God And Weather:

[seer]

Psalm

107:25

"For he commandeth, and raiseth the stormy wind, which lifteth up the waves thereof."

135:7

"He causes the vapors to ascend from the ends of the earth; Who makes lightnings for the rain, Who brings forth the wind from His treasuries."

148:8

"Fire and hail, snow and clouds;Stormy wind, fulfilling His word."

I posted this on another board, hoping to get more input from Christians. The question is - does God control ALL weather. It seems from the texts above (and others) that He does. Any thoughts?

[themuzicman]

What those texts say is that God is ABLE to control the weather, when it is His will. It doesn't mean that God makes all weather happen.

Michael

[seer]

What those texts say is that God is ABLE to control the weather, when it is His will. It doesn't mean that God makes all weather happen.

I don't know, it seems that God is more involved than that, Job 37:6,11,12

For he saith to the snow, Be thou on the earth; likewise to the small rain, and to the great rain of his strength.

Also by watering he wearieth the thick cloud: he scattereth his bright cloud:

And it is turned round about by his counsels: that they may do whatsoever he commandeth them upon the face of the world in the earth.

[themuzicman]

Umm.... read the end of Job. God basically says that everything that Job and his friends say in the book is wrong.

Michael

[seer]

Umm.... read the end of Job. God basically says that everything that Job and his friends say in the book is wrong.

Michael

Well it does seem to line up with the Psalms. And not everything Job and his friends said was wrong. I think Elihu was right on just about everything he said.

[themuzicman]

Well, read the end of Job. God says otherwise.

[rhutchin]

What those texts say is that God is ABLE to control the weather, when it is His will. It doesn't mean that God makes all weather happen.

Michael

God is omnipotent so it is correct to say that God can intervene and make the weather do that which He wills. However, because God has the power to change any weather, we can also say that when God refuses to intervene to change the weather, it is because He does not will to change the weather so that it is his will that the weather not change. Either way, we say that all weather that occurs reflects the will of God.

[themuzicman]

Unless you believe that God's just nature is to allow mankind to live with the consequences of sin, which would include adverse weather. Then God's just nature doesn't allow for altering the weather, unless there is another reason (prophecy, some aspect of God's plan) to alter it.

Michael

[mossrose]

This is Job 42:7 --


7 After the LORD had said these things to Job, he said to Eliphaz the Temanite, "I am angry with you and your two friends, because you have not spoken of me what is right, as my servant Job has.

It appears to me that God is saying that Eliphaz and his two friends did not speak rightly about God, but that Job did in rejecting the error of those men. And God rebukes them in the following verses for their arrogance and incorrect representation of God.

Even if God had said that Job did not speak rightly of Him, God Himself talks about His attributes in chapters 38 and 39. Here are some of those things that God says about His power:


38:22
"Have you entered the storehouses of the snow,
Or have you seen the storehouses of the hail,
23
Which I have reserved for the time of distress,
For the day of war and battle?
24
"Where is the way that the light is divided,
Or the east wind scattered on the earth?
25
"Who has cleft a channel for the flood,
Or a way for the thunderbolt,
26
To bring rain on a land without people,
On a desert without a man in it,
27
To satisfy the waste and desolate land
And to make the seeds of grass to sprout?
28
"Has the rain a father?
Or who has begotten the drops of dew?
29
"From whose womb has come the ice?
And the frost of heaven, who has given it birth?
30
"Water becomes hard like stone,
And the surface of the deep is imprisoned.


I think it is clear that God Himself says that He is in charge of His creation. He made the paths that the winds follow, He made the paths that the ocean currents follow, He made the seasons, He causes the rain to fall on the just and the unjust.

I believe that some of the others have spoken rightly here, that God does not always reach His hand down and change the path of the storm. Sometimes He might. And sometimes He allows it to go where it's path takes it.

If you believe that God created, and if you believe these passages in Job where He talks about His own power, then how can you NOT believe that God is in control of the weather?

[lee_merrill]

Hi everyone,

Yes, God controls the weather!

Matthew 5:45 He causes his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the righteous and the unrighteous.

It is not an accident when the rain falls on Wicked Wally's fields! It's quite deliberate. And the sun shining on Wally, too, God does something so this happens, rather than intervening only when it's necessary.

Psalm 104:13 He waters the mountains from his upper chambers; the earth is satisfied by the fruit of his work.

Jeremiah 14:22 Do the skies themselves send down showers? No, it is you, O Lord our God. Therefore our hope is in you, for you are the one who does all this.

Hebrews 1:3 He is the radiance of the glory of God and the exact imprint of his nature, and he upholds the universe by the word of his power.

Blessings,
Lee

[themuzicman]

I get really tired of this kind of proof-texting.

[rhutchin]

Unless you believe that God's just nature is to allow mankind to live with the consequences of sin, which would include adverse weather. Then God's just nature doesn't allow for altering the weather, unless there is another reason (prophecy, some aspect of God's plan) to alter it.

Michael

Sounds good to me. The conclusion of the matter is that in whatever weather we find ourselves, we can say that it is God's will for that weather to occur even if we do not know the reason for it (whether as a consequence of our or man's sin, to fulfill prophecy, to bless us, or whatever). Rain falls on the just and the unjust as do tornadoes.

[rhutchin]

I get really tired of this kind of proof-texting.

You appear to mean that we are to take this in the negative to mean that Lee has inappropriately appropriated the verses he cited for a purpose that the verses were not intended to be used. If so, why not take one or even all the verses Lee has cited and explain why you think that they cannot be used in the manner Lee has used them?

Granted Lee, has taken them from the context in which they appeared so that the context is not easily seen, but he thinks that he is citing them faithful to that context. He (and others of us) would like to see why you think that he has erred if you can explain how you arrived at that conclusion.

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

Hi everyone,

Yes, God controls the weather!

Matthew 5:45 He causes his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the righteous and the unrighteous.

It is not an accident when the rain falls on Wicked Wally's fields! It's quite deliberate. And the sun shining on Wally, too, God does something so this happens, rather than intervening only when it's necessary.

Psalm 104:13 He waters the mountains from his upper chambers; the earth is satisfied by the fruit of his work.

Jeremiah 14:22 Do the skies themselves send down showers? No, it is you, O Lord our God. Therefore our hope is in you, for you are the one who does all this.

Hebrews 1:3 He is the radiance of the glory of God and the exact imprint of his nature, and he upholds the universe by the word of his power.

Blessings,
Lee

I think that merely citing these verses (and others like them) will not suffice to definitively answer the question of whether or not God meticulously controls all of the world's weather all of the time. For none of the verses cited on this thread specifically address that question; rather they speak in general poetic terms or in terms of specific instances. God can of course be credited with setting up the world's weather systems and processes, and he can also be credited with controlling the weather on specific occasions---but there doesn't seem to be any definitive text unambiguously ascribing to God meticulous, overall control of the weather at all times.

I think this question is analogous to the wider question of meticulous sovereignty which also, IMHO, the scriptures don't resolve definitively so that one can supply inviolable proof texts for one's presupposed systematics. Many of us routinely demand that the scriptures be read in light of our own systematic theological biases and then tenaciously demand and insist that only our view is allowable, but such tenacity is often more reflective of our fragile human wish to avoid ambiguity than it is a reflection of the truth.

Scriptures like the ones cited above are ambiguous with respect to the question at hand---that is, they can be (and are) interpreted in such a way as to be taken to support either side of the debate....

[GoBahnsen]

You appear to mean that we are to take this in the negative to mean that Lee has inappropriately appropriated the verses he cited for a purpose that the verses were not intended to be used. If so, why not take one or even all the verses Lee has cited and explain why you think that they cannot be used in the manner Lee has used them?

Granted Lee, has taken them from the context in which they appeared so that the context is not easily seen, but he thinks that he is citing them faithful to that context. He (and others of us) would like to see why you think that he has erred if you can explain how you arrived at that conclusion.
Cheers. I'll pray to that. I get tired of humans trying to make God palatable to our human emotions. Example "God loves you and wants the best for you. He would never do anything to hurt you. He just wants to have a love relationship with you. He is crazy about you. He just can't get you out of His mind... He thinks you're soooo neat. So much so that He died for you...you crazy nut loved one. He just loves you...ahhhh he just loves you. Snuggle, snuggle you cuddly little love bug sinner."

Yeah I get tired of that weather.

[lee_merrill]

Hi everyone,

Scriptures like the ones cited above are ambiguous with respect to the question at hand…I did try to choose Scriptures that allow us to make a general conclusion! Let's look further:

Psalm 104:13 He waters the mountains from his upper chambers; the earth is satisfied by the fruit of his work.


The only way this is not a general statement is if he only waters the mountains (and, say, not the plains), but that certainly doesn't seem likely, or if he just sometimes waters the mountains and the plains, and sometimes they water themselves, but I don't think that will do, either, "the earth is satisfied ... his work" implies that all the rains fall at his command.

Jeremiah 14:22 Do any of the worthless idols of the nations bring rain? Do the skies themselves send down showers? No, it is you, O Lord our God. Therefore our hope is in you, for you are the one who does all this.


Again, if this is not a general statement, then we have to conclude that yes, sometimes the skies themselves send down showers. But this verse is clearly saying this doesn't happen at all! The idols don't do this, that's a blanket statement, and we should take "the skies don't do this" as a blanket statement, too. And the second half of the verse also indicates a blanket statement, "you are the one who does all this."

And last but not least!

Hebrews 1:3 He is the radiance of the glory of God and the exact imprint of his nature, and he upholds the universe by the word of his power.

This implies constant upholding, not winding up a clock, but running it, too, constant involvement, implying nothing is done without his control, in the weather.

Blessings,
Lee

[rhutchin]

I think that merely citing these verses (and others like them) will not suffice to definitively answer the question of whether or not God meticulously controls all of the world's weather all of the time. For none of the verses cited on this thread specifically address that question; rather they speak in general poetic terms or in terms of specific instances. God can of course be credited with setting up the world's weather systems and processes, and he can also be credited with controlling the weather on specific occasions---but there doesn't seem to be any definitive text unambiguously ascribing to God meticulous, overall control of the weather at all times.

I think this question is analogous to the wider question of meticulous sovereignty which also, IMHO, the scriptures don't resolve definitively so that one can supply inviolable proof texts for one's presupposed systematics. Many of us routinely demand that the scriptures be read in light of our own systematic theological biases and then tenaciously demand and insist that only our view is allowable, but such tenacity is often more reflective of our fragile human wish to avoid ambiguity than it is a reflection of the truth.

Scriptures like the ones cited above are ambiguous with respect to the question at hand---that is, they can be (and are) interpreted in such a way as to be taken to support either side of the debate....

