Can knowledge predate cause?

[themuzicman]

The subject asks the question, I guess.

To flesh it out a bit more, is it possible for beings who are constrained by time to be the cause of an action that was known to occur before the decision was taken?

Michael

[Zakath]

To answer your original question, I would suggest: "not generally in this universe."

You use the phrase, "an action that was known to occur". It would really be helpful if you could tell us who knew the action prior to the decision.:huh:

Can you give an example???

[Jaltus]

He is dealing with the conundrum of free will and foreknowledge with respect to God. Can God have foreknowledge without causing the future?

There is a debate about this going on in the Gym. I would say I am handling the issue quite well.

[Zakath]

Today @ 02:08 PM
Jaltus:

He is dealing with the conundrum of free will and foreknowledge with respect to God. Can God have foreknowledge without causing the future?Somehow the flavor of the question smacked of some old arguments I used to have with seminary students about predestination back in the days...

There is a debate about this going on in the Gym. I would say I am handling the issue quite well. Don't be so modest, Jaltus. Keep this up and we'll have to break out the first aid kit for a sling. :brow:

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 07:51 PM
Zakath:

Somehow the flavor of the question smacked of some old arguments I used to have with seminary students about predestination back in the days...

Don't be so modest, Jaltus. Keep this up and we'll have to break out the first aid kit for a sling. :brow:

Shush, Jaltus! You're doing great!

Zakath, you had said "Not in this Universe" (or along those lines). Is God part of the Universe?
So maybe you're right, yet omniscient knowledge is possible nonetheless.

[themuzicman]

The followup question to this, of course, is "Does foreknowledge require inevitability?"

Michael

[Zakath]

Today @ 02:59 PM
Captain Ochre:
Shush, Jaltus! You're doing great!Just trying help the lad stay humble, y'know! :smile:

Zakath, you had said "Not in this Universe" (or along those lines). Is God part of the Universe?
So maybe you're right, yet omniscient knowledge is possible nonetheless. IIRC, orthodox Chrisitan doctrine places the deity outside the universe looking in. The only way he was "part of the universe" was through the incarnation or theophanies.

[Zakath]

Today @ 03:35 PM
themuzicman:
The followup question to this, of course, is "Does foreknowledge require inevitability?"


Ah, the old question of whether it was just for the deity to d*a*m*n Judas for something that had to be done...

(I just HATE censor lists!):bonk:

[Jaltus]

The followup question to this, of course, is "Does foreknowledge require inevitability?" Good question, but could you define inevitability so we do not stray from the definition you want?

And Zak, it is great to have you here. I missed you. I was going to have to find a new favorite atheist, but now I don't.

[themuzicman]

Inevitable: Impossible to avoid or prevent.

Inevitability, here, would be the absolute certainty that what is foreknown will occur.

Michael

[Jaltus]

Let me answer this way:

What God foreknows to happen will happen.

[Zakath]

Today @ 03:46 PM
Jaltus:
...And Zak, it is great to have you here. I missed you. I was going to have to find a new favorite atheist, but now I don't. Thanks. Glad to oblige. :smile:

[Zakath]

Today @ 04:01 PM
Jaltus:
Let me answer this way:

What God foreknows to happen will happen.
I'm going to have to break out my spare saffron robe, you're starting to sound almost Zen here, Jaltus. :brow:

"Que sera, sera!"

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 09:27 PM
Zakath:


I'm going to have to break out my spare saffron robe, you're starting to sound almost Zen here, Jaltus. :brow:

"Que sera, sera!"

Actually, Jaltus is being especially pithy.
It is tautologically true that you will do tomorrow what you will do tomorrow. That is, it is true in all possible worlds. Assuming materialism, you will do tomorrow what you will do tomorrow. If an omniscient being exists, you will do tomorrow what you will do tomorrow. Further, if an omniscient being knows what you will do tomorrow, you will do tomorrow what you will do tomorrow.
The supposed "inevitability" is universal. If it proves that omniscience negates free will, then it also negates free will entirely (omniscience or not).
In reality, it does neither. Tautologies consist of their self-evident truth and nothing more, which is why they are frequently termed "vacuous".

Don't get overconfident, Jaltus, but you're good.
:smile:

[Jaltus]

Thanks, C.O.

[themuzicman]

Today @ 04:01 PM
Jaltus:

Let me answer this way:

What God foreknows to happen will happen.

OK, so what caused what will happen to happen?

Michael

[Jaltus]

The persons choice.

[themuzicman]

The American Hertitage Dictionary defines "choice" as:"The power, right, or liberty to choose; option."

We established that foreknowledge required inevitability, which we established as something that cannot be avoided or prevented.

IF what we will do cannot be avoided or prevented, how are we at "liberty to choose"?

Michael

[Zakath]

[i]Yesterday @ 05:16 PM
It is tautologically true that you will do tomorrow what you will do tomorrow.

Isn't tautological truth the complaint about many Zen koan?

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 02:00 AM
themuzicman:

The American Hertitage Dictionary defines "choice" as:"The power, right, or liberty to choose; option."

We established that foreknowledge required inevitability,


No, themuzicman, you did not establish that foreknowledge required inevitability. We saw that he so-called "inevitabilty" is actually a tautology which is true in all possible worlds, whether true foreknowledge exists or not.


which we established as something that cannot be avoided or prevented.


