the past. It may have been a free will choice back then, but you no longer have free will to change what you drank.


Get off that fence! It's past time for you to acceptably define free will. You need a definition that stands the test of time. Heh. Pun intended.


I think I understand the modal fallacy better than you think I do. I think my argument can avoid the problem in the same way that M.P. can avoid it.


I trust that you understand the concept of the modal fallacy better than I do.
OTOH, I have every confidence that you're overlooking its importance with respect to our topic. When you fix the modal problem in your argument, you lose the consequences for free will until you restore the modal fallacy, or beg the question with a ludicrous definition of free will (I saw one guy who literally defined a free will choice as "unpredictable" by definition!).

[Morpheus]

this is quite an interesting discussion, indeed.

though i just did a cursory read-through, it seems to me that the sticking point is what a "possible world" is.

what john seems to be saying is that if god accurately foreknows the future, all other possible worlds with regard to that future no longer exist, because they have no chance of becoming actualized.

captain ochre, if i'm not mistaken, is saying that the fact that some possible world has no chance of becoming actualized does not lead to the negation of said possible world as a possible world.

so i guess, from my perspective, that a definition of "possible world" is necessary. if a "possible world" does not necessarily entail a chance of that possible world becoming actualized, then i think it is clear that captain ochre is correct. if not, then i think john may have an argument.

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 06:03 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=105263#post105263)
Morpheus:

this is quite an interesting discussion, indeed.

though i just did a cursory read-through, it seems to me that the sticking point is what a &quot;possible world&quot; is.

what john seems to be saying is that if god accurately foreknows the future, all other possible worlds with regard to that future no longer exist, because they have no chance of becoming actualized.


Right (if I may presume to speak for John). And, as I've mentioned above, regardless of the existence of free will or foreknowledge we know that all but one option for every choice cannot be made actual based on the very definition of choice. Choice is either/or, not both/and.


captain ochre, if i'm not mistaken, is saying that the fact that some possible world has no chance of becoming actualized does not lead to the negation of said possible world as a possible world.


Correct again, though I should be quick to point out that if there is a reason aside from the either/or nature of choice as to why a given option isn't viable as a possible world (such as my choice to burrow underground using my ability to breathe sand), then we have a legitimate reason to say that there is no room for free will. What I am striving to bring to light is the difference between my ability to drink Pepsi (which has been demonstrated--you can take my word for it) rather than Coke--even though (for purposes of our example) I drank Coke instead--and the vacuous denial of freedom based on the mere actuality of the choice (if A is chosen then it is impossible to choose ~A at the same time and in the same sense). The latter is the case in all possible worlds and is thus an illegitimate vehicle for a claim that foreknowledge and free will are incompatible with one another.
Instead, it's an argument against a straw man version of free will (though John doesn't do this intentionally and would no doubt deny it at this point).


so i guess, from my perspective, that a definition of &quot;possible world&quot; is necessary. if a &quot;possible world&quot; does not necessarily entail a chance of that possible world becoming actualized, then i think it is clear that captain ochre is correct. if not, then i think john may have an argument.

It isn't that mere possibility permits free will (see my silica-based respiratory system, above), it's that the "physically possible" options necessary to free will reside in the realm of possibility rather than that of actuality, the latter of which is where John's argument appears to locate them.
You've brought up an additional problem with your last comment, Morpheus. What does it mean for an option to have a "chance" of being actual? John sees no problem with doing naturalistic "experiments" to discern certain issues in the debate and this seemingly accords with your mention of "chance", but as I point out above, there is absolutely no way to repeat a given decision without invoking some form of multiverse. A multiverse seemingly would permit contradictions without contadiction, since A and ~A could be true at the same time and in the same sense (only in different but otherwise identical universes).
The multiverse is better left alone for purposes of this discussion. Having a "chance" to do something within our context must simply mean that a free will agent acted as the cause of its own decision and could have done otherwise (all other things--those not touching the actuality of the event in question--being the same) in a possible world.

[Morpheus]

to captain ochre.

Right (if I may presume to speak for John). And, as I've mentioned above, regardless of the existence of free will or foreknowledge we know that all but one option for every choice cannot be made actual based on the very definition of choice. Choice is either/or, not both/and.

ah, i see. so you're saying that regardless of whether foreknowledge exists or not, before a choice is made there exist possible worlds that cannot be actualized, since only one possible world can be chosen. this is true even if there is no being that knows what choice will be made, so it does not pose a logical quandary for the co-existence of foreknowledge and a proper conceptualization of free will. is this correct?

Correct again, though I should be quick to point out that if there is a reason aside from the either/or nature of choice as to why a given option isn't viable as a possible world (such as my choice to burrow underground using my ability to breathe sand), then we have a legitimate reason to say that there is no room for free will. What I am striving to bring to light is the difference between my ability to drink Pepsi (which has been demonstrated--you can take my word for it) rather than Coke--even though (for purposes of our example) I drank Coke instead--and the vacuous denial of freedom based on the mere actuality of the choice (if A is chosen then it is impossible to choose ~A at the same time and in the same sense). The latter is the case in all possible worlds and is thus an illegitimate vehicle for a claim that foreknowledge and free will are incompatible with one another.

yes, i understand your view, and at this point i must say that i agree. i've never thought about the free will/foreknowledge issue in this sense.

It isn't that mere possibility permits free will (see my silica-based respiratory system, above), it's that the "physically possible" options necessary to free will reside in the realm of possibility rather than that of actuality, the latter of which is where John's argument appears to locate them.

agreed.