I have made the theological argument based on the omnipotence of God that God controls all weather. If you think that my logic is biased, then please dissect it and root out the bias. I want to know if I have argued illogically or committed logical errors.

Lee has cited certain verses and explained how they also support the conclusion that God controls the weather. If you think that his logic is also biased, then please dissect what Lee has said and root out the bias.

A lone citation of Scripture may be insufficient to answer the question posed by Seer, but Lee has presented several Scriptures that support a common theme and I have presented a theological argumen based on God's omnipotence that is consistent with the Scriptures Lee has cited. To me, the combination of the two provides a sound foundation for us to conclude that God controls the weather. If you think that there are theological biases at work, describe what you think they are.

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

Cheers. I'll pray to that. I get tired of humans trying to make God palatable to our human emotions. Example "God loves you and wants the best for you. He would never do anything to hurt you. He just wants to have a love relationship with you. He is crazy about you. He just can't get you out of His mind... He thinks you're soooo neat. So much so that He died for you...you crazy nut loved one. He just loves you...ahhhh he just loves you. Snuggle, snuggle you cuddly little love bug sinner."

Yeah I get tired of that weather.

I don't know about the "cuddly little love bug sinner" part, but what would the alternative be---that God in himself is so wholly other and impassible that he cannot be said to have emotions analogous to ours (what happened to the imago dei?) at all and that what we experience as God's love isn't what God actually feels in himself? Maybe we've got some extremes here, and both may well represent "weather" we can do without....

(Maybe theology ought to be introduced as an olympic sport, replacing ping pong, in which only those cuddly enough should be allowed to participate!) :cheers:

[GoBahnsen]

I don't know about the "cuddly little love bug sinner" part, but what would the alternative be---that God in himself is so wholly other and impassible that he cannot be said to have emotions analogous to ours (what happened to the imago dei?) at all and that what we experience as God's love isn't what God actually feels in himself? Maybe we've got some extremes here, and both may well represent "weather" we can do without....

(Maybe theology ought to be introduced as an olympic sport, replacing ping pong, in which only those cuddly enough should be allowed to participate!) :cheers:I'm not denying that God has emotions. They would be perfect of course, not like ours, but related. But just like the terrible storms that kill innocent people, toss them around like toys and slam them into trees.

We ought not to think of God as not being will to be very harsh with human lives. I think it is safe to say from Scripture, that God doesn't love everyone the same way and with the same future purpose in mind.

That is not to say that He doesn't love them at all, in some sense, but He is angry with the wicked all day and He does allow tornados to touch down and do the most horiffic things to humans, does He not?

Our God is awesome and greatly to be feared. He is not a gentleman waiting for freewills to invite Him in. He is God and He can be very non-gentle in lives and weather. Always perfect in all His ways.

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

I have made the theological argument based on the omnipotence of God that God controls all weather. If you think that my logic is biased, then please dissect it and root out the bias. I want to know if I have argued illogically or committed logical errors.

I think your logic is fine. As to your "bias," well, having biases doesn't entail errors in logic. Logic itself is pure form, but it is empty until the form is filled with content. And it is the content that often contains the bias, with or without errors. I don't think you've made any errors, per se, but you do have assumptions---namely, as you allude above, surrounding what you think God's omnipotence entails. You say that you have "made the theological argument based on the omnipotence of God." You have certain assumptions about what it means for God to be omnipotent, and you draw you inferences from these assumptions. The scriptures you use are ambiguous enough to allow that your assumptions be true. And your whole process of reasoning may well be error-free. The trouble is that others, too, have other assumptions about what God's omnipotence entails, and the scriptures can be interpreted in a broad enough way to support their assumptions and inferences as well as your own. And their arguments, likewise, may well contain no logical errors.


Lee has cited certain verses and explained how they also support the conclusion that God controls the weather. If you think that his logic is also biased, then please dissect what Lee has said and root out the bias.

Lee has done alright for himself logically too, but he has tended to take the concept of God's having "general" control of the weather as meaning that God always specifically controls all the world's weather on every specific occasion. Does God consciously control exactly where every raindrop falls or does God sovereignly set the general processes of world meteorology in motion, allowing those processes a certain leeway? I doubt that the scriptures were directly addressing this kind of question, but they could be read as doing so....


A lone citation of Scripture may be insufficient to answer the question posed by Seer, but Lee has presented several Scriptures that support a common theme and I have presented a theological argumen based on God's omnipotence that is consistent with the Scriptures Lee has cited. To me, the combination of the two provides a sound foundation for us to conclude that God controls the weather. If you think that there are theological biases at work, describe what you think they are.

Again, I certainly think your reasoning does provide a sound foundation, but so does the reasoning of your opponents, IMHO. The logic is fine on both sides, and the exegesis is plausible on both sides. The biases are to be found within the assumptions of what God's omnipotence entails; you conclude what you assume, and so do your opponents. Adopt different assumptions and reason from them and you'll get different conclusions.

It can make for a vicious circle; the scriptures inform one's assumptions, and one's assumptions guide one's interpretation of scripture. The scriptures do sometimes entertain ambiguity when we try to stretch them so that they may be brought to bear upon questions they don't directly or exhaustively address. The scriptures are not ambiguous about what they address directly---especially cardinal points of doctrine. But God's people with a heart to serve him have been batting around questions of determinism for thousands of years and coming up with divergent answers. Tenacious argumentation, yet still divergent answers....

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

I'm not denying that God has emotions. They would be perfect of course, not like ours, but related. But just like the terrible storms that kill innocent people, toss them around like toys and slam them into trees.

We ought not to think of God as not being will to be very harsh with human lives. I think it is safe to say from Scripture, that God doesn't love everyone the same way and with the same future purpose in mind.

That is not to say that He doesn't love them at all, in some sense, but He is angry with the wicked all day and He does allow tornados to touch down and do the most horiffic things to humans, does He not?

I think the key word in all of the above is "allow." What is the distinction between what God "allows" and what he positively desires and causes?


Our God is awesome and greatly to be feared. He is not a gentleman waiting for freewills to invite Him in. He is God and He can be very non-gentle in lives and weather. Always perfect in all His ways.

The question becomes: Is there any way to make sense of this, or is what you call God's "non-gentleness" merely arbitrary? Don't we interpret such things in the wider scope of our systematics? God is awesome and we should fear him. He is perfect in all his ways. But his sovereign relation to our choices may well remain a mystery, and our penchant for spinning nice elaborate theological webs may be beside the point. And there's definitely room for speculation about all these things, IMHO....

[rhutchin]

rhutchin
I have made the theological argument based on the omnipotence of God that God controls all weather. If you think that my logic is biased, then please dissect it and root out the bias. I want to know if I have argued illogically or committed logical errors.

pereynol
…You say that you have "made the theological argument based on the omnipotence of God." You have certain assumptions about what it means for God to be omnipotent, and you draw you inferences from these assumptions. The scriptures you use are ambiguous enough to allow that your assumptions be true. And your whole process of reasoning may well be error-free. The trouble is that others, too, have other assumptions about what God's omnipotence entails, and the scriptures can be interpreted in a broad enough way to support their assumptions and inferences as well as your own. And their arguments, likewise, may well contain no logical errors.

OK. So, can you list the assumptions that I have made and provide the assumptions that you would make or that you think undergird any explanation of omnipotence? What is the view of “omnipotence” as you see the Scriptures explaining it? You do not seem to be disagreeing with me on this.


rhutchin
Lee has cited certain verses and explained how they also support the conclusion that God controls the weather. If you think that his logic is also biased, then please dissect what Lee has said and root out the bias.

pereynol
Lee has done alright for himself logically too, but he has tended to take the concept of God's having "general" control of the weather as meaning that God always specifically controls all the world's weather on every specific occasion. Does God consciously control exactly where every raindrop falls or does God sovereignly set the general processes of world meteorology in motion, allowing those processes a certain leeway? I doubt that the scriptures were directly addressing this kind of question, but they could be read as doing so....

Again, you do not seem to be disagreeing with the direction in which Lee has gone, only the extent. Lee’s point is that God controls the weather (i.e., whether it rains or does not rain). You seem to agree with that. Lee has not addressed the issue of whether God also controls where each raindrop falls (but he could have). At this point, you seem to accept the conclusion that God controls the weather (the point of discussion) but not the idea that God controls the effects of the weather (which has not been addressed up to this point by myself or Lee).


rhutchin
A lone citation of Scripture may be insufficient to answer the question posed by Seer, but Lee has presented several Scriptures that support a common theme and I have presented a theological argumen based on God's omnipotence that is consistent with the Scriptures Lee has cited. To me, the combination of the two provides a sound foundation for us to conclude that God controls the weather. If you think that there are theological biases at work, describe what you think they are.

pereynol
Again, I certainly think your reasoning does provide a sound foundation, but so does the reasoning of your opponents, IMHO. The logic is fine on both sides, and the exegesis is plausible on both sides. The biases are to be found within the assumptions of what God's omnipotence entails; you conclude what you assume, and so do your opponents. Adopt different assumptions and reason from them and you'll get different conclusions.

It can make for a vicious circle; the scriptures inform one's assumptions, and one's assumptions guide one's interpretation of scripture. The scriptures do sometimes entertain ambiguity when we try to stretch them so that they may be brought to bear upon questions they don't directly or exhaustively address. The scriptures are not ambiguous about what they address directly---especially cardinal points of doctrine. But God's people with a heart to serve him have been batting around questions of determinism for thousands of years and coming up with divergent answers. Tenacious argumentation, yet still divergent answers....

I see none of this either in my definition of omnipotence nor in Lee’s explanation of the Scriptures. Can you show how either of us has created a vicious circle of reasoning? You are writing in generalities that seem to have no specific application to what has been said by myself or Lee. Help us out here, so that we can understand the point that you want to make.

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

OK. So, can you list the assumptions that I have made and provide the assumptions that you would make or that you think undergird any explanation of omnipotence? What is the view of “omnipotence” as you see the Scriptures explaining it? You do not seem to be disagreeing with me on this.