Not quite. It is established only that the actual future can only turn out one way (assuming that there is only one actual future, which is judiciously Ockhamish). This is true whether or not free will and/or omniscience exists: True in all possible worlds, in effect (multiple futures implies distinctly different possible worlds--iow in each alternate world the tautology is still true).


IF what we will do cannot be avoided or prevented, how are we at "liberty to choose"?


Because the free moral agent made a decision amongst possible future worlds in order to (self-)determine his own decision.
Similarly, in the past, you decisions are known, but despite the fact that you past is actual and "set-in-stone" as it were, nonetheless a different past is possible. You could have brushed your teeth with baking soda instead of with toothpaste. The fact that the past is actual does not remove other possibilities, only other past actualities. The same applies to the future.

Michael, track the Powell/Jaltus debate. I expect that all of this will be covered in the course of the debate and the discussion to follow.

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 01:57 PM
Zakath:

Isn't tautological truth the complaint about many Zen koan?

I'll take your word for it.
I stand behind my description of Jaltus' comment as pithy regardless. :smile:

[Zakath]

Well, "pithy" it is, then. :smile:

[Jaltus]

I would say more on this thread, but I do not want to spoil anything I have planned for my debate.

[Zakath]

What, no advertising trailers???

[themuzicman]

Yesterday @ 11:17 AM
Captain Ochre:



No, themuzicman, you did not establish that foreknowledge required inevitability. We saw that he so-called "inevitabilty" is actually a tautology which is true in all possible worlds, whether true foreknowledge exists or not.


IF you'll read back, Jaltus agreed that foreknowledge required inevitability. I presented a definition, which he did not dispute.

Nor is it a tautology, since future inevitability is not a requirement in the open view.


Not quite. It is established only that the actual future can only turn out one way (assuming that there is only one actual future, which is judiciously Ockhamish). This is true whether or not free will and/or omniscience exists: True in all possible worlds, in effect (multiple futures implies distinctly different possible worlds--iow in each alternate world the tautology is still true).


However, in the open view, the future is not inevitable NOW. The decisions I will take tomorrow are not avoidable or preventable. In the closed view, they are.

The point is isn't whether there will be only one future, but whether that future is inevitable NOW.


Because the free moral agent made a decision amongst possible future worlds in order to (self-)determine his own decision.
Similarly, in the past, you decisions are known, but despite the fact that you past is actual and "set-in-stone" as it were, nonetheless a different past is possible. You could have brushed your teeth with baking soda instead of with toothpaste. The fact that the past is actual does not remove other possibilities, only other past actualities. The same applies to the future.


However, in the open view, the future is not actual.

Furthermore, you're attempting to redirect from the point at hand. If the future is certain, and cannot be avoided or prevented in every detail, then that is incompatible with being "at liberty to choose."


Michael, track the Powell/Jaltus debate. I expect that all of this will be covered in the course of the debate and the discussion to follow.

I'm sure Powell will make a good case. I just happen to think mine is both simpler and more devistating.

Michael

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 02:09 PM
themuzicman:



IF you'll read back, Jaltus agreed that foreknowledge required inevitability. I presented a definition, which he did not dispute.


I don't dispute your definition, either. It is simply irrelevant to the question of free will, since the tautology (sans omniscience) contains exactly the same inevitability.
We will find that you are confusing possibility with actuality, once you stop pussy-footing around with the definition of "inevitability".


Nor is it a tautology, since future inevitability is not a requirement in the open view.


Tautologies are true in all possible worlds. If the OV is possible, then the tautology applies. Logic demands it.
Thus, if you demand that the OV is immune to the tautology, you declare the OV impossible.


However, in the open view, the future is not inevitable NOW. The decisions I will take tomorrow are not avoidable or preventable. In the closed view, they are.


If you do X tomorrow, it is not avoidable or preventable no matter what view of God you take (that's the tip of the iceberg regarding why you are incorrect).


The point is isn't whether there will be only one future, but whether that future is inevitable NOW.


Right now, no matter what view you take, there is only one future. That's one *actual* future. That actual future may be described propositionally either before or after the events occur. It is logically inevitable that you will do what you will do whether or not an omniscient being knows about it. Logical inevitibility has nothing to do with free will, and (from what I can tell) the OVers don't seem to provide a logical rationale as to why a non-causally-determined future cannot be known by an omniscient being.


However, in the open view, the future is not actual.


Pardon me if I don't allow that assertion to go unchallenged:
Why not?


Furthermore, you're attempting to redirect from the point at hand. If the future is certain, and cannot be avoided or prevented in every detail, then that is incompatible with being "at liberty to choose."


Nonsense; I'll deal with whatever point you introduce--I don't care where the topic leads (though it may drift so far that another thread might be in order).
I propose to you that if the future is entirely uncertain, then it cannot be avoided or prevented in every detail.
:smile:
Wrestle with that for awhile.


I'm sure Powell will make a good case. I just happen to think mine is both simpler and more devistating.


"Get used to disappointment."
--The Dread Pirate Roberts

[Socrates]

Yes, Jaltus has made an excellent case that foreknowledge is NOT causative of the future act, but logically caused BY the act. I don't think Powell has a leg to stand on, but he's a very gentlemanly opponent which does him great credit too.

[themuzicman]

Capt:

You're missing the point. Obviously, the past cannot change, nor can decisions we make after we make them.

