Kyle J. Gerkin's "A Counterclockwise Paley" - A critique

[Pate]

Yesterday I e-mailed to Kyle J. Gerkin of Internet Infidels, a critique of his article "A Counterclockwise Paley", which can be found at http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/kyle_gerkin/counterclockwise.html

I'll include the essential parts of my critique here also. Could you tell me your opinion about it?


------

You wrote in your article:
"For my part, I've always felt that the most elegant objection was to point out how the argument sabotages itself with its own logic before it even gets off the ground. The whole argument rests on the premise that organized complexity must be the product of an intelligent designer. Yet, in the conclusion, this very premise is violated without so much as the batting of an eyelash! A being of organized complexity (God) is conjured up without a designer. This is not playing by the rules laid out in the argument. In fact, it is a gross violation of the rules, since God would likely be the most complex being of all."

According to my understanding, your definition of God as being "likely the most complex being of all" would not be accepted by many Christians, or anyway, not by the 15% of them that you and J. P. have estimated to belong to the "scholarly" categories (http://www.tektonics.org/gerkin03.html). On the contrary, I would argue that God is not complex at all, but as an entity to be postulated in an explanation He's simple. You may think that God as an intelligent being must be complex, because the prime examples of intellingent beings that we know of, for example, human beings, certainly are complex. But the problem here is that you seem to be drawing an invalid analogy between an intelligent material being and an intelligent immaterial being. Unlike we humans, God is immaterial, unembodied being. Christians agree universally on this. (Or, I may need to add again, those scholarly Christians anyway. I have actually encountered a few people on the Internet, who think that God consists of antimatter. I have no doubt that some others have just as weird beliefs about God as these persons have.) :-)

Let's analyze the concept of complexity a bit. What comes to one's mind when thinking about the word "complex"? To me, at least, it brings things like consisting of many different parts, those parts not being all similar to each other and those parts being arranged in many different ways, being heterogeneous by their structure at some level, etc.

Now it is pretty obvious that terminology like this is directly applicable only to material entities, which God is not. God does not consist of different parts. There is not a delicate configuration of "God-atoms" that make up God. God has no structure. The concept of structure of an entity presupposes reducibility to entities of different and simpler kinds. God is the ultimate reality that can't be reduced to anything else. The regress of explanation has to stop somewhere. For the theist, it stops at God, who is a person with unlimited knowledge and power. (To be more exact, "unlimited" here means "has no limits outside of His own essence".) I think it's far from obvious that an entity like this can be called complex.

Properties like having unlimited knowledge and power, are only complex if we have to explain them in terms of a long chain of causes and effects that are needed to explain how an entity has the ability to bring about certain states of affairs. But again, this is the type of problem that we face with limited, material beings. The definition of God entails that it is not necessary (though possible) for Him to use intermediate causes. Being omnipotent, that is, having unlimited power, God can cause directly any state of affairs that He wants to.

So, I have to disagree with your definition of God as a complex, or even the most complex being. Therefore, I also find your "evolutionary argument" unconvincing.

Before commenting on the crucial premisses of your arguments, I'll write a few words about evolution. I, as a Christian, have no real problem in accepting evolution, though I have to add that I'm also very open to some of the more sophisticated versions of progressive creationism. I see no reason to burn bridges here. Wheter or not macroevolution is the mechanism by which the diversity of life originated is quite secondary issue to me. Perhaps theistic evolution is true, or perhaps progressive creationism is. Or perhaps the truth lies somewhere between these two.


You wrote:
"Since God is completely unnecessary in this view, it has always offended my sense of parsimony, but I could not discount the compatibilist view as a theoretical possibility--until now."

If the concept of God were employed only as an unnecessary addition to the theory by which we explain the origin of biological diversity, your sense of parsimony would certainly be rightfully offended. But for most theists, this is not the way that God-concept is used. Wholly independent of biological evolution, the concept of God can be used to explain things like the existence of the universe, the suitability of the universe for the evolution of complex life, the objectivity of moral values, religious experiences, the historical evidence for the resurrection of Jesus, etc. If the concept of God is useful in explaining these and/or other phenomena, then it is not an unnecessary addition at all, but it is the central concept of the hypothesis of theism, which is a simple hypothesis and has very considerable explanatory power. And in this case, a Christian can hardly be blamed even if (s)he ends up employing the concept of God also as a possible and plausible explanation of the biological diversity that we see.


Now, to your argument:

"2. Intelligence is an example of organized complexity."

If the central point of my criticism is valid, then this premiss is questionable. All intelligence does not need to be organized complexity.

If your second premiss is false, then the third premiss does not follow. And in that case, neither does premiss 6. On premiss 5. I would agree with you. And even though your premisses 7. and 8. seem to be correct, 9. and 10. of course do not follow, because 9. depends on the premiss 2. (Among others.)

So, in my opinion, the most crucial premiss in your argument is the second one. Because it seems to fail, so does your whole argument.

-----




I'll add a few clarifications here. My intention was not to argue that it is impossible for the concept of God to be complex just because God is immaterial. Rather, I intended to argue that the basis by which Gerkin assumes that intelligence must be "organized complexity" is questionable, because it's based on a false analogy. I also tried to argue that the concept of God is not complex, but rather, it's simple.

Also, now that I think about it, concentrating on the concept of "organized" would have made it even more obvious that the concept in question is directly applicable to material entities, but that it's difficult to apply it to immaterial God.

[Pate]

Hey, come on... don't any of you have anything to say about this?! :o

[Pate]

Hey, I just realized that there's even more profound problem in Gerkin's argument. It focuses on the question of how intelligence can originate, but applying this to God is a category mistake. God, by definition, is of course eternal and has never originated. This will raise the issue of possible problems in the concept of eternal God, but that will be a completely different issue and so Gerkin's argument, as he has formulated it, seems to fail completely. Why didn't I realize this right away? :blush:

[Ishmael]

I am coming at this with a certain amount of bias seeing as how I already pre-suppose that God does exist... but I will give my two-cents.

The reason that the design-designer argument if so powerful is that it points out the obvious scientific principle of complexity. It does not then surprise me that so many skeptics assume that Christians would conceptualize God as complex.

One the one hand God is complex. But he is also simple. That is why the "counterclockwise" article and argument is simply a false premise and all proofs from complexity of simplicity will fail.

Design/Designer STILL boils down to an ontological argument no matter how you slice it and sell it.

"Nothing has "being" in and of itself. Period.

[automatthew]

<throws this into the pot to see what bubbles up>

Kierkegaard's definition of spirit in "The sickness unto death":

Man is spirit. But what is spirit? Spirit is the self. But what is the self? The self is a relation that relates itself to its own self, or it is that in the relation [which accounts for the fact] that the relation relates itself to its own self; the self is not the relation, but [consists in the fact] that the relation relates itself to its own self.

This is a notoriously obscure passage (it's actually the beginning of the first chapter of the book). Even with an imperfect understanding of what SK is trying to get across here, it seems clear that his conception of spirit is one of a rather simple relational constitution. How far this can be applied to God is a different question.


Post Anti-Climacus

[flipper]

So a simple, non-complex entity can give rise to forms and organisms that may exhibit increasing complexity?

Sounds about right.

I fail to see how anything that is alleged to be omniscient and omnipotent and able to act without limitation can be simple. Physical limitations (speed of light versus the vast distances of the universe) seem to imply some astounding method of imparting information so that it is concurrent. If you choose to solve this desychronous problem by suggesting that this being is extradimensional, then that rather implies that it is immediately more complex a creature than the inhabitants of the 3+1 dimensions we're all so familiar with.

It seems to me that anything "eternal" and "intelligent" should require complexity. Can you suggest some sort of a mechanism by which this should not be the case?

Aren't you handwaving? I notice that when Mr Kyle J Gerkin says: "2. Intelligence is an example of organized complexity.", we are all very aware of a number of different real world examples in which this is the case, and no real world examples in which this is not. What examples do you have to offer Kyle Gerkin? Aside from a highly imaginative thought experiment that allows you to apply any fantastical attribute you care to dream up.

Here, let me have a go too, but I'm going to wield that nice William of Ockham's razor more briskly than you in our shared love of simplicity.

Let us simplify further. Why not remove the awkard requirement of intelligence? In this abstract realm that's stuffed with forces and potentials we don't yet understand, why not remove the requirements for intelligence. Why can't universe after universe by a byproduct of this undiscovered force, or forces?

[Pate]

Wow! Three responses already! This might even develop into a discussion, despite my worries. :)

I'll reply when I've got more time. Now I need to get back to work.

[Ishmael]

flipper:
So a simple, non-complex entity can give rise to forms and organisms that may exhibit increasing complexity?

Sounds about right.

I fail to see how anything that is alleged to be omniscient and omnipotent and able to act without limitation can be simple. Physical limitations (speed of light versus the vast distances of the universe) seem to imply some astounding method of imparting information so that it is concurrent. If you choose to solve this desychronous problem by suggesting that this being is extradimensional, then that rather implies that it is immediately more complex a creature than the inhabitants of the 3+1 dimensions we're all so familiar with.

