View Full Version : Wouldn't Molinism....
Sheepdog
April 6th 2003, 05:31 PM
... accurately describe a God that has omniscience?in that, He would not only know perfectly what i do given cetian actual circustances, but also having perfect, certain knowledge of what i would do given other circumstances?
it seems to me that simple foreknowledge reduces God's omniscience, in which God doesn't know something (what i would do given an alternative circumstance).
dizzle
April 6th 2003, 06:30 PM
Sounds about right to me. And Jesus hinted at judgment based upon "what a person would have done" situations.
Gavin
April 6th 2003, 06:34 PM
Sheepdog,
it seems to me that simple foreknowledge reduces God's omniscience, in which God doesn't know something (what i would do given an alternative circumstance).
That seems to be an unnecessary disjunction to me. I believe in EDF, but I still believe that God knows potentials as well ("what would have happened"). Its not an "either-or".
Gavin
Sheepdog
April 6th 2003, 11:31 PM
Today @ 05:34 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=#post)
Gavin:
Sheepdog,
That seems to be an unnecessary disjunction to me. I believe in EDF, but I still believe that God knows potentials as well ("what would have happened"). Its not an "either-or".
good point.
dizzle
April 7th 2003, 05:49 AM
But there is a fine distinction here... I cannot seem to express it, but Sheepdog you are onto something.. I sense it inuitively, but cannot find the words as these concepts come to me very difficultly.
Arminian
April 7th 2003, 06:38 AM
Tacit.
Gavin
April 7th 2003, 06:27 PM
Dee Dee,
But there is a fine distinction here... I cannot seem to express it, but Sheepdog you are onto something.. I sense it inuitively, but cannot find the words as these concepts come to me very difficultly.
Thats not likely to convince hordes of people.
Jake,
Tacit.
Did you mistake this for the word association section?
Sheepdog
April 7th 2003, 06:59 PM
Today @ 04:49 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=57577#post57577)
Dee Dee Warren:
But there is a fine distinction here... I cannot seem to express it, but Sheepdog you are onto something.. I sense it inuitively, but cannot find the words as these concepts come to me very difficultly.
agape?
:tongue:
seriously, i am not sure what you may be talking about, so if you can think of a way to articulate it, please do so.
Jaltus
April 8th 2003, 04:00 PM
Simple Foreknowledge (SFK, which actually is a technical term, David Hunt being its leading proponent) is defined as God knows exactly what will happen in the future, and limited to the actual future.
Thus, Sheepdog's criticism of it is right on. A few philosophers have made a solid critique of SFK, stating that if God only knows what will happen, how does that allow Him to react? If the future is totally determined, then God's responses to LFW are already known, and God cannot do other than what He "sees" Himself doing in the future, thus negating God's LFW.
Gavin
April 8th 2003, 05:52 PM
Ah. My apologies to Sheepdog if I misunderstand him, and thank you Jaltus for clarification.
However, many who believe in foreknowledge (if not simplie foreknowledge) also believe that God knows counterfactuals of freedom as well as what will actually happen in the future.
Such as myself.:teeth:
Jaltus
April 10th 2003, 08:04 PM
Molinistic Calvinism is unnecessary frippery. God has no need to know possibilities since they are in fact unrealizible due to His determining events.
themuzicman
April 14th 2003, 12:12 PM
Why, in EDF, would God even bother with that which is not possible?
The future already exists, and is fixed. There are no other possibilities.
Michael
Jaltus
April 15th 2003, 06:59 PM
muzicman,
What you are describing is Calvinism or SFK. God needs to know possibilities in order to plan which one He wishes to instantiate. If God does not causally determine, then there is no such thing as providence since anything He would forsee would in fact already be determined. This means that God Himself would no longer be able to act other than He already knows how He will.
Hence, if God knows possibilities, then He is not locked into a specific future.
themuzicman
April 17th 2003, 05:19 PM
So, what's different with EDF, then?
Michael
Jaltus
April 17th 2003, 05:52 PM
EDF is Exhaustive Divine Foreknowledge, and it fits into Calvinism, SFK, and Molinism. I am not sure what your question is referring to, can you elaborate?
themuzicman
April 17th 2003, 06:47 PM
I guess the question is that, If God already knows what's going to happen, why bother with what else might happen? That would seem to be needless frippery, as well.
Michael
Jaltus
April 18th 2003, 01:06 PM
By knowing what anyone would do in a given situation allows for God to be responsive. If God knows only the actual future and we do have LFW, it offers no providential guidance from God since He would be locked into anything that He foreknew would happen. If God knows what would happen in a given situation, He can respond to us and get situations that He wants while still giving us LFW.
In order to keep LFW with EDF, there are only two ways: Molinism and SFK. SFK offers a God without providential responses since He knows what He will do.
themuzicman
April 18th 2003, 09:35 PM
I guess I don't see why, in Molinism, God MUST have EDF. (Other than it being a part of the definition.)
Michael
Dave
April 19th 2003, 07:36 PM
04-10-2003 @ 07:04 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=62218#post62218)
Jaltus:
Molinistic Calvinism is unnecessary frippery. God has no need to know possibilities since they are in fact unrealizible due to His determining events.
Molinistic Calvinism? Since when did Calvinism get Molinism? Molinism is a Catholic theology of predestination. In fact, the very tenants of Molinism go against Calvinism. Molinism says:
1. that freedom of will has not been destroyed by original sin, and
2. that this freedom remains unimpaired under the influence of Divine grace (Cf. Sess. VI, can iv-v in Denzinger, "Enchiridion", ed. Bannwart, Freiburg, 1908, nn. 814-15).
