What is coherentism? And what's wrong with it?

[mattbballman19]

The purpose of this thread is for me to present to you coherentism (as a structure of justification sufficient for knowledge; whatever that is).

I am aware of the many ways that coherentism can possibly manifest itself, but I only present its essence. That essence seems to be that there exist no asymmetries between basic and non-basic beliefs. All beliefs, according to coherentism, are equal with one another and this idea of justification is found in that these beliefs 'cohere' with the other existing beliefs found in one's noetic structure. The aim of this theory of knowledge aquisition lies in the realm of epistemic justification.

For purposes of clarification, allow me to make a necessary dichotomy between what one means by 'coherence theories of meaning' and what one means by 'coherence theories of truth'. The latter deals with the actual content of the belief itself. It also relates to the role it plays in relation to other existing beliefs. Succinctly, it informs what it is that makes the belief what it is. The former is a theory of truth which states that X is true if and only if it is a part of a coherent set of propositions. This theory is in oppisition to the theory of truth that I adhere to: the correspondance theory of truth, which states that X is true if and only if X is derivative of a funtion which corresponds with the external world.

It is the former that I am here concerned with.

Four explanation are in order before a critique is presented.

1. Coherentists adhere to the doxastic assumption in that the justification for their view is based on other beliefs that the person holds. Beliefs are the sole means for justification. This would entail that coherentist are internalists in that they ground the existence of their justification within and internal to the one doing the knowing.

2. There are no priviledged class of beliefs with the coherentist.

3. The justification found in a belief is discovered by they way it 'coheres' with the internally juxta-opposed beliefs within one's noetic structure. Exp: How do I know that the it looks like the leaves are moving by themselves? The wind is blowing. How do I know that the wind is blowing? It looks as if the leaves are moving by themselves. Both beliefs are justified in that they are part of a coherent set of beliefs.

4. Coherentists seem to reach opposing conclusions when deciding on what coherentism's implications are. I think it can safely be said that logical consistency one such implication. Within one's noetic structure, the coherence of the beliefs being utilized to provide one with justification cannot logically contradict one another. This is not enough, because I could believe that I am Jesus Christ and that everyone that did not believe me were involved in a huge scam! This could be logically consistent, but yet not sufficient justification for the belief itself.

What about something called 'entailment coherence'? This says that the coherency of a belief is such iff all the members of a set are entailed by the other members found in the set.

Something called 'explanatory coherence' has also been put forth. This says that the members of sets of beliefs aid in explaining and explain other members of sets.

The last candidate is labled 'probability coherence'. Belief X is coherent iff X lacks belief in Y, and Y happens to be improbable.

I will get into the variety of the coherence theories that have been presented if needed. The basic names are positive, negative, weak, strong, linear, and holistic coherentism.

I invite any criticism.

matt

[mattbballman19]

Come on, this is a philosophy forum! :shifty: This is about as philosophical as you can get. :deal: :cool:

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

A few thoughts...

I think that correspondence and coherence work together within a realist perspective to ascertain what truth is, but, others without realist leanings would not find correspondence particularly hospitable. If one is speaking from within a strict phenomenological approach, or if one is an antirealist, a pragmatist, or a postmodernist, then correspondence as realists conceive it could well be excluded. Coherence, though inadequate in and of itself from a realist perspective, doesn't look so bad when the loss of correspondence causes a vacuum. And, when speaking to those who think in such terms, the question becomes, How can we, as realists, communicate with those of other persuasions in the absence of a viable, mutually accepted correspondence theory?

[mattbballman19]

I think that correspondence and coherence work together within a realist perspective to ascertain what truth is, but, others without realist leanings would not find correspondence particularly hospitable.

I would tend to agree with the idea that one could consistently hold to a coherence theory of truth of justification and a correspondance theory of truth.

Coherence, though inadequate in and of itself from a realist perspective, doesn't look so bad when the loss of correspondence causes a vacuum.

Probably more along the lines of a vicious circular vacuum with implausible justification shifts from one to belief to the next. Look at linear positive coherence, in particular; According to this view, the way justification is transferred is by means of a linear circle: P justifies Q, Q justifies R, ect. until the loop finally ends at Z justifying P. To me, this is viciously circular and implausible.

With regard to vicious circularity, I think attention should focus on the basis relation, which is irreflexive and asymmetrical. What this entails is that no belief can be the basis of itself whether in the whole, or in the part. But this is what linear positive coherentism seems to require. P justifies (R,S, . . . Z) and that chain in turn justifies P. But the chain cannot justify P if it is not justified. Thus R through Z justify P because P justifies them and, in this sense, P helps to justify itself. And the same will be true of other members of the chain.