It seems to me that anything "eternal" and "intelligent" should require complexity. Can you suggest some sort of a mechanism by which this should not be the case?

Aren't you handwaving? I notice that when Mr Kyle J Gerkin says: "2. Intelligence is an example of organized complexity.", we are all very aware of a number of different real world examples in which this is the case, and no real world examples in which this is not. What examples do you have to offer Kyle Gerkin? Aside from a highly imaginative thought experiment that allows you to apply any fantastical attribute you care to dream up.

Here, let me have a go too, but I'm going to wield that nice William of Ockham's razor more briskly than you in our shared love of simplicity.

Let us simplify further. Why not remove the awkard requirement of intelligence? In this abstract realm that's stuffed with forces and potentials we don't yet understand, why not remove the requirements for intelligence. Why can't universe after universe by a byproduct of this undiscovered force, or forces?

You have a point... I was just so ill equipped to speak on the matter that I needed a little time to let it sink into my complexly created brain... complex no matter how dim-witted...

But let me cut even deeper with the razor:

God has no body according the the Bible.

[automatthew]

Why must intelligence be complex? The apparatus that supports intelligence in a material universe is obviously complex (i.e. the human body), but I see no reason to believe that the mind/self/spirit/whatyouwill is a complex construction.

[citizenkyle]

Hello all.

I recently joined TheologyWeb in preparation for a dialogue scheduled between JP Holding and myself as part of our Scholarly Diplomacy series. But, since I find one of my arguments being discussed, I suppose I ought to toss in my two cents as well. :)

The following is the reply I emailed to Pate regarding his critique of my article. Pate's response to it is forthcoming. Enjoy.

>According to my understanding, your definition of God as being "likely the
>most complex being of all" would not be accepted by many Christians, or anyway,
>not by the 15% of them that you and J. P. have estimated to belong to the
>"scholarly" categories (http://www.tektonics.org/gerkin03.html). On the contrary,
>I would argue that God is not complex at all, but as an entity to be postulated
>in an explanation He's simple. You may think that God as an intelligent being
>must be complex, because the prime examples of intellingent beings that we
>know of, for example, human beings, certainly are complex. But the problem
>here is that you seem to be drawing an invalid analogy between an intelligent
>material being and an intelligent immaterial being. Unlike we humans, God
>is immaterial, unembodied being. Christians agree universally on this. (Or,
>I may need to add again, those scholarly Christians anyway. I have actually
>encountered a few people on the Internet, who think that God consists of
>antimatter. I have no doubt that some others have just as weird beliefs about
>God as these persons have.) :-)

Indeed, I believe Kenneth Copeland has revealed God's exact height on national television. :) As to your comments, I have actually heard that position from several Christians since publishing my article. The curious fact is that neither I, nor any of the skeptical readers who critiqued my argument, anticipated such an objection. I suppose we are so rooted in materialism that we just didn't see it coming. In response to that objection, I would argue two things:

1. We have no grounds for supposing the existence of the immaterial. (I realize Christians would object to this, and it becomes a meta-issue much like creationism vs. evolution).
2. Even an immaterial intelligence would involve complexity. Of course, this delves into the issue of what we mean by "complexity". You take up that very notion in what follows, so I will elaborate below.

>
>Let's analyze the concept of complexity a bit. What comes to one's mind when
>thinking about the word "complex"? To me, at least, it brings things like
>consisting of many different parts, those parts not being all similar to
>each other and those parts being arranged in many different ways, being heterogeneous
>by their structure at some level, etc.
>
>Now it is pretty obvious that terminology like this is directly applicable
>only to material entities, which God is not. God does not consist of different
>parts. There is not a delicate configuration of "God-atoms" that make up
>God. God has no structure. The concept of structure of an entity presupposes
>reducibility to entities of different and simpler kinds. God is the ultimate
>reality that can't be reduced to anything else. The regress of explanation
>has to stop somewhere. For the theist, it stops at God, who is a person with
>unlimited knowledge and power. (To be more exact, "unlimited" here means
>"has no limits outside of His own essence".) I think it's far from obvious
>that an entity like this can be called complex.

You appear to be adhering to a definition of complexity limited to physical structure, which, as you state, would not apply to an immaterial God. But I'm thinking of a broader concept of complexity, in the sense of multiple, interrelated levels and hierarchies. This is the sense in which I consider intelligence complex. For instance, the very idea we are discussing (the nature of god and complexity) is itself an example of something complex, however, an idea has no physical structure.

Now, I can see you saying: "Wait a minute! I thought you said there was no such thing as the immaterial." This broaches the old mind/body problem and the subject of whether an idea, as an extension of material processes, is itself material. But that's a whole other road which we don't really have time to go down. Besides, hopefully you take my point above regardless.

>So, I have to disagree with your definition of God as a complex, or even
>the most complex being. Therefore, I also find your "evolutionary argument"
>unconvincing.

Of course. If intelligence is not necessarily complex, my argument falls apart.

>Before commenting on the crucial premisses of your arguments, I'll write
>a few words about evolution. I, as a Christian, have no real problem in accepting
>evolution, though I have to add that I'm also very open to some of the more
>sophisticated versions of progressive creationism. I see no reason to burn
>bridges here. Wheter or not macroevolution is the mechanism by which the
>diversity of life originated is quite secondary issue to me. Perhaps theistic
>evolution is true, or perhaps progressive creationism is. Or perhaps the
>truth lies somewhere between these two.

I certainly applaud your openness to the issue. As I see it, the problem with theistic evolution for the Christian is that it seems to entail an unnecessarily cruel and lengthy process. After all, evolution is, by necessity, a vicious struggle for existence down through the eras that ends in the extinction of millions of species. Perhaps a Christian could postulate that evolution was the only possible process by which to bring about human life (presumably God's goal) but that appears to signficantly hamstring God. Not that I'm trying to turn you away from evolution, but it can be very difficult to harmonize with Biblical Christianity.

Progressive creationism (PC) seems to occupy a middle ground, which usually doesn't win PCs many allies on either side of the conflict. PC certainly harmonizes with the body of science to a greater degree than young earth creationsim, but most evolutionists would suggest that you can't pick and choose from the body of science like a smorgasbord. By the same token, while PC gels with scripture better than evolution, young earthers accuse PCs of undermining many of the key points of scripture and traditions of historic Christianity. PC doesn't seem to carry either position to its logical conclusion.

>If the concept of God were employed only as an unnecessary addition to the
>theory by which we explain the origin of biological diversity, your sense
>of parsimony would certainly be rightfully offended. But for most theists,
>this is not the way that God-concept is used. Wholly independent of biological
>evolution, the concept of God can be used to explain things like the existence
>of the universe, the suitability of the universe for the evolution of complex
>life, the objectivity of moral values, religious experiences, the historical
>evidence for the resurrection of Jesus, etc. If the concept of God is useful
>in explaining these and/or other phenomena, then it is not an unnecessary
>addition at all, but it? is the central concept of the hypothesis of theism,
>which is a simple hypothesis and has very considerable explanatory power.
>And in this case, a Christian can hardly be blamed even if (s)he ends up
>employing the concept of God also as a possible and plausible explanation
>of the biological diversity that we see.

Point taken. Of course, I would argue that God is not necessary to explain any of abovementioned. I was specifically talking about the role of God in human origins, however, I understand that this is not the primary reason for most Christians' faith.

>
>Now, to your argument:
>
>"2. Intelligence is an example of organized complexity."
>
>If the central point of my criticism is valid, then this premiss is questionable.
>All intelligence does not need to be organized complexity.
>
>If your second premiss is false, then the third premiss does not follow.

And son on and so forth. Agreed. If premise 2 is false, my argument is worthless.

Take care!
Kyle J. Gerkin

[Pate]

flipper: So a simple, non-complex entity can give rise to forms and organisms that may exhibit increasing complexity?

Why not?


I fail to see how anything that is alleged to be omniscient and omnipotent and able to act without limitation can be simple.

I fail to see how these properties make God complex. What exactly is complex in knowing everything that there is to know and being able to do anything logically coherent?


Physical limitations (speed of light versus the vast distances of the universe) seem to imply some astounding method of imparting information so that it is concurrent. If you choose to solve this desychronous problem by suggesting that this being is extradimensional, then that rather implies that it is immediately more complex a creature than the inhabitants of the 3+1 dimensions we're all so familiar with.

God, as immaterial, nonphysical being, is not bound by physical limitations. Immaterial entity is not located anywhere spatially, and therefore the term "trans-dimensional" would be more appropriate than "extra-dimensional".


It seems to me that anything "eternal" and "intelligent" should require complexity. Can you suggest some sort of a mechanism by which this should not be the case?

Again, you are using a concept ("mechanism") that presupposes materiality and some sort of reductionistic approac.


Aren't you handwaving? I notice that when Mr Kyle J Gerkin says: "2. Intelligence is an example of organized complexity.", we are all very aware of a number of different real world examples in which this is the case, and no real world examples in which this is not. What examples do you have to offer Kyle Gerkin? Aside from a highly imaginative thought experiment that allows you to apply any fantastical attribute you care to dream up.

