Featured Member Article: Kant installment by R. Liikanen

[Trout]

The Universe, Its Origin & End

Part One:

Causal Argument for the Existence of a Supreme Being,

or: Kant's Challenge Answered, or: The Refutation of Empiricism


by R. Liikanen

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The Beginning of This Causal Argument
(An Elaboration on its Premise, and the Relation Between
Cause and Effect --Expounded Through the A and B Representations--And an Explanation of the Causal Principle)

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PREFACE

The following Causal Argument presents, on pure philosophical grounds and according to five a priori principles, a strict rational, logical solution to the question of the ultimate origin of the universe, and with this follows a strict rational, logical proof that its design reflects the work of a Supreme Will, Being, or Author. The conclusion also follows that our universe is not as many theoretical mathematicians appear fond of stating, a defiance of the fantastic odds against its possibility. This argument holds that just such a universe as this, as opposed to nothing at all, not simply should, but must necessarily exist.

This pure philosophical argument demonstrates why the question in its ultimate sense reaches beyond the scope of empirically grounded sciences, however, the empirical validation of this philosophy must rest upon the known facts and the generally agreed upon findings of those sciences most closely related to the same question.

Furthermore, the agreement between this philosophy and other sciences, such as cosmology, should not only be expected. It should be demanded. For were this philosophy to conflict with these other sciences then this would be sufficient reason to dispense with this philosophy. Yet not only does this philosophy agree with the facts and findings of other sciences but this philosophy resolves certain critical and persistent anomalies associated with these facts and findings.

These anomalies, mentioned briefly in this argument, can be looked upon as clues that point the way towards this pure, philosophical solution to the question. As such, they not only point out the need for this philosophy, but they help to validate this philosophy, apart from which there is no other explanation for these anomalies, nor, given the profound nature of these anomalies, is any other explanation likely to be found.

While this philosophy therefore reaches beyond all empirically grounded sciences it is important to note that it does not conflict with any other science. The only argument advanced here against the empirical method employed by other sciences is that the empirical method is necessarily restricted and hence can only go so far as to point in the direction of a pure philosophical solution to the question of origin.

As to the end of an ultimate solution to this question, our natural, intuitive need to press the question as far as possible points to the need to utilize pure speculative reason, as opposed to a strict empirical method. Where the empirical method is followed the question can only be pressed back as far as the empirical evidence allows. The science of anthropology brings our understanding of human history back in time only as far as the archaeological evidence allows. Thus, the history of Homo sapiens is known to extend back in time nearly 200,000 years. The science of geology brings our understanding of the earth's history back in time only as far as the geological evidence allows.

Thus, the earth is estimated to be 4.6 billion years old. The science of cosmology traces all things even further back in time, but only as far back as the astronomical evidence and the laws of physics allows. Thus, the universe is estimated to be roughly 15 billion years old. Yet the question in its ultimate sense demands reaching beyond even such a far-reaching science as cosmology. The end in view in this regard is not the same as any end that properly belongs to science. The end in view is to understand a universal causal process accounting for the ultimate origin of all things.

This implies a causal process that transcends in its scope all that falls within the realm of natural science as something that can be observed and scientifically analyzed. Where such an end is proposed to have been
reached, as with this Causal Argument, what is implied therefore, is a solution to the question that renders it logically unnecessary for us to press the question any further.

Consequently, the reader may utilize their understanding of this fundamentally different end for pure philosophy in judging the rational validity of any proposed ultimate solution to the question. For if any such solution begins with a premise, or a condition, the existence of which itself raises a question as to its origin, then the critical demands imposed by the question, in its ultimate sense, have not been satisfied.

The intuitive need to press the question beyond all that empirically grounded sciences can tell us proves itself as the most natural, the most undeniable, and the most compelling grounds justifying the use of pure reason as the only instrument capable of both addressing, and resolving the question.

This need to press the question beyond even the scope of theoretical mathematics can be seen for instance, with the Einstein de-Sitter cosmological model (1932), that traces the universe back in time to a singular condition of zero spacetime and infinite density. Neglecting the paradox that such a condition poses for our common-sensed way of thinking, the equally difficult question that arises from this model is: "From where did
the supposed infinite mass of this singularity originate? Or, what was the Cause of this proposed preliminary condition?" It is not, according to the critical demands imposed by our need to press the question as far as possible, enough to begin with a condition that leads to yet another question. The end in view, if we are to yield to our intuitive need to so press the question, is the understanding of an original condition that renders it logically unnecessary for us to press the question further. This implies the understanding of an original condition that proves itself as the most rational beginning to our
understanding.

This intuitive need to so press the question poses an impossible critical impasse not only for mathematical theorists, but also philosophical theologians. If a theological argument, for instance, proposes by way of its premise, that the universe exists because God caused or willed it to exist, then our intuitive need to press the question further is sufficiet reason to dispense wth the argument. Beginning with a condition, either
material or immaterial, and the existence of which itself raises a question no less difficult than that which it proposes to resolve only pretends to a solution. Theologians in this regard have never succeeded in reducing the difficulty of the question, nor have they succeeded in understanding or removing the obstacles on the path towards its solution. The recourse of theologians in this instance has simply been to avoid the difficulty of the question by assuming an arbitrary division in their thinking between their faith and their reason.

This division that has for centuries been a cornerstone in the thinking of philosophers and theologians rests upon an appeal to our natural and our common ignorance in view of no existing rational solution to the question. Furthermore, by undermining reason as a useful instrument to this end, and by submitting to the popular notion that such a solution is not within the capacity of human reason, philosophical theologians have only helped raise a further obstacle on the path towards its solution.

This Causal Argument makes no appeal to this arbitrary division between faith and reason. The fundamental aim furthermore, has not been to reconcile faith with reason, but the aim has been to begin with an original condition that dispenses with the need to press the question further. With the original condition thus presented there follows quite logically, and rationally, the explanation of a causal process that accounts for the existence of the universe. What also follows is the necessary conclusion that there exists a Supreme Being to whom we may attribute the apparent intelligent design
of the universe. The proof upon which this conclusion rests however is radically different from any other philosophical argument for it rests entirely upon the grounds of pure reason. Once this argument is fully grasped the reader will also see that there is nothing else upon which such a proof can rest.

This does not imply however that no empirical validation of this argument is possible, or that it lacks any possible practical confirmation. The empirical validation of this argument will follow, and where common experience may serve to further validate the following is with regard to the practical, moral implications of the pure, rational proof it provides. Any such practical, moral considerations however must remain separate to the end of the present question, the solution it provides to this question, and the value of which may be judged by the strength of the foundation it provides for any moral philosophy that may arise from it.

In the following Causal Argument, the most critically important questions that the reader may bear in mind, are then as follows:
Does this argument provide a premise that is logically unavoidable, meaning, an original beginning to our understanding aside from which no more logical, no more rational beginning can be thought?

Does this rational solution to the question of the ultimate origin of the universe conflict with or agree with what has come to be known and generally accepted regarding our human and our cosmic history?

Does this solution overcome the critical difficulties and anomalies associated with those empirically grounded sciences most closely related to the same question?

Does this argument provide a logical, rational solution to the question in its ultimate sense, and a solution aside from which no more logical, rational solution can be thought?

As to the last question, the appeal to the lack of any superior, alternative solution as a negative judgment against this argument cannot be justified, for as the following argument is not simply assumed as a possibility, but is given, then the demand imposed upon anyone hoping to refute this solution is not only that they provide a proof of where this argument fails, but in the absence of this, that they provide the proof of a rationally superior solution by pointing out where such a solution is to be found. Where this fails then all rational grounds to refute or deny this solution fails. One can even say in this instance that it would then be irrational for us not to accept this one, realized, rational solution to the question.

Further, as for any objection arising from the use of the word pure, its use is justified in that the following argument provides an objectively valid, universal, a priori solution to the question. This implies a solution that is not grounded upon concrete sense experience, but a solution thought out entirely by means of pure reason. If this solution were grounded upon phenomenon found within the world of our concrete sense experience then it could not be called either pure, or a priori, in the strict sense of these terms. The a priori itself implies a solution grounded entirely upon pure reason as opposed to a solution that appeals to anything found within the realm of our concrete sense experience, even though the world of our concrete sense experience may provide for the empirical validation of this solution.

What is implied therefore is not a mere arbitrary determination, but a logical, rational solution that could have been thought out independently by the reader of this argument, or anyone else had they only put the required effort into answering the same question. This implies a solution that is not open to a wide array of conflicting opinions, but a solution that can only be understood in the same way by all. This also implies that there cannot be a number of conflicting solutions to the same question. There can only be but this one possible, universal, objectively valid, a priori solution to the question.

The universal factors that are accounted for by this Causal Argument are:

1. The mass of the universe, that is to say, its underlying essence.

2. Space and time, or more properly, spacetime.

3. Consciousness or mind.

These are the only universal factors that need to be explained by this argument. Understanding their ultimate origin is possible by conceptualizing, in the system expounded, all these universals, by uniting them in our thinking into what can be called one universal solution.

The Absolute can be said to provide the premise for this argument, but the understanding of what this term implies must be qualified by its use in the context of this argument, as opposed to how it may be used outside of this argument. Here however arises the greatest difficulty, not with this argument, for it admits of no rational flaw, but rather, with its comprehension, which by some will fail short of their expending their most serious and painstaking effort. To overcome the difficulty of comprehending this solution attention must be paid with regard to how the universal factors of sacetime, mass, and mind, are employed towards the understanding of the series by which the Absolute brings these universals into being.

This is accomplished by means of the following four a priori principles:

1. The Causal Principle.

2. The Operative Principle.

3. The Principle of Divergence.

4. The Principle of Equal Relation.

The Causal Principle explains the motivating factor to a complete causal series accounting for the existence of the universe, implying by this a causal series with an ultimate beginning, and an ultimate end.

The Operative Principle presents an abstract framework for our understanding of this causal series (it cannot properly be understood without taking into account the other principles).

The Principle of Divergence explains the process of change implied by this causal series.

The Principle of Equal Relation explains the inevitable end of this causal series.

These four principles can be understood as the first phase of a complete causal process. They explain the origin of spacetime, and mass, however they do not account for why this mass emerged to take on the form of our present universe with its apparent intelligent design.

A fifth principle, the Principle of Progressive Design, follows logically from these four principles. It can be understood as comprising the second phase of this causal process, and it provides a rational explanation for this apparent intelligent design.

