Benefit of the Doubt

[Peter Kirby]

"The benefit of the doubt is to be given to the document itself, and not arrogated by the critic to himself."

I bet you've seen this statement before. But is it true? What qualifications or prerequisites have to be met for the use of this principle? Is it used by historians today? Was it originally formulated by Aristotle, as usually claimed?

I think the quote is fascinating, so I punched it into a search engine. Guess what? I could not find this quote used in the context of any web site discussing secular history, legal evidence, scientific methodology, philology, or other fields. I could only find theological tracts using this dictum in defense of the Bible. Why is that? Is this truly a principle used by historians in general?

What does it mean to give a document the benefit of the doubt? Specifically, what does a document need to qualify for this treatment, and under what circumstances is the benefit of the doubt stretched beyond the breaking point? For example, in order to apply this principle, do we have to know the identity of the author of the document and his or her relationship to the events being narrated? Do we have to take account of the motives and genre of the writing? Could the principle be applied to the Bhagavad Gita, to the Koran, to Homer, to Tolkien, to Moby Dick, to the Book of Mormon, to a modern historian such as Michael Grant, or what--and with what results? And under what circumstances does "the benefit of the doubt" no longer hold? What if there are conflicting reports? What if the story is scientifically improbable?

I am extremely interested in seeing the content and context of the original statement of Aristotle, to whom the dictum is often attributed. Based on what I have seen, the phrasing at the top of the page seems to be a summary of Aristotle by John Warwick Montgomery in History and Christianity, p. 29. Does anyone have this book by Montgomery available? Could they check this page for us, pretty please? One site referred to Aristotle's Art of Poetry, 1460b-61b. I could not find anything resembling Montgomery's dictum in that section of Aristotle, which discusses (among other things) situations in which poetry may narrate the way things ought to be as well as how they are.

Is there anyone who can come to the defense of this dictum? What does it mean and how is it justified? (Or, if you disagree with it, what does it mean and why isn't it justified?)

best,
Peter Kirby

[Joseph Alward]

PETER KIRBY
"The benefit of the doubt is to be given to the document itself, and not arrogated by the critic to himself."

What does it mean and how is it justified?

JOE ALWARD
This dictum probably was intended to convey no more than that in any dispute over an ancient author's meaning, one should give precedence to the document: Let the document interpret the document. If the document is internally consistent, then we can be fairly confident that we know what message the author was trying to convey.

[Peter Kirby]

Then why is it usually invoked in defense of the accuracy of a writer's statement?

best,
Peter Kirby

[Blake Reas]

What does it mean to give a document the benefit of the doubt? Specifically, what does a document need to qualify for this treatment, and under what circumstances is the benefit of the doubt stretched beyond the breaking point? For example, in order to apply this principle, do we have to know the identity of the author of the document and his or her relationship to the events being narrated? Do we have to take account of the motives and genre of the writing? Could the principle be applied to the Bhagavad Gita, to the Koran, to Homer, to Tolkien, to Moby Dick, to the Book of Mormon, to a modern historian such as Michael Grant, or what--and with what results? And under what circumstances does "the benefit of the doubt" no longer hold? What if there are conflicting reports? What if the story is scientifically improbable?

I am a Christian and I do not believe this. Also I have not read it in many of the theological "tracts" as you call them written by Christians. I have read N.T. Wright, Robert Stein, D.A. Carson, F.F. Bruce etc. I have never seen them use this. I may have read over it but I do not remember them saying this. What "tracts" are you speaking of? I would like to read the articles.

I also like you site and wanted to tell you how good of a resource it is.:thumb:

By His Grace For His Glory,
Blake

[Joseph Alward]

PETER KIRBY
Then why is it usually invoked in defense of the accuracy of a writer's statement?

JOE ALWARD
Why is this dictum applied in a manner probably never intended by its author? Because if Aristotle's name is attached to it, credulous people are more likely to accept that the dictum can be applied the Bible's miracle accounts. As far as I know, it is mainly used by Christian literalists as an apologetic tool.

[Peter Kirby]

Today @ 05:03 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=65672#post65672)
Blake Reas:

I am a Christian and I do not believe this. Also I have not read it in many of the theological "tracts" as you call them written by Christians. I have read N.T. Wright, Robert Stein, D.A. Carson, F.F. Bruce etc. I have never seen them use this. I may have read over it but I do not remember them saying this. What "tracts" are you speaking of? I would like to read the articles.

I also like you site and wanted to tell you how good of a resource it is.:thumb:

Thank you very much; I am proud of the site and happy that people find it useful.

"Tract" was long ago shortened from "tractatus," or treatise, and refers to a relatively brief document written to promote a particular political or religious agenda.

I can find many examples on the internet.

http://answers.org/apologetics/contradictions.html
Another consideration to keep in mind as we study supposed discrepancies is often referred to as "Aristotle's Dictum," John Warwick Montgomery in History and Christianity (p. 29) summarizes his dictum as "the benefit of the doubt is to be given to the document itself, not arrogated by the critic to himself." In other words, the author probably knows more about the event than the critic does, and so we should allow him the benefit of the doubt unless we have clear evidence to the contrary.

http://www.simonpeter.com/spm/studies/whyitrustthebible.html
The internal evidence test addresses the internal consistency of a document. To completely validate a document, while it is good to validate that the manuscript has remained unchanged through the ages, it is also important to determine that the internal consistency and accuraccy of the manuscript is validated. One of the principles of testing the internal consistency of a manuscript is given to us by Aristotle: "The benefit of the doubt is to be given to the document itself, and not arrogated by the critic himself."

http://ghc.ctc.edu/ComputerServices/rwenke/TimberlineArchives/032197/opinions/bible.htm
Aristotle set a dictum when interpreting ancient literature." The benefit of the doubt is to be given to the document itself, not arrogated by the critic himself. One must listen to the claims of the document under analysis, and not assume fraud or error unless the author disqualified himself by contradictions or known factual inaccuracies." When read in this attitude the Bible proves itself absolutely reliable.

http://www.gospeloutreach.net/bible2.html
Literary critics apply Aristotle's dictum in all such cases of internal criticisms: "The benefit of the doubt is to be given to the document itself, and not arrogated by the critic to himself." [6] As John W. Montgomery summarizes: "One must listen to the claims of the document under analysis, and not assume fraud or error unless the author disqualified himself by contradictions or known factual inaccuracies." [7] In other words, the ability of the writer or witness to tell the truth is essential to determine credibility. Likewise, the proximity of the writer or witness both geographically and chronologically to the events recorded is also crucial to determining the reliability of the written record.

http://www.biblicaltheology.com/Research/MartinezR02.html
In order to determine whether the written record of the New Testament is credible or not, we need to examine the authorship behind the text. According to Aristotle, "The benefit of the doubt is to be given to the document itself, and not arrogated by the critic himself" (Montgomery, 29). In other words, we should objectively listen to the claims of the gospel writers apart from any preconceived bias attitudes we might have adopted from our culture or ancestors.

http://www.dtl.org/bible/treatise/what-30ad/part-1.htm
First, the writers assert to be writing literal history (Luke 3:1f). They claim to be either eye-witnesses of the events or to have received their information from eye-witnesses (Luke 1:1-4; John 19:35). In studies of other ancient documents, historians still abide by "Aristotle's dictum that the benefit of the doubt is to be given to the document itself." John Warwick Montgomery explains, "This means that one must listen to the claims of the document under analysis and not assume fraud or error unless the author disqualifies himself by contradictions or known factual inaccuracies" (Montgomery, p.29).

http://answering-islam.org/Campbell/s3c1.html
As Aristotle said in de Arte Poetica, 14606-14616, “the benefit of the doubt is to be given to the document itself, not arrogated [arrogantly taken] by the critic to himself.”

http://www.tiopan.com/~jonahs/luthhour/msg00018.html
Aristotle said the benefit of the doubt is to be given to the writer rather than someone else thousands of years later. Until he shows himself to be a charlatan, you first of all read the book as if it is what it claims to be. And in the same way, we read Matthew, Mark, Luke and John, first of all, to see what they claim. They could be wrong, but we've got to prove it.

