Exegetical and philosophical concerns with Molinism and Open Theism

[Gavin]

Open Theism is often called "neo-molinism" because, like its catholic predecessor, it denies EDF (exhaustive divine foreknowledge). Both systems, to my knowledge, posit that God is actually moving along in time with us, experiencing moment by moment consciousness, as opposed to the more traditional view that God is outside time altogether and sees all from his eternal perspective (Boethius, Augustine, reformed circles, C. S. Lewis, et.al.).

I would like to articulate two concerns with this view. I will just articulate them briefly and then look for feedback.

1) Philosophical concern - if God is inside time, then the whole appeal of the kosmological argument and other theistic arguments based on God's timelessness are thrown out the window. The objection is basically this: when did time start? If time never started, then there was an infinite amount of time in the past. But if there was an infinite amount of time in the past, then how did we ever reach the present moment? Its impossible to cross an infinite amount of time through successive addition. Try counting backwards from negative infinity to zero - no matter how many billions of years have passed, you won't make any progress. That is because you cannot even get started by finding negative infinity - its like trying to jump out of a bottomless pit.

On the other hand, if time did begin at some point, then how did it? Who created it? God cannot have, becuase he is inside time.

So I don't see that God being inside time accounts for origins. That is my philosophical concern. Thoughts?

2) Exegetical concern.

Some passages seem to teach that God is outside of time, imo.

1Lord, you have been our dwelling place
in all generations.

2Before the mountains were brought forth,
or ever you had formed the earth and the world,
from everlasting to everlasting you are God.

3You return man to dust
and say, "Return, O children of man!"[2]

4For a thousand years in your sight
are but as yesterday when it is past,
or as a watch in the night.

2 Peter 3:8
But do not forget this one thing, dear friends: With the Lord a day is like a thousand years, and a thousand years are like a day.

Psalm 90:2 says that God is "from everlasting to everlasting" - that sure seems like God is outside time to me.

And for a thousand years to just a day or a watch in the night - that seems to me to be saying that short amounts of time and long amounts of time are the exact same from God's perspective - which again seems like another way of saying that God is outside time.

I hope I have not misrepresented molinism and open theism, since I am still in the basic stages of learning them.

What are your thoughts?

[geebob]

Open Theism is often called "neo-molinism" because, like its catholic predecessor, it denies EDF (exhaustive divine foreknowledge).

no and and no.

it's sometimes called that because Greg boyd wants to call it that because they can share the common ground in which God is said to know all possibilities. But they differ in that molinism says that God knows what you will do in any situation and open theism would say that God knows fully the range of possibilities of what you would do in any situation but unlike molinism, there is not in every possible situation a specific fact about what you would do.

furthermore, in molinism, you do have edf because God knows every circumstance that will in fact happen, thus he always knows what choice you will make.

1) Philosophical concern - if God is inside time, then the whole appeal of the kosmological argument and other theistic arguments based on God's timelessness are thrown out the window.

I don't know about this, for one thing, William lane Craig has made his claim to fame because he has revived a specific type of cosmological arguement, specifically, the kalamm cosmological arguement.

The objection is basically this: when did time start?

Craig would say that time started with creation and God wasn't in time until creation. Open theism really does not have to commit itself on this question and I believe that Nicolause Wolterstorff claimed that we can't know this in his essay in God and Time: four views.

I prefer to think that God was always in time, but that's just me. As for your problem you raise of infinite regresses, I'll give you my objection to it, but I'm about to run off and watch dragon ball Z.

[GODISNOWHERE]

This is a subject of which I have been investigating for quite sometime. I have some questions and propositions that may help all of us think through this subject.

1. The standard reformed or orthodox view has been commonly described when revealing the divine forknowledge of God as "The Eternal Now".

I find the Eternal Now view slightly disturbing because of the necessary conclusion that "God was always a man", or that "Jesus is suffering on the cross right now as much as He is at the right hand of the Father". In other words in the Eternal Now view no one single moment or measure of time is greater or lesser in the Divine and Pure Actuality of God. All is. God views all of time from a divine vantage point where all of time is before Him.

Again the necessary conclusion is that specific events such as Creation, crucifixtion, or tribulation are all equally and fully present before God.

The myriad of problems with the orthodox view can be realized by simply asking the question "Where is Jesus NOW?"

2. The other aspect of this debate perhaps is more focused if the cosmological reality of all things that exist (including God) is that the future does not exist. The current theological term for this is called "Presentism". Presentism is realized in what I have termed "Divine - Human Simultaneity".

Those that are against "open theism" typically suggest that the opentheist is "limiting God". And the open theist is guilty of wrongly declaring that "God doesn't know the future".

Conclusion:
The detractors of the open view as well as the proponents need to invest their efforts in making an effort to interpret scripture while recognizing that "The Future Does Not Exist", and "How does God know the future in a cosmology where the future does not exist?"

I do not believe God has to exist outside of time to know the future. I do not accept that the future is pre-written.

Do the scriptures teach that He is outside of time?
Does scripture teach that the future is prewritten (not to be confused with pre-determined)?

Presentism is the presupposition I come to scripture with and as of this moment have not been presented with scriptural support that negates this view.

Thoughts?

http://www.godisnowhere.org/Articles/Openness%20debate2.1.pdf

Daniel

[geebob]

Thank you for your comments GODISNOWHERE. I agree with your observation that if God experiences everything in the now, he is still on the cross and that is too strange view for me.

As for your link, It sounds interesting but I have two comments. For one, I couldn't access anything. A blank acrobat page came up. Maybe it's just my old computer as it also froze.

The other is that we discourage our members from relying too much on links, so any arguements you'd like to be considered on this thread and discussed in depth should be reconstructed here.

[geebob]

Gavin,

If time never started, then there was an infinite amount of time in the past. But if there was an infinite amount of time in the past, then how did we ever reach the present moment? Its impossible to cross an infinite amount of time through successive addition. Try counting backwards from negative infinity to zero - no matter how many billions of years have passed, you won't make any progress.

As I said, the open theist need not take a position on God's status to time before creation. We hold at minimum that God placed himself in time when he created time.

I am simpathetic to the notion that God always was in time and that is primarily because I think libertarian free will requires time, (and God is libertarian free), and because God is a living dynamic community of three persons and the actions and reactions in that community I believe would involve a succession from before to after.

with regard to the infinite regress arguement, It seems to me that it fails because of the part I emboldened above. When I say that God has always existed in time, I mean that he has no temporal begining, (making time coeternal with him, naturally a logical conclusion if it plays an essential role in the trinity).

When you say that we should start counting from negative infinity(from here on out, symbolized as -%) you are treating negative infinity as a begining and as a point in time like all the other points. That simply cannot apply to a view of time that says there is no beginning and the infinite regress is dependent upon the treatment of -% as a beginning and a point like any other point and as there is no point that can be labeled -%, no beginning, the type of problematic regress that you suggest never can occur.