Peace,
Dave
Jaltus
April 20th 2003, 04:15 PM
Actually, Molinism itself has no position on original sin since that is outside the bounds of Molinism. Catholicism does say that, but not Molinism.
Molinism reconciles EDF with LFW via Middle Knowledge, and that is it.
Dave
April 20th 2003, 08:28 PM
Today @ 03:15 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=74018#post74018)
Jaltus:
Actually, Molinism itself has no position on original sin since that is outside the bounds of Molinism. Catholicism does say that, but not Molinism.
Molinism reconciles EDF with LFW via Middle Knowledge, and that is it.
no, that isn't it. How can molinism have no position on original sin since the very basis for Molinism starts with reconciling grace and free will via the concept of freedom. Luis de Molina was a Jesuit for goodness sake!
And because Molinism starts with the very view that humanity has freedom of will, it must necessarily be opposed to Calvinism and all of it's offshoots.
Peace,
Dave
Jaltus
April 20th 2003, 10:11 PM
Oh, I agree that Molinism is against Calvinism, but that is due to LFW.
Many Protestant Molinists hold to original sin and total depravity.
Dave
April 20th 2003, 11:33 PM
Today @ 09:11 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=74187#post74187)
Jaltus:
Oh, I agree that Molinism is against Calvinism, but that is due to LFW.
Many Protestant Molinists hold to original sin and total depravity.
well perhaps protestantism has taken some views out of the original and called that Molinism, but Molinism as formed held to free will first and foremost. So going back to my original post I just don't understand how anyone could say 'Calvinistic Molinism'.
Peace,
Dave
Jaltus
April 21st 2003, 05:26 PM
Me either, but there is someone who is flirting with it (can't recall the name).
themuzicman
April 22nd 2003, 11:20 AM
Maybe that's the root question: Why is there this burning desire for EDF?
Michael
chance
May 31st 2003, 06:56 AM
04-22-2003 @ 03:20 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=75411#post75411)
themuzicman:
Maybe that's the root question: Why is there this burning desire for EDF?
Michael
I think people want to believe that God has EDF because they think if God knows the future as only partly settled, even though God's knowledge of the future is exhaustive, then God's knowledge is less than perfect. In other words, knowing the future as completely settled and fixed is perfect while knowing the future as partly settled and changing from possible to actual is less than perfect.
I can see how in some people's minds knowing something as "partly" anything sounds less than perfect on the face of it.
Also, I think many people believe that there is only one possibility for any given situation that is the perfect possibility to be actualized. For example, the thinking that God must have ALWAYS known that Moses would intercede and seem to persuade God to not destroy Israel in Ex 32 because that was the one best way for things to transpire. That God is able to take several routes to get to the same end does not square well with people's ideas of perfection i.e. the one best route out of many.
geebob
June 1st 2003, 02:22 AM
So going back to my original post I just don't understand how anyone could say 'Calvinistic Molinism'.
the term molinism and middle knowledge is often (or at least here) thrown around with out much distinction. Actually middle knowledge is not spoken of much.
But middle knowledge is quite consistent with many forms of determinism. "Calvinistic Molinism" would be determinism plus middle knowledge and there is nothing about middle knowledge that implies freedom. Molinists try to use middle knowledge to reconsile freedom and edf, but that you don't have freedom does not entail that you don't have counterfactuals. You wouldn't have counterfactuals of freedom, but you would still have counterfactuals.
causal determinism pretty much implies counterfactuals. Kenny has highlighted this in his thread on Calvinism and middle knowledge and motivations for evangelism.
wienerdog
June 1st 2003, 02:54 AM
As for simple foreknowledge: if God only knows what will happen, and can't respond as a result of this, does this mean if someone asks him whether they should sin, and God knows that they will choose to commit that sin, he is unable to tell them to refrain from it? I doubt any simple foreknowledge proponent would concede this. But then, is there any reason to think that God couldn't respond as to what someone should do, even if he knows they will not listen?
chance
June 5th 2003, 04:28 AM
There is one way that God would respond and that is by saying or doing what He knows he will say or do :)
God is a slave to His knowledge of what He Himself will do :argh:
Another reason why presentism is WAAAAY better then simple foreknowledge.
Get it?
:xmm:
Jaltus
June 9th 2003, 07:52 PM
I agree that SFK has issues, that is why I aqm a Molinist.
Kenny
June 16th 2003, 02:27 PM
06-01-2003 @ 06:22 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=114201#post114201)
geebob: But middle knowledge is quite consistent with many forms of determinism. "Calvinistic Molinism" would be determinism plus middle knowledge and there is nothing about middle knowledge that implies freedom.
Actually, I don’t think this is technically correct, at least in terms of the way that the term ‘middle knowledge’ is used in contemporary discussions. Middle knowledge, as I understand it, is counterfactual knowledge concerning indeterminate events. This is what makes God’s middle knowledge distinct from God’s natural knowledge. God’s natural knowledge includes God’s knowledge of all possible contingencies – all possible worlds. This knowledge would entail counterfactual knowledge concerning events which are deterministic functions of antecedent circumstances, since God would know how the outcomes of those events would vary if the circumstances were changed. A truly indeterminate event, however, would be one that is not strictly a deterministic function of antecedent circumstances. Thus, for a truly indeterminate event, A, which occurs in one possible world, there is another possible world with precisely the same antecedent circumstances, C, in which ~A occurs. God’s natural knowledge would encompass knowledge of both possibilities, but it would not resolve which possibility would occur if God were to actualize C. Thus, any knowledge God had of whether A or ~A would occur if He were to actualize C would have to be knowledge in addition to and distinct from mere knowledge of all possible contingencies – namely, His middle knowledge. Without indeterminacy, however, all of God’s knowledge of counterfactual conditionals falls underneath God’s natural knowledge and there is no need to posit middle knowledge as a distinct category.