On the face of the matter, "omnipotence" simply means that God is all powerful, that he has all power to do all logically possible things. But the next question is, How does God use his power? Some Christians who equate omnipotence with determinism think that if God doesn't actively micromanage all aspects of creation, then he's not really omnipotent or not really sovereign. Others would counter that God may sovereignly decide to restrict the use of his power in some way, without micromanaging every detail of his creation and yet remain sovereign and omnipotent over that creation. The second view sees a distinction between what God could do and what he in fact does do. The question about how God's sovereignty and human freedom interface is a classic example of how these two views often come into conflict. The first point of view often reflects the opinion that, unless God actively controls every human decision, then he's not really sovereign. The second view would maintain that God remains sovereign even if he allows LFW among humans. Relatedly, a question about God's sovereignty or omnipotence with respect to the weather would include the scope in which God uses his power; does he actively control the fall of every raindrop, the location of each lightening strike, and the exact mph gust of every breath of wind within a micromanaged, deterministic world? Or perhaps, does he merely ordain the world meteorological processes in a general fashion and allow those processes to operate in some measure on their own? Both views could fall under the general concept of sovereignty or omnipotence in the eyes of their adherents, but there is often disagreement about what "sovereignty" or omnipotence must entail. Within these differences lie the assumptions I spoke of.

My own view is undecided. I see merit in both points of view.

What point of view do you adopt? To what extent do you think God uses his power with respect to the weather? Does God actively hurl lightning bolts at specific targets everytime lightning strikes? Does he ordain the trajectory of every raindrop, snowflake, etc? How you answer these questions will further reveal your assumptions.



Again, you do not seem to be disagreeing with the direction in which Lee has gone, only the extent. Lee’s point is that God controls the weather (i.e., whether it rains or does not rain). You seem to agree with that. Lee has not addressed the issue of whether God also controls where each raindrop falls (but he could have). At this point, you seem to accept the conclusion that God controls the weather (the point of discussion) but not the idea that God controls the effects of the weather (which has not been addressed up to this point by myself or Lee).

Well then, lets discuss the extent of God's control over the "effects of the weather," because this might really be the crux of the matter.




I see none of this either in my definition of omnipotence nor in Lee’s explanation of the Scriptures. Can you show how either of us has created a vicious circle of reasoning? You are writing in generalities that seem to have no specific application to what has been said by myself or Lee. Help us out here, so that we can understand the point that you want to make.

To some extent, everytime anyone reasons from assumptions to conclusions, there is a sort of circular reasoning involved (not necessarily a logical fallacy). In logic, we can only conclude what we have put into our premises, and our premises contain our assumptions. That's why mere logical or formal correctness in argumentation isn't enough to compel the assent of those who disagree with us. The specific application of these notions to the question at hand is that both sides of this debate (and both sides of the freedom/sovereignty debate) often reason out their arguments very well and yet fail to convince each other. As someone who listens to both sides of these questions, I often find myself recognizing that, though both sides offer good arguments, neither side totally convinces me---just as they don't convince each other. Many times, the real difference between theological points of view isn't found in the use/misuse of logic, but rather in the assumptions that one reasons from.

[rhutchin]

rhutchin
OK. So, can you list the assumptions that I have made and provide the assumptions that you would make or that you think undergird any explanation of omnipotence? What is the view of “omnipotence” as you see the Scriptures explaining it? You do not seem to be disagreeing with me on this.

pereynol
On the face of the matter, "omnipotence" simply means that God is all powerful, that he has all power to do all logically possible things. But the next question is, How does God use his power?…

My own view is undecided. I see merit in both points of view.

What point of view do you adopt? To what extent do you think God uses his power with respect to the weather? Does God actively hurl lightning bolts at specific targets everytime lightning strikes? Does he ordain the trajectory of every raindrop, snowflake, etc? How you answer these questions will further reveal your assumptions.

The next question is not, How does God use his power? It is, What does it mean that God is all powerful?

Here there are two points to be made. Omnipotence means that--

1. God has the power to affect and determine events through direct intervention. He can both make it rain and guide each raindrop to a predetermined location if He wants.

2. If God does not exercise His power to intervene in events, then He has predetermined the course of those events by His inaction. If events are not transpiring as God wills, He always has the ability to intervene in those events to get what He wants.

Where determinism comes in is when we combine omnipotence with omniscience (which is implicit in the two points above and thus an assumption that may be troubling you). It is the combination of omnipotence and omniscience that leads to the inescapable conclusion that God has determined all things. Without omniscience of present events, omnipotence can be impotent.

This is why the OVT crowd wants to deny God future knowledge of events. To avoid determinism in all its fullness, you must, at a minimum, limit God’s omniscience. I am not sure that limiting God's knowledge of future events does what OVT wants because all freewill decisions are made in present time. Technically, nothing really happens in the future, so nothing can escape God's omnipotent control. All present events can be controlled (and thus determined) by God because He is omnipotent, but He must be omiscient with respect to present events to exercise fully this control (I guess that means that He must be omnipresent also). Thus, God can make it rain, guide the raindrop to its appointed location, and turn the king’s heart whichever way He wills.

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

The next question is not, How does God use his power? It is, What does it mean that God is all powerful?

I think both questions are important because, though they are interdependent, they are often answered differently in isolation. This is particularly true with some varieties of theological determinism, as I've detailed above. But, this doesn't seem to be at issue between us.


Here there are two points to be made. Omnipotence means that--

1. God has the power to affect and determine events through direct intervention. He can both make it rain and guide each raindrop to a predetermined location if He wants.

So far, we agree.


2. If God does not exercise His power to intervene in events, then He has predetermined the course of those events by His inaction.

I think a clear and significant distinction is in order here between what God directly and positively exerts control over and what he merely "allows" without positively exerting control. I agree that he is still sovereign and omnipotent whether he actively exerts his power or not, but when he doesn't actively exert his power over his creation or beings and entities within it, he is allowing those beings and entities some measure of leeway that becomes qualitatively different from when he does exert more direct control. This becomes an important distinction, and it is especially significant for the question at hand concerning the weather, for the question of how sovereignty and human choice interface, and, potentially, for theodicy.


If events are not transpiring as God wills, He always has the ability to intervene in those events to get what He wants.

Agreed.



Where determinism comes in is when we combine omnipotence with omniscience (which is implicit in the two points above and thus an assumption that may be troubling you).

This combination of Gods attributes doesn't trouble me.


It is the combination of omnipotence and omniscience that leads to the inescapable conclusion that God has determined all things. Without omniscience of present events, omnipotence can be impotent.

There are ways to look at the combination of omnipotence and omniscience such that God may be said not to have determined everything directly, that is, God may have allowed some measure of self-determination as these things are defined by those who hold to LFW, for example, or for those who make the (I think necessary) distinction that God doesn't always exert direct control over every minute particle of creation at all times. In other words, I think universal determinism is an escapable conclusion.

But, though this discussion is analogous to and parallel to our discussion of the extent of God's control over the weather, it is a bit of a digression from it. It is helpful, nevertheless, in disclosing the matrix of assumptions in which all discussions surrounding theological determinism lie.


This is why the OVT crowd wants to deny God future knowledge of events. To avoid determinism in all its fullness, you must, at a minimum, limit God’s omniscience. I am not sure that limiting God's knowledge of future events does what OVT wants because all freewill decisions are made in present time. Technically, nothing really happens in the future, so nothing can escape God's omnipotent control. All present events can be controlled (and thus determined) by God because He is omnipotent, but He must be omiscient with respect to present events to exercise fully this control (I guess that means that He must be omnipresent also). Thus, God can make it rain, guide the raindrop to its appointed location, and turn the king’s heart whichever way He wills.

I'm not an exponent of OVT. However, I do find some of what they say worthwhile as a possible corrective to fullblown determinism. I also share some of your misgivings. Some loose ends on both sides, IMHO. But, again, this is a bit of a digression---though related to our discussion.

I ask you, to what extent do you think God directly controls the effects of the weather? Do you think he, in fact, directly controls the trajectory of every raindrop, the target of every lightning bolt, and the swiftness of each gust of wind? Or does he merely "allow" certain meteorological processes to run their course sometimes? Or perhaps, as I suspect, we haven't sufficiently explicit scriptural warrant to answer these questions definitively?

One thing more, though the analogous questions concerning theological determinism are digressions from the topic at hand, how one addresses the topic at hand will indeed impact the larger questions as well....

[lee_merrill]

Hi everyone,

I ask you, to what extent do you think God directly controls the effects of the weather? Do you think he, in fact, directly controls the trajectory of every raindrop, the target of every lightning bolt, and the swiftness of each gust of wind…Yes, I would say that every raindrop is under his control, I refer again to Wicked Wally's fields. God "sends rain on them," the rainfall there is quite deliberate, thus the control is at least within the range of Wally's farmland, and thus, I think we may conclude, to every raindrop.

Proverbs 16:33 The lot is cast into the lap, but its every decision is from the Lord.

This also implies that we may conclude that God controls the weather completely, if he controls Monopoly games completely! We can even notice that peoples' decisions affect the roll of the dice (where to toss them, shall I throw them in the air?), yet every decision that comes out from them, is from the Lord.

Blessings,
Lee

[rhutchin]

rhutchin
Here there are two points to be made. Omnipotence means that--

1. God has the power to affect and determine events through direct intervention. He can both make it rain and guide each raindrop to a predetermined location if He wants.

2. If God does not exercise His power to intervene in events, then He has predetermined the course of those events by His inaction.

pereynol
I think a clear and significant distinction is in order here between what God directly and positively exerts control over and what he merely "allows" without positively exerting control. I agree that he is still sovereign and omnipotent whether he actively exerts his power or not, but when he doesn't actively exert his power over his creation or beings and entities within it, he is allowing those beings and entities some measure of leeway that becomes qualitatively different from when he does exert more direct control. This becomes an important distinction, and it is especially significant for the question at hand concerning the weather, for the question of how sovereignty and human choice interface, and, potentially, for theodicy.

[Later]There are ways to look at the combination of omnipotence and omniscience such that God may be said not to have determined everything directly, that is, God may have allowed some measure of self-determination as these things are defined by those who hold to LFW, for example, or for those who make the (I think necessary) distinction that God doesn't always exert direct control over every minute particle of creation at all times. In other words, I think universal determinism is an escapable conclusion.

But, though this discussion is analogous to and parallel to our discussion of the extent of God's control over the weather, it is a bit of a digression from it. It is helpful, nevertheless, in disclosing the matrix of assumptions in which all discussions surrounding theological determinism lie.

A distinction can be made between God’s direct control over events and His allowing events to happen freely. The question is whether God determines those things that He allows.

This is where the concept of omnipotence is important. If God has to power to control events and can change any outcome He desires then, for God to allow an event to proceed unimpeded, is for God to determine that event.