Some passages seem to teach that God is outside of time, imo.

It can be easy for us to read various views of timelessness in scripture because we are preconditioned to view it there with all of our wacky zany science fiction on the subject and the theological tradition, but there is a big problem with this. For one, it is recognized by many scholars that the Jews did not hold this view as it was introduced into from the greeks (Jaltus may disagree and he is a scholar, but there are to my knowledge scholars who hold to timelessness that do not believe that scripture is clear on it). The second most glaring problem is that timelessness involves a significant and massive metaphysical scheme which simply is not present in scripture.

now as for the scriptures you cite,
2Before the mountains were brought forth,
or ever you had formed the earth and the world,
from everlasting to everlasting you are God.[quote]

It's not clear that timelessness was in view here. everlasting could mean from unending time and this could very well could be taken as a statement that God always was God (into the infinite past) and he always will be God (into the infinite future.

[quote]4For a thousand years in your sight
are but as yesterday when it is past,
or as a watch in the night.

because a thousand years to one who has existed forever is not a very long time compared to how long he has existed.

2 Peter 3:8
But do not forget this one thing, dear friends: With the Lord a day is like a thousand years, and a thousand years are like a day.

And a day is like a thousand years to God because he is so intensly involved in creation, the passage of even short amounts of time is no limit to what he accomplishes or how intensly and fully he experiences it. God can accomplish in a day what would take us thousands of years.

[Gavin]

Geebob,

ok, thanks for your great reply.

But they differ in that molinism says that God knows what you will do in any situation and open theism would say that God knows fully the range of possibilities of what you would do in any situation but unlike molinism, there is not in every possible situation a specific fact about what you would do.

All right I think I see it. So for the OVer God does not know what an individual will in a certain circumstance, but he knows everything that they could possibly do. I am glad I got the distinction between the two cleared up.

furthermore, in molinism, you do have edf because God knows every circumstance that will in fact happen, thus he always knows what choice you will make.

Is that EDF? That God knows all counterfactuals? Because I thought EDF conveyed the idea of simple foreknowledge as well, not just God knowing all counterfactuals.

I don't know about this, for one thing, William lane Craig has made his claim to fame because he has revived a specific type of cosmological arguement, specifically, the kalamm cosmological arguement.

True. I wonder how he does it consistently.

Craig would say that time started with creation and God wasn't in time until creation. Open theism really does not have to commit itself on this question and I believe that Nicolause Wolterstorff claimed that we can't know this in his essay in God and Time: four views.

I prefer to think that God was always in time, but that's just me. As for your problem you raise of infinite regresses, I'll give you my objection to it, but I'm about to run off and watch dragon ball Z.

I will look at your reply. I have read some of Wolterstorff. What I don't buy at all is the notion that God can be outside of time and then, at creation, somehow "enter in" to time. What does that mean? How can you go in and out of time?

More later.

[Gavin]

Dear Godisnowhere,

thanks for the reply.

This is a subject of which I have been investigating for quite sometime. I have some questions and propositions that may help all of us think through this subject.

Cool.

1. The standard reformed or orthodox view has been commonly described when revealing the divine forknowledge of God as "The Eternal Now".

I find the Eternal Now view slightly disturbing because of the necessary conclusion that "God was always a man", or that "Jesus is suffering on the cross right now as much as He is at the right hand of the Father". In other words in the Eternal Now view no one single moment or measure of time is greater or lesser in the Divine and Pure Actuality of God. All is. God views all of time from a divine vantage point where all of time is before Him.

Again the necessary conclusion is that specific events such as Creation, crucifixtion, or tribulation are all equally and fully present before God.

The myriad of problems with the orthodox view can be realized by simply asking the question "Where is Jesus NOW?"

We who hold to the "eternal now" idea would say that Jesus, of course, entered into time in the incarnation. So Jesus the man is no longer dying.

As for God himself, as the first person of the trinity, I don't think there are any problems with being outside time. Being outside time does not restrict God's action in time - we hold that God can (and does) spontaneously "break into" time and interact with creation (e.g., miracles). That does not mean he suddenly becomes in time, it just means he is free to act spontaneously in time (from outside). Hope that is at least a little clearer than mud.

2. The other aspect of this debate perhaps is more focused if the cosmological reality of all things that exist (including God) is that the future does not exist. The current theological term for this is called "Presentism". Presentism is realized in what I have termed "Divine - Human Simultaneity".

Those that are against "open theism" typically suggest that the opentheist is "limiting God". And the open theist is guilty of wrongly declaring that "God doesn't know the future".

Conclusion:
The detractors of the open view as well as the proponents need to invest their efforts in making an effort to interpret scripture while recognizing that "The Future Does Not Exist", and "How does God know the future in a cosmology where the future does not exist?"

Thats fine for you to believe that, but I would disagree on the future not existing (thus not agreeing with your conclusion that we must all interpret Scripture in that light). The future does not yet exist to us, i.e., from our perspective - but to a timeless agent (assuming that God is timeless, of course) words like "not yet" are meaningless.

Do the scriptures teach that He is outside of time?

. . .

Presentism is the presupposition I come to scripture with and as of this moment have not been presented with scriptural support that negates this view.

Care to comment on the verses in my first post?

Sincerely,
Gavin

[Gavin]

Geebob,

Thank you for your comments GODISNOWHERE. I agree with your observation that if God experiences everything in the now, he is still on the cross and that is too strange view for me.

See above. We believe, of course, that Jesus entered into time in the incarnation. This is a necessary implication from his entering in to history and space.

As I said, the open theist need not take a position on God's status to time before creation. We hold at minimum that God placed himself in time when he created time.


I do not understand that at all. Perhaps you could elaborate on how a timeless being can "come inside time".

with regard to the infinite regress arguement, It seems to me that it fails because of the part I emboldened above. When I say that God has always existed in time, I mean that he has no temporal begining, (making time coeternal with him, naturally a logical conclusion if it plays an essential role in the trinity).

When you say that we should start counting from negative infinity(from here on out, symbolized as -%) you are treating negative infinity as a begining and as a point in time like all the other points. That simply cannot apply to a view of time that says there is no beginning and the infinite regress is dependent upon the treatment of -% as a beginning and a point like any other point and as there is no point that can be labeled -%, no beginning, the type of problematic regress that you suggest never can occur.

Okay, that is the point: there was no beginning of time, according to your view. So the question stands - how did we ever reach the present moment? The appeal to negative infinity was just an analogy. The point is that if there were an infinite amount of time in the past, we would never have reached the present moment. Just as if you are counting to infinity by successive addition, you will never get there (whether you start or not).

It can be easy for us to read various views of timelessness in scripture because we are preconditioned to view it there with all of our wacky zany science fiction on the subject and the theological tradition, but there is a big problem with this. For one, it is recognized by many scholars that the Jews did not hold this view as it was introduced into from the greeks (Jaltus may disagree and he is a scholar, but there are to my knowledge scholars who hold to timelessness that do not believe that scripture is clear on it). The second most glaring problem is that timelessness involves a significant and massive metaphysical scheme which simply is not present in scripture.