An Ultimate First Beginning, and an Explanation of The Causal Principle, An Elaboration on The Premise of This Argument, And The Relation Between Cause And Effect-Expounded Through The A And B Representations-

Cosmologists estimate the age of the universe to be roughly 15 billion years. This estimate coincides with the discovery that the galaxies, with the exception of only a few within our own local cluster of galaxies, are rushing away from each other at tremendous speeds, many with recessional velocities approaching the speed of light. From this picture of a dynamically expanding universe it follows that at earlier periods of time the galaxies were closer together, and if this expansion were traced back as far as possible time would be reduced to its shortest measurable length, equal to an infinitesimal 10-43, the Planck time, prior to which spacetime and the mass from which our universe has been formed would be squeezed into a point of zero spacetime, and infinite density, called a singularity.

Cosmologists have determined the order of events that most likely followed from the Planck time onwards, but restricted to the laws of physics they are unable to determine any events that might have preceded the Planck time. The very idea of any event preceding the Planck time seems meaningless, for if the beginning of time is determined from the Planck time forward, then it seems only logical to think that no event could have preceded this beginning. Yet the question, not for cosmologists, but for metaphysicians, is: "Could there have been some process that preceded the earliest point of time known to cosmologists that could account for why the universe arose from such a simple beginning?"

Despite the inability of scientists to reach deeper toward an understanding of events even more remote than the Planck time, a point of convergence arises here between the otherwise disparate fields of physics and metaphysics. Here it can be said that where physics leaves off metaphysics begins, and while any philosophy that goes by the name may expect to meet with the greatest skepticism the need for such a philosophy can hardly be disputed on rational grounds, for as the aim is the understanding of a universal causal process predating the earliest time known to cosmologists then it follows that only pure speculative reason provides the means of determining such a process.

The scenario of a first beginning to our universe as put forth by cosmologists is fundamentally important for the following system of metaphysics has as its premise a beginning that, while it predates the earliest time known to cosmologists, nevertheless confirms the same beginning to our universe as understood by cosmologists. The zero condition of spacetime and infinite density from which our universe began to expand into existence some 15 billion years ago, equates with the same beginning proposed here, though this system of metaphysics does not propose this beginning as a conjecture. It proposes this beginning as an a priori, certainty.

The ultimate beginning for metaphysics, that predates the beginning understood by cosmologists, is referred to in the context of the question posed three centuries ago by the German philosopher and mathematician Gotfried Leibniz: "Why is there something, rather than nothing?"

The question itself rests upon the presumption that it is unusual that something, rather than nothing, exists. Yet the question also suggests that while every state other than nothing compels the question concerning the origin of that state that is other than nothing, the need to question the existence of nothing is not similarly felt.

The regression that the science of cosmology points to itself ends with a singular state of zero spacetime, so that it is at nothing that the regression of all things back in time, stops, along with the question: "Why is there something?" But here the word nothing seems to have a stifling effect upon our thinking and our understanding, for what can we possibly make of nothing?

In his Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics Kant puts forth the conflict that reason confronts in this regard as follows:

Thesis: The world [universe] has, as to time and space, a beginning (limit).

Antithesis: The world is, as to time and space, infinite." (See Appendix: 87; 339-340)

In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues in favour of the antithesis:

For let us assume that it [the universe] had a beginning. Then, as a beginning is an existence which is preceded by a time in which the thing is not, it would follow that antecedently there was a time in which the world was not, that is, an empty time. In an empty time, however, it is impossible that anything should take its beginning, because of such a time no part possesses any condition as to existence rather than non-existence.... [See Appendix: A:427, 429; B:455, 457]

Kant's judgment: "In an empty time...it is impossible that anything should take its beginning," is as dogmatic and as decisive as the practical, common-sensed notion of the term nothing. It stifles the need for any further reflection, and indeed, Kant fails to see any possible, positive solution in favour of either the thesis or antithesis.

But could not the conflict that reason brings upon itself rest upon the practical, or the common-sensed meanings of the words we use? Kant fails to see the conflict as due to this possibility, but argues rather, that the conflict poses a false problem for reason [Prolegomena 52c].
Yet we find that Kant dismisses the role of common sense in such conflicts, for he writes:

The appeal to common sense is even more absurd-if anything more absurd can be imagined-when it is a question of concept and principles claimed as valid, not in so far as they hold with regard to experience, but beyond the conditions of experience...[see Appendix]

If Kant is justified in dismissing the role of common sense in evaluating judgments in metaphysics then it follows that on these same grounds we can dismiss the presumption that something cannot follow from nothing (a judgment already overthrown by findings in the field of quantum physics). And on the same grounds it follows that a critical analysis of the word nothing is the most logical path for reason to follow.

However, because common sense will always attempt to impose itself over a more painstaking, critical exercise of reasoning, it may prove difficult to understand that we are not beginning this argument with nothing, but rather, with a critical analysis of the word nothing. Yet the recognition of the difference here is crucial for here reason stands before two possible paths on the road to understanding. These paths are distinctly separate and on a critical level, conflicting. Where one path inevitably ends in a stagnant and dogmatic skepticism, the other path leads directly to a clear and decisive solution to the first antinomy.

Dismissing the practical, common-sensed notion of nothing, however, what more can we possibly make of the concept or the idea of nothing?
We could define what we have in mind, with the thought of such an apparently empty state, as an internal, or subjective, and therefore, finite representation.

But such an internal representation is not all that we can or must have in mind with the thought of such a state, for what we understand of such an empty state must, given that no limitation can be imposed upon it, stand necessarily in relation to an external, infinite, or what we could call, Absolute state. Now in this very admission sufficient grounds exist for advancing as a premise, and a first beginning to our understanding, the two following, pure representations:

A: The Absolute state of nothing, as a boundless, infinite, external state.

B: The finite, internal representation of A (our subjective, intuitive idea of A).

It is impossible to form any conception of a total void, or nothing, without admitting either of these two representations, regardless of whether or not we define them precisely as here. As soon as we admit either one of these ideas we must necessarily admit the other.

Where A is given, B necessarily follows.

Where B is given, A necessarily follows.

Where A fails, B necessarily fails.

Where B fails, A necessarily fails.

A and B are both necessary, and the one etermines the other.

It cannot therefore be argued that as for B, this representation is a mere subjective determination, even though we can only admit to this representation by thinking it. It is rather, universally and objectively true that the subjective representation B, necessitates the objective representation A.

Furthermore, in the very idea of this relation the terms subjective and objective are merged, for there is no clear division between these pure representations. They stand in a pure state of relation. And though merely thinking such relation can only provide for us an imperfect idea of such a state in reality, that is, with respect to an actual ultimate first beginning, it does not follow that we can have no idea whatsoever of such a remote beginning.

Further grounds for establishing the certainty of this beginning rests upon the possibility of our determining a necessary causal process following from this beginning, and taking account of whether or not such a causal process conflicts with or coincides with what the science of cosmology has disclosed concerning the origin of the universe.

While this is only a simple critical analysis thus far, sufficient grounds for extending our understanding beyond these representations, and to the understanding of a universal causal process that goes beyond the science of cosmology, yet confirms the findings of
cosmology, can be accomplished by continuing this critical analysis.

To repeat:

Representation A is that Absolute state that exists as a boundless, infinite, external state. Our very thought of this simplest possible state is determined in its relation to this boundless, external state, so that A verifies and determines this thought, that is given in B. B is therefore a necessary determination of A, just as A is a necessary determination of B.

The critically important judgment is that this first state, or beginning, necessarily constitutes the simplest of all possible beginnings, hence, the term simplest must apply to all characteristic factors used to define this first state. These factors are themselves, and can only be, the universal factors of spacetime, mass, and mind. These are also the only factors that we can have in mind in our understanding of the causal process (to be explained) that follows from the relation expressed between these two pure representations.

It follows then that this ultimate first beginning constitutes the simplest state to which spacetime, mass, and mind, can regress; and conversely, it is from this simplest of possible beginnings that spacetime, mass, and mind, must begin to emerge into greater states of intensity, or greater, more complex states of being.

The understanding of an emergence from this ultimate first beginning can be provided by the A and B representations for A presents to us the idea of an unconditional state, that is, a state not subject to change. As such, A presents, with regard to this simplest possible state, the simplest possible concept of a constant, or an Absolute Cause, to which B, as a conditional, finite representation, follows as the simplest possible concept of an effect.
Consequently, a Causal Principle, as the first of the five a priori principles, following logically from the critical analysis undertaken of this beginning, may be derived from the relation expressed between these representations, as follows:

A: The Absolute Cause: The unconditional, infinite or constant state of space [or Absolute void] that exists as an external, or objective condition -the admission of

which cannot follow without:

B: The Effect: The conditional, finite, and intuitive, or subjective representation of A.

The emergence from ultimate simplicity towards greater complexity is then to be understood as following from the effect, B, in its movement towards A, as its objective, Absolute Cause.

The motivating factor in this relation between this Absolute Cause, and this effect, follows from the pure state of relation between these two representations, with the conditional state of B compelled through this pure relation to its objective Absolute Cause, A.

Now explicit to the concept of B, as an effect, is the idea of a certain dynamic intensity, for B cannot be conceived of other than as a dynamic condition, however minimal, and this by virtue of the pure state of relation between A and B.

Hence, the relation between these representations may be extended further as follows:

The concept of B, as an effect, in relation to the concept of A, follows as the concept of a finite dynamic state, expanding outwards, towards the external state of A, as its objective Cause.

Now here the concept of spacetime, and as will be explained, mass, follow necessarily; as well as the concept of mind (for the relation expressed between these representations is none other than that of a pure relation of mind), and the understanding of B, as a dynamic state motivated towards A, is possible only by thinking of it as an expanding sphere, with a certain dynamic intensity. These three universals can therefore be said, with respect to this first beginning, to exist as one. At this point they are as yet undifferentiated.

Further, the objective provided by the Absolute Cause is that of a constant, or unconditional, objective state, to which B is compelled, so that there arises from this causal relation, a necessary causal process, or series, in which the objective of A is inevitably obtained by B.

This implies a dynamic causal series in which spacetime, mass, and mind arise, from the ultimate beginning of this series, and their simplest possible state of intensity and being, through this series, to their greatest possible state of intensity and being, this following with the objective state of A, being obtained by B.

