yxboom
January 27th 2004, 11:51 AM
BEYOND KANT AND HEGEL – Towards the End of a Possible Science of Metaphysics– A response to Kant's question: "How are synthetic cognitions a priori possible?"
by Ray Liikanen
The common notion abounds that human reason cannot resolve such questions as those voiced by Immanuel Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason, namely, the so called cosmological problems, or the antinomy. As for metaphysics, the discipline that aims itself at such problems, the book has been closed. This is what the vast majority of philosophers of every description believe. They will even cite the many unfavourable statements made by Kant towards metaphysics, and point to Kant as the destroyer of this deceptive beast; for instance: "High towers and metaphysically great men resembling them, round both of which there is commonly much wind, are not for me. My place is the fruitful bathos of experience...."1
For philosophical apologists, it is the prevailing opinion among most philosophers, and most notably Kantians, that the instrument of reason that they employ towards the defense of their faith, has long ago been overthrown by Kant as an effective instrument towards this end. After his critical investigations Kant himself could only remark: "I had therefore to remove knowledge, in order to make room for belief." 2
And while Kant blocked off the possibility of a purely philosophical defense of faith grounded upon reason, the philosopher who woke him from his dogmatic slumber, David Hume, blocked off the possibility of practical philosophical apologetics by showing that the argument from design was invalid. All apologetics apart from metaphysics, must ultimately rest upon this argument; but if we cannot, as Hume argues, take anything from this world as a demonstrable proof in the existence of a transcendent being, then what remains?
From a strictly critical, purely philosophical perspective, there is but one possibility that Kant leaves open, and this is the possibility of what he calls a science of metaphysics. Kant repeatedly uses the term science, as in: "The question whether a science be possible presupposes a doubt as to its actuality…." and "the independent reader of these Prolegomena will not only doubt his previous science, but ultimately be fully persuaded that it cannot exist unless the demands here stated on which its possibility depends be satisfied…"3
Kant's use of the term science however must seem an abuse of the term to anyone objecting to metaphysics on the grounds that by its nature metaphysics defies any empirical basis. But is Kant guilty of abusing the term science? To understand how Kant justifies and qualifies his use of the term science one needs to look at the context in which Kant employs the term, and here Kant is clear enough in stating that he does not imply by a science, a science in the ordinary sense. He implies a certain method of reasoning through intuition and concepts towards what he calls synthetic propositions, a priori: "…the generation of a priori knowledge by intuition as well as by concepts, in fine, of synthetic propositions a priori, especially in philosophical knowledge, constitutes the essential subject of metaphysics." 4
But before one can grasp what this reasoning towards synthetic propositions a priori implies one needs to consider the obstacles that Kant sees confronting what he calls a science of metaphysics. Knowing what these obstacles are provides a strong indication as to what Kant implies by synthetic propositions a priori. These obstacles are put forth clearly in the form of the cosmological problems, or the antinomy, the first of which reads:
Thesis: The world [universe] has, as to time and space, a beginning (limit).
Antithesis: The world is, as to time and space, infinite. 5
This obstacle is critically important and Kant asks that his critical reader lend to this antinomy his chief attention. 6
As the arguments in favour of the thesis and antithesis appear equally strong Kant argues that reason confronts a dilemma from which there is no escape.
The dichotomy expressed in the thesis and antithesis is also of fundamental, critical importance to philosophical apologists, for the thesis as Kant notes, points towards the prospect of resolving the antinomy. As such, it serves the purely speculative interests of metaphysics as a possible defense of theism. But if the antithesis is correct and the world has always existed it follows that there is no need to postulate any such Idea as a Supreme Author of creation –Of the Interest of Reason in these Conflicts (for ref. See Endnotes: 330; A: 460/62 3; B: 490-491).
Seeing no hope of overcoming the very first obstacle towards a science, or even taking so much as a single step in this direction, Kant attempts to save whatever else remains of metaphysics by directing attention away from such apparently insoluble problems. He issues a directive towards the practical ends of a moral philosophy, or what he calls the purely regulative use of reason. The works that followed were thus Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786), Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), and Metaphysics of Morals (1797).
Yet the irreparable damage to metaphysics in view of the cosmological problems and its highest aims seemed accomplished.
In the thinking of those empiricists and atheists who have embraced Kant's critical philosophy and twisted it into an instrument to further their own ends, the charge is that speculative philosophers, theologians, and apologists directing their thoughts in this direction, have been caught brandishing an illegal weapon. They have been tried and they've been found guilty, and the sentence of the court (established within and by the authority of Kant's Critique) is that these workers of deception are no longer allowed to reason. The proper employment of reason can serve no end other than the promotion of a strict philosophy of empiricism with its central dogma that matter is all that exists. There is no other world than the world of our concrete, sense experience (the fruitful bathos of experience) and metaphysicians and apologists with them, pose only to undermine a proper and a true understanding of reality.
But apologists need not, without serious reflection, concede to this harsh depiction of Kant as the destroyer of metaphysics. Let us first put forth the plausible suspicion that this characterization of Kant has been adopted by empiricists, and atheists, by reason of the impenetrable wall of skepticism and even the outright cynicism that they display towards the very problems that are Kant's central concern. "These inevitable problems of pure reason itself" as Kant writes, "are, God, Freedom, and Immortality. The science which with all its apparatus is really intended for the solution of these problems, is called Metaphysic." 7
It should not strike anyone as odd then that an extremely restrictive interpretation of Kant's critical philosophy has been adopted by his empiricist and atheistic readers.
As these inevitable problems of pure reason are of fundamental importance to apologists then it seems obligatory on their part to undertake some study of Kant if only to determine whether or not Kant did indeed undermine the grounds for a possible philosophical defense of their faith, and whether or not an extremely restrictive interpretation of his critical philosophy is justified. Kant's admission to a belief only by having removed from it the pretense of knowledge is precisely opposite to the thinking and reasoning that apologists are compelled to adopt. For their sake however, and despite Kant's admission, it is possible to refute this negative stereotype of Kant for Kant himself, rather than claiming to have closed the book on metaphysics, writes: "That the human mind will ever give up metaphysical researches is as little to be expected as that we, to avoid inhaling impure air, should prefer to give up breathing altogether. There will, therefore, always be metaphysics in the world…"8 and as a clincher to anyone who thinks Kant's critical works were intended to direct philosophers away from pure speculative reason, to a purely regulative use of reason directed towards a practical, moral philosophy, or such works as Kant himself later undertook: "Mathematics, natural science, laws, arts, even morality, etc., do not completely fill the soul; there is always a space left over reserved for pure and speculative reason.…" 9 Such positive remarks towards pure speculative reason could hardly have been made by someone whose intention it was to rid the world of metaphysics.
Kant, furthermore, had little regard for a philosophy of strict empiricism despite the counter claims of many empiricists and atheists. He did not have a metaphysician standing behind him with a gun when he wrote:
…empiricism becomes often itself dogmatical with respect to ideas, and boldly denies what goes beyond the sphere of its intuitive knowledge, and thus becomes guilty itself of a want of modesty, which here is all the more reprehensible, because an irreparable injury is thereby inflicted on the practical interests of reason. 10 …the transcendental Ideas [such as the Idea of a Supreme Being] serve, if not to instruct us positively, at least to destroy the narrowing assertions of materialism, of naturalism, and of fatalism, and thus to afford scope for the moral Ideas beyond the field of speculation….11/quote]
Kant goes even much further towards the end of advancing the highest aims of metaphysics than the many opponents of metaphysics would care to admit.