Nor is this limited to the internet: the claim derives from printed books. For example, McDowell quotes in his apologetic compendium (Evidence that Demands a Verdict, vol. 1):


BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT

On this test John Warwick Montgomery writes that literary critics still follow Aristotle's dictum that "the benefit of the doubt is to be given to the document itself, not arrogated by the critic to himself." 64/29

Therefore, "one must list to the claims of the document under analysis, and not assume fraud or error unless the author disqualified himself by contradictions or known factual inaccuracies." 64/29

Horn amplifies this, saying: "Think for a moment about what needs to be demonstrated concerning a 'difficulty' in order to transfer it into the category of a valid argument against doctrine. Certainly much more is required than the mere appearance of a contradiction. First, we must be certain that we have correctly understood the passage, the sense in which it uses words or numbers. Second, that we possess all available knowledge in this matter. Third, that no further light can possibly be thrown on it by advancing konwledge, textual research, archaeology, etc.

"...Difficulties do not constitute objections," adds Robert Horn. "Unsolved problems are not of necessity errors. This is not to minimize the area of difficulty; it is to see it in perspective. Difficulties are to be grappled with and problems are to drive us to seek clearer light; but until such time as we have total and final light on any issue we are in no position to affirm, 'Here is a proven error, an unquestionable objection to an infallible Bible.' It is common knowledge that countless 'objections' have been fully resolved since this century began." 42/86,87

McDowell is usually derided, but to be fair to Josh most of his arguments are not original, so he is not solely responsible for the bad argumentation.

In this case the originating source seems to be John Warwick Montgomery's History and Christianity. It turns out that I have read this book before! However, I must have lost it or sold it, because I cleaned my room and did not find it. Hopefully some kind soul will give us the full citation from Montgomery.

Craig Blomberg also defends this approach. He writes:

"Once one accepts that the gospels reflect attempts to write reliable history or biography, however theological or stylized its presentation may be, then one must immediately recognize an important presupposition which guides most historians in their work. Unless there is good reason for believing otherwise one will assume that a given detail in the work of a particular historian is factual. This method places the burden of proof squarely on the person who would doubt the reliability of a given portion of the text. The alternative is to presume the text unreliable unless convincing evidence can be brought forward in support of it. While many critical scholars of the gospels adopt this latter method, it is wholly unjustified by the normal canons of historiography. Scholars who would consistently implement such a method when studying other ancient historical writing would find the corroborative data so insufficient that the vast majority of accepted history would have to be jettisoned." (The Historical Reliability of the Gospels, p. 240)

This dictum was brought to mind in an ongoing debate here. Farrell Till said, "Let's see you prove that the NT records are historically accurate." Spl_cadet replied, "Sorry, but benefit of the doubt is given to the document, not to the skeptic."

Is there a good justification and/or explanation for this (supposed) principle?

best,
Peter Kirby

[Blake Reas]

Peter,

Thanks for you lengthy response! That was helpful and now that you mention Blomberg's book I do remember reading that in there it has been about 2 or 3 years since i have read it!

By His Grace For His Glory
Blake

[Peter Kirby]

Today @ 05:04 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=65674#post65674)
Joseph Alward:

PETER KIRBY
Then why is it usually invoked in defense of the accuracy of a writer's statement?

JOE ALWARD
Why is this dictum applied in a manner probably never intended by its author? Because if Aristotle's name is attached to it, credulous people are more likely to accept that the dictum can be applied the Bible's miracle accounts. As far as I know, it is mainly used by Christian literalists as an apologetic tool.

Who is its author?

The furthest back that I have traced the dictum reliably is John Warwick Montgomery (History and Christianity, p. 29). Can anyone provide a proper cite of an older work with the idea?

Aristotle doesn't count until we can see his actual words, placed in context.

This site (http://www.gospeloutreach.net/bible2.html) referred to the Art of Poetry, 1460b-61b. Here is the passage from Perseus:

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?lookup=Aristot.+Poet.+1460a



[1460a]

...

Above all, Homer has taught the others the proper way of telling lies, [20] that is, by using a fallacy. When B is true if A is true, or B happens if A happens, people think that if B is true A must be true or happen. But that is false. Consequently if A be untrue but there be something else, B, which is necessarily true or happens if A is true, the proper thing to do is to posit B, for, knowing B to be true, our mind falsely infers that A is true also. This is an example from the Washing.3

What is convincing though impossible should always be preferred to what is possible and unconvincing. Stories should not be made up of inexplicable details; so far as possible there should be nothing inexplicable, or, if there is, it should lie outside the story--as, for instance, Oedipus not knowing how Laius died--and not in the play; for example, in the Electra the news of the Pythian games,4 or in the Mysians the man who came from Tegea to Mysia without speaking.5 To say that the plot would otherwise have been ruined is ridiculous. One should not in the first instance construct such a plot, and if a poet does write thus, and there seems to be a more reasonable way of treating the incident, then it is positively absurd. Even in the Odyssey the inexplicable elements in the story of his landing6 would obviously have been intolerable, had they been written by an inferior poet.

[1460b][1] As it is, Homer conceals the absurdity by the charm of all his other merits.

The diction should be elaborated only in the "idle" parts which do not reveal character or thought.1 Too brilliant diction frustrates its own object by diverting attention from the portrayal of character and thought.

With regard to problems,2 and the various solutions of them, how many kinds there are, and the nature of each kind, all will be clear if we look at them like this. Since the poet represents life, as a painter does or any other maker of likenesses, he must always represent one of three things--either things as they were or are; or things as they are said and seem to be; or things as they should be. These are expressed in diction with or without rare words and metaphors, there being many modifications of diction, all of which we allow the poet to use. Moreover, the standard of what is correct is not the same in the art of poetry as it is in the art of social conduct or any other art. In the actual art of poetry there are two kinds of errors, essential and accidental. If a man meant to represent something and failed through incapacity, that is an essential error. But if his error is due to his original conception being wrong and his portraying, for example, a horse advancing both its right legs, that is then a technical error in some special branch of knowledge, [20] in medicine, say, or whatever it may be; or else some sort of impossibility has been portrayed, but that is not an essential error. These considerations must, then, be kept in view in meeting the charges contained in these objections.

Let us first take the charges against the art of poetry itself. If an impossibility has been portrayed, an error has been made. But it is justifiable if the poet thus achieves the object of poetry--what that is has been already stated--and makes that part or some other part of the poem more striking. The pursuit of Hector is an example of this.3 If, however, the object could have been achieved better or just as well without sacrifice of technical accuracy, then it is not justifiable, for, if possible, there should be no error at all in any part of the poem. Again one must ask of which kind is the error, is it an error in poetic art or a chance error in some other field? It is less of an error not to know that a female stag has no horns than to make a picture that is unrecognizable.

Next, supposing the charge is "That is not true," one can meet it by saying "But perhaps it ought to be," just as Sophocles said that he portrayed people as they ought to be and Euripides portrayed them as they are. If neither of these will do, then say, "Such is the tale"; for instance, tales about gods. Very likely there is no advantage in telling them, and they are not true either, but may well be what Xenophanes declared4 --all the same such is the tale.

[1461a][1] In another case, perhaps, there is no advantage but "such was the fact," e.g. the case of the arms, "Their spears erect on butt-spikes stood,"1 for that was then the custom, as it still is in Illyria.