Why would I need to offer any examples other than God? This "highly imaginative thought experimet" is actually the traditional Christian understanding about the essence and properties of God. If Gerkin's argument just presupposes the impossibility of God, then it's useless.


Here, let me have a go too, but I'm going to wield that nice William of Ockham's razor more briskly than you in our shared love of simplicity.

Let us simplify further. Why not remove the awkard requirement of intelligence? In this abstract realm that's stuffed with forces and potentials we don't yet understand, why not remove the requirements for intelligence. Why can't universe after universe by a byproduct of this undiscovered force, or forces?

This certainly is a possibility that's worth considering. I believe that the cumulative force of all available evidence makes it more probable than not, that personal God exists, but your proposal can't be disproven either. I only could question, whether it really is simpler to postulate numerous (possibly infinite number of) universes, instead of one God. OK, you may say that you really are postulating only that undiscovered force, which causes these universes. But it may be the case that the hypothesis of this force's being personal explains the evidence that we have in such a coherent and unifying way that it should be preferred for that reason. But all this has very little to do with Gerkin's argument.

As he himself wrote in his reply to me:

"If intelligence is not necessarily complex, my argument falls apart."

and

"If premise 2 is false, my argument is worthless."

(I may later post my ongoing e-mail discussion with Gerkin to this forum. I have his permission for that.)




automatthew: Why must intelligence be complex? The apparatus that supports intelligence in a material universe is obviously complex (i.e. the human body), but I see no reason to believe that the mind/self/spirit/whatyouwill is a complex construction.

I agree. And if it is complex, that's something that at least has not been shown in this discussion.



Anyway, all this discussion about complexity becomes less important if my latter criticism, in which I showed that Gerkin's argument makes a category mistake, is valid. That criticism seems to be sufficient to refute his argument.

[Pate]

citizenkyle:
Hello all.

I recently joined TheologyWeb in preparation for a dialogue scheduled between JP Holding and myself as part of our Scholarly Diplomacy series. But, since I find one of my arguments being discussed, I suppose I ought to toss in my two cents as well. :)


Welcome to TheologyWeb! :)

Great! This will make our discussion easier. I'm planning to respond to you during the weekend, but you can already see some of my further thoughts about this issue in my earlier posts to this thread.

[citizenkyle]

Here are my thoughts with regard to Pate's suggestion that he "just realized that there's even more profound problem in Gerkin's argument. It focuses on the question of how intelligence can originate, but applying this to God is a category mistake. God, by definition, is of course eternal and has never originated. This will raise the issue of possible problems in the concept of eternal God, but that will be a completely different issue and so Gerkin's argument, as he has formulated it, seems to fail completely."

Admittedly, my argument is based on Paley's premise that a watch (i.e. complex entity) without a watchmaker is absurd. Pate suggests that God is not in the same category as an ordinary "watch". Indeed, he says that God is a category totally separate from anything else in the known universe that we can observe and examine. A category with its own set of rules where complex beings can exist eternally. In other words, a category where a watch does not require a watchmaker.

Ok. If that is the case, then my argument is irrelevant. But then, so is any argument about God. Sealing God away in a refutation-proof category turns him into a huge, unsupported premise. I, for one, am unwilling to adopt that premise.

Take care!
Kyle J. Gerkin

[Pate]

citizenkyle:
Here are my thoughts with regard to Pate's suggestion that he "just realized that there's even more profound problem in Gerkin's argument. It focuses on the question of how intelligence can originate, but applying this to God is a category mistake. God, by definition, is of course eternal and has never originated. This will raise the issue of possible problems in the concept of eternal God, but that will be a completely different issue and so Gerkin's argument, as he has formulated it, seems to fail completely."

Admittedly, my argument is based on Paley's premise that a watch (i.e. complex entity) without a watchmaker is absurd. Pate suggests that God is not in the same category as an ordinary "watch". Indeed, he says that God is a category totally separate from anything else in the known universe that we can observe and examine. A category with its own set of rules where complex beings can exist eternally. In other words, a category where a watch does not require a watchmaker.

Ok. If that is the case, then my argument is irrelevant. But then, so is any argument about God. Sealing God away in a refutation-proof category turns him into a huge, unsupported premise. I, for one, am unwilling to adopt that premise.

Take care!
Kyle J. Gerkin

Well, clearly it's a category mistake to talk about the origination of an eternal entity. Such entity, by definition, has never originated, but has always existed. So that really seems to make your argument irrelevant.

But does the fact that eternal/beginningless existence is part of the concept of God, make that concept totally separate from any other meaningful concept? I don't think so. How about the concept of eternal universe? Whether or not universe actually is eternal (I believe that it probably is not), it seems to be a pretty clear concept that we can evaluate. So why wouldn't the same be true of God?

I still don't agree with your view that God is a complex being. You mentioned "complexity, in the sense of multiple, interrelated levels and hierarchies". But how exactly should this view of complexity be applied to the concept of God? Could you be more specific?

[citizenkyle]

Pate:
Well, clearly it's a category mistake to talk about the origination of an eternal entity. Such entity, by definition, has never originated, but has always existed. So that really seems to make your argument irrelevant.

But I'm not talking about the origination of an eternal entity, I'm talking about the origination of intelligence.

Pate:
But does the fact that eternal/beginningless existence is part of the concept of God, make that concept totally separate from any other meaningful concept? I don't think so. How about the concept of eternal universe? Whether or not universe actually is eternal (I believe that it probably is not), it seems to be a pretty clear concept that we can evaluate. So why wouldn't the same be true of God?

I am not opposed to the concept of an eternal entity, per se. What I am opposed to is the concept of a *complex* eternal entity. If God truly was the most simple entity possible, I might be willing to buy his eternal nature. But, one of God's attributes is intelligence. And that indicates that he is complex.

Pate:
I still don't agree with your view that God is a complex being. You mentioned "complexity, in the sense of multiple, interrelated levels and hierarchies". But how exactly should this view of complexity be applied to the concept of God? Could you be more specific?

Under that view of complexity, I believe thoughts should to be regarded as complex. An intelligence, presumably, would involve interrelated thoughts. Thus, if God is intelligent, he is necessarily complex.

Take care!
Kyle J. Gerkin

[Pate]

Pate:
Well, clearly it's a category mistake to talk about the origination of an eternal entity. Such entity, by definition, has never originated, but has always existed. So that really seems to make your argument irrelevant.

citizenkyle:
But I'm not talking about the origination of an eternal entity, I'm talking about the origination of intelligence.

But now we need to note again, that it's a false analogy to say, that because a material, temporal intelligence must have originated, then also immaterial eternal intelligence must have originated.

The concept of eternity makes it clear that an eternal entity, even if intelligent, has not and could not have originated.



Pate:
But does the fact that eternal/beginningless existence is part of the concept of God, make that concept totally separate from any other meaningful concept? I don't think so. How about the concept of eternal universe? Whether or not universe actually is eternal (I believe that it probably is not), it seems to be a pretty clear concept that we can evaluate. So why wouldn't the same be true of God?

citizenkyle:
I am not opposed to the concept of an eternal entity, per se. What I am opposed to is the concept of a *complex* eternal entity. If God truly was the most simple entity possible, I might be willing to buy his eternal nature. But, one of God's attributes is intelligence. And that indicates that he is complex.

But I suppose you admit that an eternal universe as a whole is a very complex entity. I don't know how you explain the existence of the universe, but at least the concept of eternal universe has been accepted by many atheists throug history (more in the past an less today, though). Actually, most of the critics of Paley, probably believed in the eternal universe or at least took that possibility very seriously.



Pate:
I still don't agree with your view that God is a complex being. You mentioned "complexity, in the sense of multiple, interrelated levels and hierarchies". But how exactly should this view of complexity be applied to the concept of God? Could you be more specific?

citizenkyle:
Under that view of complexity, I believe thoughts should to be regarded as complex. An intelligence, presumably, would involve interrelated thoughts. Thus, if God is intelligent, he is necessarily complex.

But is the ability to have thoughts, anything complex in itself, if we are talking about it in the context of immaterial God? Having the specific thoughts that God has, is not an essential property of God and therefore it should not be part of the concept of God. For example, God could have refrained from creating the universe. If he had so refrained, He of couse would not have the thoughts about all the things and their relations in the universe, that He now has.

[Pate]

Hello again, Kyle. Here's my reply some of your points in your earlier response.


citizenkyle: I certainly applaud your openness to the issue. As I see it, the problem with theistic evolution for the Christian is that it seems to entail an unnecessarily cruel and lengthy process.


I don't think that the length of time needed for the process is a problem. The cruelty of the process is more problematic, but we have to remember that regardless of the view that a Christian chooses on the question of origins, this is still a problem that (s)he has to face. Why there is suffering in the world?