Kant states that human reason is by nature architectonic (336, A: 473-477; B: 501 505), implying that human reason takes from experience such pure concepts of the understanding as causality, space, and time, and with these attempts to order the world of experience into a systematic, rational understanding. Despite the difficulties that seem to arise when reason attempts to so order its concepts the world of the mind and the world of experience are by nature mutually inclusive, rather than mutually conflicting.
Kant's critical demands, far from paving the way towards a philosophy of strict empiricism and atheism, were intended to guide metaphysicians to the end of justifying their use of their concepts by showing how they relate to, and help make sense out of reality.
Kant's critical demands, while providing no justification for a philosophy of strict empiricism however, prove extremely restrictive with regard to metaphysics, and it is this stricture against metaphysics that has led to enforce the negative stereotype of Kant as the enemy, if not the destroyer of metaphysics.
Kant declares: "But he who undertakes to judge or, still more, to construct a system of metaphysics must satisfy the demands here made, either by adopting my solution or by thoroughly refuting it and substituting another. To evade it is impossible." 12
If the intention is to advance a system of metaphysics aimed at resolving the cosmological problems, or antinomy, Kant is even more clear in announcing the critical demands that are imposed: "The world is tired of metaphysical assertions; it wants [to know] the possibility of this science, the sources from which certainty therein can be derived, and certain criteria by which it may distinguish the dialectical illusion of pure reason from truth." 13
Thus, to avoid the charge of advancing only further groundless assertions Kant asks for a priori judgments (judgments from pure reason), as opposed to a posteriori judgments (judgments grounded upon common experience). In fact, if metaphysics is to be metaphysics it cannot consist of anything but a priori judgments, for as Kant states:
[quote]Who can satisfy himself with mere empirical knowledge in all the cosmological questions…since every answer given on principles of experience begets a fresh question, which likewise requires its answer and thereby clearly shows the insufficiency of all physical modes of explanation to satisfy reason? 14
…as concerns the sources of metaphysical knowledge, its very concept implies that they cannot be empirical. Its principles (including not only its maxims but its basic notions) must never be derived from experience. It must not be physical but metaphysical knowledge, namely, knowledge lying beyond experience. It can therefore have for its basis neither external experience, which is the source of physics proper, nor internal, which is the basis of empirical psychology. It is therefore a priori knowledge, coming from pure understanding and pure reason. 15 The guiding principle towards the certainty Kant demands from those who would advance metaphysics is found in the term a priori. It is this term that Kant associates with what he calls a science of metaphysics, and this only by reason of the certainty attached to the term. The restriction that the term a priori places upon metaphysics is severe, clear, and decisive, and its fundamental importance is reflected in Kant's insistence upon an answer to the question: "How are synthetic propositions a priori possible?" 16claiming that: "Metaphysics stands or falls with the solution of this problem; its very existence depends upon it." And: "Until they have adequately answered this question metaphysicians are solemnly and legally suspended from their occupations." 17
By demanding an answer to this difficult question Kant aims not to destroy all prospects of resolving the cosmological problems, but he aims to clear the field of all systems of metaphysics not comprised of judgments, a priori. By lifting metaphysics to this higher standard Kant hopes to guard metaphysics from the kinds of assertions of which he states the world is tired.
The question, "how are synthetic cognitions a priori possible?" however, is one that no philosopher since Kant has been able to answer, though there are those who would dispute this and claim that Kant was fully answered by Hegel.
But is such a claim justifiable?
Answering this question itself may lead to a clearer understanding of what Kant implies by a science of metaphysics. The task that a science must accomplish is a daunting one. If those Hegelians who claim that Kant has been fully answered by Hegel are correct then there is one obvious critical impasse posed by Kant that Hegel would have needed to overcome. But Hegel, to be fair to Kant, would also have needed to provide somewhere in the collection of his writings a preliminary answer to Kant's question: "How are synthetic propositions a priori possible?" He would also have needed to overcome by means of such a proposition the obstacles outlined by Kant that stand on the path of a science of metaphysics.
The clearest indication as to a possible solution to Kant's question, and a premise to a science is found in Hegel's Science of Logic where Hegel states:
…in any science a beginning is made by presupposing some idea -such idea being next analyzed…Were we too to observe this procedure we should have no particular object before us, because the beginning, as being the beginning of thought, must be perfectly abstract and general, pure form quite without content; we should have nothing but the idea of a bare beginning as such…18/quote]
Thus Hegel appears to be in line with Kant's thinking: "Who can satisfy himself with mere empirical knowledge in all the cosmological questions…since every answer given on principles of experience begets a fresh question, which likewise requires its answer…"
Hegel continues:
So far, there is nothing; something is to become. The beginning is not pure nothing, but a nothing from which something is to proceed; so that being is already contained in the beginning…
Further, being and nothing are present in the beginning as distinct from one another….that which is beginning, as yet is not: it is advancing toward being. The beginning therefore contains being as having this characteristic, that it flies from and transcends not being, as its opposite. 19 And:
The expression of the absolute, the eternal, or God (and God has the most undisputed right that the beginning should be made with Him)… 20 Hegel synthesizes being with not being. He also adopts the Idea of God with respect to his premise, and while this raises a question no less difficult than the one he addresses, he at least overcomes the critical problem of beginning with an empirical condition. But there is nothing in the whole of Hegel's system that can be said to constitute an a priori judgment extended from this, as Hegel calls it, bare beginning. Hegel has not only failed to provide a clear answer to Kant's difficult question concerning synthetic cognitions a priori (for at least no such answer appears in his collected writings), but he fails to explain how anything that he claims follows from this beginning, follows necessarily. Yet this is just what Kant demands. The question for Hegelians is: "Where does Hegel offer any indication of an extended synthetic a priori proposition, as a solution to the cosmological problems?" Hegelians who claim that Kant has been fully answered by Hegel have either seriously underestimated the depth of the problem Kant was addressing; or they have misunderstood the importance of Kant's critical demands, or both.
Kant's demands are similar to those voiced by David Hume, whose own objections Kant defended.
In his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume, writing specifically about this central difficulty in metaphysics, writes:
Upon the whole, we may conclude, that it is impossible in any one instance to show the principle, in which the force and agency of a cause is placed...If any one think proper to refute this assertion, he need not put himself to the trouble of inventing any long reasonings; but may at once show us an instance of a cause, where we discover the power or operating principle....The small success, which has been met with in all the attempts to fix this power, has at last obliged philosophers to conclude, that the ultimate force and efficacy of nature is perfectly unknown to us, and that it is in vain we search for it in all the known qualities of matter.21 And Kant remarking on Hume writes: "For how is it possible, says that acute man, that when a concept is given me I can go beyond it and connect with it another which is not contained in it, in such a manner as if the latter necessarily belonged to the former?" 22
Hume and Kant both confess that they are unable to think any such necessary connection.
Hume writes in his Treatise:
We must distinctly and particularly conceive the connection between the cause and effect, and be able to pronounce, from a simple view of the one, that it must be followed or preceded by the other…Now nothing is more evident, than that the human mind cannot form such an idea of two objects, as to conceive any connection between them, or comprehend distinctly that power or efficacy, by which they are united. Such a connection would amount to a demonstration, and would imply the absolute impossibility for the one object not to follow, or to be conceived not to follow upon the other. 23 And Kant writes similarly that:
[quote]But I cannot, by all my power of thinking, extract from the concept of a thing the concept of something else whose existence is necessarily connected with the former; for this I must call in experience. And though my understanding furnishes me a priori (yet only in reference to possible experience) with the concept of such a connection (that is causation), I cannot exhibit it, like the concepts of mathematics, by intuiting it a priori, and so show its possibility a priori. 24
Where Hegel fails so also countless others fail including every philosopher who has ever advanced a system of metaphysics since Kant.