As to the question whether anything that has been said or done is morally good or bad, this must be answered not merely by seeing whether what has actually been done or said is noble or base, but by taking into consideration also the man who did or said it, and seeing to whom he did or said it, and when and for whom and for what reason; for example, to secure a greater good or to avoid a greater evil.

Some objections may be met by reference to the diction, for example, by pleading "rare word," e.g. ourêas men prôton, for perhaps he means not mules but sentinels.2 And Dolon, "One that was verily evil of form," it may be not his deformed body but his ugly face, for the Cretans use "fair-formed" for "fair-featured."3 And again "Livelier mix it" may mean not undiluted as for drunkards but quicker.4 Other expressions are metaphorical, for example: Then all the other immortals and men lay all night in slumber," while yet he says: "Yea, when indeed he gazed at the Trojan plain Agamemnon Marvelled at voices of flutes . . ." [20] "All" is used instead of "many" metaphorically, "all" being a species of "many."5 And again, "Alone unsharing "6 is metaphorical; the best known is called the only one.

By intonation also; for example, the solutions of Hippias of Thasos, his " didomen de hoi"7 and to men hou kataputhetai ombrôi8 ; and by punctuation; for example, the lines of Empedocles: Soon mortal grow they that aforetime learnt Immortal ways, and pure erstwhile commingled.9 Or again by ambiguity, e.g. parôichêken de pleô nux, where pleiô is ambiguous.10 Others according to the habitual use of the phrase, e.g. wine and water is called "wine" so you get the phrase "greaves of new-wrought tin";11 or workers in iron are called "braziers," and so Ganymede is said to pour wine for Zeus, though they do not drink wine. This last might however be metaphorical.12

Whenever a word seems to involve a contradiction, one should consider how many different meanings it might bear in the passage, e.g. in "There the bronzen shaft was stayed,"13 we should ask in how many ways "being stayed" might be taken, interpreting the passage in this sense or in that, and keeping as far as possible from the attitude which Glaucon14 describes

[1461b][1] when he says that people make some unwarrantable presupposition and having themselves given an adverse verdict proceed to argue from it, and if what they think the poet has said does not agree with their own preconceived ideas, they censure him, as if that was what he had said. This is what has happened in the case of Icarius.1 They assume that he was a Spartan and therefore find it odd that when Telemachus went to Sparta he did not meet him. But the truth may be, as the Cephallenians say, that Odysseus married a wife from their country and that the name was not Icarius but Icadius. So the objection is probably due to a mistake.

In general any "impossibility" may be defended by reference to the poetic effect or to the ideal or to current opinion. For poetic effect a convincing impossibility is preferable to that which is unconvincing though possible. It may be impossible that there should be such people as Zeuxis2 used to paint, but it would be better if there were; for the type should improve on the actual.

Popular tradition may be used to defend what seems irrational, and you can also say that sometimes it is not irrational, for it is likely that unlikely things should happen. Contradictions in terms must be examined in the same way as an opponent's refutations in argument, to see whether the poet refers to the same thing in the same relation and in the same sense, and has contradicted either what he expressly says himself or what an intelligent person would take to be his meaning. It is right, however, to censure both improbability and depravity where there is no necessity and no use is made of the improbability. [20] An example is Euripides' intro duction of Aegeus3 or(of depravity )the character of Menelans in the Orestes.

The censures they bring are of five kinds; that things are either impossible or irrational or harmful or inconsistent or contrary to artistic correctness. The solutions must be studied under the heads specified above, twelve in number.4

The question may be raised whether the epic or the tragic form of representation is the better. If the better is the less vulgar and the less vulgar is always that which appeals to the better audience, then obviously the art which makes its appeal to everybody is eminently vulgar.5 And indeed actors think the audience do not understand unless they put in something of their own, and so they strike all sorts of attitudes, as you see bad flute-players whirling about if they have to do "the Discus," or mauling the leader of the chorus when they are playing the "Scylla."6 So tragedy is something like what the older school of actors thought of their successors, for Mynniscus used to call Callippides "the monkey," because he overacted, and the same was said of Pindarus.7


Maybe John Warwick Montgomery was reading some other part of Aristotle? Anyone got page 29 from Montgomery's History and Christianity?

best,
Peter Kirby

[WinAce]

Hilarious consequences ensue when one asks some Christians if this "dictum" is warranted for works like the Iliad or Qu'ran. :D

[Joseph Alward]

JOE ALWARD
Peter, why does it matter who first said it?

[Peter Kirby]

Well, wouldn't that have bearing on the intent of its original author?

Also, there is a prestige value, or perhaps an Argumentum ad antiquitatem, to saying that the rule goes back to Aristotle. spl_cadet writes: "Benefit of the doubt is given to ancient documents. It’s been the rule for over two thousand years."

Of course, we can discuss what rules actually get at the truth best without knowing who first proposed these rules.

best,
Peter Kirby

[Joseph Alward]

JOE ALWARD
Peter, why does it matter who first said it?

PETER KIRBY
Well, wouldn't that have bearing on the intent of its original author?

Also, there is a prestige value, or perhaps an Argumentum ad antiquitatem, to saying that the rule goes back to Aristotle. spl_cadet writes: "Benefit of the doubt is given to ancient documents. It’s been the rule for over two thousand years."

Of course, we can discuss what rules actually get at the truth best without knowing who first proposed these rules.



JOE ALWARD
The intent of the author if of interest if we are interested in knowing more about that author, yes. But, as you noted, we don't need an Aristotle to tell us whether the dictum can be used to support miracle accounts; we know that it cannot. If it could, then Christians would have to accept the miracles in other religions.

[Peter Kirby]

Is there anyone who would like to defend the use of such a principle to justify believing a miracle account?

best,
Peter Kirby

[rlj51]

You know, I don't think Cadet meant quite that all ancient documents are automatically true. I think one of the things he was trying to point out was that we don't need things like other accounts from the same period, by eye-witnesses, who were totally disinterested and unbiased, who wrote down there story themselves and stamped it with their seal and signed their name, and everyone knows who they were, etc etc etc (what FTill was trying to say).

The Gospels were written as historical accounts, they name real places, and real people who lived. Compare this with say the Book of Mormon which names places that have no archeological evidence to support them. Or compare to "The magic kingdom of Landover" series by Terry Brooks. No one has ever found Landover. Or compare to a faarie tale that is obviously fictional the minute you start reading it.

Anyway I am rambling now. Is my point coming across at all?

:huh:

[spl_cadet]

Today @ 02:37 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=66712#post66712)
rlj51:

You know, I don't think Cadet meant quite that all ancient documents are automatically true. I think one of the things he was trying to point out was that we don't need things like other accounts from the same period, by eye-witnesses, who were totally disinterested and unbiased, who wrote down there story themselves and stamped it with their seal and signed their name, and everyone knows who they were, etc etc etc (what FTill was trying to say).

:thumb:

[Peter Kirby]

Yesterday @ 10:37 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=66712#post66712)
rlj51:

You know, I don't think Cadet meant quite that all ancient documents are automatically true.

I agree. So, what are the qualifications that have to be met before the benefit of the doubt applies?

best,
Peter Kirby

[rlj51]

Today @ 03:03 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=66983#post66983)
Peter Kirby:



I agree. So, what are the qualifications that have to be met before the benefit of the doubt applies?

best,
Peter Kirby

Not being an historian :huh: I am not sure exactly what the rule is. However I imagine that having a valid historical background, naming real people (i.e. Herod) and real places (i.e. Jeruselam) would be part of the criteria. If the document contradicted known history (i.e. Germany won WWII) that would definately warrant skepticism. A more relevant example might be say if we found a document that said that the Romans killed off all the Christians in the 1st century and Christianity died out. We would know that was false.

