Operational vs Origins Science

[geochron]

I posted this question in a couple of places but got no answers.

I know that there are a few fans of the O-O science distinction around. But in the past when I've asked for specific examples to be classified nobody has stepped forward. So...

If you believe that there are two different kinds of science, consider and classify the following experiments...

1. 129I decayed in the early solar system (4.5 billion years ago) with a half life of 16Ma. We know this by contrasting it with other radioisotopes in the same minerals that decay by different mechanisms.

2. 129I decayed in the 1950s with a half life of 16Ma. We know this because we have records on paper of people comparing its activity with mechanical clocks.

Now explain how relying on (1) is different in kind from relying on (2). If I test the half life today and compare it with (1) is that origins or operational science? If I compare it with (2), is that origins or operational science?

[Augustine2004]

(1) is not relevant as an example of origins science. Origins 'science' considers such questions as, 'How was I291 created and when?' Science applied to events or phenomena in the distant past is not origins science unless the genesis of something is being investigated.

I would classify origins science as a branch of theology -- science applied to certain questions in theology. I would not consider origins science to be part of science, just as technology is not a part of science even though it is called 'applied science.' That sentence is true as long as we cannot repeatedly and reliably distinguish events arising from miracles from events arising from natural causes. It may be that God does not wish to give us any proof (as opposed to mere evidence, like the Bible) of His existence.

[geochron]

So the young Earth hypothesis can be ruled out without resort to origins science?

[Warcraft3]

Why is technology not a part of science?



Russ

[Augustine2004]

It is true that scientists can and have developed technology in their quest for new knowledge. And scientists have used technology or hired technologists to create experiments. What I meant by technology in this context is the economical design and manufacture of things such as bridges, computers, car engines, etc. The main purpose of science is new knowledge (at least, useful theories), not these things. Sometimes technologists have come up with novel designs, and that is new knowledge, but they still serve to create devices that benefit people.

[Augustine2004]

So the young Earth hypothesis can be ruled out without resort to origins science?What origins science? In any case if one has not yet developed detailed predictions (or 'postdictions') from a hypothesis, we couldn't say that it has been ruled out. What specific posdictions have been developed from some YEC hypothesis? What methods can be used to measure the age of anything that YECs agree are good ones?

To explain away the evidence that seems to support deep geologic time, YECs have assumed in general that scientific knowledge developed in the past 200 years do not always apply to the first 3000 or so years of Earth's existence. The speed of light, for example, may be much greater in the past than recently. People did claim that this has observable consequences, but they are assuming that there are not any other significant differences between the early history and recent times.

I do not like such an assumption, but I do not see that it has been ruled out for all time. Indeed people are looking for violations of the foundations of General Relativity and of quantum mechanics, are they not?

[geochron]

Perhaps I should clarify.

Over the time I've been here, a number of YEC correspondents have told me that there is a distinction in kind between origins and operational science. They have told me, among other things, that establishing the age of the Earth is origins science.

Origins science is not distinguished by subject matter, according to them; it is a different sort of activity from operational science. I'm seeking clarification from people who believe that about what aspects of the activity distinguish it. In the past, when I've asked them to classify a specific example they have declined. THe o-o distinction has come up a couple of time recently. It seemed like a good time to offer some cases for those who make the distinction to classify.

Please don't start a debate about what the age of the Earth is here. Please restrict comments to illuminating the distinction between origins and operational science.

[Eleutherius]

The basic idea of "origins science" is as follows.

We can't see *right now, right in front of us* the processes that produced the universe in which we live and the living things within it. Therefore, we can't "know for sure" how they came to be, or even when they came to be. It's an extension of the older type of non-hypothetical science often called "Baconian" science, making reference to Francis Bacon. Bacon liked to stress the role of induction (inferences from direct observations) in forming generalizations, such as the claim that "all ravens are black." (The rare albino raven could be seen as either disconfirming that generalization or as the exception that "proves", ie, tests the rule.) Advocates of origins science deny the legitimacy of drawing inferences about the processes of nature in the past, since by definition those processes aren't being observed right now--even though many of those processes continue right now in much the same way, they obviously aren't producing right now the planet on which we already live. IMO, this is just a clever way to deny the conclusions of modern science, and would not be used if those conclusions were more in accord with the particular interpretations of the Bible favored by advocates of "origins science."

Science since at least the time of Galileo (early 17th century) has moved past Bacon to embrace the "hypothetico-deductive" method of inquiry. Newton helped establish its power, by explaining a great range of natural phenomena (such as the earth's precise shape, its precise orbital shape, the subtle differences in the lengths of pendulums needed for clocks in different parts of the world, the paths of comets, etc) in terms of a small number of mathematical "hypotheses" from which those phenomena could be deduced. In the three centuries since Newton, scientists have used h-d methods in natural history also, to draw conclusions about the earth's age and history. This is *not* origins science, but it is absolutely legitimate science. The reasoning processes employed are identical to those used by lots of scientists and other people whose conclusions are usually accepted by creationists--medical researchers looking for the causes of diseases, petroleum geologists searching for oil deposits, even members of a jury who convict a murderer in the absence of any living human witnesses to the crime. (This latter example is perhaps the most telling. Advocates of origins science can't consistently believe that Mr Simpson should have been convicted of killing his wife, since no living person other than Mr Simpson actually saw it happen.)

Origins science is a "science stopper." It says, the methods we use to draw conclusions about the causes of directly witnessed events in the present cannot be used to draw conclusions about the causes of unwitnessed events in the past, despite the fact that we do witness in the present lots of evidence relating to those past events. Advocates of origins science claim instead, that the only living witness to the formational history of the universe--God--has already told us exactly what happened. Furthermore, they claim, we make "a liar" out of God if we place greater weight (or even equal weight) on the evidence of our senses and the power of our reason, when we draw conclusions that do not agree with a particular intepretation of God's words in Genesis.

Ultimately, this is what it's about: whether the same kinds of scientific inferences that we will accept, when drawing conclusions about unwitnessed murders in the past, can also be used to draw conclusions about the unwitnessed history of creation. If the universe *looks* like it came into being 13.7 billion years ago, that's not origins science since it doesn't agree with a "recent" creation. And OJ didn't kill his wife, either.

:lol:

[George Murphy]

(1) is not relevant as an example of origins science. Origins 'science' considers such questions as, 'How was I291 created and when?' Science applied to events or phenomena in the distant past is not origins science unless the genesis of something is being investigated.

I would classify origins science as a branch of theology -- science applied to certain questions in theology. I would not consider origins science to be part of science, just as technology is not a part of science even though it is called 'applied science.' That sentence is true as long as we cannot repeatedly and reliably distinguish events arising from miracles from events arising from natural causes. It may be that God does not wish to give us any proof (as opposed to mere evidence, like the Bible) of His existence.

Sorry, this distinction gains nothing. We try to understand how any nuclear species that we find in nature originated by investigating nuclear reactions that occur in the lab, looking for space-time neighborhoods where conditions might have existed in which those reactions could have taken place (early universe, stellar interiors or atmospheres, supernovae, interstellar space [for some spallation reactions] &c) & then testing the consequences of the hypothesis that such places are where those species were formed. Thus we can explain the origin of He-4 in the big bang, C-12 via the triple alpha process in stellar cores, &c. Somebody who's more into the nuclear end of things may be able to give the details on I-129.

I.e., we apply "operations science" through and through. So called "origins science" is just operations science applied to origins. Of course this doesn't mean that we can apply such science to the ultimate origin of the universe - i.e., "Why is there something rather than nothing." But given that there is a universe in which some kinds of rational laws hold, there is no theological reason to think that the origin of any particular type of thing can't be explained by science that is qualitatively the same as that which is applied to phenomena occurring here & now.

Shalom,
George

[geochron]

FYI 129I is an r-process nucleus. So it is most likely a supernova product. Small amounts are produced by spallation reactions and fission.

Meanwhile, isn't someone who thinks there's a difference going to classify my examples? :smile:

[Augustine2004]

George Murphy's post (#9) clarified and refined the discussion here. Thanks! However, I still say that origins science as the YEC sees it is a branch of theology, not science. Again, creationists have got to come up with an operational way to distinguish evidence that were created miraculously from evidence that occurred naturally. And give alternative hypotheses detailed enough that we can make deductions from them to check with the evidence.

[Pete4Honduras]

Geochron’s original question was

“If you believe that there are two different kinds of science, consider and classify the following experiments...

1. 129I decayed in the early solar system (4.5 billion years ago) with a half life of 16Ma. We know this by contrasting it with other radioisotopes in the same minerals that decay by different mechanisms.

2. 129I decayed in the 1950s with a half life of 16Ma. We know this because we have records on paper of people comparing its activity with mechanical clocks.

Now explain how relying on (1) is different in kind from relying on (2). If I test the half life today and compare it with (1) is that origins or operational science? If I compare it with (2), is that origins or operational science?”



Eleutherius said

[A] “We can't see *right now, right in front of us* the processes that produced the universe… Therefore, we can't "know for sure" how they came to be, or even when they came to be.”



[B] “Advocates of origins science deny the legitimacy of drawing inferences about the processes of nature in the past, since by definition those processes aren't being observed right now--even though many of those processes continue right now in much the same way, they obviously aren't producing right now the planet on which we already live.”



[C] “Origins science is a "science stopper." It says, the methods we use to draw conclusions about the causes of directly witnessed events in the present cannot be used to draw conclusions about the causes of unwitnessed events in the past, despite the fact that we do witness in the present lots of evidence relating to those past events.”





Eleutherius’ description of the differences between origin science and operation science is just off the mark. His analogy of the trial jury correctly identifies a key aspect of origin science in that it is forensic. Forensic sciences deal with the past and operation science with observable phenomena. Norm Geisler puts it this way in “Origins, Science of,” [i]Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics, “operation science is an empirical science that deals with present regularities (elsewhere “repetition of similar patterns of events”), but origin science is a forensic science that considers past singularities.”