Molinists try to use middle knowledge to reconsile freedom and edf, but that you don't have freedom does not entail that you don't have counterfactuals. You wouldn't have counterfactuals of freedom, but you would still have counterfactuals.
Well, you could still have counterfactuals of compatiblist freedom without middle knowledge or lfw. In other words, if one sees free will as being compatible with (or even requiring) the notion that human choices are deterministic functions of antecedent circumstances, then you can still have counterfactuals of freedom, but with respect to God’s natural knowledge, without adding middle knowledge as a distinct category. This, in fact, is what I believe.
causal determinism pretty much implies counterfactuals. Kenny has highlighted this in his thread on Calvinism and middle knowledge and motivations for evangelism.
Yes. The whole notion of causality presupposes the existence of counterfactual conditionals. Thus, a system in which everything is causally determined is still one which counterfactual conditionals truthfully describe. In fact, I question whether counterfactual conditionals could have any truth values with respect to indeterminate events, but that’s a different discussion.
God Bless,
Kenny
geebob
June 16th 2003, 08:16 PM
Well, you could still have counterfactuals of compatiblist freedom without middle knowledge or lfw.
I geuss pretty much most of what I said may be due to the fact that I have a hard time telling how middle knowledge isn't the result of some form of determinism or that it is at least compatible with lfw. :huh:
Kenny
June 16th 2003, 08:41 PM
Today @ 12:16 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=124812#post124812)
geebob: I geuss pretty much most of what I said may be due to the fact that I have a hard time telling how middle knowledge isn't the result of some form of determinism or that it is at least compatible with lfw. :huh:
Well the technical difference is that counterfactual knowledge concerning indeterminate events cannot be subsumed under a bare knowledge of all contingent possibilities. If an event, A, is indeterminate when it occurs in an exhaustive set of antecedent circumstances, C, then there is a possible world in which ~A occurs in C. So, mere knowledge of all possible worlds does not entail knowledge of whether A or ~A would occur in C. So, if one knows that if C were to be actualized, then A would occur, this knowledge is something over and above knowledge of all possibilities, whereas counterfactual knowledge concerning deterministic events is grounded in knowledge of how the outcomes of such events vary as a function of changing circumstances and thus is simply knowledge of all possible outcomes.
Now, how it is that counterfactual conditionals regarding indeterminate events have truth values associated with them or how it is that there could be knowledge of such counterfactuals is beyond me. Indeed, ultimately, such knowledge would be a complete and utter mystery. So, I suppose, in the end, I have a hard time seeing it too.
In Christ,
Kenny
Jaltus
June 16th 2003, 10:28 PM
But Jesus claims this type of knowledge!
Matthew 11:21-24
21 "Woe to you, Korazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida! If the miracles that were performed in you had been performed in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes.
22 But I tell you, it will be more bearable for Tyre and Sidon on the day of judgment than for you.
23 And you, Capernaum, will you be lifted up to the skies? No, you will go down to the depths. If the miracles that were performed in you had been performed in Sodom, it would have remained to this day.
24 But I tell you that it will be more bearable for Sodom on the day of judgment than for you."
Besides, all you are doing is raising the grounding objection, namely how does anything contigent have a grounding in truth. However, the question could also be phrased, how does any future possibility have truth-value? The answer is obvious, if it comes to be!
Thus, your questiuon is based on timing not on grounding, which makes it irrelevant to God, as long as you do not have a presentist view of God. For other responses to the grounding objection, I recommend reading Alvin Plantinga and William Lane Craig. Flint may have an answer also, but I have not got that far in his book yet.
Plantinga's response to this problem was quite simple, from "Reply to Robert Adams," in Alvin Plantinga, ed. Jas. E. Tomberlin and Peter Van Inwagen, p. 378:
"It seems to me much clearer that some counterfactuals of freedom are at least possibly true than that thge truth of propositions must, in general, be grounded in this way."
William Lane Craig explains this in "The Middle-Knowledge View," in Divine Foreknowledge, Four Views, ed. James K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy, p. 140:
"What Plantinga understands - and what grounding objectors generally do not - is that behind the grounding objection sticks a theory about the relationship of truth and reality that is both subtle and controversial and that needs to be articulated, defended, and applied to counterfactuals of creaturely freedom if the grounding objection is to have any force."
Essentially, it assumes a present-only correspondance theory of truth, such that only present tense or tenseless statements can in fact be true.
Kenny
June 17th 2003, 01:22 PM
But Jesus claims this type of knowledge!
Matthew 11:21-24
21 "Woe to you, Korazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida! If the miracles that were performed in you had been performed in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes.
22 But I tell you, it will be more bearable for Tyre and Sidon on the day of judgment than for you.
23 And you, Capernaum, will you be lifted up to the skies? No, you will go down to the depths. If the miracles that were performed in you had been performed in Sodom, it would have remained to this day.
24 But I tell you that it will be more bearable for Sodom on the day of judgment than for you."
As I affirmed in this thread, I believe that God does posses counterfactual knowledge regarding free will decisions, but I am a compatiblist and I don’t believe in libertarian free will. These verses are just as compatible with my view as they are with yours.
Besides, all you are doing is raising the grounding objection, namely how does anything contigent have a grounding in truth. However, the question could also be phrased, how does any future possibility have truth-value? The answer is obvious, if it comes to be!
I don’t believe that tensed propositions regarding undetermined future events would have any truth values. But, I also don’t believe that there are any truly undetermined events.