The question, here, is whether what I will choose tomorrow is already inevitable (or actual) right now, or do multiple possibilities remain now?

The closed view requires that it is, whereas the open view requires that it is not.

Michael

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 08:13 PM here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=41858#post41858)
themuzicman:

Capt:

You're missing the point. Obviously, the past cannot change, nor can decisions we make after we make them.


I'm not missing the point. Decisions cannot change before we make them any more than they can after we make them.


The question, here, is whether what I will choose tomorrow is already inevitable (or actual) right now, or do multiple possibilities remain now?


The future isn't now any more than the past is now.
Both the past and the future may be described in terms of propositional truths. Why aren't those future truths true now?


The closed view requires that it is, whereas the open view requires that it is not.


I believe that both of your perceptions above are incorrect.
The arguments constructed to support them will fail.
See the Powell/Jaltus debate, and the commentary to follow.

[themuzicman]

Yesterday @ 04:57 PM here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=41934#post41934)
Captain Ochre:



I'm not missing the point. Decisions cannot change before we make them any more than they can after we make them.


However, what we may do can change, whereas what we have done cannot.


The future isn't now any more than the past is now.
Both the past and the future may be described in terms of propositional truths. Why aren't those future truths true now?


Because the past has already been, and what happened happened. The future has not happened, and what will happen is not existentially certain.



I said;
The closed view requires that it is, whereas the open view requires that it is not.

Captain Ochre said;
I believe that both of your perceptions above are incorrect.
The arguments constructed to support them will fail.
See the Powell/Jaltus debate, and the commentary to follow.

The problem in the closed view is the dichotomy between the inevitability of foreknowledge and the liberty to choose.

Michael

[Jaltus]

Today @ 10:04 AM here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=42425#post42425)
themuzicman:

However, what we may do can change, whereas what we have done cannot.Change according to whose perspective? If our future is the past for God, then you are speaking falsely about what beliefs God can hold. In other words, your argument is based on perspective, and if the future for one is the past for another, you have just argued yourself out of the OV position.

I hope John is not reading this, for I just gave a little something away, hehe.

Because the past has already been, and what happened happened. The future has not happened, and what will happen is not existentially certain.

Unless it is the past to someone else, in which case it is inevitable to those in the future, though still being within the realm of LFW to those in the past. Let me put it this way, when you chose to post your last post, it was an LFW choice, even though it is now inevitiable. Thus, since we now have knowledge of your past action, it is both inevitable and chosen in an LFW way.

See the connection yet?

The problem in the closed view is the dichotomy between the inevitability of foreknowledge and the liberty to choose.

There is no dichotomy. Every time some OVer tries to make that case, they show the assumption that knowing is causal, which is a logical fallacy.

If a future action is known, does that mean the knowledge caused it?

Of course not, for knowledge, as I stated in Post 4 of the debate, has no potentiality. Only something with potentiality can be a cause. If something has the ability to act, it can be a cause (admittedly, I am using "act" in a very wide sense of the word). If something does not have the power to act, it cannot be a cause. Thoughts do not have the power to act, and therefore cannot be causes.

Thus, knowledge cannot be a cause, no matter the kind of knowledge.

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 04:04 PM here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=42425#post42425)
themuzicman:



However, what we may do can change, whereas what we have done cannot.


What you may do (possibility) also stays the same. All you can do is turn an possibility into an actuality (though the actual is always possible, as well).


Because the past has already been, and what happened happened. The future has not happened, and what will happen is not existentially certain.


The past has already been, the present is, and the future will be. This is relevant if you can't go to (or know) the future and irrelevant if you're timeless (eternal, immutable beings who create the space-time continuum would not appear to be locked into the timeline.
With respect to the incompatibility of omniscience and free will, you beg the question. You deny that propositions regarding the future have truth value in the present. Good luck arguing for that proposition. You're better off just begging the question, imo.


The problem in the closed view is the dichotomy between the inevitability of foreknowledge and the liberty to choose.


That isn't a problem, as Jaltus will be demonstrating. If you have questions after the debate is finished, I will be happy to assist you (to the best of my ability) in resolving them.

[themuzicman]

Yesterday @ 04:27 PM located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=42612#post42612)
Captain Ochre:
What you may do (possibility) also stays the same. All you can do is turn an possibility into an actuality (though the actual is always possible, as well).


Ah, that's where you're wrong. Right now, I have only one job possibility, which is the one I presently have. (I suppose the possibility of no job exists, as well.) This possibility remains going into the future, presently.

However, if I decide to pursue a new job, and another employer decides of offer me a position, then the future possibilities have changed for me, first because of my decision, and second because of another decision.


The past has already been, the present is, and the future will be. This is relevant if you can't go to (or know) the future and irrelevant if you're timeless (eternal, immutable beings who create the space-time continuum would not appear to be locked into the timeline.


I've never asserted that God is "locked into" the time continuum that He created. What I have stated is that the universe God created exists now, with the past being known, and the future being unknowable.


With respect to the incompatibility of omniscience and free will, you beg the question. You deny that propositions regarding the future have truth value in the present. Good luck arguing for that proposition. You're better off just begging the question, imo.


Actually, I've stated that the problem is the incompatibility between INEVITABILITY and free will, not omnicience. I realize you'd like to push me off that point, but there is no begging, here.


