Molinism: Thinking Man's Arminianism

[Jaltus]

Molinism is a system of belief created by Luis de Molina. It tries to reconcile Libertarian Free Will (LFW) with God's Exhaustive Divine Foreknowledge (EDF).

The way that Molina did this is through the use of God being able to see all possibilities. If God knows what would happen in any cricumstance, then He can plan what He wants to do in response to that circumstance. This allows people to freely choose, but for God to respond as He wishes. Thus, neither EDF nor LFW is lost.

I am just delving into this system myself, so there may very well be questions I cannot answer. However, I am trying to get ahold of William Lane Craig's The Only Wise God, since Craig is the leading Moliist in terms of depth and claritiy if thought that I know.

[GrayPilgrim]

Did God forsee this thread as a possible contingency or did he ordain it? :p

[bar Jonah]

Jaltus, we Open Viewers usually agree that God can foresee all possible outcomes (although there are rare exceptions), simply because He knows all present variables and can extrapolate all possibilities via infinite intelligence.

So, how would you differentiate Molinism from Open Theism in this regard?

[Jaltus]

OV says that God can guess what He might do, but Molinism is that He KNOWS what WOULD happen.

Would is much more definite than might. If set A happens, then only C can follow. It is not a game of odds, as OV is, it is a game of what really will happen.

[bar Jonah]

But would you not concede that even if A happens at a certain time, there are still an infinite number of possibilities after A? And an infinite number of possibilities after B?

So, if A happens, everything else in the future still must be examined. A causation tree with an infinite number of branches.

[Jaltus]

No, there are not an infinite number of things that can happen, there are in fact a limited number of things that can happen, and as we progress through time, that limited number becomes smaller. Why do I say that? Because God knows already when the end will come, whereas in the OV He does not.


Time is getting less, hence options are growing more and more limited with each passing moment.

[bar Jonah]

You say Time is getting less. Does that mean you believe that while God may exist in Time right now, that He (and even we) can exist outside of Time? The OV holds that Time isn't running out because God (and our existence) is eternal, without end. And for something to be everlasting, it must exist in Time. "Everlasting" is a temporal quality. "Eternal" is a temporal quality.

[Jaltus]

I think time as we know it will come to an end at the Final Judgment.

With a new creation, a new time will begin, though I am not dogmatic at this point (my mind could be changed here).

You are missing my point in any event. My point is that we are moving to the focal point of the future, that being the final judgment. All things come to that point, and God knows where in time that will be. Once that judgment happens, I think God no longer needs to know "all possible worlds" for evil will be vanquished.

[bar Jonah]

But we also know that such a day (the Final Judgement) won't necessarily happen in one set-in-stone exact way. It could happen in any of numerous ways and still happen in accordance to God's will. So how can it be considered an absolute focal point, a bottleneck of possibilities?

[geebob]

OV says that God can guess what He might do, but Molinism is that He KNOWS what WOULD happen.

Jaltus, I don't think you have the difference pegged here. I don't think it is necessarily the case that God does indeed geuss. I think there are instances where God knows that there is no certain outcome but at the same time he has hopes and expectations, but nevertheless, he has solid irrefutable knowledge of the occasion knowing the specific number of possibilities that could come about and which descriptions of apparent possibilities are inaccesable. That is not a geuss but is worthy of the term of knowledge, especially by the correspondence description of truth which I believe is what we are talking about in these issues.

[geebob]

But we also know that such a day (the Final Judgement) won't necessarily happen in one set-in-stone exact way.

Agreed. We humans can set deadlines with goals. Why can't God do the same without figuring out every detail?

[Chief of Staff Lizard]

Originally posted by Jaltus
Molinism is a system of belief created by Luis de Molina. It tries to reconcile Libertarian Free Will (LFW) with God's Exhaustive Divine Foreknowledge (EDF).

The way that Molina did this is through the use of God being able to see all possibilities. If God knows what would happen in any cricumstance, then He can plan what He wants to do in response to that circumstance. This allows people to freely choose, but for God to respond as He wishes. Thus, neither EDF nor LFW is lost.

I am just delving into this system myself, so there may very well be questions I cannot answer. However, I am trying to get ahold of William Lane Craig's The Only Wise God, since Craig is the leading Moliist in terms of depth and claritiy if thought that I know.

This is interesting. Sounds like we are close to the same place in this. While I have not yet decided to embrace Molinism, I am certainly leaning in that direction.

I would really like to hear why you are attracted to Molinism.

[Jaltus]

But we also know that such a day (the Final Judgement) won't necessarily happen in one set-in-stone exact way. Actually, you would be assuming that. We, humanity, know NOTHING about the end times, other than that they will look just as scripture described them. The problem is not God's description, rather it is our comprehension (may I remind all of us of the Jews concept of the Messiah, and how off they were? I'd say we will be about the same off with eschatology), the joys of the infinite disclosing to the finite.

As for "deadlines with goals," humans miss deadlines, God doesn't. Hence, it is not a deadline but an actual happening in the future.

Besides, if the future is not real, how can God see ANY of it? If you choose the OV, all prophecy MUST be determinative, otherwise God has no predictive power.

Faramir,

I am attracted to Molinism due to the way it blends my understanding of what the Bible teaches. Such passages as Matthew 11:21-24

21 "Woe to you, Korazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida! If the miracles that were performed in you had been performed in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes.
22 But I tell you, it will be more bearable for Tyre and Sidon on the day of judgment than for you.
23 And you, Capernaum, will you be lifted up to the skies? No, you will go down to the depths. If the miracles that were performed in you had been performed in Sodom, it would have remained to this day.
24 But I tell you that it will be more bearable for Sodom on the day of judgment than for you."