Anyone who actually knows about this stuff wanna tell me how I'm doing? :uhoh:

[Peter Kirby]

rlj51, thanks for your comments. Does anyone else have any ideas on when the benefit of the doubt applies?

best,
Peter Kirby

[WinAce]

It applies only when defending your cherished beliefs against the standards that you apply to the cherished beliefs of everyone else.

[johnransom]

04-13-2003 @ 08:16 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=65530#post65530)
Peter Kirby:

I am extremely interested in seeing the content and context of the original statement of Aristotle, to whom the dictum is often attributed. Based on what I have seen, the phrasing at the top of the page seems to be a summary of Aristotle by John Warwick Montgomery in History and Christianity, p. 29. Does anyone have this book by Montgomery available? Could they check this page for us, pretty please? One site referred to Aristotle's Art of Poetry, 1460b-61b. I could not find anything resembling Montgomery's dictum in that section of Aristotle, which discusses (among other things) situations in which poetry may narrate the way things ought to be as well as how they are.

04-13-2003 @ 10:48 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=65649#post65649)
Joseph Alward:
This dictum probably was intended to convey no more than that in any dispute over an ancient author's meaning, one should give precedence to the document: Let the document interpret the document. If the document is internally consistent, then we can be fairly confident that we know what message the author was trying to convey.
Joe's statement is perfectly in line with what Montgomery understood, because he goes on to state "This means that one must listen to the claims of the document under analysis, and not assume fraud or error unless the author disqualifies himself by contradictions or known factual inaccuracies." Moreover, I have only ever seen this used in defense of the internal evidence test, all of which is perfectly fitting.

As far as Aristotle's Poetics is concerned, there do seem to be some erroneous attributions, including the apparent assumption that Montgomery's restatement is itself in the original text. However, I did find the following two pieces which seem on point:

"The true mode of interpretation is the precise opposite of what Glaucon mentions. Critics, he says, jump at certain groundless conclusions; they pass adverse judgement and then proceed to reason on it; and, assuming that the poet has said whatever they happen to think, find fault if a thing is inconsistent with their own fancy."

and

"Things that sound contradictory should be examined by the same rules as in dialectical refutation - whether the same thing is meant, in the same relation, and in the same sense. We should therefore solve the question by reference to what the poet says himself, or to what is tacitly assumed by a person of intelligence."

There are volumes available on Aristotle's contributions to the development of historiography, should anyone feel brave enough to tackle these.

[Peter Kirby]

Yesterday @ 05:08 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=68826#post68826)
johnransom:

As far as Aristotle's Poetics is concerned, there do seem to be some erroneous attributions, including the apparent assumption that Montgomery's restatement is itself in the original text. However, I did find the following two pieces which seem on point:

"The true mode of interpretation is the precise opposite of what Glaucon mentions. Critics, he says, jump at certain groundless conclusions; they pass adverse judgement and then proceed to reason on it; and, assuming that the poet has said whatever they happen to think, find fault if a thing is inconsistent with their own fancy."

and

"Things that sound contradictory should be examined by the same rules as in dialectical refutation - whether the same thing is meant, in the same relation, and in the same sense. We should therefore solve the question by reference to what the poet says himself, or to what is tacitly assumed by a person of intelligence."

If what Aristotle is saying is that one shouldn't twist the meaning of what a poet says in order to make him sound stupid or contradictory, then I would agree with Aristotle.

But does the principle say that a writer is assumed to be correct unless there is proof to the contrary? What about a person who says, "The Virgin Birth is narrated in Matthew and Luke, so one rationally should believe that the Virgin Birth happened unless there is proof to the contrary." Is that justifiable?


Yesterday @ 05:08 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=68826#post68826)
johnransom:
There are volumes available on Aristotle's contributions to the development of historiography, should anyone feel brave enough to tackle these.

Sounds like fun. What are the titles?

best,
Peter Kirby

[johnransom]

Today @ 10:25 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=70386#post70386)
Peter Kirby:
If what Aristotle is saying is that one shouldn't twist the meaning of what a poet says in order to make him sound stupid or contradictory, then I would agree with Aristotle.
I don't think that's what Aristotle is saying at all. He appears to be saying that critics tend to approach a text with the assumption that their own preconceived notions are correct and attempt to force the text into agreement with those notions.


But does the principle say that a writer is assumed to be correct unless there is proof to the contrary?
I skipped over some stuff in between the two quotes, part of which was an example:

"The question about Icarius has been treated in this fashion. The critics imagine he was a Lacedaemonian. They think it strange, therefore, that Telemachus should not have met him when he went to Lacedaemon. But the Cephallenian story may perhaps be the true one. They allege that Odysseus took a wife from among themselves, and that her father was Icadius, not Icarius. It is merely a mistake, then, that gives plausibility to the objection."

This seems to bear out my point. The critic should check his preconceptions at the door.


What about a person who says, "The Virgin Birth is narrated in Matthew and Luke, so one rationally should believe that the Virgin Birth happened unless there is proof to the contrary." Is that justifiable?
Why not? The rest of what Aristotle said in between was this:

"In general, the impossible must be justified by reference to artistic requirements, or to the higher reality, or to received pinion. With respect to the requirements of art, a probable mpossibility is to be preferred to a thing improbable and yet possible. Again, it may be impossible that there should be men such as Zeuxis painted. 'Yes,' we say, 'but the impossible is the higher thing; for the ideal type must surpass the realty.' To justify the irrational, we appeal to what is commonly said to be. In addition to which, we urge that the irrational sometimes does not violate reason; just as 'it is probable that a thing may happen contrary to probability.'"

Difficult to follow, but Aristotle is saying, I think, that for artistic reasons, impossibilities are preferred to improbabilities, but that at the same time, improbability and unreasonableness should not be seen as disqualifiers.


Sounds like fun. What are the titles?
Well, you can search them out for yourself. bu the first one to come up in a Yahoo search was "Aristotle's Contribution to the Practice and Theory of Historiography : Howison Lecture, 1957" by one Kurt Von Fritz.

[Peter Kirby]

Today @ 05:32 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=70433#post70433)
johnransom:

I don't think that's what Aristotle is saying at all. He appears to be saying that critics tend to approach a text with the assumption that their own preconceived notions are correct and attempt to force the text into agreement with those notions.

I skipped over some stuff in between the two quotes, part of which was an example:

"The question about Icarius has been treated in this fashion. The critics imagine he was a Lacedaemonian. They think it strange, therefore, that Telemachus should not have met him when he went to Lacedaemon. But the Cephallenian story may perhaps be the true one. They allege that Odysseus took a wife from among themselves, and that her father was Icadius, not Icarius. It is merely a mistake, then, that gives plausibility to the objection."

This seems to bear out my point. The critic should check his preconceptions at the door.

Aristotle noted an example in which the critic made an assumption about the story that resulted in a contradiction, and Aristotle pointed out that there is an alternative interpretation that does not entail a contradiction. This sounds like what Joseph Alward intelligently stated, that the text should be used to interpret itself whenever possible. Aristotle is not saying that a text should be assumed to be historically accurate from the get go. Aristotle is defending poetry against indictment on artistic grounds.


Why not?

I guess that example does not appeal to someone who already believes in the virginal conception of Jesus. How about this? Josephus writes, "At the same festival also, a heifer [a young cow], as she was led by the high priest to be sacrificed, brought forth a lamb in the midst of the temple." (Wars 6.5.3) Do we give this the benefit of the doubt?