Kant demands on the part of any demonstration of a synthetic proposition or judgment a priori, in view of cosmological problems such as the first antinomy, not only ascending from the unconditioned beginning to the complete and conditioned series following from the beginning, but he demands that one demonstrate just how a causal series follows, a priori. One cannot simply ignore this critical demand for certainty and pretend to overcome it by jumping from a premise such as Hegel's beginning to the assertion that the universe therefore exists necessarily. Or to the assertion that the universe exploded into existence out of nothing through the power or the will of a Supreme Being who is postulated to exist at the very beginning. Apologists now so arguing are in this instance subject to the very same critical objection as mathematical theorists who assert that the universe may be no more than a freak quantum vacuum fluctuation.*
* With one such fluctuation taking place every 101080 years (see John Gribbon, In Search of the Big Bang, Bantam, 1986; 370). But if time did not exist before the fluctuation, as claimed, the calculation may just as well have been only one such fluctuation in an infinite number of years, or for this matter, an infinite number of such fluctuations all simultaneously in no time at all.
Groundless assertions here from both atheists and theists only go to point out the importance of Kant's critical demands. Where Kant's demands are overlooked, or thought inconsequential, then the questions that invariably follow are: If space-time and the mass of our universe expanded into existence out of nothing, then what caused this expansion? Was it an accident that just had to happen? How can you know? If it was God who caused all things to expand into existence out of nothing, then how do you explain the existence of this being whom you call God? And how can this God, whose existence you haven't even proved to me, create something out of nothing? How can you make rational sense out of these assertions that you ask me to accept? If they make no rational sense, why should I accept them?
Pleading ignorance in the face of such difficult questions will not prevent a relentless questioning mind from pressing them.
If simple assertions in metaphysics cannot be counted as rational explanations or proofs, then the only recourse left is as Kant demands, a rational explanation, and an a priori proof or account, of how one event has led necessarily to the next event –how the whole series from the unconditioned beginning, being the premise that we argue for, leads necessarily through a whole series of conditions, to the world we experience. The unconditional premise=A, must relate a priori, to a conditional series=B. A and B must be distinguished clearly and necessarily as A=infinite, and B=finite, yet the one (unconditional, infinite, or Absolute Cause) must necessarily imply the other (the conditional, finite universe). How is this to be managed, if at all possible? And if the universe is to be accounted for rationally, as the effect=B; of an unconditional cause=A, then as Kant has it, the pure concepts that we employ must provide for a conceptual scheme that helps us to account for the ultimate origin of B by means of its necessary relation to A. If God, as a Supreme Cause, can rationally be equated with A, and whatever determinations we define A as possessing, necessarily, and if the universe as an effect=B can rationally be accounted for as the necessary derivative of A, through the pure concepts that we employ towards this end, then reason may be able to assert the truth of the thesis over the antithesis, and provide for a philosophical defense of theism, grounded not upon empirical observations and arguments, that can never be decisive, but grounded upon pure reason, a priori.
This is the only path of reasoning that Kant's critical demands make room for. There is no room for trifling, as Kant states, with conjectures, or probabilities. If one feels these demands are impossible, for this is just what the vast majority of philosophers and apologists will continue to assert, then Kant remarks:
If they, on the other hand, desire to carry on their business, not as a science, but as an art of wholesome persuasion suitable to the common sense of man, this calling cannot in justice be denied them. They will then speak the modest language of a rational belief; they will grant that they are not allowed even to conjecture, far less to know, anything which lies beyond the bounds of all possible experience, but only to assume (not for speculative use, which they must abandon, but for practical use only) the existence of something possible and even indispensable for the guidance of the understanding and of the will in life. In this manner alone can they be called useful and wise men, and the more so as they renounce the title of metaphysicians. For the latter profess to be speculative philosophers; and since, when judgments a priori are under discussion, poor probabilities cannot be admitted (for what is declared to be known a priori is thereby announced as necessary), such men cannot be permitted to play with conjectures, but their assertion must be either science or nothing at all. 25 If however one does not wish to abandon metaphysics and the hope this holds out for a possible defense of faith, then the task is to provide an explanation that manages a rational account of the universe and its existence in such a way that its necessary existence also necessitates the existence of a Supreme Being as the motivating force that has given it its existence. This would imply a rational account of not simply what took place from the beginning of time (the science of cosmology has provided a scenario of how the elements along with stars and galaxies emerged from the Planck time forward) but this implies a rational account of why spacetime and the mass within it has undergone an expansion, and why this mass that began to expand along with spacetime, supposedly some 15 billion years ago, has been ordered into our present universe.
Hegel began from the only possible premise that could satisfy Kant's demands but he failed to show how the whole series of conditions leading up to our present world follows from his premise, a priori. Yet, from the perspective of Kant's critical philosophy the only premise open is the premise that Hegel outlines, regardless of the difficulty and some will argue, the impossibility of showing how such a beginning relates, necessarily, to Being, or how it leads, necessarily, to the whole series of conditions that must encompass in its scope, not only our present condition, but all that must necessarily follow our present condition.
Leaving aside this monumental difficulty, to accept any premise other than one that can be said to be synonymous with Hegel's premise inevitably leads to a question concerning the origin of that premise, so that the premise itself is undermined along with all the judgments that are said to follow.
This is the dilemma that all metaphysicians and apologists confront if they assert as their premise the existence of a God whose existence they must first prove, in order to defend their judgments. This however, does not amount to an impossible Catch 22 for metaphysicians or apologists. All this implies is that the premise that they feel obligated to adopt, this being the existence of a Supreme Being (with respect to the critical perspective explained) negates the legitimacy of their judgments and conclusions.
Given this, one might feel obliged to excuse Hegel for his obscurity. He at least avoids the charge of beginning with a concrete condition that would only lead to a question as to the origin of that condition; though his synthesis of Being with not-being leaves us with an equally difficult question. Hegel's synthesis and all that follows from this does not amount to a synthetic cognition a priori. There is no demonstration that is, of a necessary relation between A (The Absolute Cause) and B, the effect --our world as a series of conditions following necessarily from the relation (demonstrable, a priori) between A and B.
Yet the only premise open is a premise such as Hegel's premise. But Kant demands more than Hegel offers. The kind of solution that would go beyond Hegel and Kant, is one that would need to begin with a premise (in some way related with or synonymous with the idea of nothing) as Hegel understood, but it would also provide a less ambiguous solution to Kant's question, "how are synthetic cognitions, a priori possible?" The solution would need to show by means of such a cognition how the related impasse of thinking through a necessary connection between cause and effect is overcome.
This is why the task, according to Kant's critical demands is so daunting, but again, even here Kant states his rather optimistic outlook towards speculative metaphysics:
When I say that I hope these Prolegomena will excite investigation in the field of critique and afford a new and promising object to sustain the general spirit of philosophy, which seems on its speculative side to want sustenance, I can imagine beforehand that everyone whom the thorny paths of my Critique have tired and put out of humor will ask me upon what I found this hope. My answer is: upon the irresistible law of neessity. 26 Here our general outlook concerning metaphysics may tend towards skepticism only because of the obvious fact that the answers to the deeper cosmological questions still remain hidden. Our common ignorance in view of no existing solutions to these most difficult of philosophical questions is however no excuse for adopting skepticism over optimism, even if the optimism shown by Kant may be interpreted other than a hope for actual positive solutions to such conflicts. "The irresistible law of necessity" may indeed have a solution in store that goes far beyond anything that Kant himself might have had in mind; yet it may also be a solution that appears in its overall structure, once grasped, so simple and obvious that we may well wonder why it was not thought of earler.