[geebob]

Actually, you would be assuming that.

yeah right idea's not quite right to say that we know this but this is a reasonable assumption and it is the one you would go with assuming the open view.

As for "deadlines with goals," humans miss deadlines, God doesn't. Hence, it is not a deadline but an actual happening in the future.

see, this is where you ere as you assume that the difference is that God's keeping of the deadline is due to absolute certainty of absolutely everything.

But why should God need that. We miss our deadlines because we don't have a full grasp of the situation with knowledge of all the contingencies and possibilities.

but we have reason to believe that even if God has to deal with uncertainties, he can meet any deadline he sets because he knows with exact certainty all of the contingencies are and what needs to be done and what may need to be done so that those contingencies do not interfer with his goals and deadlines. If God has to "cheat" then by gum it he will do so. (for example, messing with the laws of nature or pushing peoples buttons so that they will act in a certain way, in consistency with their freely formed character of course).

And don't forget, the principle of the skinned cat still wins! (I'll post a thread on it for those of you who are not familier with it.

Besides, if the future is not real, how can God see ANY of it? If you choose the OV, all prophecy MUST be determinative, otherwise God has no predictive power.

We are calvinists when it comes to foreknowledge because foreknowledge of the certain is based on what has been determined (but not necessarily by God, for man and nature may also determine things).

And of course, certainly you know that some prophecies are contingent. There is no need for certainty with those prophecies. And as many of the prophecies that did not come to pass are viewed as contingent, there is no reason to assume that those that did are always no less contingent.

[GrayPilgrim]

geebob:
We are calvinists when it comes to foreknowledge because foreknowledge of the certain is based on what has been determined (but not necessarily by God, for man and nature may also determine things).

I just like that :)


And of course, certainly you know that some prophecies are contingent. There is no need for certainty with those prophecies. And as many of the prophecies that did not come to pass are viewed as contingent, there is no reason to assume that those that did are always no less contingent.

Because some prophicies are contingent, this does not necesitate that all prophecy is contingent. So to argue to this is pure conjecture and less than helpful, IMHO.

[geebob]

Because some prophicies are contingent, this does not necesitate that all prophecy is contingent. So to argue to this is pure conjecture and less than helpful, IMHO.

Which is why I would never argue it.

as I said "And of course, certainly you know that some prophecies are contingent."

Now when I said this, "And as many of the prophecies that did not come to pass are viewed as contingent, there is no reason to assume that those that did are always no less contingent."

I ment only that we can't assume that those that come to pass where certain. That doesn't mean they weren't. It just means that we can't know for certain, unless God says something like "I swear by my name..."

I believe that God did make some prophecies that were destined to come to pass no matter what.

[GrayPilgrim]

Got ya' thanks for the clarification

[Chief of Staff Lizard]

Jaltus:
Faramir,

I am attracted to Molinism due to the way it blends my understanding of what the Bible teaches. Such passages as Matthew 11:21-24

21 "Woe to you, Korazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida! If the miracles that were performed in you had been performed in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes.
22 But I tell you, it will be more bearable for Tyre and Sidon on the day of judgment than for you.
23 And you, Capernaum, will you be lifted up to the skies? No, you will go down to the depths. If the miracles that were performed in you had been performed in Sodom, it would have remained to this day.
24 But I tell you that it will be more bearable for Sodom on the day of judgment than for you."

Thanks Jaltus, that is actually exactly what I was looking for.

I like the idea of reconciling LFW and EDF, however I really like having some scripture to back it up. :thumb:

[Jaltus]

In my opinion, the OV does not handle "possible worlds" phenomena well.

[geebob]

Only in the OV are the do the possible worlds describe something that is actually possible and not just merely logically possible.

Possible worlds in molinism often describe a possible world as an enduring object So the multitude of possible worlds could only possibly be actualized at the beginning of time. I don't see why we can't consider the possible worlds in a perduring way where the actual world through time might turn into one of several possible worlds at one moment and another possible world that is consistent with the previous one at the next moment and so on.

[Jaltus]

Possible worlds in molinism often describe a possible world as an enduring object So the multitude of possible worlds could only possibly be actualized at the beginning of time. I don't see why we can't consider the possible worlds in a perduring way where the actual world through time might turn into one of several possible worlds at one moment and another possible world that is consistent with the previous one at the next moment and so on.Hmmmm, I don't think you get Molinism. Molinism takes advantage of possible worlds, not making them endure. As time progresses, options drop out and certain worlds are no longer possible.

[geebob]

That could be but I'm pretty sure that what I've said is consistent with some form of molinism that I've read of in the past.

Except for one thing, I mixed up my definitions of endurantism and perdurantism. A possible world in which America wins world war II in 1946 and Jaltus becomes an open theist in February of 2003 is a perduring possible world. We can speak of possible world's in this fashion. But it is also possible to describe possible world's in an enduring sense that does not involve the history and future but merely the present. And I believe that access to several of these possible world's is what is necessary to establishing free will.

But I do not get the perception that that is how molinists establish free will. It is my understanding that we are free because there are possible world's where we choose otherwise and this is an ultimate fact of who we are that God himself does not determine. That we are not in any of those possible world's or that they are not accessible is of no consequence to the molinist. They feel it is enough to say that we can act or refrain from acting and even though which we will do depends on the possible world that we are in. And since they are not going to obtain, God can know the future exhaustively because he knows what possible world is the actual world.