You've brought up an additional problem with your last comment, Morpheus. What does it mean for an option to have a "chance" of being actual? John sees no problem with doing naturalistic "experiments" to discern certain issues in the debate and this seemingly accords with your mention of "chance", but as I point out above, there is absolutely no way to repeat a given decision without invoking some form of multiverse. A multiverse seemingly would permit contradictions without contadiction, since A and ~A could be true at the same time and in the same sense (only in different but otherwise identical universes).
The multiverse is better left alone for purposes of this discussion. Having a "chance" to do something within our context must simply mean that a free will agent acted as the cause of its own decision and could have done otherwise (all other things--those not touching the actuality of the event in question--being the same) in a possible world.

i see your point. what i meant by an option having the "chance" of being actual was that it is not logically impossible for that option to be actualized. but it is surely the case that we don't have the ability to discern if such a chance exists for any given decision (without getting into the multiverse issue).

i will be keeping tabs on this discussion to see how it plays out.

[Morpheus]

i have been thinking some more on this issue. consider two times, a T1 and a time in the future relative to T1 - what i will call T2. suppose that there is a choice i make a T2 and that, for purposes of discussion, there is no god who foreknows what i will choose. now, using the example captain ochre brought up above, let's say my choice at T2 is between coke and pepsi. at T2, let's suppose that i choose coke. now, if one looks back into the past at T1, it is the case that, at T1, the statement "i will choose coke at T2" is true. even if i don't know it or if there is no omnigod to know it, this statement is true. but the fact that such a statement is true does not negate the free will of the decision at T2, as i'm sure both captain ochre and john powell would agree. all that is required for the existence of free will is a possible world in which i choose pepsi, and this possible world can exist in my scenario even if it is definitively true at T1 (despite no one knowing) that i will choose coke at T2. so i don't see how positing a god who simply knows at T1 that "i will choose coke at T2" presents a problem for free will. the existence of the possible world necessary for a proper conceptualization of free will is not altered by someone knowing the truth value of the statement at T1.

but i think this is what captain ochre has pretty much been arguing all along, so i don't want to steal his thunder. i just wanted to type out my current personal thoughts on the issue.

[John Powell]

Morpheus:
i have been thinking some more on this issue.


POWELL:
Welcome Morpheus! :cheers:

I was hoping you'd support my side, but I guess I'll have to be satisfied with a different perspective helping me to see yours and Capn Ochre's side.

MORPHEUS:
consider two times, a T1 and a time in the future relative to T1 - what i will call T2. suppose that there is a choice i make a T2 and that, for purposes of discussion, there is no god who foreknows what i will choose. now, using the example captain ochre brought up above, let's say my choice at T2 is between coke and pepsi. at T2, let's suppose that i choose coke. now, if one looks back into the past at T1, it is the case that, at T1, the statement "i will choose coke at T2" is true. even if i don't know it or if there is no omnigod to know it, this statement is true. but the fact that such a statement is true does not negate the free will of the decision at T2, as i'm sure both captain ochre and john powell would agree.


POWELL:
Your certainty towards me was misplaced.

If the statement "I will drink Coke" is known to be true before the action then I would argue that you have no free will to do otherwise. The statement can be known to be true only if it was impossible for you to do otherwise. Someone could predict that's what you will do and could be right sometimes, but they couldn't know what you would do if you had free will. That's my position. Capn Ochre disagrees.

What if you were told in the morning by an entity G, who some claim has foreknowledge, that the statement "Morpheus will drink Coke at noon today" is true? Could you avoid that by either drinking nothing at noon or something else or would you drink Coke at noon despite any efforts to do otherwise? If "no, you couldn't avoid that" then you don't have free will concerning that decision and G either has foreknowledge or the power to compel or something like that. If "yes, you could avoid that" then G did not have foreknowledge on that and you might have free will.

MORPHEUS:
all that is required for the existence of free will is a possible world in which i choose pepsi, and this possible world can exist in my scenario even if it is definitively true at T1 (despite no one knowing) that i will choose coke at T2. so i don't see how positing a god who simply knows at T1 that "i will choose coke at T2" presents a problem for free will. the existence of the possible world necessary for a proper conceptualization of free will is not altered by someone knowing the truth value of the statement at T1.


POWELL:
I do see a problem with that compatibility, but you and Capn Ochre apparently don't. Capn Ochre, and probably soon you, see problems in my position.

MORPHEUS:
but i think this is what captain ochre has pretty much been arguing all along, so i don't want to steal his thunder. i just wanted to type out my current personal thoughts on the issue.

POWELL:
They are helpful.

In an earlier post:

CAPN OCHRE:
Right (if I may presume to speak for John). And, as I've mentioned above, regardless of the existence of free will or foreknowledge we know that all but one option for every choice cannot be made actual based on the very definition of choice. Choice is either/or, not both/and. ”

MORPHEUS:
ah, i see. so you're saying that regardless of whether foreknowledge exists or not, before a choice is made there exist possible worlds that cannot be actualized, since only one possible world can be chosen. this is true even if there is no being that knows what choice will be made, so it does not pose a logical quandary for the co-existence of foreknowledge and a proper conceptualization of free will. is this correct?


POWELL:
I don't like this idea that "there exist possible worlds that cannot" I would add (it is impossible that they) "be actualized."

In other words, I don't like the idea that there are possible worlds that are impossible.

John Powell

[John Powell]

POWELL:
Using your methodology I should not argue in favor of the speed of light limitation because it's logically possible to travel faster than the speed of light.

CAPN OCHRE:
No, that's a straw man. I am not arguing that mere possibility allows freedom, but that the prerequisite for freedom is within that realm.