The rest of what Aristotle said in between was this:

"In general, the impossible must be justified by reference to artistic requirements, or to the higher reality, or to received pinion. With respect to the requirements of art, a probable impossibility is to be preferred to a thing improbable and yet possible. Again, it may be impossible that there should be men such as Zeuxis painted. 'Yes,' we say, 'but the impossible is the higher thing; for the ideal type must surpass the realty.' To justify the irrational, we appeal to what is commonly said to be. In addition to which, we urge that the irrational sometimes does not violate reason; just as 'it is probable that a thing may happen contrary to probability.'"

Difficult to follow, but Aristotle is saying, I think, that for artistic reasons, impossibilities are preferred to improbabilities, but that at the same time, improbability and unreasonableness should not be seen as disqualifiers.

Here is one person's comment on this passage: "In a famous passage, Aristotle admires Homer's capacity to lie and offers a sophisticated theory of fiction, arguing that poets should strive for 'probable impossibilities' rather than 'improbable possibilities' (63). One of Aristotle's examples of a probable impossibility is Odysseus's arrival in Ithaca while asleep. The suggestion seems to be that if a poet can successful establish a fabulous or uncanny series of events, we as readers will be more willing to suspend our disbelief than if the poet represented ordinary actions in a strained, unconvincing manner."

Aristotle is talking about Homer and the other poets, but let me update the example. A probable impossibility would be something that doesn't make physical sense but does make storybook sense or character sense, such as that people can travel at "warp speed" or that a ninja monk can dodge bullets. An improbable possibility would be something that makes physical sense but that doesn't make a good story or goes against character, such as if Kramer walked into Jerry's apartment like a normal person or if Hannibal Lecter didn't act creepy. Does that make sense?

Of course, this is talking about poetics, not historiography. Aristotle is not advising us to believe that impossible yet well-told stories are something other than fiction.

best,
Peter Kirby

[Peter Kirby]

I think we agree that we shouldn't assume every claim in every document to be true until there's proof to the contrary. Does anyone else have an explanation for when the benefit of the doubt applies?

best,
Peter Kirby

[Sheepdog]

04-14-2003 @ 12:29 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=66248#post66248)
WinAce:

Hilarious consequences ensue when one asks some Christians if this "dictum" is warranted for works like the Iliad or Qu'ran. :D

actually, not really. when one looks at the evidence, the Quran is shown to be an unhistorical document. (i.e. reports that Jesus wasn't crucified, when the the crucifixion is one of the most verifiable facts about Jesus-- even critical scholars and the Jesus Seminar believe He was crucified)

i thought Illiad was a fictional epic?

[Sheepdog]

04-15-2003 @ 10:11 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=68581#post68581)
WinAce:

It applies only when defending your cherished beliefs against the standards that you apply to the cherished beliefs of everyone else.


like evolution?

[WinAce]

The Qu'ran states that someone was placed on the cross instead of Jesus by divine vengeance magic. If you think history can tell us if and which god was responsible for a paranormal event, please do enlighten me on your methodology for distinguishing between an actual crucifixion and an illusory crucifixion.

For evolution, see the other forum.

[Pilgrim]

So has anyone ben able to find the actual statement in Aristotle?

[johnransom]

Today @ 12:07 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=72126#post72126)
Pilgrim:

So has anyone ben able to find the actual statement in Aristotle?
I take it that means you don't think the quotes I found are right?

[Steven]

"All scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness:
17. That the man of God may be perfect, throughly furnished unto all good works." 2 Tim. 3:16&17

One could look into a microscope to try to find the origins of creation of the world validated, and spend years trying to determine the amount of it's validity, or we as believers can open up the Word of god and trust that His inspiration is enough to test and approve what His good, perfect and pleasing will is. Simply, all articles and letters and posts should match up with the Word of God and if they do not, they are open for criticism. Even the Apostle Paul, whom we know to be sound in doctrine, was encouraged that the Bereans tested his every word by the Holy Scriptures, calling this act righteous.

This answer may be too simple for some, but that attitude is merely the result of relgiousness and the moving away from Scripture towards human acheivment/ self-rigtheousness.

Your dictum may wax poetic all day about other documents, books, etc, but the Bible is the Word of God.

Steven

[Woman]

My vote for the most lucid explanation here.

Peter Kirby:

Aristotle is talking about Homer and the other poets, but let me update the example. A probable impossibility would be something that doesn't make physical sense but does make storybook sense or character sense, such as that people can travel at "warp speed" or that a ninja monk can dodge bullets. An improbable possibility would be something that makes physical sense but that doesn't make a good story or goes against character, such as if Kramer walked into Jerry's apartment like a normal person or if Hannibal Lecter didn't act creepy. Does that make sense?

[Joseph Alward]

STEVEN
"All scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness: 17. That the man of God may be perfect, throughly furnished unto all good works." 2 Tim. 3:16&17

...the Bible is the Word of God

JOE ALWARD
Was the 2 Timothy 3:16-17 writer including his own words among those which are inspired by God? If so, then who testify that the Timothy writer's words are true?

If the writer was not including his own words among those that are inspired by God, then why should they be believed?

[Peter Kirby]

If you wish to assume that the Bible is literal truth on faith, that is your business. This thread is for those who are trying to do history and trying to figure out what would be reasonable applications of 'the benefit of the doubt'.

best,
Peter Kirby

[Pilgrim]

Today @ 02:25 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=72215#post72215)
johnransom:


I take it that means you don't think the quotes I found are right?

Maybe my eye skpped over somthing but I didn't see that exact statement in your quotes? What is the citiation for that statement?

[Peter Kirby]

If people appeal to this principle, why is nobody stepping up to explain what it means and defend its reasonableness?

I know that spl_cadet appealed to this principle in favor of the resurrection stories of the NT. Cadet, can you explain when 'the benefit of the doubt' justifies a person in believing a story to be accurate?

Or perhaps someone else is lurking who knows of some justification?

thanks,
Peter Kirby

[markg]

A foundational principle of Anglo-American democracy and law is that one is “innocent until proven guilty”. Burden of proof in our criminal legal system falls to the prosecution not to the defence. The question is, does such a principle have a bearing upon, or relevance to, the handling of historical claims? Does the application of a principle such as “benefit of the doubt” somehow undermines the whole foundation of objectivity and rational enquiry? There are, of course, other schools of Law. The Napoleonic Code, holds that the individual is guilty until proven innocent. This view is accepted in many parts of the world, but would you rather be tried under such a system or under the English common law one?

“… there are many I have met who believe that a similar law [guilty until proven innocent] exists in the realm of History. ‘Prove to me that they did…,’ is the usual way their challenge runs. At that point I usually give up on them, for clearly we have very different ideas about History.”
David W. Rickman

It is my view that iit is both commonsense and historical etiquette that claims not be pre-judged. Historian Edgar Rents notes in The Historical Method (Fortress, 1977, p 43): “Historical sources are like witnesses in a court of law; they must be interrogated and their answers evaluated".

In other words the normal means of historical investigation can and should be applied even to the New Testament documents. Is this method unable to result in the uncovering of “the truth” even resulting in the finding that the party may in fact be guilty, his case found wanting and unconvincing, when it has been fully set forth and all the evidence presented, interrogated and evaluated? If so, such a perspective would seem to be a very rigid and dogmatic outlook, a mirror image of the kind of religious dogmatism that “freethinkers” (sic) claim to be opposed to...

The bedrock of all historical research is primary sources. A primary source is usually defined as either "the direct [account] of an eyewitness of events" or "accounts secured by contemporaries from eye-witnesses”. [Allen Johnson, The Historian and Historical Evidence (1926; Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1965), p. 61]

In assessing the quality of a primary source, historians use the "time and place" rule of thumb. This says the closer in time and place a source and its creator were to an event in the past, the better the source will be. Thus better primary sources (starting with the most reliable) might include:

Direct traces of the event;

Accounts of the event, created at the time it occurred, by firsthand observers and participants;

Accounts of the event, created after the event occurred, by firsthand observers and participants;

Accounts of the event, created after the event occurred, by people who did not participate or witness the event, but who used interviews or evidence from the time of the event. (from the Library of Congress Learning Page website: The Historians' Sources).