For example, God can prevent a bomb from detonating once it is dropped on a population. If God refuses to intervene to defuse a bomb but allows it to explode and to kill scores of people, then He has determined that outcome. It is true that God allowed people to freely make the bomb, freely place the bomb on an aircraft, and freely drop the bomb. The exercise of freedom was allowed by God to get the outcome that He had determined. The full effect of omnipotence is that every outcome is under the God’s complete control and no outcome occurs unless God specifically decides that it should occur. If a man throws the die and a 6 comes up, then we know that either God intervened to make the 6 come up or He allowed the 6 to come up. Either way, the 6 comes up because God had decided that a 6 should come up. The end result is, therefore, determined by God.


rhutchin
This is why the OVT crowd wants to deny God future knowledge of events. To avoid determinism in all its fullness, you must, at a minimum, limit God’s omniscience. I am not sure that limiting God's knowledge of future events does what OVT wants because all freewill decisions are made in present time. Technically, nothing really happens in the future, so nothing can escape God's omnipotent control. All present events can be controlled (and thus determined) by God because He is omnipotent, but He must be omiscient with respect to present events to exercise fully this control (I guess that means that He must be omnipresent also). Thus, God can make it rain, guide the raindrop to its appointed location, and turn the king’s heart whichever way He wills.

pereynol
…I ask you, to what extent do you think God directly controls the effects of the weather? Do you think he, in fact, directly controls the trajectory of every raindrop, the target of every lightning bolt, and the swiftness of each gust of wind? Or does he merely "allow" certain meteorological processes to run their course sometimes? Or perhaps, as I suspect, we haven't sufficiently explicit scriptural warrant to answer these questions definitively?…

If God is both omnipotent (meaning that he can control the trajectory of every raindrop if He desires) and omniscient (so that He knows the trajectory of every raindrop as in unfolds), then God determines that trajectory even if He does nothing to change that trajectory. That raindrop travels a path determined by God. Either the raindrop is already traveling the path God has determined so that God does not have to intervene to change that path, or the raindrop is veering off the path God has determined so God intervenes to direct it to the path He has determined.

God may allow events to occur without interfering with them. However, God’s ability to intervene and change any event makes His lack of intervention a determinant of any outcome that ensues.

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

A distinction can be made between God’s direct control over events and His allowing events to happen freely. The question is whether God determines those things that He allows.

This is where the concept of omnipotence is important. If God has to power to control events and can change any outcome He desires then, for God to allow an event to proceed unimpeded, is for God to determine that event.

I think that using the label "determinism" to designate things God directly controls as well as things he merely allows to happen may be a bit misleading. But this becomes a matter of semantics. A compatibilist, such as I suspect you are, can indeed use the label "determinism" to refer to things which God merely allows to happen and be forthright about it within the confines of his system. But someone who holds to some form of agent causality or LFW would have trouble placing phenomena which God doesn't directly control under a wider deterministic umbrella. Assumptions again....


For example, God can prevent a bomb from detonating once it is dropped on a population. If God refuses to intervene to defuse a bomb but allows it to explode and to kill scores of people, then He has determined that outcome. It is true that God allowed people to freely make the bomb, freely place the bomb on an aircraft, and freely drop the bomb. The exercise of freedom was allowed by God to get the outcome that He had determined. The full effect of omnipotence is that every outcome is under the God’s complete control and no outcome occurs unless God specifically decides that it should occur. If a man throws the die and a 6 comes up, then we know that either God intervened to make the 6 come up or He allowed the 6 to come up. Either way, the 6 comes up because God had decided that a 6 should come up. The end result is, therefore, determined by God.

The first example holds if one assumes compatibilism, but if one does not, the example fails to convince. The second example is more difficult; how might one distinguish whether God is or is not intervening when the dice comes up one way or the other? I suppose that, in the first instance, God directly influences the dice so that they come up 6 by tinkering somehow with the laws of gravity, etc? In the second instance, does God merely allow the natural outcome of the forces in play to work themselves out---the amount of exertion of the thrower's hand, the pull of gravity, the texture and angle of the surface upon which the die falls, etc?

I think the overall point to be gleaned from all this is that we must distinguish meaningfully between primary and secondary causes, such that with secondary causes, God is at one remove from the outcome of events he doesn't directly control. But what one thinks the significance of this distinction is will depend upon one's wider field of assumptions concerning determinism.


If God is both omnipotent (meaning that he can control the trajectory of every raindrop if He desires) and omniscient (so that He knows the trajectory of every raindrop as in unfolds), then God determines that trajectory even if He does nothing to change that trajectory. That raindrop travels a path determined by God. Either the raindrop is already traveling the path God has determined so that God does not have to intervene to change that path, or the raindrop is veering off the path God has determined so God intervenes to direct it to the path He has determined.

I think that this example is in the same boat as the "roll of the dice" scenario.
We have primary and secondary causality in play, but how one sees the significance of this distinction will depend upon one's wider viewpoint.


God may allow events to occur without interfering with them. However, God’s ability to intervene and change any event makes His lack of intervention a determinant of any outcome that ensues.

In a sense I agree with this. But it also remains possible that what you call God's "lack of intervention" isn't the only determinant involved.

[rhutchin]

rhutchin
A distinction can be made between God’s direct control over events and His allowing events to happen freely. The question is whether God determines those things that He allows.

This is where the concept of omnipotence is important. If God has to power to control events and can change any outcome He desires then, for God to allow an event to proceed unimpeded, is for God to determine that event.

pereynol
I think that using the label "determinism" to designate things God directly controls as well as things he merely allows to happen may be a bit misleading. But this becomes a matter of semantics. A compatibilist, such as I suspect you are, can indeed use the label "determinism" to refer to things which God merely allows to happen and be forthright about it within the confines of his system. But someone who holds to some form of agent causality or LFW would have trouble placing phenomena which God doesn't directly control under a wider deterministic umbrella. Assumptions again....

The “labels” we give to concepts are irrelevant here. It may be true that someone who holds to some form of agent causality or LFW would have trouble placing phenomena which God doesn't directly control under a wider deterministic umbrella. The issue here is the effect of omnipotence. For those who are into LFW, the effect of omnipotence is that men are free to do only that which God allows and nothing more. People can freely choose to act only after God first determines that He will not intervene to prevent them from taking that action. People act only with the specific permission of God. That is the effect of omnipotence. Given this, one can label it anything they want and the effect remains the same.


rhutchin
For example, God can prevent a bomb from detonating once it is dropped on a population. If God refuses to intervene to defuse a bomb but allows it to explode and to kill scores of people, then He has determined that outcome. It is true that God allowed people to freely make the bomb, freely place the bomb on an aircraft, and freely drop the bomb. The exercise of freedom was allowed by God to get the outcome that He had determined. The full effect of omnipotence is that every outcome is under the God’s complete control and no outcome occurs unless God specifically decides that it should occur. If a man throws the die and a 6 comes up, then we know that either God intervened to make the 6 come up or He allowed the 6 to come up. Either way, the 6 comes up because God had decided that a 6 should come up. The end result is, therefore, determined by God.

pereynol
The first example holds if one assumes compatibilism, but if one does not, the example fails to convince. The second example is more difficult; how might one distinguish whether God is or is not intervening when the dice comes up one way or the other? I suppose that, in the first instance, God directly influences the dice so that they come up 6 by tinkering somehow with the laws of gravity, etc? In the second instance, does God merely allow the natural outcome of the forces in play to work themselves out---the amount of exertion of the thrower's hand, the pull of gravity, the texture and angle of the surface upon which the die falls, etc?

I think the overall point to be gleaned from all this is that we must distinguish meaningfully between primary and secondary causes, such that with secondary causes, God is at one remove from the outcome of events he doesn't directly control. But what one thinks the significance of this distinction is will depend upon one's wider field of assumptions concerning determinism.

You are not grasping the concept of omnipotence. The need here is get a clear understanding of omnipotence and what it entails. Until you do that, it does no good to relate it to compatibilism or anything else.

We do not have to distinguish whether God intervenes. We simply need to know that the end result of throwing the die is determined by God -- either through direct intervention or by allowing the outcome to occur. All primary or secondary causes and influences are under the control of God (by virtue of omnipotence), so each step in the process is determined by God because that is the power that omnipotence gives to God.


rhutchin
If God is both omnipotent (meaning that he can control the trajectory of every raindrop if He desires) and omniscient (so that He knows the trajectory of every raindrop as in unfolds), then God determines that trajectory even if He does nothing to change that trajectory. That raindrop travels a path determined by God. Either the raindrop is already traveling the path God has determined so that God does not have to intervene to change that path, or the raindrop is veering off the path God has determined so God intervenes to direct it to the path He has determined.

pereynol
I think that this example is in the same boat as the "roll of the dice" scenario.
We have primary and secondary causality in play, but how one sees the significance of this distinction will depend upon one's wider viewpoint.

Here again, you have divorced yourself from omnipotence and are not taking it into account. Omnipotence makes no distinction between primary and secondary causes because it gives God absolute control over both. Omnipotence gives God the ability to determine what causes proceed and which He stops.


rhutchin
God may allow events to occur without interfering with them. However, God’s ability to intervene and change any event makes His lack of intervention a determinant of any outcome that ensues.

pereynol
In a sense I agree with this. But it also remains possible that what you call God's "lack of intervention" isn't the only determinant involved.

No other determinants matter. Omnipotence gives God absolute and final control over all causes involved in any action. God exerts final control over all causes and determinants.

[Benster]

I understood that there are certain events on earth that God chooses to leave to man's control (or attempt to control) in order to somehow allow free will. (Although this presents a host of inconsistencies.)

Mankind (at least the Chinese, so I read recently!) are now able to manipulate the weather. So, I would assume that man's attempts, for good or ill, to make it rain, would be left by God to work, or not, without His interference.

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

The “labels” we give to concepts are irrelevant here. It may be true that someone who holds to some form of agent causality or LFW would have trouble placing phenomena which God doesn't directly control under a wider deterministic umbrella. The issue here is the effect of omnipotence. For those who are into LFW, the effect of omnipotence is that men are free to do only that which God allows and nothing more. People can freely choose to act only after God first determines that He will not intervene to prevent them from taking that action. People act only with the specific permission of God. That is the effect of omnipotence. Given this, one can label it anything they want and the effect remains the same.

You claim that what is at issue is the effect of omnipotence while how one employs "determinism" as a label remains irrelevant. You also seem to suggest that secondary causality (as a means) is entirely moot simply because all end results are, to you, determined by God---whether directly or indirectly. I disagree.

Labels are useful, and they convey meaning; as such, they ought to be as precise as possible. You may think it fitting to label anything "determinism" whether it has to do with secondary causes or agent causality or anything pertaining to human volition or the workings of natural processes, but I disagree. You aren't bothered by this type of "labeling" simply because it reflects your opinions; you seem to define all events deterministically within your theology, so therefore you assert that everything must fall under that particular rubric. But for those of us who find significance in God's choosing not to directly control all events and all exercises of human volition, "determinism" isn't an apt label at all. If words mean anything, and communication is a matter of precise signification, then your broad use of the label "determinism" is a valid point of debate for those who disagree with your position.