With the attainment of the objective, Absolute Cause, by the effect, spacetime, mass, and mind, are to be understood as emerging into existence, from apparent non-existence; but this argument denies and negates the very possibility of a totally void state, or an absolute state of non-existence. The premise here proposes a regress of spacetime, mass, and mind, only to the point of approximating a totally void state.


As To The Possible Grounds For Rejecting This Beginning:


Considering what has been advanced thus far it is found that even in the investigation by means of reason into such an intangible condition as an ultimate first state, intuition and concepts are possible that permit our dealing with such a beginning in a strict, critical manner. And while it may seem that the apparent negation of all things makes it impossible to extend to such a state any characteristic of mind, as the most critically important of those universals assigned, this first beginning cannot be said to prove an absolute negation. Whatever skepticism may exist with regard to this beginning must rest upon what our practical experience would have us impute as the necessary conditions for the determination of mind. Yet the beginning expounded by means of the A and B representations implies no ordinary concept of mind, hence, no ordinary concept of mind can suffice as a critical refutation of this beginning. Further, as the difficulty of coming to terms with such a beginning arises naturally, in that this beginning reaches by necessity to the closest approximation of an absolute void, this should bring us to see not the impossibility of such a beginning, but this should bring us to see the logical grounds for defining this beginning as the simplest of all possible states, and the simplest of all possible relations of mind. Further, any refutation of such a beginning would need to rest
not upon a critical analysis in itself that must inevitably lead to the same judgment advanced here, but to an appeal to the practical, dictionary definition of nothing. But this argument rests not upon the meanings of words employed to meet practical ends, but upon a critical exercise of reason directed at an end more fundamentally crucial than any question of immediate practical concern. This critical analysis, directed to an end removed from our immediate practical concerns, leads to the judgment that the pure relation of mind expressed through the A and B representations, being removed to the furthest possible extreme, and to a state that defies our practical, everyday experience, affords the only possible grounds for any skepticism that may exist with regard to such a beginning.

Given the preceding Causal Principle however, an immediate difficulty arises, for as the Absolute Cause to the effect remains constant, then the process of change implied by the effect implies a negation of the state of relation between this cause and effect. In other words, the concept of the effect seems to negate its possibility.

This apparent conflict however is overcome for the effect can only be understood as a dynamic state compelled by and towards the Absolute. This implies that the effect imposes upon the original state preceding it, the opposing force of its condition. The concept of the effect as an opposing force to its Cause implies not its impossibility, but it provides an indication as to its necessary nature.

The following principles explain this process of change, whereby the objective state of A is obtained by the effect B, and by utilizing the concept of mass and its intensification.


The Operative Principle
A framework for the operation of cause and effect

Deduction 1
(the existence of Mind at the ultimate first beginning)

There is, in the consideration of an ultimate beginning to all things, nothing apart from the relation expressed between the A and B representations, that can be thought to exist. These provide the only possible premise for an ultimate first beginning. All things must therefore be understood to begin with mind, for it is mind alone that conceptualizes this relation between the A and B representations.

Mind is thus the most fundamentally significant of those universal concepts that define this ultimate first state.

Deduction 2
(the regression to the absolute point marked by the ultimate first beginning)

The universal concepts of spacetime, mass, and mind that characterize the ultimate first state must subsist in this state at their least possible level, or simplest possible form. The regression of these universals cannot continue beyond the point marked by this ultimate first state.
Consequently, this ultimate first state constitutes an Absolute point at which the regress of spacetime, mass and mind ceases, and that Absolute point from which these universals begin to emerge towards greater states of intensity, complexity, and being.

Deduction 3
(the dynamic factor motivating the effect of a pure, dynamic, mobile force of mind, emerging from its ultimate first state)

From an ultimate first state an effect followed, and this effect is best defined as a pure, dynamic, mobile force of mind. It is the pure state of relation existing between this effect and its Absolute Cause that provided the dynamic factor motivating this effect. Further, as the Absolute Cause to this effect implies an infinite, or a constant motivating factor, this effect must be considered as not simply possible, or even as inevitable, but as given.

Deduction 4
(the effect of a pure, dynamic, or mobile force of mind, as the effect of a finite sphere of expansion)

It is impossible to think of the effect of a pure, dynamic, mobile force of mind that followed from its ultimate first state, other than as a finite sphere expanding towards its Absolute Cause, so that explicit to the concept of this effect, is the idea of its dynamic expansion. If we do not form an idea of this effect as a dynamic sphere of expansion, then we can form no idea of this effect at all.

Deduction 5
(the diminishing force of the effect)

The expansion of this effect towards its Absolute Cause implies that its expansion was taken up within an increasing sphere, and this implies that the dynamic force by which it was compelled (explicit in the relation between A and B) diminished in proportion to its expansion.

[The following deductions, 6, 7, & 8, are clarified by the Principle of Divergence.]

Deduction 6
(the opposition to the effect)

Explicit to the concept of the effect is the concept of change, and this change is to be understood as a dynamic expansion, and hence, opposing force to the pure state of its Absolute Cause, and the pure, first state of relation from which it followed.

Deduction 7
(the termination of the effect)

Due to its dynamic nature this effect overcame the opposition to its expansion to a finite extent, but as its force dissipated with its expansion its force inevitably dissipated to the point of its complete dissipation, and consequently, its expansion ceased.

Deduction 8
(the opposite effect)

As the expansion of this effect ceased the opposing force to this effect, being precisely proportionate to its expended force, caused this effect to contract back to its originating point.

Deduction 9
(a state of continued relation between cause and effect)

The contraction of this effect continued only to the point of its ultimate originating point. This ultimate originating point marked a point of neither expansion nor contraction, and therefore comprised a state of continued relation between cause and effect.

Deduction 10
(the succession of the effect and a consequent series)

The state of continued relation maintained between cause and effect, at this ultimate originating point, resulted in a successive effect following from this point, and this successive effect followed as the former, with its expansion, a complete dissipation of its force, its cessation, and again, its contraction back to this ultimate originating point.

Consequently, a complete series of interconnected stages of effects, successively expanding and then contracting, followed.

Deduction 11
(the state of continued relation as an instantaneous transitional point)

The ultimate originating point of this series, that also constitutes a state of continued relation between cause and effect, marks a transitional point between the expansion and contraction of the stages stages within this series, and as this point also marks an ultinmate, Absolute (that is, constant) originating point, then the transitional period between the contraction and the expansion of the stages within this series cannot be
conceived as existent, that is, the transition between the contraction and the expansion of each stage was instantaneous.

End of deductions for the Operative Principle.

The concept of change implied by this series can only be understood in the form of its divergence from the pure form of the ultimate first state that marked its beginning. Otherwise, it would be impossible to form any idea of this series. The concept that allows for the understanding of this divergence is the concept of the successive intensification of this series, and of fundamental importance to the understanding of this change, is the concept of mass.

The following principle explains this further.


The Principle of Divergence


Deduction 1
(the concept of successive intensification)

As each stage of expansion within the series that followed from an ultimate first state collapsed back to this first state, or Absolute originating point, each succeeding stage followed with a greater intensity. This increased intensity can be understood only in terms of a successively cumulative change from one stage to the next throughout this series.
Such a change can also be understood on strict logical, and necessary grounds, for just as it is impossible to think of a single stage within this series without the concept of change, so it is impossible to think of this series except by means of the same concept, and this only by means of the successive intensification of this series.

Deduction 2
(the Absolute intensification of the series)

The increased intensity of each stage in this series over each preceding stage was the result of the constant, Absolute Cause, and motivating factor that compelled this series.

As this Absolute Cause remained constant throughout this series the degree of force exerted upon the originating point of each stage within this series must be understood as increasing, successively, and inevitably, to the point of an Absolute degree of intensity.

Deduction 3
(the relation of cause and effect expounded further, and the nature of the divergence that occurred within each stage throughout this series)

Given the concept of an expanding sphere, it follows that the outermost edge of each stage of expansion comprised that point of expansion that was the greatest in its force or intensity, and its rate of expansion. It also follows that this outermost force to each stage of expansion, due to its closest approximation, and state of relation to the Absolute, remained pure, or whole in its form or nature.

The constant motivating factor of this series can therefore be understood as due to the pure state of relation maintained between this pure outermost force (that can best be defined only as a pure, dynamic, mobile force of mind), and its Absolute Cause; that is, this pure outermost force, by virtue of its closest approximation and pure state of relation to its Absolute Cause, acted with, and as the Absolute, to compel this series.

Now this pure outermost force may be defined even further as a pure immaterial force, or as a pure force of spirit, but explicit to this definition is the concept of intensity, where the intensity of this pure dynamic force is to be understood as increasing successively with each stage throughout this series (according to the previous deduction).

As the dynamic intensity of this pure force intensified with each stage of this series an accumulation of more substantial (material) forces diverged from it.
These divergent forces comprised a stream of more differentiated forces that trailed off from this pure, outermost force, and while such a stream of divergent forces implies a form that remains to us unknowable, the existence of such a stream of divergent forces can be deduced according to the concept of change, without which it again remains impossible to think of this series. By means of this same principle of change, applied to the whole of this series, we can further deduce that with each of its successive stages this
stream of divergent forces became more substantial, more disproportionate, and more differentiated in their form from that pure, outermost force from which they diverged.

[To help clarify this process we can think of this series as a transition, from its least state of intensity and complexity, to its greatest state of intensity and complexity, and to this end one may take into consideration the concepts here that are either explicit or implicit. For instance: The intensification of this series may be understood in terms of its mass intensity, where, beginning from its simplest possible state, this mass intensity approximates a state closest to its total negation, but from which this mass intensity increases successively to the point of its obtaining at the end of this series, to an Absolute (infinite) mass intensity. Also, the concept of spacetime is integral to this system, and this concept, identified with the concept of expansion, can be understood as intensifying from the point of the ultimate beginning of this series, wherein it approximates a state closest to its total negation, but from which it undergoes successive intensification to the point of its obtaining at the end of this series, to the Absolute. Yet a further concept implicit within this system is the concept of heat, varying from its least possible degree of intensity at the ultimate beginning of this series, and increasing with each successive stage throughout this series to the point of an Absolute degree of intensity.]

Deduction 4
(the expended force of expansion)

The expended energy of the pure dynamic force that compelled each stage within this series can be understood as taken up in the form of those more substantial forces that diverged from it.