Here philosophical apologists need not be put off from the apparent pretentiousness of such a task. There are enough mathematical theorists now, such as Stephen Hawking, who are attempting to advance a complete unified theory, or a theory of everything that atheistically inclined scientists claim will once and for all put an end to the need for metaphysics, and along with it, the Idea of a Supreme Being. Given this, apologists who are serious about defending their faith need to raise their own expectations if they are to have any hope of keeping pace with their opponents.
To manage this, it is a further question for philosophical apologists hoping to advance a purely philosophical defense of their faith whether or not they are willing to take Kant seriously, or whether or not they feel it is possible to carry metaphysics beyond Kant and Hegel.
Where there remain open minds with respect to metaphysics, Hegel's beginning provides the best clue, at least with regard to a beginning. To provide a clearer answer to the question "how are synthetic cognitions a priori possible?" (that may be difficult to trace in the context of Hegel's own writings) the answer is in Hegel's beginning from a condition that does not admit to anything concrete, that seems to, at first reflection, amount only to nothing. To add to the plausibility of such a beginning the science of cosmology itself takes the regress of space-time and mass back to a singular condition of zero space time (along with an unexplained infinite density). The singularity itself suggests a condition (or a non condition) of nothing, from which something has proceeded, and this with respect to the a priori concepts, as Kant calls them, of space and time. The infinite density that is said to have been contained in this singularity however is something for which no cosmologist has provided any adequate explanation, and here metaphysicians hold at least a decisive advantage, for mathematical theorists cannot but propose certain preliminary, empirical conditions, to their theories; otherwise, they are left with nothing to attach their theories to. It is this very reason that drives them to formulate theories that do away with the idea of a singularity at the beginning of time. However, every empirical condition that a mathematical theorist proposes as a premise leaves us facing the question concerning the origin of that preliminary condition. For metaphysicians the aim is to understand a rationally justifiable premise, a priori, that avoids begging this question. Hegel provides some indication as to the form of the premise that must be adopted.
The path for reason from this point forward, rather than being blurred, is spelled out unmistakably by Kant in the context of his reply to the writer of an unfavourable review of his Critique:
I challenge my critic to demonstrate, as is only just, on a priori grounds, in his own way, any single really metaphysical proposition asserted by him. Being metaphysical, it must be synthetical and known a priori from concepts, but it may also be any one of the most indispensable propositions, as, for instance…the necessary determination of events in the world by their cause….
He finds in these Prolegomena and in my Critique eight propositions [the four antinomy each with its thesis and antithesis] of which one in each pair contradicts the other, but each of which necessarily belongs to metaphysics…Now he has the liberty of selecting any one of these eight propositions…and then of attacking my proof of the opposite proposition. If I can save this one and at the same time show that, according to principles which every dogmatic metaphysics must necessarily recognize, the opposite of the proposition adopted by him can be just as clearly proved, it is thereby established that metaphysics has an hereditary failing not to be explained, must less set aside, until we ascend to its birthplace, pure reason itself….If, on the other hand, I cannot save my demonstration, then a synthetic proposition a priori from dogmatic principles is to be reckoned to the score of my opponent, and I shall deem my impeachment of ordinary metaphysics unjust….27 Considering the importance that Kant attaches to the antinomy one has to wonder what Kant would have thought of the science of big bang cosmology, and its tracing the history of the universe back some 15 billion years to its beginning. The science of cosmology has, with empirical evidence, completely overturned the antithesis of the first antinomy, and this for Kant would have proved monumentally important for it is the thesis that holds out the hope of a possible philosophical defense of faith.
It is the thesis that offers the means of refuting the kind of dogmatic atheism apparent in Maurice Cornforth's Materialism and the Dialectical Method:
Was the world created by a Supreme Being? What was the origin of matter? What was the origin of motion? What was the very beginning of everything? What was the first cause? These are the sort of questions which puzzle people.
It is possible to answer these questions.
No, the world was not created by a Supreme Being. Any particular organisation of matter, any particular process of matter in motion, has an origin and a beginning –it originated out of some previous organisation of matter, out of some previous process of matter in motion. But matter in motion had no origin, no beginning. 28 Yet the author states: "Materialism is not a dogmatic system. It is rather a way of interpreting, conceiving of, explaining every question." 29
Yet metaphysics also, is a way of interpreting, conceiving of, explaining every question.
For philosophical apologists to avoid the charge of professing only a blind faith in the existence of an eternal Supreme Being, which is here no worse than the blind faith in the existence of eternal matter, the only recourse is to recognize that the science of cosmology has opened a door that was once thought closed.
In the eighteenth century Kant could not foresee how far technology and science would advance. He could not foresee the advances in quantum physics brought about by the Theory of General Relativity (used by Einstein and de-Sitter to propose, in 1932, a cosmological model of the universe beginning from a singularity), nor could he have foreseen the discovery of the expanding universe, itself predictable according to Einstein's theory.
Having traced the universe back as far as the laws of physics permit cosmologists have not only overturned the antithesis in favour of the thesis but in doing so they have undermined the grounds for holding onto a philosophy of strict empiricism.
The question of advancing metaphysics beyond Kant and Hegel can no longer be looked upon as closed, not that is without also closing one's mind to the advances made in the science of cosmology. On the basis of the findings in this field alone philosophically minded apologists ought to consider seriously the prospect of taking up metaphysics in the defense of their faith.
References
1Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (Library of Liberal Arts, Lewis White Beck, 1950) 122 [372-373]; hereafter cited as Pr.
2Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, from the edition translated by F. Max Müller, (Anchor Books, N.Y., 1966) Preface, B: xxx; hereafter cited as CPR.
3 Pr. 4 [256-257].
419 [273-274, 270].
587 [339-340].
658 footnote [340-341].
7CPR 5 [A: 3-4; B: 4-8]
8Pr. 116 [367-368].
9130 [380-381].
10CPR 335 [A: 469-473; B: 497-501].
11Pr. 112 [363-364].
1211 [263 264].
13126 [376-377].
14100 [351 352].
1513 [265-266].
1623/4 [275-276/77].
1725 [277-278].
18Carl J. Friedrich, The Philosophy of Hegel (Modern Library, 1954), 211.
19Ibid.
20216.
21David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford, 1967), 158/59; hereafter cited as Tr.
22Pr. 24 [276-277].
23Tr. 161/62
24Pr. 119 [370-371].
2525/6 [277-279].
26116 [367-368].
27128/29 [378-380].
28Little New World Paperbacks, 1978, 43
2917.
Note from the Author
Immanuel Kant asks for a system of a priori reasoning, or a system of pure philosophical understanding in response to the cosmological problems that he outlines in his critical philosophy. In his Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, Kant, asks that his critical reader devote to the first antinomy his chief attention. As Beyond Kant and Hegel attempts to show, this challenge was not answered by Hegel. It is, however, answered by a work found at http://philosophical-apologetic.com (http://philosophical-apologetic.com/). The Appendix to this work [citing the above quotes] outlines Kant's continuing relevance in this regard, despite more than two centuries passing since the publication of his Critique of Pure Reason. The work found at the above site, entitled: The Universe, Its Origin & End, Part One: Causal Argument for the Existence of a Supreme Being, with the alternative titles: Kant's Challenge Answered, or The Refutation of Empiricism, is self-published, but this work is offered freely to all serious students and professors of philosophy and theology, and all those who wish to place their faith upon an immovable foundation, with the only stipulation being that nothing be taken out of context, that proper reference be made when citing this work, and that if the reader so chooses, they make others aware of this as yet, unrecognized, yet strongest possible defense of theism. One serious note: this work is not something to take lightly. One needs to lend this work their most serious concentration. Where this is done and the work is mastered, the reward will be nothing less than a pure philosophical understanding invincible to the attacks of the most heated skeptics and atheists.