David Hackett Fischer in "Historians’ Fallacies" states: "An historian must not merely provide good relevant evidence but the best relevant evidence. And the best relevant evidence, all things being equal, is evidence that is most nearly immediate to the event itself.

And Barzun and Graff, The Modern Researcher (Fourth edition, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985, p. 167 note:
"The value of a piece of testimony usually increases in proportion to the nearness in time and space between the witness and the events which he testifies. An eyewitness has a good chance of knowing what happened; a reporter distant from the event by only a few years has a better chance than one separated by a century.

Two very popular skeptical approaches to the historicity of the New Testament, particularly fondly used by Christ-mythers are based on claims about primary source evidence – or rather the lack of it. Both are fallacious as pointed out by no lesser authority than Hackett. The first is the fallacy of negative proof, an attempt to sustain a proposition merely by negative evidence.

[i]“[the fallacy of negative proof] occurs whenever a historian declares that ‘there is no evidence that X is the case,’ and then proceeds to affirm or assume that not-X is the case...He and every other reasoning being on this planet may know that not-X is the case. But a simple statement that ‘there is no evidence of X’ means precisely what it says - no evidence. The only correct empirical procedure is to find affirmative evidence of not-X - which is often difficult, but never in my experience impossible.” David Hackett Fischer, Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought (New York and Evanston: Harper and Row,1970), 47

A lack of evidence is just that, it is not proof for a counter-claim, and it is wrong to state otherwise. Hackett again:
"Evidence must always be affirmative. Negative evidence is a contradiction in terms - it is no evidence at all. The nonexistence of an object is established not by nonexistent evidence but by affirmative evidence of the fact that it did not, or could not exist." (above, p 62).

The second such fallacy, the fallacy of the possible proof consists in an attempt to demonstrate that a factual statement is false by establishing the possibility of its falsity.

"‘One of the greatest fallacies of evidence... is the disposition to dwell on the actual possibility of its being false; a possibility which must exist when it is not demonstrative. Counsel can bewilder juries in this way till they almost doubt their own senses.’ …Valid empirical proof requires not merely the establishment of possibility, but of probability. Moreover, it demands a balanced estimate of probabilities pro and con. If historians, like lawyers, must respect the doctrine of reasonable doubt, they must equally be able to recognize an unreasonable doubt when they see one.” Fischer, Historians' Fallacies, p53.

While primary sources are superior for obvious reasons much of what we know of ancient history is based on secondary sources, someone quoting or paraphrasing what someone else had to say. Such evidence is accepted because there is nothing better. Indeed to limit oneself to primary sources of the most immediate and direct kind does serious damage to historical reliability of the majority of ancient events and person.

Craig A.Gibson, in Interpreting a Classic: Demosthenes and His Ancient Commentators asserts:
“I …suggest that the burden of proof should be… on anyone who would assume that there is a necessary cause-and-effect relationship between an ancient commentary's … accuracy, or usefulness - or substitute any other word denoting its value to modern scholars - and its date, place, or social circumstances of composition. The scholars of late antiquity, it should go without saying, did not suffer from a mental disability caused by their spatial or temporal distance from Hellenistic Alexandria.”

This would seem to be a confirmation of the principle of “innocent until proven guilty”. Be that as it may, the centrality of primary sources is not in dispute even though historians of the ancient world often had to work with only secondary sources.

On the basis of the time and place principle the Biblical documents, of course, fare far better than any almost all other records of events from the same time frame of ancient history. They are closer in time, reliant upon eyewitness testimony, coming from several different sources and preserved in numerous and incredibly accurate manuscript copies.

N. Sherwin-White, Oxford historian writes in “Roman Society and Roman Law in the New Testament” Oxford, 1963. p107):
"It is astonishing that while Graeco-Roman historians have been growing in confidence, the 20th century study of the Gospel narratives, starting from no-less-promising material, has taken so gloomy a turn in the developments of form criticism... That the degree of confirmation in Graeco-Roman terms is less for the Gospels than for [The Book of] Acts is due... to the differences in their regional setting. As soon as Christ enters the Roman orbit in Jerusalem confirmation begins. For Acts, the confirmation of historicity is overwhelming."

And Stuhlmacher notes:
"As a Western Scripture scholar, I am inclined to doubt these
[Gospel] stories, but as a historian I am obliged to take them as
reliable." (Stuhlmacher P., "The Gospel and the Gospels", Eerdmans: Grand Rapids MI, 1991, in Bloesch D.G., "Holy Scripture", 1994, pp255,273).

Focussing particularly on the accounts of the empty tomb after Jesus’ resurrection the following comments should be noted.

Oxford Classical historian Michael Grant, writes, "If we apply the same criteria that we would apply to other ancient literary sources, the evidence is firm and plausible enough to necessitate the conclusion that the tomb was indeed found empty." (Michael Grant, Jesus: An Historian's Review of the Gospels (Scribners, 1977), p. 176.)

Paul Meier writes, "If all the evidence is weighed carefully and fairly, it is indeed justifiable, according to the canons of historical research, to conclude that [Jesus' tomb] was actually empty... And no shred of evidence has yet been discovered in literary sources, epigraphy, or archaeology that would disprove this statement."
(Paul Meier, "The Empty Tomb as History," Christianity Today 28/3/1975, p5)

The automatic dismissal of the possibility of any extraordinary or unusual event is a worldview presumption, it is not a historical principle. If you “know” the answer beforehand then you can hardly be considered an objective investigator of the historical evidence. I do not know whether “benefit of the doubt” is one of the canons of historiography but it certainly seems a fair thing to say that it should be.

There is no disputing that extraordinary and unusual events elicit skepticism both in the contemporary world and in the ancient world, and that includes the Biblical accounts – consider Joseph’s attitude when he heard of Mary’s pregnancy, “Doubting” Thomas’ demands to see with his own eyes and touch with his own hands the risen Jesus; the disciples themselves frequently surprised, skeptical and unbelieving of what they actually see. As for the study of history, good historians are skeptical but open, bad historians are dogmatic and closed-minded. There is a difference. And deciding on the answer before one investigates is hardly the mark of a good historian. Surely no one is advancing the argument that only dogmatic skeptics can truly judge the veracity or accuracy of a particular claim while dogmatic believers are always imprisoned by deception and falsehood? And that there is no mediating position between the extremes of naïve credulity and dogmatic skepticism?


Peter Kirby wrote in an earlier post:

So, what are the qualifications that have to be met before the benefit of the doubt applies?

This seems a rather illogical question. Benefit of the doubt/innocence until proven guilty is the starting point of enquiry; it is not something that occurs after certain qualifications have been met. One is not innocent until proven guilty only after one meets certain criteria, one just is…

If an individual chooses either to reject the historicity of the New Testament or to accept it as a valid source of historical information, this is a personal call based hopefully on honest investigation and examination of the relevant evidence, it is not an invitation to bludgeon those who have come to a different conclusion.