This is a problem worth its own thread in this forum. Because of this reason, and also because this is not very significant issue in context of your evolutionary argument, I'll be quite brief here. The existence of evil and suffering is not logically incompatible with the existence of God. There's very wide agreement among philosophers of religion on this point. So, that leaves us with only the evidential version of the problem of evil. It may be thought that the quality or quantity of evil in the world makes it improbable that God exists. Or it can be argued that some particular evil is probably gratuitous and that gratuitous evil is incompatible with the existence of God. But The fact is that we're not in a very good position to see whether some particular case of suffering really is gratuitous or not. Neither can we be confident in estimating the quality and quantity of evil that's optimal for God's purposes. This is to be expected. How could we expect to know exactly what place these events have in God's plan? I don't intend to construct a full theodicy in this thread, so I'll just add one more point. I believe that it is necessary for people to have some kind of experiental knowledge of what it's like to be living far away from the full presence of God, and be saved from that state of being by God, before it's possible for them to fully appreciate the wonderful and intimate presence of God in its fullness that they will experience in the world to come, and stay in that state voluntarily without ever rebelling again. Therefore, I see the current state of the world, even with all its seemingly unnecessary and cruel sufferings, as part of the preparation that we need. Even if the Genesis Fall was not a one-time historical event, that doesnt change the fact that we have fallen into sin, individually and collectively. We do not currently love God with all our heart or our neighbours as ourselves. Therefore we are now further from God, than what is God's ultimate purpose. Therefore, when we see this suffering around us and experience it ourselves, it will help us realize that the turning away from God and rebellion against him is not a good idea. This realization is necessary for us to once be in the presence of God forever, and not turn away from Him, though our free will would still make it possible.



Progressive creationism (PC) seems to occupy a middle ground, which usually doesn't win PCs many allies on either side of the conflict.

You're probably right, but truth is not decided by vote or the number of allies.


The other points you made concerning the YEC/PC/evolution -debate, would also be worth their own thread on this board, and I therefore choose not to comment them any further, as they also are not very essential issues in context of your argument.

[citizenkyle]

Pate:
But now we need to note again, that it's a false analogy to say, that because a material, temporal intelligence must have originated, then also immaterial eternal intelligence must have originated.

The concept of eternity makes it clear that an eternal entity, even if intelligent, has not and could not have originated.


And I must note again that an immaterial intelligence (or anything) is an unsupported assumption.


Pate:
But I suppose you admit that an eternal universe as a whole is a very complex entity. I don't know how you explain the existence of the universe, but at least the concept of eternal universe has been accepted by many atheists throug history (more in the past an less today, though). Actually, most of the critics of Paley, probably believed in the eternal universe or at least took that possibility very seriously.

As we move backwards in time to the big bang, we reach a point in time called a singularity, where all forces are one, all particles are one, etc. This is the simplest, most symmetrical state of affairs. Therefore, anything prior to that would need to be simpler still. I can imagine such an entity existing but not posessing intelligence.


Pate:
But is the ability to have thoughts, anything complex in itself, if we are talking about it in the context of immaterial God? Having the specific thoughts that God has, is not an essential property of God and therefore it should not be part of the concept of God. For example, God could have refrained from creating the universe. If he had so refrained, He of couse would not have the thoughts about all the things and their relations in the universe, that He now has.

If God was capable of having thoughts of any kind prior to the creation, which he must have had in order to have decided to create in the first place and how to go about that creation, then I would argue that he is necessarily complex.

Take care!
Kyle J. Gerkin

[flipper]

flipper: So a simple, non-complex entity can give rise to forms and organisms that may exhibit increasing complexity?
Why not?
Sounds a lot like evolution to me is all, although it doesn't reveal much about the mechanism. I think a number of your christian peers would take issue with that.

I fail to see how anything that is alleged to be omniscient and omnipotent and able to act without limitation can be simple.
I fail to see how these properties make God complex. What exactly is complex in knowing everything that there is to know and being able to do anything logically coherent?

There's the question of storage. To know everything there is to know, then there must be some way of storing and accessing said information. Even if it is stored in some other dimensional arrangement, it must be arranged and accessible in some way and it must also be intepreted. Does this being have the ability to know things that are apparently impossible, like both the position and velocity of every electron?
God, as immaterial, nonphysical being, is not bound by physical limitations. Immaterial entity is not located anywhere spatially, and therefore the term "trans-dimensional" would be more appropriate than "extra-dimensional".
So you're talking about something that exists across a number of higher dimensions than those we are familiar with? Although I know you are postulating something that has no physical body, I would like to use shapes as an anology as to why I believe that such a being would likely have to more complex rather than less. In two dimensions, we are only allowed very primitive shapes - a square, for example. In three dimensions, our shape achieves an extra dimension for additional complexity - a cube. In 4D, the cube becomes something else that we can't really visualize, whose unfolded blueprint can be described by the highly complex hypercube.

I wrote:
>It seems to me that anything "eternal" and "intelligent" should require complexity. Can you suggest some sort of a mechanism by which this should not be the case?

Again, you are using a concept ("mechanism") that presupposes materiality and some sort of reductionistic approac.

Well then we can all entertain the wildest notions as we like, confident that there will never be any requirement to account for them. My reasons for suggesting complexity are thus:
Let's take a more conservative definition of eternity (which should help your argument) by suggesting that this means the whole known period of time. It may be circular rather than infinite, as infinity has its own difficulties. Let us also accept that the universe is a finite entity, spoken into creation and then later destroyed. On either side of the universe is an unknown time that (let us say) had no informational content that required storing. However when time and the universe came into existance, then a flood of information was created. Our universe is a complex thing, and so a vast mountain of information that describes everything as it was at every possible moment must be accessible to your being. Furthermore, your being is directly responsible for this complexity - it came from "within" it as well as being responsible for tracking it. Intelligence implies that all the complex information in the universe was in some way conceived of, directed, and planned. So there are two problems - the storage and tracking of complex information, and the self-sustaining intelligence to create all this complex information in the first place. Do you see why I am somewhat skeptical?
I agree that the interaction of simple forces may result in complex and/or emergent behaviors, but these are undirected in an intelligent sense. The complexity is a result of variables.

quote:

Aren't you handwaving? I notice that when Mr Kyle J Gerkin says: "2. Intelligence is an example of organized complexity.", we are all very aware of a number of different real world examples in which this is the case, and no real world examples in which this is not. What examples do you have to offer Kyle Gerkin? Aside from a highly imaginative thought experiment that allows you to apply any fantastical attribute you care to dream up.


Why would I need to offer any examples other than God? This "highly imaginative thought experimet" is actually the traditional Christian understanding about the essence and properties of God. If Gerkin's argument just presupposes the impossibility of God, then it's useless.

I hadn't realized that there was a unified traditional Christian understanding regarding the questions of omnipotence, omniprescence, determinism and causality, eternal vs timeless.

[citizenkyle]

Pate:
The other points you made concerning the YEC/PC/evolution -debate, would also be worth their own thread on this board, and I therefore choose not to comment them any further, as they also are not very essential issues in context of your argument.

Yes, as I hopefully made clear in my paper, the validity of evolutionary theory is a necessary premise of my argument which I believe is well enough established to not require any defense on my part. If one rejects evolution, one will rightly reject my entire argument.

Also, I agree that the YEC/PC/evolution debate is (far!) outside the scope of this thread and should be abandoned by us.

Take care!
Kyle J. Gerkin

[Pate]

This is the kind of discussion that I like! It puts one's brains to work and forces one to look at the issues from the opposite point of view also. And attacks are aimed at the arguments here, not persons behind them! My only complaint would be that this seems to be pretty much a 2 vs. 1 -situation right now. So if any of my fellow Christians have thoughts that they think might be worth sharing, I especially want to encourage them to post them here.

Pate:
But now we need to note again, that it's a false analogy to say, that because a material, temporal intelligence must have originated, then also immaterial eternal intelligence must have originated.

The concept of eternity makes it clear that an eternal entity, even if intelligent, has not and could not have originated.

citizenkyle:
And I must note again that an immaterial intelligence (or anything) is an unsupported assumption.

You may think that it is unsupported assumption. But how does this answer my point about false analogy?

And of course, the question of whether or not anything immaterial (intelligence or otherwise) exists cannot be decided independently of the question of God's existence. I hope that you're not wishing to include the nonexistence of the immaterial in the premises of your argument and then go on to argue in a circle.


Pate:
But I suppose you admit that an eternal universe as a whole is a very complex entity. I don't know how you explain the existence of the universe, but at least the concept of eternal universe has been accepted by many atheists throug history (more in the past an less today, though). Actually, most of the critics of Paley, probably believed in the eternal universe or at least took that possibility very seriously.

citizenkyle:
As we move backwards in time to the big bang, we reach a point in time called a singularity, where all forces are one, all particles are one, etc. This is the simplest, most symmetrical state of affairs. Therefore, anything prior to that would need to be simpler still. I can imagine such an entity existing but not posessing intelligence.

But it seems to be the case, that the big bang singularity really is synonymous to "nothing", as it's the beginning point of space, time, matter and energy. As atheist Quentin Smith writes: "the most reasonable belief is that we came from nothing, by nothing and for nothing."

"Nothing" may be the simplest possible concept. By means of explanatory power, however, it really has nothing to offer. So if the universe arising from the singularity was uncaused, the universe began from nothing and by nothing, which I don't think to be very reasonable explanation. However, I as a theist have no problem with big bang cosmology and the idea that the universe began without a material cause.