Now you say that the other possible world's are indeed accesable, but I'm curious as to how this can be so and yet you hold to edf. The only thing that I can think of is that God decides through time which possible world is actualized. But if that is the case, I don't see how we are truly free unless it is we ourselves who play a role in which possible world is actualized.

[Jaltus]

If we did not have access to other possible worlds then creation was a deterministic contract in the first place.

[geebob]

I agree, and for that reason, I don't see how molinism as I understand really coheres with a libertarian/indeterministic picture.

Do you have a quote from perhaps Craig that says that we have access to these worlds? And if we do, do you have an explanation as to how God still has edf?

Admittedly, I may not understand molinism, but even if I don't, there are philosophers who also see molinism as too deterministic, as Hasker notes in his book God, Time, and Knowledge, "It is at least ironic, and perhaps significant, that the theory of middle knowledge, which was then under suspicion because it conceded to much to free will, should now be viewed with concern by a number of philosophers because it comes too close to determinism." (p12)

[Jaltus]

Yeah, and the OV limits God's sovereignty.

Quoting an opponent is always a sure way to show disagreement, but not necessarily flaws.

[geebob]

Yeah, and the OV limits God's sovereignty.

this coming from a fellow free will theist.. :no:



still waiting on that quote and explanation.

[bar Jonah]

Jaltus:
Yeah, and the OV limits God's sovereignty.

Quoting an opponent is always a sure way to show disagreement, but not necessarily flaws.
So if God allows something to happen without directly causing it, this diminishes His sovereignty? How? Nothing happens without Him allowing it to happen. Therefore, He constantly has absolute -- but indirect -- control over all things, including Satan.

So, I fail to see how this diminishes God's sovereignty. Can you elaborate?

[GrayPilgrim]

RightIdea:
So if God allows something to happen without directly causing it, this diminishes His sovereignty? How? Nothing happens without Him allowing it to happen. Therefore, He constantly has absolute -- but indirect -- control over all things, including Satan.

So, I fail to see how this diminishes God's sovereignty. Can you elaborate?

That was not Jaltus' point. He was saying that if you read someone who does not like a position, in this case Molinism, you will always find a refutation of it. He used OV as an example since Geebob is an OVer. At least that was my read of the situation.

[geebob]

I'd like to mention that my purpose in quoting Hasker was not to show necessary flaws. I readily admit that my understanding of molinism may be significantly lacking. But I believe that my arguements point to why it amounts to a sort of determinism, and since other suspect it of being too deterministic, It may be for the reason that I pointed out and Jaltus agreed to, "If we did not have access to other possible worlds then creation was a deterministic contract in the first place."

[dizzle]

Faramir:


This is interesting. Sounds like we are close to the same place in this. While I have not yet decided to embrace Molinism, I am certainly leaning in that direction.

I would really like to hear why you are attracted to Molinism.

You too Faramir?? Weird huh?

[Jaltus]

GP,

Right on. I was showing, through my spiritual gift of sarcasm, that quoting an oppenent to show a flaw is missing the point of debate.

GB,

It looks like William Lane Craig has a totally different idea than I do.

Incoming long quote from WLC, Time and Eternity, 264:
In assessing the question of how God knows which events will transpire, it is helpful to distinguish two models of divine cognition: the perceptualist model and the conceptualist model. The perceptionalist model construes divine knowledge on the analogy of sense perception. God looks and sees what is there. Such a model is implicitly assumed when people speak of God's "foreseeing" the future or having "foresight" of future events. the perceptualist model of divine cognition does run into real problems when it comes to God's knowledge of the future, for, since future events do not exist, there is nothing there to perceive.

By contrast, on a conceptualist model of divine foreknowledge, God does not acquire His knowledge of the world by anything like perception. His knowledge of the future is not based on His "looking" ahead and "seeing" what lies in the future (a terribly anthropomorphic notion in any case). Rather God's knowledge is self-contained; it is more like a mind's knowledge of innate ideas. As an omniscient being, God has essentially the property of knowing all truths; there are truths about future events; ergo, God knows all truths concerning future events.

So long as we are not seduced into thinking of divine foreknowledge on the model of perception, it is no longer evident why knowledge of future events should be impossible. A conceptualist model furnishes a perspicuous basis for God's knowledge of future contingents.

Any questions? :o :thinking: ;}

[geebob]

only on how he uses possible worlds to get his conceptualist picture. I still suspect that he and other molinists hold that there is one possible world that is the actual world and other possible worlds are not accessible to the present as the actual world perdures (I may be using that term librally as it is a little tricky to see how a presentist world can perdure).

[President-Elect $cirisme]

Jaltus:
Molinism is a system of belief created by Luis de Molina. It tries to reconcile Libertarian Free Will (LFW) with God's Exhaustive Divine Foreknowledge (EDF).

The way that Molina did this is through the use of God being able to see all possibilities. If God knows what would happen in any cricumstance, then He can plan what He wants to do in response to that circumstance. This allows people to freely choose, but for God to respond as He wishes. Thus, neither EDF nor LFW is lost.

I am just delving into this system myself, so there may very well be questions I cannot answer. However, I am trying to get ahold of William Lane Craig's The Only Wise God, since Craig is the leading Moliist in terms of depth and claritiy if thought that I know.

Thanks for the info, Jaltus. :thumb:

More and more, my beliefs have been lining up with Molinism. :cheers:

[Chief of Staff Lizard]

cirisme:


Thanks for the info, Jaltus. :thumb:

More and more, my beliefs have been lining up with Molinism. :cheers:

What he said. Jaltus. :thumb:

Very good post.

[Jaltus]

Feel free to ask questions, guys.