Deduction 5
(the opposing or counter-force to expansion)

Those forces that diverged from the outermost edge of each stage of expansion acted as the opposing, or the counter-force to each stage of expansion, and with the complete dissipation of the outward force of expansion, these forces acted to cause the collapse of these forces as a whole, back to their originating point.

[This clarifies the preceding principle's deductions 6, 7, & 8.]

End of deductions for the Principle of Divergence.

Now to this conceptual system the principle of a qualitative change has been introduced, where at the outermost edge of each stage of expansion the relation between the Absolute Cause and the effect explained, remains whole, or pure in form, but from which the expended force of this expansion is taken up in an increasingly more divergent stream of more substantial, more disproportionate or differentiated forces, with rates of expansion that diminished relatively to their distance from the outermost edge of each stage of expansion.

The crucial point to be grasped is that as these diverging forces underwent a successive intensification throughout this series the extent of variation between the pure motivating force of this series and these diverging forces became more and more pronounced.

This conceptual system however is as yet incomplete, for just as it remains impossible to conceive of any single stage within this series other than by means of the concept of change, and as having both a beginning and an end, so it remains impossible to conceive of the series made up of these successive stages other than by means of the same concept of change, and as having both a beginning and an end.

The following principle explains the necessary termination of this series.


The Principle of Equal Relation


Deduction 1
(the critical stage of this series as the final stage within this series)

Inevitably, the intensification of the forces generated by this series reached a critical stage beyond which they could intensify no further, and at this critical stage this series was brought to its end.

Deduction 2
(the critical stage of this series, marking the separation between the pure motivating force of this series, and those forces that diverged from it)

At the critical stage of this series the pure, dynamic force that compelled this series, and those more substantial forces that diverged from it, reached such a level of intensification and divergence, that these two qualitatively differentiated, and opposed forces, underwent a complete separation.
With the inevitable, complete separation of these two opposed forces this series completed its transition from its simplest possible state to its most complex, or greatest of possible states.

Deduction 3
(the successive nature of this series prior to its final, critical stage)

Prior to the final, critical stage of this series, the intensity attained by the forces generated throughout this series was insufficient to prevent these forces, as a whole, from collapsing back to their originating point. These forces therefore continued to undergo further intensification and divergence until this final, critical stage.

With this critical stage, and the end of this series, the forces generated throughout this series attained to an Absolute level of intensity beyond which no further intensification and divergence of this series remained possible.

Deduction 4
(a final state of equal relation between the pure motivating force of this series and those forces that diverged from it)

The final, critical stage of this series, was reached at that stage where the pure, dynamic, mobile force of mind that compelled this series was equal in intensity to the intensity of those forces that diverged from it; that is, at that stage where this pure force of mind overcame completely, the counter-force to its expansion due to these divergent forces. At this final, critical stage, this pure force of mind obtained to the state of its objective, Absolute Cause.

With the end of this series a state of balance was then reached between this pure force of mind, and the mass of divergent forces generated by this force in its transition to the Absolute. Thus, two qualitatively differentiated and opposed forces were generated through the operation of this series, one purely immaterial, that is, whole in form or nature, and the other, a mass of more substantial (material) and differentiated forces.

The forces generated through this series thus obtained to a level of intensity beyond which they could intensity no further, and these forces as a whole became fixed within a certain sphere defined by the Absolute limit and intensity of the final, critical stage of this
series.

This completed the first phase of the causal process that accounts for the ultimate origin of the universe.

End of deductions for the Principle of Equal Relation.

These preceding principles follow through, logically and necessarily, to a concluding principle. This principle, the Principle of Progressive Design, rests on the judgment that it is with the final, critical stage of this series, and the equal state of relation between the two qualitatively differentiated forces generated through this series, that the universe began to take on its present design.


Empirical Validation


As the principles of this argument are derived from pure reason their proof is grounded upon reason itself, yet key findings in the field of cosmology provide for the empirical validation of these principles.

Here only a brief outline follows of the evidence in support of what the vast majority of cosmologists regard as the best available theory for the origin of the universe. The cosmological model they offer, the big bang model, rests upon indisputable evidence that the universe has undergone a dynamic expansion in the past.

It is said here that the universe has undergone a dynamic expansion, for the evidence of this expansion is in the form of radiation that has travelled over immense distances to reach us. The radiation reflected by the Andromeda galaxy for instance, began its journey through space two million years ago, at the time of the first hominids. The light from the Virgo cluster of galaxies began its much longer journey through space 50 to 70 million years ago, when birds and mammals first appeared on earth. And peering into the deepest reaches of space the image of the double quasar PHL 1222 is the image of an object that existed 12 billion years ago, when the universe was still in its infancy.

This means that astronomers can tell us much about what the universe was like in the past, but this one directional view into the past affords them no knowledge of what the universe is like at the present, or if the expansion of the universe is still taking place. Given the enormous changes having swept over the earth in just the last few hundred thousand years, one can only speculate that equally vast changes may have swept over the entire universe, and the true reality that remains hidden to us may be far removed from the images of the distant past observed by astronomers.

The beginning of the expansion that has taken place is thought to go back as far as the Planck time of 10-43 seconds, prior to which spacetime and the mass of the universe collapse to a paradoxical point of zero spacetime, and infinite density.

This Causal Argument necessitates such a beginning to the universe. It also provides a rational means of accounting for the infinite mass of the singularity and the expansion following from this point of zero spacetime.

One of the greatest difficulties that the standard big bang model faces however is that it demands a precise balance between the force of gravity and the force of expansion. According to cosmologists this balance had to be established at the very beginning of the big bang. The difficulty is that if the equivalence between these opposing forces had deviated even slightly from a certain critical factor then the universe would not have come into being. If the force of gravity had been slightly stronger the universe would have collapsed before any stars or galaxies could form. If the force of expansion had been slightly stronger the densities inside stars would not have been strong enough to cause thermonuclear reactions, and the universe would have turned out cold and lifeless. According to cosmologists this critical balance could not have deviated by more than 1 part in 1060 beginning from the Planck time on all the way through to the present. Cosmologists are unable to explain how such a precise balance could have been achieved. It is however accounted for and necessitated by the fourth principle of this argument, the Principle of Equal Relation.

A further implication in this is that the expansion that began some 15 billion years ago, being driven by an Absolute motivating force, was perfectly smooth or homogenous in form, and the expansion that took place took place instantaneously. This is implied in the conceptual system of this argument in the concept of the successive intensification of a series from a state approximating its absolute negation, to the point of its obtaining to an Absolute degree of intensity.

There is all the empirical evidence needed to verify such a beginning to our universe, for instance, given the recessional velocities of those most remote objects observed, quasars, that approximate the outermost edge of the expansion that began 15 billion years ago. The question in this regard is: "If these most remote objects reflect what the universe was like in its infancy, then how were these objects removed to such great distances at such a relatively early period in the universe's history, that is, at a time when its mass was supposedly confined to a relatively small volume of space?"
This question is resolved if we consider that the expansion of these objects was preceded by a series in which each stage intensified successively to the point of a final critical stage that obtained to an Absolute degree of intensity.
Quasars, in other words, approximated the outermost edge of the expansion that took place 15 billion years ago, and were driven to the remote distances at which they are now observed almost instantaneously, at the very beginning of the big bang, by an Absolute force of intensity.

This argument adds a priori confirmation to the big bang theory, which in turns helps to validate this argent; however, there are other fundamentally important facts that provide for the empirical validation of this argument. These are: the evidence of life on earth evolving over four billion years from the most simple single-celled organisms to the most complex multi-celled organisms. This regression back in time evident in the earth's history is the same regression confirmed by big bang cosmology, though even if the findings in these fields were dismissed on the grounds that the events they attest to have not been directly observed, or thereby confirmed, there is yet the direct confirmation of this same process of change taking place in our very beings, for before the coming into being of any being, there preceded a state of non-being, and hence in this indisputable fact of our own emergence into existence from a prior state of non-existence we have the undeniable confirmation of this same process to which all things within the realm of our experience are subject. Hence, we can even on strict empirical grounds, confirm a principle of change that is not only particular, but truly universal.
The logical, rational deduction of this argument is that this universal process of change points back to an ultimate beginning that can only be understood by means of pure reason. While this ultimate beginning reaches beyond our immediate experience and our immediate understanding it cannot then be said that nothing within the realm of our possible experience can confirm such a beginning, or provide grounds for our understanding such a beginning, even if only abstractly, for all things, being subject to the same universal process of change, to this movement from non-existence into existence, and from the most simple to the most complex, testifies to this ultimate beginning of all things, to the premise of this argument, and to the a priori principles that
follow from this premise.

Furthermore, apart from the preceding principles providing an explanation for why the universe has undergone an expansion, and apart from their explaining the origin of spacetime, and mass, the Principle of Equal Relation necessitates that this expansion either has, or will be overtaken by a Steady State universe, due to the equal state of relation between the Absolute force driving the expansion of the universe, and the
mass of the universe.

The remaining question, of how the universe emerged into its present, high level of complexity and design, is answered by the final principle that follows logically from the preceding principles.


Principle of Progressive Design


This philosophy begins by defining an ultimate first beginning. Reason affords the only logical explanation of this beginning and the only means of understanding the causal process following from it; and while some resistance may be expected towards this philosophy in that it transcends a strict empirical method, and what some may consider undeniable, or hard proof, the question is such that no such proof can reasonably be demanded or expected. Yet there is nothing here that conflicts with the empirical evidence available from those fields most closely related to the same question.

All the cosmological evidence available, rather, points back to the very beginning necessitated by this argument, though while this beginning leaves cosmologists facing the dilemma of a singular condition of zero spacetime, and infinite density, and a breakdown of the laws of physics, this philosophy provides a rational account for this same beginning.