Pate:
But is the ability to have thoughts, anything complex in itself, if we are talking about it in the context of immaterial God? Having the specific thoughts that God has, is not an essential property of God and therefore it should not be part of the concept of God. For example, God could have refrained from creating the universe. If he had so refrained, He of couse would not have the thoughts about all the things and their relations in the universe, that He now has.

citizenkyle: If God was capable of having thoughts of any kind prior to the creation, which he must have had in order to have decided to create in the first place and how to go about that creation, then I would argue that he is necessarily complex.

Hmm.. "having some thoughts" is enough to make an entity complex?

But anyway, I'm not sure that I chose the right path in my previous answer, because it would be better compatible with a version of the God-concept, that I only see as an alternative, not so well with the one that I most firmly hold to, which has a certain Molinistic bent.

So I would now argue that the knowledge that an omniscient God has, which can be defined as a kind of direct, all-encompassing, changeless intuition, which includes perfect knowledge of the possibilities and actualities, it seems to me, may not be properly called complex. When God knows some concept, the actualization of which is complex (an entity which has many different properties P1, P2, P3, P4.... and their relations R1, R2, R3, R4...), it's obvious that God himself does not have those complex properties and their relations, but rather, He has the knowledge of those properties and relations, which is entailed by God's property of omniscience, which is a simple property, as I have described.

[Pate]

flipper:
So a simple, non-complex entity can give rise to forms and organisms that may exhibit increasing complexity?

Pate:
Why not?

flipper:
Sounds a lot like evolution to me is all, although it doesn't reveal much about the mechanism. I think a number of your christian peers would take issue with that.


I wouldn't. So, that's their problem, not mine. ;)

Besides, the analogy is quite questionable. I'm sure you would agree that concepts like mutation, natural selection, heredity etc. are not applicable to God.


Flipper: I fail to see how anything that is alleged to be omniscient and omnipotent and able to act without limitation can be simple.

Pate: I fail to see how these properties make God complex. What exactly is complex in knowing everything that there is to know and being able to do anything logically coherent?

Flipper: There's the question of storage. To know everything there is to know, then there must be some way of storing and accessing said information. Even if it is stored in some other dimensional arrangement, it must be arranged and accessible in some way and it must also be intepreted.

Can you justify your claim that immaterial God with a direct, changeless knowledge of everything, needs storage? It seems that you're using a concept that's applicable only to limited material entities.


Flipper: Does this being have the ability to know things that are apparently impossible, like both the position and velocity of every electron?

As far as I know, we can't measure exactly both the position and velocity of an electron, because the energy of the photon in the process of measurement disturbs the movement of electron. So the impossibility in this case is physical impossibility, not logical impossibility. But God's knowledge is not based on measurements, but is immediate and therefore does not require any physical causes or intermediate means of aquiring it. Therefore, I suppose the answer would be yes. As I've stated, physical limitations do not apply to a nonphysical God.


Pate:
God, as immaterial, nonphysical being, is not bound by physical limitations. Immaterial entity is not located anywhere spatially, and therefore the term "trans-dimensional" would be more appropriate than "extra-dimensional".

flipper:
So you're talking about something that exists across a number of higher dimensions than those we are familiar with?

Now I need help with my limited knowledge of English. (English is not my native language.) I intended to say that God is nonspatial and therefore... hmm.. nondimensional? I'm not sure which term, trans-dimensional or extra-dimensional means the same thing, or whether neither one does. I hope you understood my idea anyway.


flipper:
Although I know you are postulating something that has no physical body, I would like to use shapes as an anology as to why I believe that such a being would likely have to more complex rather than less. In two dimensions, we are only allowed very primitive shapes - a square, for example. In three dimensions, our shape achieves an extra dimension for additional complexity - a cube. In 4D, the cube becomes something else that we can't really visualize, whose unfolded blueprint can be described by the highly complex hypercube.

Because I meant that God is a nonspatial, nondimensional entity, He would be more, not less simple than something having physical body and existing in 3+1 dimensions, even by the standards of your analogy.



flipper:
It seems to me that anything "eternal" and "intelligent" should require complexity. Can you suggest some sort of a mechanism by which this should not be the case?

Pate:
Again, you are using a concept ("mechanism") that presupposes materiality and some sort of reductionistic approac.

flipper:
Well then we can all entertain the wildest notions as we like, confident that there will never be any requirement to account for them.

I don't see anything very wild in questioning illegitimate use of terminology.



flipper:
Let's take a more conservative definition of eternity (which should help your argument) by suggesting that this means the whole known period of time. It may be circular rather than infinite, as infinity has its own difficulties.

Infinite period of time in the past really would have its own problems. However, there are several options how to view God's relationship to time. I think it's most likely that W. L. Craig's view about God's being timeless sans creation and subsequently in time, is correct.



flipper:
Let us also accept that the universe is a finite entity, spoken into creation and then later destroyed. On either side of the universe is an unknown time that (let us say) had no informational content that required storing. However when time and the universe came into existance, then a flood of information was created. Our universe is a complex thing, and so a vast mountain of information that describes everything as it was at every possible moment must be accessible to your being. Furthermore, your being is directly responsible for this complexity - it came from "within" it as well as being responsible for tracking it. Intelligence implies that all the complex information in the universe was in some way conceived of, directed, and planned. So there are two problems - the storage and tracking of complex information, and the self-sustaining intelligence to create all this complex information in the first place. Do you see why I am somewhat skeptical?


Yes, I think that I can see why. I do think however, that some of the problems you've mentioned, are mostly applicable to material entities only. (Storing and tracking information, etc.)



flipper:
I hadn't realized that there was a unified traditional Christian understanding regarding the questions of omnipotence, omniprescence, determinism and causality, eternal vs timeless.


Not unified in every sense. Certainly there are many ways to interpret certain divine properties.

[citizenkyle]

Pate:
And of course, the question of whether or not anything immaterial (intelligence or otherwise) exists cannot be decided independently of the question of God's existence. I hope that you're not wishing to include the nonexistence of the immaterial in the premises of your argument and then go on to argue in a circle.

I hope you are not wishing to include the existence of the immaterial in your premises, and then argue that God isn't complex because he's immaterial. :)

Pate:
So I would now argue that the knowledge that an omniscient God has, which can be defined as a kind of direct, all-encompassing, changeless intuition, which includes perfect knowledge of the possibilities and actualities, it seems to me, may not be properly called complex. When God knows some concept, the actualization of which is complex (an entity which has many different properties P1, P2, P3, P4.... and their relations R1, R2, R3, R4...), it's obvious that God himself does not have those complex properties and their relations, but rather, He has the knowledge of those properties and relations, which is entailed by God's property of omniscience, which is a simple property, as I have described.

Doesn't sound very simple to me ;).

Seriously though, before we go any further we need to resolve this conflict over materialism. It's true that I deny the immaterial. I don't even know what it means to be an immaterial being. It appears to be a contradiction in terms to me. The only things I know of that are immaterial are nothingness and non-existence.

It appears that you are asserting an immaterial being and then using its immaterialism as a "catch all" to avoid any possible refutation.

So you can see where we are at an impasse.

Take care!
Kyle J. Gerkin

[Pate]

Pate:
And of course, the question of whether or not anything immaterial (intelligence or otherwise) exists cannot be decided independently of the question of God's existence. I hope that you're not wishing to include the nonexistence of the immaterial in the premises of your argument and then go on to argue in a circle.

citizenkyle:
I hope you are not wishing to include the existence of the immaterial in your premises, and then argue that God isn't complex because he's immaterial. :)

But surely there's a difference. I believe that the main purpose of your argument is to disprove/prove improbable the existence of Theistic God. This being the case, it's not a good idea to formulate an argument so that it only attacks a straw-man version of God. You see, that's exactly what's going on in your argument if it does not take into account the fact that Theistic God, if He exists, is immaterial. That's like attacking the theory of evolution with an argument like "purely random processes could never produce all the biological diversity that there is" and refusing to take into account the fact that natural selection is not "purely random".



Pate:
So I would now argue that the knowledge that an omniscient God has, which can be defined as a kind of direct, all-encompassing, changeless intuition, which includes perfect knowledge of the possibilities and actualities, it seems to me, may not be properly called complex. When God knows some concept, the actualization of which is complex (an entity which has many different properties P1, P2, P3, P4.... and their relations R1, R2, R3, R4...), it's obvious that God himself does not have those complex properties and their relations, but rather, He has the knowledge of those properties and relations, which is entailed by God's property of omniscience, which is a simple property, as I have described.

citizenkyle:
Doesn't sound very simple to me ;).

Well, I fail to see the complexity here. The properties I mentioned (direct, all-encompassing etc.) all seem to follow very nicely from God's immateriality and His having unlimited knowledge, which are not complex properties in themselves.


citizenkyle:
Seriously though, before we go any further we need to resolve this conflict over materialism.

I agree that materialism is a subject worthy of discussion. But I don't think that we need that discussion in order to resolve the force of your argument. (That's what this discussion is all about. I haven't even tried to build a full positive case for Theism, as that's not needed in order to critically examine the atheistic argument you've presented.)