[President-Elect $cirisme]

Does Molinism teach that God is bound by time, or does He exist outside of time?

[bar Jonah]

Regardless of view, "bound by time" is a misnomer. No one believes God is "bound" by time. This would infer that God is less than His creation, and would be a heretical view, whether one is Calvinist or Open Theist, or in between (simple foreknowledge, and Molinism/middle knowledge).

Either one believes God can exist outside of Time and independent of it, or one believes Time is a characteristic of existence, that a real thing or entity cannot exist without Time, any more than a physical object cannot exist without length or width or height.

[Jaltus]

Actually, RightIdea, many presentists do in fact believe God is bound by time in that it was not made by God but that He MUST exist within it (He did not choose to exist within it).

Molinists generally hold to the concept of God in time, though there are many nuances. However, as Arminians are not truly stuck in either camp, Molinists are not either. God can be in or out of time.

William Lane Craig makes a case for God being atemporal before creation and temporal since creation (by divine condescendance, not by necessity).

[dizzle]

And of course there is the idea of the nature of time... from what I learned, time is a consequence of physciality, ie space-time. It is not a constant but varies with mass, acceleration, and gravity, which the Being of God has none. It does not seem at all possible to me that time is an inherent aspect of existence, it is in inherent aspect of creation.

[dizzle]

I have found that Craig book, and I guess I need to soon (a preterist soon) get off my duff and read it.

[geebob]

And of course there is the idea of the nature of time... from what I learned, time is a consequence of physciality, ie space-time.

I am not convinced that philosophers (and theologians) when speaking of this issue are speaking of the same thing as physicists. The notion of tensed facts is wholly seperate from specifics in physicality. In other words, it is perfectly coherent to speak of something that is the case now, but not the case later or before and vice versa without addressing physics. I believe all you need is a concrete entity and it is perfectly possible for descriptions such as "that was the case then but not now." And of coarse since God is concrete and not abstract, this sense of time could be everlasting regardless of whether the physical exists. (maybe God is abstract, but I find that absurd, but then again, maybe I'm just not a very good platonist).

Another issue that I think seperates the physical concept from the notion I speak of is the lack of a need of measurement of duration. In the physical world we speak of seconds and minutes and so on, but for the notion of "this was the case then, but not now," such measurements can be perfectly irrelevent.

[Jaltus]

Define time without measurement, and you will quickly find you cannot.

I think there is no way to talk of time as not being physical. As soon as you say the difference between events, you'll realize that you must have physicality in order to have events.

[bar Jonah]

Jaltus:
Define time without measurement, and you will quickly find you cannot.

I think there is no way to talk of time as not being physical. As soon as you say the difference between events, you'll realize that you must have physicality in order to have events.
Jaltus, DeeDee, that's not true at all. God made decisions and fellowshipped within the Trinity before Creation. How? If an event happens, then there is a before and after, and therefore by necessity there must be time in which for those things to happen, even if it is not happening in a material world.

God does things and says things and decides things completely separate from material reality. Even a Calvinist believes God made decisions before Creation. How, if there was no time in which to do such a thing? Regardless of the presence or absence of material existence, if there are events happening and/or decisions being made, then time must be a factor.

[GrayPilgrim]

RightIdea:

Jaltus, DeeDee, that's not true at all. God made decisions and fellowshipped within the Trinity before Creation. How? If an event happens, then there is a before and after, and therefore by necessity there must be time in which for those things to happen, even if it is not happening in a material world.

God does things and says things and decides things completely separate from material reality. Even a Calvinist believes God made decisions before Creation. How, if there was no time in which to do such a thing? Regardless of the presence or absence of material existence, if there are events happening and/or decisions being made, then time must be a factor.

Remember the arian contovery, and the phrases "there is when he was not" and, the preferrable "there is not when he was not"? These phrases use a reference to Christ's ontology and succession of events, not to temporal succession. That is, prior to Creation the Trintiy existed in a plane that had succession of events but not succsssion of moments, i.e. it is possible to speek of event A happening prior to event B, but it is not possible to say event A happened x seconds prior to event B.

GP

[bar Jonah]

GrayPilgrim:


Remember the arian contovery, and the phrases "there is when he was not" and, the preferrable "there is not when he was not"? These phrases use a reference to Christ's ontology and succession of events, not to temporal succession. That is, prior to Creation the Trintiy existed in a plane that had succession of events but not succsssion of moments, i.e. it is possible to speek of event A happening prior to event B, but it is not possible to say event A happened x seconds prior to event B.

GP
According to your presuppositions regarding temporal reality(ies)? Yes. According to scripture? Please back that up with scripture.

[dizzle]

Dear GP:

That is pretty much what I was going to say.... there can be succession with temporal succession. We say that Christ proceeds forth from the Father but this is not temporal successoin but logical procession. Science has determine time to be a function of phsycality, this is not a controversial idea. If there is no physicality there is no time as we understand it. And if we wish to venture into things for which we have no reference point, that is also fine, but we must remember then that we are the proverbial Flatland Creatures in a two-dimenional world speculating on cubes. That analogy is closer to reality than we realize I do suspect.

[bar Jonah]

Dee Dee Warren:
Dear GP:
Science has determine time to be a function of phsycality, this is not a controversial idea. If there is no physicality there is no time as we understand it.
You choose to quote as your authority(ies) a largely atheistic scientific community that denies the existence of the metaphysical/spiritual realm? Well, of course they're going to say Time doesn't exist without physicality. They believe NOTHING exists without physicality. LOL :)

[Jaltus]

Jaltus, DeeDee, that's not true at all. God made decisions and fellowshipped within the Trinity before Creation. How? If an event happens, then there is a before and after, and therefore by necessity there must be time in which for those things to happen, even if it is not happening in a material world.