My initial response to Morpheus in the same thread (composed prior to this message) should make that clear.


POWELL:
Perhaps it is a straw man, but I'm not sure.

Is it logically possible, Capn Ochre, for a material object to travel faster than the speed of light in a vacuum? Is it logically possible for there to occur violations of the laws of nature (eg., conservation of mass-energy, conservation of momentum, etc.)? For example, is it logically possible to push on an object with a greater force than it pushes back (i.e., violate Newton's Third Law of Motion)? Are "miracles" (meaning, in this sense, violations of the laws of nature) logically possible?

I'm thinking you should agree with me that all of these are logically possible. Where we might disagree is whether these things are physically possible or, where physically possible, sufficiently probable to warrant serious consideration.

One of the problems I'm seeing is that anything is or is not logically possible if you define it appropriately. For example, if we agree that, by definition, X cannot occur then X cannot occur even if X could logically occur by the older meanings of the words.

What is "really" possible therefore, probably should be what is physically possible, not what is logically (i.e., semantically) possible.

POWELL:
Here's one solution. I can merely define foreknowledge and free will to be incompatible (which is what I think is essentially the case already). I can do that and you cannot justifiably refute my argument using my definitions.

CAPN OCHRE:
Sure I could.


POWELL:
Not by using my definitions, but by using my methodology of framing definitions.

CAPN OCHRE:
I could use your own technique against you, pitting my own definition of free will against yours. Rather pointless, don't you think?

POWELL:
You would have to propose your own definitions or something like that.

CAPN OCHRE:
Hence the desirability of an agreed-upon definition. Yours, I submit, is out-of-step with the customary definitions. Your definition of free will is easily shown to be an impossibility, which I have already accomplished (afaics).


POWELL:
Actually, I'm thinking that the usual definitions make foreknowledge and free will incompatible. My rewriting of the definitions is partly an effort to more clearly show this.

POWELL:
How does one judge whether what philosophers argue about in their hypothetical worlds is true in the actual world or not, whether their definitions are useful in the real world? BY DOING PHYSICAL EXPERIMENTS.

CAPN OCHRE:
Oh? So a perfect circle is truly an impossibity? I vehemently disagree.


POWELL:
Given the "known" nature of particles that would compose such a thing, it appears to me that one can't make a perfect a circle in our natural universe. Could you propose a reasonable method to do this?

CAPN OCHRE:
Science sans logic doesn't tell you what is or isn't logically possible, it merely arranges observations into probabilities and descriptive "laws" that allow useful predictions.

Your introduction of methodological naturalism to the discussion is completely misguided, imo.


POWELL:
I'm new to the philosophy of science, so false starts should not be surprising.

Science sans logic isn't science. It would be like science sans other essential features such as numerical quantities or experiments or observations or language.

POWELL:
Otherwise, you can't really have much confidence in what they claim.

CAPN OCHRE:
Fine, then we can also conclude that we cannot travel to distant suns because observation tells us that such travel doesn't happen at the macroscopic level (in terms of descriptive law).


POWELL:
Yes, there could be problems here if I overdo it. I agree that it's logically possible to travel to distant suns, but I personally don't think we or any aliens do it because of the difficulties.

Perhaps our disagreement is whether it is sufficiently probable to warrant serious consideration the possibility that an entity knows the future, but at the same time we still have free will. I've been thinking this is incompatible, but it is perhaps possible, but so improbable as to not warrant serious consideration, that someone has free will to choose other than what God predicts, but just no one ever does so.

Consider a simpler example.

If J tosses a normal coin a bunch of times, is it possible that every time he does so the coin comes up heads?

Is it logically possible? I think yes.

Is it physically possible? I also think yes.

Is it sufficiently probable to seriously consider that it is the correct explanation for the phenomenon, rather than the much more likely explanation that the process is not random, that either something is not normal about the coin or the tossing or something like that? I think the process is probably not random.

Now, consider my third stage scenario. How likely is it that every time G predicts that J will choose A that J chooses A even having been given a strong incentive to choose B? I think if J has free will it's very unlikely he will choose A. Perhaps it is logically possible and physically possible, but it's so unlikely as to not warrant serious consideration as the correct explanation. A much more likely explanation is that G is forcing J to choose B or something like that.

POWELL:
Without such experiments, it mostly depends on what definitions and rules of logic you accept.

CAPN OCHRE:
Okay, and note that I do not accept your definition of free will, and that I have given a rationale for dismissing it.


POWELL:
Fine. I guess we need to come to some agreement on definitions.

POWELL:
So, you think foreknowledge and free will are compatible. Let's do some BIBLICAL experiments and one hypothetical PHYSICAL experiment.

Here's the Biblical experiment: In the Bible when God said X will happen, did X always happen?

Consider the case of the naming of the Messiah. Was it "Immanuel" like God said the virgin would make it or was it "Jesus" like the virgin was later commanded to make it? You have never resolved this in this thread as far as I can remember.

CAPN OCHRE:
We don't know based on the text whether or not the immediate fulfillment of the prophecy (found in Isaiah Ch. 7) was fulfilled, otoh we have no particular reason to doubt its fulfillment.


POWELL:
Probably the fulfillment was during the days of Isaiah.

CAPN OCHRE:
Regarding the secondary (yet greater) fulfillment in the life of Christ, the mere ideas that Jesus was virgin-born and recognized by the Gospel writers as truly and completely divine in nature fulfills the prophecy in accordance with the NT references to Isaiah.