That isn't a problem, as Jaltus will be demonstrating. If you have questions after the debate is finished, I will be happy to assist you (to the best of my ability) in resolving them.

Very well.

MIchael

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 03:48 PM located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=42921#post42921)
themuzicman:

Ah, that's where you're wrong. Right now, I have only one job possibility, which is the one I presently have. (I suppose the possibility of no job exists, as well.) This possibility remains going into the future, presently.


Color me skeptical--How is it that you are working at the only job possible for you?


However, if I decide to pursue a new job, and another employer decides of offer me a position, then the future possibilities have changed for me, first because of my decision, and second because of another decision.


The possibility of being offered a different job in the future is not contingent on the actuality of being offered a different job in the future.


I've never asserted that God is "locked into" the time continuum that He created. What I have stated is that the universe God created exists now, with the past being known, and the future being unknowable.


How do you reasonably assert that the future is unknowable to an atemporal omniscient being (doogie admitted that a causally determined future is knowable--do you disagree)?


Actually, I've stated that the problem is the incompatibility between INEVITABILITY and free will, not omnicience. I realize you'd like to push me off that point, but there is no begging, here.


You're being (unintentionally, I assume) deceptive.
If omniscience entails X and X is incompatible with free will, then omniscience and free will are themselves incompatible.
I'm not pushing you anywhere. That's where you're at, whether you realize it or not.


Very well.


Good.
Here's to a quick resolution of the formal debate.
:cheers:

[themuzicman]

03-23-2003 @ 01:17 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=42999#post42999)
Captain Ochre:

You're being (unintentionally, I assume) deceptive.
If omniscience entails X and X is incompatible with free will, then omniscience and free will are themselves incompatible.
I'm not pushing you anywhere. That's where you're at, whether you realize it or not.

Good.
Here's to a quick resolution of the formal debate.
:cheers:

The point is that omniscience doesn't entail X, since X does not exist, yet.

X could be the concept of a rock God could not lift, or the idea of something bigger than God, or the future.

Whether a) I choose pursue other employment and b) Another employer chooses to offer me a job are open in the future, which does not exist. They remain possibilities, but other possibilities remain, as well. Until we choose there is nothing to know. (Yes, possibilities are present, not future.)


How do you reasonably assert that the future is unknowable to an atemporal omniscient being (doogie admitted that a causally determined future is knowable--do you disagree)?


If doogie meant existentially knowable, then I disagree. The near future may be predictable in some circumstances, based upon the past and present, but free will requires an open future.

Michael

Michael

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 02:42 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=45316#post45316)
themuzicman:

The point is that omniscience doesn't entail X, since X does not exist, yet.


Seems to me that you are hopping from meaning to meaning to avoid the issue. Omniscience, as traditionally conceived, includes knowledge of the future. That's how I'm using it. You, otoh, appear to be using a redefinition of omniscience which does not include future knowledge.
Without definitions in common, we will end up talking past each other.
Defining omniscience as "able to know everything which may logically be known" should provisionally include sure knowledge of the future unless reason is given for excluding future knowledge. The reason you give is that the future "doesn't exist yet". However, we're dealing with a being who existed prior (logically prior, if you like) to His creation, which may include time itself. What is the justification for the limitation on knowledge of that which supposedly doesn't exist yet, based on time distinctions?


X could be the concept of a rock God could not lift, or the idea of something bigger than God, or the future.


The first two are nonsensical, given mainstream theology. Why would you define X as a self-contradiction, or on what basis is the third one nonsensical (you're not making any sense, afaics)?


Whether a) I choose pursue other employment and b) Another employer chooses to offer me a job are open in the future, which does not exist. They remain possibilities, but other possibilities remain, as well. Until we choose there is nothing to know. (Yes, possibilities are present, not future.)

Those are asserted arguments, Michael, and as such carry no force. Possibilities are absolute across time. On Sept. 1, 1901, it was possible that I would eat chocolate cake on my fifth birthday. On Jan 19, 19XX it was possible that I would eat chocolate cake on my fifth birthday. On March 24, 2003, it was possible that I would eat chocolate cake on my fifth birthday.

None of this depends on the actuality of my eating chocolate cake on my fifth birtday, btw.


If doogie meant existentially knowable, then I disagree. The near future may be predictable in some circumstances, based upon the past and present, but free will requires an open future.


Well, there's the rub, Michael. Suppose a closed future. Does that future exist? Is it knowable? How does one have sure knowledge of something non-existent?

[themuzicman]

Today @ 11:33 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=45390#post45390)
Captain Ochre:
Seems to me that you are hopping from meaning to meaning to avoid the issue. Omniscience, as traditionally conceived, includes knowledge of the future. That's how I'm using it. You, otoh, appear to be using a redefinition of omniscience which does not include future knowledge.
Without definitions in common, we will end up talking past each other.


Thank you for finally acknowledging part of the problem. Your definition assumes you are right.

If we use a more meaningful DEFINITION of omniscience (such as the one from the American Heritage Dictionary, 4th edition), we find that omniscient means "Having total knowledge; knowing everything."

Defining omniscience as "able to know everything which may logically be known" should provisionally include sure knowledge of the future unless reason is given for excluding future knowledge.


Actually, this is incorrect. Omniscience should only include that which one can demonstrate to be knowable. That was the point of mentioning a rock too large for God to lift. God cannot know what this item is, because it does not exist.

Thus, to present the future as knowable requires some evidence that the future already exists, and how.