God does things and says things and decides things completely separate from material reality. Even a Calvinist believes God made decisions before Creation. How, if there was no time in which to do such a thing? Regardless of the presence or absence of material existence, if there are events happening and/or decisions being made, then time must be a factor.First off, you have two assumptions built into your question.

Assumption 1: Fellowship requires change.

There is no need for that, especially when you have three persons who are omniscient. They did not sit around and ask [Kramer voice] "How was your day today? Did you have a good day today?" [/Kramer voice] What need is there for sequential events for fellowship between the homoousias, omniscient persons?

Assumption 2: Time = sequence

You are already assuming time equals sequence in order to show that time equals sequence, which is circular.

[dizzle]

RightIdea:

You choose to quote as your authority(ies) a largely atheistic scientific community that denies the existence of the metaphysical/spiritual realm? Well, of course they're going to say Time doesn't exist without physicality. They believe NOTHING exists without physicality. LOL :)

Genetic fallacy.

[yxboom]

Yxboom interjection: Molinism is fence-sitting Open Theism! :hrm:

[dizzle]

Molinism is looking better and better now that I know it annoys Boom. LOL. Hmmm.....

[bar Jonah]

Dee Dee Warren:
Genetic fallacy.
Not at all. You are using as your authority a source that begins with an utterly false premise. Therefore, it acts as a faulty premise for yourself. They begin by assuming nothing can exist without physicality. And your belief is based on their false assumption. That is not a logical fallacy on my part by any stretch.

[dizzle]

Well actually RightIdea, I should have reached back a bit further... not all scientists who have theorized on the nature of time are atheists who crass materialists. How can you say that all of them who have reached this conclusion start with a base assumption that nothing can exist without physicality? I don' t think that you can.

[geebob]

Define time without measurement,

sequence. "that was the case but not now." the preceding can be true without any entailment of any measure what so ever.

Gray Pilgrim, I have no intention of drawing upon or considering the line of reasoning of any party within the arian conroversy. If my thoughts are parrallel, it is by coincedence. My understanding though is that the arians did try to use the classical view of God to deny that Jesus was God and I intuit that they were right to recognize the disconituity of incarnation and timelessness, but I am not trying to raise that issue here.

These phrases use a reference to Christ's ontology and succession of events, not to temporal succession.

I don't see how it is possible that truth can change like that without temporal succession. If for all of existence it was true that "this was the case" and now for all of existence it is no longer, true, we have a before and after.

[GrayPilgrim]

geebob:

Gray Pilgrim, I have no intention of drawing upon or considering the line of reasoning of any party within the arian conroversy. If my thoughts are parrallel, it is by coincedence. My understanding though is that the arians did try to use the classical view of God to deny that Jesus was God and I intuit that they were right to recognize the disconituity of incarnation and timelessness, but I am not trying to raise that issue here.

Sorry, I did not mean to imply that you were harkneing to the Arian Controversy. I was attempting to answer RI's question in his post:

God does things and says things and decides things completely separate from material reality. Even a Calvinist believes God made decisions before Creation. How, if there was no time in which to do such a thing? Regardless of the presence or absence of material existence, if there are events happening and/or decisions being made, then time must be a factor.

I was attempting to show that God can act in succession of events without there being a succession of moments.

RI, my source on time is not a largely athiestic community, unless you are willing to call Jaltus a largely athiestic community. For unless I am mistaken, and I cogitate his wife will agree he is neither a community nor an athiest ;)

[Jaltus]

My views on time were developed at Calvin College, which is not exactly a known defender of Atheism (because it is a Christian school). It was the physics profs who drilled physicality and time into my head.

I am still waiting for responses to my two objections.

[yxboom]

yxboom interjection: Bunch of closet OVers I tell you! :hrm:

[Jaltus]

Yx, you are coming out of the closet? hmm, you may need to read the Bible more about certain issues.

;)

[geebob]

I was attempting to show that God can act in succession of events without there being a succession of moments.

I suppose this is possible, and yet I don't see that it accounts for my contention.


BTW Jaltus, do you mind if your molinism thread gets turned into a God and time thread?

[Jaltus]

What, you kidding me? Those are just about my two favorite topics!

It is like I've gone to thread heaven (well, thread new heavens and earth, which I guess would mean a new computer hard drive and monitor, of course it would need to be a flat screen, you know, one of those 21 inch models with the really nice color scheme, and one of those anti-glare thingies (technical term) and maybe a drink holder with a slot for snacks, oh and a picture in picture plug in for TV so I can watch games while working on a paper......what was the question?).

[yxboom]

look.....a DUCK!

[Chief of Staff Lizard]

Jaltus:
What, you kidding me? Those are just about my two favorite topics!

It is like I've gone to thread heaven (well, thread new heavens and earth, which I guess would mean a new computer hard drive and monitor, of course it would need to be a flat screen, you know, one of those 21 inch models with the really nice color scheme, and one of those anti-glare thingies (technical term) and maybe a drink holder with a slot for snacks, oh and a picture in picture plug in for TV so I can watch games while working on a paper......what was the question?).

Sounds to me like you have Attention Def... Hey did you say flat screen. that is so cool my Partents have one of those by the pool table that has this cool green top like a lime life save, but I hate the cherry ones they make me sick. Sorta like that movie I saw the other day at the mall where I bough this shirt and.

O never mind.