POWELL:
I'm trying to focus on the issue of what God predicted the name of the virgin's firstborn Son would be called and what the virgin actually called His name, not on whether Jesus was "God with us."

POWELL:
This is surprisingly similar to my scenario. Mary is ordered to call him "Jesus," but God wrote down in Isaiah that she would name him "Immanuel." So, which did Mary do? You know the answer already.

CAPN OCHRE:
Where, exactly, was Mary told to call her son "Immanuel" per se?


POWELL:
Mary wasn't told to call him "Immanuel," but to call him "Jesus." Nevertheless, apparently God predicted through Isaiah that she would call his name "Immanuel."

My argument is that the Bible appears to say that God predicted that the virgin would call her firstborn son "Immanuel," but she was ordered by God's messenger to call her firstborn son "Jesus." She did what she was ordered, rather than what was predicted.

My scenario is similar in that it has God predicting that J will choose A, but God orders J to choose B. To be like Mary's case, J would pick B despite what God predicted that J would choose.

In both of these cases there is free will, not foreknowledge.

POWELL:
Assuming the essential elements of the story are true, I would say it's because Mary had free will to obey God's command and God was only guessing what Mary would do, He didn't foreknow it. How would you explain it?

CAPN OCHRE:
I'd explain it by reading the text with respect to its context: The Isaiah passage is a prophecy regarding OT events in its own right.


POWELL:
Right.

CAPN OCHRE:
The NT authors saw parallels interwoven into the OT text which illuminated their contemporary experience of Jesus. The passage in Isaiah, afaics, was not intended to communicate a truth about the Son prior to the Incarnation, but (as the gospel writers saw it--and I agree) to show the harmony of the Gospel with the established vehicle of revelation (the OT documents).


POWELL:
Are you then saying, Capn Ochre, that the Isaiah passage is not a prediction that the virgin Mary would call her Son Immanuel?

POWELL:
Consider the case of David and Saul. Was David and his men turned over to Saul like God said will happen?

CAPN OCHRE:
Reading 2 Samuel 23 in its context, it appears to me that David is asking God what the intent of the men of Keilah is toward him, rather than asking for a reading of the future.

Your interpretation seems to be influenced by a desire to find your pet contradiction, imo.


POWELL:
I concede that there is some of that influencing me here, but I don't think that invalidates my argument. The validity of an argument is not supposed to be dependent on the biases of the presentor. However, whether one is persuaded by an argument should be somewhat dependent on the apparent biases of the presentor.

I don't remember what I thought when I read this passage as a believing Mormon, but I suspect that I interpreted it something like you are. Nevertheless, I'm not now as willing to give the Bible the leeway for "harmonizing" interpretations in passages like this that you are (and I formerly was) willing to give it. I'm much less willing now to sweep big problems with the scriptures under the rug hoping they're only insignificant problems.

The simplest reading of the passage suggests that David outsmarted God. David asked God what the men of Keilah will do and what Saul will do. To display His wisdom, I think God should have indicated that the prediction was contingent on what David might do or refuse to answer until David asked the right question, but that's not what the Bible writer appears to mean. God merely told David what will happen, period.

If you're going to allow God this kind of assumed contingency when He gives a prophecy, Capn Ochre, why not elsewhere? If a holy man asks God when Jesus returns and God says "On the vernal equinox of 2050 A.D." with no caveats and that day passes uneventfully, should that man be satisfied with God answering his follow up question of "what happened?" with "My prediction was contingent on some things that turned out differently." To many believers, regardless of how imperfect God might appear to be, God is perfect.

So, Capn Ochre, are Biblical prophecies contingent on what mortals do? In other words, can mortals cause Biblical prophecies to fail to be fulfilled when no contingency on their actions is expressed or clearly implied in the prophecy?

POWELL:
Also, did Saul come down like God said will happen?

CAPN OCHRE:
Did God say that it was true that Saul would actually come to Keilah in pursuit of David?


POWELL:
I would say "yes." I don't think God should be interpreted to be implying here "It is possible that this will happen, but it won't be what actually happens because you will leave when I tell you this."

1 Sam 23:11-12 (KJV):
11 Will the men of Keilah deliver me up into his hand? will Saul come down, as thy servant hath heard? O LORD God of Israel, I beseech thee, tell thy servant. And the LORD said, He will come down.

12 Then said David, Will the men of Keilah deliver me and my men into the hand of Saul? And the LORD said, They will deliver thee up.

POWELL:
The Bible did not say "He will come down UNLESS YOU . . ." or "They will deliver thee up IF YOU . . ." Nor do I think it means "It is possible He will come down and that they will deliver thee up, but this won't actually happen because you will leave after I tell you this." Is any of this what you think the Bible meant?

CAPN OCHRE:
Again, in the full context of the passage, the questions David asks of God amount to: "Am I safe here?" God answers "no" in effect, so David leaves.


POWELL:
Since David was not speaking directly to God, but using the ephod, which I guess could only give yes / no answers, I think God should not have caused the ephod to answer either yes or no until David asked the right question, such as "Should I leave?" or "Am I safe to stay here?"

POWELL:
The physical experiment, of course, is my scenario, specifically stage 3.

CAPN OCHRE:
Your third stage is ludicrous. In term of our OT example, it's like God advising David like so: "Whatever you do, do the opposite."


POWELL:
Not quite. It's more like "I predict that Saul will come down and the men of Keilah will deliver you and your men to Saul, but I command that you leave so this doesn't happen." We then watch to see if David does what God predicted he would do or if David does what God ordered him to do.

