A weak arguement for libertarian free will.

[geebob]

I want to clarify what I mean by calling this arguement weak. It is in fact a very powerful arguement. When a philosopher calls some concept or arguement as weak, he does not mean that it is a bad arguement or conception but rather that it is modest in its claims. And for what little it claims, it may make a more serious and substantial claims. What I will put forth is a weak arguement for libertarian free will because it is gives all pretensions of yeilding to libertarian free choice. It is not enough to fully prove the case though as for one, it has to do with arbitrary choices that involve little to no reasoning and in libertarian freedom we want to say that we can make free choices for reasons. That of course does not mean that the reasons dictate what we choose as the other choice may have reasoning behind it as well for which we could have picked the alternative. But my arguement will not bear this out.

The following is in fact a strong arguement and possibly proof against psycological determinism which is the mechinism typically put forward by soft determinists including most if not all theological determinists. It is this rock solid claim in which we find modest but strong support for the libertarian conception of free will.

My arguement is based upon optical illusions that display ambiguity.

The picture below is of an object that can be interpreted in 3 different ways by the mind.

it can be viewd as:
A a cube in a corner of a square room.
B a big cube that has a smaller cube shaped notch in the corner and
C a small cube in front of a large cube.

Now as you study the picture and figure out how to view it in all three ways, you can in your mind change the interpretation at will. You can go back and forth between interpretations and look at them in any order. You can go back in forth at any indeterminate frequency.

Psycological determinism cannot explain this. There is no desire, reason, or inclination that would dictate when you'd view what interpretatation or in what order apart from my description. Maybe you'd observe the different interpretations as you read my descriptions, but afterwords, the skys the limit.

I will post a few more pictures that disply similar ambiguities.

[geebob]

Here's a famous one of the old lady and young lady.

[yxboom]

http://www.mindfake.com/images/illusions/illusion_15.gif much cleaner :teeth:

[Zakath]

Today @ 01:57 PM
geebob:

...Now as you study the picture and figure out how to view it in all three ways, you can in your mind change the interpretation at will. You can go back and forth between interpretations and look at them in any order. You can go back in forth at any indeterminate frequency.

Psycological determinism cannot explain this... First, I'd wager that not everyone can discern three separate figures...

Second, I'd suggest that it's less an issue of determinism and more an issue of whether the perceiver is processing stimulus as field dependent or field independent.

Just a thought...

[geebob]

First, I'd wager that not everyone can discern three separate figures...

only two is enough for my arguement. I find C actually difficult to maintain but I can get that picture.

I would assume that the old lady/young lady is fairly easy to see.


Second, I'd suggest that it's less an issue of determinism and more an issue of whether the perceiver is processing stimulus as field dependent or field independent.

that's a bit over my head.

[Zakath]

Today @ 02:17 PM
geebob:

...that's a bit over my head.

Hey, you were the one that brought up Freudian psychological determinism to describe a simple issue of cognitive processing when there was a shrink lurking on the board!

As Freud would say, "Sometimes a cigar is merely a cigar." :brow:

[Jaltus]

Zak,

The argument against theological determinism still holds.

[PuritanD]

I'd admit that I have very limited knowledge in regard to philosophy and psychology...

How does this proof of discerning or how one conceptualize is proof against theological determinism? Am I missing something here?

Are you trying to connect that because one can see one or another possible image that this means we were not determined to see what we thought we saw but that we chose it?

PuritanD

[geebob]

There is a mechinism that most theological determinists use to demonstrate how God determines our choices. He does so by determining our strongest inclination/desire/reason for a choice and we necessarily choose that choice.

In these pictures, when you view which interpretation and when you switch back and forth between interpretations is not dictated by some inclination from our character. It is a pure act of will and the mechanism suggested has no bearing on it.

You can still hold to theological determinism, but you can't say that determination of the will is always in the way that *psycological determinism suggests.

*this is psycological determinism as I've defined it which I believe has been around longer than freud. I'm not familier with what Zakath is talking about.

It is the psycological determinism of Buriden's ass from the middle ages which I am addressing here.

The donkey in this thought problem dies because his head is exactly equally distant from two equal piles of hey. Since the animal cannot have more desire for one stack over the other, it remains suspended in indecision until he dies of starvation.

These pictures I believe provide a counterexample.

[PuritanD]

So you are not trying to disprove theological determinism then?

[Zakath]

<Sigh> Can't we all just have a little fun around here... :smile:

Geebob and Jaltus, this in no way validates or invalidates the agrument for theological determinism. I would not use the psychological determinism argument here.

BTW, even though I was trained as a Jungian, let's get a little behavioristic here:

Psychological determinism is "the view that all human actions and states of mind are precisely determined by antecedent conditions, such as our rearing, social context, education, prior psychological condition, neurophysiology, and so on."

I don't think psychological determinism can be ruled out in this specific case of a cognition exercise because you have not taken any steps to rule out antecedent conditioning.

My own opinion is that you first see what you see because of the way your brain is "wired" (i.e. neurophysiology), then as higher level cognitive processing occurs the other elements of psychological determinism are factors.

The "Buridan's ass" paradox, which allegedly shows up in Aristotle somewhere, was pooh-poohed by Freud who pointed out that complex organisms (mammals, in this case) have multiple instincts and that self-preservation would override the stupidity or passivity of the critter in question. The decision of which pile of hay to choose would be arbitrary, not logical. But the ass would choose to survive rather than tolerate a statis condition that would kill it.

