Free will or p-zombies?

[citizenkyle]

I've been thinking about free will as of late, and I'd like to get some Christian feedback on the issue. First, a question: do non-human animals have free will? My understanding is that traditional Christian thought would answer in the negative, affirming that free will is a gift from God exclusive to humans.

But, clearly animals make choices. They assimilate sensory input, compare it against their programming (genetic and/or learned), and react accordingly. This is actually the exact same thing a robot does, and if animals lack free will they are nothing more than organic robots--with cells instead of circuits.

With that in mind, let's consider the chimpanzee. Chimps make decisions, exhibit a vast array of emotions, learn to use tools, form societies, make friends and enemies, etc. They appear to have free will, but presumably they do not, and are merely a complex organic robot.

Thus, given the great similarity in anatomy and behavior between humans and chimps, it seems that, in theory, God could create a p-zombie (a human without free will) and no one, including the p-zombie, would be able to tell the the difference.

If this is so, how do we know humans actually do have free will? What is the Biblical support for such a doctrine?

[Captain Ochre]

Yesterday @ 06:48 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=60457#post60457)
citizenkyle:

I've been thinking about free will as of late, and I'd like to get some Christian feedback on the issue. First, a question: do non-human animals have free will? My understanding is that traditional Christian thought would answer in the negative, affirming that free will is a gift from God exclusive to humans.


Hi, Kyle.
I don't think that there is a "Christian" position on animal wills. Free will is possible without a moral sense, but it is the moral sense that we refer to when we speak of "free will" in theology.


But, clearly animals make choices. They assimilate sensory input, compare it against their programming (genetic and/or learned), and react accordingly. This is actually the exact same thing a robot does, and if animals lack free will they are nothing more than organic robots--with cells instead of circuits.


I don't think that a robot analogy is the best way to emphasize that animals have free will--but maybe that's just me . . . :smile:


With that in mind, let's consider the chimpanzee. Chimps make decisions, exhibit a vast array of emotions, learn to use tools, form societies, make friends and enemies, etc. They appear to have free will, but presumably they do not, and are merely a complex organic robot.

Thus, given the great similarity in anatomy and behavior between humans and chimps, it seems that, in theory, God could create a p-zombie (a human without free will) and no one, including the p-zombie, would be able to tell the the difference.

If this is so, how do we know humans actually do have free will? What is the Biblical support for such a doctrine?

Empirically, you don't know whether or not humans have free will, though you might except yourself on the basis of subjective experience. We grant other humans the presumption of self-awareness and free will on the basis of induction (afaict!).
The Bible speaks frequently of humans making decisions for which they are morally culpable. That, in short, provides the basis for the Biblical foundation for free will.
Calvinists disagree to one extent or another, depending on the degree of Calvinism (Calvinist joke: What do you call a four-point Calvinist? Answer: An Arminian).

[citizenkyle]

Yesterday @ 11:48 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=61224#post61224)
Captain Ochre:
Hi, Kyle.
I don't think that there is a "Christian" position on animal wills. Free will is possible without a moral sense, but it is the moral sense that we refer to when we speak of "free will" in theology.

Can you elaborate on this distinction?

Yesterday @ 11:48 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=61224#post61224)
Captain Ochre:
I don't think that a robot analogy is the best way to emphasize that animals have free will--but maybe that's just me . . . :smile:

I don't think so either. I was arguing that animals do not have free will.

Yesterday @ 11:48 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=61224#post61224)
Captain Ochre:
The Bible speaks frequently of humans making decisions for which they are morally culpable. That, in short, provides the basis for the Biblical foundation for free will.

Morally culpable humans doesn't necessarily indicate free will. Alternatively, it could indicate a really mean God. :smile:

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 04:36 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=61726#post61726)
citizenkyle:



Can you elaborate on this distinction?


Sure. Suppose that you have a choice of two different trees to climb, and it is not better morally to climb one than to climb the other, yet you are able to make a choice between the two. Such a decision would be both free and morally neutral.


I don't think so either. I was arguing that animals do not have free will.


Sorry, your lead-in featuring the word "But" led me to believe otherwise.
My understanding is that traditional Christian thought would answer in the negative, affirming that free will is a gift from God exclusive to humans.