[geebob]

I recall seeing something that you might appreciate in a back issue of popular science. It was something like the ultimate computer station. It had a heated vibrating chair and other climate controls, a fancy sound system, cup holders, ergonomic keyboard. it looked like a monster, but a really fancy one.

[Renegade Drow]

Stupid question of the day.

What is OV?? (besides a really bad beer)



RD

[bar Jonah]

Renegade Drow:
Stupid question of the day.

What is OV?? (besides a really bad beer)
RD
The Open View is sometimes held by Covenent theologians, sometimes by Dispensationalists. It is generally viewed as outside of Orthodox, although that doesn't mean it is or isn't true. (This would be a logical fallacy, of course.)

The Open View holds that God responds to the actions and decisions of human beings in a dynamic relationship, that Creation isn't deterministic and predetermined, and therefore we have free will to make choices and decisions, including the choice to accept Christ. It holds that, because human beings have free will, the future is therefore undetermined (and thus doesn't exist), and so God only knows some of the future -- that part of the future that He decides to bring about regardless of human free will. (For example, the death and resurrection of Jesus were predetermined, regardless of the free will of any human beings, because this event was absolutely necessary for the reconciliation of humanity to God.)

For more info, visit this thread:

http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&threadid=441&perpage=10&pagenumber=1

[yxboom]

Renegade Drow:
Stupid question of the day.

What is OV?? (besides a really bad beer)
It is "Open View" not to be mistaken for a similarly named tv show where a bunch of girls gather around and gossip over a cup of coffee :hrm:

[geebob]

It is generally viewed as outside of Orthodox, although that doesn't mean it is or isn't true.

Also, most open viewers challenge the claim itself as many central claims of the open view do in fact find agreement within the tradition. There is one little claim where we stand in contrast to almost all of the tradition (in western theology of course, not the biblical tradition) and that is our beliefs about omniscience and foreknowledge. As for challenges concerning specific soverignty (suggests God controls everything) impassibility(God has no emotions) and immutability, strong connections to the tradition can be found.

[yxboom]

I must be tired but it appears that you are saying that OV connects to the traditional views in
...specific soverignty (suggests God controls everything) impassibility(God has no emotions) and immutability... :huh:

[bar Jonah]

yxboom:
It is "Open View" not to be mistaken for a similarly named tv show where a bunch of girls gather around and gossip over a cup of coffee :hrm:
Altho perhaps not coincidentally, those women don't know the future either. :thinking:

I agree, Boomer... the OV does disagree at least to some extent on orthodox views of supposed impassibility, immutablity and so forth. I am amazed at people who really believe God doesn't love, doesn't get angry, can't be sad. People who claim God cannot change His nature, even though He was not a man... and then He was.

[Jaltus]

He said connections to the orthodox views, not connection to the classical views. Current orthodoxy has redifined many of the classical attributes. GB was in fact right.

You know what the saddest thing about my whole wandering post was, I remembered to accurately close the parenthetical statement and put a period after it.

[geebob]

I must be tired but it appears that you are saying that OV connects to the traditional views in

As for challenges concerning specific soverignty (suggests God controls everything) impassibility(God has no emotions) and immutability, strong connections to the tradition can be found.

These things are challenged in the tradition.

[yxboom]

Ok thanks. I acknowledge that the error was in my reading.

[geebob]

It would've been more clear if I said "challenges to..." What I wrote is actually pretty ambiguous.

[yxboom]

Ok than it was your fault!

[mattbballman19]

This is off topic, but the clearest I've seen the Molinist position (which I hold) presented is here:

http://www.geocities.com/Athens/8160/molinism.htm

matt

[Jaltus]

Wow, good link!


Geebob, that would answer your question about possible worlds.

[geebob]

I'm definitely interested, it looks thick so I'll look at it later.

I've changed the way that I look at them myself though. I see them as perduring. I'd say that the semantics with which I use them, it would be improper to say what specific possible world we are in. It is enough to say that if there is a possible world that is such, so it can be the same with the actual world (Or maybe not this world but some other actual world with a differenct history and makeup)

[Joseph Alward]

JOE ALWARD
As I understand molinism, God is believed to know what man at every point in his life will do in each of a practically infinite number of different sets of circumstances, and this is what constitutes God's alleged omniscience.

Can anyone provide an example of a particular act of man that could be seen to result from his free will?

[Secretary of Education - Colin the Cat]

aaaahh, to choose, or not to choose, that is the question....

[Solly]

Today @ 04:27 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=58589#post58589)
Joseph Alward:

JOE ALWARD
Can anyone provide an example of a particuar act of man that could be seen to result from his free will?

Can anyone provide an example of man being in particular situation and having the freedom to choose what to do next?

Joseph; are you of the view that will is not determiniative or causative in itself, but is just the act of volition once other factors have had their say? Ie, I am thirsty - this is not a matter of will - then "will" comes into play, moving my body to deal with my thirst. Or, on an intellectual level, I am presented with facts that clarify a particular position; I am convinced by those facts. I change my position to the position explained by those facts by a volitional act, but that act is not causative of my "conversion" but the result of prior influences.

If you are a determinist in this sense - and if not, ignore what follows - would you say that certain parts of the Christian community are rowing against the tide in this matter, by trying to hold to a view of Free Will that has not credibility in the wider community (I know they would say it has Biblical foundations, but all Christians say that about their views)? My own view is that the LFW brigade are bringing in political and philosophical baggage that is not relevant to the debate - hence LFW being "big" in America for instance. Another aspect I do not follow, is the idea that we exist in a perfect equilibrium, from which we make a purely rational unmotivated choice.