The reason you give is that the future "doesn't exist yet". However, we're dealing with a being who existed prior (logically prior, if you like) to His creation, which may include time itself. What is the justification for the limitation on knowledge of that which supposedly doesn't exist yet, based on time distinctions?



1) Free will. If what I would do was known before I even existed, then my free will could not possibly have been involved as the cause. Foreknowledge does not require that the foreknower be the cause, however it does require *a* cause, because what is foreknown must be inevitable. If what I will choose is inevitable, then it is not really my choice. In our universe, since everything that we know was created by God, if everything is foreknown, then everything was caused by the only one who could have caused it. If God is the cause of everything that has happened, then that includes sin. God, by definition, cannot be the cause of sin.

2) The concept of God having emotions that change with time is illogical. If God exists outside of time, and percieves every possible moment of time simultaneously, then He should not become angry, and then merciful, and then regretful, etc. To us, God should be a constant who never changes.

3) Jesus. If God exists out of time, and percieves every moment of time simultaneously, then He would not be able to confine Himself to moving through time, and experiencing change as Christ did when He was here (assuming Jesus is God and God the Son, as traditional Christianity accepts.)

To explain how I solve these problems is to simply state that God created a universe that has (at least) 4 dimensions, and has at least the potential to expand along each of those dimensions. Time is constantly expanding in one direction with each movement forward along that dimension bringing a new moment in time, and giving each man the opportunity in those moments to make his own decisions, including to sin.

It also allows God, when interacting with our universe, to change emotions, to move with events, and to extend mercy and grace for that which man has screwed up.

I understand that you will reject this view, because it is foreign to you, but it is as valid as the closed view.


The first two are nonsensical, given mainstream theology. Why would you define X as a self-contradiction, or on what basis is the third one nonsensical (you're not making any sense, afaics)?


Then let me connect the dots. All three are, at least potentially, unknowable. It demonstrates that omniscience doesn't imply that God can know everything we can name, but only that He knows what is knowable.

The crux of the open/closed view debate, is whether the future exists, and thus falls into omniscience.


Well, there's the rub, Michael. Suppose a closed future. Does that future exist? Is it knowable? How does one have sure knowledge of something non-existent?

A closed future does not have to be known, nor does it have to exist. However, it is not the known/unknown that matters, but the closed nature. Which is why this is the open/closed view debate and not the known/unknown future debate.

One cannot have sure knowledge of the what does not exist, beyond the fact that it does not yet exist (assuming we know that). :hrm:

Why is it necessary for someone to have sure knowledge of the future?

Michael

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 07:02 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=45473#post45473)
themuzicman:

Thank you for finally acknowledging part of the problem. Your definition assumes you are right.


No, my definition is simply in keeping with the traditional understanding, which is a good stepping-off point for argument. Thus, knowledge of the future is taken as possible for the sake of argument unless we have reason to believe that such isn't possible. I don't claim that omniscience includes knowledge of the future because that is the case by definition, but based on the evidence with respect to logical possibility.


If we use a more meaningful DEFINITION of omniscience (such as the one from the American Heritage Dictionary, 4th edition), we find that omniscient means "Having total knowledge; knowing everything."


That's a more meaningful definition? I won't wait up for your explanation as to why it's more meaningful . . .


Actually, this is incorrect. Omniscience should only include that which one can demonstrate to be knowable.


That's a logical fallacy (argumentum ad ignorantiam: If we don't know that X is knowable, then X is not knowable).


That was the point of mentioning a rock too large for God to lift. God cannot know what this item is, because it does not exist.


Your "existence" criteria was shown false via counterexample (causally determined future). Try again.


Thus, to present the future as knowable requires some evidence that the future already exists, and how.


To borrow from my former analogy, does omnipotence also require that we explain how God could create something out of nothing? Thus, omnipotence includes only that which is possible, and we have no evidence that creating something from nothing is possible--do we?

Contrary to your approach, it is sensible to regarding all knowledge as possible unless we have reason to think otherwise. Is it possible for people to eventually travel to distant suns? I figure that you would have to answer "no"--can you exlain how we could possibly do so? You'd better believe that I'll carry that comparison down to the nitty-gritty: I won't let you posit anything as possible without evidence that it is so.



1) Free will. If what I would do was known before I even existed, then my free will could not possibly have been involved as the cause.

:smile:
That's it? Why not?


Foreknowledge does not require that the foreknower be the cause, however it does require *a* cause, because what is foreknown must be inevitable. If what I will choose is inevitable, then it is not really my choice.


You're hiding behind the term "inevitable"--I encourage you to expand your argument so that I can make your error clear to you.
For inevitability to remove your freedom, you must either have your choice coerced from outside yourself, or your must not have any other possible option. Let's look at a choice you made in the past. Is it inevitable that you chose A over B? With respect to actual, the actual cannot be otherwise because of the law of non-contradiction. In the realm of possibility, however, you had other possible (non-actual) options.
IOW, it is inevitable that you will choose what you will choose, via tautology. This is true in all possible worlds, whether those which include an OV God or those which include a hyper-Calvinist God. You follow? That universal inevitability is logically vacuous. It says absolutely nothing about free will at all.


In our universe, since everything that we know was created by God, if everything is foreknown, then everything was caused by the only one who could have caused it. If God is the cause of everything that has happened, then that includes sin. God, by definition, cannot be the cause of sin.