This beginning is equated in this philosophy with a state of continued relation between cause and effect, and it points back to the ultimate beginning of the series leading to this beginning, as understood by cosmologists, and the existence there of what can best be defined only as the simplest of all possible relations of mind. Through the causal series following from this ultimate beginning, as explained through the first four principles, it follows that this relation of mind is to be understood as obtaining from its simplest possible state of being, to its obtaining at the end of this series, to its greatest possible state, as Absolute Spirit, Absolute Mind, and Absolute Being.
According to the Principle of Equal Relation, an equal state of relation now exists between this Absolute Being, and Mind, and the mass generated by it in its transition to the Absolute, so that two logical judgments inevitably follow:

1) This Absolute Being, and Mind, has an unbounded, conscious awareness of the mass of these divergent forces; thus, to this Absolute Being we must attribute the characteristic of omniscience; and

2) As a pure force of Absolute Spirit, this Absolute Being, and Mind, transcends the physical universe (is infinite), but has Absolute power over its mass, so that this Being may seize complete control over the elements derived from this mass at their most fundamental level, and thus direct the universe according to its design; thus, to his Absolute Being we must attribute the characteristic of omnipotence.

The path reason follows towards this conclusion though necessary, appears at odds with a strict empirical approach, which here appears counter-intuitive, for it fails to recognize the intuitive need to press the question as far as possible. These two approaches furthermore reveal a critical distinction having to do with the understanding of the what and the understanding of the why. Where with the empirical approch there is a reaching towards an understanding of the what, and where with pure speculative reason there is a reaching towards an understanding of the why.

For instance, there is no doubt that cosmologists, who now lay claim to a knowledge of all the fundamental laws of physics, are able to explain what happened from the Planck time onwards, and while in this they have gone further than the vast majority of philosophers could ever hope to, this understanding, when the question is pressed as far as possible, amounts to an understanding of what events took place. But the question in its ultimate sense demands knowing why these conditions themselves came to be. Hence, all mathematical theories ultimately fail to address the question in this sense, for these models, given their empirical basis, must begin by postulating certain preliminary conditions that permit the laws of physics to be utilized, yet the question demands reaching beyond all such conditions to know why these conditions themselves came to be.

This leads then to the further judgment that such an understanding that would truly constitute an understanding of the why, as opposed to just an understanding of the what, resides only in an Absolute Mind, capable of understanding all that exists in its infinite complexity, and save for the a priori understanding that can do no more than point to the existence of such an Ultimate Reality, the quest on the part of theorists employing a strict empirical method for a similar understanding, is conducted in vain.

Where one yields to their own intuitive need to press the question as far as possible, even to the point of rejecting as a logical premise any pre-existing empirical condition, or any pre-existing immaterial Being, it is found that while removing in this any blindness towards the profound depth of the question, reason in its pure speculative, yet critical sense, and in apparent defiance of our supposed common sense, provides the strongest possible logical, rational proof in the existence of such a Higher Being.

Even science in this instance fails to offer support for the possible objection that the nature of such a Being, as an immaterial spirit, is an impossible idea, for science itself discloses a reduction of matter to ever simpler forms even further distanced from hard matter, so that the logical question follows: "At what point are we to assume that this reduction of matter abates?"

If this reduction of matter abates at that which is yet physical in essence the question is: "What are we to say is the nature of this yet physical essence?"
But here science is of no avail for that which is so distanced from that which is more readily observed leads at best only to conjecture, and whether the issue has to do with the ultimate origin the universe, the true nature of the human mind, or what it is that constitutes the essence of life, all arguments must inevitably end with one's deciding upon those terms and conditions that best reflect one's individual preference. For empiricists, the issue becomes one of deciding upon those terms and conditions that best reflect the truth of their central dogma that only matter exists. For those who reject this dogma, the issue becomes one of admitting that the underlying substance of the physical world reduces ultimately to pure spirit, and this is an entirely rational judgment against which the empiricist, unable to deny the reduction of matter to ever simpler forms, is deprived of all grounds for any reasonable objection.

But what then is to be said given the scientific evidence that provides the true account of human origins through evolution, for is this process not evident given a fossil record extending billions of years into the past? And does this strictly natural, scientific theory, not render superfluous any such notion as a Supreme Author of creation?

Here however, the findings of natural science, rather than conflicting with this argument, offer support for its approach, for here also is found the evidence of a regress back in time from the more complex to the more simple. With this regress their arises the same fundamental problem having to do with the physical mechanism or agent of change that ultimately began this process. But even granting all the knowledge gathered from science in this regard, when the question is driven as far as possible, this knowledge, regardless of its factual nature or relevance, falls short of answering this question, for the understanding in demand again does not concern what took place in the past. What did take place is summed up by the principle that simpler life forms have been replaced over time by more complex life forms. What is in demand is an understanding of why this change from the more simple to the more complex took place, and the understanding of this why demands a demonstrable proof in the existence of that dynamic, physical mechanism of change that began and that continues to drive this process. Yet any appeal to a physical mechanism of change fails for given any such mechanism the inevitable question follows: "What preceded or led to the emergence of this physical mechanism of change?" The incessant pressing of the question leads ever further away from all those objects that lie within the field of possible scientific analysis.

This incessant pressing of the question is natural, and unavoidable, and it provides the strongest and most irrefutable need to go beyond a philosophy of strict empiricism.

This incessant pressing of the question therefore leads necessarily to the only possible alternative found in pure philosophy and the preceding a priori principles, that themselves follow through to a judgment, grounded upon strict necessity, that the universe in all its infinite complexity, from the formation of the elements, to the formation of galaxies and stars, and the intricate, vast and complex web of life on earth, attests not to the existence of a blind and purposeless physical agent of change, but rather, to the continuing drive of the Supreme Author of this design to bring all things to an ever greater state of complexity and being.

Given then this, as it may be called, Principle of Progressive design, as a logical deduction following from the preceding principles, the otherwise persistent anomalies that plague the theory of evolution disappear, most significantly, the relatively brief period of time over which species related to the human family have progressed to the level of Homo sapiens. This period, of about four million years, reflects but 0.1 per cent of the earth's 4.6 billion year history -a period of time far too short according to many scientists for the normal processes of evolution to achieve such advances. And to compound this difficulty, the substantial differences between groups classified within the human family, as between Homo sapiens and their closest, yet comparably primitive precursors, Neanderthals.

Despite there being various theories that have attempted to account for how evolution proceeds not gradually, through a long, drawn out succession of minor changes, but rapidly, through a succession of spontaneous leaps, all such theories are prone to the same criticism leveled here against all empiricist theories with respect to the question of origin taken in its ultimate sense.

The preceding principles, following logically to this concluding Principle of Progressive Design, overcome the otherwise impossible difficulties faced by all
empirically grounded theories, for it expresses an Absolute consciousness in which the whole of creation, from its most minute features to its greatest and most complex features, are understood in their entirety as they exist not only in themselves, but as they exist in relation to the whole of creation. It also expresses a Supreme Mind that has steadily and progressively advanced in its dynamic consciousness and creative capacity through the very act of creation, as evident from all that science itself has disclosed concerning the past. And it expresses a Supreme Mind that has through this boundless capacity for intelligent and purposeful thought and design, given life through a
complexity of processes and actions that infinitely transcend finite human comprehension, and that therefore defy all strict empiricist attempts to rationally account for the why of this creation, to a vast and diverse community of other beings who can share, to some finite extent, this same capacity for intelligent and purposeful thought and design.

Now should this later conclusion prove the more rational of the two possible alternative paths open to us, these being the path of a philosophy of strict empiricism, with its imperative atheism, on the one hand, versus pure philosophy, with its strict, logical, rational proof in the existence of a Supreme Being, on the other hand, then two remaining difficulties appear for this argument, for this Principle of Progressive Design appears to conflict radically with the belief in an Eternal Being who, as theologians believe: does not change. [Mal. 3:6]

But the question is: "Does not the act of creation, as the act of a Supreme Will, bind the Creator and the created in a mutually inclusive, dynamic process of change?" For this is just what the Principle of Progressive Design implies.
Where the world undergoes change the idea of its Creator as a Being knowing no change leaves those professing such a belief with the dilemma that a changing world cannot occupy any thought in the mind of God.

The only way of avoiding such a dilemma is if by this notion of an unchanging or eternal Being is meant simply that the Absolute remains constant. As for this, this argument states the same. Or, given the proper context from which this notion is lifted, that the laws of the Absolute are immutable.

Further, the very concept of the Absolute implies that which infinitely transcends the finite bounds of human comprehension, so that this argument, in which the Absolute provides both the premise and the conclusion, provides not a contradiction, but rather, the only rational a priori proof in such a Being. And unlike the all too easy appropriation of a few supposedly self-evident words, lifted out of context and raised to the level of a self?contradictory dogma, it allows for the belief in a God who not only transcends the finite bounds of human understanding, but it allows for the belief in a God with the capacity to think and act.

The final, remaining difficulty arises with the following:

1. In the beginning God made the heaven and he earth.

2. But the earth was unsightly and unfurnished, and darkness was over the deep, and the

3. Spirit of God moved over the water.

4. And God said, Let there be light, and there was light.

5. And God saw the light that it was good, and God divided between the light and darkness.

6. And God called the light Day, and the darkness he called Night, and there was evening and there was morning, the first day.

Septuagint

The common interpretation has it that these first few lines from Genesis imply that all things were created ex nihilo, 6,000 years ago.

So-called creationists go so far in their dogmatic insistence upon this sole possible interpretation that they compel themselves with equal vigor to cast aside all the scientific evidence pointing to a vast prehistory.

This denial of science and its evidence of a vast pre-history is grounded upon a dogmatic and critically flawed interpretation of the first few lines of Genesis.
In the first verse we are told that the Supreme Author of creation went about the act of creation; then, in the second verse, we are told that everything that this Supreme Author just finished creating was in such a state of disarray, that this same Supreme Author then had to go about, as explained in the subsequent versus, putting all things into proper order. Now if this is the case, what can creationists, or any others who assume these first two versus are inseparable in time, come up with as the excuse for this initial, botched act of creation?

If the first two versus in Genesis do refer to the very first day of creation then the inescapable conclusion follows that the Author of this botched creation was no omniscient, omnipotent Author of creation at all, but more likely, some blind and bungling impostor. As some theologians have argued, however, there is nothing within the whole of this account concerning the amount of time that may have elapsed between these initial two verses.

The grounds for refuting the common assumption concerning these two versus is itself found in another scripture indicating how scripture is to be interpreted and understood: "...to whom would He teach knowledge?...For He says...Line on line...A little here, a little there." . In other words, the events depicted in one verse do not necessarily coincide in time with the events depicted in preceding versus.

Consequently, there is room enough for the judgment that an unspecified period of time may have elapsed between the events spoken of in the first two versus of Genesis.