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by Ray Liikanen
The common notion abounds that human reason cannot resolve such questions as those voiced by Immanuel Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason, namely, the so called cosmological problems, or the antinomy. As for metaphysics, the discipline that aims itself at such problems, the book has been closed. This is what the vast majority of philosophers of every description believe. They will even cite the many unfavourable statements made by Kant towards metaphysics, and point to Kant as the destroyer of this deceptive beast; for instance: "High towers and metaphysically great men resembling them, round both of which there is commonly much wind, are not for me. My place is the fruitful bathos of experience...."1
For philosophical apologists, it is the prevailing opinion among most philosophers, and most notably Kantians, that the instrument of reason that they employ towards the defense of their faith, has long ago been overthrown by Kant as an effective instrument towards this end. After his critical investigations Kant himself could only remark: "I had therefore to remove knowledge, in order to make room for belief." 2
And while Kant blocked off the possibility of a purely philosophical defense of faith grounded upon reason, the philosopher who woke him from his dogmatic slumber, David Hume, blocked off the possibility of practical philosophical apologetics by showing that the argument from design was invalid. All apologetics apart from metaphysics, must ultimately rest upon this argument; but if we cannot, as Hume argues, take anything from this world as a demonstrable proof in the existence of a transcendent being, then what remains?
From a strictly critical, purely philosophical perspective, there is but one possibility that Kant leaves open, and this is the possibility of what he calls a science of metaphysics. Kant repeatedly uses the term science, as in: "The question whether a science be possible presupposes a doubt as to its actuality…." and "the independent reader of these Prolegomena will not only doubt his previous science, but ultimately be fully persuaded that it cannot exist unless the demands here stated on which its possibility depends be satisfied…"3
Kant's use of the term science however must seem an abuse of the term to anyone objecting to metaphysics on the grounds that by its nature metaphysics defies any empirical basis. But is Kant guilty of abusing the term science? To understand how Kant justifies and qualifies his use of the term science one needs to look at the context in which Kant employs the term, and here Kant is clear enough in stating that he does not imply by a science, a science in the ordinary sense. He implies a certain method of reasoning through intuition and concepts towards what he calls synthetic propositions, a priori: "…the generation of a priori knowledge by intuition as well as by concepts, in fine, of synthetic propositions a priori, especially in philosophical knowledge, constitutes the essential subject of metaphysics." 4
But before one can grasp what this reasoning towards synthetic propositions a priori implies one needs to consider the obstacles that Kant sees confronting what he calls a science of metaphysics. Knowing what these obstacles are provides a strong indication as to what Kant implies by synthetic propositions a priori. These obstacles are put forth clearly in the form of the cosmological problems, or the antinomy, the first of which reads:
Thesis: The world [universe] has, as to time and space, a beginning (limit).
Antithesis: The world is, as to time and space, infinite. 5
This obstacle is critically important and Kant asks that his critical reader lend to this antinomy his chief attention. 6
As the arguments in favour of the thesis and antithesis appear equally strong Kant argues that reason confronts a dilemma from which there is no escape.
The dichotomy expressed in the thesis and antithesis is also of fundamental, critical importance to philosophical apologists, for the thesis as Kant notes, points towards the prospect of resolving the antinomy. As such, it serves the purely speculative interests of metaphysics as a possible defense of theism. But if the antithesis is correct and the world has always existed it follows that there is no need to postulate any such Idea as a Supreme Author of creation –Of the Interest of Reason in these Conflicts (for ref. See Endnotes: 330; A: 460/62 3; B: 490-491).
Seeing no hope of overcoming the very first obstacle towards a science, or even taking so much as a single step in this direction, Kant attempts to save whatever else remains of metaphysics by directing attention away from such apparently insoluble problems. He issues a directive towards the practical ends of a moral philosophy, or what he calls the purely regulative use of reason. The works that followed were thus Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786), Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), and Metaphysics of Morals (1797).
Yet the irreparable damage to metaphysics in view of the cosmological problems and its highest aims seemed accomplished.
In the thinking of those empiricists and atheists who have embraced Kant's critical philosophy and twisted it into an instrument to further their own ends, the charge is that speculative philosophers, theologians, and apologists directing their thoughts in this direction, have been caught brandishing an illegal weapon. They have been tried and they've been found guilty, and the sentence of the court (established within and by the authority of Kant's Critique) is that these workers of deception are no longer allowed to reason. The proper employment of reason can serve no end other than the promotion of a strict philosophy of empiricism with its central dogma that matter is all that exists. There is no other world than the world of our concrete, sense experience (the fruitful bathos of experience) and metaphysicians and apologists with them, pose only to undermine a proper and a true understanding of reality.
But apologists need not, without serious reflection, concede to this harsh depiction of Kant as the destroyer of metaphysics. Let us first put forth the plausible suspicion that this characterization of Kant has been adopted by empiricists, and atheists, by reason of the impenetrable wall of skepticism and even the outright cynicism that they display towards the very problems that are Kant's central concern. "These inevitable problems of pure reason itself" as Kant writes, "are, God, Freedom, and Immortality. The science which with all its apparatus is really intended for the solution of these problems, is called Metaphysic." 7
It should not strike anyone as odd then that an extremely restrictive interpretation of Kant's critical philosophy has been adopted by his empiricist and atheistic readers.
As these inevitable problems of pure reason are of fundamental importance to apologists then it seems obligatory on their part to undertake some study of Kant if only to determine whether or not Kant did indeed undermine the grounds for a possible philosophical defense of their faith, and whether or not an extremely restrictive interpretation of his critical philosophy is justified. Kant's admission to a belief only by having removed from it the pretense of knowledge is precisely opposite to the thinking and reasoning that apologists are compelled to adopt. For their sake however, and despite Kant's admission, it is possible to refute this negative stereotype of Kant for Kant himself, rather than claiming to have closed the book on metaphysics, writes: "That the human mind will ever give up metaphysical researches is as little to be expected as that we, to avoid inhaling impure air, should prefer to give up breathing altogether. There will, therefore, always be metaphysics in the world…"8 and as a clincher to anyone who thinks Kant's critical works were intended to direct philosophers away from pure speculative reason, to a purely regulative use of reason directed towards a practical, moral philosophy, or such works as Kant himself later undertook: "Mathematics, natural science, laws, arts, even morality, etc., do not completely fill the soul; there is always a space left over reserved for pure and speculative reason.…" 9 Such positive remarks towards pure speculative reason could hardly have been made by someone whose intention it was to rid the world of metaphysics.
Kant, furthermore, had little regard for a philosophy of strict empiricism despite the counter claims of many empiricists and atheists. He did not have a metaphysician standing behind him with a gun when he wrote:
…empiricism becomes often itself dogmatical with respect to ideas, and boldly denies what goes beyond the sphere of its intuitive knowledge, and thus becomes guilty itself of a want of modesty, which here is all the more reprehensible, because an irreparable injury is thereby inflicted on the practical interests of reason. 10 …the transcendental Ideas [such as the Idea of a Supreme Being] serve, if not to instruct us positively, at least to destroy the narrowing assertions of materialism, of naturalism, and of fatalism, and thus to afford scope for the moral Ideas beyond the field of speculation….11/quote]
Kant goes even much further towards the end of advancing the highest aims of metaphysics than the many opponents of metaphysics would care to admit.
Kant states that human reason is by nature architectonic (336, A: 473-477; B: 501 505), implying that human reason takes from experience such pure concepts of the understanding as causality, space, and time, and with these attempts to order the world of experience into a systematic, rational understanding. Despite the difficulties that seem to arise when reason attempts to so order its concepts the world of the mind and the world of experience are by nature mutually inclusive, rather than mutually conflicting.