And your privileging of ends over means is also part of your position, but it may not be shared by others. What "matters" to you may not be what is more important in everyone's eyes, and it may not even be what is of utmost importance in God's eyes. If God didn't place some value upon means and secondary causality, I suspect he wouldn't have allowed them in the first place. Ends and means constitute a whole, and though our limited human minds may find comfort in exalting one and marginalizing the other, it isn't at all apparent that such a move is correct. You find little significance in secondary causes because of your commitment to theological determinism. Someone else who doesn't share that commitment may well find greater significance in secondary causality than you do.

Also, if one defines everything in deterministic terms from the outset, then by definition there will be nothing outside the parameters of determinism. The trouble with that move is that it is a mere tautology which fails to address the real debate. No opponent would find such a tactic compelling. And there'd be no way to falsify determinism under such an assumption; how would one know or discover that fullblown determinism was false without putting your tautology to the test or questioning the way you use it as a "label?" You say labels are unimportant yet you insist upon labeling everything as being determined.


You are not grasping the concept of omnipotence. The need here is get a clear understanding of omnipotence and what it entails. Until you do that, it does no good to relate it to compatibilism or anything else.

I grasp your concept of omnipotence quite well; you equate it with determinism and then insist that everything must be determined in order for true omnipotence to obtain. I disagree.


We do not have to distinguish whether God intervenes. We simply need to know that the end result of throwing the die is determined by God -- either through direct intervention or by allowing the outcome to occur. All primary or secondary causes and influences are under the control of God (by virtue of omnipotence), so each step in the process is determined by God because that is the power that omnipotence gives to God.

Again, you privilege ends over means within the confines of your own tautological definition of omnipotence. Given this thought process, you are always right, by definition, even though you eschew labels. I find all this unconvincing. Your reasoning is self-consistent, but this alone isn't enough to make your conclusions effectively persuasive.


Here again, you have divorced yourself from omnipotence and are not taking it into account. Omnipotence makes no distinction between primary and secondary causes because it gives God absolute control over both. Omnipotence gives God the ability to determine what causes proceed and which He stops.

Actually, it is only your definition of omnipotence which obliterates the significance of secondary causes....


No other determinants matter. Omnipotence gives God absolute and final control over all causes involved in any action. God exerts final control over all causes and determinants.

All this is okay within your viewpoint, but I have a suspicion that if no other determinants mattered then God probably wouldn't have taken the trouble to create and allow them....

[rhutchin]

rhutchin
The “labels” we give to concepts are irrelevant here. It may be true that someone who holds to some form of agent causality or LFW would have trouble placing phenomena which God doesn't directly control under a wider deterministic umbrella. The issue here is the effect of omnipotence. For those who are into LFW, the effect of omnipotence is that men are free to do only that which God allows and nothing more. People can freely choose to act only after God first determines that He will not intervene to prevent them from taking that action. People act only with the specific permission of God. That is the effect of omnipotence. Given this, one can label it anything they want and the effect remains the same.

pereynol
You claim that what is at issue is the effect of omnipotence while how one employs "determinism" as a label remains irrelevant. You also seem to suggest that secondary causality (as a means) is entirely moot simply because all end results are, to you, determined by God---whether directly or indirectly. I disagree.

Labels are useful, and they convey meaning; as such, they ought to be as precise as possible…But for those of us who find significance in God's choosing not to directly control all events and all exercises of human volition, "determinism" isn't an apt label at all…

And your privileging of ends over means is also part of your position, but it may not be shared by others…You find little significance in secondary causes because of your commitment to theological determinism…

Also, if one defines everything in deterministic terms from the outset, then by definition there will be nothing outside the parameters of determinism. The trouble with that move is that it is a mere tautology which fails to address the real debate. No opponent would find such a tactic compelling. And there'd be no way to falsify determinism under such an assumption; how would one know or discover that fullblown determinism was false without putting your tautology to the test or questioning the way you use it as a "label?" You say labels are unimportant yet you insist upon labeling everything as being determined.

Given what you have said, I propose that we first describe/define the concept and then attach a label to it later. I have tried to divorce the discussion from the label of “determinism “ but have had to us the word “determine” as a descriptor to explain the meaning of omnipotence. My suspicion is that you see the word “determine” and immediately think “determinism.” My objective has been to avoid labels until we nail down the meaning of “omnipotence” and then we can develop whatever labels might be convenient.

I do not see how I have defined “omnipotence” in deterministic terms. As far as I can tell, I have offered a neutral argument based solely on a logical organization of the facts before us. I have drawn conclusions from that argument using the word “determine” as a descriptor and not a label. I would like to stick with that argument.

My point that secondary causes are not significant relates entirely to my definition of “omnipotence” and requires no a priori commitment to theological determinism. My argument simply notes that a final cause that rules over all secondary causes makes those secondary causes irrelevant. If you object to that position, then you need to explain how you would define omnipotence in relation to secondary causes.


rhutchin
You are not grasping the concept of omnipotence. The need here is get a clear understanding of omnipotence and what it entails. Until you do that, it does no good to relate it to compatibilism or anything else.

pereynol
I grasp your concept of omnipotence quite well; you equate it with determinism and then insist that everything must be determined in order for true omnipotence to obtain. I disagree.

If your claim is that you grasp my concept of omnipotence but then turn around and claim that I equate it with determinism, then you have not grasped my concept of omnipotence. You are disagreeing with a misconception that you created.

What you need to do is start with my original definition of omnipotence and describe how this definition does not work. Key to this is the relationship between omnipotence and secondary causes.


rhutchin
We do not have to distinguish whether God intervenes. We simply need to know that the end result of throwing the die is determined by God -- either through direct intervention or by allowing the outcome to occur. All primary or secondary causes and influences are under the control of God (by virtue of omnipotence), so each step in the process is determined by God because that is the power that omnipotence gives to God.

pereynol
Again, you privilege ends over means within the confines of your own tautological definition of omnipotence. Given this thought process, you are always right, by definition, even though you eschew labels. I find all this unconvincing. Your reasoning is self-consistent, but this alone isn't enough to make your conclusions effectively persuasive.

OK, you disagree. So, now explain what you see as the correct approach. It is great that you disagree with my position, but it would be nice if you staked out an alternative position that you could then describe and defend.


rhutchin
Here again, you have divorced yourself from omnipotence and are not taking it into account. Omnipotence makes no distinction between primary and secondary causes because it gives God absolute control over both. Omnipotence gives God the ability to determine what causes proceed and which He stops.

pereynol
Actually, it is only your definition of omnipotence which obliterates the significance of secondary causes....

Exactly right. So, tell us your definition of omnipotence and describe how it is able to maintain the significance of secondary causes.


rhutchin
No other determinants matter. Omnipotence gives God absolute and final control over all causes involved in any action. God exerts final control over all causes and determinants.

pereynol
All this is okay within your viewpoint, but I have a suspicion that if no other determinants mattered then God probably wouldn't have taken the trouble to create and allow them....

OK, you disagree. Does that mean that your position is “Other determinants matter. Omnipotence does not give God absolute and final control over all causes involved in any action. God does not exert final control over all causes and determinants.”

Can you stake out a position?

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

Given what you have said, I propose that we first describe/define the concept and then attach a label to it later. I have tried to divorce the discussion from the label of “determinism “ but have had to us the word “determine” as a descriptor to explain the meaning of omnipotence. My suspicion is that you see the word “determine” and immediately think “determinism.” My objective has been to avoid labels until we nail down the meaning of “omnipotence” and then we can develop whatever labels might be convenient.

I do not see how I have defined “omnipotence” in deterministic terms. As far as I can tell, I have offered a neutral argument based solely on a logical organization of the facts before us. I have drawn conclusions from that argument using the word “determine” as a descriptor and not a label. I would like to stick with that argument.

Well, I'm not sure that what you've said coheres. When you argue that God determines everything, how is that not determinism? What exactly is the functional difference between using the verb "to determine" and the noun "determinism" as a "label" or merely a "descriptor?" What's the difference between a label and a descriptor, as you see it? Moreover, if you are a determinist and are blatantly arguing for theological determinism, why shy away from the label? Either you are a theological determinist or you're not---or you're undecided....


My point that secondary causes are not significant relates entirely to my definition of “omnipotence” and requires no a priori commitment to theological determinism.

I think theological determinism is implicit within your definition of omnipotence; when you claim outright that secondary causes are just as "determined" by God as the things he directly controls---that indeed they must be in order for omnipotence to be upheld, how can you deny that your definition is already freighted with determinism? By the way, I never said anything about your assumption being a priori in the strictest sense....


My argument simply notes that a final cause that rules over all secondary causes makes those secondary causes irrelevant.

This argument of yours works well within your overall systematics, and it does assume compatibilism, IMHO. It also privileges ends over means, as I've contended before. And the concept of "irrelevance" must have a context in which to function. The unanswered question is, Irrelevance to what? In your case, it seems that you mean "irrelevance to the end results," or, perhaps the eschatological results. But there are other contexts to consider in which secondary causality may be quite relevant and significant---namely the qualitative difference between beings possessing LFW and those possessing compatibilistic volition and theodicy. Within these contexts, secondary causes are by no means irrelevant.


If you object to that position, then you need to explain how you would define omnipotence in relation to secondary causes.

Actually I don't need to explain how I would define omnipotence in relation to secondary causes in order to object to your position; I can merely object to your position without having to supply an alternate view. It is fallacious for you to think that an objection cannot stand alone; one may legitimately reject, disagree, or falsify a position, evaluating that position on its own merits, without bearing the onus of formulating a fully developed alternative. Examples of this occur regularly in science, in the trials and errors of invention and technological innovation, and in courts of law. We may recognize problems within scientific theories without yet having a fully formed countertheory; we can recognize that there's something wrong with a machine we've invented when it malfunctions before we provide a fully-orbed solution or improvement, and we can proclaim a defendant innocent without proclaiming someone else guilty. This kind of thing happens all the time. And the limitations of any argument can be legitimately explored without the necessary formulation of a viable alternative. Nevertheless, a critique or objection may well suggest the beginnings of an alternative, and I will attempt to delineate some sketchy contours of what I think could be an alternative a little further on.

And as I've said repeatedly to you, up front, I am yet unpersuaded on the subject of determinism; perhaps you can persuade me. This is simply where I honestly stand as a nonsectarian. I can state specific objections to various takes on determinism, be they Calvinist, Arminian, or OVT, but I cannot simply "pick a winner" and magically resolve my misgivings about any of these systems. I am suspending judgment on the issue and shall continue to do so until convinced otherwise. And again, it isn't necessary for me to argue a positive case for any one position in order to have legitimate objections concerning your position. That's the way it is....


If your claim is that you grasp my concept of omnipotence but then turn around and claim that I equate it with determinism, then you have not grasped my concept of omnipotence. You are disagreeing with a misconception that you created.

Then explain to me how you aren't equating omnipotence with determinism, because everytime I read what you say, it seems as plain as day....


What you need to do is start with my original definition of omnipotence and describe how this definition does not work. Key to this is the relationship between omnipotence and secondary causes.

As I've said, your definition works fine as part of the overall structure of your position, but what merely "works" on a conceptual or systematic level may still be false. Other definitions also "work," and their logical consistency makes them just as plausible as yours. Someone like me is left having to decide between several seemingly self-consistent, plausible positions. But I will begin to elaborate my thoughts on secondary causes if you think that would be helpful.


OK, you disagree. So, now explain what you see as the correct approach. It is great that you disagree with my position, but it would be nice if you staked out an alternative position that you could then describe and defend.

Exactly right. So, tell us your definition of omnipotence and describe how it is able to maintain the significance of secondary causes.

OK, you disagree. Does that mean that your position is “Other determinants matter. Omnipotence does not give God absolute and final control over all causes involved in any action. God does not exert final control over all causes and determinants.”

Can you stake out a position?

I can begin to stake out a position, but it won't be a decisive subscription to any of the common sectarian viewpoints. I shall deal with two issues here: defining omnipotence with respect to secondary causes and the significance of secondary causes (especially human volition and the workings of natural processes) within theodicy.

But I'm going to start a new post for this purpose; read on for the continuation...

[lee_merrill]

Hi everyone,

Just a quick note, I believe believers can really choose, within God's will, that there is not always and only one choice, for those submitted to God.

1 Corinthians 9:1 Am I not free?

And God knows those choices, and incorporates them into his plan, thus God doesn't ordain every decision…

Galatians 5:13 You, my brothers, were called to be free. But do not use your freedom to indulge the sinful nature; rather, serve one another in love.

Blessings,
Lee

[rhutchin]

rhutchin
Given what you have said, I propose that we first describe/define the concept and then attach a label to it later. I have tried to divorce the discussion from the label of “determinism “ but have had to us the word “determine” as a descriptor to explain the meaning of omnipotence. My suspicion is that you see the word “determine” and immediately think “determinism.” My objective has been to avoid labels until we nail down the meaning of “omnipotence” and then we can develop whatever labels might be convenient.

I do not see how I have defined “omnipotence” in deterministic terms. As far as I can tell, I have offered a neutral argument based solely on a logical organization of the facts before us. I have drawn conclusions from that argument using the word “determine” as a descriptor and not a label. I would like to stick with that argument.

pereynol
Well, I'm not sure that what you've said coheres. When you argue that God determines everything, how is that not determinism? What exactly is the functional difference between using the verb "to determine" and the noun "determinism" as a "label" or merely a "descriptor?" What's the difference between a label and a descriptor, as you see it? Moreover, if you are a determinist and are blatantly arguing for theological determinism, why shy away from the label? Either you are a theological determinist or you're not---or you're undecided....

Determinism is a label given to a set of beliefs. That set of beliefs defines that which has been agreed upon. The functional difference is that the verb (determine) is used to identify that which one believes after which one can then use a noun (determinism) as a label for those beliefs so that one can cite the label and avoid rewriting the entire set of beliefs. I am trying to keep the argument at the verb stage and identify what it is that “omnipotence” does.


rhutchin
My point that secondary causes are not significant relates entirely to my definition of “omnipotence” and requires no a priori commitment to theological determinism.

pereynol
I think theological determinism is implicit within your definition of omnipotence; when you claim outright that secondary causes are just as "determined" by God as the things he directly controls---that indeed they must be in order for omnipotence to be upheld, how can you deny that your definition is already freighted with determinism? By the way, I never said anything about your assumption being a priori in the strictest sense....

Let’s look at the argument. Consider a set of secondary causes that all can interact to varying degrees to produce a specific final outcome. If there is one cause that rules all those secondary causes such that it either (1) negates the effects of secondary causes so that the outcome produced is not that which would have occurred absent this one cause or (2) must be purposely withheld in order to leave secondary causes free to achieve the final outcome, then that one cause is the ultimate determinant of the final outcome.

The first point relates to God directly intervening to achieve a final outcome that is contrary to all secondary causes. Under point (1) direct action by God is the determinant of the final outcome.

Under point two, God has the ability to intervene to override the effects of secondary causes but He purposely chooses not to do so because those secondary causes accomplish His purpose. In this case, God’s ability to intervene to negate secondary causes plus His purposeful decision not to intervene makes Him the determinant of the final outcome. Another example, if I have the ability to water my garden during a drought and choose not to do so, then I am the one who has determined that the garden will wilt and die even though this occurs because of the drought.

My definition of omnipotence encompasses the power expressed in both point 1 and 2. If we were able to agree on this, then we could use that definition as the basis for developing a set of beliefs that we could then call, determinism.


rhutchin
My argument simply notes that a final cause that rules over all secondary causes makes those secondary causes irrelevant.

pereynol
This argument of yours works well within your overall systematics, and it does assume compatibilism, IMHO. It also privileges ends over means, as I've contended before. And the concept of "irrelevance" must have a context in which to function. The unanswered question is, Irrelevance to what? In your case, it seems that you mean "irrelevance to the end results," or, perhaps the eschatological results. But there are other contexts to consider in which secondary causality may be quite relevant and significant---namely the qualitative difference between beings possessing LFW and those possessing compatibilistic volition and theodicy. Within these contexts, secondary causes are by no means irrelevant.

OK. How about describing a situation in which we have a final cause that rules over all secondary causes without making those secondary causes irrelevant. Maybe my earlier example will help. Lets say that I have the power to water my garden during a drought and choose not to do so? My claim is that I am the one who has determined the fate of my garden and no secondary causes can change that. Consequently, those secondary causes are irrelevant. How about if you use this or your own example and show how secondary causes could be relevant in a case like this. The relevance we are looking for would be to make something other than me the determinant of the final outcome.


rhutchin
If you object to that position, then you need to explain how you would define omnipotence in relation to secondary causes.

pereynol
Actually I don't need to explain how I would define omnipotence in relation to secondary causes in order to object to your position; I can merely object to your position without having to supply an alternate view. It is fallacious for you to think that an objection cannot stand alone; one may legitimately reject, disagree, or falsify a position, evaluating that position on its own merits, without bearing the onus of formulating a fully developed alternative. Examples of this occur regularly in science, in the trials and errors of invention and technological innovation, and in courts of law. We may recognize problems within scientific theories without yet having a fully formed countertheory; we can recognize that there's something wrong with a machine we've invented when it malfunctions before we provide a fully-orbed solution or improvement, and we can proclaim a defendant innocent without proclaiming someone else guilty. This kind of thing happens all the time. And the limitations of any argument can be legitimately explored without the necessary formulation of a viable alternative. Nevertheless, a critique or objection may well suggest the beginnings of an alternative, and I will attempt to delineate some sketchy contours of what I think could be an alternative a little further on.

And as I've said repeatedly to you, up front, I am yet unpersuaded on the subject of determinism; perhaps you can persuade me. This is simply where I honestly stand as a nonsectarian. I can state specific objections to various takes on determinism, be they Calvinist, Arminian, or OVT, but I cannot simply "pick a winner" and magically resolve my misgivings about any of these systems. I am suspending judgment on the issue and shall continue to do so until convinced otherwise. And again, it isn't necessary for me to argue a positive case for any one position in order to have legitimate objections concerning your position. That's the way it is....

OK, let’s assume that you are a neutral observer. How about explaining what part of my argument fails and why.


rhutchin
If your claim is that you grasp my concept of omnipotence but then turn around and claim that I equate it with determinism, then you have not grasped my concept of omnipotence. You are disagreeing with a misconception that you created.

pereynol
Then explain to me how you aren't equating omnipotence with determinism, because everytime I read what you say, it seems as plain as day....

Actually, determinism would encompass more than just that contained in a definition of omnipotence. Omnipotence relates only to the “power” held and describes that power. Determinism combines the power defined as omnipotence with a purpose or plan for using that power. Just because God is omnipotent does not tell us how He uses that omnipotence. Omnipotence says that God has the power to save everybody. Determinism would indicate that he uses that power to save or not save. If I give you a million dollars, I give you the ability to do something, but that does not say what you will do.


rhutchin
What you need to do is start with my original definition of omnipotence and describe how this definition does not work. Key to this is the relationship between omnipotence and secondary causes.

pereynol
As I've said, your definition works fine as part of the overall structure of your position, but what merely "works" on a conceptual or systematic level may still be false. Other definitions also "work," and their logical consistency makes them just as plausible as yours. Someone like me is left having to decide between several seemingly self-consistent, plausible positions. But I will begin to elaborate my thoughts on secondary causes if you think that would be helpful.

What other definition have you found that works and is it a valid definition of omnipotence?


rhutchin
OK, you disagree. So, now explain what you see as the correct approach. It is great that you disagree with my position, but it would be nice if you staked out an alternative position that you could then describe and defend.

Exactly right. So, tell us your definition of omnipotence and describe how it is able to maintain the significance of secondary causes.

OK, you disagree. Does that mean that your position is “Other determinants matter. Omnipotence does not give God absolute and final control over all causes involved in any action. God does not exert final control over all causes and determinants.”

Can you stake out a position?



pereynol

I can begin to stake out a position, but it won't be a decisive subscription to any of the common sectarian viewpoints. I shall deal with two issues here: defining omnipotence with respect to secondary causes and the significance of secondary causes (especially human volition and the workings of natural processes) within theodicy.

But I'm going to start a new post for this purpose; read on for the continuation...

That’s a good start.

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

Determinism is a label given to a set of beliefs. That set of beliefs defines that which has been agreed upon. The functional difference is that the verb (determine) is used to identify that which one believes after which one can then use a noun (determinism) as a label for those beliefs so that one can cite the label and avoid rewriting the entire set of beliefs. I am trying to keep the argument at the verb stage and identify what it is that “omnipotence” does.

I think that the label and the verb are linked, and I think one can identify what "omnipotence does" equally well whether one avoids labels or not.


Let’s look at the argument. Consider a set of secondary causes that all can interact to varying degrees to produce a specific final outcome. If there is one cause that rules all those secondary causes such that it either (1) negates the effects of secondary causes so that the outcome produced is not that which would have occurred absent this one cause or (2) must be purposely withheld in order to leave secondary causes free to achieve the final outcome, then that one cause is the ultimate determinant of the final outcome.