The conflict between this account and science disappears given the more plausible conclusion that this account is not then the account of an ultimate beginning, but the account of a new beginning, and regardless of its otherwise literal or symbolic content, a new beginning that marks a significant turning point in the relationship between the Author of creation with the work of creation.


Conclusion


This Causal Argument results from a naïve, but unshakable, single-minded optimism toward the potential of reason to acquire certainty. While Kant's pessimism in this regard led him to write: "I had therefore to remove knowledge, in order to make room for belief," [Critique of Pure Reason, Preface] the undermining of reason as the most secure foundation that belief could hope for has led to the very form of hardened skepticism
from which Kant hoped to rescue philosophy.

However if the objection is yet raised that this argument violates the critical dictates of the challenge, that this philosophy can be of no service to the use of our understanding in experience, that it may even impede a rational knowledge of nature [Prolegomena, § 44] or that this system of pure understanding is only something that may be thought but not proved, then to the contrary, this philosophy not only adheres to the findings of other sciences where these serve as clues pointing reason in the direction of this ultimate solution, but it resolves certain otherwise persistent anomalies related to these findings; most notably, the paradoxical singularity and the precise balance between the force of gravity and the force of expansion, and in evolutionary theory, the relatively brief period of time over which more complex life forms have emerged on earth.

In thus pressing the question of origin to the extent necessary to realize the solution to these problems one must resist the common, but false notion that the highest aims of pure philosophy extend beyond the bounds of possible human understanding. Apart from the solution offered by means of pure reason there is no accounting for the universal factors of spacetime, mass, and mind, and no accounting for the apparent intelligent design of the universe. Unless that is, if one is willing to thoroughly deny the role of pure philosophy, and its highest aims, even given its a priori form, and more willing rather, to resort to mere conjecture, or the false notion that the question for which reason affords the one, and only possible solution, defies possible human understanding. But where no more rational alternative is to be found a much more difficult challenge appears for those who would defend a strict empiricist, atheistic world-view against this argument, for such a task demands on their part precisely this -the determination of a decidedly superior alternative to this solution from pure reason, implying an alternative solution with the power to altogether subvert this argument. Failing this, however, no alternative remains for those who would hope to defeat this argument but to appeal to the common notion that the cosmological problems here resolved extend beyond the bounds of human understanding, for while such an appeal can hold no force over those willing to lend this argument the attention necessary to comprehend it, may hold force enough with those who possess no such inclination, or who, considering the depth of the matter, may find themselves unable to comprehend it. Yet the path to this end has been made as easy as the most stringent advocate of clarity can reasonably demand, and where one claims a certain inability, it is most likely that such an admission reflects not a lack of the requisite ability, but a lack of the requisite will.

The following points are made in favour of this Causal Argument:

1. It satisfies the aim of our intuitive need to press the question concerning the existence of something, and answers why something, rather than nothing, exists.

2. It agrees with all the available scientific evidence, but more importantly, it resolves the otherwise critical and persistent anomalies that confront the science of
cosmology, and evolutionary theory.

3. It unifies faith with reason by providing a pure, philosophical, rational proof in the existence of a Supreme Being.

4. It has, despite all the possible skeptical objections that may be raised against metaphysics, all the empirical validation that can reasonably be demanded of it.

5. There exists no possible rational alternative to the solution it provides to the question of the ultimate origin of all things. This solution provides the one and only possible, universal, objectively valid, a priori solution to the question.

6. It not only explains why the universe underwent expansion, but according to the Principle of Equal Relation, it predicts (rather, necessitates) the end of the expansion of the universe, and an eventual Steady State universe.

As for the immediate concerns that arise from this argument:

While the proof of this argument is grounded upon reason, is further validation of this argument and its conclusion possible within the more complex, practical sphere of human experience?

Does this rational proof in the existence of a Supreme Being imply that there exists within us the potential of eternal life?

If so, why should such a prospect merit our desire?

Is this Supreme Being, as an omnipotent and omniscient Author of creation, these being the two attributes justified by this argument, omnibenevolent?
If so, then how do we explain the existence of evil?

Such questions could never be addressed before in any convincing manner for the foundation upon which the solution to such questions could rest has never before existed. Now with this foundation it becomes possible to proceed, at least to that extent that human reason allows, from the first step of knowing why all things exist, to the second step of knowing why all things are, just as they are.


End of Part One

________________________________________________________

Appendix

This Appendix deals with Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy, the Critique of Pure Reason, and Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, and the Causal Argument as it relates to Kant's critical demands with regard to any system of metaphysic directed at resolving the cosmological problems that he outlines in the form of the four antinomy.

Quotes from the Critique are cited under the A and B editions, taken from the translation by F. Max Müller (Anchor Books, N.Y., 1966). All other quotes are from the Prolegomena... (Library of Liberal Arts, 1950), and are numbered accordingly.


Kant's Challenge, Kant's Critical Demands for a Science of Metaphysics,
and: What is Meant by a Science of Metaphysics?


Owing to the vast scientific advances realized since the eighteenth century there is the opinion that Kant's critical philosophy is now passé. But in his own defense of the subject of metaphysics, Kant writes: "That the human mind will ever give up metaphysical researches is as little to be expected as that we, to avoid inhaling impure air, should prefer to give up breathing altogether." [367-368]

The other quotes used here should, if considered carefully, provide for the conclusion that Kant's critical philosophy is now looked upon as passé by some only because there has arisen in our time a prevailing philosophy of strict empiricism, and this has coincided with the rise of an unparalleled, near religious like faith and reverence in hard science. A great many philosophers, not being immune to this influence have even attempted to make of their discipline a handmaiden of science, thus confounding the aims of philosophy with the aims of science. But the aims of science and philosophy are not necessarily the same. Where science is restricted to dealing with what lies within the field of concrete experience philosophy remains free to approach the most difficult of all questions. And though this lack of restrictions in pure philosophy may, as some argue, serve a negative purpose, it cannot reasonably be assumed that it serves only a negative purpose, for what is at stake is nothing of consequence to science, but the grounds for humanity's faith in the existence of something that transcends all that science concerns itself with. Kant's critical demands were not intended to strike a lethal blow against metaphysics and those ideas that reach beyond the scope of science, but to direct metaphysics away from the negative influence of those systems wherein no certainty could be found, and towards the kind of certainty reflected in the dogmatic methods of such disciplines as pure mathematics and physics, thus Kant writes concerning his investigations of these,
that: "Both sciences, therefore, stood in need of this inquiry, not for themselves, but for the sake of another science: metaphysics." [75, 327]
Where the ideas central to metaphysics are thought inconsequential in comparison with the more immediate practical concerns of everyday life then the highest aims of philosophy are thwarted, so that no alternative remains but to relegate philosophy to the level of a poor handmaiden of science, or an all too easy to neglect critical tool for the theoretical study of law, morals, and the arts.

But is this all that philosophy was ever meant to be?

Kant reaches the conclusion that while the cosmological questions appear to defy any possible positive solution, one must, to avoid the charge of mere idle speculation, guide metaphysics along a path more in line with the dogmatic and the more disciplined approaches of other sciences.

There is no mistaking that the fundamental problems of philosophy addressed in the Causal Argument are the same problems mentioned by Kant in the preface to his Critique: God, Freedom, and Immortality [A:3-4; B:4-8], and while Kant undertook his investigations to discover just how much we could reasonably expect from metaphysics, it seems odd that he would in the course of his investigations, employ the term science with respect to metaphysics. But a justification of Kant's association of the term science with metaphysics, becomes apparent by focusing upon the critical demands that he outlines to the end of a science of metaphysics. This focus conflicts with the belief that Kant's intention was to rid the world of metaphysics. Kant's remark: "Mathematics, natural science, laws, arts, even morality, etc., do not completely fill the soul; there is always a space left over for pure and speculative reason." [380-381] as but one positive comment made by Kant towards metaphysics, could hardly have been made by someone whose intention it was to put an end to metaphysics.

It appears to be a failure to appreciate the reason why Kant imposes his strict critical demands upon metaphysics that leads to the false notion that Kant wrote his critical works with the intention to rid the world of metaphysics.
As to the most import of these critical demands and the kind of understanding it aims at, Kant remarks:

the conclusion drawn...then is that metaphysics is properly concerned with synthetical propositions a priori, and these alone constitute its end...the generation of a priori knowledge by intuition as well as by concepts...of synthetical propositions a priori, especially in philosophical knowledge, constitutes the essential subject of metaphysics. [273-270]

Here Kant provides the strongest indication as to why he attacks those systems of metaphysics that do not exhibit what he calls synthetical propositions, a priori. It is also this distinction, synthetic propositions a priori, that leads Kant to associate the kind of metaphysics he looks for with sciences such as pure mathematics and physics.

The critical demand for synthetic a priori propositions is enough to overthrow the claims of all systems of metaphysics not so constituted, hence Kant remarks: "My purpose is to persuade all those who think metaphysics worth studying that it is absolutely necessary to pause a moment and, regarding all that has been done as though undone, to propose first the preliminary question, "Whether such a thing as metaphysics be even possible at all?" [255-256] "The question whether a science be possible presupposes a doubt as to its actuality." [256-257] "The learned men whose works have been useful to me in other respects...will, I hope, forgive me for saying that I have never been able to find either their essays or my own less important ones...to have advanced the science of metaphysics in the least."