Kant's critical demands, far from paving the way towards a philosophy of strict empiricism and atheism, were intended to guide metaphysicians to the end of justifying their use of their concepts by showing how they relate to, and help make sense out of reality.
Kant's critical demands, while providing no justification for a philosophy of strict empiricism however, prove extremely restrictive with regard to metaphysics, and it is this stricture against metaphysics that has led to enforce the negative stereotype of Kant as the enemy, if not the destroyer of metaphysics.
Kant declares: "But he who undertakes to judge or, still more, to construct a system of metaphysics must satisfy the demands here made, either by adopting my solution or by thoroughly refuting it and substituting another. To evade it is impossible." 12
If the intention is to advance a system of metaphysics aimed at resolving the cosmological problems, or antinomy, Kant is even more clear in announcing the critical demands that are imposed: "The world is tired of metaphysical assertions; it wants [to know] the possibility of this science, the sources from which certainty therein can be derived, and certain criteria by which it may distinguish the dialectical illusion of pure reason from truth." 13
Thus, to avoid the charge of advancing only further groundless assertions Kant asks for a priori judgments (judgments from pure reason), as opposed to a posteriori judgments (judgments grounded upon common experience). In fact, if metaphysics is to be metaphysics it cannot consist of anything but a priori judgments, for as Kant states:
[quote]Who can satisfy himself with mere empirical knowledge in all the cosmological questions…since every answer given on principles of experience begets a fresh question, which likewise requires its answer and thereby clearly shows the insufficiency of all physical modes of explanation to satisfy reason? 14
…as concerns the sources of metaphysical knowledge, its very concept implies that they cannot be empirical. Its principles (including not only its maxims but its basic notions) must never be derived from experience. It must not be physical but metaphysical knowledge, namely, knowledge lying beyond experience. It can therefore have for its basis neither external experience, which is the source of physics proper, nor internal, which is the basis of empirical psychology. It is therefore a priori knowledge, coming from pure understanding and pure reason. 15 The guiding principle towards the certainty Kant demands from those who would advance metaphysics is found in the term a priori. It is this term that Kant associates with what he calls a science of metaphysics, and this only by reason of the certainty attached to the term. The restriction that the term a priori places upon metaphysics is severe, clear, and decisive, and its fundamental importance is reflected in Kant's insistence upon an answer to the question: "How are synthetic propositions a priori possible?" 16claiming that: "Metaphysics stands or falls with the solution of this problem; its very existence depends upon it." And: "Until they have adequately answered this question metaphysicians are solemnly and legally suspended from their occupations." 17
By demanding an answer to this difficult question Kant aims not to destroy all prospects of resolving the cosmological problems, but he aims to clear the field of all systems of metaphysics not comprised of judgments, a priori. By lifting metaphysics to this higher standard Kant hopes to guard metaphysics from the kinds of assertions of which he states the world is tired.
The question, "how are synthetic cognitions a priori possible?" however, is one that no philosopher since Kant has been able to answer, though there are those who would dispute this and claim that Kant was fully answered by Hegel.
But is such a claim justifiable?
Answering this question itself may lead to a clearer understanding of what Kant implies by a science of metaphysics. The task that a science must accomplish is a daunting one. If those Hegelians who claim that Kant has been fully answered by Hegel are correct then there is one obvious critical impasse posed by Kant that Hegel would have needed to overcome. But Hegel, to be fair to Kant, would also have needed to provide somewhere in the collection of his writings a preliminary answer to Kant's question: "How are synthetic propositions a priori possible?" He would also have needed to overcome by means of such a proposition the obstacles outlined by Kant that stand on the path of a science of metaphysics.
The clearest indication as to a possible solution to Kant's question, and a premise to a science is found in Hegel's Science of Logic where Hegel states:
…in any science a beginning is made by presupposing some idea -such idea being next analyzed…Were we too to observe this procedure we should have no particular object before us, because the beginning, as being the beginning of thought, must be perfectly abstract and general, pure form quite without content; we should have nothing but the idea of a bare beginning as such…18/quote]
Thus Hegel appears to be in line with Kant's thinking: "Who can satisfy himself with mere empirical knowledge in all the cosmological questions…since every answer given on principles of experience begets a fresh question, which likewise requires its answer…"
Hegel continues:
So far, there is nothing; something is to become. The beginning is not pure nothing, but a nothing from which something is to proceed; so that being is already contained in the beginning…
Further, being and nothing are present in the beginning as distinct from one another….that which is beginning, as yet is not: it is advancing toward being. The beginning therefore contains being as having this characteristic, that it flies from and transcends not being, as its opposite. 19 And:
The expression of the absolute, the eternal, or God (and God has the most undisputed right that the beginning should be made with Him)… 20 Hegel synthesizes being with not being. He also adopts the Idea of God with respect to his premise, and while this raises a question no less difficult than the one he addresses, he at least overcomes the critical problem of beginning with an empirical condition. But there is nothing in the whole of Hegel's system that can be said to constitute an a priori judgment extended from this, as Hegel calls it, bare beginning. Hegel has not only failed to provide a clear answer to Kant's difficult question concerning synthetic cognitions a priori (for at least no such answer appears in his collected writings), but he fails to explain how anything that he claims follows from this beginning, follows necessarily. Yet this is just what Kant demands. The question for Hegelians is: "Where does Hegel offer any indication of an extended synthetic a priori proposition, as a solution to the cosmological problems?" Hegelians who claim that Kant has been fully answered by Hegel have either seriously underestimated the depth of the problem Kant was addressing; or they have misunderstood the importance of Kant's critical demands, or both.
Kant's demands are similar to those voiced by David Hume, whose own objections Kant defended.
In his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume, writing specifically about this central difficulty in metaphysics, writes:
Upon the whole, we may conclude, that it is impossible in any one instance to show the principle, in which the force and agency of a cause is placed...If any one think proper to refute this assertion, he need not put himself to the trouble of inventing any long reasonings; but may at once show us an instance of a cause, where we discover the power or operating principle....The small success, which has been met with in all the attempts to fix this power, has at last obliged philosophers to conclude, that the ultimate force and efficacy of nature is perfectly unknown to us, and that it is in vain we search for it in all the known qualities of matter.21 And Kant remarking on Hume writes: "For how is it possible, says that acute man, that when a concept is given me I can go beyond it and connect with it another which is not contained in it, in such a manner as if the latter necessarily belonged to the former?" 22
Hume and Kant both confess that they are unable to think any such necessary connection.
Hume writes in his Treatise:
We must distinctly and particularly conceive the connection between the cause and effect, and be able to pronounce, from a simple view of the one, that it must be followed or preceded by the other…Now nothing is more evident, than that the human mind cannot form such an idea of two objects, as to conceive any connection between them, or comprehend distinctly that power or efficacy, by which they are united. Such a connection would amount to a demonstration, and would imply the absolute impossibility for the one object not to follow, or to be conceived not to follow upon the other. 23 And Kant writes similarly that:
[quote]But I cannot, by all my power of thinking, extract from the concept of a thing the concept of something else whose existence is necessarily connected with the former; for this I must call in experience. And though my understanding furnishes me a priori (yet only in reference to possible experience) with the concept of such a connection (that is causation), I cannot exhibit it, like the concepts of mathematics, by intuiting it a priori, and so show its possibility a priori. 24
Where Hegel fails so also countless others fail including every philosopher who has ever advanced a system of metaphysics since Kant.
