Debate Proposition for Materialists/Atheists

[psychopath]

Just thought I'd provide a link to it here, so it gets noticed:

http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&threadid=3475

[johnransom]

Your debate resolution is improperly phrased, psycho. No worldview can preclude rational thought, since a worldview is dependent in part on having rational thought. Better would be:

"A materialistic world precludes rational thought."

or

"The materialistic worldview, if correct, precludes rational thought."

Not trying to get at you, natch. Everyone understands what you meant. Just trying to deflect the obvious skeptical attack.

[stevencarrwork]

The debate is unlikely to happen as he wants us to agree that only humans (ie not God or angels) have free will.

He also does not speak English as you or I know it.

He denies that machines can choose.

http://math.boisestate.edu/~marion/teaching/fallcrypto02/assignment_7.htm

'The remote machine chose the secret number A:= 73265823752837647326238758237 '

'The activated phone chose the secret number B:= 88965549987'

I gave an example of a machine choosing numbers in a lottery, and he still does not think it is English to talk about a machine choosing.

http://robison.casinocitytimes.com/articles/262.html

'The machine then pays you off according to how many of the numbers you chose match the numbers the machine chose.'

As you can see, many native English-speakers are happy to talk about machines choosing, but apparently we are only allowed to debate psychopath if we stop talking standard English.

This is going to cramp any opponent of psycopath who decides to write his replies in English.

[johnransom]

Today @ 02:35 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=76845#post76845)
stevencarrwork:

The debate is unlikely to happen as he wants us to agree that only humans (ie not God or angels) have free will.

He also does not speak English as you or I know it.
Wrong. Strike the "you or". It is evident from his numerous inane posts here that our friend Carrdork does not speak the same standard English that everyone else here does, since he plainly does not understand what is said in it.


He denies that machines can choose...I gave an example of a machine choosing numbers in a lottery, and he still does not think it is English to talk about a machine choosing.
Case in point on two grounds. First, Psycho declined to elaborate his position on this because it will form part of his debate strategy, so statements as to what exactly he means by "I don't see any meaning in talking about a lottery machine 'choosing'" are speculative at best. But that does not prevent Stevie from jumping to conclusions as usual. Second, it is obvious to any moderately intelligent reader of English that equating the random generation of numbers by a computer with conscious human decisions to act or not act in a certain fashion is an equivocation of the first order on the word "choose" (hence Psycho's quotes, I imagine, but trust Steven not to notice those). Note also his equating the behavior of cats and dogs to that of humans. Speaks volumes about what he thinks of himself.

[stevencarrwork]

JohnRansom does not think cats or dogs can choose??? What is this?

And does he want more examples of intelligent people talking about machines choosing?

http://geminga.it.nuigalway.ie/cai_tutor/func_dec/f_intex2.htm

Or a thesis from MIT?

http://web.mit.edu/24.242/www/Church-TuringThesis.pdf

Perhaps when Psychopath wrote 'I don't see any meaning in talking about a lottery machine 'choosing'"....' he simply meant that he could not understand MIT graduates, who tend to be moderately intelligent readers of English.


But Random thinks sceptics are only allowed to debate if they agree in advance that their opponents' definitions are right.

Psyhco says that he 'and then argue that rational thought is not possible if we do not have free will.'

But he and Ransom want their opponents to agree *before the debate* that free will only exists for beings with rational thought, and not for cats and dogs or chimpanzees etc etc.

So they want their opponents to concede that they are right before they will agree to debate.

But does Random agree with Psyhcopath that Jesus had free will because he had the ability to do evil? Or does Random think Jesus's nature precluded him from doing evil?

Does Ransom think somebody has the ability to do X , if that person's nature precludes him totally from doing X, and that person would never ever do X, under any circumstances?

[stevencarrwork]

Yesterday @ 09:26 PM johnransom:
Second, it is obvious to any moderately intelligent reader of English that equating the random generation of numbers by a computer with conscious human decisions to act or not act in a certain fashion is an equivocation of the first order on the word "choose" (hence Psycho's quotes, I imagine, but trust Steven not to notice those).



Let us assume that it is a huge equivocation to compare people with machines.

Now we all know that Psyhcopath is going to say that a materialistic viewpoint means a mechanistic viewpoint, and this means that people are no more than machines, and they can no more be said to choose than other machines , like lottery machines.

At least, I now have the person calling himself John Ransom on record as saying that comparing people to lottery machines is a huge equivocation.

It is the same equivocation that Pshyco will pull in his debate, so it
is nice to see Christians attempting to demolish it now :-)

[Sheepdog]

perhaps a refinement the definition of free-will is required. i typically use "granted A and B, the ability to freely choose either A or B." here, "freely" denotes that the choice is not determined by anything other than self (albeit it can be influenced). the choices of machines are determined by design, physics, and the laws of probability (see any essay on "statisical causality" or "probabilistic causality"). the choices of cats and dogs are generally understood to be determined by instinct, environment, and genetics. to our knowledge, humans are the only beings that can make self-determined choices. of course, that is probably the issue psycho intends to argue, so i'll leave it be.

[stevencarrwork]

Today @ 01:42 AM Sheepdog:

perhaps a refinement the definition of free-will is required. i typically use "granted A and B, the ability to freely choose either A or B." here, "freely" denotes that the choice is not determined by anything other than self (albeit it can be influenced). the choices of machines are determined by design, physics, and the laws of probability (see any essay on "statisical causality" or "probabilistic causality"). the choices of cats and dogs are generally understood to be determined by instinct, environment, and genetics. to our knowledge, humans are the only beings that can make self-determined choices. of course, that is probably the issue psycho intends to argue, so i'll leave it be.

Could we try this as a definition of free will?

A thing has free will to do A or not-A, if there are very similar objects in very similar circumstances who do A, and there are very similar objects in very similar circumstances who do not-A.

That way, you avoid trying to say that a person at time T has the ability to do A and to do B.


You can never produce any evidence for one person having the ability to do something other than what he actually did, unless you have a time-machine or parallel universes.

As for self-determined choices, you say cats and dogs choices are determined (partly) by instinct and genetics. Isn't that is what is meant by self-determined choices? Presumably you mean its own instinct and genetics.

Are you saying a dog's choices are determined by a *different* dogs instinct and genetics?

[WinAce]

What I'd like to see is an actual attack on free will in a materialist framework that doesn't simultaneously refute free will in all other views.

[stevencarrwork]

Today @ 05:38 AM WinAce:

What I'd like to see is an actual attack on free will in a materialist framework that doesn't simultaneously refute free will in all other views.

And flying pigs?

Christians can't even define free will in such a way that it does not refute their case.

Self-determined choices mean choices determined by the thing itself - that *includes* lottery machines, unless John Ransom thinks something other than a lottery machine produces the numbers chosen by a lottery machine. If so, I think the public should be told before they are sold tickets in what is clearly a pre-determined draw.

After all, would you buy tickets in a lottery where only one set of numbers can be chosen by the machine? Once attackers of mechanistic world-views concede that the general public is right to think lottery machines can choose many sets of numbers, we might get somewhere in this debate :-)

http://www.state.nj.us/lottery/games/1-6_lotzee.shtml

It appears the State of New Jersey thinks machines can choose numbers.

And so does Cornell University :-

http://courses.ece.cornell.edu/ece411/hw-1.pdf

The essence of Christian philosophy is to redefine words so that they mean something different from how people use them in everyday life.

[psychopath]

You seem to have some deep misunderstandings of my position and what "assumptions" I'm "demanding" my opponent accepts before the debate. Perhaps, if these can't be resolved, someone else should debate with me.


The debate is unlikely to happen as he wants us to agree that only humans (ie not God or angels) have free will.

No. My argument says nothing regarding whether free will actually exists, but only that IF materialism is true, it cannot. Therefore, the cases of God and angels are irrelevant (and I do not hold that they do not possess free will, so you're wrong there as well).

Insofar as animals are concerned, my argument will cover all sentient beings in a materialistic universe, WITHOUT assuming beforehand that dogs and cats don't have free will. IOW, there is NO required assumption necessary prior to the debate that only human beings can possess free will.


He also does not speak English as you or I know it.

He denies that machines can choose.

http://math.boisestate.edu/~marion/...ssignment_7.htm

'The remote machine chose the secret number A:= 73265823752837647326238758237 '

'The activated phone chose the secret number B:= 88965549987'

I gave an example of a machine choosing numbers in a lottery, and he still does not think it is English to talk about a machine choosing.

http://robison.casinocitytimes.com/articles/262.html

'The machine then pays you off according to how many of the numbers you chose match the numbers the machine chose.'

As you can see, many native English-speakers are happy to talk about machines choosing, but apparently we are only allowed to debate psychopath if we stop talking standard English.

This is going to cramp any opponent of psycopath who decides to write his replies in English.

While I think you're merely equivocating on the concept of "choice" here, but I can accomodate your objection. What if I reworded my definition thusly:

If a person has free will at some time T, then he has the ability to freely choose A at time T and the ability to freely choose not-A at time T.

Now there should be no misunderstanding as to what type of "choice" we're talking about.


Perhaps when Psychopath wrote 'I don't see any meaning in talking about a lottery machine 'choosing'"....' he simply meant that he could not understand MIT graduates, who tend to be moderately intelligent readers of English.

See above.


Psyhco says that he 'and then argue that rational thought is not possible if we do not have free will.'

But he and Ransom want their opponents to agree *before the debate* that free will only exists for beings with rational thought, and not for cats and dogs or chimpanzees etc etc.

So they want their opponents to concede that they are right before they will agree to debate.

Ridiculous. All of the assumptions you say I'm forcing upon my opponents are fabrications; you can hold that free will is possible for cats, dogs, etc. and this debate can still work. I have no problem with that.


But does Random agree with Psyhcopath that Jesus had free will because he had the ability to do evil? Or does Random think Jesus's nature precluded him from doing evil?

An absurd misrepresentation of my position. As I said, I don't think this issue is important with regard to my debate proposition, but let me just hint at your problem by saying that you're committing the fallacy of bifurcation.


Now we all know that Psyhcopath is going to say that a materialistic viewpoint means a mechanistic viewpoint, and this means that people are no more than machines, and they can no more be said to choose than other machines , like lottery machines.

At least, I now have the person calling himself John Ransom on record as saying that comparing people to lottery machines is a huge equivocation.

It is the same equivocation that Pshyco will pull in his debate, so it
is nice to see Christians attempting to demolish it now :-)

I wish I had your ability to know the thoughts and plans of others. :bow:


Could we try this as a definition of free will?

A thing has free will to do A or not-A, if there are very similar objects in very similar circumstances who do A, and there are very similar objects in very similar circumstances who do not-A.

1) This definition is vague. What constitutes "very similar" objects? What constitutes "very similar" circumstances? Consider a rock on the edge of a cliff. Given one set of circumstances, it will will just sit there. Given some very, very similar circumstances according to which the rock is moved ever so slightly toward the edge, it will fall off. Does a rock, then, possess free will? Of course not, because there is no free choice involved for the rock. My revised definition, OTOH, is quite clear on what is necessary for free will to be present.

2) My revised definition is much closer to the commonly accepted philosophical definition of free will than this one. From http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/f9.htm#free:

"freedom {Lat. libertas Ger. Freiheit}}
The human capacity to act (or not to act) as we choose or prefer, without any external compulsion or restraint."

As I've already stated, we need not even limit this to humans for the purposes of this debate.

From http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/:

""Free Will" is largely a philosophical term of art for a particular sort of capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives."

Once again, for the purposes of the debate it need not even be assumed that only rational agents can possess free will.

3) Suppose that there is a thing X. Now suppose there is a thing Y that is very similar to thing X that, given a certain set of circumstances, is absolutely predetermined to do A. Now suppose that there is a another very similar thing Z (though different than Y) to thing X that, given a set of very similar circumstances, is absolutely predetermined to do not-A, because these small changes caused a different outcome. According to Carr's definition, thing X has free will, even though the forces in play here are purely deterministic. But determinism is the exact opposite of free will. I don't see the tenability of a definition of free will that can lead to things having free will due to circumstances that are diametrically opposed to free will in the first place.

For these reasons, I reject this proposed definition.


That way, you avoid trying to say that a person at time T has the ability to do A and to do B.

What is wrong with my now revised definition?

That seems to cover the important points.

[psychopath]

Oh yeah, John Ransom, I will take into consideration your point about the wording of the proposition, because I think you have a point. Thanks.

[Vorkosigan]

delete

[stevencarrwork]

Today @ 08:58 AM psychopath:

If a person has free will at some time T, then he has the ability to freely choose A at time T and the ability to freely choose not-A at time T.


1) This definition is vague. What constitutes "very similar" objects? What constitutes "very similar" circumstances? Consider a rock on the edge of a cliff. Given one set of circumstances, it will will just sit there. Given some very, very similar circumstances according to which the rock is moved ever so slightly toward the edge, it will fall off. Does a rock, then, possess free will? Of course not, because there is no free choice involved for the rock. My revised definition, OTOH, is quite clear on what is necessary for free will to be present.



For these reasons, I reject this proposed definition.





For one thing, your definition still has 'person' in it. You must remove that.

Secondly you won't accept my definition, and you insist I accept yours before your debate. This is what I object to.


Thirdly, short of time-machines and parallel universes, you cannot put a person back at time T and see if he actually did have the ability to do both A and not A. What is the point of a definition that nobody has evidence about?

Fourthly, my definition is better, as shown by your misunderstanding.

You give an example of a rock which does not fall off a cliff. You say that in similar circumstances , a rock would fall off , and imply that I am saying a rock has free will.

If you had read my definition, you would see that I gave the example of similar objects which, in similar circumstances, do both A and not A. If a rock is in the circumstances of falling, *all* rocks in those circumstances would fall, so failing my definition of that object having free will.

There are no circumstances in which rocks will both fall and not fall. So my definition survives.

BTW, a person would also fall in those circumstances in which a rock would fall. So it is *your* definition shows that people do not have free will. My definition was carefully chosen to avoid the problem that *you* have with *your* definition.

At a time T, a person does not have the ability to fall 6 storeys and not fall 6 storeys. Therefore, *your* definition proves that a person does not have free will.

You have to alter your definition to restrict 'A' to only those things a person has free will over.

So your definition is also circular. It means that people have free will if they can do things they have free will over.

So why debate a circular definition that has no evidence in its favour?

As for your claim that it is unclear what 'similar objects' mean, then most people would understand that when we are talking about people, then 'other people' are the similar objects that come into play.

Similary for similar circumstances. These must be decided on a case-by-case basis by reasonable people.

Most people would agree that I have the free will to decide whether to drink tea or coffee. Similar circumstances would be eg is the tea my brand or do I have time to drink the coffee?

But the circumstances of being attacked by a lion are sufficiently different that most people would regard it as a brand new set of circumstances.

So my definition is workable, not circular, and we can get evidence for or against it.

Your definition is unworkable, circular and we can never get evidence for it.

[stevencarrwork]

Today @ 08:58 AM
psychopath:

According to Carr's definition, thing X has free will, even though the forces in play here are purely deterministic. But determinism is the exact opposite of free will. I don't see the tenability of a definition of free will that can lead to things having free will due to circumstances that are diametrically opposed to free will in the first place.



Once again, we see how Psycho refuses to debate unless his opponents agree with him before he starts.

'Determinism is the exact opposite of free will'. This is for him to show, and not assume.

It is also suprising that somebody who claims to know some philosophy, has never even heard of compatibilism.

http://www.hu.mtu.edu/~tlockha/h2700cmptblsm.htm is a very , very short summary of the subject.

'To say that human actions and choices are free is to say that they are not dictated by external conditions or events (e.g., confinement in prison, threat of force).' This is a compatibilist view of freedom.





If Psycho insists that his opponent accept definitions of free will that are incompatibilist, he will find few takers for a debate.

[nomad]

he's just trying to nail down the definitions. if you aren't interested in the debate, why you trying to bait him?

a couple things:

If a person has free will at some time T, then he has the ability to freely choose A at time T and the ability to freely choose not-A at time T.

first of all, you should add 'for some value of A'. if someone pushes me off a tall building, i don't have any free choice about falling. but that doesn't invalidate that i might have free choice in something else.

i think you are attempting to define 'free will' as 'not materialism', i.e. there is some decision made by the agent that is not deterministic (fully predicted by circumstances). so, that would be a better place to start. that will solve that problem.

second, you also have the assumption that your opponent (whoever he may be) assumes a perfectly deterministic universe. you may want to make this explicit beforehand, to avoid a red herring debate about this (even if they don't personally believe it, they may argue that it's possible to undermine your argument).

third, you still need to define 'rational thought'. this is central to the debate, whether rational thought can occur as part of the mechanation of a mechanistic universe.

fourth, going along with the first, you may do better to define free will as follows:

' for an agent X at time T, faced with a possible path A and a possible path B, the outcome cannot be accurately predicted even with full knowledge of the conditions of the test (up to and including the entire universe).'

what you are trying to argue, i believe, is that the ball doesn't 'choose', the ball follows the laws of physics to its logical conclusion, and that to say 'choose' is merely an anthropomorphism of english. and then to attempt to show that the same is true for humans. so, what you need to prove is that for humans, there is some choice A that requires knowledge outside the bounds of the mechanistic universe.

that still requires the link from a will to rational thought (which i can't see offhand but you must have a plan or you wouldn't be asking for the debate). it does look like a debate on free will.

ideas?

[stevencarrwork]

Today @ 04:07 PM

nomad:


second, you also have the assumption that your opponent (whoever he may be) assumes a perfectly deterministic universe.



Nomad makes good points.

I don't believe the universe is deterministic. I gave the example of uranium atoms decaying, which appears to be genuinely random.


I say 'appears' because, of course, I might be wrong. The fact that nobody can find a cause why an atom decays at one time rather than another does not mean that there is none.

But , at the moment, it looks as though the universe is not deterministic.




nomad:



' for an agent X at time T, faced with a possible path A and a possible path B, the outcome cannot be accurately predicted even with full knowledge of the conditions of the test (up to and including the entire universe).'



Psycho will struggle to make this better definition of free will work.

It also means that the agent cannot predict what he will do, even if he has full knowledge of his thoughts, desires, hopes, beliefs etc.

To say we have free will, only if we do not know what we are doing is paradoxical.

But perhaps psycho is willing to answer the question 'In a non-deterministic universe, how can he predict what he is going to do?'

[nomad]

I don't believe the universe is deterministic. I gave the example of uranium atoms decaying, which appears to be genuinely random.


so then, he will have to attempt to prove it, if he is going to use it.



It also means that the agent cannot predict what he will do, even if he has full knowledge of his thoughts, desires, hopes, beliefs etc.


in what manner do these exist?

if they only exist as a pattern in nature (in the same way that a 'flower' is only an arrangement of 'a bunch of atoms'), then thoughts do not need to be attended to directly; they are merely the end results of the physical processes within the atoms forming his brain.

if they are not... well, then maybe we need a definition of 'material'. otherwise, you are accepting the supernatural (which would be a separate debate probably).

but maybe a clarification is necessary:

To say we have free will, only if we do not know what we are doing is paradoxical.

' for an agent X at time T, faced with a possible path A and a possible path B, the outcome cannot be accurately predicted even with full knowledge of the conditions of the test (up to and including the entire material universe).'



But perhaps psycho is willing to answer the question 'In a non-deterministic universe, how can he predict what he is going to do?'


are you saying the universe is unpredictable? how is 'the butterfly effect' of quantum physics evened out?

[stevencarrwork]

Today @ 05:13 PM
nomad:



in what manner do these exist?

if they only exist as a pattern in nature (in the same way that a 'flower' is only an arrangement of 'a bunch of atoms'), then thoughts do not need to be attended to directly; they are merely the end results of the physical processes within the atoms forming his brain.

if they are not... well, then maybe we need a definition of 'material'. otherwise, you are accepting the supernatural (which would be a separate debate probably).



Certainly they exist, and have effects, and should be used in explanations by materialists.

To give an analogy. Computers are material things.

To explain how this computer works , when typing your reply, you would explain it in terms of cutting-and-pasting, buttons to click on, subject boxes etc.

If you tried to explain how you replied in terms of atoms and molecules, people would be baffled.

You are better off explaining computers in terms of abstract things like drop-down menus, numbers, variables, software queues, print queues etc.

Computers are material objects , yet materialists explain them using abstract entities.

And a human being is far more complicated than a computer, so we would expect explanations of human behaviour to involve abstract terms.

A glance at any Pshychology 101 book will confirm that.

Materialists have no fear of abstract things like love, hate, anger, jealousy as better explanations than atoms , molecules, chemistry.

[nomad]

Certainly they exist, and have effects, and should be used in explanations by materialists.


perhaps i should leave this for the actual argument, when and if it occurs. it sounds like this is a large part of the argument.



If you tried to explain how you replied in terms of atoms and molecules, people would be baffled.


but it would still be true. in fact, in some ways, it is MORE true, because these are at the base of the 'chain reaction' that leads to the computer painting certain pixels on the screen a certain color.

that's the implication... if you can show determinism at some specific low level, you can't introduce a 'free agent' higher up the chain.

that's the difference between description ('the plant fell on the floor because the mass of the earth pulled on its mass with a force that, insufficiently opposed by air resistance, accelerated it until the collision with the ground stopped it') and explanation ('hey, you pushed my plant off the table!' :) they are both true in different senses.

so maybe that is also an assumption that needs to me made explicit.



Materialists have no fear of abstract things like love, hate, anger, jealousy as better explanations than atoms , molecules, chemistry.


and as long as they are recognized as abstractions, and not as something 'real' of itself, i do not see any conflict there.

[stevencarrwork]

Today @ 08:58 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=77348#post77348)
psychopath:

If a person has free will at some time T, then he has the ability to freely choose A at time T and the ability to freely choose not-A at time T.

2) My revised definition is much closer to the commonly accepted philosophical definition of free will than this one. From http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/f9.htm#free:

"freedom {Lat. libertas Ger. Freiheit}}
The human capacity to act (or not to act) as we choose or prefer, without any external compulsion or restraint."




What is wrong with my now revised definition?

That seems to cover the important points.


It doesn't cover what people mean by free will, which does not mean the ability to do not-A and A, as examples from history show.

Who can forget the line in High Noon, when the Sheriff took moral responsibility for the town by saying 'A man doesn't have to do what a man's gotta do'?

Or when Martin Luther took full moral responsibility for his actions? 'Here I stand. I can do something else.'

[johnransom]

Yesterday @ 05:55 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=76998#post76998)
stevencarrwork:

JohnRansom does not think cats or dogs can choose??? What is this?
Well, if Steve the sun dog tells us the opposite, I guess we should take him at his word.


And does he want more examples of intelligent people talking about machines choosing?

http://geminga.it.nuigalway.ie/cai_...ec/f_intex2.htm

Or a thesis from MIT?

http://web.mit.edu/24.242/www/Church-TuringThesis.pdf
Well, let's see then:

"...what the machine does isn’t what the human computing agent does; it’s a highly simplified and stylized mimicry of what the human agent does. But the differences are in inessential details, not in fundamental computational capacities. Everything a human computer can do can be simulated, or so Turing proposes, by a Turing machine.
The details here are pretty arbitrary. The number of symbols can be few or many, as long as it’s finite. The inputs and outputs can be Arabic numerals, instead of strings of “1”s. We can allow auxiliary tapes for scratch work. We can even allow indeterministic computations. These are machines programmed with conflicting sets of instructions, so that, at certain junctures, the machine chooses, arbitrarily, which instruction to follow."

The only instance of the word choose in the entire thesis. And it occurs in a passage explaining that these machines merely mimic human computational behavior. And the arbitrary branching of program instructions bears little or no resemblance to the human process of choice anyway.


Perhaps when Psychopath wrote 'I don't see any meaning in talking about a lottery machine 'choosing'"....' he simply meant that he could not understand MIT graduates, who tend to be moderately intelligent readers of English.
No, he meant that he couldn't understand the drivel produced by an utterly unintelligent writer of English.


But Random thinks sceptics are only allowed to debate if they agree in advance that their opponents' definitions are right.
Since I have said precisely zero on this topic, another massive leap of illogic.


Psyhco says that he 'and then argue that rational thought is not possible if we do not have free will.'

But he and Ransom want their opponents to agree *before the debate* that free will only exists for beings with rational thought, and not for cats and dogs or chimpanzees etc etc.

So they want their opponents to concede that they are right before they will agree to debate.
As usual Stevie wants to insert words into others' mouths. Psycho was quite clear when he stated in response to you:

"Uh, I'm not saying that you should. All I said is that my first definition was built on the assumption that humans are the only beings in this world that possibly possess free will; due to misgivings on this point, I have since altered that definition to try and GET AWAY from this problem.

And like I said in my last post, the issue of dog/cat free will would be addressed within my argument. I'm not 'demanding' you to accept before the fact that they don't."

Evidently Stevie thinks no one will ever double check his wild claims and irrational assertions.

And in a show of blatant hypocrisy, Stevie thinks others should agree with him before they debate:

"Once you have defined free will to my satisfaction, I will be quite happy to debate."


But does Random agree with Psyhcopath that Jesus had free will because he had the ability to do evil? Or does Random think Jesus's nature precluded him from doing evil?
Of course Psycho said no such thing, as previously explained, but that never prevented Stevie from repeating his wild and irrational assertions before. And Stevie is evidently very confused about the difference between free will and free agency.


Does Ransom think somebody has the ability to do X , if that person's nature precludes him totally from doing X, and that person would never ever do X, under any circumstances?
A descent into utter incoherence. If a person has the ability to do X, then by definition it is in his nature to be able to do X, therefore his nature cannot preclude him from doing X.

[johnransom]

Yesterday @ 07:02 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=77035#post77035)
stevencarrwork:
Let us assume that it is a huge equivocation to compare people with machines.
More incomprehension from Steven. Only an utterly unintelligent reader would draw this idea from what was stated. To say nothing of the fact that comparing people to machines is not an equivocation anyway. Where's the ambiguity in that?


Now we all know that Psyhcopath is going to say that a materialistic viewpoint means a mechanistic viewpoint, and this means that people are no more than machines, and they can no more be said to choose than other machines , like lottery machines.
Steve the psychic now. Except that all moderately intelligent readers had assumed this from the start. It apparently took Steve quite a while to get his ESP running right.


At least, I now have the person calling himself John Ransom on record as saying that comparing people to lottery machines is a huge equivocation.
OK, genius, provide the citation. Without attaching any of your wild rationalizations.


It is the same equivocation that Pshyco will pull in his debate, so it is nice to see Christians attempting to demolish it now :-)
Only Stevie can see the equivocation, and only Stevie can see Christians arguing against it. Oh how blind we all are.

[psychopath]

I do not have time to comment on everything that's been said, even though I have taken all of it into account.

Steven Carr, if I had the chance I would attempt to show you why your definition is faulty, but, instead, how about you provide me with one philosophical source that defines free will in a manner close to how you are defining it. If you can't, then I think it is safe to say that your definition is unviable.

Here is my up-to-date definition of free will:

If a being has free will at some time T with respect to some action A, then he has the ability to freely choose A at time T and the ability to freely choose not-A at time T.

I have incorporated Carr's suggestion of the replacement of the word "person," and have taken into effect nomad's suggestion regarding the specification of free will for some action A.

All my opponent needs to assume for the debate is that materialism is true. He need not assume that the universe is perfectly deterministic. He need not assume that compatibilism (yes, I've heard of it) is false. He need not assume anything else that other people (well, mostly Carr) are saying that I'm demanding of him.

Carr, your talk about "evidence" for a definition is flawed. There can be no evidence for a definition, but only for or against some thing to which that definition refers. All a definition refers to is some concept; it can be a useful definition regardless of whether that concept itself can be empirically verified as actualized in the world.

For example, we can come up with a perfectly tenable definition for the number 1, even though we cannot empirically test for the actualization of the number 1 in this world.

Also, you're confusing the ability to choose with the ability to do what one chooses to attempt. If I'm at the top of a building, then at some time I have the ability to choose to jump off and the ability to choose to not jump off. This does not imply that I can actually jump off and not jump off at the same time. This distinction must be realized.

Your "examples from history" do nothing to show that my definition is untenable. The statement "a man doesn't have to do what a man has to do" is incoherent and contradictory. Martin Luther King had free will, because he could freely choose to do A ("stand") and not-A (not stand).

Carr, your posts convey a deep misunderstanding of what my definition of free will says, and what I'm making my opponents assume. I think it may be best if I try and find someone else to debate, because I don't know if these differences can be resolved.

[nomad]

Here is my up-to-date definition of free will:

If a being has free will at some time T with respect to some action A, then he has the ability to freely choose A at time T and the ability to freely choose not-A at time T.



a better term might be 'agent'. but it's your definition.



All my opponent needs to assume for the debate is that materialism is true. He need not assume that the universe is perfectly deterministic. He need not assume that compatibilism (yes, I've heard of it) is false. He need not assume anything else that other people (well, mostly Carr) are saying that I'm demanding of him.


ok, cool. most defenses of what you wrote that i have seen (and, in fact, that i would argue) require those assumptions. if you have ways to get around them i can't wait to watch and find out what they are :)

[stevencarrwork]

Today @ 07:07 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=77688#post77688)
johnransom:

"...what the machine does isn't what the human computing agent does; it's a highly simplified and stylized mimicry of what the human agent does. But the differences are in inessential details, not in fundamental computational capacities. Everything a human computer can do can be simulated, or so Turing proposes, by a Turing machine.


In his desperate attempts to discredit me, Mr. Ransom banks on his readers not noticing the sentences 'But the differences are in inessential details, not in fundamental computational capacities. Everything a human computer can do can be simulated, or so Turing proposes, by a Turing machine.'

'Differences in inessential details', 'not in fundamental.....'.

It appears that people who know what they are talking about think machines can choose, and the differences are 'inessential details'.

But that does not stop Mr. Ransom distorting the very thing he quotes, hoping his readers will not examine what he say too closely.

[stevencarrwork]

Yesterday @ 08:14 PM
psychopath:

If a being has free will at some time T with respect to some action A, then he has the ability to freely choose A at time T and the ability to freely choose not-A at time T.



An incredibly circular definition.

Beings have free will if they freely choose?? What sort of definition is that?

Don't you have to now define 'freely choose' before people know what your definition means?

[WinAce]

I once made this picture for just such situations.

http://users.rcn.com/rostmd/winace/pics/o_logic.jpg

[psychopath]

From dictionary.com, here are the two definitions given for free will.

"1. The ability or discretion to choose; free choice

2. The power of making free choices that are unconstrained by external circumstances or by an agency such as fate or divine will."

Since both of these definitions of free will utilize the phrase "free choice," I suppose that you would then argue that these definitions are circular as well?

Would you rather I remove the word "freely?" The reason I put it in there is to distinguish between the type of choice required for free will and the type of choice made by, to use an example of Carr's, a lottery machine. Though it may be the case that the word "choose" may be appropriate in each case, I do not think anyone would deny that the "choice" of a lottery machine is not the same as the "choice" required in accordance with free will. That's why I inserted the word "freely" in my definition; as you can see, other sources don't seem to have a problem with this usage.

Edit: From Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, defining free will:

"1: the freedom or ability to choose

2: the power of making free choices unconstrained by external agencies"

Would you argue that all of these definitions are "circular," since they likewise speak of freely choosing?

[Sheepdog]

Today @ 12:35 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=77232#post77232)
stevencarrwork:



Could we try this as a definition of free will?

A thing has free will to do A or not-A, if there are very similar objects in very similar circumstances who do A, and there are very similar objects in very similar circumstances who do not-A.

That way, you avoid trying to say that a person at time T has the ability to do A and to do B.

that may work.



You can never produce any evidence for one person having the ability to do something other than what he actually did, unless you have a time-machine or parallel universes.

did you choose to make that post? could you have not made the post? if so, there is your evidence/


As for self-determined choices, you say cats and dogs choices are determined (partly) by instinct and genetics. Isn't that is what is meant by self-determined choices? Presumably you mean its own instinct and genetics.

Are you saying a dog's choices are determined by a *different* dogs instinct and genetics?

well, so much for cognative discussion-- you did well up until this point. you need to read up on the philosophy of free-will, etc. self-determination, simply put, is that the will (or mind, or whatever we wish to call it) determines the choice. if a choice is determined by instinct or genetics, then the choice is not self-determined. you may disagree, but then i have to ask you, where did you get your instincts and genetics? you certainly didn't choose your genetics, but got them form your parents (likewise instincts are themselves caused by genetics and/or events/environment)

[johnransom]

Yesterday @ 06:00 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=77870#post77870)
stevencarrwork:
In his desperate attempts to discredit me, Mr. Ransom banks on his readers not noticing the sentences 'But the differences are in inessential details, not in fundamental computational capacities. Everything a human computer can do can be simulated, or so Turing proposes, by a Turing machine.'

'Differences in inessential details', 'not in fundamental.....'.

It appears that people who know what they are talking about think machines can choose, and the differences are 'inessential details'.

But that does not stop Mr. Ransom distorting the very thing he quotes, hoping his readers will not examine what he say too closely.
Yet again, Stevie banks on everyone else being at his intellectual level. The statement quite clearly shows that the author is talking only of "fundamental computational capacities", which in context means the ability to perform algorithms and has absolutely nothing to do with rational choice.

Note also that Stevie completely ignored my challenge that he substantiate his wild ratiolaizations.

Oh, and Stevie's other proof link - merely a random number generator, as previously discussed.

[psychopath]

I think I'll bump this up, just in case anyone else is interested.

[stevencarrwork]

CARR
'Now we all know that Psyhcopath is going to say that a materialistic viewpoint means a mechanistic viewpoint, and this means that people are no more than machines, and they can no more be said to choose than other machines , like lottery machines.'

At least, I now have the person calling himself John Ransom on record as saying that comparing people to lottery machines is a huge equivocation.

It is the same equivocation that Pshyco will pull in his debate, so it
is nice to see Christians attempting to demolish it now :-) '






04-24-2003 @ 08:59 AM
psychopath:


I wish I had your ability to know the thoughts and plans of others.



Pshycopath in his debate :- 'And if humans do not possess free will and are governed solely by the arrangement of their biochemical makeup, they really aren't anything more than extremely complex robots.'

Gosh, I really do know the thoughts and plans of others.

Interesting how Psychopath was reduced to sarcastic comment on my remarks, as he was unable to refute them, when he knew all along that he was planning to argue exactly along the lines that JohnRansom had refuted - that it was an equivocation to compare the ability of humans with the abilities of present-day machines.


If Psychopath thinks that the abilities of humans can be duplicated by robots, then he should revise his conception of robots, not his conception of humans.

After all, humans would still be doing exactly the same things, no matter what the source of their ability. Pshcyopath is committing the genetic fallacy.

[stevencarrwork]

04-24-2003 @ 07:07 PM
johnransom:


A descent into utter incoherence. If a person has the ability to do X, then by definition it is in his nature to be able to do X, therefore his nature cannot preclude him from doing X.

So Jesus's nature did not preclude him from doing evil!

After all, Psycho is defining free will as the ability to choose good or evil, so if Jesus had free will he must have had the ability to do evil, and Mr. Ransom thinks that means his nature did not preclude Jesus from doing evil.

[psychopath]

I can post in here, so...


CARR
'Now we all know that Psyhcopath is going to say that a materialistic viewpoint means a mechanistic viewpoint, and this means that people are no more than machines, and they can no more be said to choose than other machines , like lottery machines.'

At least, I now have the person calling himself John Ransom on record as saying that comparing people to lottery machines is a huge equivocation.

It is the same equivocation that Pshyco will pull in his debate, so it
is nice to see Christians attempting to demolish it now :-) '

04-24-2003 @ 08:59 AM
psychopath:

I wish I had your ability to know the thoughts and plans of others.

Pshycopath in his debate :- 'And if humans do not possess free will and are governed solely by the arrangement of their biochemical makeup, they really aren't anything more than extremely complex robots.'

CARR:
Gosh, I really do know the thoughts and plans of others.

Interesting how Psychopath was reduced to sarcastic comment on my remarks, as he was unable to refute them, when he knew all along that he was planning to argue exactly along the lines that JohnRansom had refuted - that it was an equivocation to compare the ability of humans with the abilities of present-day machines.

Your prediction implied that my argument would rest on "humans-are-mechanistic" concept. However, even if you disregard that point in my opening statement where I talk about humans being robots, my entire argument still stands. I only made this point with respect to one of my premises, and that premise can still be defended EVEN if you don't accept my explication of humans and robots.

So, essentially, you were wrong. Your prediction was that I was going to utilize the "humans-are-mechanistic" idea to base my argument of the incompatibility of materialism and free will, but if you'll go look at my opening argument, my argument A in which I show this incompatibility says NOTHING about how humans would be robots under a materialistic paradigm.

The fact that my entire argument is unaffected even if you disregard the part where I talk about robots shows that you aren't attacking the meat of the argument, but only a corollary issue.


Gosh, I really do know the thoughts and plans of others.

Not really. Though I did bring up the issue of robots, it really is inconsequential to my argument.


If Psychopath thinks that the abilities of humans can be duplicated by robots, then he should revise his conception of robots, not his conception of humans.

Of course, I DON'T think that, because I don't accept materialism.


After all, humans would still be doing exactly the same things, no matter what the source of their ability. Pshcyopath is committing the genetic fallacy.

No. The issue at hand when I talk about robots is that of a proper judgment. I at no point state that the fact that a judgment comes from a robot or a robot-like human makes that judgment incorrect, but only that such a judgment is inproper. I make this distinction in my argument.


After all, Psycho is defining free will as the ability to choose good or evil...

Uhhhh, no. This is just false.