And:

Metaphysics has hitherto never been able to prove a priori either this proposition or that of sufficient reason, still less any more complex theorem such as belongs to psychology or cosmology, or indeed any synthetical proposition. By all its analyzing, therefore, nothing is affected, nothing obtained or forwarded, and the science, after all this bustle and noise, still remains as it was in the days of Aristotle.... If anyone thinks himself offended, he is at liberty to refute my charge by producing a single synthetical proposition belonging to metaphysics which he would prove dogmatically a priori; for until he has actually performed this feat I shall not grant that he has truly advanced the science, even if this proposition should be sufficiently confirmed by common experience. No demand can be more moderate or more equitable and, in the (inevitably certain) event of its nonperformance, no assertion more just than that hitherto metaphysics has never existed as a science. [368-369]

Kant's refutation of all existing systems of metaphysics is as uncompromising as his critical demands. As no synthetic a priori propositions exist in metaphysics then metaphysics itself does not exist. Yet to this end he offers his Prolegomena as: "a sketch and textbook...." [380-381]; as apparent again in: "These Prolegomena are for the use, not of mere learners, but of future teachers, and even the latter should not expect that they will be serviceable for the systematic exposition of a ready-made science, but merely for the discovery of the science itself." [255-256] To which Kant further adds:

To discover how the endeavors of the learned may be united in such a purpose I must leave to others. In the meantime, it is not my intention to persuade anyone merely to follow my propositions or even to flatter me with the hope that he will do so; but attacks, repetitions, limitations, or confirmation, completion, and extension, as the case may be, should be appended. If the matter be but investigated from its foundation, it cannot fail that a system, albeit not my own, shall be erected that shall be a possession for future generations for which they may have reason to be grateful. [381-383]

Kant offers a further clue as to what he means by a science of metaphysics with his remarks: "In the sphere of this faculty you can determine and define either everything or nothing," [263-264] and to those who would advance such a system: "...their assertion must be either science or nothing at all." [278-279] And: "Metaphysics must be science, not only as a whole, but in all its parts; otherwise it is nothing at all." [371-372] And yet again: "The world is tired of metaphysical assertions; it wants [to know] the possibility of this science, the sources from which certainty therein can be derived, and certain criteria by which it may distinguish the dialectical illusion of pure reason from truth." [376-377]

By demanding that metaphysics be science or nothing at all Kant narrows down what he means by a science of metaphysics by clearing the field entirely of all systems that do not exhibit what he calls synthetic propositions a priori. The difficulty Kant faces in clarifying himself any further however is compounded by the fact that the very kind of knowledge he insists upon is, as he states, nowhere to be found:

Were a metaphysics which could maintain its place as a science really in existence, could we say: "Here is metaphysics; learn it and it will convince you irresistibly and irrevocably of its truth"? This question would then be useless...There is no single book to which you can point as you do to Euclid, and say: "This is metaphysics; here you may find the noblest objects of this science, the knowledge of a highest being and of a future existence, proved from principles of pure reason." [270-271]

It is this denial in the existence of metaphysics combined with Kant's strict critical demands that has led to the characterization of Kant as the enemy and the destroyer of metaphysics. However, this negative characterization of Kant overlooks the fact that for Kant there was no need to destroy what did not exist. For Kant there was only the need to point out that what philosophers were willing to call metaphysics did not deserve to be so called.
Even before Kant, Hume had raised the very same critical objection. Hume argued that the claims of metaphysicians were grounded upon common experience, making their proofs a posteriori (based upon common experience) so that they were not necessarily true.

Hume, speaking of a necessary relation between cause and effect, states:

The repetition of perfectly similar instances can never alone give rise to an original idea, different from what is to be found in any particular instance, and has been observed, and as evidently follows from our fundamental principles, that all ideas are copied from impressions. (A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford, 1967) p. 163.

And:

Upon the whole, we may conclude, that it is impossible in any one instance to show the principle, in which the force and agency of a cause is placed...If any one think proper to refute this assertion, he need not put himself to the trouble of inventing any long reasonings; but may at once show us an instance of a cause, where we discover the power or operating principle....The small success, which has been met with in all the attempts to fix this power, has at last obliged philosophers to conclude, that the ultimate force and efficacy of nature is perfectly unknown to us, and that it is in vain we search for it in all the known qualities of matter. [158-159]

If we define a cause to be an object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling the former are placed in a like relation of priority and contiguity to those objects, that resemble the latter; we may easily conceive, that there is no absolute nor metaphysical necessity.... [172]

Having in this refuted all those who believed they had offered irrefutable proofs, Hume even goes a step beyond Kant's demands by formulating certain rules by which to judge of causes and effects, as follows:

1. The cause and effect must be contiguous in space and time.

2. The cause must be prior to the effect.

3. There must be a constant union between the cause and effect. It is chiefly this quality, that constitutes the relation.

4. The same cause always produces the same effect, and the same effect never arises but from the same cause. [173]

Nothing less than the kind of knowledge demanded by Kant could possibly establish in our understanding any causal relation according to these rules. These rules in themselves were therefore sufficient to refute the claims of any existing system of metaphysics. Where Hume appears to dismiss the possibility of metaphysics altogether however, Kant refutes only the claim that any legitimate system of metaphysics existed.

Thus, Kant remarks as quoted: "If anyone thinks himself offended, he is at liberty to refute my charge by producing a single synthetical proposition belonging to metaphysics which he would prove dogmatically a priori; for until he has actually performed this feat I shall not grant that he has truly advanced the science...."

To the end of generating such knowledge Kant is clear in dismissing the role of common sense, providing in this a further clue as to the kind of knowledge he calls for:

...there are two things which, in case the challenge be accepted, I must deprecate: first, trifling about probability and conjecture, which are suited as little to metaphysics as to geometry; and secondly, a decision by means of the magic wand of so-called common sense, which does not convince everyone but accommodates itself to personal peculiarities. For as to the former, nothing can be more absurd than in metaphysics, a philosophy from pure reason, to think of grounding our judgments upon probability and conjecture. Everything that is to be known a priori is thereby announced as apodictically certain, and must therefore be proved in this way....The appeal to common sense is even more absurd-if anything more absurd can be imagined-when it is a question of concept and principles claimed as valid, not in so far as they hold with regard to experience, but beyond the conditions of experience. For what is common sense? It is the faculty of the knowledge and use of rules in concreto, as distinguished from the speculative understanding, which is a faculty of knowing rules in abstracto. Common sense can hardly understand the rule that every event is determined by means of its cause and can never comprehend it in its generality. It therefore demands an example from experience; and when it hears that this rule means nothing but what it always thought when a pane was broken or a kitchen utensil missing, it then understands the principle and grants it. Common sense, therefore, is only of use so far as it can see its rules (though they actually are a priori) confirmed by experience; consequently to comprehend them a priori, or independently of experience, belongs to the speculative understanding and lies quite beyond the horizon of common sense. [368-371]

And as to the necessary form of metaphysical knowledge, Kant remarks:

...as concerns the sources of metaphysical knowledge, its very concept implies that they cannot be empirical. Its principles (including not only its maxims but its basic notions) must never be derived from experience. It must not be physical but metaphysical knowledge, namely, knowledge lying beyond experience. It can therefore have for its basis neither external experience, which is the source of physics proper, nor internal, which is the basis of empirical psychology. It is therefore a priori knowledge, coming from pure understanding and pure reason. But so far metaphysics would not be
distinguishable form pure mathematics; it must therefore be called pure philosophical knowledge....[265-266]

Thus, a science of metaphysics for Kant is a system of a priori knowledge, and to distinguish it from empirically grounded sciences, he calls it pure philosophical knowledge.

And as to the unavoidable necessity of this kind of knowledge:

Who can satisfy himself with mere empirical knowledge in all the cosmological questions of the duration and of the magnitude of the world, of freedom or of natural necessity, since every answer given on principles of experience begets a fresh question, which likewise requires its answer and thereby clearly shows the insufficiency of all physical modes of explanation to satisfy reason? [351-352]

This demand for knowledge not grounded upon experience is mentioned even more clearly, and specifically in relation to the cosmological problems or the antinomy, in the context of Kant's reply to an unfavourable review of his Critique:

He [the reviewer] finds in these Prolegomena and in my Critique eight propositions, of which one in each pair contradicts the other [the antinomy], but each of which necessarily belongs to metaphysics, by which it must either be accepted or rejected....Now he has the liberty of selecting any one of these eight propositions at his pleasure and accepting it without any proof, of which I shall make him a present, but only one....and then of attacking my proof of the opposite proposition. If I can save this one and at the same time show that, according to principles which every dogmatic metaphysic must necessarily recognize, the opposite of the proposition adopted by him can be just as clearly proved, it is thereby established that metaphysics has an hereditary failing not to be explained, much less set aside, until we ascend to its birthplace, pure reason itself. And thus my Critique must either be accepted or a better one take its place; at least it must be studied, which is the only thing that I now require. If on the other hand, I cannot save my demonstration, then a synthetic proposition a priori from dogmatic principles is to be reckoned to the score of my opponent, and I shall deem my impeachment of ordinary metaphysics unjust.... [378-380]

While Kant apparently saw no means of resolving the antinomy positively, he yet expresses some doubt regarding the possibility of a positive solution to the first antinomy by remarking:

I therefore would be pleased to have the critical reader to devote to this antinomy of pure reason his chief attention, because nature itself seems to have established it with a view to stagger reason in its daring pretensions and to force it to self-examination. For every proof which I have given of both thesis and antithesis I undertake to be responsible, and thereby to show the certainty of the inevitable antinomy of reason. When the reader is brought by this curious phenomenon to fall back upon the proof of the presumption upon which it rests, he will feel himself obliged to investigate the ultimate foundation of all knowledge by pure reason with me more thoroughly. [footnote, 340-341]

The response to Kant offered in the Causal Argument begins by refuting the common-sensed definition of nothing, and the presumption that: in an empty time...it is impossible that anything should take its beginning, because of such a time no part possesses any condition as to existence rather than non-existence. The error evident here is Kant's carrying over into a judgment of metaphysics the common-sensed meaning of the word nothing.
Yet Kant, despite this, provides the following, where his thinking appears to remove itself from the thinking apparent in the first antinomy:

there is between reality (sense-representation) and the zero, or total void of intuition in time, a difference which has a quantity. For...between every degree of occupancy space and of totally void space, diminishing degrees can be conceived, in the same manner as between consciousness and total unconsciousness (psychological darkness) ever-diminishing degrees obtain. Hence there is no perception that can prove an absolute absence; for instance, no psychological darkness that cannot be considered as consciousness which is only outbalanced by a stronger consciousness. [306-307]

And in the parallel section of the Critique:

Now there is a gradual transition possible from empirical to pure consciousness, till the real of it vanishes completely and there remains a merely formal consciousness (a priori) of the manifold in space and time; and, therefore, a synthesis also is possible in the production of the quantity of a sensation, from its beginning, that is, from the pure intuition = 0, onwards to any quantity of it....Every reality therefore in a phenomenon has intensive quantity, that is, a degree. If this reality is considered as a cause (whether of sensation, or of any other reality in the phenomenon, for instance, of change) the degree of that reality as a cause we call a momentum, for instance the momentum of gravity.... [A: 166-169; B: 208-211]