Kant demands on the part of any demonstration of a synthetic proposition or judgment a priori, in view of cosmological problems such as the first antinomy, not only ascending from the unconditioned beginning to the complete and conditioned series following from the beginning, but he demands that one demonstrate just how a causal series follows, a priori. One cannot simply ignore this critical demand for certainty and pretend to overcome it by jumping from a premise such as Hegel's beginning to the assertion that the universe therefore exists necessarily. Or to the assertion that the universe exploded into existence out of nothing through the power or the will of a Supreme Being who is postulated to exist at the very beginning. Apologists now so arguing are in this instance subject to the very same critical objection as mathematical theorists who assert that the universe may be no more than a freak quantum vacuum fluctuation.*
* With one such fluctuation taking place every 101080 years (see John Gribbon, In Search of the Big Bang, Bantam, 1986; 370). But if time did not exist before the fluctuation, as claimed, the calculation may just as well have been only one such fluctuation in an infinite number of years, or for this matter, an infinite number of such fluctuations all simultaneously in no time at all.
Groundless assertions here from both atheists and theists only go to point out the importance of Kant's critical demands. Where Kant's demands are overlooked, or thought inconsequential, then the questions that invariably follow are: If space-time and the mass of our universe expanded into existence out of nothing, then what caused this expansion? Was it an accident that just had to happen? How can you know? If it was God who caused all things to expand into existence out of nothing, then how do you explain the existence of this being whom you call God? And how can this God, whose existence you haven't even proved to me, create something out of nothing? How can you make rational sense out of these assertions that you ask me to accept? If they make no rational sense, why should I accept them?
Pleading ignorance in the face of such difficult questions will not prevent a relentless questioning mind from pressing them.
If simple assertions in metaphysics cannot be counted as rational explanations or proofs, then the only recourse left is as Kant demands, a rational explanation, and an a priori proof or account, of how one event has led necessarily to the next event –how the whole series from the unconditioned beginning, being the premise that we argue for, leads necessarily through a whole series of conditions, to the world we experience. The unconditional premise=A, must relate a priori, to a conditional series=B. A and B must be distinguished clearly and necessarily as A=infinite, and B=finite, yet the one (unconditional, infinite, or Absolute Cause) must necessarily imply the other (the conditional, finite universe). How is this to be managed, if at all possible? And if the universe is to be accounted for rationally, as the effect=B; of an unconditional cause=A, then as Kant has it, the pure concepts that we employ must provide for a conceptual scheme that helps us to account for the ultimate origin of B by means of its necessary relation to A. If God, as a Supreme Cause, can rationally be equated with A, and whatever determinations we define A as possessing, necessarily, and if the universe as an effect=B can rationally be accounted for as the necessary derivative of A, through the pure concepts that we employ towards this end, then reason may be able to assert the truth of the thesis over the antithesis, and provide for a philosophical defense of theism, grounded not upon empirical observations and arguments, that can never be decisive, but grounded upon pure reason, a priori.
This is the only path of reasoning that Kant's critical demands make room for. There is no room for trifling, as Kant states, with conjectures, or probabilities. If one feels these demands are impossible, for this is just what the vast majority of philosophers and apologists will continue to assert, then Kant remarks:
If they, on the other hand, desire to carry on their business, not as a science, but as an art of wholesome persuasion suitable to the common sense of man, this calling cannot in justice be denied them. They will then speak the modest language of a rational belief; they will grant that they are not allowed even to conjecture, far less to know, anything which lies beyond the bounds of all possible experience, but only to assume (not for speculative use, which they must abandon, but for practical use only) the existence of something possible and even indispensable for the guidance of the understanding and of the will in life. In this manner alone can they be called useful and wise men, and the more so as they renounce the title of metaphysicians. For the latter profess to be speculative philosophers; and since, when judgments a priori are under discussion, poor probabilities cannot be admitted (for what is declared to be known a priori is thereby announced as necessary), such men cannot be permitted to play with conjectures, but their assertion must be either science or nothing at all. 25 If however one does not wish to abandon metaphysics and the hope this holds out for a possible defense of faith, then the task is to provide an explanation that manages a rational account of the universe and its existence in such a way that its necessary existence also necessitates the existence of a Supreme Being as the motivating force that has given it its existence. This would imply a rational account of not simply what took place from the beginning of time (the science of cosmology has provided a scenario of how the elements along with stars and galaxies emerged from the Planck time forward) but this implies a rational account of why spacetime and the mass within it has undergone an expansion, and why this mass that began to expand along with spacetime, supposedly some 15 billion years ago, has been ordered into our present universe.
Hegel began from the only possible premise that could satisfy Kant's demands but he failed to show how the whole series of conditions leading up to our present world follows from his premise, a priori. Yet, from the perspective of Kant's critical philosophy the only premise open is the premise that Hegel outlines, regardless of the difficulty and some will argue, the impossibility of showing how such a beginning relates, necessarily, to Being, or how it leads, necessarily, to the whole series of conditions that must encompass in its scope, not only our present condition, but all that must necessarily follow our present condition.
Leaving aside this monumental difficulty, to accept any premise other than one that can be said to be synonymous with Hegel's premise inevitably leads to a question concerning the origin of that premise, so that the premise itself is undermined along with all the judgments that are said to follow.
This is the dilemma that all metaphysicians and apologists confront if they assert as their premise the existence of a God whose existence they must first prove, in order to defend their judgments. This however, does not amount to an impossible Catch 22 for metaphysicians or apologists. All this implies is that the premise that they feel obligated to adopt, this being the existence of a Supreme Being (with respect to the critical perspective explained) negates the legitimacy of their judgments and conclusions.
Given this, one might feel obliged to excuse Hegel for his obscurity. He at least avoids the charge of beginning with a concrete condition that would only lead to a question as to the origin of that condition; though his synthesis of Being with not-being leaves us with an equally difficult question. Hegel's synthesis and all that follows from this does not amount to a synthetic cognition a priori. There is no demonstration that is, of a necessary relation between A (The Absolute Cause) and B, the effect --our world as a series of conditions following necessarily from the relation (demonstrable, a priori) between A and B.
Yet the only premise open is a premise such as Hegel's premise. But Kant demands more than Hegel offers. The kind of solution that would go beyond Hegel and Kant, is one that would need to begin with a premise (in some way related with or synonymous with the idea of nothing) as Hegel understood, but it would also provide a less ambiguous solution to Kant's question, "how are synthetic cognitions, a priori possible?" The solution would need to show by means of such a cognition how the related impasse of thinking through a necessary connection between cause and effect is overcome.
This is why the task, according to Kant's critical demands is so daunting, but again, even here Kant states his rather optimistic outlook towards speculative metaphysics:
When I say that I hope these Prolegomena will excite investigation in the field of critique and afford a new and promising object to sustain the general spirit of philosophy, which seems on its speculative side to want sustenance, I can imagine beforehand that everyone whom the thorny paths of my Critique have tired and put out of humor will ask me upon what I found this hope. My answer is: upon the irresistible law of neessity. 26 Here our general outlook concerning metaphysics may tend towards skepticism only because of the obvious fact that the answers to the deeper cosmological questions still remain hidden. Our common ignorance in view of no existing solutions to these most difficult of philosophical questions is however no excuse for adopting skepticism over optimism, even if the optimism shown by Kant may be interpreted other than a hope for actual positive solutions to such conflicts. "The irresistible law of necessity" may indeed have a solution in store that goes far beyond anything that Kant himself might have had in mind; yet it may also be a solution that appears in its overall structure, once grasped, so simple and obvious that we may well wonder why it was not thought of earler.