[Joseph Alward]

SOLLY
Joseph; are you of the view that will is not determinative or causative in itself

JOE ALWARD
I don't have a view to express, yet. I just want to know if those who subscribe to molinism can provide an example of a particular situation in which man could be seen as having the freedom to choose what to do next. Perhaps there are no molinists in this forum.

[Jaltus]

I am a Molinist, just happen to be very busy ATM IRL.

Do I reply to this post or not? That was a free choice.

Solly,

Another aspect I do not follow, is the idea that we exist in a perfect equilibrium, from which we make a purely rational unmotivated choice.

I do not know anybody who holds to this as LFW.

[Joseph Alward]

JALTUS
Do I reply to this post or not? That was a free choice.

JOE ALWARD
In molinism, God knows all of the infinite number of possible circumstances that could exist prior to man making a choice to act, and knows what the man will do in each circumstance.

God, at the moment just prior to your making your decision to reply, or not reply, knew the precise set of cirumstances that would determine what you would do, didn't he, because he knows all of the present?

Now, since God just prior to your "decision" knew the circumstances which would lead you to choose whether to reply, or not reply, he also knew--according to molinism--what you would do in the event of those particular circumstances.

Since God knew what you would do before you actually did it, the nature of God--he cannot be wrong--made it impossible for you not to have chosen to reply to me. You don't have to call this lack of free will if you don't want to, but it seems to me that you could not have chosen to do anything else other than what God knew ahead of time you would do. Otherwise, God would have "known" something that proved not to be so, and that's impossible with an all-knowing God.

[Chief of Staff Lizard]

For Jaltus (or anyone else who might know):

I find some point of Molinism very compelling, but I am not certain how Molinism views God's relationship to time.

From a Molinist perspective, how does God relate to time?

[geebob]

From a Molinist perspective, how does God relate to time?

I'm not a molinist, but I'll mention that a molinist need not be commited to any view of time (as far as the specifics of molinism are concerned) even though most if not all of them view God as in time. The most important ones such as William lane Craig and Alvin Plantinga hold that God is in time.

William Hasker in his book that critisizes both Molinism and Timelessness (though less so with timelessness as he defends it's coherency) believes that a combination of molinism and timelessness can help the short comings of molinism that molinism shares with other theories on how God can foreknow the future free actions of men.

[Chief of Staff Lizard]

Today @ 11:32 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=60389#post60389)
geebob:



I'm not a molinist, but I'll mention that a molinist need not be commited to any view of time (as far as the specifics of molinism are concerned) even though most if not all of them view God as in time. The most important ones such as William lane Craig and Alvin Plantinga hold that God is in time.

William Hasker in his book that critisizes both Molinism and Timelessness (though less so with timelessness as he defends it's coherency) believes that a combination of molinism and timelessness can help the short comings of molinism that molinism shares with other theories on how God can foreknow the future free actions of men.

Thanks geebob, that was a big help. Do you recall the name of Hasker's book. It sounds like a good read. As I am interested in molinism from a timelessness perspective.

[geebob]

God, Time, and Knowledge

The part of the book suggesting a combination makes up a small part of a chapter, but it could be that it is so far the most significant treatment of the idea to date. As of his writing (and possibly republication) he said he knew of no one who suggested the combination.

[Chief of Staff Lizard]

Again, thanks. :thumb:

[Sheepdog]

Today @ 02:41 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=59995#post59995)
Joseph Alward:

Since God knew what you would do before you actually did it, the nature of God--he cannot be wrong--made it impossible for you not to have chosen to reply to me.

:doh: oops. you have made Jaltus' post necessarily impossible to avoid based on foreknowledge, which itself is dependant on Jaltus' post. it is a vicious circle of you own making (and even if it wasn't, you still have a necessary conclusion following a contingent premise-- which is invalid logic. [edit to add] if it was foreknown that Jaultis will post, the most that this logically entails is that Jaltus will post. it doesn't necessarily entail that Jaltus could not have failed to post)

[Jaltus]

Since God knew what you would do before you actually did it, the nature of God--he cannot be wrong--made it impossible for you not to have chosen to reply to me. You don't have to call this lack of free will if you don't want to, but it seems to me that you could not have chosen to do anything else other than what God knew ahead of time you would do. Otherwise, God would have "known" something that proved not to be so, and that's impossible with an all-knowing God.

I think Sheepdog has been reading the Free will foreknowledge debate that John and I had. He made an informal reply of my formal answer to your problem.

Just because something will happen does not mean that it must happen, which is what you are assuming. That entails fatalism.

If something will happen, that just means it will happen (tautology). If something will happen, there is nothing to say it must happen (non-tautology). That something will happen is not deterministic, it is descriptive (though perhaps "premptively descriptive" is a more apt, if abstract, term).

If something "will happen" means something "must happen," then you run into determinism no matter what model (theistic or not) you hold to, since no matter what any of us do, the future will happen.

In other words, you still need to answer the question of how God's foreknowledge is determinative. Once again, knowledge is not and cannot be causative, as it has no agency.

[Joseph Alward]

FALTUS
Just because something will happen does not mean that it must happen, which is what you are assuming.

JOE ALWARD
If God knows it will happen, then it MUST happen.

Since God knows all of the present, he therefore knew each of the infinite number of details which made up the circumstances that existed with respect to your coming decision about responding to my email. Now, according to molinism, God knows what each of us will do in any particular set of circumstances. Since God knew what that set of circumstances was in your case, he knew what you would do. Thus, at the moment your decision was made, you HAD to decide to respond to my email, since God knew that's what you would do. If you had NOT responded, then God would have "known" something then that turned out not to be true later, and this is impossible, for God cannot be wrong.