There is no way to test the origin of the universe by operation science, just like there is no way to perform experiments today on the events of a car accident last Tuesday. We are capable of looking at the scene of the accident, measuring tire skid marks, noting direction and point of impact, etc (excluding eye witness testimony for the sake of analogy). Then by applying the principles we know about the movement of physical objects (principles derived from real-time experiments) we can arrive at a relatively accurate understanding the events of the accident.



Similarly, models that explain the beginning of the universe can be generated and tested by observations (of the forensic kind) and analyses made today. This testing will look for an accurate and consistent account of causality and uniformity.



[about ‘C’]

I admit that I differ with many of my young-earth creationist brothers and that they must take a serious look at their understandings of both science and the Bible. Some of them do make the claims that Eleutherius mentions. This is unfortunate. Origin science, appropriately conceived, should not be a “science stopper.”



I will attempt to apply these categories to Geochron’s original question; admittedly it is outside my area of expertise. Number (2) above is a principle derived from operational science. It becomes a forensic tool when applied to the “scene” of the actual composition of minerals.

[George Murphy]

Eleutherius said

[A] “We can't see *right now, right in front of us* the processes that produced the universe… Therefore, we can't "know for sure" how they came to be, or even when they came to be.”



[B] “Advocates of origins science deny the legitimacy of drawing inferences about the processes of nature in the past, since by definition those processes aren't being observed right now--even though many of those processes continue right now in much the same way, they obviously aren't producing right now the planet on which we already live.”



[C] “Origins science is a "science stopper." It says, the methods we use to draw conclusions about the causes of directly witnessed events in the present cannot be used to draw conclusions about the causes of unwitnessed events in the past, despite the fact that we do witness in the present lots of evidence relating to those past events.”





Eleutherius’ description of the differences between origin science and operation science is just off the mark. His analogy of the trial jury correctly identifies a key aspect of origin science in that it is forensic. Forensic sciences deal with the past and operation science with observable phenomena. Norm Geisler puts it this way in “Origins, Science of,” [i]Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics, “operation science is an empirical science that deals with present regularities (elsewhere “repetition of similar patterns of events”), but origin science is a forensic science that considers past singularities.”

There is no way to test the origin of the universe by operation science, just like there is no way to perform experiments today on the events of a car accident last Tuesday. We are capable of looking at the scene of the accident, measuring tire skid marks, noting direction and point of impact, etc (excluding eye witness testimony for the sake of analogy). Then by applying the principles we know about the movement of physical objects (principles derived from real-time experiments) we can arrive at a relatively accurate understanding the events of the accident.


Similarly, models that explain the beginning of the universe can be generated and tested by observations (of the forensic kind) and analyses made today. This testing will look for an accurate and consistent account of causality and uniformity.

[about ‘C’]

I admit that I differ with many of my young-earth creationist brothers and that they must take a serious look at their understandings of both science and the Bible. Some of them do make the claims that Eleutherius mentions. This is unfortunate. Origin science, appropriately conceived, should not be a “science stopper.”I said in an earlier post that it's all "operations science." Using the term the way you do, I could also say that it's all origins science. An astrophysicist
studying the sun is looking at the past, and has to make inferences from the data she receives on earth, using theories about EM wave propagation and so forth, in order to be able to say anything about events that supposedly took place on the sun 8 minutes before. A chemist in a lab is always dealing with data that have to do with the past - even if only fractions of a second in the past - and has to make similar inferences to be able to say anything about what happened in a beaker a moment ago.

There is no qualitative difference between such work and what scientists do in studying fossils from millions of years ago, or the evolution of stars in a galaxy a billion years ago, or the microwave background ~13.5 billion years ago. (& of course those ages are inferred from the data that's obtained, making use the understanding of processes obtained in our immediate space-time neighborhood.) It's still the same science, whether you're looking at something in the lab or in interstellar space.

& it's the same basic scientific procedure that's used in forensics. When a coroner tries to determine when someone died he'll make use of what's known about body temperature and so forth to try to infer a time of death. Of course there could have been physical factors that weren't taken into account - e.g., some medical condition of the deceased - that will invalidate his results. That's a caveat that all scientists have to be aware of. But it doesn't change the type of science that's being done.

Making the distinction between "origins science" and "operations science" is just obfuscation. If you want to know how science is done, talk to scientists rather than philosophers.

Shalom,
George

[kuboes1831]

George and Eleutherius are absolutely spot on and I have nothing to add except my total agreement

[Country Doc]

[/QUOTE] Good question. First I would like to ask you to consider that it takes as much blind, raw, faith to belive in evolulution as it does creation.

Lets consider the term science. As a former chemisrty & physics major, science is described as the ability to preform an expirement, study the results, reproduce the expirment, and compair the results. If both results compair favorably, then there is grounds for continued study and the adding of variables & compairing those results for further exploration of them.

In the cases of evolution & creation, NONE of mankind was present to observe the original prosecess, so we have no way to repete the expirement hence we can't draw any conclussions from either process.

As for both radio-active dating systems they are flawed because the radio-active system makes the assumption that all radio-active levals are and have been constant forever, and still are. Current studies indicate a higher radio-active leval today than in the past. (Due I'm sure to increased poulitian.) This would mean that everything today would appear to be much older than it really is.

Now I leave you with the pleasure of deciding which is most revealivant to your question. Have fun.

May the Holy Spirit guide and healp you,
Country Doc

[Warcraft3]

Hey there Country Doc.....

As for both radio-active dating systems they are flawed because the radio-active system makes the assumption that all radio-active levals are and have been constant forever, and still are. Current studies indicate a higher radio-active leval today than in the past. (Due I'm sure to increased poulitian.) This would mean that everything today would appear to be much older than it really is.

What current studies have shown that there was a significant difference in the levels of certain radioactive isotopes?




Russ

[geochron]

Good question. First I would like to ask you to consider that it takes as much blind, raw, faith to belive in evolulution as it does creation.



No, it doesn't.



Lets consider the term science. As a former chemisrty & physics major, science is described as the ability to preform an expirement, study the results, reproduce the expirment, and compair the results. If both results compair favorably, then there is grounds for continued study and the adding of variables & compairing those results for further exploration of them.



No, that's not how it's described.



In the cases of evolution & creation, NONE of mankind was present to observe the original prosecess, so we have no way to repete the expirement hence we can't draw any conclussions from either process.



Oh dear, we've been over this many times before. We can observe the processes of the early Earth quite easily. We can show that everyday physics and chemistry can explain it all quite easily.



As for both radio-active dating systems they are flawed because the radio-active system makes the assumption that all radio-active levals are and have been constant forever, and still are.



In fact they assume that radioactive levels are not constant, but decay according to testable laws.



Current studies indicate a higher radio-active leval today than in the past. (Due I'm sure to increased poulitian.) This would mean that everything today
would appear to be much older than it really is.



No, in fact current studies demonstrate many radioactive species were present in the past that are not present now.

[BrianB]

I don't make it back this way much, due to time constraints, but I thought I'd throw this in because I think it might be of some help. My take is that the attempt to distinguish between 'origins' and 'operations' science is simply attempting to frame a proper distinction in the wrong way. The proper distionction is between nomological science and historical science. They are not unrelated (of course) but they are conceptually different.

See the following quote, especially the text in bold (my bold).

--- begin quote ---
I contend that historical sciences generally can be distinguished from nonhistorical scientific disciplines by virtue of the three following features:

1. The historical interest or questions motivating their practitioners: Those in the historical sciences generally seek to answer questions of the form "What happened?" or "What caused this event or that natural feature to arise?" On the other hand, those in the nomological or inductive sciences generally address questions of the form "How does nature normally operate or function?

2. The distinctively historical types of inference used: The historical sciences use inferences with a distinctive logical form. Unlike many nonhistorical disciplines, which typically attempt to infer generalizations or laws from particular facts, historical sciences make what C. S. Peirce has called "abductive inferences" in order to infer a past event from a present fact or clue. These inferences have also been called "retrodictive" because they are temporally asymmetric that is, they seek to reconstruct past conditions or causes from present facts or clues. For example, detectives use abductive or retrodictive inferences to reconstruct the circumstances of a crime after the fact. In so doing they function as historical scientists. As Gould has put it, the historical scientist proceeds by "inferring history from its results."

3. The distinctively historical types of explanations used: In the historical sciences one finds causal explanations of particular events, not nomological descriptions or theories of general phenomena. In historical explanations, past causal events, not laws, do the primary explanatory work. The explanations cited earlier of the Himalayan orogeny and the beginning of World War I exemplify such historical explanations.

In addition, the historical sciences share with many other types of science a fourth feature.

4. Indirect methods of testing such as inference to the best explanation: As discussed earlier, many disciplines cannot test theories by direct observation, prediction or repeated experiment. Instead, testing must be done indirectly through comparison of the explanatory power of competing theories.
--- end quote ---

The Methodological Equivalence of Design & Descent: Can There Be a Scientific "Theory of Creation"?
Reprinted from The Creation Hypothesis, ed. by J.P. Moreland (InterVarsity Press, 1994)
http://www.arn.org/docs/meyer/sm_methodological.htm

I recommend reading the full article. Very interesting and helpful in bringing needed nuances to these discussions.

Meyer's doctoral work (PhD in the History and Philosophy of Science from the University of Cambridge) was "on the logical and methodological features of the historical sciences" if anyone cares.

Regards,
Brian

[HRG_new]

Good question. First I would like to ask you to consider that it takes as much blind, raw, faith to belive in evolulution as it does creation.