POWELL:
If your philosophical ideas are true, Capn Ochre, then they should CORRECTLY predict the outcome of these cases. Do they?

CAPN OCHRE:
I think that you're misapplying the texts.


POWELL:
Perhaps I am.

John Powell

[John Powell]

POWELL:
I snipped a lot. I should read this a few more times, but I'm in a hurry.

POWELL:
I don't see that. I'm not saying that J of the scenario exists or that G exists or that Satan exists. It's all hypothetical, Capn Ochre. It's all possible at most. None of it is actual.

CAPN OCHRE:
It's all actual for the sake of argument.


POWELL:
I don't think so. I think it's assumed to be possible, i.e., possibly actual, for the sake of argument even if it weren't really possible.

A possible world to me means a world that is possibly actual. If it cannot be actual, i.e., if it is impossible that it be actual, then it is not a possible world.

CAPN OCHRE:
If A is true, is it true because A is true?
:wink:


POWELL:
Using one of the normal meanings of the word "because," yes. The answer to a highly open ended question "why?" can include the equally open ended word "because."

CAPN OCHRE:
Thus, since only one option is possible, I do not have free will (if a free will choice is between two possible options).


POWELL:
You have two options.

Option 1: press the button.
Option 2: don't press the button.

You don't have logically incompatible option three.
Option 3: both press and don't press the button in the same sense at the same time.

CAPN OCHRE:
What you still don't seem to have grasped is that your logic is identical to my silly argument above, except that yours is dressed up with temporal niceties. Did you notice that I have no need to invoke foreknowledge to make essentially the same argument that you make?


POWELL:
The arguments look more similar to you than they do to me.

I concede that you do not have free will to both press and not press the button at the same time in the same sense because these two are logically incompatible. But then I argue that if it is known that you will press the button at noon then you don't have free will to not press the button at noon. You think that foreknowledge is not a problem for free will.

POWELL:
In the world / situation in which it is NOT logically possible for ~A to be chosen, IN THAT WORLD it is not logically possible for ~A to be chosen, right?

CAPN OCHRE:
Here, you're using "logically possible" to denote "actual".


POWELL:
I didn't mean to. "Possible" here should mean "possibly actual." To me the actual world is the one we live in.

CAPN OCHRE:
In the actual world, the non-actual is "impossible" in the sense that it cannot be actual (since being both actual and non-actual in the same time and in the same sense would be absurd).

So, no, not right. In all actual worlds, the set of possible worlds is identical. Or perhaps it would be better to say that the set of possible worlds doesn't give two flips for the set consisting of the actual world. That which is actual does not limit the set of possible worlds in any manner at all.


POWELL:
We're having problems with "actual" vs. "possible." To me it makes sense to think of a possible world as one that is possible to be actual. If there is an actual world then one could think of a possible world as one that might have been actual if there weren't an actual.

CAPN OCHRE:
The basic premise of free will is that actual world at T1 could be either actual world A or actual world B at T2, based on the uncoerced decision of a free agent. Your argument does not touch that concept of free will at all.


POWELL:
We agree somewhat here. If it is not known which will be actual, then at T1 it is possible that the actual world at T2 will be A and it is possible that the actual world at T2 will be B. We disagree when it is known at T1 that the actual world will be (or is) A. At that point I argue that world B is no longer a possibility, it can no longer possibly be actual in the set of possible worlds we're discussing.

CAPN OCHRE:
Again, we know that actual worlds A and B cannot both be actual (since that's a contradiction), so one of the actual worlds is "impossible" in the sense that it will not be actual.


POWELL:
Both together can't be actual, but they are each possibly actual individually.

CAPN OCHRE:
Despite this, all options not taken (where the option was real and not bogus) are/were/will be possible in the sense of being options that were not/are not/will not be actual but were/are/will be possible in the exact sense required for freedom of the will to exist (using a reasonable definition of free will, as above).


POWELL:
Yes, provided it was not foreknown which option is, was, or will be taken.

I've conceded several times already that there is a logical loophole. Suppose G predicts that J will choose A over and over again and J voluntarily chooses A every single time despite strong incentive to do otherwise? This case does not appear to present a logical contradiction, but I still think G cannot know J will choose A, despite his hitherto flawless predicting. If J really has free will then he might choose to do other than what G predicted, so G could not really know what J would do, but could only predict it.

CAPN OCHRE:
It's not possible to choose other than what is actually chosen, is it?

POWELL:
Correct. You cannot logically change what you did, are doing, or will do. I don't think this is a problem for free will provided know one knows what you will do. You can logically change what you might have done, might be doing, and might will do.

CAPN OCHRE:
How do you define free will for purposes of your example?


POWELL:
The same as before.

CAPN OCHRE:
Given any choice between two or more options, it is possible to only choose one while the rest are impossible (since you cannot choose other than the actual choice).


POWELL:
It's impossible to choose more than one of several logically incompatible options. It's impossible to choose any of the rest either when you choose one or when it is foreknown which one you will choose. Otherwise, those other options are possible provided they aren't logically incompatible (such as both pressing and not pressing the button in the same sense at the same time).

CAPN OCHRE:
I demand that you define free will such that the above absurdity is remedied.


POWELL:
I don't see my definition or the usual definitions having a problem with this.

POWELL:
One is justified in claiming that it is the case that "G foreknows J will choose A" ONLY IF, given that claim to foreknowledge, J cannot choose ~A.

CAPN OCHRE:
The modal fallacy is trying to stick its ugly head in the door again.


POWELL:
I meant ". . . J cannot choose ~A in that same world."