IOW, you're claiming that future knowledge is only possible if God causes all things (traditional causal determiniem, or what I call "divine determinism"). Yet you offer no logical reason as to why future knowledge and free will are incompatible.


2) The concept of God having emotions that change with time is illogical. If God exists outside of time, and percieves every possible moment of time simultaneously, then He should not become angry, and then merciful, and then regretful, etc. To us, God should be a constant who never changes.


Likewise, if God is omnipresent, he shouldn't be able to enter the temple where he already was.
You're pinning too much on anthropomorphic language, imo.
Why shouldn't God be both eternally angry at sin, and simultaneously angry temporally (from the human perspective) with respect to temporal sin?


3) Jesus. If God exists out of time, and percieves every moment of time simultaneously, then He would not be able to confine Himself to moving through time, and experiencing change as Christ did when He was here (assuming Jesus is God and God the Son, as traditional Christianity accepts.)


Likewise, if God cannot die, then Jesus could not die.
You're spreading the topic out into quite a few of our established thread, btw. :smile:


To explain how I solve these problems is to simply state that God created a universe that has (at least) 4 dimensions, and has at least the potential to expand along each of those dimensions. Time is constantly expanding in one direction with each movement forward along that dimension bringing a new moment in time, and giving each man the opportunity in those moments to make his own decisions, including to sin.


And God cannot know those decisions from his atemporal (having created the four dimensions?) state because . . .? Oh! Because you assume that he cannot because there is no evidence that He can? Argumentum ad ignorantiam, a favorite fallacy?


It also allows God, when interacting with our universe, to change emotions, to move with events, and to extend mercy and grace for that which man has screwed up.


Why couldn't an atemporal God who knows all things temporally and acts all at once eternally (yet temporally with respect to the creation) change emotions, move with events, and extend mercy and grace for that which man has screwed up?
Argumentum ad ignoratiam, a favorite fallacy?


I understand that you will reject this view, because it is foreign to you, but it is as valid as the closed view.


Nice try at psychologizing, but I reject your view because of the fallacy involved in justifying it. Your view may ultimately be correct, but you have no non-fallacious argument in its favor, afaics.


Then let me connect the dots. All three are, at least potentially, unknowable. It demonstrates that omniscience doesn't imply that God can know everything we can name, but only that He knows what is knowable.


Okay, but your justification for restricting God's knowledge in this case is thus far based on fallacy.


A closed future does not have to be known, nor does it have to exist. However, it is not the known/unknown that matters, but the closed nature. Which is why this is the open/closed view debate and not the known/unknown future debate.


What does open/closed mean if not unknown/known? Again, I claim that "changing" a future that does not exist is nonsense. You can't change something that doesn't exist.
If open/closed means unknown/known, then you're arguing in a circle.


One cannot have sure knowledge of the what does not exist, beyond the fact that it does not yet exist (assuming we know that). :hrm:


:smile:


Why is it necessary for someone to have sure knowledge of the future?


It's not.

[themuzicman]

Yesterday @ 03:18 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=45516#post45516)
Captain Ochre:
No, my definition is simply in keeping with the traditional understanding, which is a good stepping-off point for argument. Thus, knowledge of the future is taken as possible for the sake of argument unless we have reason to believe that such isn't possible. I don't claim that omniscience includes knowledge of the future because that is the case by definition, but based on the evidence with respect to logical possibility.


It also convienently assumes your position on the matter.


That's a more meaningful definition? I won't wait up for your explanation as to why it's more meaningful . . .


Because it provides a definition that we can agree upon.


That's a logical fallacy (argumentum ad ignorantiam: If we don't know that X is knowable, then X is not knowable).


Uh, I wasn't concluding that X is not knowable. I was simply stating that proof needed to be presented before we can accept that X is known. Try to keep up.


Your "existence" criteria was shown false via counterexample (causally determined future). Try again.


Well, finally you take a position. There are the "existentially known" closed view folks, and the "causally known" folks. Yours requires a slightly different argument.


To borrow from my former analogy, does omnipotence also require that we explain how God could create something out of nothing? Thus, omnipotence includes only that which is possible, and we have no evidence that creating something from nothing is possible--do we?


We're here, aren't we? We came from somewhere. If we assume the bible is true, then we have documentation that God created. (That wasn't THAT hard, was it?)


Contrary to your approach, it is sensible to regarding all knowledge as possible unless we have reason to think otherwise.


Convienent, since it sets up your opponent to prove a negative. Wrong, but convienent.


Is it possible for people to eventually travel to distant suns? I figure that you would have to answer "no"--can you exlain how we could possibly do so? You'd better believe that I'll carry that comparison down to the nitty-gritty: I won't let you posit anything as possible without evidence that it is so.


It is possible? The proper logical answer is "no", not because it is or isn't possible, but we lack the emperical evidence to say otherwise. This is a major weakness in logic. In a philosophical sense, I would answer "I don't know."


You're hiding behind the term "inevitable"--I encourage you to expand your argument so that I can make your error clear to you.


While ignoring your own? :bonk:


For inevitability to remove your freedom, you must either have your choice coerced from outside yourself, or your must not have any other possible option. Let's look at a choice you made in the past. Is it inevitable that you chose A over B? With respect to actual, the actual cannot be otherwise because of the law of non-contradiction. In the realm of possibility, however, you had other possible (non-actual) options.