Considered it. Found out that it is obviously false.
BTW, scientists do not "believe in" evolution. They are convinced by owerwhelming evidence that it is an excellent approximation to reality.

Lets consider the term science. As a former chemisrty & physics major, science is described as the ability to preform an expirement, study the results, reproduce the expirment, and compair the results.

As an actual PhD (physics), I wonder where you got this description from. Which experiments have been done with supernovae, earthquakes and ice ages that you are aware of ? On what experiments did Kepler base his three laws of planetary motion - did he personally kick Mars to see what would happen ?

Science tries to explain a range of observations by a more basic and naturalistic (thus testable) theory. Experiments are helpful, but not required. Repetition of the event isn't required either, only repeatability of the observation (and you can observe common descent via the nested hierarchy as often as you like).


If both results compair favorably, then there is grounds for continued study and the adding of variables & compairing those results for further exploration of them.

In the cases of evolution & creation, NONE of mankind was present to observe the original prosecess, so we have no way to repete the expirement hence we can't draw any conclussions from either process.

Nobody is present at the place of the sun either, yet we can observe the magnetic field of a sunspot and the composition of its chromosphere. IOW, observations can be made across space gaps, and in the same way they can be made across time gaps.

DO you realize that any observation is an observation of the past, and almost all observation are indirect to some degree ?

As for both radio-active dating systems they are flawed because the radio-active system makes the assumption that all radio-active levals are and have been constant forever, and still are.

That's not an assumption, that's a theorem in quantum mechanics - which has been confirmed by observations at the Oklo reactor.


Current studies indicate a higher radio-active leval today than in the past. (Due I'm sure to increased poulitian.) This would mean that everything today would appear to be much older than it really is.

If you think that a higher concentration of radioactive isotopes (mostly because of bomb testing and Chernobyl) means a "higher radioactive level", you retroactively flunk your final exams in physics.

[HRG_new]

I don't make it back this way much, due to time constraints, but I thought I'd throw this in because I think it might be of some help. My take is that the attempt to distinguish between 'origins' and 'operations' science is simply attempting to frame a proper distinction in the wrong way. The proper distionction is between nomological science and historical science. They are not unrelated (of course) but they are conceptually different.

See the following quote, especially the text in bold (my bold).

--- begin quote ---
I contend that historical sciences generally can be distinguished from nonhistorical scientific disciplines by virtue of the three following features:

1. The historical interest or questions motivating their practitioners: Those in the historical sciences generally seek to answer questions of the form "What happened?" or "What caused this event or that natural feature to arise?" On the other hand, those in the nomological or inductive sciences generally address questions of the form "How does nature normally operate or function?

You mean that experimental particle physicists do not have to answer the question "What happened at this point in the target area, 10^14 periods ago" ?
Note that the time scale of particle physics is 10^-23 secs and below, while the detection time of our best equipment is far above 10^-9 secs. This compares quite favorably to the corresponding ratio in paleontology.

IOW, particle physicists (and people in chemical kinetics etc.) reconstruct past events, just as paleontologists, geologists etc. do. The alleged dichotomy between operational and origin sciences looks a bit like a pretense to discredit the theory of evolution.

[BrianB]

You mean that experimental particle physicists do not have to answer the question "What happened at this point in the target area, 10^14 periods ago" ?


Um. I never mentioned particle physics. Are you confusing me with someone else's thread/post?

Brian

[geochron]

I don't make it back this way much, due to time constraints, but I thought I'd throw this in because I think it might be of some help. My take is that the attempt to distinguish between 'origins' and 'operations' science is simply attempting to frame a proper distinction in the wrong way. The proper distionction is between nomological science and historical science. They are not unrelated (of course) but they are conceptually different.

See the following quote, especially the text in bold (my bold).

--- begin quote ---
I contend that historical sciences generally can be distinguished from nonhistorical scientific disciplines by virtue of the three following features:

1. The historical interest or questions motivating their practitioners: Those in the historical sciences generally seek to answer questions of the form "What happened?" or "What caused this event or that natural feature to arise?" On the other hand, those in the nomological or inductive sciences generally address questions of the form "How does nature normally operate or function?

2. The distinctively historical types of inference used: The historical sciences use inferences with a distinctive logical form. Unlike many nonhistorical disciplines, which typically attempt to infer generalizations or laws from particular facts, historical sciences make what C. S. Peirce has called "abductive inferences" in order to infer a past event from a present fact or clue. These inferences have also been called "retrodictive" because they are temporally asymmetric that is, they seek to reconstruct past conditions or causes from present facts or clues. For example, detectives use abductive or retrodictive inferences to reconstruct the circumstances of a crime after the fact. In so doing they function as historical scientists. As Gould has put it, the historical scientist proceeds by "inferring history from its results."

3. The distinctively historical types of explanations used: In the historical sciences one finds causal explanations of particular events, not nomological descriptions or theories of general phenomena. In historical explanations, past causal events, not laws, do the primary explanatory work. The explanations cited earlier of the Himalayan orogeny and the beginning of World War I exemplify such historical explanations.

In addition, the historical sciences share with many other types of science a fourth feature.

4. Indirect methods of testing such as inference to the best explanation: As discussed earlier, many disciplines cannot test theories by direct observation, prediction or repeated experiment. Instead, testing must be done indirectly through comparison of the explanatory power of competing theories.
--- end quote ---

The Methodological Equivalence of Design & Descent: Can There Be a Scientific "Theory of Creation"?
Reprinted from The Creation Hypothesis, ed. by J.P. Moreland (InterVarsity Press, 1994)
http://www.arn.org/docs/meyer/sm_methodological.htm

I recommend reading the full article. Very interesting and helpful in bringing needed nuances to these discussions.

Meyer's doctoral work (PhD in the History and Philosophy of Science from the University of Cambridge) was "on the logical and methodological features of the historical sciences" if anyone cares.

Regards,
Brian

It would be in the spirit of this thread to classify the examples in my opening post into nomological vs historical. In addition, is "how do solar systems form" a question for historical or nomological science?

[shunyadragon]

I don't make it back this way much, due to time constraints, but I thought I'd throw this in because I think it might be of some help. My take is that the attempt to distinguish between 'origins' and 'operations' science is simply attempting to frame a proper distinction in the wrong way. The proper distionction is between nomological science and historical science. They are not unrelated (of course) but they are conceptually different.

See the following quote, especially the text in bold (my bold).

--- begin quote ---
I contend that historical sciences generally can be distinguished from nonhistorical scientific disciplines by virtue of the three following features:

1. The historical interest or questions motivating their practitioners: Those in the historical sciences generally seek to answer questions of the form "What happened?" or "What caused this event or that natural feature to arise?" On the other hand, those in the nomological or inductive sciences generally address questions of the form "How does nature normally operate or function?

2. The distinctively historical types of inference used: The historical sciences use inferences with a distinctive logical form. Unlike many nonhistorical disciplines, which typically attempt to infer generalizations or laws from particular facts, historical sciences make what C. S. Peirce has called "abductive inferences" in order to infer a past event from a present fact or clue. These inferences have also been called "retrodictive" because they are temporally asymmetric that is, they seek to reconstruct past conditions or causes from present facts or clues. For example, detectives use abductive or retrodictive inferences to reconstruct the circumstances of a crime after the fact. In so doing they function as historical scientists. As Gould has put it, the historical scientist proceeds by "inferring history from its results."

3. The distinctively historical types of explanations used: In the historical sciences one finds causal explanations of particular events, not nomological descriptions or theories of general phenomena. In historical explanations, past causal events, not laws, do the primary explanatory work. The explanations cited earlier of the Himalayan orogeny and the beginning of World War I exemplify such historical explanations.

In addition, the historical sciences share with many other types of science a fourth feature.

4. Indirect methods of testing such as inference to the best explanation: As discussed earlier, many disciplines cannot test theories by direct observation, prediction or repeated experiment. Instead, testing must be done indirectly through comparison of the explanatory power of competing theories.
--- end quote ---

The Methodological Equivalence of Design & Descent: Can There Be a Scientific "Theory of Creation"?
Reprinted from The Creation Hypothesis, ed. by J.P. Moreland (InterVarsity Press, 1994)
http://www.arn.org/docs/meyer/sm_methodological.htm

I recommend reading the full article. Very interesting and helpful in bringing needed nuances to these discussions.

Meyer's doctoral work (PhD in the History and Philosophy of Science from the University of Cambridge) was "on the logical and methodological features of the historical sciences" if anyone cares.

Regards,
BrianThe problem is that nobody outside 'Creation Science' bothers to make the distinction between 'origins' and 'operational' science, because it is an illusion that serves no purpose.

The greatest laboratory of physics is the universe and much of our attempts to understand such basic principles such as gravity depends on looking back into the past and the assumption of uniformitarianism. Looking out into space is looking back into time to the beginnings of the universe.

[kuboes1831]

The Methodological Equivalence of Design & Descent: Can There Be a Scientific "Theory of Creation"?
Reprinted from The Creation Hypothesis, ed. by J.P. Moreland (InterVarsity Press, 1994)
http://www.arn.org/docs/meyer/sm_methodological.htm

I recommend reading the full article. Very interesting and helpful in lainging needed nuances to these discussions.

Meyer's doctoral work (PhD in the History and Philosophy of Science from the University of Cambridge) was "on the logical and methodological features of the historical sciences" if anyone cares.

Regards,
Brian

Having a Ph. D, from a reasonable university is no gaurantee that later work will be any use. The article cited is totally flawed by carefully avoiding any mention of geological time. See the article by a nonCambridge type on ID in relation to geological time in Ruse and Dembski ed Debating Design , Cambridge Univ Press 2004 p275ff.

By avoiding geological Time ID effectively becomes YEC and will soon go that way.