As I've said before, it's not the eschatological outcome only that holds significance; the means to that end may yet hold their own significance apart from the "final result." There's nothing wrong with your argument as considered within its own sphere and set of evaluative criteria when you make assertions about "the ultimate determinant." However, when you start to make claims about the significance of secondary causes being abrogated, you are only correct about such an assertion from within your own point of view. This is so because what you hold as significanct is defined by your valuing "the end result" above other considerations, and not everyone shares your evaluative judgment on this score. What anyone holds to be "significant" will be relative to his overall evaluative system, and if your system values the "end result" over everything else, then you must realize that you and those who hold the qualitative value of secondary causes as a means will find a significance in them that you do not. Therefore, you should readily see how someone who doesn't share your idea that final results are always more significant than the secondary causes which function as a means to those results would disagree with you precisely about what you assert is most significant.


The first point relates to God directly intervening to achieve a final outcome that is contrary to all secondary causes. Under point (1) direct action by God is the determinant of the final outcome.

Agreed.


Under point two, God has the ability to intervene to override the effects of secondary causes but He purposely chooses not to do so because those secondary causes accomplish His purpose.

What if God sovereignly chooses to allow his creatures a measure of freedom, the use of which doesn't always please him? What if his final purposes are to let free beings develop and to cooperate with their decisions for the good and make the most of their misuse of freedom, bringing good out of evil? The problem of evil begins to surface at this point, as well as the nature of human freedom in relation to it. Theodicy also comes into play, but we'll get to that later.

God certainly has the ability to have chosen to utterly control all causes. But your assumption that God allows secondary causes to play out simply because they already accomplish his purposes may be wrong; perhaps he allows them to play out because he wanted to create free agents who are qualitatively different from the alternative.


In this case, God’s ability to intervene to negate secondary causes plus His purposeful decision not to intervene makes Him the determinant of the final outcome.

Again, I think your argument stands, but only within the scope of your own assumptions and evaluative criteria and views as to what is most significant. If one deviates from these or considers other possibilities, one is left dissatified by your argument.


Another example, if I have the ability to water my garden during a drought and choose not to do so, then I am the one who has determined that the garden will wilt and die even though this occurs because of the drought.

My definition of omnipotence encompasses the power expressed in both point 1 and 2. If we were able to agree on this, then we could use that definition as the basis for developing a set of beliefs that we could then call, determinism.

I appreciate the trouble you've taken to develop your case, and I do think it is fine as far as it goes. But I have misgivings over the way you've set up this analogy; human beings are not vegetables, and their nurture may be self-determined in part....


OK. How about describing a situation in which we have a final cause that rules over all secondary causes without making those secondary causes irrelevant.

Well, human choices can be secondary causes, and it is possible that God doesn't always "rule" our choices. It is also possible that he does rule all of our choices, but if this is true, I've got misgivings pertaining to theodicy. Also the idea of what is "irrelevant" is in the same boat as what is "significant;" both are relative to a peculiar set of evaluative criteria.


Maybe my earlier example will help. Lets say that I have the power to water my garden during a drought and choose not to do so? My claim is that I am the one who has determined the fate of my garden and no secondary causes can change that. Consequently, those secondary causes are irrelevant.

Again, relevance and signifcance are context-specific, and in this case, relevance is related to the intentions of the gardener. If you intend to ruin your garden, then the secondary causes (drought) become quite relevant to your intentions. When you choose not to water the garden and not to interfere with the natural effects of the drought, you do so in keeping with your intentions, and relevance is determined accordingly. We are trying to ascertain the intentions of God, and what we think his intentions are will govern what we suppose to be relevant or significant.


How about if you use this or your own example and show how secondary causes could be relevant in a case like this. The relevance we are looking for would be to make something other than me the determinant of the final outcome.

Alright. Let's suppose that God wanted us to have LFW as in the traditional free-will theodicy. God intended us to make choices he didn't determine. These choices function as secondary causes within his cosmos, as do the choices of the angels. Perhaps God finds these choices qualitatively significant in themselves. In your analogy, I suppose you'd have to have sentient vegetables endowed with personality who could choose whether or not to nurture and water themselves....


OK, let’s assume that you are a neutral observer. How about explaining what part of my argument fails and why.

I don't think your argument fails. I just think it is wedded to certain assumptions about what God's intentions are, how he uses his omnipotence, and what is significant and what is not within your overall framework. Your argument is a plausible one, but there are other plausible arguments with their own scenarios wherein God's intentions, his use of his power, and notions of significance depart from your own.


Actually, determinism would encompass more than just that contained in a definition of omnipotence. Omnipotence relates only to the “power” held and describes that power. Determinism combines the power defined as omnipotence with a purpose or plan for using that power. Just because God is omnipotent does not tell us how He uses that omnipotence. Omnipotence says that God has the power to save everybody. Determinism would indicate that he uses that power to save or not save. If I give you a million dollars, I give you the ability to do something, but that does not say what you will do.

I've acknowledged all this from the beginning.


What other definition have you found that works and is it a valid definition of omnipotence?

You seem to have modified your definition to suit mine here. If you'll read my earlier posts, I gave you a similar definition of omnipotence and asserted that what I thought was at issue between us was not the definition of omnipotence so much as how God uses his power. You seemed to be disagreeing with me then and focused on defining omnipotence. It seemed to me that you wanted to equate it with determinism, but you have denied that, or have jettisoned the label for rhetorical (or some other) reasons. In any event, I find nothing objectionable in your above definition. The question is, What are God's intentions as far as the use of his limitless power is concerned? Is there more than one possibility? Can we know for certain---and how may we know for certain?

[rhutchin]

rhutchin
Let’s look at the argument. Consider a set of secondary causes that all can interact to varying degrees to produce a specific final outcome. If there is one cause that rules all those secondary causes such that it either (1) negates the effects of secondary causes so that the outcome produced is not that which would have occurred absent this one cause or (2) must be purposely withheld in order to leave secondary causes free to achieve the final outcome, then that one cause is the ultimate determinant of the final outcome.

pereynol
…However, when you start to make claims about the significance of secondary causes being abrogated, you are only correct about such an assertion from within your own point of view. This is so because what you hold as significanct is defined by your valuing "the end result" above other considerations, and not everyone shares your evaluative judgment on this score….

When we look at the concept of omnipotence, we must look at the process through which an event comes to pass and the effect of omnipotence on that process. The end result is the end point of that process.

Two questions must be answered.
1. Does omnipotence convey the power to determine the final outcome?
2. Does omnipotence convey the power to determine each step in the process that leads to the final outcome?

My claim is that the answer to the two questions is, Yes. This defines omnipotence. Omnipotence places the entire process under the authority of one ruling cause. If God is omnipotent, then He rules over the final outcome as well as every step in the process that leads to the final outcome. Consequently, everything that happens can be attributed to God and not to any other cause (e.g., a secondary cause). [Attributing something to God does not relieve everyone else of accountability, but that is another issue altogether.]


rhutchin
The first point relates to God directly intervening to achieve a final outcome that is contrary to all secondary causes. Under point (1) direct action by God is the determinant of the final outcome.

pereynol
Agreed.

rhutchin
Under point two, God has the ability to intervene to override the effects of secondary causes but He purposely chooses not to do so because those secondary causes accomplish His purpose.

pereynol
What if God sovereignly chooses to allow his creatures a measure of freedom, the use of which doesn't always please him? What if his final purposes are to let free beings develop and to cooperate with their decisions for the good and make the most of their misuse of freedom, bringing good out of evil? The problem of evil begins to surface at this point, as well as the nature of human freedom in relation to it. Theodicy also comes into play, but we'll get to that later.

God certainly has the ability to have chosen to utterly control all causes. But your assumption that God allows secondary causes to play out simply because they already accomplish his purposes may be wrong; perhaps he allows them to play out because he wanted to create free agents who are qualitatively different from the alternative.

You are moving beyond the issue at hand and are deserting your objective neutrality. We are seeking a definition of omnipotence. How one (e.g., God) exerts power if he is omnipotent is a different issue. We can address the problem of evil after we decide what it means to say that God is omnipotent. Let’s first determine what it is that we mean when we say that God is omnipotent.

If God is omnipotent, He has absolute and final control over everything that happens. Nothing can happen unless God either (1) personally makes it happen or (2) decrees that it will happen by virtue of His decision not to intervene in an event. My assumption is not that God allows secondary causes to play out simply because they already accomplish his purposes. That is my definition (not assumption) of the power defined by omnipotence. Omnipotence means that the power God enjoys is such that secondary causes play out only after God first decides (decrees) to allow them to play out. The only reason for God to decide this is because they will accomplish His purpose.

I do not understand what you meant by saying, “…perhaps he allows them to play out because he wanted to create free agents who are qualitatively different from the alternative.” How does this (whatever you mean) impact omnipotence or somehow free a person from that overriding control conveyed to God when we say that He is omnipotent?


rhutchin
In this case, God’s ability to intervene to negate secondary causes plus His purposeful decision not to intervene makes Him the determinant of the final outcome.

pereynol
Again, I think your argument stands, but only within the scope of your own assumptions and evaluative criteria and views as to what is most significant. If one deviates from these or considers other possibilities, one is left dissatified by your argument.

Remove any assumptions that you think I might have. Does it still stand. If not, what does not stand?
- Does omnipotence mean something other than that God has the ability to intervene to negate secondary causes?
- Does omnipotence mean something other than that God has the power to intervene to change any secondary cause?
- Does omnipotence mean something other than that God is ultimately the final determinant of what secondary causes are able to do?


rhutchin
Another example, if I have the ability to water my garden during a drought and choose not to do so, then I am the one who has determined that the garden will wilt and die even though this occurs because of the drought.

My definition of omnipotence encompasses the power expressed in both point 1 and 2. If we were able to agree on this, then we could use that definition as the basis for developing a set of beliefs that we could then call, determinism.

pereynol
I appreciate the trouble you've taken to develop your case, and I do think it is fine as far as it goes. But I have misgivings over the way you've set up this analogy; human beings are not vegetables, and their nurture may be self-determined in part....

Again, you are deserting objective neutrality. You are allowing your misgivings about the implications of making God omnipotent to color your thinking. However, you can see why a definition of omnipotence is so important. Once that term is defined, it creates a barrier to what people want to think. To some, it is a very unpleasant situation, and they do not want to be in it.


rhutchin
OK. How about describing a situation in which we have a final cause that rules over all secondary causes without making those secondary causes irrelevant.

pereynol
Well, human choices can be secondary causes, and it is possible that God doesn't always "rule" our choices. It is also possible that he does rule all of our choices, but if this is true, I've got misgivings pertaining to theodicy. Also the idea of what is "irrelevant" is in the same boat as what is "significant;" both are relative to a peculiar set of evaluative criteria.