Thus, your questiuon is based on timing not on grounding, which makes it irrelevant to God, as long as you do not have a presentist view of God. For other responses to the grounding objection, I recommend reading Alvin Plantinga and William Lane Craig. Flint may have an answer also, but I have not got that far in his book yet.
I expressed some of my thoughts regarding Craig’s response to the grounding objection on my last post on the second page in this (http://theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&forumid=14&threadid=3131) thread. As I also argued on that thread, I believe that if there were genuinely unresolved undetermined events, no being could possibly know what their outcome would be until after the fact because knowledge requires adequate causal links between the knower and that fact that is known. I call this the “grounding of knowledge objection.” As I explained, the grounding of knowledge objection leads into the conclusion of the grounding objection because if there were unresolved undetermined events, God could not possibly know their outcomes until after the fact and since (via the doctrine of omniscience) God knows the truth values of all truth determinate propositions, it follows that propositions regarding unresolved undetermined events have no truth values.
In Christ,
Kenny
Arminian
June 17th 2003, 05:52 PM
Kenny,
As I also argued on that thread, I believe that if there were genuinely unresolved undetermined events, no being could possibly know what their outcome would be until after the fact because knowledge requires adequate causal links between the knower and that fact that is known.
I think that begs the question in response to God's knowledge. For example, you know that I wrote this because you are reading it. You don't know or understand all the variables and how they interacted before I posted. Still, you know that I wrote this.
As for God, if he sees all future events, the situation is the same, but with none of the weaknesses that accompany prediction. Your point is better made against OV, which rejects it, along with the point I just made, anyhow.
An example I often use is of God counting. Since numbers go on for eternity, what number has God arrived at? Take that number and add 1 to it and you've just created a number greater than God's. Of course, you could select the alternative that God is STILL counting, but that certainly wouldn't fit with your perspective, either. The only solution is to say that God does know all possible numbers because his knowledge isn't dependant upon causal/non-causal relationships.
So we'll call the number God has ariived at "X." And we will call the response "X + 1."
Kenny
June 17th 2003, 06:56 PM
Today @ 09:52 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=125745#post125745)
Arminian: Kenny, I think that begs the question in response to God's knowledge. For example, you know that I wrote this because you are reading it. You don't know or understand all the variables and how they interacted before I posted. Still, you know that I wrote this.
Right, the causal link between you writing your post and the fact that I know you have written it is the fact that you wrote it and posted it on this internet site which in turn caused a copy of what you wrote to appear on my computer screen when I logged on to the site which caused me to see what you had written and my brain to process the information and which thereby allowed me to infer that you had written the post. I don’t claim that a being must be aware of all the causal links involved between her knowledge that p and the fact that p, and I hold that these links can be very indirect, but I maintain that some sort of appropriate causal link must be there. I go into this in more detail on the link I provided above, so I suggest you check it out.
As for God, if he sees all future events, the situation is the same, but with none of the weaknesses that accompany prediction. Your point is better made against OV, which rejects it, along with the point I just made, anyhow.
Well, as I point out on the thread I linked to, if God knows the outcome of indeterminate future events simply because God sees them as they occur in the future, then a B theory of time is correct and God still knows these events only “after the fact.”
An example I often use is of God counting. Since numbers go on for eternity, what number has God arrived at?
Well, I don’t believe that God, since his mind is infinite and His awareness is exhaustive, has to count sequentially in order to gain knowledge of all numbers. Knowledge of all mathematical structures and propositions is simply immediately and exhaustively present to God’s awareness.
The only solution is to say that God does know all possible numbers because his knowledge isn't dependant upon causal/non-causal relationships.
I don’t see the connection here. I believe that God’s knowledge of mathematical structures and propositions is causally grounded in God’s own exhaustive self-awareness. In terms of my philosophical theology of mathematics, I think it is most plausible to locate the source of mathematical differentiation in the distinction and unity that exists among the members of the Trinity. God’s mind abstracts all possible mathematical relationships from God’s knowledge of Himself as a Trinitarian being in which fundamental relationships of unity and diversity exist necessarily. So, the causal link between God’s knowledge of all real numbers and the existence of all real numbers is the fact that real numbers exist as abstractions from God’s internal relations as a Trinitarian being and the fact that God is exhaustively aware of Himself and His internal relations as a Trinitarian being.
In Christ,
Kenny
Arminian
June 17th 2003, 07:11 PM
Kenny,
I don’t see the connection here. I believe that God’s knowledge of mathematical structures and propositions is causally grounded in God’s own exhaustive self-awareness. In terms of my philosophical theology of mathematics, I think it is most plausible to locate the source of mathematical differentiation in the distinction and unity that exists among the members of the Trinity. God’s mind abstracts all possible mathematical relationships from God’s knowledge of Himself as a Trinitarian being in which fundamental relationships of unity and diversity exist necessarily. So, the causal link between God’s knowledge of all real numbers and the existence of all real numbers is the fact that real numbers exist as abstractions from God’s internal relations as a Trinitarian being and the fact that God is exhaustively aware of Himself and His internal relations as a Trinitarian being.
Well, I'm not sure that your theory solves the problem. "Abstraction" is the essence of my X + 1. You allude to it as a "structure," but it isn't, if what you mean by "structure" is the expression of reality.
So we are back to where we started. Either God is continually creating numbers or he is not. Either way, there is a number he has arrived it.
Arminian
June 17th 2003, 07:16 PM
Kenny,
I don’t claim that a being must be aware of all the causal links involved between her knowledge that p and the fact that p, and I hold that these links can be very indirect, but I maintain that some sort of appropriate causal link must be there.
Well, I know you think that there are causal links, since that is what you are proposing. That wasn't the point. I was addressing your point that no one could predict what will happen if there weren't any. You made that comment with regard to God.