There is also the famous isolation problem, but I won't get into that now.

And, when speaking to those who think in such terms, the question becomes, How can we, as realists, communicate with those of other persuasions in the absence of a viable, mutually accepted correspondence theory?

It seems that the correspondence theory is unconcously presupposed by others of various opposing persuasions. If it is, in fact, the correct way one goes about finding the truth. But as far as the coherence persuasion, in particular, I think it fails for a number of reasons. Namely, what I said above, and the fact that it says that there is no such thing as an appropriately justified false belief since "appropriate justification" and truth are the same thing. Indeed, this is claimed as a virtue for the theory. But I see it as a vice. It is possible and, I think, actually the case that one has an appropriately justified belief that is false. The only way to avoid this problem is to define 'appropriate justification' as the same thing as truth. But this is begging the question.

Those are my thoughts for now. Thank you for yours.

matt

[mattbballman19]

If one is speaking from within a strict phenomenological approach, or if one is an antirealist, a pragmatist, or a postmodernist, then correspondence as realists conceive it could well be excluded.

Assuming that most pragmatists are anti-realists, I'd say that their view is self-refuting. For the advocates of such a view don't recommend it because it itself is useful, but because it corresponds to realities of scientific theory testing, language, etc . . . I also believe that it can persuasively be said to fail the 'phenomenological argument' (hereafter PA) for the correspdence theory. If you don't already know, PA gives attention to careful description and presentation of specific cases to see what can be learned from then about truth. Exp: Consider the case of persons X and Y. In his office, X gets a call from the university bookstore that a specific book he had ordered (say 'The existence of God' by Richard Swinburne) has arrived and is waiting for him. Once this has happened a mental state has happened in X's mind (the thought that that particular book is in the bookstore). X, who is aware of the content of that thought, is becoming aware of 2 other things closely related to it: the nature of the thought and the verification steps that would help him to determine the truth of the thought. X must make certain steps the will get him to the specific building which contains the bookstore in which the specfic book X is looking for is located. On X's way there, Y, at the same time, has a particular sensory experience indicating of the very same book that X is looking for. But X has a 2nd experience not had by Y. X has an experience which makes think that his thought corresponds to an actual state of affairs. X is able to compare his thought with its intentional object and 'see' that the thought is true. In that case, X actually experiences the correspondence relation itself and truth itself becomes the object of his awareness.

As far as realism and postmodernism goes, I think they are incompatible, since postmodernism believes that reality is a 'social construction'. Since I, being a realist, believe that logic has universal validity, foundationalism being an appropriate way to justify belief (which doesn't really have anything to do with Cartesian certianty), dialouge on the nature of existence must begin with the assumption of the existence of particular things attempted to be explained, the existence of universals, etc . . .

So, in essence, I agree with you.

matt

[chance]

hmmmmmm.....I know a professor friend that said in a book he wrote that he held to a web of beliefs, which sounds very similar to a book promoting coherentism called The Web of Belief. I am almost sure he is a coherentist and I know he is a nominalist (not a realist), so...................hmmmmmmmmm
:huh:

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

Today @ 06:35 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=97167#post97167)
chance:

hmmmmmm.....I know a professor friend that said in a book he wrote that he held to a web of beliefs, which sounds very similar to a book promoting coherentism called The Web of Belief. I am almost sure he is a coherentist and I know he is a nominalist (not a realist), so...................hmmmmmmmmm
:huh:

makes perfect sense....

[mattbballman19]

BTW. 1. How would being a nominalist contribute or support a coherence theory of truth?

2. In what way is he/she a nominalist?

matt

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

Today @ 05:58 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=101468#post101468)
mattbballman19:

BTW. 1. How would being a nominalist contribute or support a coherence theory of truth?

Slightly, IMHO, in that nominalism, as it rejects extramental universals, would therefore harmonize more readily with coherentism. Generally speaking, if universals are merely names or abstract concepts imposed on reality by the categories of the mind, they needn't correspond with extramental states of affairs....

[mattbballman19]

Generally speaking, if universals are merely names or abstract concepts imposed on reality by the categories of the mind, they needn't correspond with extramental states of affairs....

If something was an abtract concept imposed on reality by the catagories of particular minds, how can that something justifiably be labeled a universal?

matt