CAPN OCHRE:
What does "cannot" mean? That one of the two "possible" options is "impossible" (just as in my example above where foreknowledge is neither mentioned nor a factor)?


POWELL:
I think so, yes.

CAPN OCHRE:
You can only mean that the actual cannot be otherwise. The connotation of "cannot" that hints to us that one of the options was never possible (in the sense that would have allowed for free will) does not belong.


POWELL:
I think it does belong.

POWELL:
Because if J CAN choose ~A then sometimes he might choose ~A, especially if he is well motivated to do so. But, if J can't choose ~A then J does not have free will.

CAPN OCHRE:
Non sequitur. How many actual worlds are there, again? One? So, how are you going to test the same decision over and again to see if it comes out differently? Oh, it's impossible to do so unless there is more than one actual world? You don't say!


POWELL:
There is only one actual world, the one you and I exist in. There are many possible worlds = possibly actual worlds or worlds assumed to be actual for the sake of argument.

One good way to test someone's claim to foreknowledge is to ask him what you will do and then try to do otherwise. If you succeed at doing otherwise then he could not have had foreknowledge. If you don't succeed then he might have foreknowledge, but he might also have great power to compel.

POWELL:
You seem to think there's no problem because under the bizarre situation that J has free will and is well motivated to choose ~A, he nevertheless chooses A, time after time after time.

CAPN OCHRE:
Baloney. I think that there's no problem because the third stage is absurd for reasons that I have already described in some detail. You do me a disservice to hint otherwise, imo.


POWELL:
Uh oh. I seem to have misrepresented you.

If God writes down over and over again that J will choose A and gives the note each time to J, but J is well motivated to choose ~A, say by God commanding that J choose the opposite of what He writes down, perhaps told that each time He does the opposite He'll be given lots of blessings then do you expect J will choose A over and over again or that J will choose ~A?

CAPN OCHRE:
The bizarre aspect of the scenario is that the foreknowledge of the pseudoJaltus decision is apparently blind to the context of the scenario. The foreknowledge seemingly informs God that Jaltus will choose A, but the circumstances (that is, the motivation to choose ~A) are unknown. The fact is that the scenario is unbelievable whether foreknowledge exists or not. People choose what they are motivated to choose, in our experience. In effect, the scenario asks PseudoJaltus to choose what he doesn't wish to choose, which is absurd in all possible worlds.

I had asked Kyle Gerkin (in a separate thread) whether or not is it possible for a person decide something that he doesn't want to decide (iow to take the option that he doesn't want). If free will exists, then I would say that it is mandatory that one chooses what one wishes to choose. Your third stage, John, plays to the absurdity of supposing that one could choose other than what one wants to choose.


POWELL:
Perhaps you are assuming that in order for it to be believable that God writes down that J will choose A then there must be a compelling reason that J chooses A. However, to bring out my argument, my scenario gives good reasons to do the exact opposite. Consequently, you call my Jaltus an unbelievable pseudoJaltus who chooses against what God wrote down.

POWELL:
There is no LOGICAL problem, perhaps, but there's the practical problem that REAL people instead of the strange ones you're apparently thinking about won't reasonably do that. J will probably choose ~A when G claims that J will choose A. It's as simple as that. You're right that it's logically possible that J chooses A, but it's not reasonably possible. If we were to perform this experiment in the ACTUAL world and I were J, I could show you how easy it is to prove G wrong.

CAPN OCHRE:
Not without offending the premisses of the argument, you couldn't.


POWELL:
Well sure, it would offend if the premise is that both God has foreknowledge and I have free will.

CAPN OCHRE:
Since our foreknowledge-endowed being is accepted (for the sake of argument) as knowing the future based on actuality, your actually talking about choosing both A and ~A at the same time. I cannot choose Pepsi, having chosen Coke at moment M. Therefore, no free will?


POWELL:
No free will to change what you did, do, or will do, but yes free will to change what you might will do.

CAPN OCHRE:
You say if J cannot choose ~A then J does not have free will to choose ~A, but I knew before I chose Coke that I could not choose both Coke and Pepsi at the same time and in the same sense. One of the options was "impossible" before I ever chose, even if foreknowledge is impossible.


POWELL:
The option to do both at the same time in the same sense was always logically impossible. To choose Pepsi was not impossible until you chose Coke or it was foreknown that you would choose Coke.

POWELL:
I think I'm understanding better why and where we disagree.

CAPN OCHRE:
I look forward to the convincing evidence that you are correct in your impression.


POWELL:
I see.

CAPN OCHRE:
It not the logical vs. physical but the fact that "possible" has changed in meaning. If something is logically possible (perfect circles) then mustn't we accept that a perfect circle is physically possible, just as we accept that it is impossible for a human being to leap over the Empire State Building even while we know that it isn't actually a logical impossibility?


POWELL:
I thought the distinction between logical and physical possibility was a useful one.

CAPN OCHRE:
If it is true that pseudoJaltus chooses A, then pseudoJaltus will choose A--there's no question (to make it clear that I am answering your question: Does q HAVE TO BE true? I think you should say NO to be consistent with what you've said before.

If all fish are dead, then fish are extinct.
All fish are dead.
Therefore, fish are extinct.

It is logically possible that fish are not extinct, and if the premisses are true, then fish are certainly extinct. IOW, there are possible worlds where fish are not extinct.)


POWELL:
I concede that in worlds in which premise 1 and 2 are not true that fish might not be extinct.

However, in the world in which it is true that "if all fish are dead then fish are extinct" and it is true that "all fish are dead" in that world is it possible that fish are NOT extinct?