Here philosophical apologists need not be put off from the apparent pretentiousness of such a task. There are enough mathematical theorists now, such as Stephen Hawking, who are attempting to advance a complete unified theory, or a theory of everything that atheistically inclined scientists claim will once and for all put an end to the need for metaphysics, and along with it, the Idea of a Supreme Being. Given this, apologists who are serious about defending their faith need to raise their own expectations if they are to have any hope of keeping pace with their opponents.
To manage this, it is a further question for philosophical apologists hoping to advance a purely philosophical defense of their faith whether or not they are willing to take Kant seriously, or whether or not they feel it is possible to carry metaphysics beyond Kant and Hegel.
Where there remain open minds with respect to metaphysics, Hegel's beginning provides the best clue, at least with regard to a beginning. To provide a clearer answer to the question "how are synthetic cognitions a priori possible?" (that may be difficult to trace in the context of Hegel's own writings) the answer is in Hegel's beginning from a condition that does not admit to anything concrete, that seems to, at first reflection, amount only to nothing. To add to the plausibility of such a beginning the science of cosmology itself takes the regress of space-time and mass back to a singular condition of zero space time (along with an unexplained infinite density). The singularity itself suggests a condition (or a non condition) of nothing, from which something has proceeded, and this with respect to the a priori concepts, as Kant calls them, of space and time. The infinite density that is said to have been contained in this singularity however is something for which no cosmologist has provided any adequate explanation, and here metaphysicians hold at least a decisive advantage, for mathematical theorists cannot but propose certain preliminary, empirical conditions, to their theories; otherwise, they are left with nothing to attach their theories to. It is this very reason that drives them to formulate theories that do away with the idea of a singularity at the beginning of time. However, every empirical condition that a mathematical theorist proposes as a premise leaves us facing the question concerning the origin of that preliminary condition. For metaphysicians the aim is to understand a rationally justifiable premise, a priori, that avoids begging this question. Hegel provides some indication as to the form of the premise that must be adopted.
The path for reason from this point forward, rather than being blurred, is spelled out unmistakably by Kant in the context of his reply to the writer of an unfavourable review of his Critique:
I challenge my critic to demonstrate, as is only just, on a priori grounds, in his own way, any single really metaphysical proposition asserted by him. Being metaphysical, it must be synthetical and known a priori from concepts, but it may also be any one of the most indispensable propositions, as, for instance…the necessary determination of events in the world by their cause….
He finds in these Prolegomena and in my Critique eight propositions [the four antinomy each with its thesis and antithesis] of which one in each pair contradicts the other, but each of which necessarily belongs to metaphysics…Now he has the liberty of selecting any one of these eight propositions…and then of attacking my proof of the opposite proposition. If I can save this one and at the same time show that, according to principles which every dogmatic metaphysics must necessarily recognize, the opposite of the proposition adopted by him can be just as clearly proved, it is thereby established that metaphysics has an hereditary failing not to be explained, must less set aside, until we ascend to its birthplace, pure reason itself….If, on the other hand, I cannot save my demonstration, then a synthetic proposition a priori from dogmatic principles is to be reckoned to the score of my opponent, and I shall deem my impeachment of ordinary metaphysics unjust….27 Considering the importance that Kant attaches to the antinomy one has to wonder what Kant would have thought of the science of big bang cosmology, and its tracing the history of the universe back some 15 billion years to its beginning. The science of cosmology has, with empirical evidence, completely overturned the antithesis of the first antinomy, and this for Kant would have proved monumentally important for it is the thesis that holds out the hope of a possible philosophical defense of faith.
It is the thesis that offers the means of refuting the kind of dogmatic atheism apparent in Maurice Cornforth's Materialism and the Dialectical Method:
Was the world created by a Supreme Being? What was the origin of matter? What was the origin of motion? What was the very beginning of everything? What was the first cause? These are the sort of questions which puzzle people.
It is possible to answer these questions.
No, the world was not created by a Supreme Being. Any particular organisation of matter, any particular process of matter in motion, has an origin and a beginning –it originated out of some previous organisation of matter, out of some previous process of matter in motion. But matter in motion had no origin, no beginning. 28 Yet the author states: "Materialism is not a dogmatic system. It is rather a way of interpreting, conceiving of, explaining every question." 29
Yet metaphysics also, is a way of interpreting, conceiving of, explaining every question.
For philosophical apologists to avoid the charge of professing only a blind faith in the existence of an eternal Supreme Being, which is here no worse than the blind faith in the existence of eternal matter, the only recourse is to recognize that the science of cosmology has opened a door that was once thought closed.
In the eighteenth century Kant could not foresee how far technology and science would advance. He could not foresee the advances in quantum physics brought about by the Theory of General Relativity (used by Einstein and de-Sitter to propose, in 1932, a cosmological model of the universe beginning from a singularity), nor could he have foreseen the discovery of the expanding universe, itself predictable according to Einstein's theory.
Having traced the universe back as far as the laws of physics permit cosmologists have not only overturned the antithesis in favour of the thesis but in doing so they have undermined the grounds for holding onto a philosophy of strict empiricism.
The question of advancing metaphysics beyond Kant and Hegel can no longer be looked upon as closed, not that is without also closing one's mind to the advances made in the science of cosmology. On the basis of the findings in this field alone philosophically minded apologists ought to consider seriously the prospect of taking up metaphysics in the defense of their faith.
References
1Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (Library of Liberal Arts, Lewis White Beck, 1950) 122 [372-373]; hereafter cited as Pr.
2Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, from the edition translated by F. Max Müller, (Anchor Books, N.Y., 1966) Preface, B: xxx; hereafter cited as CPR.
3 Pr. 4 [256-257].
419 [273-274, 270].
587 [339-340].
658 footnote [340-341].
7CPR 5 [A: 3-4; B: 4-8]
8Pr. 116 [367-368].
9130 [380-381].
10CPR 335 [A: 469-473; B: 497-501].
11Pr. 112 [363-364].
1211 [263 264].
13126 [376-377].
14100 [351 352].
1513 [265-266].
1623/4 [275-276/77].
1725 [277-278].
18Carl J. Friedrich, The Philosophy of Hegel (Modern Library, 1954), 211.
19Ibid.
20216.
21David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford, 1967), 158/59; hereafter cited as Tr.
22Pr. 24 [276-277].
23Tr. 161/62
24Pr. 119 [370-371].
2525/6 [277-279].
26116 [367-368].
27128/29 [378-380].
28Little New World Paperbacks, 1978, 43
2917.
Note from the Author
Immanuel Kant asks for a system of a priori reasoning, or a system of pure philosophical understanding in response to the cosmological problems that he outlines in his critical philosophy. In his Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, Kant, asks that his critical reader devote to the first antinomy his chief attention. As Beyond Kant and Hegel attempts to show, this challenge was not answered by Hegel. It is, however, answered by a work found at http://philosophical-apologetic.com (http://philosophical-apologetic.com/). The Appendix to this work [citing the above quotes] outlines Kant's continuing relevance in this regard, despite more than two centuries passing since the publication of his Critique of Pure Reason. The work found at the above site, entitled: The Universe, Its Origin & End, Part One: Causal Argument for the Existence of a Supreme Being, with the alternative titles: Kant's Challenge Answered, or The Refutation of Empiricism, is self-published, but this work is offered freely to all serious students and professors of philosophy and theology, and all those who wish to place their faith upon an immovable foundation, with the only stipulation being that nothing be taken out of context, that proper reference be made when citing this work, and that if the reader so chooses, they make others aware of this as yet, unrecognized, yet strongest possible defense of theism. One serious note: this work is not something to take lightly. One needs to lend this work their most serious concentration. Where this is done and the work is mastered, the reward will be nothing less than a pure philosophical understanding invincible to the attacks of the most heated skeptics and atheists.
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