But, clearly animals make choices.


Morally culpable humans doesn't necessarily indicate free will.


It does if compatibilism isn't logically consistent.


Alternatively, it could indicate a really mean God. :smile:

A mean omnibenevolent God wouldn't be particularly logically consistent, either.

[citizenkyle]

Today @ 11:17 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=61770#post61770)
Captain Ochre:
Sure. Suppose that you have a choice of two different trees to climb, and it is not better morally to climb one than to climb the other, yet you are able to make a choice between the two. Such a decision would be both free and morally neutral.

But choices do not equal free will. A robot could choose between two trees to climb. Do you think my assessment of animals as organic robots is inavlid? If so, why?

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 07:00 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=61806#post61806)
citizenkyle:



But choices do not equal free will. A robot could choose between two trees to climb. Do you think my assessment of animals as organic robots is inavlid? If so, why?

It begs the question in terms of validity. You could be right, but simply supposing that animals correspond to robots doesn't establish anything.

[citizenkyle]

Today @ 12:36 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=61844#post61844)
Captain Ochre:
It begs the question in terms of validity. You could be right, but simply supposing that animals correspond to robots doesn't establish anything.

Here's the way I see it.
1. Robots do not have free will.
2. In terms of function and behavior I can find no definitive difference between animals and robots.
3. Thus, there is no reason to suppose animals have free will.
4. Humans are animals.
5. Thus, there is no reason to suppose humans have free will.

Now, I imagine Christians will object to (4) on the grounds that humans are qualitatively distinct from the other animals in the eyes of God. But, supposing you were an atheist and rejected the Bible, would you then object to my argument?

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 08:17 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=61882#post61882)
citizenkyle:



Here's the way I see it.
1. Robots do not have free will.
2. In terms of function and behavior I can find no definitive difference between animals and robots.
3. Thus, there is no reason to suppose animals have free will.
4. Humans are animals.
5. Thus, there is no reason to suppose humans have free will.

Now, I imagine Christians will object to (4) on the grounds that humans are qualitatively distinct from the other animals in the eyes of God. But, supposing you were an atheist and rejected the Bible, would you then object to my argument?

Sure, unless I was too biased to recognize that 2,3 is a fallacious argument from ignorance.
http://www.intrepidsoftware.com/fallacy/ig.htm
Your argument is reasonable (though not the least bit compelling) as an inductive argument--but that ignores the inductive argument that tries to reach the opposite conclusion.

[citizenkyle]

Yesterday @ 01:25 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=61889#post61889)
Captain Ochre:
Sure, unless I was too biased to recognize that 2,3 is a fallacious argument from ignorance.

You think so? If free will is completely unnecessary to explain the behavior of animals, why would you posit it?

Yesterday @ 01:25 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=61889#post61889)
Captain Ochre:
Your argument is reasonable (though not the least bit compelling) as an inductive argument--but that ignores the inductive argument that tries to reach the opposite conclusion.

How would that go?

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 05:13 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=63038#post63038)
citizenkyle:

You think so? If free will is completely unnecessary to explain the behavior of animals, why would you posit it?


Returning to the former part of your if/then, is free will completely unnecessary to explain the behavior of animals?
Your tentative proof doesn't establish that free will is completely unnecessary to explain the behavior of animals. It offers deterministic processes as a plausible possibility. As I said, this adds up to an inductive argument that's reasonable, and a deductive argument that's fallacious.


How would that go?

1) I have subjective evidence of free will, since my decisions appear to precede my actions. Moreover, consciousness should be a victim of an evolutionary Ockham's razor if consciousness is merely along for the ride rather than the very thing doing the steering. IOW, consciousness should be somewhat surprising if causal determinism is universal.
2) Animals exhibit behaviors analogous to my own, which allows a reasonable induction that animals have both consciousness & free will.

3) On the noetic front, universal causal determinism is death to rational thought (C. S. Lewis, The Abolition of Man), which leads to the absurdity of being programmed to think about whether or not you are programmed.