As for the first point (that timelessness was introduced by the greeks), I am not sufficiently qualified about what the Jews and the Greeks believed about this to really comment, except to say that I do not see Jewish and Hellinistic thought in general as the final word on the subject, if the Scriptures unambiguously teach on the subject (and I think they do).

As for the second part, that timelessness involves a massive metaphysical scheme, I am not sure what exactly you mean by this phrase, but I disagree that it is not present in Scripture.

As for your comments on the verses I cited:

And a day is like a thousand years to God because he is so intensly involved in creation, the passage of even short amounts of time is no limit to what he accomplishes or how intensly and fully he experiences it. God can accomplish in a day what would take us thousands of years.

One day being the same as a thousand years from God's perspective merely on the basis of what he accomplishes? If he accomplishes so much in a day, wouldn't that mean that he accomplishes all the more in a thousand years?

The verse does not say anything what God can accomplish in a short amount of time. The context is about the judgement to come at the end times, and God not being "slow". I remain convinced that a short amount of time being the same thing as a long amount of time to God implies God is timeless.

8"But do not forget this one thing, dear friends: With the Lord a day is like a thousand years, and a thousand years are like a day."

because a thousand years to one who has existed forever is not a very long time compared to how long he has existed.

It doesn't say anything about "relative to how long God has existed". I do not see any reason to import that assumption onto the text. But I won't quibble about this one because the passage could be interpreted your way (although I do not think this would be the most natural reading of this passage).

It's not clear that timelessness was in view here. everlasting could mean from unending time and this could very well could be taken as a statement that God always was God (into the infinite past) and he always will be God (into the infinite future.

Well at least you admit he is eternal. It comes down to, of course, what is meant by "everlasting".

Blessings,
Gavin

[Gavin]

Great C.S. Lewis quote that may help you understand my position:

C.S. Lewis wrote in Mere Christianity, p. 147, "If you picture Time as a straight line along which we have to travel, then you must picture God as the whole page on which the line is drawn.".

[geebob]

Is that EDF? That God knows all counterfactuals? Because I thought EDF conveyed the idea of simple foreknowledge as well, not just God knowing all counterfactuals.

it allows for edf as the molinist claims that God has determined what situations will arise. in light of that determination, he will know the free actions of men.

I do not understand that at all. Perhaps you could elaborate on how a timeless being can "come inside time".

not really. I don't take a position on that and it simply is not necessary to open theism. Whether or not God was or was not in time prior to creation, it makes little difference to the open view as we are only commited to the view that he is in time now.

I will say that if God entered time where he previously wasn't in time, obviously timelessness was just a fact of his relation toward existence and not something that was necessarily apart of him. similary, that he was without creation was equally contingent and not necessary to his being.

So the question stands - how did we ever reach the present moment?

that there is an infinite past necessitates that there is a present moment. Without a present moment from whence you can look back and say there's an infinite past, no infinite past can be claimed. Thus you must contradict yourself when speaking of an infinite past and then claim that there can be no present.

The appeal to negative infinity was just an analogy.

there is a bit of a mystery to this concept of an infinite past and the large part of the theological tradition says mysteries are good. That's quite alright until they try to give nonsensical incoherencies a description of mystery in that positive sense. But apart from the claim of incoherency or in light of significant information, you can't authoritatively claim that the mystery is bad. The closest you come to identifying an incoherency in the infinite past claim is that notion there of the impossibility of starting with negative infinity and working toward the present.

Just as if you are counting to infinity by successive addition, you will never get there (whether you start or not).

I'll admit that there is an asymetry here between the infinite past that has been traversed by God and the infinite future of the fullness of which we will never reach.

if the Scriptures unambiguously teach on the subject

and they are not unambigous. The scriptures in fact depict God within time as he is claimed to act and react, to remember, to plan. He says he will do this and that. This does not prove that he is not timeless but it all has to be qualified and that qualification is not found in scripture.

For example, you are puzzled about how a timeless God can enter into time, but before you said that, you said that God entered into time in the incarnation. The massive explanation that is required to make sense of this is not found within scripture, and some philosophers, specifically Wolterstorff have claimed that God cannot be in time because a God who redeems and is incarnated is in time.

As for the second part, that timelessness involves a massive metaphysical scheme, I am not sure what exactly you mean by this phrase, but I disagree that it is not present in Scripture.

If we were to ignore the problem of incarnation, the metaphysical story required to uphold God's timelessness is to say that all of the scriptures that portray God acting in time are really just from our perspective and what really happens is that God is timelessly acting and he is acting in such a way that those actions manifest at certain times, but he is not acting at those times. God is did not act to free the israelites at the time of their captivity though the scriptures portray that, but he was acting timelessly in such a way that at the time of the captivity, the israelites were freed because of his timeless captivity. But this is a significant story that is not told in scripture and if it is true, you cannot come to that conclusion on the basis of the scriptures that do not even hint at such a mechanism.

One day being the same as a thousand years from God's perspective merely on the basis of what he accomplishes? If he accomplishes so much in a day, wouldn't that mean that he accomplishes all the more in a thousand years?

There is no quantitative limit to what God can do in any given amount of time and an excellent way to convey this to us for who complain that there are only 24 hours in a day is that he's got more than 24 hours. But to insist on timelessness or to make the claim that your making is to abuse the metaphore. This is metaphorical language and though your original take on it has been the norm, you cannot be conclusive about it.

It doesn't say anything about "relative to how long God has existed". I do not see any reason to import that assumption onto the text.

the assumption is clearly as reasonable if not more than the one that you are importing into the text.

The context is about the judgement to come at the end times, and God not being "slow".

in the master plan and grand scheme of things, he's not. if it takes you ten hours to make a 5k post here, in the scheme of things, you are slow. If it takes two to three weeks for the US to topple the iraqi regime, in the grand scheme of things, considering how long wars can go on, that is quick. so your ten hours is slow and yet the us's 3 week war is quick.

I remain convinced that a short amount of time being the same thing as a long amount of time to God implies God is timeless.

To say that a slow amount of time is the same as a long amount of time is meaningless, unless we are talking about a metaphore and varying perspective.

Well at least you admit he is eternal. It comes down to, of course, what is meant by "everlasting".

but I mean the same thing about eternal as I do everlasting. God has always been.



I know the following was addressed to Godisnowhere, but I want to share an observation.

The future does not yet exist to us, i.e., from our perspective - but to a timeless agent (assuming that God is timeless, of course) words like "not yet" are meaningless.

the thing about this is that if the future does not exist to us, than I fail to see how we will be in the future if it does exist to a timeless being. That we exist in something entails that that something exists to us.

[Jaltus]

I'll get back to this thread when I am not so busy (perhaps after I die?), but I would like to point out to GODINOWHERE that many believe the future does exist (B-Theory), as I am one of those.