Kenny
June 17th 2003, 07:23 PM
I’m sorry Arminian, I am not following. Perhaps you can state things differently? By 'mathematical structures,' I simply meant 'mathematical entities' (such as numbers, shapes, sets, etc.). Mathematical propositions are simply descriptions of mathematical entities and/or the relationships between them.
God’s mind is infinite and God’s awareness is exhaustive. God’s mind doesn’t have to go through a series of real time steps in order to generate true mathematical propositions or coherent mathematical entities. These are simply immediately present to God’s mind as a consequence of His exhaustive self awareness.
In Christ,
Kenny
Kenny
June 17th 2003, 07:27 PM
Today @ 11:16 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=125800#post125800)
Arminian:
Kenny,
Well, I know you think that there are causal links, since that is what you are proposing. That wasn't the point. I was addressing your point that no one could predict what will happen if there weren't any. You made that comment with regard to God.
Yes, and I don't see that point as having been refuted. There are very good reasons for thinking that knowledge of a fact entails causal links between one's knowledge of that fact and the fact itself. Again, see the link I provided.
Arminian
June 17th 2003, 07:37 PM
Kenny,
God’s mind is infinite and God’s awareness is exhaustive. God’s mind doesn’t have to go through a series of real time steps in order to generate true mathematical propositions or coherent mathematical entities. These are simply immediately present to God’s mind as a consequence of His exhaustive self awareness.
I agree that God doesn't have to go through "real-time" steps. But the fact remains that there is a causal link between the numbers in the abstraction I presented. And the fact remains that God has either arrived at a number or he hasn't. The alternative is that there is knowledge that isn't dependant upon causal links.
So X represents the biggest number God knows. So what's X + 1?
Kenny
June 17th 2003, 08:23 PM
Today @ 11:37 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=125824#post125824)
Arminian: Kenny, I agree that God doesn't have to go through "real-time" steps. But the fact remains that there is a causal link between the numbers in the abstraction I presented.
Well, the fact that 3 is the same as 2+1 constitutes a logical relationship between the numbers 3, 2 and 1, not a causal relationship between those numbers. I do not believe that God’s mind builds up all possible numbers by counting (in fact, that’s impossible, the set of real numbers is not countable). Rather, I believe that all mathematical entities and mathematical relationships are reflections of the infinitely rich relationships of unity and diversity which exist within God’s Trinitarian being and that God knows all mathematical entities and the relationships between them immediately and directly as a consequence of His own exhaustive, immediate and direct self awareness.
Mathematical entities and mathematical relationships are metaphysically grounded in God’s nature. The causal link between God’s knowledge of mathematical entities and mathematical relationships to the reality of those entities and relationships is that they are grounded in God’s nature and God knows His own nature exhaustively.
And the fact remains that God has either arrived at a number or he hasn't.
God never “arrived” at any number. God’s exhaustive self knowledge constitutes a single eternal act of knowing and consequently so does God’s knowledge of mathematical truths. All mathematical entities are eternally and immediately present to God’s self awareness.
The alternative is that there is knowledge that isn't dependant upon causal links.
I’m not seeing why either there has to be a largest number which God has arrived at or there is knowledge which is not dependent on causal links. Do you deny that true mathematical propositions are metaphysically grounded in God’s nature? If you do then I think you’ll find yourself, as a Christian theist, running into significant theological and philosophical problems, but I won’t go into that unless it is necessary. If you accept this, then do you also accept that God is exhaustively, immediately and eternally aware of His own nature? If you accept both of these propositions, than there is no difficulty in supposing that all mathematical knowledge is present to God exhaustively, immediately and eternally in such a way that it is causally dependent on God’s self awareness.
So X represents the biggest number God knows. So what's X + 1?
There is no biggest number God knows since there is no biggest number and God has knowledge of all numbers.
In Christ,
Kenny
Arminian
June 17th 2003, 09:05 PM
Kenny,
Well, the fact that 3 is the same as 2+1 constitutes a logical relationship between the numbers 3, 2 and 1, not a causal relationship between those numbers. I do not believe that God’s mind builds up all possible numbers by counting (in fact, that’s impossible, the set of real numbers is not countable).
Well, to the degree that 3 is a product of 2 and the addition of 1, it has a logical causal relationship.
unting (in fact, that’s impossible, the set of real numbers is not countable)
On the contrary, a set is countable. By definition, a set has boundaries and limitations, or it wouldn’t be a set.
Rather, I believe that all mathematical entities and mathematical relationships are reflections of the infinitely rich relationships of unity and diversity which exist within God’s Trinitarian being and that God knows all mathematical entities and the relationships between them immediately and directly as a consequence of His own exhaustive, immediate and direct self awareness.
Yes, you’ve said that before. But “rich relationships” and “self-awareness” sound great but don’t address the issue in a way that’s meaningful. In the end I’m forced to go back to my previous conclusion. Is God aware of what number he has arrived at or not?
Mathematical entities and mathematical relationships are metaphysically grounded in God’s nature. The causal link between God’s knowledge of mathematical entities and mathematical relationships to the reality of those entities and relationships is that they are grounded in God’s nature and God knows His own nature exhaustively.
That’s sounds interesting, but it doesn’t address the issue, IMHO. See above.
I’m not seeing why either there has to be a largest number which God has arrived at or there is knowledge which is not dependent on causal links.
Is there a smallest real number, or do you think he hasn’t arrived at that (I’m not being sarcastic.)?
Do you deny that true mathematical propositions are metaphysically grounded in God’s nature?
They certainly reflect something about his nature. Of course, the existence of evil does, too, but I don’t think it’s grounded in his nature.