[citizenkyle]

Today @ 11:26 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=63113#post63113)
Captain Ochre:
Returning to the former part of your if/then, is free will completely unnecessary to explain the behavior of animals?
Your tentative proof doesn't establish that free will is completely unnecessary to explain the behavior of animals.

In what way is free will necessary to explain the behavior of animals?

Today @ 11:26 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=63113#post63113)
Captain Ochre:
1) I have subjective evidence of free will, since my decisions appear to precede my actions.

But this is not evidence of free will at all. A robot's decisions precede its actions as well. All that proves is that you make decisions, which was never in dispute.

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 08:32 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=63262#post63262)
citizenkyle:

In what way is free will necessary to explain the behavior of animals?


I don't know. Does that mean that you'll use argumentum ad ignorantiam on me, again?


But this is not evidence of free will at all.


Yes, it is evidence; it just isn't proof. O. J.'s blood at the murder scene is both evidence that O. J. was there, and evidence that somebody put O. J.'s blood at the scene (or, alternatively, made it look that way).


A robot's decisions precede its actions as well.


Is it not clear that I am talking about consciousness in conjunction with efficient causation? Is the robot conscious? Do we not have evidence that man-made robots function as they are designed to function, save for either mechanical failure or programming failure? Do robots constructed to build the latest Saturn SUV run around Sunset Boulevard trying to find a good cappucino?
If I scratched my nose, and then decided to scratch my nose, that would be evidence contrary to free will with respect to the initial scratching, don't you agree? That same evidence would be consistent with causal determinism (if we ignore the aspect of self-awareness, which should be a casualty of evolution).


All that proves is that you make decisions, which was never in dispute.

I'm explicitly reasoning inductively, which means that I'm not trying to prove anything (thus a claim that I haven't proven anything is a red herring). I'm making a probabilistic case for free will, based on the evidence. Just in case you missed it, you didn't prove anything either. You didn't admit that you were reasoning inductively, iirc.

[citizenkyle]

04-11-2003 @ 02:08 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=63294#post63294)
Captain Ochre:
Is it not clear that I am talking about consciousness in conjunction with efficient causation? Is the robot conscious? Do we not have evidence that man-made robots function as they are designed to function, save for either mechanical failure or programming failure?

Do we not have evidence that animals function in the same way? Ants, for instance, are clearly designed for certain duties as they carry out such duties from birth.

04-11-2003 @ 02:08 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=63294#post63294)
Captain Ochre:
If I scratched my nose, and then decided to scratch my nose, that would be evidence contrary to free will with respect to the initial scratching, don't you agree?

Not necessarily. Decision making is simply removed from the causal chain.

04-11-2003 @ 02:08 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=63294#post63294)
Captain Ochre:
That same evidence would be consistent with causal determinism

As is the reverse.

04-11-2003 @ 02:08 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=63294#post63294)
Captain Ochre:
(if we ignore the aspect of self-awareness, which should be a casualty of evolution).

For all we know, this is the case. I don't think insects are self-aware and they make up the vast bulk of animal life on earth. Big mammals may be a fringe exception.

04-11-2003 @ 02:08 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=63294#post63294)
Captain Ochre:
I'm explicitly reasoning inductively, which means that I'm not trying to prove anything (thus a claim that I haven't proven anything is a red herring). I'm making a probabilistic case for free will, based on the evidence. Just in case you missed it, you didn't prove anything either. You didn't admit that you were reasoning inductively, iirc.

You needn't consider my post so suspiciously. I wasn't trying to throw people off with a red herring, I was just speaking loosely. I understand that you are making a probabilistic case, as am I. And I'm not trying to hide the fact that I am reasoning inductively--I simply thought a declaration of the obvious was unneccesary.

[Captain Ochre]

Today @ 10:10 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=66682#post66682)
citizenkyle:

Do we not have evidence that animals function in the same way? Ants, for instance, are clearly designed for certain duties as they carry out such duties from birth.


We don't have conclusive evidence either way, Kyle.
Ants designed for certain duties? Who designed them for such duties? I wasn't expecting you to turn into a Design Advocate before my eyes. :wink:


Not necessarily. Decision making is simply removed from the causal chain.