I believe the future exists for one major reason, Minkowskian space-time, which is a mathematical model of physics abstractions. Due to my diverse (probably bizarre) educational background, I put a lot of stock in physics.

And yes, OV is not a form of Molinism, since Boyd's change of a single word undermines the entire concept. He changes the idea that God knows what we would do in any circumstance to God knows what we might do, turning it into a game of statistics instead of holding to any form of surety.

[Gavin]

geebob,

it allows for edf as the molinist claims that God has determined what situations will arise. in light of that determination, he will know the free actions of men.

The claim could be made that God is no less evil or coercive, then, in molinism, as he allegedly is in Calvinism. Since God is bringing about circumstances that cause sin, and he knows full well that people will sin in those circumstances, someone with a high regad for human autonomous free will would probably claim that God is as morally repugnant in molinism as he is (supposedly) in Calvinism.

not really. I don't take a position on that and it simply is not necessary to open theism. Whether or not God was or was not in time prior to creation, it makes little difference to the open view as we are only commited to the view that he is in time now.

I will say that if God entered time where he previously wasn't in time, obviously timelessness was just a fact of his relation toward existence and not something that was necessarily apart of him. similary, that he was without creation was equally contingent and not necessary to his being.

Since you don't believe that God came inside time, we don't need to dissuss this. Suffice to say that I find it totally nuexplainable for God to "come inside time" at creation.

that there is an infinite past necessitates that there is a present moment. Without a present moment from whence you can look back and say there's an infinite past, no infinite past can be claimed. Thus you must contradict yourself when speaking of an infinite past and then claim that there can be no present.

No, you misunderstand me. I am not claiming that there was an infinite past. I am claiming that, because there is a present moment, there cannot have been an infinite past. It sounds like you agree on that point.

there is a bit of a mystery to this concept of an infinite past and the large part of the theological tradition says mysteries are good. That's quite alright until they try to give nonsensical incoherencies a description of mystery in that positive sense. But apart from the claim of incoherency or in light of significant information, you can't authoritatively claim that the mystery is bad. The closest you come to identifying an incoherency in the infinite past claim is that notion there of the impossibility of starting with negative infinity and working toward the present.

If the infinite past theory is demonstrably illogical, then the appeal to "mystery" is useless, right? After all, that is what Arminians say to Calvinists regarding human responsibility/divine sovereignty.

I'll admit that there is an asymetry here between the infinite past that has been traversed by God and the infinite future of the fullness of which we will never reach.

What kind of "assymetry" would that be?

you are puzzled about how a timeless God can enter into time, but before you said that, you said that God entered into time in the incarnation. The massive explanation that is required to make sense of this is not found within scripture, and some philosophers, specifically Wolterstorff have claimed that God cannot be in time because a God who redeems and is incarnated is in time.

Its really not a problem at all. When God becomes an man, he is entering into history and space, so of course he in entering into time. But for God himself, the first in the trinity, to enter into time, is a whole different ball game. For one he did not become a man, and for another there is no evidence that he did enter into time in Scripture's account of creation.

If we were to ignore the problem of incarnation, the metaphysical story required to uphold God's timelessness is to say that all of the scriptures that portray God acting in time are really just from our perspective and what really happens is that God is timelessly acting and he is acting in such a way that those actions manifest at certain times, but he is not acting at those times.

Not necessarily. I do believe that many times when God appears to change his mind or something like that it is only from our perspective, but it need not always be like this. As I said, for God to be outside time does not restrict his activity in time. If God is above time, that should not mean that he bound by the limits of time - just the opposite.

There is no quantitative limit to what God can do in any given amount of time and an excellent way to convey this to us for who complain that there are only 24 hours in a day is that he's got more than 24 hours. But to insist on timelessness or to make the claim that your making is to abuse the metaphore. This is metaphorical language and though your original take on it has been the norm, you cannot be conclusive about it.

How is it metaphorical? It sure sounds like your forcing your assumptions on the text in order to avoid the conclusions that come from the most natural reading. If a short amount of time is that same as a long amount of time to God, i.e., from his perspective, it does not follow merely that God is recourceful in donig a lot in a little amount of time. That may be true, but the fuller meaning of the text seems to be that time is all the same to God.


the assumption is clearly as reasonable if not more than the one that you are importing into the text.

I am not aware of any assumption being imported onto the text in my view. I am simply trying to read it straightforward. It honestly does not say anything relative to how long God has existed.

To say that a slow amount of time is the same as a long amount of time is meaningless, unless we are talking about a metaphore and varying perspective.

Its meaningless unless God is outside of time.

Jaltus,

And yes, OV is not a form of Molinism, since Boyd's change of a single word undermines the entire concept. He changes the idea that God knows what we would do in any circumstance to God knows what we might do, turning it into a game of statistics instead of holding to any form of surety.

Maybe so, but still, it is common usage to refer to OV as "neo-molinism", given the similarities.

Blessings,
Gavin

[Gavin]

btw Jaltus are you a molinist?

[Gavin]

My basic point in my philosophical concern with the view that time has always existed is that if it had, then we would never have reached the present moment. For the record.

[Jaltus]

Yes, I am a Molinist.

[AcousticJS]

Yesterday @ 09:35 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=62032#post62032)
Gavin:

My basic point in my philosophical concern with the view that time has always existed is that if it had, then we would never have reached the present moment. For the record.

I'm having difficulty getting my head around your point, Gavin. Why would we not have got to this point in time if it has always existed? I can imagine that time (as in sensation of duration) has always existed, and yet we have got to where we are. Why do you see the two is incompatible?

God bless
Jon

[Gavin]

Jon, thanks for your reply.

I'm having difficulty getting my head around your point, Gavin. Why would we not have got to this point in time if it has always existed? I can imagine that time (as in sensation of duration) has always existed, and yet we have got to where we are. Why do you see the two is incompatible?

God bless
Jon


This may clarify, it is from my first post:

If time never started, then there was an infinite amount of time in the past. But if there was an infinite amount of time in the past, then how did we ever reach the present moment? Its impossible to cross an infinite amount of time through successive addition. Try counting backwards from negative infinity to zero - no matter how many billions of years have passed, you won't make any progress. That is because you cannot even get started by finding negative infinity - its like trying to jump out of a bottomless pit.

On the other hand, if time did begin at some point, then how did it? Who created it? God cannot have, becuase he is inside time.

So I don't see that God being inside time accounts for origins. That is my philosophical concern.

The idea is that you cannot cross an infinite amount of time with the successive addition of moment by moment passing of time, anymore than you can count to infinity by successive addition of finite numerals.

Therefore God must have started time itself at some point (not a sequential point, but an aspectual point, you understand).

Does that clarify?

[joelkaki]

A problem that I see with Molinism is this:

It does not seem that there is one set response for each set of circumstances. For instance, I could be in the exact same set of cirumstances two time, and yet make two different decisions. So how could God predestine based on "Middle Knowledge"--knowing what would happen?