CAPN OCHRE:
Your argument flops because it fails to maintain consistency in dealing with what is possible, again touching your problem in arriving at an acceptable definition of free will.

Here's the reduction to absurdity again:

If Bill chooses Coke, then he cannot choose Pepsi.
Bill chooses Coke
Therefore,
Bill cannot choose Pepsi.

If Bill cannot choose Pepsi, then he has no free will in the scenario above, no?


POWELL:
In the world / situation in which it is true that "If Bill chooses Coke then he cannot choose Pepsi" and it is true that "Bill chooses Coke" then in that world it must be true cannot be false that "Bill cannot choose Pepsi." I would say that in that world Bill does not have free will to choose Pepsi. Now, here's one for you.

If God has foreknowledge then we do not have free will.
God has foreknowledge.
Therefore,
We do not have free will.

Do we have free will in the world in which the two premises above are true?

POWELL:
The actual is the way it is. Things cannot be other than the way they are. Things could be different from the way they MIGHT be.

In the world that it is the case "A" then IN THAT WORLD "~A" is not logically possible.

CAPN OCHRE:
Suddenly "not logically possible" means not actual. Only this isn't the first time.


POWELL:
What I mean is something like not logically possible of being actual.

POWELL:
Ok, let me write it out in long English.

If it were the case that "G foreknows J will choose A" then it would be the case that "J will choose A" and it would be the case that "J cannot choose ~A"

CAPN OCHRE:
(okay so far . . .)

POWELL:
If it were the case that "J has free will to choose A or ~A" then it would be the case that "J CAN choose ~A"

CAPN OCHRE:
Nope. "CAN" and "cannot" don't mean anywhere near the same thing (apart from their opposition).


POWELL:
"Can" here means "it is possible that" and "cannot" means "it is not possible that"

CAPN OCHRE:
Apart from foreknowledge, if I choose A I cannot choose ~A, even if a chronologically subsequent possible world could contain the ~A decision. This would render free will impossible if it weren't ridiculous.

POWELL:
These two propositions contradict, however, since in the same world that "J cannot choose ~A" it is not logically possible in that same world to also be true "J can choose ~A."

CAPN OCHRE:
Incorrect, since the sense of the words has drifted. In my past, it remains possible to have chosen Pepsi rather than Coke even while it is impossible to reconcile the actual choosing of Pepsi with my actual choosing of Coke at the same time and in the same sense.


POWELL:
Ok, let me avoid "can" and use "possible". Unfortunately, you'll probably claim I'm changing the meaning of the word in the various places.

If it were the case that "G foreknows J will choose A" then it would be the case in that same world A that "J will choose A" and it would be the case in that same world A that "It is not possible that J chooses ~A."

If it were the case that "J has free will to choose A or ~A" then it would be the case in that same world A' that "It is possible that J chooses ~A."

These two propositions contradict, however, since in the world that "J cannot choose ~A" it is not logically possible in that same world to also be true "J can choose ~A." In other words, it is not possible that world A and A' are the same world.

Is that better?

POWELL:
I'm not trying to be funny, but I think I can imagine what you feel.

CAPN OCHRE:
You've admitted a modal fallacy, and you've conceded that your scenario doesn't manifest a logical problem in its third stage.

Are you able to identify my hangup, the one that amuses and irritates you?


POWELL:
I think the modal fallacy is removable. All you have to do is stay in the same world or set of worlds and not make claims about other possible worlds.

I guess I can't identify your "hangup." Will you remind me?

CAPN OCHRE:
John, I believe that your study and understanding of logical theory & language is better than mine, but otoh I think that I've worked on this particular problem more fully than you have.


POWELL:
Given our discussion, I don't see justification for any claim of superiority on my part in this regard.

CAPN OCHRE:
If I haven't played all of the angles yet, I'm getting pretty close. You're caught on your definition of what "cannot" be done (somewhere in the realm of either possibility or actuality) and on your definition of free will. When you shore up one sinking point, you leave another area to sag.

Proof is in the pudding.

POWELL:
Perhaps it's not justified because I'm testing PHYSICAL possibility and you're arguing LOGICAL possibility.

CAPN OCHRE:
Isn't "PHYSICAL possibility" the same as actuality?


POWELL:
Not in my book. It's physically possible for humans to travel between the stars, but no one is actually doing it. It's not happening in the actual world.

CAPN OCHRE:
The claim that foreknowledge is incompatible with free will is a claim touching a(n allegedly) logically impossible state of affairs (coexistence of foreknowledge and free will), is it not?


POWELL:
Yes.

CAPN OCHRE:
Is it logically possible? Faster-than-light travel creates paradoxes, does it not?


POWELL:
Yes.

One I remember is the case of sublight moving persons transmitting superlight tachyon signals. We assumed that Lorentz time and space changes occur for these sublight moving persons / transmitters, but no such changes occur for the tachyons themselves. Who knows what equations of length and time apply to superlight tachyons? Given those assumptions and if the transmitters are moving fast enough (but still sublight speed) then the mathematics suggests that the original transmitter can receive a reply to his tachyon message before he sent it. The paradox occurs because he then might decide not to send the message in the first place. If he chose to do that then how could he have received the reply to his message?

Perhaps your solution to the paradox would be for him to chose to send the message anyways.

Because of problems like this I would say that superlight speed is logically possible, but not physically possible.

CAPN OCHRE:
I won't duck the material; I'll reply to you on these points via private message, and you have permission in advance to publish my reply.


POWELL:
I've responded to those before this.

