reformed epistemology?

[rlj51]

I have just recently been introduced to this, and was wondering what you guys think of it? I am unsure as of yet. Here is a sample article written by Alvin Plantinga:

http://www.leaderu.com/truth/3truth02.html

[Peter Kirby]

I don't think that the key to explaining the differences between theists and atheists is that "one of yous ain't gots your head on straight," that is, defective mental equipment. There are just too many highly intelligent theists and too many highly intelligent atheists for that to be the main difference between the populations.

Rather, I think that the most important differences are nurturing, temperament, and experiences. Nurturing, as in, most Hindu households produce Hindu kids, most Islamic households produce Muslim kids, most Catholic households produce Catholic kids, most atheist households produce atheist kids, and so on. Temperament tweaks the last factor, in that some people are more likely to reject the beliefs of their parents. Also, some people are more likely to subject their beliefs to withering examination, while others are content to go with what is taught to them. Experiences, as in some people have had good relationships with people of a certain belief, as well as in how much someone enjoys spiritual practice.

If you read the last paragraph, you must by now realize that I don't think that most people take their stance on religion because of intellectual issues, and thus that having metaphysical beliefs of a certain type is not the result of bad mental equipment.

To answer Plantinga's question, when I think of the category of cognitive malfunction, I think it applies when a person has already decided to look at an issue from an intellectual standpoint, is aware of the relevant objective evidence and argumentation, and comes to a conclusion that does not follow from the evidenced premises.

best,
Peter Kirby

[Solly]

Today @ 09:38 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=70716#post70716)
Peter Kirby:
Rather, I think that the most important differences are nurturing, temperament, and experiences.

Nurturing, as in, most Hindu households produce Hindu kids, most Islamic households produce Muslim kids, most Catholic households produce Catholic kids, most atheist households produce atheist kids, and so on.

Temperament tweaks the last factor, in that some people are more likely to reject the beliefs of their parents.

Also, some people are more likely to subject their beliefs to withering examination, while others are content to go with what is taught to them.

Experiences, as in some people have had good relationships with people of a certain belief, as well as in how much someone enjoys spiritual practice.


Is this a case of having your cake and eating it Peter? :hrm: I think you covered every eventuality, and specified none. :lol: :thumb: So we might accept our beliefs because of nurturing, but because of nature we might reject them, or turn to something else. We might accept them through choice, but we might reject them through choice too.

*This is a friendly post*

[Peter Kirby]

Today @ 09:44 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=70719#post70719)
Solly:

Is this a case of having your cake and eating it Peter? :hrm: I think you covered every eventuality, and specified none. :lol: :thumb: So we might accept our beliefs because of nurturing, but because of nature we might reject them, or turn to something else. We might accept them through choice, but we might reject them through choice too.

*This is a friendly post*

I like friendly posts. :smile:

Yes, I am covering all the bases, because I don't think that there is a single explanation for why people are theists (or atheists), and so I try to give all the explanations that apply in reality. I even admit that, for some people, intellectual arguments hold sway, but I don't think that the division comes down to how well a person's brain is functioning. (Oh, I get it, I don't think that the division comes down to any one thing as a universal rule--but I guess that's messy reality for ya. :smile:)

best,
Peter Kirby

[Steven]

Scrolling down several pages of 'this is my biography' to get to the actual article, a thought occurred to me; anyone whose bio is longer or almost as long as their article probably does not speak for God as much as himself. What a revelation!

"For Christ sent me not to baptize, but to preach the gospel: not with wisdom of words, lest the cross of Christ should be made of none effect.
18. For the preaching of the cross is to them that perish foolishness; but unto us which are saved it is the power of God.
19. For it is written, I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and will bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent.
20. Where is the wise? where is the scribe? where is the disputer of this world? hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?
21. For after that in the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe." 1 corinth 1:17-21

- Steven

www.informationgospel.net

[jsolis]

04-19-2003 @ 11:05 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=73504#post73504)
Steven:

Scrolling down several pages of 'this is my biography' to get to the actual article, a thought occurred to me; anyone whose bio is longer or almost as long as their article probably does not speak for God as much as himself. What a revelation!