[lucaspa]

(1) is not relevant as an example of origins science. Origins 'science' considers such questions as, 'How was I291 created and when?' Science applied to events or phenomena in the distant past is not origins science unless the genesis of something is being investigated.

I would classify origins science as a branch of theology -- science applied to certain questions in theology. I would not consider origins science to be part of science, just as technology is not a part of science even though it is called 'applied science.' That sentence is true as long as we cannot repeatedly and reliably distinguish events arising from miracles from events arising from natural causes. It may be that God does not wish to give us any proof (as opposed to mere evidence, like the Bible) of His existence.

In science, there is no such thing as "origins science". THis is a made up term to try to get rid of data and ideas that some people find theologically troubling -- old earth, evolution, big bang, etc.

The trouble here is that creationism proposes a specific scientific theory of how God created. It postulates certain "miracles", such as a world-wide Flood, to explain phenomenon we see TODAY. "Miracles" can be studied by science as long as they leave evidence that exists today.

The key here is: the present is the way it is because the past was the way it was. One time events can be studied if they leave evidence today. An example is the giant meteor impact at the end of the Cretaceous (KT boundary). That is a one-time event of catastrophic proportions. It was proposed, via science, because it left an iridium rich layer in the rocks at the KT boundary all around the world. A hypothesis of a meteor impact would explain this.

Similarly, special creation of each species (by God) was hypothesized to explain the designs in plants and animals and their geographical distribution. However, the actual distribution and the imperfect designs ended up showing this hypothesis to be wrong. Darwin discussed several examples of data that could not be explained by this hypothesis in Origin. Instead, another theory -- descent with modification -- explained all the data explained by special creation and the data special creation could not explain.

[lucaspa]

The greatest laboratory of physics is the universe and much of our attempts to understand such basic principles such as gravity depends on looking back into the past and the assumption of uniformitarianism. Looking out into space is looking back into time to the beginnings of the universe.Uniformitarianism is not an "assumption". Rather, it was first a hypothesis and is now a conclusion. In effect, uniformitarianism is a very well-supported theory that we conclude is (provisionally) true unless and until data show up to challenge it. I already gave one example where processes we observe happening today (uniformitarianism) cannot account for some data -- the iridium layer at the KT boundary. We do not have giant meteor impacts to observe today. Similarly, a world-wide Flood was hypothesized to account for all the geological formations on the planet (1700-1831). However, examination of those formations in detail revealed that they could not possibly have been the result of a world-wide Flood.

Another example of a one-time phenomenon are the competing theories of Big Bang and Ekpyrotic. Both deal with the origin of the universe. Big Bang involves a singularity while Ekpyrotic involves the collision of higher dimensional 'branes (Big Splat). However, each event would leave different gravity waves that would persist to today. We don't have the technology to measure gravity waves -- yet -- but, when we can, we will be able to tell which theory is wrong.

[geochron]

If I may summarise. There have been a few philosophical rambles about the distinction between two types of science. But nobody seems to want to categorise my examples in the opening post.

If you can't classify the examples I gave, I think we're justified in concluding the distinction you want to draw is useless.

[lucaspa]

The proper distionction is between nomological science and historical science. They are not unrelated (of course) but they are conceptually different.

See the following quote, especially the text in bold (my bold).

--- begin quote ---
I contend that historical sciences generally can be distinguished from nonhistorical scientific disciplines by virtue of the three following features:

1. The historical interest or questions motivating their practitioners: Those in the historical sciences generally seek to answer questions of the form "What happened?" or "What caused this event or that natural feature to arise?" On the other hand, those in the nomological or inductive sciences generally address questions of the form "How does nature normally operate or function? This shows that Moreland has never actually done any science. What he describes as "historical science" is what happens in what he says is "operational science". Let me give you just a couple of examples from my own work.

I had a paper published (Tissue Engineering, 1(4): 345-353, 1995) describing an experiment for a possible treatment for osteoarthritis. We were looking at the question: What happens when we put adult stem cells in a cartilage defect in animals (that mimics osteoarthritis)? We drilled a 3 mm diameter hole thru the articular cartilage and part of the underlying bone in the knee of rabbits. This diameter hole will not regenerate on its own and is an established model for osteoarthritis. In the defect in one knee we placed a polymer alone and in the other knee we placed polymer into which had been grown special cells, mesenchymal stem cells (MSCs for short). Animals were euthanized at 6 and 12 weeks post-op and the defect removed for histological (under the microscope) analysis. At 6 weeks there was no difference between defects with polymer alone and defects with polymer-MSCs. Both contained cells but there was no identifiable cartilage or bone. At 12 weeks, the defects with polymer alone contained fibrocartilage (which is NOT the same as articular cartilage) and no bone. It looked like a big hole in cartilage and bone filled with scar tissue. In contrast, the defect with polymer-MSCs had a surface layer of articular cartilage and an underlying layer of bone. The edges of the defect could not be observed. The bone in the defect could not be distinguished from the surrounding bone.

We concluded that the MSCs had formed the new cartilage and bone that now filled the defect. However, the point here is that we DEDUCED, or INFERRED, the differentiation of the MSCs to chondrocytes (cartilage cells) or osteoblasts (bone cells). We never observed it directly. In thinking about our current, and planned, experiments, this lack of direct observation will be true there also. The best, and most accepted, "proof" will be to insert the gene for beta-galactosidase into the MSCs. The beta-galactosidase produced by the labeled cells will stain blue with a chemical reaction. Therefore, we will see the chondrocytes and osteoblasts in the defect treated with polymer-MSCs turn blue, "proving" that the MSCs differentiated into these cells.

Everything we "observed" happened in the past, from a microsecond to 6 weeks before we removed the tissue at 12 weeks post-op. It is still looking at the result of a past event we will never be able to see in real time. This is no different than Darwin observing the Galapagos finches and INFERRING that evolution occurred. Or Darwin asking: What happened such that the finches are so different from one another?

Take one more example from the "operational" sciences. This time chemistry. One of the first experiments I did in undergraduate organic chemistry was reacting organic acid with an alcohol to get an ester. The question is: What happened when you mix alcohol and acids?

Esters have distinctive odors that depend on the acid and alcohol used. My reaction produced an ester that smelled like bananas. My lab partner and I knew we had succeeded when we began smelling bananas. Did we ever see the 2 molecules actually come together to form an ester? No. We knew we had those 2 chemicals and that we got the reaction product. We DEDUCED the reaction took place, but never directly observed it. Except for behavioral biology, where the observed behavior can be observed in real time and videotaped, nearly every experiment I can think of in the "operational" sciences looks at "what happened" questions and involves deductive reasoning. All the events occur in the recent past, but the past.

[BrianB]

It would be in the spirit of this thread to classify the examples in my opening post into nomological vs historical. In addition, is "how do solar systems form" a question for historical or nomological science?

Ok, your original examples are both of the historical variety because they both are discussing things that happened in the past. In addition, both of them abide be the principle (nomological) that 129I decays with a half life of 16Ma.

"How do solar systems form" is a nomological question.

Remember, "what happened" vs "How does nature normally operate or function" are the distinguishing questions.

Brian

[geochron]

So you would agree that they are not different in kind from each other, or from any other measurement of the half life of 129I?

It seems to me, however, that the question is "what is the half life of 129I?", not "what happened?". So might they not equally be nomological?

[BrianB]

Having a Ph. D, from a reasonable university is no gaurantee that later work will be any use. The article cited is totally flawed by carefully avoiding any mention of geological time. See the article by a nonCambridge type on ID in relation to geological time in Ruse and Dembski ed Debating Design , Cambridge Univ Press 2004 p275ff.

By avoiding geological Time ID effectively becomes YEC and will soon go that way.

Umm, how does 'carefully avoiding any mention of geologic time' make the article totally flawed?

Brian

[BrianB]

This shows that Moreland has never actually done any science. What he describes as "historical science" is what happens in what he says is "operational science". Let me give you just a couple of examples from my own work.


1. Who is Moreland?

2. I fail to see how any of what you said has relevance to the distinction I've been concerned with.

Brian

[BrianB]

So you would agree that they are not different in kind from each other, or from any other measurement of the half life of 129I?


Certainly. I agree.


It seems to me, however, that the question is "what is the half life of 129I?", not "what happened?". So might they not equally be nomological?

No, the question would be more "what _was_ the half-life measured to be at X point in the past?" at least in the way you stated it in your first post.

Brian

Man theologyweb is so slow. I swear, a better forum software setup would speed things up considerably. grrr

[geochron]

No, the question would be more "what _was_ the half-life measured to be at X point in the past?" at least in the way you stated it in your first post.



But if you open that door doesn't all science become historical? For instance, a test of Ohm's Law addresses e.g. "what was the relationship between current and voltage 10 seconds ago"

[lucaspa]

1. Who is Moreland?

2. I fail to see how any of what you said has relevance to the distinction I've been concerned with.

BrianMoreland is the guy who wrote the article you quoted. You didn't know that?

To recap:
1. What you and Moreland call "operational science" or "what happens in the now" actually looks at historical events, not present time.
2. What you and Moreland call "operational science" uses the same methods as what is called "historical science" -- looking at evidence that persists to the present and deducing what happened in the past.

In the 129I example, I fail to see your distinction. In the present, we measure decay for a period of days and weeks and from that graph that 1/2 the radioactivity will be gone in x amount of time.

In the past, we look at a sample and look at the ratio of 129I to decay product. We then compare the age determined by several independent decay series of other isotopes and calculate that the ratio corresponds to a half-life of x for 129I.

It shows in both cases that 129I decays with a half-life of x. In both the present and the past.

[lucaspa]

No, the question would be more "what _was_ the half-life measured to be at X point in the past?" at least in the way you stated it in your first post.Brian, if 129I did not decay over the whole time with the same half-life, the ratio of 129I to decay product would not match the age determined by other radioactive series. The half life could not vary from 1,000 years to 16 million years and provide the observed ratio. So ... what the experiment shows is that the half-life (decay rate) of 129I is X. This is the same thing nomologically as measuring the decay rate of 129I in the present.

The question still is: what is the half-life of 129I

[BrianB]

But if you open that door doesn't all science become historical? For instance, a test of Ohm's Law addresses e.g. "what was the relationship between current and voltage 10 seconds ago"

Off the cuff I would say that all science has a history component to it. That is, scientific principles/laws are discovered through observing the empirical world as history plays out.

Let me explain a little more.

Our observations of the world as history unfolds allows us to discover scientific principles (laws of motion, themo, principles in biology, etc). When we have these scientific principles, we use them to extrapolate to events in the real world, to things that happen in history. So there's a close interrelationship between the 'nomological' and the 'historical' but they are not the same thing.

Once we have established a principle (say, Ohm's law) we can use that as a valid assumption about what has happened in history when we didn't actually observe/measure it.

As a graphic (and simplistic) generalization:
history (observed) -> principle
principle -> history (unobserved)

Does that help?

Brian

[BrianB]

Moreland is the guy who wrote the article you quoted. You didn't know that?


No. Meyer is the author. I see where the confusion is. It was also published in a book edited by J.P. Moreland. I stated Meyer's credentials, but didn't make it clear enough that he was the author. Sorry bout that.



To recap:
1. What you and Moreland call "operational science" or "what happens in the now" actually looks at historical events, not present time.
2. What you and Moreland call "operational science" uses the same methods as what is called "historical science" -- looking at evidence that persists to the present and deducing what happened in the past.


I think you need to be a little more careful in your reading.

1. The article doesn't discuss 'operational science'
2. My discussion of 'operational science' was about how I thought it wasn't a helpful categorization.


In the 129I example, I fail to see your distinction.

I didn't make a distinction between the two examples originally proposed. Both are of the historical nature, and both lend support to the principle that 129I decays with a half life of 16Ma, regardless of when it is occuring. See my previous post for more info on the relationship between the nomological (principle) and historical.

Brian

[geochron]

Broadening the picture somewhat, let's look at the political context. YECists want to use the operational/origins science to discredit those bits of science that establish the ancient age of the Earth or support evolution (not an exhaustive list). As far as I can see the nomological/historical division is of no use to them in this political effort.

[lucaspa]

lucaspa 1. What you and Moreland call "operational science" or "what happens in the now" actually looks at historical events, not present time.
2. What you and Moreland call "operational science" uses the same methods as what is called "historical science" -- looking at evidence that persists to the present and deducing what happened in the past.

1. The article doesn't discuss 'operational science'
2. My discussion of 'operational science' was about how I thought it wasn't a helpful categorization. Neither one of your points addresses my points.
1. Operational science looks at historical events, thus eliminating any difference between it and historical science.
2. Operational science uses the same methods as historical science, again eliminating any different between the two.

Thus, since the two are the same, there is no point to trying to make a distinction, is there?

[Captain Ochre]

I posted this question in a couple of places but got no answers.

I know that there are a few fans of the O-O science distinction around. But in the past when I've asked for specific examples to be classified nobody has stepped forward. So...

If you believe that there are two different kinds of science, consider and classify the following experiments...

1. 129I decayed in the early solar system (4.5 billion years ago) with a half life of 16Ma. We know this by contrasting it with other radioisotopes in the same minerals that decay by different mechanisms.

2. 129I decayed in the 1950s with a half life of 16Ma. We know this because we have records on paper of people comparing its activity with mechanical clocks.

Now explain how relying on (1) is different in kind from relying on (2). If I test the half life today and compare it with (1) is that origins or operational science? If I compare it with (2), is that origins or operational science?

In case #1, an assumption about the relative amounts of each radioisotope is required in order to enable the relative comparison.
In case #2, there is no like assumption even by analogy.

Over and out.

[geochron]

In case #1, an assumption about the relative amounts of each radioisotope is required in order to enable the relative comparison.
In case #2, there is no like assumption even by analogy.

Over and out.

No, because fractional changes are measured, not absolute changes.

But even were it the case, it doesn't make the activity different in kind afaics.

[Captain Ochre]

No, because fractional changes are measured, not absolute changes.

You'll have to explain how your complaint relates to my argument against. What do "fractional changes" have to do with the presumption of relative amounts of the individual isotopes? You're not trying to tell me that the long-ago subtances were measured when the object was first formed ...?

But even were it the case, it doesn't make the activity different in kind afaics.

Playing one hole of golf is the same as playing a whole round?
Great. Let's play for money. I'll play the one hole and you play all 18. Low score wins. What do you bet?

[geochron]

You'll have to explain how your complaint relates to my argument against. What do "fractional changes" have to do with the presumption of relative amounts of the individual isotopes? You're not trying to tell me that the long-ago subtances were measured when the object was first formed ...?



Perhaps you aren't understanding how the analysis works? We have a number of minerals. We know the amount of time that elapsed between formation of each one from, say, the U-Pb chronometer. We measure the ratio of the decay product of 129I to iodine in each one. From the evolution of this ratio with time we deduce a half life that can be compared with a modern determination.

But the challenge actually relates to what distinguishes this record of the half-life of 129I 4.5 Gyr ago, from the paper record of the half-life of 129I from the 1950s. If one is a different kind of thing from the other, why? For instance, can you call into question the assertion that rocks show the half life of 129I in the early solar system was 16Ma, without calling into question the assertion that a paper shows that the half life of 129I was 16Ma in the 1950s?

It seems to me that this is what you need to do to demsontrate that one is origins science and the other operational science.

[Captain Ochre]

Perhaps you aren't understanding how the analysis works?

I'm going according to your explanation, so ... was your explanation accurate and complete?

We have a number of minerals. We know the amount of time that elapsed between formation of each one from, say, the U-Pb chronometer.

In each case an (MN) assumption is made regarding the initial amount of U-Pb in the sample as it formed originally. We'll call this assumption #1.

We measure the ratio of the decay product of 129I to iodine in each one.

In each case an (MN) assumption is made regarding the initial amount of 1291 in the sample as it formed originally. We'll call this assumption #2.
In each case an (MN) assumption is made regarding the initial amount of iodine in the sample as it formed originally. We'll call this assumption #3.
Okay so far?
With each step of induction, we take a step further away from reliability of results. That is not to say that the results are therefore unreliable.

Here's a graph of results that appears to describe the measurements you're talking about:
http://adsbit.harvard.edu/cgi-bin/nph-iarticle_query?1997M%26PSA..32Q..20B

For that matter ...
With one exception, the I-Xe show concordancy with Pb-Pb ages and a direct correlation with metamorphic grade.

Did the exception also manifest the 16Ma decay rate that you have assured me was the rule in ages past? (I guess lead was supposed to be the benchmark for this particular set of tests).

From the evolution of this ratio with time we deduce a half life that can be compared with a modern determination.

Science is an inductive process. Why are you deducing something (allegedly)?

But the challenge actually relates to what distinguishes this record of the half-life of 129I 4.5 Gyr ago, from the paper record of the half-life of 129I from the 1950s.

True, and I just noticed it prior to reading your current reply, though it feeds in with the other major reason that your comparison of the methods used for two scientific aims doesn't fly. Operational science seeks answers to the way things usually work. Historical science cannot rely exclusively on that method, for history is composed of events that span from one end of the spectrum to the other in terms of the way things work. If things don't work the way they normally work, then the historical view based on pure MN will give you inaccurate results (with no necessary regard for consistency of those results). In terms of assessing the two, I would say that they are both operational science. Rather than trying to account for some historic event, they attempt to account for a modern observation (isotope amounts in mineral samples) in terms of another modern observation (half-life measurements). The previously noted difference remains valid, IMO, since the minerals were not observed over that length of time under controlled conditions. It is a layering of inductive reasoning in the case of the historical exercise of operational science, and a MOL isolated piece of inductive reasoning in the case of the contemporary example. I could add that it is hard to imagine that the mineral samples were treated to controlled conditions with an isolation of one variable in the case of the historical operational set of tests.

If one is a different kind of thing from the other, why?

See above.

For instance, can you call into question the assertion that rocks show the half life of 129I in the early solar system was 16Ma, without calling into question the assertion that a paper shows that the half life of 129I was 16Ma in the 1950s?

Yes, I believe so. If I read the experiment correctly as you present it, it returns the 16Ma rate for the samples that tested out as hoped regardless of the findings of the tests using mechanical chronometers (perhaps not as reliably).

It seems to me that this is what you need to do to demsontrate that one is origins science and the other operational science.

They are two different manifestations of operational science, IMO.

[geochron]

I'm going according to your explanation, so ... was your explanation accurate and complete?



Umm, I doubt it is complete yet for that matter, I'm not writing a paper. The challenge didn't rest on the details of the experiment, as far as I could see. Sorry for any confusion.



In each case an (MN) assumption is made regarding the initial amount of U-Pb in the sample as it formed originally. We'll call this assumption #1.



Actually Pb-Pb analyses don't rely on assumptions about the amount of uranium present in the sample.



In each case an (MN) assumption is made regarding the initial amount of 1291 in the sample as it formed originally. We'll call this assumption #2.
In each case an (MN) assumption is made regarding the initial amount of iodine in the sample as it formed originally. We'll call this assumption #3.



Not quite. For the experiment to produce a correlation between 129I/127I and time from which a half life can be deduced, the region of the solar system sampled must have had a homogenous ratio before the minerals were formed. But that "assumption" is tested in the analysis - it's not analogous to the assumptions at the beginning of a deductive process.