Ultimately historians can only arrive at probabilities; they cannot prove things one way or the other. Historians certainly cannot pronounce upon the meaning inherent in matters of faith or belief. No historian can “prove” the virgin birth or the resurrection or the deity of Christ, or, incidentally, that any particular non-controversial “ordinary” event actually occurred at a particular time and place. Historians can and do assert that it is most probable that a historical person such as Jesus existed and said and did a number of things which resulted in his execution by the Romans, but also that his tomb was plausibly empty and that a new and vital movement was born that believed this Jesus who had died had risen again to a new order of life. Whether one chooses to believe or disbelieve in the historical reality of any particular event is a personal choice based upon the presuppositions and assumptions that undergird one’s worldview. There is no way to replicate the past or to test it or to experiment upon it. Though it cannot be humanly avoided I think there is far too much dependence on the common informal fallacy of "chronological snobbery" - anything old is bad; anything new is good- a belief in the natural superiority of one's own contemporary worldview with the inevitable imposition of one's own philosophical presuppositions and assumptions onto those from a different era and outlook. In truth, things, events, people, testimony, and evidence are good or bad on their own merits, whether new or old.

Isn’t the real source of much antipathy towards Christianity based on a worldview supposition and an ideological position that says virgin births or resurrections from the dead cannot happen under any circumstances, anytime anywhere and therefore any reports of such events, no matter how reliably attested must be immediately dismissed out of hand? Is dismissing things out of hand before one investigates representative of good practice?

Markg

[markg]

"The benefit of the doubt is to be given to the document itself, and not arrogated by the critic to himself." J.W. Montgomery

According to Paul Conkin and Roland Stromberg in The Heritage and Challenge of History (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1971, p17) it was Cicero, who two millennia ago established the cardinal “laws” for historians:
"History's first law is that an author must not dare to tell anything but the truth; its second is that he must make bold to tell the whole truth."

I do believe that Montgomery’s comment is an accurate summation of a sound principle that, at the very least, is not invalid when used by historians in examining written documentary evidence. This is clarified by his elaboration:

"This means that one must listen to the claims of the document under analysis, and not assume fraud or error unless the author disqualifies himself by contradictions or known factual inaccuracies."

In fact I find it hard to believe that anyone, without a particular axe to grind, would object to the principle of listening to the claims of a document itself without prejudice. This is not a question of lack of skepticism. Historians are by their trade skeptics, but when biases are allowed to overrule a priori the witness of the original source, the historian is betraying the authentic voice of the original writer in favour of his own agenda.

One example involves the many quests for the “historical Jesus”, once infamously described as modern skeptical liberals gazing into a well and seeing their own reflection. Another example comes from Nietzsche in his book Beyond Good and Evil, where he raises the problem of the historian (or anyone else who considers a particular historical event) who puts so much of his own spin onto it that the actual event and it's actual facts are lost in the interpretation. Nietzsche uses the French Revolution, which he calls "that gruesome farce," as an example of an historical event that has been "contemplated from a distance and interpreted" for so long and by so many different people that it has "finally disappeared under the interpretation."

The contemporary skeptical naturalist dismisses the actions of God in human affairs; thus he refuses to let the evidence speak for itself. This approach could fairly be labeled as “bad historiography” - even if the majority of contemporary historians engage in it. One has every right to his convictions about the nature of reality and the relationship between the reality one experiences now in the present and reality as it was experienced at certain times and places in the past by others. But to dispute the accuracy of any particular historic event soley on the basis that one has nothing in one’s experience by which to compare such an occurrence is an abuse of the historian’s craft. N. T. Wright asserts that “the greater plausibility must derive, not from the background information [i.e. what the historian believes he knows] but from the specific evidence itself.” It should be the evidence that leads us to our conclusions, not our biases.

There is no denying the for moderns there are metaphyiscal and rational question marks about the person and works of Jesus and particularly about the resurrection. Historian Paul Barnett writes:
"Philosophically and scientifically there are problems with a resurrection, and I feel those as keenly as most. But I cannot escape the historical question. Did the resurrection happen or not? If it happened, it happened--and so much the worse for my dogmas." Is the New Testament Reliable: A Look at the Historical Evidence, IVP:1986, p. 172.

If it is untrue - a myth, a hoax, a fraud, a lie, a fantasy - then, as Paul the apostle himself wrote, less than 20 years after the event:

“...if Christ has not been raised, our preaching is useless and so is your faith. More than that, we are then found to be false witnesses about God, for we have testified about God that he raised Christ from the dead… if Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile; you are still in your sins. Then those also who have fallen asleep in Christ are lost. If only for this life we have hope in Christ, we are to be pitied more than all men.”

When Paul writes “We are then found to be false witnesses” he is issuing a challenge to critics and skeptics to test the veracity of his message. So crucial is the resurrection of Jesus that without it the whole Christian faith is exposed as nothing more than a house of cards that will come crumbling down. Paul is not making a theological statement but a historical one open to investigation by anyone who so chooses. The validity of the statement hinges upon the historicity of a particular event, the resurrection. Thus it is an open invitation to disprove the factuality of the profound and mysterious one-of-a-kind event that sparked the birth of Christianity. Paul makes no excuses - if this is not true, all is “useless” and “futile”, and “we are to be pitied more than all men.” Wright notes: "The fact that dead people do not ordinarily rise is itself part of early Christian belief, not an objection to it. The fact that Jesus' resurrection was, and remains, without analogy is not an objection to the early Christian claim. It is part of the claim itself.”

The principle of analogy says that how things happen in the present determines what we can say about how things happened in the past. This principle is much favoured by historical skeptics. For them miracles, supernatural events or divine intervention do not happen now, so they can never have happened at any time in the past. God is thus excluded a priori from any involvement in the course of history. Appeal is usually made to science for this refusal to even consider the miraculous as real historical events. However as skeptic Jeffery Jay Lowder notes in his article Independent Confirmation and the Historicity of Jesus (1997):

‘Cohen and Nagel argue that "the corroboration of an event by even a respectable number of independent witnesses will generally be held as of no account if the event is known to be contrary to the verifiable body of knowledge called science." However, this seems confused. Scientific data is always historical information by the time a scientist evaluates it, if for no other reason than there is a delay -- however small - between the time the scientist's sense organs observe the data and the time the sense-data is received by the brain. The upshot is that if one were to strictly follow Cohen's and Nagel's principle, it would not even be theoretically possible to overthrow current scientific theories, for the "verifiable body of knowledge called science" would be a priori immune to contrary findings. ’


Peter Kirby has written challenging the notion of “benefit of doubt":
But does the principle say that a writer is assumed to be correct unless there is proof to the contrary? What about a person who says, "The Virgin Birth is narrated in Matthew and Luke, so one rationally should believe that the Virgin Birth happened unless there is proof to the contrary." Is that justifiable?

And

How about this? Josephus writes, "At the same festival also, a heifer [a young cow], as she was led by the high priest to be sacrificed, brought forth a lamb in the midst of the temple." (Wars 6.5.3) Do we give this the benefit of the doubt?


Yes, why wouldn't one? Giving "benefit of the doubt" until further evidence is uncovered and investigation undertaken is hardly incompatible with a healthy skepticism. Extreme incredulity is no more inherently virtuous or useful than extreme credulity. Indeed both represent a mindset not conducive to honest and fair examination of a particular claim. Are you perhaps confusing the idea of “benefit of the doubt” with that of “burden of proof”?

It certainly is a common principle that "the burden of proof, for any historical assertion, always rests upon its author" (David Hackett Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies: Towards a Logic of History, Harper & Row, 1970. p63) But does not a burden of proof fall on the one who asserts “the New Testament documents are unreliable as historical sources” equally as much as the one who affirms the historical reliability of the New Testament? And does not the benefit of the doubt apply until the burden has been proved?

This involves what is known as the Criterion of Historical Presumption - in other words who has the burden of proof? Despite what one may think, there is nothing written in stone in historiography. History is at best an inexact science and the “Historical method” is far from perfect, even if it is the best tool available for understanding the past. There are general principles and guidelines but not rules. Different historians and schools of history take different approaches and have different emphases in relation to historiography, and to the understanding of history itself. Philosophers of history continue to debate what are the “rules” of historiography. Krentz notes: “historical method is anything but a carefully defined and agreed on set of axioms and presuppositions.” (Edgar Krentz, Historical-Critical Method, Fortress, 1975, p 61).

It no coincidence that atheists, and skeptics come down on the side of the burden of proof falling upon the document while Conservative Christian scholars come down on the side of the burden of proof falling to the critic. It is no surprise to find postmodernist and deconstructionist historians taking a different approach to Marxist historians, and so on. All historians, like all humans, have bias. There is no one exempt. Indeed the burden of proof issue often says more about the person examining a particular text than about the text itself. It often reveals the presuppositions and philosophical assumptions of the contemporary historian.

There is no hard and fast rule about historical presumption. V. A. Harvey writes: "The historian does not accept the authority of his witnesses; rather he confers authority upon them, and he does this only after subjecting them to a rigorous and skeptical cross examination" (Harvey, The Historian and the Believer Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966, p107).

But Louis Gottschalk counters: “a document should be assumed trustworthy unless, under burden of proof, it is shown to be unreliable.” (Gottschalk, Understanding History: A Primer of Historical Method, 2d ed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969, p 89)

Differences of opinion exist. In passing however I should note that, as Kant pointed out, a general presumption of lying is self-refuting, since if such a presumption is universalized (so one always assumes someone is lying), lying becomes pointless (as lying is meaningless without a general presumption of truth telling). Wayne Booth argues that "Abstract commands to ‘doubt pending proof’ [ought to be replaced] with [what is] the ancient and natural command to ‘assent pending disproof.’" [ Booth, Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent, University of Chicago Press, 1974, p.101.]

The point remains that historians can take opposite positions on burden of proof while still working with the same general criteria and principles. Jeff Lowder contends:

“Those who accept the empirical claims of a historical text bear the burden of proof just as much as those who assert their falsehood; in the absence of such proof we should suspend judgment. Empirical uncertainty thus forms the middle ground between the claim that empirical claims are certainly true and the claim that empirical claims are certainly false.”

But let me turn Lowder’s statement around, without altering the sense of it in any way, to better consider it in the light of the critcism put forward by Peter Kirby:
“Those who assert the falsehood of the empirical claims of a historical text bear the burden of proof just as much as those who accept the claims as reliable and accurate; in the absence of such proof we should suspend judgment. Empirical uncertainty thus forms the middle ground between the claim that empirical claims are certainly false and the claim that empirical claims are certainly true.”

What better describes the suspension of judgment than the principle of “innocent until proven guilty”? The presumption of innocence is both a courtesy and a foundation of our system of law and government.

The problem still remains that whole shelf loads of ancient history, which rest on only one source document - often a copy from many centuries later – cannot pass muster and would be dismissed as unreliable evidence. In reality, such sources are not treated this way. If critics of the concept of “innocent until proven guilty” or “benefit of the doubt” are saying that those following this principle cannot suspend judgment pending analysis and investigation they are wrong. One does not need to automatically invoke dogmatic skepticism until the burden of roof question is answered. If the above dictum is what Peter Kirby proposes then I am willing to agree with a proviso: Historians very rarely “suspend judgment” in practice. In fact the notion of suspending judgment, as outlined by Lowder is a dodge. The historian will gravitate to one or the other two options. Historians are not good at sitting on fences! Putting the burden of proof on the document fails to meet this standard.

Indeed the criterion of historical presumption is not even considered to be anywhere near the most important principle used in historical research - especially in the area of ancient history! In this context the words of Bart Ehrman are relevant:

“Historians obviously have to devise criteria for determining which sources can be trusted and which cannot – much as the jury in a murder trial must decide which of the witnesses called to the stand can be believed. In reconstructing any past event – whether an air disaster in 1930, a heresy trial in 1030, or a crucifixion in 30 – an ideal situation would be to have sources that (a) are numerous, so that they can be compared to one another (the more the better!); (b) derive from a time near the event itself, so that they were less likely to have been based on hearsay or legend; (c) were produced independently of one another, so that their authors were not in collusion; (d) do not contradict one another, so that one or more of them is not necessarily in error; (e) are internally consistent, so that they show a basic concern for reliability; and (f) are not biased towards the subject matter, so that they have not skewed their accounts to serve their own purposes” (Bart Ehrman, Jesus: Apocalyptic Prophet of the New Millennium, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp.85-86).

This is a much more realistic set of axioms for dealing with ancient history. Once again, according to these general historigraphical principles, the Gospels and other New Testament writings come out surprisingly well, much better than most other ancient documents whose validity and reliabity are not subject to the same degree of hyper-skepticism.


No one proposes that the gospels are devoid of a viewpoint or a bias. They are written for a particular purpose, to present a particular message. The writers of the gospels like all writers, and all humans have their own perspectives and agendas. This has never prevented people from imparting true and factual information about events and has never prevented historians from extracting such data from the sources.

Robert Stein, notes that "to assume the inauthenticity of the Gospel materials, unless proven otherwise, appears to be an extreme skepticism unwarranted both in the light of the various arguments [listed above] and a violation of a common courtesy every witness deserves. A witness should be presumed innocent until proven guilty" Robert H. Stein, "The 'Criteria' for Authenticity," in Gospel Perspectives: Studies of History and Tradition in the Four Gospels, ed. R. T. France and David Wenham (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1980), 247.

Noted atheist and skeptic Michael Shermer proclaims this self-same principle with regard to the Holocaust: "The burden of proof is on the Holocaust deniers to prove the Holocaust did not happen, not on Holocaust historians to prove that it did.” Michael Shermer, "Holocaust Revisionism and Pseudo-History: Does It Warrant Serious Skepticism," Skeptic, vol.2, No.2, p.22.

He thus charges Holocaust deniers with the burden of proof but he refuses to apply the same principle against Christ mythers and Jesus deniers. The fact that Shermer rightly attacks Holocaust deniers but is himself a a hyper-skeptic regarding Jesus Christ is very telling. No more clearer example of Shermer’s own bias, prejudice and presuppositions could be demonstrated.

Robert Jan Van Pelt points out another feature of Holocaust denial that eerily echoes the skeptics response to the New Testament witness to Jesus: “Holocaust deniers regularly and systematically dismiss whole categories of perfectly acceptable evidence by arguing in each particular case that another explanation of a selected pieces of evidence may be possible, ignoring the obvious explanation that is supported by other evidence.”


"It seems reasonable to assume that if a certain piece of evidence is not inherently improbable and was believed by the Romans themselves to be the truth, the burden of proof must lie with those who wish to disbelieve it" (T. J. Cornell `The Value of the Literary Tradition Concerning Archaic Rome', in Kurt A. Raaflaub (ed.), Social Struggles in Archaic Rome, Berkeley 1986, p64)

“We should never lose sight of the fact that the Romans of the later Republic thought they knew a great deal about their own history, a claim that would be very hard to understand if there were not some sound basis for it. It is difficult to imagine that the Romans were entirely mistaken about something to which they obviously attached great importance'” (1986. p63).

Finally skeptic Alan Griffiths in “Where did early Roman history come from?”, clearly recognizes the implication of allowing ancient documents to be accepted as “innocent until proven guilty” with the burden of proof falling upon the critic, and quickly passes by on the other side of the road!

“Let us leave aside the question of the relationship between subjectively perceived importance and historical truth, remarking in passing only that this principle would constitute powerful evidence for the historicity of Jesus Christ's resurrection from the dead.”

On that note I conclude.

[heyjoi]

Hello Peter Kirby
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Best Regards
Johann Helgason
baruk@internet.is

[Lili]

Heyjoi, this thread is from 2003. Peter Kirby might not even post here anymore.