"For Christ sent me not to baptize, but to preach the gospel: not with wisdom of words, lest the cross of Christ should be made of none effect.
18. For the preaching of the cross is to them that perish foolishness; but unto us which are saved it is the power of God.
19. For it is written, I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and will bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent.
20. Where is the wise? where is the scribe? where is the disputer of this world? hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?
21. For after that in the wisdom of God the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe." 1 corinth 1:17-21

- Steven

www.informationgospel.net

Did we read the same article? Several pages of 'this is my bio'? A bio 'longer' or 'almost as long' as the article? At what point in his article did Dr. Plantinga claim, explicitly or implicitly, to be speaking for God?

Do you have, just out of curiosity, an answer to the question in the final paragraph of Plantinga's article? I wonder if you were so busy pretending to be more humble than Plantinga that you did not really attend to the matters he discussed. Normally, a response to an article ought not be little more than thinly veiled ad hominem.

The question is this: Is there anything outside of the human mind which can be held as a standard to which human thought must conform? Plantinga asserts that a human mind is functioning properly if it operates as intended by God. The question is how does an atheist know what a properly functioning human mind is? Plantinga may be arrogant and self-serving (I am sure you know more about that than I), but that does not (a) affect the truth-value of his argument or (b) answer his question.

J. Solis, F.J.

[jsolis]

04-17-2003 @ 09:38 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=70716#post70716)
Peter Kirby:

I don't think that the key to explaining the differences between theists and atheists is that "one of yous ain't gots your head on straight," that is, defective mental equipment. There are just too many highly intelligent theists and too many highly intelligent atheists for that to be the main difference between the populations.

Rather, I think that the most important differences are nurturing, temperament, and experiences. Nurturing, as in, most Hindu households produce Hindu kids, most Islamic households produce Muslim kids, most Catholic households produce Catholic kids, most atheist households produce atheist kids, and so on. Temperament tweaks the last factor, in that some people are more likely to reject the beliefs of their parents. Also, some people are more likely to subject their beliefs to withering examination, while others are content to go with what is taught to them. Experiences, as in some people have had good relationships with people of a certain belief, as well as in how much someone enjoys spiritual practice.

If you read the last paragraph, you must by now realize that I don't think that most people take their stance on religion because of intellectual issues, and thus that having metaphysical beliefs of a certain type is not the result of bad mental equipment.

To answer Plantinga's question, when I think of the category of cognitive malfunction, I think it applies when a person has already decided to look at an issue from an intellectual standpoint, is aware of the relevant objective evidence and argumentation, and comes to a conclusion that does not follow from the evidenced premises.

best,
Peter Kirby

The question is, recasting Plantinga if I may: Do we have something like an 'epistemological obligation' to accept conclusions only if they follow from "evidenced premises"? If we do not have this obligation then there is no such thing as "cognitive malfunction." If we do have this obligation, then how do we come by it? Do we have this obligation merely on your--or someone else's--say-so? Or is this obligation something for which you can offer "evidenced premises"?

Best to you,
J. Solis, F.J.

[b488]

Plantinga seems to be saying in the article that the atheist has no naturalistic account that explains adequately what is meant by the mind functioning properly. If this is the case, they do not have a clear standard by which they can say that a theists mind is cognitively dysfuntioning becuase they believe in a god 'without evidence'. He goes on to show that such questions do not belong in the realm of medicine or psychology but in philosophy/theology by pointing out one accepts what is rational in these matters primarily by what presuppositions one holds on a metaphysical level. And he points out that theists do have an account as to proper functioning (by having a right relationship to god) and why many do not possess it to a strong degree (via sin) This last point is more strongly made in other writings by P.

There seems to be a wide variety of events/things that we deal with on a daily basis for which we have no empirical evidence for: the existence of the external world, other minds, and the reality of the past. Yet we are not brought to our knees to inaction based on this dilemma. We accpet these things on a different basis. Why can not a belief in God operate on this other basis (a priori , 'common sense' (blech!) or whatever else one wishes to call it)?

Ciao! :thumb:

[Spiderman&Co.]

Scrolling down several pages of 'this is my biography' to get to the actual article, a thought occurred to me; anyone whose bio is longer or almost as long as their article probably does not speak for God as much as himself. What a revelation!

- Steven

www.informationgospel.net (http://www.informationgospel.net)


If you had paid attention you would have noticed that Plantinga did not write the biography, someone else did! But methinks you really just wanted to post a link to this informationgospel site you are so excited about. So, I thought I would reproduce it to try to get a few more hits for you! :badger:

[Spiderman&Co.]

I don't think that the key to explaining the differences between theists and atheists is that "one of yous ain't gots your head on straight," that is, defective mental equipment. There are just too many highly intelligent theists and too many highly intelligent atheists for that to be the main difference between the populations.

I actually think that you misread Plantinga, and I think, based on your post, that you have more in common w/ him than you may think.

For Plantinga, the idea of cognitive malfunction is not a purely "intellectual" thing. There are a wide variety of factors that can cause cognitive malfunction and one of these is sin, as Plantinga specifically identifies. Hence a cognitive malfunction may be due to our own falleness as the biblical text attests to.

[shunyadragon]

I have just recently been introduced to this, and was wondering what you guys think of it? I am unsure as of yet. Here is a sample article written by Alvin Plantinga:

http://www.leaderu.com/truth/3truth02.html

Cannot get this in China, can you send in to me or post it some how?

[shunyadragon]

I actually think that you misread Plantinga, and I think, based on your post, that you have more in common w/ him than you may think.

For Plantinga, the idea of cognitive malfunction is not a purely "intellectual" thing. There are a wide variety of factors that can cause cognitive malfunction and one of these is sin, as Plantinga specifically identifies. Hence a cognitive malfunction may be due to our own falleness as the biblical text attests to.

For it to be a convincing unbiased objective argument concerning 'cognative function' it should be independent of Christian presuppositions, such as the nature of sin and the Fall from the Christian perspective. This puts to much of a circular spin on it taking it back to a strictly Christian perspective. This would not be meaningful to an 'Outsider'.

[rmwilliamsjr]

Cannot get this in China, can you send in to me or post it some how?

done, so no one else sends a copy. reply if you get it ok.

[shunyadragon]

I have just recently been introduced to this, and was wondering what you guys think of it? I am unsure as of yet. Here is a sample article written by Alvin Plantinga:

http://www.leaderu.com/truth/3truth02.html

A thread based on this article would be more on the specific aspect of Alan Plantinga's concept of Warrant, rational vs. irrational belief, or What is functioning properly concerning believing something with or without evidence.

Alan Planitinga in this article simply presents several scenarios for justification of belief as to whether evidence is required to believe in 'something'. He persents the Atheist/agnostic, naturalist or metaphysical materialist worldview that believes objective falsifiable evidence is needed to support a rational belief system, and proposes that it is irrational for people to believe in a God and a theistic belief system without objective evidence. Plantinga acknowledges that there is not any objective falsifiable evidence for God and the theistic worldview.


He sums up his conclusion that a person is not irrational and 'functioning properly' with this.

By way of conclusion: a natural way to understand such notions as rationality and irrationality is in terms of the proper functioning of the relevant cognitive equipment. Seen from this perspective, the question whether it is rational to believe in God without the evidential support of other propositions is really a metaphysical or theological dispute. The theist has an easy time explaining the notion of our cognitive equipment's functioning properly: our cognitive equipment functions properly when it functions in the way God designed it to function. The atheist evidential objector, however, owes us an account of this notion. What does he mean when he complains that the theist without evidence displays a cognitive defect of some sort? How does he understand the notion of cognitive malfunction?The main problem is his use of 'cognitive malfunction'. People are not cognatively malfunctioning when they use rational and irrational thinking, this is very normal and everybody is guilty of irrational thinking at one time or another and they are not malfunctioning, and often accuss others who we disagree with as being irrational, which does not amount to much of an argument either way.

The atheist doe not owe the theist anything for believing that not having any objective falsifiable evidence for a belief is irrational, this is simply how the atheist defines his or her belief. In fact this fits closely to one of the definitions used in the dictionary - based on clear, practical and scientific reasons.

I do not see any thing special about Plantinga's claim of 'Warrant'. It could very well apply to any religious belief that hold to beliefs that lack an objective falsifiable basis on the evidence, suchas Buddhism, Islam or Hinduism.

.

[Truthdigger]

I don't think that the key to explaining the differences between theists and atheists is that "one of yous ain't gots your head on straight," that is, defective mental equipment.

There is more to Reformed Epistemology than cognitive malfunction- we can also assign the wrong warrant in a given situation, hence the name "Warrant and Proper Function". So there are at least two factors that decide whether or not one's beliefs are correct-I'm sorry, you are misreading Plantinga.

[Truthdigger]

I do not see any thing special about Plantinga's claim of 'Warrant'. It could very well apply to any religious belief that hold to beliefs that lack an objective falsifiable basis on the evidence, suchas Buddhism, Islam or Hinduism.

He admits as much. However, one reason he chooses "warrant" over "justification" is the soteriological dimensions of the latter.

I would ask you, in light of what you said earlier, to provide an account of what it is to be functioning properly within a non-theistic (say, naturalist) universe. I know you don't fall into this category, but if you're defending them you should be able to provide an ample defense.

[Spiderman&Co.]

For it to be a convincing unbiased objective argument concerning 'cognative function' it should be independent of Christian presuppositions, such as the nature of sin and the Fall from the Christian perspective. This puts to much of a circular spin on it taking it back to a strictly Christian perspective. This would not be meaningful to an 'Outsider'.

You speak of both "convincing" and "meaningful." These are both subjective terms. Hence, if Plantinga's epistemology (and Christianity, in general) is true, then there is meaning even for those of another worldview.

When you speak of "meaning" you are trying to construe it strictly upon the intellectual foundations of a person's worldview. I would say that there is much knowledge that we gain independently of the "unbiased" argument that you are seeking. Examples are testimony, knowlegde of the outside world, memory, and our own existence, to name a few. These things have some objective means of verification, but most of us accept them as basic beliefs apart from evidential (or "objective") verification.

Similarly, I would say that the existence of the Christian God is rightfully accepted as a "basic" view in the same way that we accept memory, or the existence of other beings. This is part of Plantinga's point.

[Spiderman&Co.]

Alvin Planitinga in this article simply presents several scenarios for justification of belief as to whether evidence is required to believe in 'something'. He persents the Atheist/agnostic, naturalist or metaphysical materialist worldview that believes objective falsifiable evidence is needed to support a rational belief system, and proposes that it is irrational for people to believe in a God and a theistic belief system without objective evidence. Plantinga acknowledges that there is not any objective falsifiable evidence for God and the theistic worldview.

the emphasis is mine...

Can you provide a quote for the above bolded statement. I don't think you have understood Plantinga if you think he is saying that objective, falsifiable evidence for God and the theistic worldview does not exist! He has written literature on this topic!

See Plantinga's Two Dozen or so Arguments (http://www.homestead.com/philofreligion/files/Theisticarguments.html)


I'll try to send it to you via email a little later...

[shunyadragon]

[/b]

the emphasis is mine...

Can you provide a quote for the above bolded statement. I don't think you have understood Plantinga if you think he is saying that objective, falsifiable evidence for God and the theistic worldview does not exist! He has written literature on this topic!

See Plantinga's Two Dozen or so Arguments (http://www.homestead.com/philofreligion/files/Theisticarguments.html)


I'll try to send it to you via email a little later...

All through the paper he does not doubt the atheist claim that there is 'no [objective falsifiable] evidence', and no where in the paper does he object to this assertion by the atheists. He bases his rejection on the claim that this belief is irrational.

In the paper he says, basicaly the argument for God is not based on objective evidence demanded by the skeptics but '. . . the dispute here is ultimately ontological, or theological, or metaphysical; here we see the ontological and ultimately religious roots of epistemological discussions of rationality.'

I will checkout this reference, but what I would look at in this argument is whether Plantinga presents objective falsifiable 'evidence' for God or does he present an ontological, or theological, or metaphysical; here we see the ontological and ultimately religious roots of epistemological discussions of rationality.'

He also acknowledges to sides of the argument by saying the '. . . he [theist]may be inclined to see the shoe as on the other foot; he may be inclined to think of the atheist as the person who is suffering, in this way, from some illusion, from some noetic defect, from an unhappy, unfortunate, and unnatural condition with deplorable noetic consequences. He will see the atheist as somehow the victim of sin in the world- his own sin or the sin of others.

[shunyadragon]

You speak of both "convincing" and "meaningful." These are both subjective terms. Hence, if Plantinga's epistemology (and Christianity, in general) is true, then there is meaning even for those of another worldview.

When you speak of "meaning" you are trying to construe it strictly upon the intellectual foundations of a person's worldview. I would say that there is much knowledge that we gain independently of the "unbiased" argument that you are seeking. Examples are testimony, knowlegde of the outside world, memory, and our own existence, to name a few. These things have some objective means of verification, but most of us accept them as basic beliefs apart from evidential (or "objective") verification.

Similarly, I would say that the existence of the Christian God is rightfully accepted as a "basic" view in the same way that we accept memory, or the existence of other beings. This is part of Plantinga's point.

Actually I am not trying to construe these terms from an intellectual foundation. To a certain extent he is putting the cart before the horse, he is using Christian presuppositions, when trying to give an unbiased argument for a theistic God. Outsiders who do not believe, would not consider the Christian God as a "basic" view in the same way we accept memory. This would would only be an argument to confirm what one already believes if one is a Christian.

[Spiderman&Co.]

To a certain extent he is putting the cart before the horse, he is using Christian presuppositions, when trying to give an unbiased argument for a theistic God. Outsiders who do not believe, would not consider the Christian God as a "basic" view in the same way we accept memory. This would would only be an argument to confirm what one already believes if one is a Christian.

Can you cite an example of Plantinga using Christian presuppositions and trying to give an unbiased argument for a theistic god?

Plantinga always seems to identify the presuppositions that he uses when he is constructing an argument. But the beauty of his epistemology is recognizing that we can have knowledge outside of having an argument to support it.

[shunyadragon]

See Plantinga's Two Dozen or so Arguments (http://www.homestead.com/philofreligion/files/Theisticarguments.html)


I'll try to send it to you via email a little later...

I still need this reference if you could send it to me.

[Griggsy]

Platinga's warrant for God is off base,because unllike the evidence of our senses, other minds and such, it is not evident at all but the mere feeling that there is some super mind behind and beyond the cosmos.But as that is all there is, God would have to be immanent. As the ignostic-Ockham arguments show and the presumpton of naturalism, there is no need to posit God.
He would not make sense or He would have nothing to do, for the sake of argument.
Thanks Barry D. and Storico for putting me down as your buddy.

[Griggsy]

As Platinga begs the question, his argument is null.
Other minds etc. are to be taken at face value from experience.
We naturalists show up theistic arguments for Him and make our own against Him.That in itself shows He is not basic, no more than is Russell's teacup!