It seems to be the case that your evolutionary argument is not an effective argument agaist the Theistic concept of immaterial God. Just assuming materialism would be question-begging. On the other hand, if you can successfully argue for materialism, then I have to wonder what role that leaves for your evolutionary argument to play, because materialism in itself is incompatible with Theism.


citizenkyle:
It's true that I deny the immaterial. I don't even know what it means to be an immaterial being. It appears to be a contradiction in terms to me. The only things I know of that are immaterial are nothingness and non-existence.

But as far as I know, even most of the Atheist philosophers would disagree with you. Not too many of them claim that the concept of God is internally incoherent.


citizenkyle:
It appears that you are asserting an immaterial being and then using its immaterialism as a "catch all" to avoid any possible refutation.

There's nothing wrong with my asserting God's immateriality in my criticism of your argument, because that's part of the concept of Theistic God that your argument is supposed to disprove!

I agree with you that if God would be a material being, then your argument would be pretty strong. But this is not very significant point, because (leaving aside those few uninformed individuals believing in a God who consists of antimatter ;)) there's a wide agreement among Christians (and also among Jews and Muslims) that God is not a material being.

[citizenkyle]

Pate:
There's nothing wrong with my asserting God's immateriality in my criticism of your argument, because that's part of the concept of Theistic God that your argument is supposed to disprove!'

Actually, my argument is supposed to disprove an "intelligent" God, not an immaterial one. But I take your point. What you are saying is that God can be both intelligent and non-complex *because* he is immaterial. Ok. Let me ask you this: can you name any examples of intelligent, non-complex entities *besides* God?

Take care!
Kyle J. Gerkin

[Pate]

citizenkyle:


Actually, my argument is supposed to disprove an &quot;intelligent&quot; God, not an immaterial one. But I take your point. What you are saying is that God can be both intelligent and non-complex *because* he is immaterial.

The Theistic concept of God includes also immateriality. So, I really think that this is a point you need to take. Otherwise you would have to concede that your argument is irrelevant with regard to Christian, Jewish and Islamic conceptions of God (among others). That wouldn't leave much relevance to your argument.


Ok. Let me ask you this: can you name any examples of intelligent, non-complex entities *besides* God?

I don't actually need to do that.

If you're willing to accept examples taken from certain Theistic worldviews, then perhaps I could. (Not as simple as God, though.)

But if you mean examples that are accepted as part of materialistic worldview, then of course I can't. I agree that purely material entities, if they are intelligent, must also be complex.

[citizenkyle]

Pate:
If you're willing to accept examples taken from certain Theistic worldviews, then perhaps I could. (Not as simple as God, though.)

But if you mean examples that are accepted as part of materialistic worldview, then of course I can't. I agree that purely material entities, if they are intelligent, must also be complex.

Ok, *if* God can be both intelligent and non-complex by virtue of being immaterial, then my argument fails. But how can we know that? If every example of intelligence that we can cite is material, how can we apply such a concept to an immaterial being? How do we even know it can be applied? So far as we know, intelligence is tied up intrinsically with materialism. Until you can cite a counter example, I don't see that you have grounds for saying otherwise.

[Pate]

citizenkyle:


Ok, *if* God can be both intelligent and non-complex by virtue of being immaterial, then my argument fails. But how can we know that?

By analyzing the concept of God.


If every example of intelligence that we can cite is material, how can we apply such a concept to an immaterial being? How do we even know it can be applied? So far as we know, intelligence is tied up intrinsically with materialism. Until you can cite a counter example, I don't see that you have grounds for saying otherwise.

Now your really are advancing a different argument. You are arguing that intelligence must be material and that means that God as immaterial intelligence is not a real possibility. This argument has nothing to do with your previous evolutionary argument. (It doesn't add anything really important to this, anyway.) Therefore I'll repeat my claim that your evolutionary argument fails to have relevance. It does not work against the Theistic conception of God, which includes immateriality.

But this other argument, too, has problems. While it may be the case that materiality is a common property among intelligent beings, I see no reason to think that it's a necessary condition for intelligence.

Besides, it's not necessary to give another example of an event or entity to show that it's a meaningful concept. Otherwise we would have to exclude all singular events, the Big Bang, for example, from our worldview.

[citizenkyle]

Pate:
Now your really are advancing a different argument. You are arguing that intelligence must be material and that means that God as immaterial intelligence is not a real possibility. This argument has nothing to do with your previous evolutionary argument. (It doesn't add anything really important to this, anyway.)

I disagree. My previous evolutionary argument held to the premise that intelligence is necessarily complex. But you are trying to evade that premise by stating that an *immaterial* intelligence need not be complex. When I was constructing my argument, I didn't care whether God was immaterial or not, but since you are now using his immaterial nature as a trump card, I am going to challenge you to demonstrate that immaterial, non-complex intelligence is a real possibility.

Pate:
But this other argument, too, has problems. While it may be the case that materiality is a common property among intelligent beings, I see no reason to think that it's a necessary condition for intelligence.

On what grounds? What about intelligence as we know it can you divorce from materialism? Modern neuroscience is inseparable from materialism.

Pate:
Besides, it's not necessary to give another example of an event or entity to show that it's a meaningful concept. Otherwise we would have to exclude all singular events, the Big Bang, for example, from our worldview.

But we can physically examine the universe and attempt to determine whether the Big Bang happened or not. If God wishes to present himself for physical examination, I will waive my requirement of an example. But, if you are going to argue by analogy, there must be some real world referent.

[Pate]

citizenkyle:
If every example of intelligence that we can cite is material, how can we apply such a concept to an immaterial being? How do we even know it can be applied? So far as we know, intelligence is tied up intrinsically with materialism. Until you can cite a counter example, I don't see that you have grounds for saying otherwise.

Pate:
Now your really are advancing a different argument. You are arguing that intelligence must be material and that means that God as immaterial intelligence is not a real possibility. This argument has nothing to do with your previous evolutionary argument. (It doesn't add anything really important to this, anyway.)

citizenkyle:
I disagree. My previous evolutionary argument held to the premise that intelligence is necessarily complex. But you are trying to evade that premise by stating that an *immaterial* intelligence need not be complex. When I was constructing my argument, I didn't care whether God was immaterial or not, but since you are now using his immaterial nature as a trump card, I am going to challenge you to demonstrate that immaterial, non-complex intelligence is a real possibility.


This is a point where we don't seem to be able to understand each other very well. I'm not sure why that is so.

When you look at your earlier comment that I just underlined, I think that you can agree that it contains the following points:

1. It may be the case that the concept of intelligence cannot be applied to immaterial being.

and

2. The known examples of intelligence are material beings.


OK, let's assume for a moment that these points are valid and give us sufficient basis to conclude that the concept of immaterial intelligence is something that's not worth to be taken seriously. If this is the case, then it's clear that the Theistic concept of God (a concept which includes immateriality and intelligence) is not something that's worth taking seriously. This conclusion would follow wholly apart from your evolutionary argument. Therefore, the only thing that it would add to this, would be the refutation of the cocept of material God. But such a concept is rejected by Theists even without your evolutionary argument. Therefore it really does not add anything important to the conclusion of your other argument. I don't regard a 10-premise argument to a trivial conclusion to be a very good argument.

But now, let's assume that these points are not valid. Then it still seems to be the case that in your evolutionary argument, you have an argument which refutes the concept of material God, but is powerless against the concept of God that Theist really hold to, which includes immateriality and eternity/timelessness. So you still have a 10-premise argument to a trivial conclusion.

I hope that this clarifies makes my position with regard to your arguments.



Pate:
But this other argument, too, has problems. While it may be the case that materiality is a common property among intelligent beings, I see no reason to think that it's a necessary condition for intelligence.

citizenkyle:
On what grounds? What about intelligence as we know it can you divorce from materialism? Modern neuroscience is inseparable from materialism.

I'm not sure about the evidential value of arguments for the existence of human soul. I'd have to do some more reading on the subject than I currently have done, in order to draw any firm conclusions. I'd say that if an immaterial soul exists as basis of human personhood (and as part of the Theistic worldview this seems to be more probable than not), it at least seems to function in a very tight interaction with brain.

So this is something that I'd not necessarily want to use as an argument when discussing with a materialist, though I'm open to the possibility that there are convincing arguments like that. I'll only make the following points:

- Fully materialistic basis of human personhood and intelligence is compatible with Theism.
- The results of neuroscientific research do not disprove the concept of human soul, though it may be possible to argue that they make it unnecessary.




Pate:
Besides, it's not necessary to give another example of an event or entity to show that it's a meaningful concept. Otherwise we would have to exclude all singular events, the Big Bang, for example, from our worldview.

citizenkyle:
But we can physically examine the universe and attempt to determine whether the Big Bang happened or not. If God wishes to present himself for physical examination, I will waive my requirement of an example. But, if you are going to argue by analogy, there must be some real world referent.