An unbroken causal chain removes free decisionmaking from consideration in the first place (unless you're a Compatibilist). Please notice that I mentioned free will. I consider an unbroken causal chain incompatible with free will--don't you?


As is the reverse.


Obviously. So where does that leave us? :smile:


For all we know, this is the case.


If we know anything at all (iow if we're self-aware), then self-awareness isn't a casualty of evolution.


I don't think insects are self-aware and they make up the vast bulk of animal life on earth. Big mammals may be a fringe exception.


Could be, but I suggest that you examine the logic of your supposition. It's essentially another argument from ignorance. Rocks could be self-aware for all we know, but it's probably an unfalsifiable hypothesis.


You needn't consider my post so suspiciously. I wasn't trying to throw people off with a red herring, I was just speaking loosely. I understand that you are making a probabilistic case, as am I. And I'm not trying to hide the fact that I am reasoning inductively--I simply thought a declaration of the obvious was unneccesary.

It's not obviously inductive if you're trying to peddle your conclusion as a sound one, to be found true if the premisses are true. It certainly appeared to me that you were trying to push a conclusion stronger than that warranted by the evidence you provided.
Your evidences are inconclusive, and your appeal to Ockham's razor is of questionable validity. I haven't dealt with the latter issue comprehensively yet, however.
Ever read Swinburne?

[citizenkyle]

Yesterday @ 03:27 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=66702#post66702)
Captain Ochre:
We don't have conclusive evidence either way, Kyle.
Ants designed for certain duties? Who designed them for such duties? I wasn't expecting you to turn into a Design Advocate before my eyes. :wink:

On the contrary, my friend, I have always been a Design Advocate--just not intelligent design.

Yesterday @ 03:27 PM
Captain Ochre:
An unbroken causal chain removes free decisionmaking from consideration in the first place (unless you're a Compatibilist). Please notice that I mentioned free will. I consider an unbroken causal chain incompatible with free will--don't you?

I do indeed. Let me ask you this: what is the difference between free decision making and unfree decision making?

Yesterday @ 03:27 PM
Captain Ochre:
If we know anything at all (iow if we're self-aware), then self-awareness isn't a casualty of evolution.

Not always, anyway.

Yesterday @ 03:27 PM
Captain Ochre:
Could be, but I suggest that you examine the logic of your supposition. It's essentially another argument from ignorance. Rocks could be self-aware for all we know, but it's probably an unfalsifiable hypothesis.

It's not quite as bad as all that. We have good reason to think our self-awareness springs from the complexity of our brains. Thus, things with simple brains (or none at all) are unlikely to be self-aware.

Yesterday @ 03:27 PM
Captain Ochre:
Ever read Swinburne?

I must say that I have not. Got a recommendation?

[rlj51]

Hmmm don't animals choose from maybe a couple of options at most given a situation? Fight or flight? Come across a bear in the woods, it won't sit down and try to communicate with you by drawing pictures in the dirt, because it knows you both don't speak the same language.

Contrast that with humans. We do have instincts to guide us on things, but we can overide them. It seems like we have an infinate range of possibilities given any situation.

[citizenkyle]

Today @ 12:13 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=67899#post67899)
rlj51:
Contrast that with humans. We do have instincts to guide us on things, but we can overide them. It seems like we have an infinate range of possibilities given any situation.

I don't think the human range is anywhere near infinite. In fact, human behavior actually falls into relatively predictable patterns given all possible behaviors (hence fields such as sociology and psychology). Humans are clearly built for certain behaviors. That is why you will never see a human society patterned after an ant colony. Even if a radical group tried to mimic one, it would never catch on. It's not in the genes.

[rlj51]

Well what I am trying to point out is that humans can go against theire instincts if they so choose. We can reprogram ourselves, and we do it consciencely (<--not sure if I spelled that correctly). My instinct for instance may be to lash out in anger if someone wrongs me. However I can change myself so that I do not do that anymore, or at least stop myself when I feel the urge. I am not aware that animals have this ability. Not to mention the fact that I am thinking about the fact that I can change myself right now. Seems like a pretty big divide between us and the little critters in the forest. :teeth: