Ontological Proof of God

[Ishmael]

Norman Malcolm variation of Anselm:

1. If God does not exist, his existence is logically impossible.
2. If God does exist, his existence is logically necessary.
3. Hence, either God's existence is logically impossible or it is logically necessary.
4. If God's existence is logically impossible, then the concept of God is self-contradictory.
5. The concept of God is not self-contradictory.
6. Therefore, God's existence is logcically necessary.
7. Therefore, God esists.

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

The form appears valid, but how can we trust the veracity of 1 & 2 in the first place?

[Ishmael]

pereynol:
The form appears valid, but how can we trust the veracity of 1 & 2 in the first place?

1. Because God, by definition, is eternal and independent so he cannot come into being or be caused to come into being.

2. for the reason in point 1... and if he ceased to exist or came into being he would be limited and by definition God is unlimited.. even to OVers...

[Blake Reas]

pereynol:
The form appears valid, but how can we trust the veracity of 1 & 2 in the first place?

In the Presuppositionalist method the point is we must assume them. I think we are talking about the same thing. I may be wrong though if I am I would like a correction:help: !

In Christ,
Blake Reas

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

Calvinist,
For some crazy reason, recent posts are running off my computer screen so that I can't adjust to read everything....

But, the main difficulty with the ontological arg. is that it makes perhaps an illicit jump from the conceptual to the actual. The formulation above is better than that which Gaunilo attacked, but it still would be possible that that one could conceive of a deity so defined as a logical possibility, with all one's logical/conceptual ducks in a row, even if such a deity did not exist in the actual world. The question becomes, how do we get around this?

Do you remember how Plantinga posed the matter?

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

Blake,
Yes, that's another way of putting it! If we could collectively get around these things here on TW, our fame would be established!

[Blake Reas]

I think that is why the Transcendental Argument is so powerful! It is what gives the Ontological Argument it's truthfulness! You must assume a Christian view of truth for it to be true. The thing is Christianity has the only tools necessary to make sense of the world. Therefore we have every right to believe in 1 & 2 the argument is valid.

In Christ,
Blake Reas;)

[Ishmael]

pereynol:
Calvinist,
For some crazy reason, recent posts are running off my computer screen so that I can't adjust to read everything....

But, the main difficulty with the ontological arg. is that it makes perhaps an illicit jump from the conceptual to the actual. The formulation above is better than that which Gaunilo attacked, but it still would be possible that that one could conceive of a deity so defined as a logical possibility, with all one's logical/conceptual ducks in a row, even if such a deity did not exist in the actual world. The question becomes, how do we get around this?

Do you remember how Plantinga posed the matter?

I am going to address this question once I wade through Plantinga's sea of Ontological Arguments.

[smilax]

What really makes the argument from non-contingency cool is the fact that not only must God exist in this world, but He must also exist in every single possible world.

The trick is that a non-contingent being cannot be possible but not necessary. If it were so, then there is some condition upon which that being's existence is contingent that determines whether that being exists or not. But as our Lord said, "I AM THAT I AM."

[Ishmael]

Calvinist:


I am going to address this question once I wade through Plantinga's sea of Ontological Arguments.

I am still working on Plantinga... I will address his thoughts on Ontology tomorrow night.

[Ishmael]

Look at him... look ye and fear the power of philosophy!

[Pate]

smilax:
What really makes the argument from non-contingency cool is the fact that not only must God exist in this world, but He must also exist in every single possible world.

The trick is that a non-contingent being cannot be possible but not necessary. If it were so, then there is some condition upon which that being's existence is contingent that determines whether that being exists or not. But as our Lord said, "I AM THAT I AM."

But this is exactly what makes the following objection possible:

1. If God's existence is logically necessary, then it should not be possible to conceive a possible world in which God doesn't exist.
Such a concept should be contradictory.
2. There is no logical contradiction in the concept of a world without God.
3. Therefore, God's existence is not logically necessary.


I believe there are ways to get around this problem, though.

[Pate]

Calvinist:
Look at him... look ye and fear the power of philosophy!

I wonder whether he looked like that before he became a philosopher, or has the intense study of philosophy made him look like that. ;)

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

Pate:


I wonder whether he looked like that before he became a philosopher, or has the intense study of philosophy made him look like that. ;)

I fear---the latter....

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

Calvinist,
Seeing your sig made me think of Thomas Merton's poem to his brother who died in battle---have you read it, by chance? It's pretty moving. (Sorry for the tangent.)

[Pate]

Pate:
I wonder whether he looked like that before he became a philosopher, or has the intense study of philosophy made him look like that.

pereynol:
I fear---the latter....

Yes, I'm afraid that you may be right. This is a problem that should not be overlooked. A friend of mine actually said that she almost converted to atheism when she saw a picture of Richard Dawkins. ;)

(I can't understand women. In my opinion, Dawkins looks just annoyingly arrogant in that picture. It can be found at the front page of http://www.world-of-dawkins.com/ )

I wonder if we Christians can offer something better than Plantinga in response. Isn't that our responsibility to our sisters in Christ? :)

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

Reminds me of Sting....:hrm:

[Ishmael]

pereynol:
Calvinist,
Seeing your sig made me think of Thomas Merton's poem to his brother who died in battle---have you read it, by chance? It's pretty moving. (Sorry for the tangent.)

No I am not familiar with Thomas Merton. Got a link?

[Ryokan]

dumb question, but what would make the concept of God self contradictory, and why isn't it.

[Ishmael]

Plantinga is the origin of the restatement of Malcolm in the logical schema. I had not known that originally because I had read about Malcolm's Onotological argument in a survey... :hrm:

Ryokan: Forget "self" contradictory and just think "contradictory"

--if it is possible for a necessary being to exist then it is necessary for it to exist
--God, is by definition, a necessary being
--to say that God does not exist is therefore contradictory

[johnransom]

Pate:
I wonder if we Christians can offer something better than Plantinga in response. Isn't that our responsibility to our sisters in Christ? :)

As a male (and therefore, I hasten to add, speaking academically), I would think that William Craig fits the bill. Ladies?

[johnransom]

Calvinist:
Norman Malcolm variation of Anselm:

1. If God does not exist, his existence is logically impossible.
2. If God does exist, his existence is logically necessary.
3. Hence, either God's existence is logically impossible or it is logically necessary.
4. If God's existence is logically impossible, then the concept of God is self-contradictory.
5. The concept of God is not self-contradictory.
6. Therefore, God's existence is logcically necessary.
7. Therefore, God esists.

Unlike pereynol, I don't see that the form is valid. I take issue with #1 and #4, especially. I don't see why the concept of God should be self-contradictory, regardless of the possibility of his existence. This appears to be an attempt to remove the ontology from the ontological argument.

[johnransom]

pereynol:
But, the main difficulty with the ontological arg. is that it makes perhaps an illicit jump from the conceptual to the actual. The formulation above is better than that which Gaunilo attacked, but it still would be possible that that one could conceive of a deity so defined as a logical possibility, with all one's logical/conceptual ducks in a row, even if such a deity did not exist in the actual world.

My understanding of the ontological argument is that it rests on the premiss that perfection cannot be perfect unless it is actual. Consequently, if one can conceive of perfection, then by definition perfection must exist. Thus the "illicit jump" does not exist.

However, I think the real problem with the argument is essentially that it seems like a logical trick. But most of the objections seem to me just as much word games as the argument itself (fussing over whether being is a predicate and such). I think that to clarify the argument, one might better state the premiss as "perfection cannot be perfect unless it is either potentially or already actual". I phrase it that way in order to fend off objections that it is quite feasible to conceive of a non-existent perfection. For example, I can conceive of a perfect square, but I have no idea whether anyone has ever drawn one. But it is easy to envision what a perfect square would look like. In the case of God, though, the definition excludes potentiality and so He must be actual.

[Ishmael]

johnransom:


Unlike pereynol, I don't see that the form is valid. I take issue with #1 and #4, especially. I don't see why the concept of God should be self-contradictory, regardless of the possibility of his existence. This appears to be an attempt to remove the ontology from the ontological argument.

You will have to explain how this removes the ontology from the argument... I don't see it at all.

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

Calvinist:


No I am not familiar with Thomas Merton. Got a link?

Hey Calvinist,
Sorry I didn't reply earlier as I am having some computer problems. I'll try to get you a link to Merton later. He was a trappist monk, pretty far removed from you doctrinally, but you'd probably appreciate his poem to his brother.

Also, I remain pretty convinced about the formal validity of the version of the ontological arg you posted. johnransom would have to translate the arg into symbolic form and reveal where he thinks the form fails for us to see his point. His objection about ontology doesn't appear formal....

[Pate]

johnransom:


As a male (and therefore, I hasten to add, speaking academically), I would think that William Craig fits the bill. Ladies?

Yes, it would be better to get comments from ladies on this one.

But this problem is not totally nonexistent for male Christians either. Can you name any female Christian scholar who looks better than Acharya S? ( http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0932813747/ref=lib_rd_ss_TBCV/104-8855320-0122328?v=glance&s=books&vi=reader&img=18#reader-link ) The quality of her work does not get anywhere near the level of her looks, though. :)

[johnransom]

Calvinist:


You will have to explain how this removes the ontology from the argument... I don't see it at all.

pereynol:


Also, I remain pretty convinced about the formal validity of the version of the ontological arg you posted. johnransom would have to translate the arg into symbolic form and reveal where he thinks the form fails for us to see his point. His objection about ontology doesn't appear formal....

Hmm, sorry I confused the issues. There are actually separate issues on form and premisses that I was referring to. The formal issue is that #1, #2 and #3 appear to establish a false dilemma. Symbolically (and I am not a trained logician, so bear with me):

1. If A, then Y.
2. If ~A, then Z.
3, Since either A or ~A, then either Y or Z.

The trouble is, Z is not ~Y. I do not see that impossibility and necessity are the sole choices. I certainly agree that #2 is correct, but I have a hard time with #1.

As for removing the ontology with #1 and #4, I meant that the argument has been recast as primarily an issue of logical contradiction, not one of necessary existence.

[Ishmael]

johnransom:
Hmm, sorry I confused the issues. There are actually separate issues on form and premisses that I was referring to. The formal issue is that #1, #2 and #3 appear to establish a false dilemma. Symbolically (and I am not a trained logician, so bear with me):

1. If A, then Y.
2. If ~A, then Z.
3, Since either A or ~A, then either Y or Z.

The trouble is, Z is not ~Y. I do not see that impossibility and necessity are the sole choices. I certainly agree that #2 is correct, but I have a hard time with #1.

1. If God does not exist, his existence is logically impossible.

Okay, let me restate the question:

If God does not exists, how could he logically exist?

The reason that your pure logical equation is breaking down is because you forget the first assumption: "necessary being."

So Z is not ~Y and it makes very little differnce to the "proof."



As for removing the ontology with #1 and #4, I meant that the argument has been recast as primarily an issue of logical contradiction, not one of necessary existence.

Anselm's ontological argument has always been an appeal to logic. He, after all, surmised that it is more perfect to exist than to not exist... based on the definition of the word "perfect." "Perfect" defined implies that to exist is more "prefect" than to "be" only imaginary. Therefore, the most perfect being "must" exist-by definition. So no matter how you formulate this argument, IMO, you in no way separate the "ontology," for an appeal to "being" is foundationally a logical appeal to your own being.

This particular formulation is a contemporary one which Plantinga adapted from Malcolm's similar "proof."

[flipper]

Yes, this logical argument is even ropier (mainly because quite a lot depends on definition and sophistry) than Zeno's paradox, which is a great illustration of how an impeccable application of rigorous logic can draw a conclusion that is completely unsupported in reality.

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

johnransom:




Hmm, sorry I confused the issues. There are actually separate issues on form and premisses that I was referring to. The formal issue is that #1, #2 and #3 appear to establish a false dilemma. Symbolically (and I am not a trained logician, so bear with me):

1. If A, then Y.
2. If ~A, then Z.
3, Since either A or ~A, then either Y or Z.

The trouble is, Z is not ~Y. I do not see that impossibility and necessity are the sole choices. I certainly agree that #2 is correct, but I have a hard time with #1.

I think that:
1.~G>I
2.G>N
should be translated as :
(~G>I)v(G>N)
The arg. progresses:
IvN
Then we have:
I>C
~C
------
~I by modus tollens

Then we reconsider:
IvN
~I
------
N

However, this doesn't work:
G>N
N
------
G because it affirms the consequent.

But:
~G>I
~I
------
~(~G) again, by modus tollens,
G seems to hold water.....


Any thoughts?


As for removing the ontology with #1 and #4, I meant that the argument has been recast as primarily an issue of logical contradiction, not one of necessary existence.

---which is to say, that by definition, or by tautology, or by means of making an analytic statement, that that which is perfect or necessary cannot not exist. I think, in the first instance, existence is taken to be a predicate of perfection, which is objectionable. But, in the second instance, what is by definition necessary must necessarily exist. Since the latter is a tautology, it is not vulnerable to the same objection as the former.

[johnransom]

pereynol:


I think that:
1.~G>I
2.G>N
should be translated as :
(~G>I)v(G>N)
The arg. progresses:
IvN
Then we have:
I>C
~C
------
~I by modus tollens

Then we reconsider:
IvN
~I
------
N

However, this doesn't work:
G>N
N
------
G because it affirms the consequent.

But:
~G>I
~I
------
~(~G) again, by modus tollens,
G seems to hold water.....


Any thoughts?
Doesn't this rather bear out my point? Namely, that impossibility and necessity do not constitute a valid dilemma.

[johnransom]

Calvinist:


1. If God does not exist, his existence is logically impossible.

Okay, let me restate the question:

If God does not exists, how could he logically exist?

The reason that your pure logical equation is breaking down is because you forget the first assumption: "necessary being."

? The argument as quoted contains no such premiss. The trouble here is that, if this is a recast of Anselm, then Malcolm's #1 has no place in it, because the founding premiss of Anselm's argument is that God is defined as the greatest conceivable being. As such, Anselm's argument precludes #1 as a nonsense.

As I see it, Malcolm's premiss can only be made if God is defined cosmologically, not ontologically. Therefore, as I suspected earlier, this is not an ontological argument.

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

John,
If something is absolutely necessary, then it simply cannot be impossible. Again, while one may well object to predicating existence of perfection, necessity and existence cannot be separated. If something is in fact necessary, then it must exist.

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

johnransom:


? The argument as quoted contains no such premiss. The trouble here is that, if this is a recast of Anselm, then Malcolm's #1 has no place in it, because the founding premiss of Anselm's argument is that God is defined as the greatest conceivable being. As such, Anselm's argument precludes #1 as a nonsense.

As I see it, Malcolm's premiss can only be made if God is defined cosmologically, not ontologically. Therefore, as I suspected earlier, this is not an ontological argument.


The above revsion of the ontological arg substitutes an argument from a necessary being for Anselm's original arg from a perfect being. The new version concludes existence via tautology, while Anselm's predicated existence of perfection.

Neither is a cosmological arg proper because neither begins with the world in order to establish a necessary being---as a cosmological arg would. The new version of the ontological arg assumes a necessary being, just as Anselm's assumed a perfect being. Nevertheless, as you seem to be saying, one could meaningfully found the premises of an ontological arg upon the conclusion of a cosmological arg; in other words, one could say that one's assumed necessary being in the premises of the ontological arg is derived from a cosmological arg. But that move in no way converts the ontological arg into a cosmological one; it merely links the two separate arguments together in a cumulative case succession within a foundationalist schema.

[Ishmael]

johnransom:


? The argument as quoted contains no such premiss. The trouble here is that, if this is a recast of Anselm, then Malcolm's #1 has no place in it, because the founding premiss of Anselm's argument is that God is defined as the greatest conceivable being. As such, Anselm's argument precludes #1 as a nonsense.

As I see it, Malcolm's premiss can only be made if God is defined cosmologically, not ontologically. Therefore, as I suspected earlier, this is not an ontological argument.

I went and looked up the critique on this logical schema and I see how you are saying that this is a cosmological argument now. Still, I disagree that this is a cosmological formulation.

The existence which the proof points to is only of God. "Necessary Being" is in relationship to everything that exists but we are precisely speaking of that Necessary Being defined. It is contradictory to speak of a "Necessary Being" which does not exist; therefore, one must either speak of the impossibility of Necessary Being or the Reality of Necessary Being.
An argument beyond the precise logical meaning of "necessary" to defend the logical impossiblity of "non-existence" will turn rapidly into a cosmological arument... I see that.

[Ishmael]

johnransom:

Doesn't this rather bear out my point? Namely, that impossibility and necessity do not constitute a valid dilemma.

No it doesn't. Pereynol has suggested what is a logical form which is valid.... "Either/Or" !

Either God's existence is necessary or impossible.

It is logically necessary to think of a necessary being as real:
Assumptions: more perfect to exist than not to exist--necessary by definition means "necessary"--more perfect is that the necessary being is actually necessary
1. A Necessary Being must be either (a) a necessary existence (b) a mere possible existence (c) an impossible existence.
2. An impossible existence would be a contraction. (non-contradition)
3. Nor can it be a mere possible existence, for such an existence would be (a) dependent. (b)fortuitous. (c)temporal. If God came to be, then he would be dependent, which is contrary to his independent or Necessary Being.
5. Necessarily, necessary being exists.
It is logically contradictory to concieve of a Necessary Being as a not necessarily having being.

[Brian]

Hello Guys!

I hope you don't mind me jumping in here. 1.~G>I
2.G>N
should be translated as :
(~G>I)v(G>N) I assume G represents, “God does exist.”
I assume N represents, “God’s existence is logically necessary.”
I assume I represents, “God’s existence is logically impossible.”

Statement #1 is then represented by: ~G-->I
Statement #2 is then represented by: G-->N

However, it has been asserted that Statements #1 and #2 could be represented by the tautology (~G-->I)v(G-->N). However, that is not how a proof with givens works. If I am given A and B, it is represented A+B. What our proof assumes is that statement #1 AND statement #2 are true, i.e. they are givens. This would be represented by (~G-->I)+(G-->N). This would read in plain English as, “If God does not exist, then God’s existence is logically impossible, AND, if God does exist, then God’s existence is logically necessary.” The other forumlations reads, "If God does not exist, then God’s existence is logically impossible, OR, if God does exist, then God’s existence is logically necessary." By introducing an OR here you are allowing for the possibility of either statement to be false while the other is true...a possibility the framers of this proof deny, i.e. they insisit #1 and #2 are true.

The proper formulation for statments #1 and #2 is (~G-->I)+(G-->N).

Sincerely,

Brian

[johnransom]

Calvinist:


No it doesn't. Pereynol has suggested what is a logical form which is valid.... "Either/Or" !

Either God's existence is necessary or impossible.

It is logically necessary to think of a necessary being as real:
Assumptions: more perfect to exist than not to exist--necessary by definition means "necessary"--more perfect is that the necessary being is actually necessary
1. A Necessary Being must be either (a) a necessary existence (b) a mere possible existence (c) an impossible existence.
2. An impossible existence would be a contraction. (non-contradition)
3. Nor can it be a mere possible existence, for such an existence would be (a) dependent. (b)fortuitous. (c)temporal. If God came to be, then he would be dependent, which is contrary to his independent or Necessary Being.
5. Necessarily, necessary being exists.
It is logically contradictory to concieve of a Necessary Being as a not necessarily having being.

I understand all of this, although I think it would be more accurate under #3 to say that a possible existence is either (a) and (c) or (b) and (c). Possibility does not necessarily imply dependency, but I am fairly sure it must imply temporality. I am also a little suspicious that there is some equivocation on the meaning of “necessary” (i.e., logically versus causally) in this argument – to state that “necessary means necessary” is not exactly helpful in this regard. Still, as I noted before - where is this assumption relating to a necessary being in the citation of Malcolm’s argument?

As to Malcolm’s argument again, if the assumption is using necessary in the causal sense, then it still seems to me that we have a cosmological argument in hand.

[johnransom]

Brian:
Hello Guys!

I hope you don't mind me jumping in here.I assume G represents, “God does exist.”
I assume N represents, “God’s existence is logically necessary.”
I assume I represents, “God’s existence is logically impossible.”

Statement #1 is then represented by: ~G-->I
Statement #2 is then represented by: G-->N

However, it has been asserted that Statements #1 and #2 could be represented by the tautology (~G-->I)v(G-->N). However, that is not how a proof with givens works. If I am given A and B, it is represented A+B. What our proof assumes is that statement #1 AND statement #2 are true, i.e. they are givens. This would be represented by (~G-->I)+(G-->N). This would read in plain English as, “If God does not exist, then God’s existence is logically impossible, AND, if God does exist, then God’s existence is logically necessary.” The other forumlations reads, "If God does not exist, then God’s existence is logically impossible, OR, if God does exist, then God’s existence is logically necessary." By introducing an OR here you are allowing for the possibility of either statement to be false while the other is true...a possibility the framers of this proof deny, i.e. they insisit #1 and #2 are true.

The proper formulation for statments #1 and #2 is (~G-->I)+(G-->N).

Sincerely,

Brian

Again, I'm an amateur here but surely this doesn't work because it reduces to I+N. But: I=~N. I think the whole thing might be better represented as:

1. G v ~G
2. G > N
3. ~G > I
4. Therefore N v I

Does this adequately resolve the conflict?

[Brian]

Hello Justranson!

(~G-->I)+(G-->N) does not reduce to I+N. That would require the truth value of of (~G-->I) to be equivalent to the truth value of I, and would require the truth value of of (G-->N) to be equivalent to the truth value of N. They are not equivalent.

Also, it does not necessarily follow that I is equivalent to ~N. I states that God’s existence is logically impossible. ~N states that God’s existence is not logically necessary. For these two statements to be equivalent you would have to argue that logical impossibility is the same as logical non-necessity. That would be a hard argument to make.

Once again, (A-->B) is not equivalent to B. I see no conflict. My point is that the forumlation of (~G-->I)v(G-->N) is wrong, and that it should be (~G-->I)+(G-->N).

Sincerely,

Brian

[johnransom]

Brian:
...it does not necessarily follow that I is equivalent to ~N. I states that God’s existence is logically impossible. ~N states that God’s existence is not logically necessary. For these two statements to be equivalent you would have to argue that logical impossibility is the same as logical non-necessity. That would be a hard argument to make...

Well, that's what I had originally said, but others in this thread are claiming that this is indeed the thrust of the argument. Unless I am really missing something...

[Ishmael]

I really think you guys are beinning to miss the point with this fanatical analyzation of the logical form...

I will restate the Ontological argument this afternoon for disection.

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

johnransom:


Well, that's what I had originally said, but others in this thread are claiming that this is indeed the thrust of the argument. Unless I am really missing something...

I don't think anybody asserted that Impossibility (of existence) is the equivalent of non-necessity, but it nevertheless remains true that, if a being is necessary, it would be impossible that such a being not exist....

[Brian]

Hello Everyone!

I am going to throw another wrench into the mix.:p

1. If God does not exist, his existence is logically impossible.
2. If God does exist, his existence is logically necessary.
3. Hence, either God's existence is logically impossible or it is logically necessary.

G=God does exist.
N=God’s existence is logically necessary.
I=God’s existence is logically impossible.

Statements 1 and 2: (~G-->I)+(G-->N)

Statement 3: (IvN) does not logically follow! Statement 3 should read [(~G-->I)+(G-->N)]-->(IvN), which is a tautology. This means that the truth-values of G, I, and N are irrelevant. The statement is true no matter what. However, the statement can not logically conclude (IvN).

Statement 3 (corrected): If 1 and 2, then God's existence is logically impossible or it is logically necessary. Once again, the formulation for this is [(~G-->I)+(G-->N)]-->(IvN), and not (IvN). There is a huge different between “If A, then B” and just “B”. You are wanting to conclude “B”, but you can’t according to traditional Aristotelian logic.

As to the statement: [(~G-->I)+(G-->N)]-->(IvN) being a tautology, the proving force is “zilch.” Here is a definition for Tautology: An empty or vacuous statement composed of simpler statements in a fashion that makes it logically true whether the simpler statements are factually true or false. The statement: (~G-->I)+(G-->N)-->(IvN) has the same “proving” force as (A-->A) or (Bv~B) or a myriad of other formulations. If the ontological proof necessarily depends on the conclusion of (uncorrected) 3 from statements 1 and 2, then the proof has been refuted.

Sincerely,

Brian
A Christian Who Loves the Theistic Proofs

[johnransom]

Brian:
Hello Everyone!

I am going to throw another wrench into the mix.:p

1. If God does not exist, his existence is logically impossible.
2. If God does exist, his existence is logically necessary.
3. Hence, either God's existence is logically impossible or it is logically necessary.

G=God does exist.
N=God’s existence is logically necessary.
I=God’s existence is logically impossible.

Statements 1 and 2: (~G-->I)+(G-->N)

Statement 3: (IvN) does not logically follow! Statement 3 should read [(~G-->I)+(G-->N)]-->(IvN), which is a tautology. This means that the truth-values of G, I, and N are irrelevant. The statement is true no matter what. However, the statement can not logically conclude (IvN).

Statement 3 (corrected): If 1 and 2, then God's existence is logically impossible or it is logically necessary. Once again, the formulation for this is [(~G-->I)+(G-->N)]-->(IvN), and not (IvN). There is a huge different between “If A, then B” and just “B”. You are wanting to conclude “B”, but you can’t according to traditional Aristotelian logic.

As to the statement: [(~G-->I)+(G-->N)]-->(IvN) being a tautology, the proving force is “zilch.” Here is a definition for Tautology: An empty or vacuous statement composed of simpler statements in a fashion that makes it logically true whether the simpler statements are factually true or false. The statement: (~G-->I)+(G-->N)-->(IvN) has the same “proving” force as (A-->A) or (Bv~B) or a myriad of other formulations. If the ontological proof necessarily depends on the conclusion of (uncorrected) 3 from statements 1 and 2, then the proof has been refuted.

Sincerely,

Brian
A Christian Who Loves the Theistic Proofs

Thanks! That's what I suspected all along, but lacked the formal logic to prove it!

[Ishmael]

Try this one:
Plantinga's final (maybe) argument:
Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity
1. Something has the property of maximal greatness if it has the property of maximal excellence in every possible world.
2. Maximal excellence entails omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection.
3. Maximal greatness is possibly exemplified.
4. There is a World (W) in which the essence (E) is such that E is exemplified in W and E entails maximal greatness in W.
5. For any object (X), if X exemplifies E, then X exemplifies maximal excellence in every possible world.
6. E entails the property of maximal excellence in every possible world.
7. If W had been actual, it would have been impossible that E would fail to be exemplified.
8. What is possible does not vary from world to world.
9. There exists a being that has maximal excellence in every world.
10. The being that has maximal excellence exists in the actual world.

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

Brian:
Hello Everyone!

I am going to throw another wrench into the mix.:p

1. If God does not exist, his existence is logically impossible.
2. If God does exist, his existence is logically necessary.
3. Hence, either God's existence is logically impossible or it is logically necessary.

G=God does exist.
N=God’s existence is logically necessary.
I=God’s existence is logically impossible.

Statements 1 and 2: (~G-->I)+(G-->N)

Statement 3: (IvN) does not logically follow! Statement 3 should read [(~G-->I)+(G-->N)]-->(IvN), which is a tautology. This means that the truth-values of G, I, and N are irrelevant. The statement is true no matter what. However, the statement can not logically conclude (IvN).

Statement 3 (corrected): If 1 and 2, then God's existence is logically impossible or it is logically necessary. Once again, the formulation for this is [(~G-->I)+(G-->N)]-->(IvN), and not (IvN). There is a huge different between “If A, then B” and just “B”. You are wanting to conclude “B”, but you can’t according to traditional Aristotelian logic.

As to the statement: [(~G-->I)+(G-->N)]-->(IvN) being a tautology, the proving force is “zilch.” Here is a definition for Tautology: An empty or vacuous statement composed of simpler statements in a fashion that makes it logically true whether the simpler statements are factually true or false. The statement: (~G-->I)+(G-->N)-->(IvN) has the same “proving” force as (A-->A) or (Bv~B) or a myriad of other formulations. If the ontological proof necessarily depends on the conclusion of (uncorrected) 3 from statements 1 and 2, then the proof has been refuted.

Sincerely,

Brian
A Christian Who Loves the Theistic Proofs

Well, there certainly are a number of balls in play here, and I'll have to take some time to consider them all. I initially thought you might be onto something, but after reading this, I'm not quite sure. Several considerations come to mind. First, apart from 3 serving as a conclusion, we simply have the beginnings of a simple Aristotelian dilemma; if 3 were a premise, there'd be a whole different story. I want to ask calvinist whether he's sure about the exact wording of the argument, as well as the source it was drawn from. Second, it is certain that Malcolm intended to assert IvN, and it is no doubt equally certain that he wished to assert ~GvG (obviously), whether these disjunctions were derived from 1 & 2 or not. Thirdly, with respect to the relation between 1 & 2, It might be possible that it could be formulated as an inclusive disjunction, while 3 could be an exclusive one. In any event, my initial take on the matter is that you're being overly hasty in declaring the arg "refuted." I'll take some time to examine it more rigorously, and if you do the same, we have at least some hope of getting to the bottom of things.

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

Calvinist:
I really think you guys are beinning to miss the point with this fanatical analyzation of the logical form...

I will restate the Ontological argument this afternoon for disection.

Hey Calvinist,
Thanks for putting up with us all! I want to ask, are you certain that the initial post contained Malcolm's exact wording? What published work did this arg come from?

And thanks for the Plantinga as well; I'm sure it'll receive due attention here!

[Brian]

Hello pereynol,

In any event, my initial take on the matter is that you're being overly hasty in declaring the arg "refuted."

The argument as stated is not correct. My "hasty" declaration is completely based on the stated argument. Statement 3 is simply wrong. Its seems to be the natural conclusion from 1 and 2, but in terms of logical accuracy, it is not. Also, if 3 were a premise, it is not obvious and is certainly inauthentic.

Your charge of me being overly hasty concerning my claim of refutting the ontological argument itself is justified. ;)

Thanks!

Brian

[Ishmael]

pereynol:


Hey Calvinist,
Thanks for putting up with us all! I want to ask, are you certain that the initial post contained Malcolm's exact wording? What published work did this arg come from?

And thanks for the Plantinga as well; I'm sure it'll receive due attention here!

I noted in another post that the originial was actually a Plantinga restatement of Malcolm in a logical schema. I had not known that originally because the author of the survey I drew it from did not mention that part about it... :argh:

[Ishmael]

pereynol:


Well, there certainly are a number of balls in play here, and I'll have to take some time to consider them all. I initially thought you might be onto something, but after reading this, I'm not quite sure. Several considerations come to mind. First, apart from 3 serving as a conclusion, we simply have the beginnings of a simple Aristotelian dilemma; if 3 were a premise, there'd be a whole different story. I want to ask calvinist whether he's sure about the exact wording of the argument, as well as the source it was drawn from. Second, it is certain that Malcolm intended to assert IvN, and it is no doubt equally certain that he wished to assert ~GvG (obviously), whether these disjunctions were derived from 1 & 2 or not. Thirdly, with respect to the relation between 1 & 2, It might be possible that it could be formulated as an inclusive disjunction, while 3 could be an exclusive one. In any event, my initial take on the matter is that you're being overly hasty in declaring the arg "refuted." I'll take some time to examine it more rigorously, and if you do the same, we have at least some hope of getting to the bottom of things.

This is Plantinga's original wording of Malcolm. Malcolm might take exception to the way it is formualted, however. I will come back to this and try to more acureately lay down Malcolms argument tonight.

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

Brian:
Hello pereynol,



The argument as stated is not correct. My "hasty" declaration is completely based on the stated argument. Statement 3 is simply wrong. Its seems to be the natural conclusion from 1 and 2, but in terms of logical accuracy, it is not. Also, if 3 were a premise, it is not obvious and is certainly inauthentic.

Your charge of me being overly hasty concerning my claim of refutting the ontological argument itself is justified. ;)

Thanks!

Brian

Actually, we could easily have:

(~G>I) . (G>N)
~G v G
therefore, I v N

Or, we could have:
(~G>I) . (G>N)
~I v ~N
therefore ~G v G

There are simply two hypothetical syllogisms here...

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

And the first syllogism above may hold the key to how we get 3 from 1 & 2....

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

Calvinist:


This is Plantinga's original wording of Malcolm. Malcolm might take exception to the way it is formualted, however. I will come back to this and try to more acureately lay down Malcolms argument tonight.

Thanks for your time and trouble, Calvinist. If Plantinga formulated or reformulated the arg, I'd say the chances that it contains a formal fallacy are scant....

[Ishmael]

pereynol:


Thanks for your time and trouble, Calvinist. If Plantinga formulated or reformulated the arg, I'd say the chances that it contains a formal fallacy are scant....

Most likely but Plantinga did not think that his restatement was valid based on the problem about dependence on a fundamentally cosmological argument.

The Plantinga "maximal" proof which I just posted is one that he considered to be valid.

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

Calvinist:


Most likely but Plantinga did not think that his restatement was valid based on the problem about dependence on a fundamentally cosmological argument.

Ah---so the combined insights of us all are indeed worth something. But did he consider this arg formally invalid?


The Plantinga "maximal" proof which I just posted is one that he considered to be valid.

Excellent.

[Ishmael]

pereynol:


Ah---so the combined insights of us all are indeed worth something. But did he consider this arg formally invalid?



Excellent.

I don't know. I will have to investigate.

[Brian]

Hello Guys!

(~G>I) . (G>N)
~G v G
therefore, I v N

I am not sure what you mean by ".". However, adding the tautology (~GvG) does nothing for the argument. For instance,


G ~G I N (~G-->I) (G-->N) [(~G-->I)+(G-->N)] (IvN)
T F T T T T T T
T F T F T F F T
T F F T T T T T
T F F F T F F F
F T T T T T T T
F T T F T T T T
F T F T F T F T
F T F F F T F F

[(~G-->I)+(G-->N)]-->(IvN) (Gv~G)
T T
T T
T T
T T
T T
T T
T T
T T
Now let's apply this (Gv~G) to statements 1 and 2...

[(~G-->I)+(G-->N)+(Gv~G)]
T
F
T
F
T
T
F
F Notice that the truth values for [(~G-->I)+(G-->N)] are identical to the truth values for [(~G-->I)+(G-->N)+(Gv~G)]. Tautologies as conjuntions do not help any proof along. The point is, you have not even got off the ground to prove anything when you conclude a tautology. As to forumlations of the proof, if statements 1,2 and 3 are worded correctly, then my analysis seems to be correct from a formal logic perspective.

Sincerely,

Brian

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

pereynol:


Actually, we could easily have:

(~G>I) . (G>N)
~G v G
therefore, I v N

Here, haven't we managed to conclude I v N from (~G>I) . (G>N) with recourse to ~G v G ? I don't see how you can deny this....

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

"." is a conjunction; if my keyboard would permit, it would be at the x-height rather than on the baseline like a period. How familiar with alternate symbols for the operators are you? You must be pulling my leg....;)

[Brian]

Hello pereynol!

I need you to define "." which you use in your equation for me to answer you. What do you mean by "."? By the way, I think you will find the answer contained in my truth tables. Nevertheless, let me know what "." means, and I will get back to you. Thanks!

Brian

Whoops! I just say your post. No, I am not pulling your leg. I have not seen "." for and before. Thanks! I will get back to you later.

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

Brian:
Hello Guys!
Notice that the truth values for [(~G-->I)+(G-->N)] are identical to the truth values for [(~G-->I)+(G-->N)+(Gv~G)]. Tautologies as conjuntions do not help any proof along. The point is, you have not even got off the ground to prove anything when you conclude a tautology. As to forumlations of the proof, if statements 1,2 and 3 are worded correctly, then my analysis seems to be correct from a formal logic perspective.

Sincerely,

Brian

Whats going on with :
(~G > I) . (G>N)
~G v G
------------------------
therefore I v N

is the same as:

~G>I
~G
--------
I MP

and

G>N
G
--------
N MP

A Constructive Dilemma....
The other example is similar, except it would be by MT. Earlier, you indicated that I v N could not arise from (~G > I) . (G>N). With the addition of ~G v G, it can, IMHO.

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

And here is a fully developed proof:

1.~G>I
2.G>N /IvN
3.GvI 1, Impl
4.IvG 3, Com
5.~I>G 4, Impl
6.~I>N 2,5, HS
7.~~IvN 6, Impl
8.IvN 7, DN

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

The above shows clearly how 3 can be derived from 1 & 2 (in Malcolm's original arg). Sorry about the spacing....

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

Going on, we have malcolm's original premises:
1.~GvI
2.GvN

And, having established (above) that:
3.IvN

We continue with Malcolm's
4.I>S
5.~S

4 & 5 become the premises of a MT, thus:
I>S
~S
-----
~I,

which, when combined with 3, above, gives:

IvN
~I
-----
N,

which becomes Malcolm's original 6:

6. N

The trouble arises in getting from here to Malcolm's 7:

Therefore, God exists.


Because, again, when we combine 2 & 6, we cannot construct a valid syllogism because we end up affirming the consequent. Yet, we can take Malcolm's original premise 2. G>N, and replace it with ~GvN (by the rule of material implication). Then, combining ~GvN with N (from Malcolm's 6, above), we can build a disjunctive syllogism, thus:

~GvN
N
--------
~~G

Then, by DN, we finally arrive at Malcolm's 7: G

Therefore, God exists.

[Brian]

Hello pereynol!

I have blundered badly, and you have been correct all along. Please forgive me. Here is the explanation if you care.

G ~G I N (~G-->I) (G-->N) [(~G-->I)+(G-->N)] [(~G-->I)+(G-->N)]-->(IvN)
T F T T T T T T
T F T F T F F T
T F F T T T T T
T F F F T F F T
F T T T T T T T
F T T F T T T T
F T F T F T F T
F T F F F T F TBecause the implication is a tautology, then the consequence is established as necessarily true. That is, because [(~G-->I)+(G-->N)]-->(IvN) is a tautology, then (IvN) necessarily follows. You don't need (Gv~G).

Take modus ponens for example.
A B A-->B (A-->B)+A [(A-->B)+A]-->B
T T T T T
T F F F T
F T T F T
F F T F TSince the formulation of MP ends in a tautology, then the consequence of the formulation is necessarily true, i.e. B. Please forgive me for sending you on this wild goose chase. I am embarrased!:bonk:

Sincerely,

Brian

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

Hey Brian,
Thanks for all the work you did; no need for embarrassment or apology as you made us all think harder and it helped tighten our mutual understanding. You did, after all, steer us in a better direction.

Have you looked at Plantinga yet? How are you at the modal stuff?

[Brian]

Hello pereynol,

Thanks for your graciousness! I read through Plantinga, and it was over my head. I do not know anything about "the modal stuff." What do you mean by that?

Thanks!

Brian

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

Plantinga's arg deals with predicate logic and modal logic, possible worlds, etc---an area in which he absolutely excels.
He made an earlier claim, in his God and Other Minds that the ontological arg failed on the grounds that it wouldn't compel the assent of the unbeliever. But since, he has abandoned that criterion and worked out a version of the ontological arg he deems valid and sound----probably the above version cited by Calvinist.

I'm heading out for a while---talk to you later, and thanks again!

[Tim Holt]

pereynol:
He made an earlier claim, in his God and Other Minds that the ontological arg failed on the grounds that it wouldn't compel the assent of the unbeliever. But since, he has abandoned that criterion and worked out a version of the ontological arg he deems valid and sound----probably the above version cited by Calvinist.

Could someone please confirm the reference for this? Thanks.

(By the way: hi everyone!)

[Dr. Jack Bauer]

Calvinist:
1. If God does not exist, his existence is logically impossible.
2. If God does exist, his existence is logically necessary.
3. Hence, either God's existence is logically impossible or it is logically necessary.
4. If God's existence is logically impossible, then the concept of God is self-contradictory.
5. The concept of God is not self-contradictory.
6. Therefore, God's existence is logically necessary.
7. Therefore, God esists.

You clarified in a later post by saying that God by definition cannot *go* out of existence. But the atheist does not say that God went out of existence. The atheist says there NEVER was a God. And so 1. really does not mean "his existence is logically impossible." It means "His COMING INTO BEING is logically impossible." And thus the argument seems to me to vanish, since 5 would need to change thus: "The concept of God's coming into being is not logically contradictory," and you've already said this is false.

Maybe I'm no philosopher, but I'm unable to see any improvement over Anselm here.

[Pate]

I touched on this subject before in this thread (from a little different angle), but I'll make this comment again, now using a modified version of the argument that Calvinist presented. Sorry if this point is already dealt with somewhere in this discussion. I only skimmed it through very quickly and carelessly.

It seems to be the case that there is some potential for an atheistic ontological argument:

1. If God does not exist, his existence is logically impossible.
2. If God does exist, his existence is logically necessary.
3. Hence, either God's existence is logically impossible or it is logically necessary.
4. If God's existence is logically necessary, then the concept of world without God is self-contradictory.
5. The concept of world without God is not self-contradictory.
6. Therefore, God's existence is logically impossible.
7. Therefore, God does not exists.

The OA is one of those theistic arguments that I haven't read very much about. So, maybe you can give some helpful comments on this.

It seems to be the case that unless this atheistic version of the argument is dealt with, the result is a stalemate between atheistic and theistic versions and we only can conclude on the basis of them that one of them can't be correct, but we can't say which one. Then it also follows that either the concept of God or the concept of universe without God is self-contradictory, though neither one of them gives an appearance of being such. Alternatively we may conclude that God is not a logically necessary being. I think that this is the position that Richard Swinburne holds to.

[Ishmael]

Dear Pate:
"2. If God does exist, his existence is logically necessary."
I am of the opinion that it is impossible to conceive of a reality where nothing exists. This is first order for me. I like to ask people to use their brains and describe it. My opinion is that one can give a positive affirmation to the possibility of "nothingness" but that they cannot actually conceive of it. This is the basis of necessary being.

I know that the criticism here is that the argument starts to degenerate from 'a priori' to a cosmological argument, namely, "if anything exists then there must be an initial cause." I can live with the criticism, though I do not believe that I am giving into a cosmological argument given that I am only speaking of a sense of "being."

Yet, all the "being" that we can perceive, must admit that "being" is not "being" in an of itself. All "being" we readily perceive has a beginning and an ending. So then, how can the universe exist if all we know to exist, exists contingent upon that "being" which existed before it.

So... I argue this proposition:
If Being is, then there must be "being" (before all other "being") which is non-contingent.
What I mean is: If "being" is (and it certainly is in the sense of 'I think, therefore, I am') then (and this is because we cannot conceive of "nothingness") there must be "being" which is non-contingent. ( If God does exist, his existence is logically necessary.")

Therefore, to argue the #1 of the proof, "If God does not exist, his existence is logically impossible," is to deny you own existence. Philosophically, this is possibly but not likely to persuade many.

[Satori]

Calvinist:
Norman Malcolm variation of Anselm:

1. If God does not exist, his existence is logically impossible.
2. If God does exist, his existence is logically necessary.
3. Hence, either God's existence is logically impossible or it is logically necessary.
4. If God's existence is logically impossible, then the concept of God is self-contradictory.
5. The concept of God is not self-contradictory.
6. Therefore, God's existence is logcically necessary.
7. Therefore, God esists.

This is the most ridiculous tangled web of meaningless conjecture I've ever read.

I'm amazed at the lengths some people will go to to self-delude.

No wonder you guys are so confused, if this nonsense is what passes for "logic" and "evidence", then you are in a sorry state indeed.

Oh boy, this is sad.

Satori

[Satori]

Cal, you are presuming the map is the territory, as is the limited theist mindset, and you have no reason to make that presumption.

Satori

[Ishmael]

Dear Satori:

I am not going to put up with your nonsense on this thread. This is a serious philosophical conversation. If you have something to contribute then be welcome, if not, then I will ask the moderator to delete your posts.

[Pilgrim]

Folks, try to keep your comments on topic and offer reasonable explinations of your criticisms. Otherwise the thread becomes hijacked and we don't want that now do we!

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

Satori:


This is the most ridiculous tangled web of meaningless conjecture I've ever read.

I'm amazed at the lengths some people will go to to self-delude.

No wonder you guys are so confused, if this nonsense is what passes for "logic" and "evidence", then you are in a sorry state indeed.

Oh boy, this is sad.

Satori

Norman Malcolm was a professor of philosophy at Cornell, a man of fine reputation, and the ontological argument has been a legitimate topic of philosohical discussion for nine hundred years. Alvin Plantinga's version, too, deserves due consideration rather than insubstantial heckling.

If you want to be taken at all seriously here, then squelch the rant and enter into the discussion with respect. The tenor of most of your posts so far has been flippant, and their substance is so deficient that they scarcely arouse interest. If you want our "best and brightest" to pay you heed, you'll have to at least rise to such a level as to warrant attention....

[Pilgrim]

Well said that!

[Pate]

02-20-2003 @ 02:01 PM
Calvinist:

Dear Pate:
"2. If God does exist, his existence is logically necessary."
I am of the opinion that it is impossible to conceive of a reality where nothing exists. This is first order for me. I like to ask people to use their brains and describe it. My opinion is that one can give a positive affirmation to the possibility of "nothingness" but that they cannot actually conceive of it. This is the basis of necessary being.

I agree with you that nothingness cannot be conceived, because there is nothing to conceive. :brow:



So... I argue this proposition:
If Being is, then there must be "being" (before all other "being") which is non-contingent.
What I mean is: If "being" is (and it certainly is in the sense of 'I think, therefore, I am') then (and this is because we cannot conceive of "nothingness") there must be "being" which is non-contingent. ( If God does exist, his existence is logically necessary.")

Therefore, to argue the #1 of the proof, "If God does not exist, his existence is logically impossible," is to deny you own existence. Philosophically, this is possibly but not likely to persuade many.

But someone could argue that there is and always has been "being", but this is just a "brute fact", not logically necessary.

[Ishmael]

But someone could argue that there is and always has been "being", but this is just a "brute fact", not logically necessary.

Someone could argue that "being" has always existed but this is not true about those things which we know from observation to to have being. We haven't always existed and we will cease to exist (at least physically).

The reason; therefore, that "being," which is non-contingent (unlike ourselves), is necessary flows from the fact that our "being" is not necessary; and yet, we exist. At some point in the distant past there must logically be some necessary being. To argue otherwise is to argue that "being" came into existence from "non-being."

[Pate]

02-24-2003 @ 09:22 PM
Calvinist:

But someone could argue that there is and always has been "being", but this is just a "brute fact", not logically necessary.

Someone could argue that "being" has always existed but this is not true about those things which we know from observation to to have being. We haven't always existed and we will cease to exist (at least physically).

The reason; therefore, that "being," which is non-contingent (unlike ourselves), is necessary flows from the fact that our "being" is not necessary; and yet, we exist. At some point in the distant past there must logically be some necessary being. To argue otherwise is to argue that "being" came into existence from "non-being."

Hmm... I suppose that you are talking about logically necessary being, and not for example "metaphysically necessary" in Swinburnean sense? Apparently you are, but I just thought to make sure that I've understood this correctly.

Is it really logically impossible that there would be a being which would in fact be eternal, but would not exist in every possible world? (And so its eternal existence in this actual world would be a "brute fact".)

Furthermore, some have even argued that a logically necessary being cannot cause anything contingent.

(Just examining the possible problems in the argument, not that I necessarily agree with all the objections that I've stated.)

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

Pate,

Though nearly all Christians will find the arg from aseity convincing, atheists don't seem to have any compunction about dodging it. I think your remarks about Swinburne are interesting, though it's been a few years since I've read him---mid '90's I think. However, I agree with Calvinist's observations about the apparent contingency of the physical universe, as well as the fact that cosmological contingency would undermine the soundness of constructing a reverse ontological arg implying the aseity of the world, if not the validity of such an arg. Of course, the soundness of the ontological arg proper is yet problematic to many.

IMHO, if one grasps the arg from aseity, it would hold true for every possible world, and if the universe is contingent, where should we go from there?

Like Swinburne, I tend to be a "culmulative caser" as far as the theistic args are concerned....

[Ishmael]

02-25-2003 @ 12:22 AM
Pate:
Hmm... I suppose that you are talking about logically necessary being, and not for example "metaphysically necessary" in Swinburnean sense? Apparently you are, but I just thought to make sure that I've understood this correctly.


Yes, logically necessary being.


Is it really logically impossible that there would be a being which would in fact be eternal, but would not exist in every possible world? (And so its eternal existence in this actual world would be a "brute fact".)


I would argue here that every possible world must have some contingency to it. Even if that contingency is only the "space" which the necessary being occupies.


Furthermore, some have even argued that a logically necessary being cannot cause anything contingent.


I would be interested in hearing this argument.


(Just examining the possible problems in the argument, not that I necessarily agree with all the objections that I've stated.)

:yipee:

[Pate]

02-25-2003 @ 12:37 PM
pereynol:
Like Swinburne, I tend to be a "culmulative caser" as far as the theistic args are concerned....

Yes, I agree that this is probably the most efficient approach to theistic evidence. I'm currently reading Swinburne's "The Existence of God". Swinburne has many important insights on the general methodology of building a theistic case, but occasionally there are also points that I can't help but to disagree strongly. I'd probably say that the most effective philosophical apologetics can be constructed when combining Swinburne's general approach with W. L. Craig's specific arguments. For example, Craig's version of the Kalam cosmological argument seems much stronger than the cosmological argument offered by Swinburne.

[Pate]

Pate:
Furthermore, some have even argued that a logically necessary being cannot cause anything contingent.

Calvinist:
I would be interested in hearing this argument.

At least Richard Swinburne makes this argument. (My comments have a large degree of Swinburnean influence right now because I'm currently reading his book.)

But I have to say that Swinburne's argument seems to be erroneous.

He writes in page 76 of "The Existence of God":

"I do not believe that there can be any absolute explanation of logically contingent phenomena. For surely never does anything explain itself. P's existence at t2 may be explained in art by P's existence at t1. But P's existence at t1 might be the ultimate brute fact about the universe, but it would not explain itself. Nor can anything logically necessary provide any explanation of anything logically contingent. For a full explanation is, we have seen, such that the explanandum (i.e. the phenomenon requiring explanation) is deducible from it. But you cannot deduce anything logically contingent from anything logically necessary. And a partial explanation is in terms of something which in the context made the occurrence of the [i]explanandum[/i} probable, without which things would probably have gone some other (logically possible) way. Yet a world in which some logically necessary truth did not hold is an incoherent supposition, not one in which things would probably have one some other way. These are among many reasons why it ust be held that God is a logically contingent being, although maybe one necessary in other ways."

But isn't the problem with this argument pretty obvious? God is a logically necessary being, and among his properties is perfect freedom. So, if God has no overriding reason to cause certain effect in all possible worlds and also has no overriding reason not to cause that effect in all possible worlds, then it is indeed true that this effect, though it's caused by a logically necessary God, exist in some possible worlds but not in all of them, and therefore it's not necessary but contingent. God's freedom to cause it does not necessitate God's causing it. This does not lead to a postulation of some possible world in which a logically necessary truth would not hold.

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

02-25-2003 @ 12:09 PM
Pate:

I'd probably say that the most effective philosophical apologetics can be constructed when combining Swinburne's general approach with W. L. Craig's specific arguments. For example, Craig's version of the Kalam cosmological argument seems much stronger than the cosmological argument offered by Swinburne.

Yeah, I think Craig's formulation of the kalam arg is particularly useful, being both elegant and simple. And if one does embrace building a cumulative case, the complementary relationship between all the theistic args becomes apparent. Moreover, the common atheistic rejoinders about the limitations of each arg in isolation become far less forceful.

Also (and I really appreciate this), Craig's version of the Kalam arg is such that anyone can readily grasp its implications without being an egghead.

[psychopath]

Here is the original argument put forward:

1. If God does not exist, his existence is logically impossible.
2. If God does exist, his existence is logically necessary.
3. Hence, either God's existence is logically impossible or it is logically necessary.
4. If God's existence is logically impossible, then the concept of God is self-contradictory.
5. The concept of God is not self-contradictory.
6. Therefore, God's existence is logcically necessary.
7. Therefore, God esists.

I don't know if someone's already touched on what I'm about to say, because I didn't take the time to read the entire thread. If so, forgive me.

I see the problem with this proof in #4. It seems like a non sequitur. If God does not exist, his existence is logically impossible; however, it doesn't follow that the CONCEPT of God is self-contradictory. In this instance, God as an actual being and God as conceptualized in our minds are two different things, the former of which (but not the latter) is the basis for his logical impossibility or necessity. I hope that made some sort of sense.

[Ishmael]

02-27-2003 @ 01:05 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=25343#post25343)
psychopath:

Here is the original argument put forward:

1. If God does not exist, his existence is logically impossible.
2. If God does exist, his existence is logically necessary.
3. Hence, either God's existence is logically impossible or it is logically necessary.
4. If God's existence is logically impossible, then the concept of God is self-contradictory.
5. The concept of God is not self-contradictory.
6. Therefore, God's existence is logcically necessary.
7. Therefore, God esists.

I don't know if someone's already touched on what I'm about to say, because I didn't take the time to read the entire thread. If so, forgive me.

I see the problem with this proof in #4. It seems like a non sequitur. If God does not exist, his existence is logically impossible; however, it doesn't follow that the CONCEPT of God is self-contradictory. In this instance, God as an actual being and God as conceptualized in our minds are two different things, the former of which (but not the latter) is the basis for his logical impossibility or necessity. I hope that made some sort of sense.


The concept of God would be contradictory if we concieve of God as a first-cause, non contingent being and then say, "even though we concieve of God in this way, He does not exist." That sort of reasoning would be contradictory. If one were to concieve of God in some other way, then perhaps it would not create a contradiction.

[elderbanks]

This all comes down to logical thought by man. To think that God is nonexistest is not logic to me. Sorcates develop debate and a good one. so again the authour of this question wants more imput for the belief of faith. The truth of the matter is all great philosophers had good reason to belive how they did. I will push the Teleological by Kant, this design of being and the way of the world that with faith it was God as we debate the truth and the ideal that he realy exist. So I will always argue that my faith is the proff that he lives in Jesus Christ.

[elderbanks]

To have a good ideal of the fact, to have Epistemology, looking for the truth and meaning of God's existance. the creator by his creations is profe of his existence. Theist agains Atheists with the rationality that is related to faith as the essential to existing humans. With all the different investigations the reality for ontology is the existence of God in the ancient, the medieval and now modern period. the botton line is the consistency in existence of evil and the natural rational philosophers can see that sin is the problem. to have faith that your belief is rotted in Christ Jesus.

[HRG_new]

11-30-2003 @ 06:38 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=321073#post321073)
Ishmael:




The concept of God would be contradictory if we concieve of God as a first-cause, non contingent being and then say, "even though we concieve of God in this way, He does not exist." That sort of reasoning would be contradictory. If one were to concieve of God in some other way, then perhaps it would not create a contradiction.

If necessity is included in the definition of "God" (as required for step 1), then there are good reasons to think that the concept is logically self-contradictory. "X exists" is a tautology for no X; thus - by completeness of predicate calculus - there exists a conceivable world in which X does not exist. IOW, X cannot be necessary.

See in addition the recent threads on CARM (Apologetics board) where it was shown that the argument structure can also prove the non-existence of God, if defined as required for step 1. The point is simple: the non-existence of God is not self-contradictory either.

Regards,
HRG.