Here's a graph of results that appears to describe the measurements you're talking about:
http://adsbit.harvard.edu/cgi-bin/nph-iarticle_query?1997M%26PSA..32Q..20B

For that matter ...
With one exception, the I-Xe show concordancy with Pb-Pb ages and a direct correlation with metamorphic grade.

Did the exception also manifest the 16Ma decay rate that you have assured me was the rule in ages past? (I guess lead was supposed to be the benchmark for this particular set of tests).



The work has come a long way since then, and still progresses.

I'm more interested in the principle of comparing the two sets of experiments. But since you ask, the Allegan feldspar measurement was subsequently retracted when the effect of shock disturbance was demonstrated (Hohenberg C. M., Pravdivtseva O. and Meshik A. (2000) Reexamination of anomalous I-Xe ages: Orgueil and Murchison magnetites and Allegan feldspar. Geochim. Cosmochim. Acta 64, 4257–4262.)



Science is an inductive process. Why are you deducing something (allegedly)?



That radioactive decay is exponential is arrived at inductively. But from an exponential decay we deduce the half-life - it's a mathematical quantity that determines the shape of an exponential curve.



True, and I just noticed it prior to reading your current reply, though it feeds in with the other major reason that your comparison of the methods used for two scientific aims doesn't fly. Operational science seeks answers to the way things usually work. Historical science cannot rely exclusively on that method, for history is composed of events that span from one end of the spectrum to the other in terms of the way things work. If things don't work the way they normally work, then the historical view based on pure MN will give you inaccurate results (with no necessary regard for consistency of those results).



If things don't work the way they usually work in the laboratory, then "operational" science will give you inaccurate results, so I don't see how this helps. It's also not clear that spotting things "not working as usual" in a laboratory is a different sort of problem from spotting it in a sample.



In terms of assessing the two, I would say that they are both operational science. Rather than trying to account for some historic event, they attempt to account for a modern observation (isotope amounts in mineral samples) in terms of another modern observation (half-life measurements). The previously noted difference remains valid, IMO, since the minerals were not observed over that length of time under controlled conditions.



But the conditions they have experienced over that length time are in fact observed through the properties of the rock they form today.

We can infer from fission tracks that a rock has not exceeded a given temperature. We can infer from a chart recorder hooked up to a thermometer that a sample did not exceed a given temperature. How are these two processes different in kind?



It is a layering of inductive reasoning in the case of the historical exercise of operational science, and a MOL isolated piece of inductive reasoning in the case of the contemporary example. I could add that it is hard to imagine that the mineral samples were treated to controlled conditions with an isolation of one variable in the case of the historical operational set of tests.



In both cases the environment the materials experienced was well defined in terms of the things we understand to affect radioactive decay. In the 1950s experiment this was set up by a human being. As far as I can see that is the only difference.



Yes, I believe so. If I read the experiment correctly as you present it, it returns the 16Ma rate for the samples that tested out as hoped regardless of the findings of the tests using mechanical chronometers (perhaps not as reliably).



Forgive me, you seem to be saying you can see a difference in kind, then saying the difference is one of reliability (which I don't see as a difference in kind).



They are two different manifestations of operational science, IMO.



Even though one involves dating the solar system at 4.5 Gyr old?

[Captain Ochre]

Even though one involves dating the solar system at 4.5 Gyr old?

#1 does not date the solar system at 4.5 Gyr. old.
You just gave away the store.

There's more from your post that I'll reply to after somebody else contributes to the thread (might as well be you, geochron).
It's time for the sleep cycle.

[geochron]

#1 does not date the solar system at 4.5 Gyr. old.
You just gave away the store.

There's more from your post that I'll reply to after somebody else contributes to the thread (might as well be you, geochron).
It's time for the sleep cycle.

The same analysis provides several Pb-Pb ages around 4.5 Gyr, so it actually does date the solar system (or at least part of it) at 4.5 Gyr. You may want to argue that this would be origins science, rather than operational science, though you have just said that the exact same experiments are a form of operational science.

Hope you slept well.

[lucaspa]

Science is an inductive process. Why are you deducing something (allegedly)?
Because science is a deductive process. Induction does not allow conclusions wider than the specific examples used in the induction. Deduction allows conclusions wider than the specific examples.



Operational science seeks answers to the way things usually work. Historical science cannot rely exclusively on that method, for history is composed of events that span from one end of the spectrum to the other in terms of the way things work. If things don't work the way they normally work, then the historical view based on pure MN will give you inaccurate results (with no necessary regard for consistency of those results).What's "MN"? What is "pure MN"?

It is a layering of inductive reasoning in the case of the historical exercise of operational science, and a MOL isolated piece of inductive reasoning in the case of the contemporary example. You said science was inductive reasoning. So what do you have against inductive reasoning.

[Captain Ochre]

The same analysis provides several Pb-Pb ages around 4.5 Gyr, so it actually does date the solar system (or at least part of it) at 4.5 Gyr.

Baloney. You can't get to the solar system dating without adding steps to the first example you gave. Stop playing make-believe:
1. 129I decayed in the early solar system (4.5 billion years ago) with a half life of 16Ma. We know this by contrasting it with other radioisotopes in the same minerals that decay by different mechanisms.
http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showpost.php?p=771719&postcount=1

You may want to argue that this would be origins science, rather than operational science, though you have just said that the exact same experiments are a form of operational science.

If you come up with a #3 that gives us steps that reason toward a specific age for the solar system, I might. You haven't, so the point is moot.

Now back to your earlier reply.

Actually Pb-Pb analyses don't rely on assumptions about the amount of uranium present in the sample.

Not even in terms of ratio?

Not quite. For the experiment to produce a correlation between 129I/127I and time from which a half life can be deduced, the region of the solar system sampled must have had a homogenous ratio before the minerals were formed. But that "assumption" is tested in the analysis - it's not analogous to the assumptions at the beginning of a deductive process.

Take "assumption" in terms of "a minor premise". The epistemic origin of this premise is hidden in your initial presentation. I am simply illustrating its presence. I am not attempting to imply that it is utterly without foundation (though that might not be a bad idea rhetorically if it resulting in explicit justification of the premise --:smile:). By hiding the premise, your aim of equating the epistemic processes involved in each of the examples is facilitated.

But since you ask, the Allegan feldspar measurement was subsequently retracted when the effect of shock disturbance was demonstrated (Hohenberg C. M., Pravdivtseva O. and Meshik A. (2000) Reexamination of anomalous I-Xe ages: Orgueil and Murchison magnetites and Allegan feldspar. Geochim. Cosmochim. Acta 64, 4257–4262.)

I'll take that as a lack of controlled conditions in terms of classical experimentation. :wink:

That radioactive decay is exponential is arrived at inductively. But from an exponential decay we deduce the half-life - it's a mathematical quantity that determines the shape of an exponential curve.

Okay.
We'll say then that the inductive conclusions (including hypotheses) of science are then set in deductive form for purposes of testing.
Testing then results in additional inductive reasoning.

If things don't work the way they usually work in the laboratory, then "operational" science will give you inaccurate results, so I don't see how this helps.

"[H]elps"? You mean you don't see how it distinguishes between one and the other? If things don't work the way they ususally work in the laboratory, this usually becomes apparent when the experiment is repeated (for reasons that are obvious, I think). You don't have that option with the formation of the solar system (AFAICS).

It's also not clear that spotting things "not working as usual" in a laboratory is a different sort of problem from spotting it in a sample.

You can repeat the same experiment on a sample (so long as you're not destroying the sample in the process), and you'll find "the way things usually work" for that sample under those conditions. What you cannot repeat is the conditions responsible for the sample, in this case.

But the conditions they have experienced over that length time are in fact observed through the properties of the rock they form today.

That's true, but only to a point. Can you measure how many times a sample had its clocks reset by shock phenomena, for example?

We can infer from fission tracks that a rock has not exceeded a given temperature. We can infer from a chart recorder hooked up to a thermometer that a sample did not exceed a given temperature. How are these two processes different in kind?

Those two examples probably are not different in kind, since each makes about the same number of inferences and trusts measurement to one particular mechanism. Oversight of the latter could conceivably elevate the latter example in terms of reliability if both modes of measurement are relatively similar in terms of vulnerability to tampering.

That's trusting your account of fission tracks, of course.
:smile:

I can't help but note that you've opened up your briefcase for an expanded number of test cases.

In both cases the environment the materials experienced was well defined in terms of the things we understand to affect radioactive decay.

That seems to be a rather severe exaggeration in terms of the meteorite samples that were left to chance, unknown, and potentially extreme conditions for perhaps millions of years.

In the 1950s experiment this was set up by a human being. As far as I can see that is the only difference.

We're still talking about the mechanical chronometers used to meaure radioactive decay rates, right? What inference is required regarding the controlled conditions under which the radioactive samples were kept?

Sounds to me as though you see only what you wish to see in this case.

Forgive me, you seem to be saying you can see a difference in kind, then saying the difference is one of reliability (which I don't see as a difference in kind).

Ditto my comment above.
The difference in kind results in a potential difference in reliability (though chance could make up the difference). If you would have explained
specifically how you achieved your perception then there might be more to say on the subject.

Even though one involves dating the solar system at 4.5 Gyr old?

Neither of your first two examples dates the solar system at 4.5 Gyr old. Shame on you for suggesting otherwise.

[geochron]

Baloney. You can't get to the solar system dating without adding steps to the first example you gave. Stop playing make-believe:
1. 129I decayed in the early solar system (4.5 billion years ago) with a half life of 16Ma. We know this by contrasting it with other radioisotopes in the same minerals that decay by different mechanisms.
http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showpost.php?p=771719&postcount=1



I didn't say, if you look back, that my #1 inevitably led to an age for the solar system. But time is measured by Pb-Pb in the abstract you offered as an example of #1 - this measures time back from the present. That this is so is not clear from the abstract, I agree, but it's not my example.

Thus, in your example, the intervals over which variation in 129I is measured are arrived at by first determining absolute ages, then subtracting them. The absolute age of the solar system (or at least a lowest limit on it) is determined on the way to the 129I measurement.

I don't think it was unreasonable of me to understand that your comments encompassed the example you had offered. Especially since I framed my comment as a question.

Before continuing, I'll reiterate that the point of my op is to show that our knowledge of iodine decay in the 50s from a record of an experiment in the 50s and our knowledge of its decay in the early solar system from samples from the early solar system are different in kind.



Not even in terms of ratio?



You mean U/Pb ratio? Nope.



Take "assumption" in terms of "a minor premise". The epistemic origin of this premise is hidden in your initial presentation. I am simply illustrating its presence. I am not attempting to imply that it is utterly without foundation (though that might not be a bad idea rhetorically if it resulting in explicit justification of the premise --:smile:). By hiding the premise, your aim of equating the epistemic processes involved in each of the examples is facilitated.



In this case our assumption predicts that the data will have a certain form when plotted in a certain way. That it is valid is thus tested as we do the analysis (by whether our plot takes the predicted form).

If that's not an answer to your point, you'll have to explain your point again with fewer $10 words.



I'll take that as a lack of controlled conditions in terms of classical experimentation. :wink:



But remember we are considering an experiment done in the 50s as our contrast, not an experiment we plan to do. In each case we examine the record to see whether, as we understand it, conditions allow the measurement to be relied upon. In each case our understanding of whether the conditions were suitable may change over time.



"[H]elps"? You mean you don't see how it distinguishes between one and the other? If things don't work the way they ususally work in the laboratory, this usually becomes apparent when the experiment is repeated (for reasons that are obvious, I think). You don't have that option with the formation of the solar system (AFAICS).



But we're interested in what the half life of iodine was in the 50s and in the early solar system, not today or in the future. In each case we are stuck with the repetitions and variations that occurred at the time, one set chosen by an experimenter, one set arising naturally. We can work from our record of the prevailing conditions in each case, of course, and attempt to duplicate the conditions. But what I haven't seen yet is how a difference in kind is going to arise.

Here's a frinstance, perhaps imperfect. In the early solar system we can define an upper limit to the temperatures experience during decay from the rock. In the 50s we can read that the temperature was kept below a certain value by a thermostat. In neither case can we go back an make sure that thermostat or rock behaved as expected in response to temperature.



What you cannot repeat is the conditions responsible for the sample, in this case.



It's not clear to me how this is different in kind from the problem of repeating the experiment from the 50s. We can repeat the conditions to the extent that we understand them. The issue might be thought of thus - we repeat the experiment again today and get a half life of 16Ma once again. Can this count as a repeat of the measurement from the 50s but not as a repeat of the measurement from the early solar system?



That's true, but only to a point. Can you measure how many times a sample had its clocks reset by shock phenomena, for example?



You can certainly constrain the maximum shock it has experienced, and enough shock will prevent the data exhibiting the predicted form from which a half life can be extracted.



That's trusting your account of fission tracks, of course.
:smile:



Never trust anyone, not even your own Father :smile:



That seems to be a rather severe exaggeration in terms of the meteorite samples that were left to chance, unknown, and potentially extreme conditions for perhaps millions of years.



Not really, if you look at what affects chemistry (ie the rock) and what affects nuclear physics (radioactive decay).



We're still talking about the mechanical chronometers used to meaure radioactive decay rates, right? What inference is required regarding the controlled conditions under which the radioactive samples were kept?



Sorry, I don't follow the question.



Ditto my comment above.
The difference in kind results in a potential difference in reliability (though chance could make up the difference). If you would have explained
specifically how you achieved your perception then there might be more to say on the subject.



How does one assess reliability? Reliability in the case of records of historical events seems to me to be a continuum, not something that falls easily into operational standard and origins standard.



Neither of your first two examples dates the solar system at 4.5 Gyr old. Shame on you for suggesting otherwise.



Whoops. Actually it's the specific example you introduced that involves dating the solar system on the way to the iodine measurement :smile:
My view was that the details of the experiments were not that relevant.

The debate can perhaps be reduced to this:

In each case we have a record of something that happened in the past. How is relying on one record different in kind from relying on the other?

Edited to add: it's not clear to me whether you think they are or are not different in kind - at one point you said they were both forms of operational science, perhaps now you want to add "unless one of them involves first measuring absolute ages of rocks" :wink:

[Higon]

In case #1, an assumption about the relative amounts of each radioisotope is required in order to enable the relative comparison.
In case #2, there is no like assumption even by analogy.

Over and out.

Hey geochron, I´m here attending your call in the other thread, but seems like Captain Ochre already nailed the subject.

[geochron]

Hey geochron, I´m here attending your call in the other thread, but seems like Captain Ochre already nailed the subject.



I'm a little puzzled as he said...



They are two different manifestations of operational science, IMO.



So are you agreeing with him that both are examples of operational science?

The question he never addressed in wanting to make a distinction is this. In each case we have a record of something that happened in the past. How is relying on one record different in kind from relying on the other?

[Captain Ochre]

I'm a little puzzled as he said...



So are you agreeing with him that both are examples of operational science?

The question he never addressed in wanting to make a distinction is this. In each case we have a record of something that happened in the past.

In each case you have something in the present that you expect to give you insight into the past.
Historical science is "What happened?"
Operational science is "How do things usually work"?

The expectation of this thread seems to be that there are totally different approaches to obtaining answers to these two questions, but the point is more subtle than that. You can obtain information about how things usually work thought direct and repeatable observations (experimentation that requires no significant extrapolations). Determining the occurrence of specific events in the past frequently requires different (or more) steps of reasoning, and requires a presuppositional framework that is more thinly spread than for "how do things usually work?"

How is relying on one record different in kind from relying on the other?

That's the wrong question, IMO.
Sorry for not returning to this thread sooner. The feeling that the discussion isn't progressing sometimes serves to diminish my enthusiasm.

[geochron]

So are you now saying both are not examples of operational science?

[HRG_new]

In each case you have something in the present that you expect to give you insight into the past.
Historical science is "What happened?"
Operational science is "How do things usually work"?

Then almost every instance of modern "operational" science requires historical science. In each case of an interaction between elementary particles, the physicist must try to unravel from his data (bubble or spark chamber, calorimeters, photomultipliers etc.) what happened.

And the ratios between the typical time scales of elementary particles (10^-25 to 10^-23 seconds) and of detection (10^-9 to 10^-6 seconds) are far larger than for paleontology (10^9 years to a few weeks).

Every observation is an observation of the past.

The expectation of this thread seems to be that there are totally different approaches to obtaining answers to these two questions, but the point is more subtle than that. You can obtain information about how things usually work thought direct and repeatable observations (experimentation that requires no significant extrapolations). Determining the occurrence of specific events in the past frequently requires different (or more) steps of reasoning, and requires a presuppositional framework that is more thinly spread than for "how do things usually work?"

However, both kinds of sciences - that's why they are not different in reality - require the same assumptions, which can only partially tested: local invariance under space-time translations. WIthout that assumption, an experiment done today in Moscow - in whatever discipline - would be useless to predict how things usually work tomorrow in Sydney.

My personal conviction says that the distinction was invented *) by creationists so that they would be able to play the innocent: "We aren't at all against science - we are very much in favor of true, i.e. operational science!"

*) and if not directly invented, then propagandized ...

[Captain Ochre]

So are you now saying both are not examples of operational science?

No, but I'm saying that one of your examples has elements of both questions to it (one of them tries to ask "How did things usually work?") and from there you have pressed the point that there is no distinction to be made.

[Captain Ochre]

Then almost every instance of modern "operational" science requires historical science. In each case of an interaction between elementary particles, the physicist must try to unravel from his data (bubble or spark chamber, calorimeters, photomultipliers etc.) what happened.

If the scientist doesn't have "controlled" conditions, then he runs afoul of the usual understanding of experimentation, however. If the results are expected, there's no wondering what happened since much of "what happened" is already assumed.
There is no real emphasis on what specifically happened in one controlled experiment next to another that achieves the same results.

And the ratios between the typical time scales of elementary particles (10^-25 to 10^-23 seconds) and of detection (10^-9 to 10^-6 seconds) are far larger than for paleontology (10^9 years to a few weeks).

Point being?

Every observation is an observation of the past.

Every observation is an observation of the present, but this aspect of the discussion will tend to distract from the real issue in any case. It's not from whence the observations were drawn, the issue is what questions are being asked.

However, both kinds of sciences - that's why they are not different in reality - require the same assumptions, which can only partially tested: local invariance under space-time translations.

1) The same assumptions are not required (for example, science should be able to evaluate the existence of a dinosaur that appeared literally miraculously without any line of descent, based on observed evidence).
2) Even if the same assumptions were required, a similarity in one respect does not follow to no difference in reality.

WIthout that assumption, an experiment done today in Moscow - in whatever discipline - would be useless to predict how things usually work tomorrow in Sydney.

And you've got another illustration that will deal with whether or not X happened at some point in the past?

My personal conviction says that the distinction was invented *) by creationists so that they would be able to play the innocent: "We aren't at all against science - we are very much in favor of true, i.e. operational science!"

*) and if not directly invented, then propagandized ...

Your personal conviction betrays a whopping case of worldview bigotry.
:teeth:

[grmorton]

My personal conviction says that the distinction was invented *) by creationists so that they would be able to play the innocent: "We aren't at all against science - we are very much in favor of true, i.e. operational science!"

*) and if not directly invented, then propagandized ...