God can't be directly examined physically and neither can the Big Bang. In case of the Big Bang, we can examine the features of the universe (cosmic background radiation, expansion rate etc.) and postulate the Big Bang to explain these features as effects of the Big Bang. In a similar manner, we can examine certain features of reality and postulate God as an explanation. In both cases we infer from the evidence to an explanation. The Big Bang certainly does not need to be rejected on the basis that it's a singular event and not directly observable. The same is true of God. One may question the merits of the God-hypothesis and propose alternative explanations for the same phenomena, but this is also true with regard to the Big Bang.

[citizenkyle]

Pate:
I hope that this clarifies makes my position with regard to your arguments.

Arggh! :) We are like ships passing in the night. I believe I understand your position. But let me take another shot at clarifying mine.

I don't think the immaterial exists, but that premise is not part of my argument because, as you correctly note, that wouldn't address the Christian concept of God.

What I do argue is that:
1. Intelligence is necessarily complex.
2. God (the concept anyway) is intelligent.
Therefore, God is complex.

You are trying to argue that God is not complex but is still intelligent. Your reasoning for this is that God is immaterial so different rules apply. But it's not fair to just posit some special kind of non-complex intelligence. You must compare any potentially existing intelligence to the intelligence that we are already aware of. Yes, every instance of intelligence we are aware of is tied up with a material being, but that doesn't exempt God. In other words, you can't just say God posesses a non-complex intelligence *because* he is immaterial. You must present evidence for non-complex intelligence being a real possibility.

Pate:
God can't be directly examined physically and neither can the Big Bang. In case of the Big Bang, we can examine the features of the universe (cosmic background radiation, expansion rate etc.) and postulate the Big Bang to explain these features as effects of the Big Bang. In a similar manner, we can examine certain features of reality and postulate God as an explanation. In both cases we infer from the evidence to an explanation. The Big Bang certainly does not need to be rejected on the basis that it's a singular event and not directly observable. The same is true of God. One may question the merits of the God-hypothesis and propose alternative explanations for the same phenomena, but this is also true with regard to the Big Bang.

The key difference is that God can explain anything and everything, thus he actually explains nothing.

[Pate]

citizenkyle:
I don't think the immaterial exists, but that premise is not part of my argument because, as you correctly note, that wouldn't address the Christian concept of God.

OK. Good. Because we agree on this much, it also means that it's not a valid objection against my criticisms of your argument to question the existence of immaterial. But your earlier responses have contained many such objections. Let me just include some of them below:


"And I must note again that an immaterial intelligence (or anything) is an unsupported assumption."

"I hope you are not wishing to include the existence of the immaterial in your premises, and then argue that God isn't complex because he's immaterial."

"It appears that you are asserting an immaterial being and then using its immaterialism as a "catch all" to avoid any possible refutation."


So, if you are now willing to concede that in order to address the the Christian concept of God, you cannot deny the immateriality of God in the premisses of your evolutionary argument, then it seems to be the case that we can now agree that those earlier comments that you made, are irrelevant.



citizenkyle:
What I do argue is that:
1. Intelligence is necessarily complex.
2. God (the concept anyway) is intelligent.
Therefore, God is complex.

You are trying to argue that God is not complex but is still intelligent. Your reasoning for this is that God is immaterial so different rules apply. But it's not fair to just posit some special kind of non-complex intelligence. You must compare any potentially existing intelligence to the intelligence that we are already aware of. Yes, every instance of intelligence we are aware of is tied up with a material being, but that doesn't exempt God. In other words, you can't just say God posesses a non-complex intelligence *because* he is immaterial. You must present evidence for non-complex intelligence being a real possibility.


But clearly the burden of proof is upon you to show that God as an immaterial intelligence must be necessarily complex. I already challenged this by (among other things) pointing out the obvious disanalogy between limited, material, temporal intelligence and immaterial, timeless/eternal intelligence. Your reply to this was the first one of those three quotations that I gave above. In that reply you just questioned the existence of anything immaterial, but that's a reply that you have now refuted even yourself, as I have pointed out earlier in this post.

I see no reason to think that the concept of God, as I've defined it, is complex. There's no more need to give any other example of immaterial, non-complex intelligence in order to show that the existence of such is possible, than there is need to give another example of the origin of the universe in order to show that it is possible (indeed, probable) that such an event happened.



Pate:
God can't be directly examined physically and neither can the Big Bang. In case of the Big Bang, we can examine the features of the universe (cosmic background radiation, expansion rate etc.) and postulate the Big Bang to explain these features as effects of the Big Bang. In a similar manner, we can examine certain features of reality and postulate God as an explanation. In both cases we infer from the evidence to an explanation. The Big Bang certainly does not need to be rejected on the basis that it's a singular event and not directly observable. The same is true of God. One may question the merits of the God-hypothesis and propose alternative explanations for the same phenomena, but this is also true with regard to the Big Bang.

citizenkyle:
The key difference is that God can explain anything and everything, thus he actually explains nothing.

I disagree. While it is true that the God-hypothesis is compatible with a very wide variety of different states of affairs, it is nevertheless true that there are some states of affairs that give better support to the God-hypothesis than others would give. So the crucial issue is whether or not we have sufficient basis to accept a hypothesis or not. (I'll leave aside the issue that Plantinga has, in my opinion, successfully demonstrated that belief in God can be rational also in a different way, and not only as an entity postulated in explanatory hypothesis.)

[citizenkyle]

Round and round we go. :argue:

Ok, let me try a different tack. Is there anything that could disprove your concept of God?

If you say no, then I will agree that my argument is impotent, but I must also conclude that your concept of God is worthless. That which is not falsifiable is mere speculation.

[Pate]

citizenkyle:
Round and round we go. :argue:


Actually, you're the one going round and round. I just need to follow you, because my intention is to crush every argument that you'll leave to the side of your path. ;)


citizenkyle:
Ok, let me try a different tack. Is there anything that could disprove your concept of God?

If you say no, then I will agree that my argument is impotent, but I must also conclude that your concept of God is worthless. That which is not falsifiable is mere speculation.


A clear logical contradiction in the concept of God would disprove it. Other than that, I'm not sure whether any kind of absolute disproof is possible. But that's true for very many concepts other than God also. Certainly it's possible to construct somewhat powerful arguments against the existence of God and many atheistic philosophers, at least, believe that they have been successful in doing this. (I also agree that certain atheistic arguments have some force.) The really significant question is, which worldview is the most rational one, and this is mostly a matter of comparing the intellectual merits of competing worldviews, not a question of finding a decisive disproof.

[citizenkyle]

Pate:
A clear logical contradiction in the concept of God would disprove it. Other than that, I'm not sure whether any kind of absolute disproof is possible. But that's true for very many concepts other than God also.

Can you name any materialist concepts where this is the case?

Pate:
Certainly it's possible to construct somewhat powerful arguments against the existence of God and many atheistic philosophers, at least, believe that they have been successful in doing this. (I also agree that certain atheistic arguments have some force.)

Which ones and why?

Pate:
The really significant question is, which worldview is the most rational one, and this is mostly a matter of comparing the intellectual merits of competing worldviews, not a question of finding a decisive disproof.

Right. But a decisive disproof would certainly clear up matters. :)

[Pate]

citizenkyle:
Can you name any materialist concepts where this is the case?


I don't think that we have to look very far to find such a concept. How about the concept of materialism itself? Is absolute disproof of materialism possible?


citizenkyle:
Which ones and why?


Argument from divine hiddenness would be one of them, I think. It doesn't get anywhere near to disproving God, but it does raise certain issues that need to be answered carefully.

The problem of evil has some intellectual merits, in my opinion, though I don't think that it has the kind of power that many atheists seem to think. I consider it to be more emotional than intellectual problem, but it does have some intellectual merit also. (Actually, at http://theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&threadid=527 I have posted a challenge that you're welcome to accept if you want to.)



Right. But a decisive disproof would certainly clear up matters. :)

Yes, it would. But there would also be a darker side to that. We would have one interesting subject less to debate. ;)

[citizenkyle]

Pate:
I don't think that we have to look very far to find such a concept. How about the concept of materialism itself? Is absolute disproof of materialism possible?


Yes, by producing something immaterial. Now, you may this is impossible because the immaterial cannot be produced for examination in the material realm. But this just supports my contention that claims of the immaterial are just that - immaterial. Because the burden of proof lies with the person making a positive claim.

If materialism is merely the claim that there is nothing immaterial, then that is a negative claim. Negative claims are not subject to the same standards of proof as are positive claims. That's why the negative claim "No God exists" is not subject to the same standards as the positive claim "The Christian God exists". Or why the negative claim "No unicorns exist" is not subject to the same standards as the positive claim "Unicorns exist".

Negative claims can never be met with absolute proof, as one can always assert that there is a God/unicorn/whatever hiding out there somewhere. But negative claims can be *disproved* easy enough. All one has to do is produce a God/unicorn/whatever for examination and the claim is refuted. Positive claims can be *proved* in this exact same manner. But any claim (negative or positive) in order to be meaningful must be able to be disproven. For instance, that gravity exists is a positive claim. And it is easily enough disproven. One simply would have to produce an object of sufficient mass which is not traveling at escape velocity yet (barring the work of engines, wings, etc.) does not fall to the earth.