There is no biggest number God knows since there is no biggest number and God has knowledge of all numbers.
So we'll make X the sum of all the numbers that God has knowledge of. So what’s X + 1?
Kenny
June 18th 2003, 01:31 AM
Well, to the degree that 3 is a product of 2 and the addition of 1, it has a logical causal relationship.
No, it is only a logical one. The numbers two and one do not cause the number three to exist or to have the properties which it does. I’m not even sure what causality could mean in this context.
On the contrary, a set is countable. By definition, a set has boundaries and limitations, or it wouldn’t be a set.
No. In set theory, a countable set is a set which can be mapped one to one with the set of integers. Cantor showed that the set of real numbers is not countable. The infinity of the set of real numbers is larger than the infinity of the set of integers. Thus, it is impossible, even given an infinite amount of time, to generate the entire set of real numbers in a series of discrete steps without missing some numbers along the way.
Yes, you’ve said that before. But “rich relationships” and “self-awareness” sound great but don’t address the issue in a way that’s meaningful. In the end I’m forced to go back to my previous conclusion. Is God aware of what number he has arrived at or not?
Well, Arminian, I’m not sure what to say. We seem to be talking past one another. Either you’re not understanding what I’m saying or I’m not understanding what you’re saying or both. I believe my comments have already answered your previous question/conclusion and I do not know what needs to be added. I don’t think I really have the premises of your argument clear.
Is there a smallest real number, or do you think he hasn’t arrived at that (I’m not being sarcastic.)?
Since the negative numbers go out to negative infinity, no, there is no smallest real number.
They certainly reflect something about his nature. Of course, the existence of evil does, too, but I don’t think it’s grounded in his nature.
Then what do you see as being the origin of mathematical truth? Do mathematical entities exist independently of God?
So we'll make X the sum of all the numbers that God has knowledge of. So what’s X + 1?
Assuming that we are restricting ourselves to real numbers here, the sum of all the real numbers (that would be the integral of f(x) = x with respect to x from negative infinity to infinity) would be zero. So X +1 would be 1.
In Christ,
Kenny
Arminian
June 18th 2003, 02:14 PM
Kenny,
No. In set theory, a countable set is a set which can be mapped one to one with the set of integers
I had a nagging feeling....
No, it is only a logical one. The numbers two and one do not cause the number three to exist or to have the properties which it does. I’m not even sure what causality could mean in this context.
Again, think about what I'm talking about. I'm talking about what happens in the mind of the person doing the calculation -- not the relationship of the numbers to each other. If God is thinking logically, what is the effect of adding 2 to 1?
Kenny
June 18th 2003, 02:35 PM
Today @ 06:14 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=126580#post126580)
Arminian: Again, think about what I'm talking about. I'm talking about what happens in the mind of the person doing the calculation -- not the relationship of the numbers to each other. If God is thinking logically, what is the effect of adding 2 to 1?
Well, the manner and order in which a finite, sequential thinker, thinks through the relationships between 3, 2, and 1 is completely arbitrary (3 – 2 =1, 3-1 =2, 1+2=3, 3*3 – 2*2*2 = 1, 1 – 2/3 =1/3, etc.). There is no one privileged “logical” way to think about the relationship between these numbers, so I am not certain exactly what “If God is thinking logically” is supposed to mean in this context. God does not have to think through all the relationships between 3,2 and 1 in a sequential manner; He simply perceives all the various relationships between them as they are. I’m really not seeing the point here or what the relevance is to my position concerning the causal grounding requirement for knowledge.
In Christ,
Kenny
Arminian
June 18th 2003, 02:53 PM
Kenny,
Well, the manner and order in which a finite, sequential thinker, thinks through the relationships between 3, 2, and 1 is completely arbitrary (3 – 2 =1, 3-1 =2, 1+2=3, 3*3 – 2*2*2 = 1, 1 – 2/3 =1/3, etc.).
You're making this too difficult. Look for the word "adding" in my last post and then answer my question, please.
Kenny
June 18th 2003, 03:21 PM
The “effect” of adding 2 to 1 is 3. But, the use of the word “effect” here can only be taken in a very loose metaphorical sense. In reality all that one does when one adds 2 to 1 and obtain 3 is perceive an eternal a-causal relationship between the numbers 3, 2 and 1. Any genuine cause/effect relations associated with adding these two numbers occurs only in information processing in the mind of the thinker. But, it’s not necessary to think sequentially through the addition process to obtain this result. Here’s 3 (///); here’s 2 (//); here’s 1 (/). Just by observing all three simultaneously, one can see the relationship 2+1 =3. Something similar, I believe, occurs in the mind of God. God simply sees all the numbers as they are, all at once, and perceives the various relationships between them. There is no need to think of God sequentially “adding” the numbers. Again, I’m not sure what this has to do with my view of knowledge.
In Christ,
Kenny
Arminian
June 18th 2003, 03:58 PM
Kenny,
The “effect” of adding 2 to 1 is 3. But, the use of the word “effect” here can only be taken in a very loose metaphorical sense. In reality all that one does when one adds 2 to 1 and obtain 3 is perceive an eternal a-causal relationship between the numbers 3, 2 and 1.
Yes, I agree. Numbers are merely counting tokens. They are just a little more sophisticated than using fingers and toes.
Any genuine cause/effect relations associated with adding these two numbers occurs only in information processing in the mind of the thinker.
Exactly. The mind of the thinker is the issue here.
But, it’s not necessary to think sequentially through the addition process to obtain this result. Here’s 3 (///); here’s 2 (//); here’s 1 (/). Just by observing all three simultaneously, one can see the relationship 2+1 =3. Something similar, I believe, occurs in the mind of God. God simply sees all the numbers as they are, all at once, and perceives the various relationships between them.