Joel

[joelkaki]

OVer's always make the claim that God cannot know the future because it does not yet exist. Now, if so, then how can God know the past, either? The past does not presently exist, so how can he know that?


Joel

[Chief of Staff Lizard]

Yesterday @ 05:53 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=63362#post63362)
joelkaki:

A problem that I see with Molinism is this:

It does not seem that there is one set response for each set of circumstances. For instance, I could be in the exact same set of cirumstances two time, and yet make two different decisions. So how could God predestine based on "Middle Knowledge"--knowing what would happen?

Joel

:huh:

The exact set of circumstnace? I don't see how as there are so many factors, not the least of which is the fact that the second time you come to decision point you have the experience from the first time you made the same decision.

Even it were theoretically possible, if all the factors were the same, how could the decision you made be any different. That is God knows what decision you will make based on all the factors. If all the factors were the same, the the decision would be as well.

[joelkaki]

The exact set of circumstnace? I don't see how as there are so many factors, not the least of which is the fact that the second time you come to decision point you have the experience from the first time you made the same decision.

Even it were theoretically possible, if all the factors were the same, how could the decision you made be any different. That is God knows what decision you will make based on all the factors. If all the factors were the same, the the decision would be as well.

I'm not necessarily saying that you could have the exact set of factors duplicated. More theoretically speaking, and should the theory hold true, it would disprove the fact that God would ordain based on what would happen.

It seems that in your last paragraph you are assuming what you need to prove. I do not see that as a warranted assumption. Given the exact set of circumstances twice, I don't see how you could not make a different decision each time. You might just decide to do something else. So how can you say that this or that would happen every time in that situation.

Another thing: I don't see any evidence in Scripture of God predestining something based on Molinistic Middle Knowledge. Where does the Bible ever teach that?

One more: I guess maybe Jaltus should answer this question (but others feel free) since it was evoked due to something he said.
According to Molinism, God, based on his knowledge of what would happen, can decide what set of circumstances to bring about in order to get the desired result. First of all, how does that preserve libertarian free will? (I don't hold to LFW, but Molinism does.) If God works the circumstances so that there could only be one choice--what would happen, how could you still maintain the view that man has LFW?
According to Molinism, God can decide not to influence the circumstances so as to let his creatures do what their LFW decides. If that is the case, then how can God be said to be in control? Something could therefore happen outside of his plan, and it would seem that he could potentially be at risk as in the case of Open Theism.

Joel

[Chief of Staff Lizard]

Today @ 09:23 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=64023#post64023)
joelkaki:

It seems that in your last paragraph you are assuming what you need to prove. I do not see that as a warranted assumption. Given the exact set of circumstances twice, I don't see how you could not make a different decision each time. You might just decide to do something else. So how can you say that this or that would happen every time in that situation.



Well, I am not really trying to prove anything, I am just trying to understand your position. I am not (yet) a Molinist, but I am considering the position. Not trying to debate here, just to understand.

I still do not see how it would be possible to choose differently if all the factors were the same. Something would have to be different to produce a different choice.

If all the factors were the same, all the motivations, all the reasoning, all the thought processes, how could the conclusion (the choice) be any different?

Maybe I'm just not understanding your position. :huh:

To me there must be some sort diversion in the chain of situations prior to the instant of choice for the choice to be different. Of couse, I am assuming that the chooser has Free Will as this is central to molinism.

Maybe Jaltus could provide a little insight on this.

Again, I am not trying to debate, just understand. If I appear ignorant in this area, it is because I am. This area of study is fairly new to me.

[geebob]

Faramir,

If all the factors were the same, all the motivations, all the reasoning, all the thought processes, how could the conclusion (the choice) be any different?

Some of what you present is dangerously close to compatibilism. What you posted above would pretty much fit the bill of psycological determinism which is that the method through which our decisions are determined is through our motivations, and/or reasons.

In LFW it must be with in one's power to choose to act and within their power to choose to refrain. If it is not within one's power to go against what they percieve to be their strongest reason, their strongest motivation or if it is not within their power to change their motivation and reasoning, then they are not free in the libertarian sense.

I don't know if a professional philosopher of the molinist persuasion would admit the description that you have given because it seems to conflict with libertarian freedom, but then again, that is a significant question about molinism- does it really work with libertarian freedom? It may not yeild to a full blown theological determinism as God cannot determine the counterfactuals of freedom, but nevertheless, there is an ultimate fact about how you would act in any circumstance and a lack of a possibility that you could act differently in that same circumstance and it's hard to see how that doesn't conflict with the notion of libertarian freedom.


Gavin,

The claim could be made that God is no less evil or coercive, then, in molinism, as he allegedly is in Calvinism. Since God is bringing about circumstances that cause sin, and he knows full well that people will sin in those circumstances, someone with a high regad for human autonomous free will would probably claim that God is as morally repugnant in molinism as he is (supposedly) in Calvinism.

perhaps. I'm not a molinist though so it's not my problem, but as you can read in my response to faramir, molinism cannot be considered a full blown theological determinism.

No, you misunderstand me. I am not claiming that there was an infinite past. I am claiming that, because there is a present moment, there cannot have been an infinite past. It sounds like you agree on that point.

I didn't misunderstand you. I'm saying that the concept that you are dealing with, an infinite past, necesarily entails a present, unless we are dealing with a B theory of time, but I do not suggest such a thing. thus to say that the present can not be reached in an infinite past contradicts the notion of an infinite past as the present is inseperable from an infinite past.

If the infinite past theory is demonstrably illogical, then the appeal to "mystery" is useless, right? After all, that is what Arminians say to Calvinists regarding human responsibility/divine sovereignty.

I agree. my arguement was that I can appeal to mystery because no incoherency was demonstrated since the only demonstration you gave, a vicious infinite regress (I say vicious because not all infinite regresses are bad) depended upon something that does not exist in the concept of the infinite past that I would suggest, one without a beginning.

What kind of "assymetry" would that be?

the one I mentioned. The infinite past up to the present has passed in full by God though the infinite future will never be lived through fully.

Of course, that isn't the only asymetrical relationship the future bears to the past.

Its really not a problem at all. When God becomes an man, he is entering into history and space, so of course he in entering into time.

there was a "before" and an "after". This is temporality in full.

But for God himself, the first in the trinity,

The trinity is God himself. To suggest that the father is timeless while the son or spirit is temporal is to say that the truine God is a temporal being.

Not necessarily.

then your version of timelessness is something different from what the great theologians of the church have meant by it. If you really believe that timelessness is necessary to the various arguements for the existence of God, since your view of timelessness is significantly different from that of the classical theologians who worked out these arguements, it could very well be that your view does not work with those views any better.

As I said, for God to be outside time does not restrict his activity in time.

once God acts in time, there is a before and after that can be predicated to God. The effects of his actions can be in time, but not his actions themselves. Not the things that he himself does. That just isn't timelessness.