Therefore, if your concept of God is unable to be disproved, it is meaningless. And naturally any argument against such a God would be meaningless as well.

Now, you might say that the concept of materialism is meaningless based on what I have outlined above. After all, if one can't produce the immaterial, then materialism is not falsifiable. And I would agree with you. Materialism is only meaningful in that it militates against the existence of the immaterial. But if such things are nonsense, then so is any explicit declaration of materialism. It should just be implicit in our understanding of the universe.

[Pate]

Pate:
I don't think that we have to look very far to find such a concept. How about the concept of materialism itself? Is absolute disproof of materialism possible?

citizenkyle:
Yes, by producing something immaterial. Now, you may this is impossible because the immaterial cannot be produced for examination in the material realm.


Yes, of course it's impossible to examine the immaterial the way that the material is examined.

Any indirect evidence for immaterial (certain phenomena from which one may infer to the existence of an immaterial cause, etc.) is such that if the materialist is determined to find a material explanation for it, (s)he will be able to come up with one, no matter how implausible. Or if (s)he can't do that, then it's still possible to appeal to human ignorance and believe that a material explanation exists, though it's unknown. Therefore, I really doubt that materialism is disprovable in any very absolute way.


citizenkyle:
But this just supports my contention that claims of the immaterial are just that - immaterial. Because the burden of proof lies with the person making a positive claim. If materialism is merely the claim that there is nothing immaterial, then that is a negative claim. Negative claims are not subject to the same standards of proof as are positive claims. That's why the negative claim "No God exists" is not subject to the same standards as the positive claim "The Christian God exists".


The burden of proof lies with the person making any claim about reality, whether it's positive or negative. If it's not possible to adequately prove some negative claim, then that should only make us cautious about making such a claim.

And also, materialism makes a positive claim, which could be formulated as something like "the ultimate basis of reality is material".


citizenkyle:
Or why the negative claim "No unicorns exist" is not subject to the same standards as the positive claim "Unicorns exist".


With regard to unicorns, the important issue is the same as with regard to God. That is, whether or not we have rational basis to believe in the existence of such an entity. But I hope that you're not going to claim that these two beliefs are on the same level with regard to their rationality.


citizenkyle:
Therefore, if your concept of God is unable to be disproved, it is meaningless. And naturally any argument against such a God would be meaningless as well. Now, you might say that the concept of materialism is meaningless based on what I have outlined above. After all, if one can't produce the immaterial, then materialism is not falsifiable. And I would agree with you. Materialism is only meaningful in that it militates against the existence of the immaterial.


Absolute disproof would be a logical contradiction in the concept of God or a logical contradiction between concept of God and a some logically necessary truth. I don't think that this kind of contradiction actually exists. But this still leaves the issue of some non-absolute evidence against the existence of God. That's perfectly possible and some such evidence in fact exists. The question just is, how rational it is to accept the existence of God when considering the evidence for and against it.

So, this issue of proof/disproof only seems to be problematic to Theism in particular, if we accept some very strict positivist/empiricist criterion for proof/disproof. But such a criterion fails its own test. A principle like "we can accept a proposition to be meaningful only if it's self-evidently true or directly empirically verifiable" is itself neither self-evidently true or directly empirically verifiable.

[citizenkyle]

I don't know how much further we are going to get with these issues. Since we both have various other threads going, perhaps it would be most prudent to wrap this up. I have enjoyed corresponding with you and thank you for your comments and criticisms. Now, for some final thoughts.

The God you propose is untoucable by any method of analysis or examination that find worthwhile. I have no interest in such beings.

On the bright side (for you), I will admit that my evolution argument fails against such a God.

[Pate]

citizenkyle:
I don't know how much further we are going to get with these issues. Since we both have various other threads going, perhaps it would be most prudent to wrap this up. I have enjoyed corresponding with you and thank you for your comments and criticisms. Now, for some final thoughts.

That's OK with me. I have also enjoyed our correspondence and so I want to thank you. Even if we can't agree on all these issues, I hope that both of us have been able to gain at least little better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of our own views and opposing views.


citizenkyle:
The God you propose is untoucable by any method of analysis or examination that find worthwhile. I have no interest in such beings.

On the bright side (for you), I will admit that my evolution argument fails against such a God.

As far as I know, the concept of God that I've proposed, is in all essential respects well within the borders of traditional Christian (and wider monotheistic) understanding of the concept of God. I therefore conclude that your argument fails against any concept of God that is nowadays relevant and intellectually respectable in our societies, except perhaps the pantheistic concept of God.

[citizenkyle]

Pate:
That's OK with me. I have also enjoyed our correspondence and so I want to thank you. Even if we can't agree on all these issues, I hope that both of us have been able to gain at least little better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of our own views and opposing views.

Indeed. Let's hope more Christians and skeptics can follow our example in carrying on civil and productive discussions.

Pate:
As far as I know, the concept of God that I've proposed, is in all essential respects well within the borders of traditional Christian (and wider monotheistic) understanding of the concept of God. I therefore conclude that your argument fails against any concept of God that is nowadays relevant and intellectually respectable in our societies, except perhaps the pantheistic concept of God.

The argument fails against any God who is intelligent yet posesses zero complexity. Of course, proving the existence of such a being is another matter altogether. ;)

[Robin Goodfellow]

Hi Guys,

I’m thinking about this while sleep-deprived, so I may be way off. But I’m not so sure Kyle’s argument fails even if God has no complexity.

Are you keeping in mind that Paley’s argument was an argument from analogy? Kyle points out that Paley said that because our experience has been that all complex, organized objects were created by a designer, that so also must living things also have been created by a designer.

But our experience has always been that the designer is a complex, material being. So, for the analogy to hold, wouldn’t we have to conclude that life’s designer is a complex, material being? To claim otherwise, as Pate does, is to admit that Paley’s original analogy fails. So, even on the alternative track that Pate has laid out, we can still say, with Kyle, that “the argument sabotages itself with its own logic before it even gets off the ground.”

If the designer doesn't have to be material or complex, perhaps it doesn't have to be intelligent either. It could just be Dawkins' Blind Watchmaker.

Pate objects that this is irrelevant for the Judeo-Christian God. I say the Judeo-Christian God can't be properly inferred from Paley's analogy. It can only be posited if we decide Paley's analogy fails.

No?

Robin Goodfellow

[citizenkyle]

Robin Godfellow:

Pate objects that this is irrelevant for the Judeo-Christian God. I say the Judeo-Christian God can't be properly inferred from Paley's analogy. It can only be posited if we decide Paley's analogy fails.

No?


This is true. My assumption was that Pate was not attempting to defend Paley's argument as valid. And my argument was not an attempt to refute Paley (Darwin already did) but rather to prove that God cannot exist. However, Pate (perhaps representing Christianity at large) has placed God in an untoucable immaterial realm where he has little to fear from my (or any) arguments.

[Robin Goodfellow]

citizenkyle:


This is true. My assumption was that Pate was not attempting to defend Paley's argument as valid. And my argument was not an attempt to refute Paley (Darwin already did) but rather to prove that God cannot exist. However, Pate (perhaps representing Christianity at large) has placed God in an untoucable immaterial realm where he has little to fear from my (or any) arguments.
Right. I didn't read closely enough. I assume Pate agrees with your criticism of Paley.

Thanks,

Robin

[Pate]

citizenkyle:
Indeed. Let's hope more Christians and skeptics can follow our example in carrying on civil and productive discussions.


Let's hope so. And, you know what? I can even admit that even though you disagree with me in some very important matters, you still seem to be a very pleasant person! Can you imagine certain other theists and atheists saying that of each other? ;)


The argument fails against any God who is intelligent yet posesses zero complexity. Of course, proving the existence of such a being is another matter altogether.

I'd just say that this is a straw-man version of my position. Only "nothingness" has zero complexity, but it also has zero explanatory power. You cannot shave too strongly with Ockham's razor, if you want to avoid making a deadly wound to your worldview.

My earlier point about invalid analogy still holds.

Also, remember that my aim was not to prove the existence of God, but only to refute your argument agaist God's existence.

[Pate]

Robin Godfellow:
Are you keeping in mind that Paley’s argument was an argument from analogy?

Yes, but analogy does not require perfect identity in order to be successful.

Postulating a material designer does not solve the problem, but only moves it further. This is something that Kyle and I agree on.


Pate objects that this is irrelevant for the Judeo-Christian God. I say the Judeo-Christian God can't be properly inferred from Paley's analogy. It can only be posited if we decide Paley's analogy fails.

If the designer doesn't have to be material or complex, perhaps it doesn't have to be intelligent either. It could just be Dawkins' Blind Watchmaker.


I'm not sure that I would accept Paley's argument without any modification. I don't even waste my time arguing against evolution. The form of design-argument that I do consider to be powerful, is one dealing with the necessary conditions for the existence and evolution of life. That argument, even if successful, does not in itself establish the conclusion that the designer is specifically the Judeo-Christian God, but it can work as a part of cumulative case for that conclusion.

My purpose in this discussion was not so much to defend the traditional Paley's version of the teleological argument, but rather to refute the evolutionary argument against God's existence, that Kyle presents in his web site.