You've answered your own question. If the future is causally known, then all of my decisions are the result of causes, and not of my own choosing. While it may appear that possibilities exist, I will be caused (coerced by cause) into choosing A.


IOW, it is inevitable that you will choose what you will choose, via tautology. This is true in all possible worlds, whether those which include an OV God or those which include a hyper-Calvinist God. You follow? That universal inevitability is logically vacuous. It says absolutely nothing about free will at all.


Inevitability applies more to the "existential foreknowledge" argument than the causal foreknowledge arument.


IOW, you're claiming that future knowledge is only possible if God causes all things (traditional causal determiniem, or what I call "divine determinism"). Yet you offer no logical reason as to why future knowledge and free will are incompatible.


See above.


Likewise, if God is omnipresent, he shouldn't be able to enter the temple where he already was.
You're pinning too much on anthropomorphic language, imo.
Why shouldn't God be both eternally angry at sin, and simultaneously angry temporally (from the human perspective) with respect to temporal sin?


Because the bible clearly states that God is angry with Isreal, and that His anger will subside at some point in the future.


Likewise, if God cannot die, then Jesus could not die.


Factually incorrect. Dying, from a Christian perspective, is simply the physical body being separated from the soul/spirit. When God took on a body, He could at any point be separated from that body, and that body could die. That doesn't mean He ceases to exist.

However, from an "existential foreknowledge" base, you'd be correct.


You're spreading the topic out into quite a few of our established thread, btw. :smile:


Yeah, well... :argh:


And God cannot know those decisions from his atemporal (having created the four dimensions?) state because . . .? Oh! Because you assume that he cannot because there is no evidence that He can? Argumentum ad ignorantiam, a favorite fallacy?


Actually, it's because you have not proven that He does.


Why couldn't an atemporal God who knows all things temporally and acts all at once eternally (yet temporally with respect to the creation) change emotions, move with events, and extend mercy and grace for that which man has screwed up?
Argumentum ad ignoratiam, a favorite fallacy?


There is no logical error, here. I never drew a conclusing based upon "we don't know."

Apparantly your favorite response to a point you can't argue is to concoct some assumption about what I've said, and then claim logical fallacy. That's twice you've done that in this post.


Nice try at psychologizing, but I reject your view because of the fallacy involved in justifying it. Your view may ultimately be correct, but you have no non-fallacious argument in its favor, afaics.


I reject your assessment of the fallacy.


Okay, but your justification for restricting God's knowledge in this case is thus far based on fallacy.


You'll have to do better than that.


What does open/closed mean if not unknown/known? Again, I claim that "changing" a future that does not exist is nonsense.


Then prove the future exists. That's a nice affirmative.


You can't change something that doesn't exist.


Who said anything about changing something that doesn't exist? Either you're putting words in my mouth, or you're not reading.


If open/closed means unknown/known, then you're arguing in a circle.


Then read more carefully. I said:

Which is why this is the open/closed view debate and not the known/unknown future debate.


It would help tremendously if you would stop imposing your assumptions on my arguments.

Michael

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 05:54 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=46214#post46214)
themuzicman:

It also convienently assumes your position on the matter.


Bunkum. John Powell makes (or should have made) the exact same assumption for the sake of his argument, or else he'll end up begging the question.
So far as "assuming" my position on the matter based on the evidence I presented above, I make no apology, nor should I.


Because it provides a definition that we can agree upon.


How nice of you to agree for me to agree with you.
Did you think of consulting me? Did you give a reason for rejecting the other definition? Don't bother answering; this rabbit trail doesn't bear following.


Uh, I wasn't concluding that X is not knowable. I was simply stating that proof needed to be presented before we can accept that X is known. Try to keep up.


If I'm behind you, it means that I lapped you.
In fact, you're being disingenuous. Here's what you said:
"Omniscience should only include that which one can demonstrate to be knowable."
IOW, if there's no demonstration that something is knowable, that thing isn't to be taken as knowable (iow, it's unknowable). Lack of evidence is to be taken as evidence of lack. That's the argument from ignorance fallacy to a tee.
Omniscience includes everything knowable whether we can prove it or not. You can't enter the debate with the presumption that X is unknowable based on a lack of evidence. That's a fallacy. Hurry up, or I'll lap you again.


Well, finally you take a position. There are the "existentially known" closed view folks, and the "causally known" folks. Yours requires a slightly different argument.


If you're referring to the "causally determined future" then you're incorrect: That's not my position, it's simply my counterexample to your supposed basis for dismissing the possibility of future knowledge.


We're here, aren't we? We came from somewhere. If we assume the bible is true, then we have documentation that God created. (That wasn't THAT hard, was it?)


Nobody said that begging the question was hard . . . but it's still a fallacy ("We're here" doesn't demonstrate that you were created ex nihilo). If you rest your case on the Bible, then there is no need to put the argument in terms of the compatibility of omniscience (including future knowledge) and free will. I insist that you do not expand the topic in that direction in this thread.


Convienent, since it sets up your opponent to prove a negative. Wrong, but convienent.