Again, I did not ask how God sees numbers. I talked about the ADDITION of numbers. Regarding the question I asked, What number has God arrived at?
Kenny
June 18th 2003, 04:05 PM
Today @ 07:58 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=126668#post126668)
Arminian: Again, I did not ask how God sees numbers. I talked about the ADDITION of numbers.
Adding numbers is ultimately nothing more than seeing relationships between them.
Regarding the question I asked, What number has God arrived at?
Since God's mind does not count or add sequentially but percieves all mathematical relationships simultaneously, this question is meaningless.
Arminian
June 18th 2003, 07:28 PM
Kenny,
Adding numbers is ultimately nothing more than seeing relationships between them.
No, it's actually more than that. It involves a process. For example, if God started adding with the lowest real number, what number would that be? 1, correct? So he would add 1 to 1, correct? What would come next?
Since God's mind does not count or add sequentially but percieves all mathematical relationships simultaneously, this question is meaningless.
The fact is that his mind does add sequentially when that is the solution to the problem being proposed. Yes, of course, his knowledge of numbers is not dependant upon sequence, which is what I alluded to in my first post. But referring to that does not address the question I propsed.
So if God ever did start counting sequentially (And I imagine he has, since I've done it.), what number did he start with, and what happened next?
Jaltus
June 18th 2003, 07:58 PM
I think Kenny is denying that there is any sequentiality in God, something which is horribly mistaken for it invalidates the incarnation and what the incarnation was meant to do.
You see, if God does not let Himself be sequential, then the result is that Jesus did in fact not live with mankind since man is sequential. Now, if Jesus is God, then God must have at some point had sequentiality. If at one point in time God had sequence, then He will always have sequence for His time could be divded into pre- during, and post- sequence activities.
Kenny
June 18th 2003, 09:10 PM
Yesterday @ 11:28 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=126966#post126966)
Arminian: Kenny, No, it's actually more than that. It involves a process.
Okay, so your not talking about God coming up with mathematical knowledge that God did not know previously, but merely God counting, just like when I count to ten, I already have a concept of the numbers one through ten before I even start? Well, okay, but what does this have to do with my view of knowledge, exactly? This seems to be a question about divine action, not divine knowledge.
For example, if God started adding with the lowest real number, what number would that be?
Well, restricting ourselves to the positive real numbers, the lowest real number would be zero. And, we wouldn’t be talking about all real numbers here, but only integers. Sorry, these are just technical quibbles.
1, correct? So he would add 1 to 1, correct? What would come next?
2
The fact is that his mind does add sequentially when that is the solution to the problem being proposed.
Well, in terms of God’s knowledge, God is already aware of every conceivable and meaningful ordering of numbers, including the adding sequence which you are proposing. I suppose if God were to decide to count through this sequence one number at a time, He could, but this would not add anything to God’s mathematical knowledge.
So if God ever did start counting sequentially (And I imagine he has, since I've done it.), what number did he start with, and what happened next?
Well, I don’t know. I believe in divine timelessness, but I’m not dogmatic about it. I also do not see the concept of divine timelessness as being incompatible with God acting along a temporal sequence if God so chooses. Indeed, God acts along our linear timeline. I suppose if God desired to create a timeline and count along it, He could. I suppose God could start with whatever number He wanted and end with whatever number He wanted or never stop if He wanted. I don’t know if God has ever done anything like this or what conceivable motivation He might have for doing it, but hey, He’s God so He can do what He wants. But, I fail to see the relevance to the current discussion.
God Bless,
Kenny
Kenny
June 18th 2003, 09:15 PM
Yesterday @ 11:58 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=126990#post126990)
Jaltus: I think Kenny is denying that there is any sequentiality in God, something which is horribly mistaken for it invalidates the incarnation and what the incarnation was meant to do.
No, I do not deny that there is any sequentially in God. I believe, for example, that God is aware of the sequence of real numbers arranged from smallest to greatest. I also believe that there are logical priorities within God’s knowledge. Since I believe in divine timelessness, however, I do not believe that there is any sequentially with respect to God’s experience and I think such a view is coherent, but I hold my view of divine timelessness loosely and I am not dogmatic about it.
You see, if God does not let Himself be sequential, then the result is that Jesus did in fact not live with mankind since man is sequential.
Well, since I hold to a B theory of time, I believe that all events in history exist and that God experiences all of history in a single divine present. The flow of time, I believe, is an illusion created by the way our finite minds process information, but from the perspective of divine omniscience, all is and there is no real flow of time. However, I do not deny that temporal events can be arranged sequentially by means of causal and logical priorities between them nor do I deny that God perceives this sequence. I think he perceives it similar to the way we perceive numbers on a number line; we see all the numbers at once arranged sequentially. So, from God’s perspective, before 4 BC (let’s say this is the right year for Jesus’ birth) the incarnation has not occurred with respect to our timeline and after 4 BC the incarnation has occurred, that is with respect to our timeline. From another perspective, however, from a perspective outside of time, I think it is right to say that the incarnation had occurred from all eternity –“Behold the lamb of God, slain from the foundation of the world.” The incarnation was caused from outside of our space-time continuum but its effects manifest themselves within it. With respect to Jesus’ psychological experience as it pertains to His humanity, I believe that Jesus experienced an illusory subjective flow of time just like we all do, because, in terms of his humanity, Jesus experienced limited knowledge. However, with respect to Jesus’ experience, in terms of His divine nature, I believe that there is a sense in which He has always experienced what it’s like to be an infant, to walk as a human among the crowds and teach, to suffer and to die, to be raised in glory, to ascend into heaven, to reign as the victorious Son of Man, to come again to the earth to recieve His own. Now, Jesus, qua divine nature, is not ignorant of the causal relationships and priorities between these events by which they can be sequentially arranged, but if a B theory of time holds, then there is no passing of one of these events out of existence and another coming into existence. All exist at once and so all are experienced at once.