How is it metaphorical?

the word "as" is always a good indicator. A thousand years is not a day and vice versa is not the case either. To insist that one is the other is meaningless. Actually the way you take it is no less metaphorical either. So the question is "what way is a day like a thousand years?"

If a short amount of time is that same as a long amount of time to God, i.e., from his perspective, it does not follow merely that God is recourceful in donig a lot in a little amount of time.

neither does it follow then that tense cannot be predicated to God. It does not follow that all time is a simultaneous whole. The metaphysics just aren't there and it isn't clear that they are any where to be found in scripture.

The way in which I take this does not require that I think of God in terms other than those that are at work in the narrative. God acts at specific times, he remembers, he plans. All of these are chocked full of temporality.

I am simply trying to read it straightforward. It honestly does not say anything relative to how long God has existed

It doesn't make any sense read "straightforwardly" as a thousand years is not a day and vice versa. Placing God outside of time does not make a thousand years identical with a day unless God's ability to distinguish the two is dissolved. Clearly there must be a sense in which one is like the other and suggesting that the similarity is due to timelessness stands on weak grounds as it is at odds with the rest of scripture and nothing is present to qualify those scriptures.

[Kenny]

04-10-2003 @ 03:52 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=60880#post60880)
Jaltus:

I'll get back to this thread when I am not so busy (perhaps after I die?), but I would like to point out to GODINOWHERE that many believe the future does exist (B-Theory), as I am one of those.

I believe the future exists for one major reason, Minkowskian space-time, which is a mathematical model of physics abstractions. Due to my diverse (probably bizarre) educational background, I put a lot of stock in physics.

And yes, OV is not a form of Molinism, since Boyd's change of a single word undermines the entire concept. He changes the idea that God knows what we would do in any circumstance to God knows what we might do, turning it into a game of statistics instead of holding to any form of surety.

Hi Jaltus. I also have a diverse educational background (BA in philosophy & religion and physics, currently working on an MA in theology) which causes me to put a lot of stock in physics, but I am often skeptical of to just what extent metaphysical conclusions can be drawn from physics. I think often times what we know from physics puts some constraints on the metaphysical conclusions we draw but nevertheless underdetermines most of them. Though I adopt a view of divine timelessness and an accompanying B theory of time (and I think that the theory of relativity lends support to this position), I don’t think that Minkowskian space-time is a knock out argument for such a position.

The problem is that Minkowskian space-time, when taken as a metaphysical interpretation of relativity, is not the only viable option because it assumes that there is no metaphysically privileged reference frame. Minkowskian space-time works for calculation purposes because the laws of physics are genuinely invariant with respect to all reference frames (and that is what Minkowskain space-time assumes), but time itself could be a more complex phenomenon involving qualitative aspects which the strictly quantitative equations are unable to capture. Thus, the fact that the laws of physics are invariant with respect to all reference frames does not entail that there is no metaphysically privileged reference frame.

Relativity itself (in terms of its predictions) is logically consistent (provided that faster than light signaling is strictly prohibited) with the notion that time flows and the future does not exist. Relativity of simultaneity does mean that the measured temporal ordering of some events is reversed with respect to differing reference frames, but this is only true of “space-like” separated events. Causally related “time-like” separated events retain the same measured temporal ordering in all reference frames. So relativity preserves the temporal ordering of causally related events and it is impossible (barring FTL signaling) to transmit information about the future backwards through time. One could consistently hold the apparent temporal reversal of space-like separated events (as well as all the other weird effects described by relativity) in differing reference frames is nothing more than an artifact of measurement. Somewhere (even if we have no idea where it is) there is a metaphysically privileged reference frame (the one which God is in, perhaps) which keeps true time and by which the true temporal orderings of events is judged. Gravitation and motion (with respect to this privileged frame) introduce “distorting effects” into our measurements which the equations of relativity would tell us how to correct for if we knew which reference frame is the metaphysically privileged one.

That being said, I buy Minkowskian space time as a correct metaphysical description of the nature of the universe, but relativity itself does not force us to adopt that position.

God Bless,
Kenny

[Gavin]

geebob,

it may take some time before I can get back to you.

sincerely,
gavin

[themuzicman]

04-11-2003 @ 11:51 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=63619#post63619)
joelkaki:

OVer's always make the claim that God cannot know the future because it does not yet exist. Now, if so, then how can God know the past, either? The past does not presently exist, so how can he know that?


Joel

It's called a "memory". You know, part of the intelligence?

:argh:

Michael

[joelkaki]

OK, just wondering if someone was ever going to give me that answer.

Joel

[geebob]

I don’t think that Minkowskian space-time is a knock out argument for such a position...That being said, I buy Minkowskian space time as a correct metaphysical description of the nature of the universe, but relativity itself does not force us to adopt that position.

greeting kenny. I'm no physicist, but I've been around Jaltus for a while and I know he loves his minkowskian space time. I've read your explanation but it's a little beyond me. I clearly see that you don't think reletivity itself is inconsistent with an A theory of time, but are you extending that to minkowskian spacetime? You say it's not a good arguement, but is that because it isn't established as the correct view or because it too can be worked into an A theory?

[Kenny]

Today @ 07:05 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=66395#post66395)
geebob: greeting kenny. I'm no physicist, but I've been around Jaltus for a while and I know he loves his minkowskian space time. I've read your explanation but it's a little beyond me. I clearly see that you don't think reletivity itself is inconsistent with an A theory of time, but are you extending that to minkowskian spacetime? You say it's not a good arguement, but is that because it isn't established as the correct view or because it too can be worked into an A theory?

Minkowskian space-time is certainly correct as a calculation device. Minkowskian space-time assumes that there is no privileged reference frame. That is certainly true as long as we are talking about the laws of physics in and of themselves. There is no privileged reference frame in the sense that the laws of physics are formulated more simply in that reference frame than in others. If we treat all reference frames as being on equal footing, then what emerges, via relativity of simultaneity, is a four dimensional space-time geometry in which there is no privileged present moment, and this works for calculation purposes because the laws of physics are genuinely invariant – they privilege no particular reference frame and thus no particular present moment. However, taking the Minkowskian picture as an accurate metaphysical description of the nature of the universe may be unduly reductionistic. The fact that the laws of physics (which are strictly quantitative in nature) do not privilege any reference frame does not entail that there is no privileged reference frame. The universe has qualitative attributes which cannot be captured via mathematics (e.g. we can describe wavelengths of light mathematically but we can not describe what it is like to experience the color blue mathematically). It may be that time is a more metaphysically complex phenomenon than what the laws of physics describe. The advocate of the A theory of time could argue (and many do) that our qualitative experiences suggest that time really does flow in some sense and thereby clues us in to aspects of the nature of time that our physical theories leave out. .