Why would it be wrong? In fact, it sets the stage for arguments such as the one John Powell presented in the Boxing Ring: If knowledge of the future is assumed to exist and it is logically impossible, then we should expect that absurd conclusions should result from the assumption that accurate future knowledge is[fixed via edit] possible.
That's why it's the sensible approach, even if it isn't strictly logical to claim that future knowledge is possible owing to a lack of contrary evidence.
The reverse approach, assuming that knowledge of the future is impossible, kills all discussion since the best that can be offered is a "counterexample" that does not agree with the foundational premiss (that foreknowledge isn't possible).
Your position, when taken as a premiss, will always beg the question. My position, when taken as a premiss, allows the opposition the opportunity of falsification via reduction to absurdity.


It is possible? The proper logical answer is "no", not because it is or isn't possible, but we lack the emperical evidence to say otherwise.


Sorry, musicman, but the proper logical answer isn't going to rely on the fallacy of argumentum ad ignorantiam.


This is a major weakness in logic. In a philosophical sense, I would answer "I don't know."


What's a major weakness in logic? The prohibition on fallacies? :wink:
Logic is the primary tool of philosophy. If you refrain from the fallacy, you end up with the proper answer: You don't know. If you assume that travel to other suns isn't possible, then your conclusion will necessarily contain that conclusion--there is no possible falsification, afaics. Taking the contrary position allows the possibility of falsification unless travel to other suns actually is possible. Thus, as I said earlier, it is sensible to take things as possible unless there is evidence to the contrary, particularly since "possibility" is an inoffensive category.


While ignoring your own? :bonk:


Your emoticon notwithstanding, I have been guilty of no fallacy here, while you have committed the argument from ignorance fallacy twice.
Do you disagree that "inevitability" affords you a degree of ambiguity that may hide a fallacy?
"You will do what you will do" illustrates inevitability, does it not?


You've answered your own question. If the future is causally known, then all of my decisions are the result of causes, and not of my own choosing. While it may appear that possibilities exist, I will be caused (coerced by cause) into choosing A.


I know the answer to my question, but the point was to get you to give your answer to the question. It looks like you didn't read the question carefully, since I was asking about an instance in the past, while you immediately referred to a causally determined future. So, maybe you can answer my question next time around and we'll build from there.


Inevitability applies more to the "existential foreknowledge" argument than the causal foreknowledge arument.


Why, exactly?
And be specific, because this is where you're making your chief error. The more specific you make your argument, the easier it will be for me to illustrate your error to you.


See above.


If you're referring to this, you missed the point.
If the future is causally known, then all of my decisions are the result of causes, and not of my own choosing. While it may appear that possibilities exist, I will be caused (coerced by cause) into choosing A.
If that's not what you're referring to, then please point me to it.


Because the bible clearly states that God is angry with Isreal, and that His anger will subside at some point in the future.


"Angry" appears to equate with "out-of-favor", which may be taken as descriptive of God's relationship with temporal Israel rather than God's opinion of temporal sin. I invoke the ban on Bible-based argument in this thread, which isn't relevant to the issue of whether or not knowledge can predate cause.


Factually incorrect. Dying, from a Christian perspective, is simply the physical body being separated from the soul/spirit. When God took on a body, He could at any point be separated from that body, and that body could die. That doesn't mean He ceases to exist.


I'm quite aware of that. In fact, you can find me making your argument above in Tweb in another thread. The point is that your prohibition on God's temporal activity relies on a single understanding of time just as my reductio ad absurdum relies on a single understanding of "die".


However, from an "existential foreknowledge" base, you'd be correct.


Really? When did you rule out more than one perspective or axis of time? A priori? :smile:


Actually, it's because you have not proven that He does.


What's the difference? Same fallacy, afaics.


There is no logical error, here. I never drew a conclusing based upon "we don't know."


Since you don't know that future knowledge is impossible, then, is it okay for me to ask you to assume that it is possible, for the sake of argument?
:smile:


Apparantly your favorite response to a point you can't argue is to concoct some assumption about what I've said, and then claim logical fallacy. That's twice you've done that in this post.


I've got you by the quotation marks, musicman. Complain to your editor.


I reject your assessment of the fallacy.


You can only do so by revising your previously-stated position. You're stuck with what you wrote in the past.


You'll have to do better than that.


No, I don't. Proper identification of your fallacy, which I've done, is sufficient to render your argument unsound.


Then prove the future exists. That's a nice affirmative.


You didn't answer my question, nor my attack on your notion that the future may be "changed".
You want me to bear the burden of proof--is that it?
Exhibit A: I can describe the future with well-formed propositions that appear to be true (On April 3, 2007, I'll arrive at work at 8:30 PM). If the future doesn't exist, how can true statements regarding the future be made? Consider the analogy from the past, also. The past doesn't exist. It did exist, and we can describe it today with similarly well-formed propositions.


Who said anything about changing something that doesn't exist? Either you're putting words in my mouth, or you're not reading.


I'm asking you to confirm that open/closed correponds to unknown/known. No answer yet, but I'm a patient person.
If open corresponds to unknown, then your argument is vacuous. If, otoh, open means that the future can be changed, then I'm charging you with advocating nonsense.
I'm reading what you write, and I'm asking you to clarify it (and you turned defensive).



Then read more carefully. I said:
"Which is why this is the open/closed view debate and not the known/unknown future debate."

It would help tremendously if you would stop imposing your assumptions on my arguments.


An if/then is not an imposition. Stop whining.
So, if "open" doesn't mean "unknown" and doesn't mean "changeable" then what does it mean?
Define your term, Michael, so that I don't have to guess.