I agree that human choices can be secondary causes. However, it is NOT possible that God doesn't always "rule" our choices. This cannot be possible under the definition of omnipotence. Omnipotence means that God has all power and nothing is outside that power, not even human choices. Is this not the argument that Paul anticipates in Romans 9:19-20 where he says, “Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth he yet find fault? For who hath resisted his will? Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus?”


rhutchin
Maybe my earlier example will help. Lets say that I have the power to water my garden during a drought and choose not to do so? My claim is that I am the one who has determined the fate of my garden and no secondary causes can change that. Consequently, those secondary causes are irrelevant.

pereynol
Again, relevance and signifcance are context-specific, and in this case, relevance is related to the intentions of the gardener. If you intend to ruin your garden, then the secondary causes (drought) become quite relevant to your intentions. When you choose not to water the garden and not to interfere with the natural effects of the drought, you do so in keeping with your intentions, and relevance is determined accordingly. We are trying to ascertain the intentions of God, and what we think his intentions are will govern what we suppose to be relevant or significant.

I agree, but that is not the issue here. The issue here is the proper definition and understanding of the concept of omnipotence. What God does because He is omnipotent is another issue altogether. We first need to ascertain what God is (i.e., Is He omnipotent and what does that mean?). Only after we decide that issue can we logically begin to discuss His intentions. God’s intentions become of great concern once we grant that He is, indeed, truly omnipotent.


rhutchin
How about if you use this or your own example and show how secondary causes could be relevant in a case like this. The relevance we are looking for would be to make something other than me the determinant of the final outcome.

pereynol
Alright. Let's suppose that God wanted us to have LFW as in the traditional free-will theodicy. God intended us to make choices he didn't determine. These choices function as secondary causes within his cosmos, as do the choices of the angels. Perhaps God finds these choices qualitatively significant in themselves. In your analogy, I suppose you'd have to have sentient vegetables endowed with personality who could choose whether or not to nurture and water themselves....

The tone of your argument suggest to me that you understand what it means to say that God is omnipotent. It does not appear that you like the implications of God being omnipotent.


rhutchin
OK, let’s assume that you are a neutral observer. How about explaining what part of my argument fails and why.

pereynol
I don't think your argument fails. I just think it is wedded to certain assumptions about what God's intentions are, how he uses his omnipotence, and what is significant and what is not within your overall framework. Your argument is a plausible one, but there are other plausible arguments with their own scenarios wherein God's intentions, his use of his power, and notions of significance depart from your own.

I agree. There are indeed other arguments with their own scenarios wherein God's intentions, his use of his power, and notions of significance depart from mine. Are they plausible?? I think that each such argument must treat God as if He is NOT omnipotent in order for the argument to succeed. If you know another argument, test it to see whether God is omnipotent within the parameters of the argument.


rhutchin
What other definition have you found that works and is it a valid definition of omnipotence?

pereynol
You seem to have modified your definition to suit mine here. If you'll read my earlier posts, I gave you a similar definition of omnipotence and asserted that what I thought was at issue between us was not the definition of omnipotence so much as how God uses his power. You seemed to be disagreeing with me then and focused on defining omnipotence. It seemed to me that you wanted to equate it with determinism, but you have denied that, or have jettisoned the label for rhetorical (or some other) reasons. In any event, I find nothing objectionable in your above definition. The question is, What are God's intentions as far as the use of his limitless power is concerned? Is there more than one possibility? Can we know for certain---and how may we know for certain?

I agree. You are asking the right questions, What are God's intentions as far as the use of his limitless power is concerned? Is there more than one possibility? Can we know for certain---and how may we know for certain?

Those are the questions we seek to answer because of the meaning of omnipotence. That is why secondary causes are irrelevant. It is God’s intentions that matter (His exercise of power) and nothing else.

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

When we look at the concept of omnipotence, we must look at the process through which an event comes to pass and the effect of omnipotence on that process. The end result is the end point of that process.

Two questions must be answered.
1. Does omnipotence convey the power to determine the final outcome?
2. Does omnipotence convey the power to determine each step in the process that leads to the final outcome?

My claim is that the answer to the two questions is, Yes. This defines omnipotence. Omnipotence places the entire process under the authority of one ruling cause.

The concept of omnipotence simply means "all power," which is to say that God is all powerful. Omnipotence is an attribute of God. He can do anything that is within the realm of logical possibility. All through this discussion, you have had the tendency to personify the attribute of omnipotence. For example, you ask whether omnipotence conveys power, and you claim that "omnipotence places the entire process under the authority of one ruling cause." The way you phrase these things almost makes it seem that an attribute acts in a personal way in a fashion that is somehow apart from God. This gets a little misleading, IMHO.

God indeed possesses all power; that is what omnipotence means. God has the ability to control all secondary causes, AND God also has the ability to decide NOT to control them. Omnipotence doesn't mean God MUST control all secondary causes; if omnipotence did mean that, then it wouldn't be omnipotence because there would be some power outside the range of God's power---namely the power to decide not to control secondary causes. And if there is some power that is not in God's grasp, he cannot be said to be omnipotent.

You appear to be suggesting that God cannot decide not to control secondary causes because he must do so in order to maintain his omnipotence. I think this is misguided. I also believe that this move is functionally tantamount to equating omnipotence with determinism, as I've said.


If God is omnipotent, then He rules over the final outcome as well as every step in the process that leads to the final outcome. Consequently, everything that happens can be attributed to God and not to any other cause (e.g., a secondary cause).

If God decides to exercise his omnipotence such that some things that happen can be attributed to secondary causes, then your argument may be in danger....


[Attributing something to God does not relieve everyone else of accountability, but that is another issue altogether.]

Actually, it's a related story. Why doesn't attributing something to God fail to relieve everyone else of accountability? There are several attempted answers to this question from theological determinist quarters, and I find all the ones I've heard unsatisfying.

One common answer is to appeal to secondary causes, ironically enough. The same secondary causes (human volition) whose significance is so cavalierly dismissed in every other instance supposedly somehow exonerates God from moral culpability by putting him at one causal remove from the evil he supposedly ordained his creatures to choose. In other words, the significance of agent causality as a secondary cause is denied eschatologically and yet (inconsistently) affirmed morally.

Probably the best answer I've heard to this dilemma from theological determinists comes from some theonomists who simply affirm that God is above any moral culpability by virtue of who he is. This might be the case, but I find it hard to accept, for various reasons---the chief reason is that voluntarism presents other difficulties.

How do you think that people whose evil decisions are utterly controlled by God are said to retain moral culpability?


You are moving beyond the issue at hand and are deserting your objective neutrality.

Actually, I only claimed to be suspending judgment until convinced otherwise---not to have "objective neutrality." It's quite possible that true objective neutrality doesn't exist in us frail humans and that it represents an ideal, a myth really, that is a relic of enlightenment rationalism. But I do try to look at all sides fairly and with an open mind. I'm just stating my reservations and don't mean to do you or your arguments a disservice. I appreciate your thoughts and I hope that you appreciate my subjecting them to the most rigorous criticism I find appropriate. If I didn't do this, I wouldn't be doing either of us any favors.


We are seeking a definition of omnipotence. How one (e.g., God) exerts power if he is omnipotent is a different issue.

We seem to be spinning around these issues. I still think omnipotence = God's being all powerful; that is the definition of omnipotence. And I still think that our disagreement surrounds how we think God chooses to use his power.


We can address the problem of evil after we decide what it means to say that God is omnipotent. Let’s first determine what it is that we mean when we say that God is omnipotent.

It seems that both of us have already determined what we think omnipotence means, and we disagree. The prospect of our reaching agreement here doesn't seem promising, and our takes on the problem of evil will of course depend upon our respective ideas of omnipotence. I think we're at an impasse.


If God is omnipotent, He has absolute and final control over everything that happens. Nothing can happen unless God either (1) personally makes it happen or (2) decrees that it will happen by virtue of His decision not to intervene in an event. My assumption is not that God allows secondary causes to play out simply because they already accomplish his purposes. That is my definition (not assumption) of the power defined by omnipotence.

The categories of "definition" and "assumption" are not mutually exclusive! Once you define omnipotence in the way you do, you then use it as an assumption from which to draw inferences. This controls all your thinking on the topic. It is also the principal reason why you and I can't seem to have a meeting of the minds.


Omnipotence means that the power God enjoys is such that secondary causes play out only after God first decides (decrees) to allow them to play out. The only reason for God to decide this is because they will accomplish His purpose.

As I've said, this is a plausible and self-consistent explanation, but it isn't the only viable explanation....


I do not understand what you meant by saying, “…perhaps he allows them to play out because he wanted to create free agents who are qualitatively different from the alternative.” How does this (whatever you mean) impact omnipotence or somehow free a person from that overriding control conveyed to God when we say that He is omnipotent?

You say that omnipotence paradoxically means that God cannot choose to allow human free agents incompatibilistic control such that their choices (as secondary causes) become truly significant. My concept of omnipotence includes the idea that God indeed does have the power to choose to do this.
I think God actually possesses all power, but you seem to think that, though God is omnipotent, he cannot do certain things. In fact, his power appears to be conceptually restricted by your definition of omnipotence.


I agree that human choices can be secondary causes. However, it is NOT possible that God doesn't always "rule" our choices. This cannot be possible under the definition of omnipotence. Omnipotence means that God has all power and nothing is outside that power, not even human choices.

Again, you seem to be saying that God's very power is restricted by your definition of omnipotence.


Is this not the argument that Paul anticipates in Romans 9:19-20 where he says, “Thou wilt say then unto me, Why doth he yet find fault? For who hath resisted his will? Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus?”

Does the text lend any credence to this objection on its own terms? Paul may well be simply rebuking the impudence of the rhetorical objector and not affirming any sort of determinism on God's part at all. Moreover, if theological determinism were true, then the very objection itself would be determined, and this makes for an extremely convoluted reading. No one can resist God's will, says the objector, yet Paul rebukes the objector for precisely his foolish resistance to his creator.

I do admit that these verses are difficult, and they do give me pause. But I have trouble interpreting Romans in stark terms of soteriological deteminism across the board, and I take these verses as part of their greater context.


I agree, but that is not the issue here. The issue here is the proper definition and understanding of the concept of omnipotence. What God does because He is omnipotent is another issue altogether. We first need to ascertain what God is (i.e., Is He omnipotent and what does that mean?). Only after we decide that issue can we logically begin to discuss His intentions. God’s intentions become of great concern once we grant that He is, indeed, truly omnipotent.

My thinking is an inversion of your own; God has all power and can therefore use it in any way he sees fit. It's h