I happen to think that a B theory of time can account for our qualitative experience just as well and that the B theory of time is to be preferred because it is more simple, but to each her own. I am open to revising my B theory view of the nature of time in the face of some good arguments against it (and I occasionally do encounter some that give me pause). Either way, given my other metaphysical views concerning the relationship between freedom and determinism, the impact on my view of divine foreknowledge is negligible.

To answer your question directly, as a calculation device and a statement about the invariance of the laws of physics, Minkowskian space time is certainly correct but not inconsistent with an A theory of time. As a description of the metaphysical nature of time, Minkowskian space-time is inconsistent with an A theory but there is no way to demonstrate conclusively that such a description is correct. It may be that this question is insoluble when considering the laws of physics alone, since the laws of physics (due to their being quantitative) may necessarily miss important metaphysical features of the nature of time.

In Christ,
Kenny

[geebob]

I am open to revising my B theory view of the nature of time in the face of some good arguments against it (and I occasionally do encounter some that give me pause).

Well I'd like to try.

I would insist that my consciousness is enduring and that my consciousness is essentially identical to who I am. The past is with me in memory and it is something that I did but am not doing now. The future is something that I have not yet been made consciouse of. Thus for all of time to exist wholy would mean that there are other concious persons who inhabit my timeline. Arguably an infinite number. They all share my timeline and they will go through what is called my life, but they are not me. I am not being born right now. It is in my past, but there are individuals called by my name who share a mother identical to my own in many aspects to mine who are being born at the time in which I was born.

[GODISNOWHERE]

This thread has really blossomed. I am unaware of Minkowskian space-time and look forward to learning more about it. In addition I would like to know more about Schwartschild time which Dr. Russel Humphries has mentioned before.

As to the reference of 2 Peter and 1 day equalling a thousand years...I believe that this verse has nothing to do whatsoever with time based calculation on the diff between man and God, but rather God's clear message of mercy, patience and long suffering.

Again, the future does not exist to be known, yet God knows the future to a greater degree than man knows. And we know a lot.

Daniel

[themuzicman]

The explanation for how God could create time, and then experience it from the outside is what I call a "dynamic creation."

Last I knew, scientists put the size of the universe at 10 to 20 billion light years, and that the universe was still expanding. Thus, we see what God created is dynamic in these dimensions.

Thus, if time is the 4th dimension created, it, too, should be dynamic, in that it expands into the future, and each new moment is, in fact, a new element of what God created, and in a very minute way, our actions and decisions define what each moment holds.

Thus, God created time, but created it to be dynamic and expanding in nature, and outside our universe is not bounded by that which He created, but when He wants to interact with us, He must travel with us along this dynamic dimension as each moment unfolds.

As such, time travel (backwards) would be possible, and God is not bound to time, and yet the future does not yet exist.

Michael

[nomad]

ok, i'm a novice here. and i haven't read much of the literature (i'm writing down the titles though to read later). but i had a couple thoughts.

is the universe infinite? if not, where does it end and what is beyond it?

if the universe IS infinite, we have a real example of how a 'there' of infinite distance does not preclude there being a 'here'.

and geebob, i think that might be able to interpreted differently; your consciousness is no more enduring than your body (or, at least, it is 'enduring' in exactly the same sense your body currently is), and is just as tied to time as your body.

the rest is over my head; i decline to comment out of an attempt to not repeat old arguments, until i have had a chance to learn about other things posted.

[Kenny]

Today @ 05:35 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=75540#post75540)
geebob: Well I'd like to try.

I would insist that my consciousness is enduring and that my consciousness is essentially identical to who I am.

I would say that your subjective experience of your consciousness enduring arises from the fact that your same consciousness is present at every moment along the timeline in which you exist.

The past is with me in memory and it is something that I did but am not doing now.

Verb tenses get tricky when talking about a B theory of time so hopefully this won’t get too muddled. I would say that the past is something that you are doing and something that you are experiencing. Your consciousness is just as present five years ago as it is now. But, the way in which your consciousness is related to five years ago differs from the way that your consciousness is related to the present moment. Your subjective experience, which makes it appear that time has passed and that what happened five years ago no longer exists, merely arises from the fact that your consciousness relates differently to these two moments and it has tied these differing relationships together and organized them in such a way that makes it seem that time has passed.

The future is something that I have not yet been made conscious of.

Again, I would say that you are (in a tenseless sense) present in the future and conscious of it, but that the manner in which your consciousness is related to the present moment creates the illusion that things are otherwise.

Thus for all of time to exist wholy would mean that there are other concious persons who inhabit my timeline. Arguably an infinite number. They all share my timeline and they will go through what is called my life, but they are not me.

No, ‘they’ are all you. Each of these ‘differing’ persons shares one and the same consciousness which makes them not differing persons at all but the same person. It is your consciousness which is present throughout all of these moments, but in differing relationships to these moments.

I am not being born right now.

You are being born right now in a tenseless sense, though you are not being born right now if ‘right now’ is taken to tag the moment at which the above sentence is typed.

It is in my past, but there are individuals called by my name who share a mother identical to my own in many aspects to mine who are being born at the time in which I was born.

No, you’re the one being born and it is your mother who is giving birth to you. Your consciousness is simply related differently to the present moment than it is to the moment in which you are being born.

God Bless,
Kenny

[Kenny]

Today @ 06:43 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=75598#post75598)
nomad:

is the universe infinite? if not, where does it end and what is beyond it?

The most current astronomical data suggests that the universe is infinite, though due to the expansion of the universe and the limitations of the speed of light, there is a horizon beyond which we cannot observe. In fact, some scientists speculate that since the universe appears to be homogeneous on large scales that this pattern repeats indefinitely giving rise to every possible configuration of matter repeating itself at some point. This would mean that there are an infinite number of planets nearly identical to earth out there and that you have a doppelganger on many of them. I would dispute this speculation on the grounds that it implicitly denies divine providence by assuming that the distribution of matter is random. We really don’t know how far out we can expect the patterns we observe around us to hold or what purposes God may have for what lies beyond our observable horizon – yet another caution about the danger overdrawing metaphysical conclusions from physics. It has been speculated in the past that perhaps the universe has a spherical type geometry in which it would be a finite object in 4-D but have no edge in 3-D (think of 2 dimensional beings living on the surface of a sphere for an analogy), but recent observations are giving the lie to such a view.

if the universe IS infinite, we have a real example of how a 'there' of infinite distance does not preclude there being a 'here'.

Yes, and on a B theory of time, there would be no difficulty with an infinite sequence of past events just as there is no problem with an infinite sequence of spatial objects. I’ve never been a fan of the Kalam Cosmological argument.

and geebob, i think that might be able to interpreted differently; your consciousness is no more enduring than your body (or, at least, it is 'enduring' in exactly the same sense your body currently is), and is just as tied to time as your body.