POWELL:
Because if ~A can be chosen then it cannot be the case that it is foreknown that A will be chosen.

CAPN OCHRE:
Non sequitur. Think about it, or revise your language to say what you really mean.


POWELL:
Maybe you're right, but it appears to follow to me. If ~A can be chosen then it cannot be the case in the same world that it is foreknown that A will be chosen.

POWELL:
How could it be other than what was foreknown?

CAPN OCHRE:
In the realm of possibility, rather than that of actuality.


POWELL:
I agree that if in world A it is foreknown that J will choose A then it is possible in some other world that ~A is chosen, but I would argue that it is not possible in that same world or set of worlds that foreknowledge exists that ~A is chosen.

In the actual world only female humans give birth.

Q1. Is it possible for male humans to give birth?
Q2. Is it possible in our world for male humans to give birth?

Perhaps you'll say "yes, it's possible, but not actual" because there are hypothetical worlds where men might give birth.

POWELL:
How is it possible for ~A to be chosen IN THE SAME WORLD that it is known or foreknown that A is the case?

CAPN OCHRE:
That would be the actual world you're talking about, right? Remember how you told me you weren't saying that it freedom demands choosing both A and ~A at the same time and in the same sense? How am I supposed to believe you when you type the sort of stuff you just did?


POWELL:
Maybe I'm not understanding this as well as I was thinking.

Are you saying that it's not possible for ~A to be chosen in the same world in which it is foreknown that A is chosen?

POWELL:
If ~A could be true then it could not be true that it is foreknown or known that A is the case.

CAPN OCHRE:
What does "could be true" mean? Actual, or possible? It must mean "could be actual", no? And possible is prerequisite for actuality, isn't it?


POWELL:
"Could be true" means "is possible that it is true" or "is possible that it could be actual."

CAPN OCHRE:
Your language still finds a comfortable ambiguity between possible and actual, imo. Repair the ambiguity, and your fallacy will come to light (apart from the fallacy of ambiguity, that is).


POWELL:
Perhaps.

POWELL:
Because of the meaning of the words "know" and "foreknow." You can't know something to be true that is false. If it's possible that X is false then you can't know that X is true. You can only know X is true if X is true, cannot be false.

CAPN OCHRE:
Rather, if it's actual that X is false, then you can't know that X is true (or actual).

Not that what you wrote is incorrect, I'm just illustrating how ambiguous it is with respect to our topic.


POWELL:
Hmm.

POWELL:
I think I understand the modal fallacy better than you think I do. I think my argument can avoid the problem in the same way that M.P. can avoid it.

CAPN OCHRE:
I trust that you understand the concept of the modal fallacy better than I do.


POWELL:
Maybe, maybe not.

John Powell

[Captain Ochre]

06-11-2003 @ 01:45 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=119802#post119802)
John Powell:

A possible world to me means a world that is possibly actual. If it cannot be actual, i.e., if it is impossible that it be actual, then it is not a possible world.


I removed the bits about logical premisses equating with "actual for the sake of argument". It isn't worth the word expense, imo.
I find your definition above acceptable, and further I do not think that you are consistent in its use during the course of your arguments.


POWELL:
You have two options.

Option 1: press the button.
Option 2: don't press the button.

You don't have logically incompatible option three.
Option 3: both press and don't press the button in the same sense at the same time.


Good; and just for review, the above is true in all possible worlds.
Your argument, John, is based on the contention that the actuality of either Option 1 or Option 2 makes the other option impossible. This course of argument has the effect of making free will impossible to exercise (as soon as you make a decision, that decision is the only possible option), and it is also a shift in meaning, since the supposedly "possible" option that wasn't chosen has been revealed as impossible.
The fact that one of the options was made actual does not mean that it is impossible that the other option could have been actual.


POWELL:
The arguments look more similar to you than they do to me.


I may have to "give up" on you, John. The free-form discussion doesn't seem to be getting us anywhere. Perhaps you're best off setting sail a series of syllogisms to send up on the rocks of logic.
Pardon the gloomy word-picture that I painted for you. :wink:


I concede that you do not have free will to both press and not press the button at the same time in the same sense because these two are logically incompatible. But then I argue that if it is known that you will press the button at noon then you don't have free will to not press the button at noon.


Yes, I had noticed that.
:smile:


You think that foreknowledge is not a problem for free will.


Correct, and I think that I can find a flaw in any syllogism fashioned to support the opposite conclusion, provided it is presented in language that I understand.


POWELL:
I didn't mean to. &quot;Possible&quot; here should mean &quot;possibly actual.&quot; To me the actual world is the one we live in.


Did you ever get around to pointing out an exercise of free will in our actual world? I don't recall it, at the moment.


POWELL:
We're having problems with &quot;actual&quot; vs. &quot;possible.&quot; To me it makes sense to think of a possible world as one that is possible to be actual. If there is an actual world then one could think of a possible world as one that might have been actual if there weren't an actual.


That's an excellent definition, imo. Again, I don't think that you stick to it.
Returning to my Pepsi vs. Coke illustration, having actually consumed Coke, is it thereby impossible that I could have downed some Pepsi instead? Why isn't the Pepsi-drinking past a possible world?


POWELL:
We agree somewhat here. If it is not known which will be actual, then at T1 it is possible that the actual world at T2 will be A and it is possible that the actual world at T2 will be B.


You immediately start using language loosely (by which method you hide your error from yourself):
If it is not known which will be actual, then at T1 it is possible that the actual world at T2 will be A or it is possible that the actual world at T2 will be B.
That's the nitpick, illustrating the a priori impossibility of both options at the same time a