In my view, molinism is incompatible with the notion that God knows all of the present, for that gives him certain knowledge of the circumstances that bear on your decision. That's the fatal flaw in molinism, in my opinion.

[Sheepdog]

lol, yup. i've been gleening a tad from the debate. :thumb:

JOE ALWARD
If God knows it will happen, then it MUST happen.

i presume that is based on your next comments (otherwise, as you know, assertion doesn't count for much)...

Since God knows all of the present, he therefore knew each of the infinite number of details which made up the circumstances that existed with respect to your coming decision about responding to my email. Now, according to molinism, God knows what each of us will do in any particular set of circumstances. Since God knew what that set of circumstances was in your case, he knew what you would do. Thus, at the moment your decision was made, you HAD to decide to respond to my email, since God knew that's what you would do. If you had NOT responded, then God would have "known" something then that turned out not to be true later, and this is impossible, for God cannot be wrong.

or rather, God if Jaltus didn't respond, God would have foreknown he wouldn't respond. this is why it doesn't follow that a choice must occur.

In my view, molinism is incompatible with the notion that God knows all of the present, for that gives him certain knowledge of the circumstances that bear on your decision. That's the fatal flaw in molinism, in my opinion.

:hrm: i am not sure i follow what you are saying here :-/

[Jaltus]

FOE ALWARD
If God knows it will happen, then it MUST happen.

Why? God knowing that something will happens only means it will happen (tautology). Nothing about God's knowledge is causal, which is the only proper use of the word must. Must is defined by causality, not inevitability.

Since God knows all of the present, he therefore knew each of the infinite number of details which made up the circumstances that existed with respect to your coming decision about responding to my email. Now, according to molinism, God knows what each of us will do in any particular set of circumstances. Since God knew what that set of circumstances was in your case, he knew what you would do. Thus, at the moment your decision was made, you HAD to decide to respond to my email, since God knew that's what you would do. If you had NOT responded, then God would have "known" something then that turned out not to be true later, and this is impossible, for God cannot be wrong.

You once again beg the question of causality. HOW did God's knowledge CAUSE anything? Nothing about God's knowledge took away my free will. That is an unwarranted (and so far undefended) assumption you are making. How about some evidence?

In my view, molinism is incompatible with the notion that God knows all of the present, for that gives him certain knowledge of the circumstances that bear on your decision. That's the fatal flaw in molinism, in my opinion.

I see your point, but you are missing the reasoning behind it. If you could link God's knowledde to causality instead of inevitability, then you would have a case. As it stands, you do not.

[Joseph Alward]

JOE ALWARD

Jaltus, several times you mentioned "cause" or "causality," but I don't believe any of those words appeared in my argument, nor do I think that I implied causality.

My argument is simpler, perhaps, than I led you to believe.

I will take it up again, this time at the point where God knows all of the cirumstances which relate to your coming decision.

According to molinism, God would already have known what you would do in each of the infinite number of sets of circumstances you might find yourself in. Since God knows all of the present, he would have known the exact circumstances which existed prior to your making your decision. Now, since he knew in advance what you would do in each of the infinite number of circumstances, he obviously knew at that moment what you would decide before you made your decision.

God knew what you would do--if molinism is correct, so there is nothing you could have done at that point other than respond to my email (we know this is what you had to do, because that is what you did), for if you had not responded, then God would have "known" something in the past which proved not to be true in the future, and that is not possible for an all-knowing God.

[themuzicman]

02-10-2003 @ 05:13 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=13233#post13233)
Jaltus:

My views on time were developed at Calvin College, which is not exactly a known defender of Atheism (because it is a Christian school). It was the physics profs who drilled physicality and time into my head.

I am still waiting for responses to my two objections.


Calvin College? In Grand Rapids? Seriously?

I live near GR and work in GR.. How long ago were you here?

Michael

[Jaltus]

themuzicman,

I went to Calvin from 1993-1997, with my wife graduating in 1998.

Jaltus, several times you mentioned "cause" or "causality," but I don't believe any of those words appeared in my argument, nor do I think that I implied causality.

It does assume it, but we'll get to that in a moment.

My argument is simpler, perhaps, than I led you to believe.

I will take it up again, this time at the point where God knows all of the cirumstances which relate to your coming decision.

According to molinism, God would already have known what you would do in each of the infinite number of sets of circumstances you might find yourself in. Since God knows all of the present, he would have known the exact circumstances which existed prior to your making your decision. Now, since he knew in advance what you would do in each of the infinite number of circumstances, he obviously knew at that moment what you would decide before you made your decision.

Ok, gotcha.

God knew what you would do--if molinism is correct, so there is nothing you could have done at that point other than respond to my email (we know this is what you had to do, because that is what you did), for if you had not responded, then God would have "known" something in the past which proved not to be true in the future, and that is not possible for an all-knowing God.

And how does this thwart Molinism? Again, you are confusing the power of "must" with the power of "will." Just because I will choose to do something does not mean I must choose it. Irrespective of who foreknows I will make the choice, there is nothing that means I must make that choice, only that I will. You are confusing necessity with actuality. LFW is only compomised if I must do something (must assumes causality). If you argue that just because God knows I will do something that I will, thus making it necessary, you will have left out two things:

1) The causality that makes it necessary (all necessary occurrences things are in fact caused).

2) A loop-hole that allows for the past to be non-necessary. Just because we are dealing with future happenings does not mean that there are no repercussions for other time sets. Your assumption that will = must means that all past actions are necessary as well, essentially ruling out LFW by defenition of time.