But, like I said, I’m not dogmatic about my view of divine timelessness. I just happen to think the best philosophical and scientific arguments are on the side of a B theory of time and that the Bible largely underdetermines one’s views on this subject. I am open to revising my view in light of good Biblical, philosophical, theological or scientific reasons which might come my way.
All that said, I don’t really want to go on with a discussion of divine timelessness or divine action on this thread except insofar as it pertains to my view of divine knowledge. Honestly, I fail to see the relevance of this discussion to that issue. So, unless the relevance is pointed out to me, I do not plan to continue this line of discussion at this time because I think it would be better on another thread.
In Christ,
Kenny
Arminian
June 18th 2003, 09:40 PM
Kenny,
Well, restricting ourselves to the positive real numbers, the lowest real number would be zero. And, we wouldn’t be talking about all real numbers here, but only integers. Sorry, these are just technical quibbles.
That’s fine. I speak with respect to X from negative infinity to infinity, and I don’t feel the need to qualify it every time.
Well, in terms of God’s knowledge, God is already aware of every conceivable and meaningful ordering of numbers, including the adding sequence which you are proposing. I suppose if God were to decide to count through this sequence one number at a time, He could, but this would not add anything to God’s mathematical knowledge.
If God DID do it, his knowledge of what he was doing would reflect that. Do you agree? When would he know he is done?
Kenny
June 19th 2003, 01:11 PM
Today @ 01:40 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=127159#post127159)
Arminian: If God DID do it, his knowledge of what he was doing would reflect that. Do you agree?
Yes, but how His knowledge would reflect it depends on how the metaphysics of time works. For concreteness, let’s say God decided to count in the following way: God creates a universe with its own time line and puts a time bound angelic observer in it. At time t0, nothing is heard. At time t1, God causes a thunderous voice to reverberate throughout the universe saying “One!.”. At t2, the voice utters “Two!”. At t3, the voice utters “Three!”, and so on, all they way up to infinity. All the while, the angelic observer takes note of which number the count is on.
Now, I hold, in line with a classical view, that God has two types of knowledge, His natural knowledge and His free knowledge. God’s natural knowledge includes both God’s complete self awareness and God’s knowledge of all contingent possibilities. God’s free knowledge is God’s knowledge of which set of contingent possibilities He has chosen to actualize. Now, God’s natural knowledge is logically prior to God’s free knowledge because God’s choice of which contingent possibilities to actualize is based in His natural knowledge of what those possibilities are, but there is no temporal separation or priority between the two types of knowledge. They come into being simultaneously in one eternal act. Divine wisdom need not hesitate nor second guess itself, and so God’s natural knowledge and God’s free knowledge are eternally settled. So, if God has freely chosen to engage in the count described above, it is eternally known to God that He has so decided.
Now, how God’s knowledge is related to the count itself depends on whether an A theory or a B theory of time is correct. On my B theory view, the entire timeline on which the count takes place comes into being at once as soon as God wills it. Thus, from God’s perspective, the entire counting sequence already exists because God sees the entire timeline over which the count takes place as actual. Thus, God’s propositional knowledge of the counting sequence looks something like the infinitely long conjunction: “At t1, I am causing ‘One!’ to be uttered and at t2, I am causing ‘Two!’ to be uttered and at t3, I am causing ‘Three!’ to be uttered and …”. God’s knowledge of the count, on this view, eternally consists of something like this infinitely long conjunction. On this view, God’s knowledge of the count can simply be subsumed under His free knowledge since the fact that God has chosen to engage in the count entails the actuality of the count.
However, if I am wrong about my B view of time and an A view holds, then things look a little different, because God’s knowledge also has to incorporate tensed facts. Thus, God’s free propositional knowledge of the count will still be eternally the same, something like: “I have chosen to cause ‘One!’ to be uttered at t1 and I have chosen to cause ‘Two!’ to be uttered at t2 and I have chosen to cause ‘Three!’ to be uttered at t3 …”. But, God would also have to have tensed knowledge, over and above His free knowledge, of how His free decision to engage in the count is playing itself out in real time. So, at t1 God’s tensed propositional knowledge of the count would look something like: “I am causing ‘One!’ to be uttered at t1 and I will cause ‘Two!’ to be uttered at t2 and I will cause ‘Three!’ to be uttered at t3 and…”. At t2, God’s knowledge of the count changes to something like: “I have caused ‘One!’ to be uttered at t1 and I am causing ‘Two!’ to be uttered at t2 and I will cause ‘Three!’ to be uttered at t3 and…”. The tenses in God’s propositional knowledge of the count will continue changing appropriately as time progresses.
In either case, however, my causal grounding requirement is more than adequately satisfied. In both cases, God’s knowledge of the count is causally grounded in God’s self awareness of what He has chosen to do and what He is currently doing.
When would he know he is done?
Again, that depends on how the metaphysics of time work. If a B theory is correct, then, from God’s perspective, the count is complete as soon as God decides to engage in it since the entire timeline containing the count comes into being. So God knows He’s done as soon as He has decided to do it. From the angelic observer’s time bound perspective, however, the count is never completed. If an A theory of time is correct, however, then God will never actually be done with the count and so God will never know that He is done.
Now, what does this have to do with my view that knowledge must be causally grounded?
In Christ,
Kenny
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