On a B theory of time, geebob’s body is a four dimensional object spread across space-time with various parts of that object being connected via causal relationships. Perhaps his consciousness could be viewed in a similar way (though there are complications here since consciousness does not have spatial qualities). On the other hand, perhaps geebob’s consciousness transcends time in some sense but relates to moments in time in differing ways. Both the above models show promise for accounting for our subjective experience that time passes, I think.

In Christ,
Kenny

[Kenny]

whoops -- ignore this post.

[geebob]

Your consciousness is just as present five years ago as it is now. But, the way in which your consciousness is related to five years ago differs from the way that your consciousness is related to the present moment.

For me, this is where the road meets the rubber. If I am not conscious of it, then it is not apart of my consciousness. You say that my consciousness is related to the past differently, but the fact is, I am not experiencing what is going on five years ago. I know you insist on identifying the entity that is experiencing the going's on five years ago as my consciousness, but supposing "I" am swimming "right now" five years ago. Well I don't feel the water around me. I'm sitting in a chair with horrible posture and keys under my fingures. Swimming is not what I am experiencing. It is not what I am conscious of. I am dry and in fact my hands are feeling a little bit too dry.

If I am not consciouse of it, it is not apart of my consciousness. Experience is what feeds most of it's being, and that experience endures.

[Kenny]

Hi geebob,

Let verbs which refer to being in a tenseless sense be denoted by being tagged with an ‘*’ symbol (e.g. I am* being born somewhere in space time) and those verbs without such a symbol carry their normal English sense of tense.

For me, this is where the road meets the rubber. If I am not conscious of it, then it is not apart of my consciousness.

I would say you are* conscious of your past experiences even if you are not partaking in your past experiences in the present moment.

You say that my consciousness is related to the past differently, but the fact is, I am not experiencing what is going on five years ago.

You are* experiencing what is going on five years ago even if right now that experience is not immediately present to your awareness.

I know you insist on identifying the entity that is experiencing the going's on five years ago as my consciousness, but supposing "I" am swimming "right now" five years ago. Well I don't feel the water around me.

You do feel* the water around you even if you presently don’t feel the water around you.

I'm sitting in a chair with horrible posture and keys under my fingures. Swimming is not what I am experiencing. It is not what I am conscious of. I am dry and in fact my hands are feeling a little bit too dry.

You are*, in fact, experiencing both sets of sensations even though your subjective experience is that you are only experiencing one of those sets.

If I am not consciouse of it, it is not apart of my consciousness. Experience is what feeds most of it's being, and that experience endures.

You are* conscious of every moment along your temporal existence even if it seems that you only experience one moment at a time. I suspect much of you argument rests on equivocating between ‘is*’ and ‘is’ – something which is very easy to do when trying to discuss a B theory of time.

The fact that your subjective experience makes it seem that only some aspects of your conscious experience exist at any given moment may seem puzzling on a B theory, but it is not so puzzling given what we know about the complexities of consciousness. We already know that often there is no sharp dividing line between the conscious and the subconscious. We already know that our brain organizes and interprets sensory input and that our conscious experience is already the result of a great deal of interpolation on the part of our cognitive faculties. Also, very strange cases, such as split brain subjects, suggest that it is possible for two distinct sets of conscious experience to occur simultaneously in the very same subject – perhaps this is, in some ways, analogous to our subjective experience of time. Human consciousness is not the simple phenomena of Plato’s undivided soul, but consciousness itself seems to have parts and relations within itself. I suspect that our subjective experience of time is more the result of how our brain organizes and interprets information than it is anything to do with the metaphysical reality that under girds our experience.

Bottom line for me is that I think a B theory of time is simpler and that it can adequately account for all the available data. An A theory of time would require us to postulate some sort of metaphysically privileged reference frame which our best theories in physics tell us there is no way to detect. I think it is clear which way Occam’s razor swings with respect to this issue.

God Bless,
Kenny

[joelkaki]

Sorry, this conversation has gone a little over my head. Would anyone care to explain what a "B theory of time" is? "A theory"?


Joel

[Kenny]

Today @ 06:07 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=76710#post76710)
joelkaki:

Sorry, this conversation has gone a little over my head. Would anyone care to explain what a "B theory of time" is? "A theory"?


Joel

An A theory of time maintains that only the present moment exists, the past no longer exists, and the future does not yet exist. On this theory, time flows from past to present to future. A B theory of time maintains that the past, present, and future all exist and the flow of time is merely a subjective illusion. Time itself is merely a static dimension along which events are arranged. In fact, words like ‘past,’ ‘present,’ and ‘future,’ on this theory, are strictly relative to the point in time in which the subject matter is being discussed. There is no ontologically privileged moment called the present. Five years ago is just as present to myself five years ago as today is present to myself today.

God Bless,
Kenny

[Theolog]

My approach is slightly different.

Time and space may come in many different flavors.

With the recent discovery of “black matter” and the theory that all so-called empty space is really filled with black matter, the idea of the singularity of all time and space, as we know it, becomes not only a possibility but also a probability.

If all that we know as time and space is in fact a single created event/object, then indeed all reality is written in stone and unchangeable, all that we perceive/cognize or precognize would be predetermined and our brain is simply cognizing the minute nature of this single event/object.

The conflict of free will arises when we attempt to rationalize our control of reality. Often our will is only an illusionary mental reality and not actual reality.

I find no comfort with the Monlinist, Open Theist or Deist prospect of arbitrary time and space, only an unsetteling chaos.

[Kenny]

Today @ 05:05 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=78506#post78506)
Theolog: With the recent discovery of “black matter” and the theory that all so-called empty space is really filled with black matter, the idea of the singularity of all time and space, as we know it, becomes not only a possibility but also a probability.

I’m not sure what you mean here. In these contexts, the term ‘singularity’ typically refers to the conditions at the center of a balck hole or the conditions present at the beginning of the universe in which our current physical theories break down. But, this doesn’t seem to be what you are referring to. Furthermore, I don’t see how the discovery of dark matter and dark energy impact the current discussion all that significantly, except for the fact that these discoveries are part of what is giving the lie to the view that the universe has a spherical type geometry (since dark energy is causing the universe to accelerate in its expansion rather than slow down and cave in on itself), as I mentioned earlier. Still, I see no impact here on whether or not an A theory or B theory of time is correct beyond the considerations already mentioned. But, while I do have some background in physics, I am no expert on cosmology, so perhaps you have something else in mind?

If all that we know as time and space is in fact a single created event/object, then indeed all reality is written in stone and unchangeable, all that we perceive/cognize or precognize would be predetermined and our brain is simply cognizing the minute nature of this single event/object.

That’s not immediately obvious. A B theory of time is logically compatible with the presence of indeterminate events.

The conflict of free will arises when we attempt to rationalize our control of reality. Often our will is only an illusionary mental reality and not actual reality.

Even as a Calvinist, I believe that there is a meaningful sense in which we can be said to have free will. Free will is a necessary prerequisite for moral responsibility. Christian theism is incoherent without it.

In Christ,
Kenny