There is a modern version of "Buriden's ass", courtesy of the "hyperdiscordians":

"An ass, standing equidistant from two identical bales of hay, would convene a Congressional subcommitee to appoint a panel of experts to interview those involved to produce a thirty-five pound ring-bound document detailing the problem and then starve to death. "

[Jaltus]

The decision of which pile of hay to choose would be arbitrary, not logical I believe that was geebob's point.

[geebob]

Puritan


So you are not trying to disprove theological determinism then?

Only a very significant cog in the weel.


Zak

Psychological determinism is "the view that all human actions and states of mind are precisely determined by antecedent conditions, such as our rearing, social context, education, prior psychological condition, neurophysiology, and so on."

The arguement I put down is concerned with everything but the bold part. I doubt we have an equivalent of that prior to hobbs and I am considering the classical question. If theological determinists want to allow for such obviously non-volitional and materialistic to play a role in god's determination, then they may get around this. I have met calvinists who have beefs with that.


I don't think psychological determinism can be ruled out in this specific case of a cognition exercise because you have not taken any steps to rule out antecedent conditioning.

What possible motives, inclinations, or desires could dictate that I must view the interpretations of the first picture in an order of ABCABACB instead of ABCBACBC?


My own opinion is that you first see what you see because of the way your brain is "wired" (i.e. neurophysiology), then as higher level cognitive processing occurs the other elements of psychological determinism are factors.

wiring of the brain is not a consideration here when I speak of the mechinisms by which calvinists and most other theological determinists use to explain theological determinism.


<Sigh> Can't we all just have a little fun around here...

NO SOUP FOR YOU!

[PuritanD]

Yesterday @ 02:42 PM located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=42538#post42538)
geebob:

Only a very significant cog in the weel.

Huh???

[geebob]

I'm demonstrating a disproof of a very significant part of the traditional account of theological determinism. Not the whole thing.

[PuritanD]

Yesterday @ 03:50 AM located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=42838#post42838)
geebob:

I'm demonstrating a disproof of a very significant part of the traditional account of theological determinism. Not the whole thing.

Please forgive my ignorance, but specifically which part are you disproving? As I mentioned before, I am not a philosophy major nor did I have a great class on it. Would you mind stating it in layman's terms.

Thanks,
PuritanD

[geebob]

psycological determinism (not Zakath's version, which I have to wonder is really called by that name).

The soft determinist who says we are free because we do what we want and what we want is determined by our strongest inclination is at issue.

[Ishmael]

This is nothing more than an optical illusion. You see what you see because of biology and then you use your reason to see the other thing as you adjust your eyes. It was determined to be such. :brow: We were predestined to see two or three things depending on how we focused our eyes. Case closed.

(I don't see any connection to theology BTW.)

[geebob]

You see what you see because of biology

which is not psycological determinism as pushed by many theological determinists.


and then you use your reason to see the other thing as you adjust your eyes.

and what possible reason would anyone have for viewing the different interpretations in the order of ABCABAB or instead ABCBACB. What possible reason would I have to view B for 2 seconds then C for 3.4 seconds and then go back to B for 1 second instead of viewing A for 5 seconds and then switching to C for 1 second?

[PuritanD]

03-24-2003 @ 12:43 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=43744#post43744)
geebob:

psycological determinism (not Zakath's version, which I have to wonder is really called by that name).

The soft determinist who says we are free because we do what we want and what we want is determined by our strongest inclination is at issue.

Let me get this straight. You are trying to connect a soft determinst's idea of desire with psycological determinism? If this is true, then you are arguing that all desires are psycological, right.

I do not think inclination and desires equal, but hey I missed out on that class. :argh: I think that soft determinst's like Feinberg would not associate with inclination but actually desire. I could be wrong here so please feel free to correct me.

I think though that it would be difficult to prove the point you are trying with the two optical illusions. As Calvinist seems to point out, it is just as possible for the outcome you presuppose to be "determined" already.

Why is it not possible for the different interpretations in the order of ABCABAB or instead ABCBACB be already "determined" by God. And how is it possible to prove otherwise?

Still, I love the optical illusions. I just do not see how two people might have different probable outcomes or even a single person is detrimental to the theological determist view point. I do not think that probablity is strong enough evidence to discount such a belief.

PuritanD

[geebob]

I do not think inclination and desires equal, but hey I missed out on that class.

for the purposes of my arguement, the distinctions are irrelevent.


Why is it not possible for the different interpretations in the order of ABCABAB or instead ABCBACB be already "determined" by God. And how is it possible to prove otherwise?

of course. But they cannot explain God's methodology for this through our mental states. They don't have to, but that is the way many if not most theological determinists explain it. They could say that God achieves this as zakath suggests, through neurological pathways.

[PuritanD]

Today @ 06:42 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=46418#post46418)
geebob:

of course. But they cannot explain God's methodology for this through our mental states. They don't have to, but that is the way many if not most theological determinists explain it. They could say that God achieves this as zakath suggests, through neurological pathways.

I find it hard to believe that we could explain away God's methodology through our mental state anyways. Especially, now we are dealing more with abstratctions and theories more than actual hard evidence. Why do compatibalists need to answer such questions? I do not think that we will ever know our minds and how they work well enough to ever determine (no pun intended) of God's methodology.

I would chalk it up to the Great Mystery of God.