Every sensation, therefore, and every reality in phenomena, however small it may be, has a degree, that is, an intensive quantity which can always be diminished; and there is between reality and negation a continuous connection of possible realities, and of possible smaller perceptions. Every colour, red, for instance, has a degree, which, however small, is never the smallest; and the same applies to heat, the momentum of gravity, etc. [A: 166-170; B: 208-212]

Thus, in principle, Kant offers a means of overcoming the common-sensed presumption upon which the first antinomy rests, and this is most apparent with the remark: "there is no perception that can prove an absolute absence; for instance, no psychological darkness that cannot be considered as consciousness which is only outbalanced by a stronger consciousness."
And again in:

If therefore all reality in perception has a degree, between which and negation there is an infinite succession of even smaller degrees, and if every sense must have a definite degree of receptivity of sensations, it follows that no perception, and therefore no experience, is possible, that could prove, directly or indirectly, by any roundabout syllogisms, a complete absence of all reality in a phenomenon. We see therefore that experience can never supply a proof of empty space or empty time, because the total absence of reality in a sensuous intuition can itself never be perceived, neither can it be deduced from any phenomenon whatsoever and from the difference of degree in its reality; nor ought it ever to be admitted in explanation of it. For although the total intuition of a certain space or time is real all through, no part of it being empty, yet as every reality has its degree which, while the extensive quality of the phenomenon remains unchanged, may diminish by infinite degrees down to the nothing or void, there must be infinitely differing degrees in which space and time are filled.... [A: 170-174; B: 212-216]

The premise of the Causal Argument postulates nothing less than this principle in its concept of a necessary first beginning and extending to this simplest of possible beginnings the same concepts of space and time.
Kant understood the difficulty of the first antinomy fully and in these excerpts he points out the only possible direction that one's thinking must take in order to overcome this obstacle.

Kant demands not that we give up all hopes of answering the cosmological problems posed by the antinomy, but rather, he asks that his critical reader lend to the first antinomy his chief attention. [340]

Thus, the Causal Argument takes up Kant's challenge by offering a critical analysis of the presumption upon which the first antinomy rests. The principles that follow from the premise thereby established overcome the further difficulty to which Kant remarks:

...I cannot by all my power of thinking, extract from the concept of a thing the concept of something else whose existence is necessarily connected with the former; for this I must call in experience. And though my understanding furnishes me a priori (yet only in reference to possible experience) with the concept of such a connection (that is causation), I cannot exhibit it, like the concepts of mathematics, by intuiting it a priori, and so show its possibility a priori... [370-371]

This remark is similar to Hume's remark concerning the same difficulty:

We must distinctly and particularly conceive the connection between the cause and effect, and be able to pronounce, from a simple view of the one, that it must be followed or preceded by the other...Now nothing is more evident, than that the human mind cannot form such an idea of two objects, as to conceive any connection between them, or comprehend distinctly that power or efficacy, by which they are united. Such a connection would amount to a demonstration, and would imply the absolute impossibility for the one object not to follow, or to be conceived not to follow upon the other. [161-162]

And Kant, remarking on Hume:

Hume started chiefly from a single but important concept in metaphysics, namely, that of the connection of cause and effect...He challenged reason, which pretends to have given birth to this concept of herself to answer him by what right she thinks anything could be so constituted that if that thing be posited, something else also must necessarily be posited; for this is the meaning of the concept of cause. He demonstrated irrefutably that it was perfectly impossible for reason to think a priori and by means of concepts such a combination, for it implies necessity. We cannot at all see why, in consequence of the existence of one thing, another must necessarily exist or how the concept of such a combination can arise a priori. Hence he inferred that reason was altogether deluded with reference to this concept, which she erroneously considered as one of her own children, whereas in reality it was nothing but a bastard of the imagination, impregnated by experience, which subsumed certain representations under the law of association and mistook a subjective necessity (habit) for an objective necessity arising from insight. Hence he inferred that reason had no power to think such combinations, even in general, because her concepts would then be purely fictitious and all her pretended a priori cognitions nothing but common experiences marked with a false stamp. In plain language, this means that there is not and cannot be any such thing as metaphysics at all. [257-259]

Yet looking to the positive side of these criticisms, Kant remarks:

The question was not whether the concept of cause was right, useful, and even indispensable for our knowledge of nature, for this Hume never doubted; but whether that concept could be thought by reason a priori, and consequently whether it possessed an inner truth, independent of all experience, implying a perhaps more extended use not restricted merely to objects of experience. This was Hume's problem. It was solely a question concerning the origin, not concerning the indispensable need of using the concept. Were the former decided, the conditions of the use and the sphere of its valid application would have been determined as a matter of course. [259]

By overcoming the obstacle of the first antinomy the Causal Argument overcomes the problem of thinking through a necessary relation between cause and effect, a priori and in this it provides an answer to Kant's riddle: "How are synthetic cognitions a priori possible?" [275-276] with respect to a system of metaphysics aimed at resolving the cosmological problems.
As a solution from pure reason the Causal Argument helps clarify Kant's defense of Hume, for the task as Kant and Hume both noted was to demonstrate a necessary relation between cause and effect, a priori. It is this central difficulty that lies at the foundation of Hume's and Kant's criticisms pointed not at metaphysics, or its highest aims, but all attempts to establish metaphysics without understanding the importance of this difficulty,
and the nature of that kind of pure philosophical understanding that alone could resolve it.

The failure to comprehend this difficulty and the critical demands it imposes upon metaphysics is reflected even more clearly in the context of Kant's response to an unfavourable review of his Critique:

That my suspicion [concerning his reviewer's inability to grasp the problem] is not without foundation is provided by the fact that he does not mention a word about the possibility of synthetic knowledge a priori, the special problem upon the solution of which the fate of metaphysics wholly rests and upon which my Critique (as well as the present Prolegomena) entirely hinges. [376-377]

Kant reiterates this same demand in his remark:

The conclusion drawn...then is that metaphysics is properly concerned with synthetical propositions a priori, and these alone constitute its end...the generation of a priori knowledge by intuition as well as by concepts...of synthetical propositions a priori, especially in philosophical knowledge, constitutes the essential subject of metaphysics. [273-270]

Kant argues that the demands he makes for metaphysics, for what he calls "synthetic propositions a priori," are unavoidable, thus any solution from metaphysics cannot circumvent these demands: "But he who undertakes to judge or, still more, to construct a system of metaphysics must satisfy the demands here made, either by adopting my solution or by thoroughly refuting it and substituting another. To evade it is impossible." [263-264]

The critical demands he imposes upon metaphysics also lead Kant to declare, with regard to any proposed proof, that:

By this caution the criticisms of the assertions of reason is much simplified. Wherever reason operates with concepts only, only one proof is possible, if any. If therefore we see the dogmatist advance with his ten proofs, we may be sure that he has none. For if he had one, which (as it ought to be in all matters of pure reason) had apodictic power, what need would he have of others? [A: 788; B: 816]

The Causal Argument, in its overall form, constitutes a singular proof, again in line with Kant's critical demands.

It could be said therefore that Kant's critical philosophy, the only philosophy in which the possibility of such an argument from pure reason is discussed in any depth, far from being outdated, was more than two centuries ahead of its time. The first antinomy is the first obstacle addressed by this argument and this would be so even if Kant had never written a word on the subject of metaphysics. The argument advanced by focusing upon this antinomy also overcomes certain critical anomalies associated with the science of big
bang cosmology, itself a science removed by Kant by more than two centuries, yet it is an argument that in the very least adheres to Kant's strict demand for a system of metaphysics grounded upon pure reason, a priori, that answers problems so profound that no solutions to these problems are even thought, by the vast majority of present day cosmologists, to be possible.
Here again, Kant, in his defense of metaphysics, and the advantage that it holds out over other sciences, remarks:

For here is an advantage upon which, of all possible sciences, metaphysics alone can with certainty reckon: that it can be brought to such completion and fixity as to be in need of no further change or be subject to any augmentation by new discoveries; because here reason has the sources of its knowledge in itself....When, therefore, it has exhibited the fundamental laws of its faculty completely and so definitely as to avoid all misunderstanding, there remains nothing further which pure reason could know, a priori; nay, there is no ground even to raise further questions. [113]

The same would necessarily hold true for any system of metaphysics falling in line with Kant's critical demands.

The following points may therefore be added to the previous points listed in favour of the Causal Argument:

7. It resolves, positively, Kant's first antinomy, and provides an extended, synthetic cognition, a priori, as a pure philosophical, rational proof in the existence of a Supreme Being.

8. It avoids Kant's own objection concerning the appeal to common sense in either the formulation of, or the evaluation of, critical judgments in metaphysics.

____________________________________________________

The Universe, Its Origin & End, Part One:
Causal Argument for the
Existence of a Supreme Being
ISBN: 0-9696855-0-1


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[Augustine2004]

Part 2?

[dizzle]

Part one was done about four months ago in this same forum area.

[Augustine2004]

A google turned up this link:

http://www.philosophical-apologetic.com/

Apparently you have to pay $12 to see the second part. I will spend a few weeks to a few months checking out part one. If anyone wants to discuss it, I am game, but don't expect profound or brilliant thinking. In fact, I get dopey from time to time. But I try.

If part one seems sound, I will risk the $12, though I don't know whether anyone else wants to pay to be able to discuss part two.

[dizzle]

Here is the former article on TheologyWeb that I was referring to:

http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?t=18287

I think you are referring to something else

[Augustine2004]

Here is the former article on TheologyWeb that I was referring to:

http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?t=18287

I think you are referring to something elseIf you will please check post #1, you will see 'part one' blazoned there. Thanks for the link, I will go skim it. I am still skeptical, but won't it be something if the author did bring it off, without any mistake! What would grmorton think!

[Augustine2004]

The universal factors that are accounted for by this Causal Argument are:

1. The mass of the universe, that is to say, its underlying essence.

2. Space and time, or more properly, spacetime.

3. Consciousness or mind.

These are the only universal factors that need to be explained by this argument. Understanding their ultimate origin is possible by conceptualizing, in the system expounded, all these universals, by uniting them in our thinking into what can be called one universal solution.

It seems to me that what the author must do is to explain the existence of mind or pure reason only by means of pure reason. He should not try to explain mass & spacetime together with pure reason/mind or consciousness because mass and spacetime are inductive concepts from experience?? He can try to explain them, if at all, AFTER he explains mind.