I would say that an argument can be made that the term grew out of the views of Henry Morris. He wrote in 1974:

"The creation model therefore postulates a primeval period of
special creation in the past - 'special' in the sense that the
processes of creation which were then in operation are no longer
in operation today, and therefore not accessible for scientific
measurment and study."

[lucaspa]

Hey geochron, I´m here attending your call in the other thread, but seems like Captain Ochre already nailed the subject. In case #1, that is not an assumption. It's a conclusion based on other data.

However, the isochron method does not require ANY assumptions, and it still provides an age of the earth of 4.5 billion years.
http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs/isochron-dating.html

[HRG_new]

1) The same assumptions are not required (for example, science should be able to evaluate the existence of a dinosaur that appeared literally miraculously without any line of descent, based on observed evidence).

How could it ? Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.

2) Even if the same assumptions were required, a similarity in one respect does not follow to no difference in reality.

So what are the essential differences, IYO ? No one claims that there are several different scientific disciplines, but they share the same basic.

Your personal conviction betrays a whopping case of worldview bigotry.
:teeth:

See Glenn's point on the possible origins of the alleged distinction.

The bigot will call any realistic and unbiased assessment of his views bigotry. How else could he mentally survive ?

[Captain Ochre]

How could it ?

How could it not?

Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.

What evidence do you propose as absent?
The evidence that a particular dinosaur existed?
The evidence of a line of evolutionary descent that includes our particular dinosaur?
The evidence of a miraculous appearance?


So what are the essential differences, IYO ?

The primary difference occurs as the presuppositions interfere with the nature of the question. A miracle doesn't affect "the way things normally work" unless miracles are "the way things normally work" (in which case the naturalist will dutifully label it a "natural" phenomenon anyway).

No one claims that there are several different scientific disciplines, but they share the same basic.

Are you missing a "not" and maybe the term modified by "basic"?

See Glenn's point on the possible origins of the alleged distinction.

Why? Do you want us all to commit a genetic fallacy?

The bigot will call any realistic and unbiased assessment of his views bigotry. How else could he mentally survive ?

So, are you calling my realistic and unbiased assessment of your views "bigotry"?
Is that how you mentally survive?

Maybe you should just deal with the assessments on their own terms.
I just noticed that you dodged one of my questions.
And you've got another illustration that will deal with whether or not X happened at some point in the past?

The question was on-topic, AFAICS.
Why did you skip it?

[lucaspa]

If the scientist doesn't have "controlled" conditions, then he runs afoul of the usual understanding of experimentation, however.
1. Even with "controls", most experiments in "real time" are nothing of the sort. They are still historical of events not directly witnessed, even if here "history" is in the last few minutes or days.
2. The "controls" are there merely to eliminate alternative hypotheses as explanations. You can do the same thing with one-time events by looking for the different consequences the alternative hypotheses will produce.

Every observation is an observation of the present, but this aspect of the discussion will tend to distract from the real issue in any case. It's not from whence the observations were drawn, the issue is what questions are being asked. The question being asked is of the general form: if this event happened in the past, what are the consequences of that event that will persist and be observable today?

1) The same assumptions are not required (for example, science should be able to evaluate the existence of a dinosaur that appeared literally miraculously without any line of descent, based on observed evidence).
It should and it can. Instantaneousl appearance without lines of descent will have consequences we can see today. IF we had seen those consequences, we could have concluded instantaneous appearance. In fact, the first theory in science was that dinosaurs did "appear miraculously without any line of descent". But the observations falsified that theory.

2) Even if the same assumptions were required, a similarity in one respect does not follow to no difference in reality.
All science assumes "unity" as one of the 5 assumptions about the universe. The others are objectivity, contingency, rationality, accessibility. Those assumptions about the universe originally were derived from characteristics of God. So, if you say "unity" doesn't apply, which in this case is that laws are the same thru all spacetime, you are denying an aspect of God! It's not science you are attacking, but God. Ironic, isn't it?


And you've got another illustration that will deal with whether or not X happened at some point in the past?
Let's try Meteor Crator. An unwitnessed meteor impact in the past. How do we conclude that the hypothesis that a meteor impacted at the site and caused the crator to be such a well-supported hypothesis that we accept it (provisionally) as fact?

1. We find pieces of rock at the site that are very different from the rocks in the surrounding strata.
2. We perform experiments today at firing small rocks at high velocity at mud and seeing the splash pattern. That splash pattern is identical to Meteor Crator. So we "assume" (bad word) that particles traveling at high velocities in the past and hitting the ground will form the same type of spash pattern as particles doing so today.

Now, you have a problem with any of this?

[lucaspa]

What evidence do you propose as absent?
The evidence that a particular dinosaur existed?
The evidence of a line of evolutionary descent that includes our particular dinosaur?
The evidence of a miraculous appearance?
The second. Lacking ancestors to a PARTICULAR dinosaur does not mean that the dinosaur does not have ancestors.

In order to conclude that absence of evidence really is evidence of absence, you need to be able to search the entire search space. Let's try a simple example. You could claim unicorns exist. There is an absence of evidence of unicorns. However, unicorns are horse-sized animals that are claimed to live in Europe. We have records of people all over Europe for the last 1,000 years and they have been everywhere a horse-sized animal could be. We have searched all the space where unicorns could possibly be and no unicorns.

Another example: coelencanths. It was claimed that coelencanths were extinct. It was based on the lack of fossil evidence over the last 65 million years. BUT, we had not searched all the oceans of the earth, much less all the possible fossil record for the last 65 million years. Therefore, when coelencanths were caught in the 1930s, it was obvious that absence of evidence was not evidence of absence.

However, there is evidence that can't be there IF species were created separately. It is the evidence AGAINST "miraculouse appearance" that is telling.

The primary difference occurs as the presuppositions interfere with the nature of the question. A miracle doesn't affect "the way things normally work" unless miracles are "the way things normally work" (in which case the naturalist will dutifully label it a "natural" phenomenon anyway).
IF species were separetly created and appeared instantly in their present form, THEN there would be observable consequences of that event. Remember, special creation was THE "PRESUPPOSITION" of all naturalists prior to about 1850. Even Lyell, who used uniformitarianism in geology, thought in 1830 that species were specially, miraculously created.

"Each species 'was endowed at the time of its creation, with the attributes of organization by which it is nowdistinguished." Only limited variations withina type have ever occurred. Each species, itself immutable, probably takes its origin frmo a single pair, such pairs having "been created in succession at such times and in such places as to enable them tomultiply and endure for an appointed period, and occupy an appointed place onthe globe." CC Gillespie, Genesis and Geology 130-131.

So, science has tried creationism as a theory. But the data FALSIFIED the theory -- showed it to be wrong. God simply did not create by miraculous appearance.

Why? Do you want us all to commit a genetic fallacy?
In this case, it's not a "genetic fallacy". The argument that there was a difference between "origin" and "operational" science was started by Morris. We can question his motives and look at his reasoning. Was his motive a simple description based upon looking at how science works? NO! Morris based his arguments on the difference within his PRESUPPOSITION that Genesis was literally true. Therefore, everything had to fit within that presupposition. Morris faced a problem: science is extremely reliable information and people do rightfully trust it. So, since science is trusted in the areas of nuclear physics, medicine, etc and the SAME SCIENTIFIC METHODS are used to conclude evolution happened, you can see Morris' problem. He can't deny ALL science but wants to deny evolution. What does he do? Well, he attempts to separate science into 2 camps: operational vs origins. Then he can claim that operational is reliable and correct but that origins science (which produced evolution) is wrong.

The argument, therefore, has the "genetics" of trying to deny data that goes against Morris' PRESUPPOSITIONS. Since you say we should not argue from presuppositions, then you must (by your own criteria) reject Morris' argument and artificial duality of the nature of science.

[Captain Ochre]

The second. Lacking ancestors to a PARTICULAR dinosaur does not mean that the dinosaur does not have ancestors.

You mean to say lack of evidence, I suppose.
Lacking ancestors would mean that a dinosaur does not have ancestors, if we interpret the words according to any ordinary understanding.

Would you agree that the lack of evidence for the other two statements similarly would not mean that the statements were therefore untrue (thus acknowledging my point)?

In order to conclude that absence of evidence really is evidence of absence, you need to be able to search the entire search space.

I don't think that you mean it.

Let's try a simple example. You could claim unicorns exist. There is an absence of evidence of unicorns. However, unicorns are horse-sized animals that are claimed to live in Europe. We have records of people all over Europe for the last 1,000 years and they have been everywhere a horse-sized animal could be. We have searched all the space where unicorns could possibly be and no unicorns.

I think you're exaggerating a bit, but I'll play along.
:smile:
A few curiousities:
http://www.unicornlady.net/Legends/evidence.html
http://www.answers.com/topic/unicorn
http://www.antoranz.net/CURIOSA/ZBIOR3/C0311/05en-QZC08031_jednorozce.HTM

Another example: coelencanths. It was claimed that coelencanths were extinct. It was based on the lack of fossil evidence over the last 65 million years. BUT, we had not searched all the oceans of the earth, much less all the possible fossil record for the last 65 million years. Therefore, when coelencanths were caught in the 1930s, it was obvious that absence of evidence was not evidence of absence.

Was the conclusion that the coelocanth was extinct justified prior to the discovery of a living specimen?


However, there is evidence that can't be there IF species were created separately. It is the evidence AGAINST "miraculouse appearance" that is telling.

What evidence do we have that the one dinosaur in my example did not appear miraculously?

IF species were separetly created and appeared instantly in their present form, THEN there would be observable consequences of that event. Remember, special creation was THE "PRESUPPOSITION" of all naturalists prior to about 1850. Even Lyell, who used uniformitarianism in geology, thought in 1830 that species were specially, miraculously created.

I'm making a point about science, not arguing against evolution. Supposing this one species in my example was specially created and appeared miraculously, what observable consequences should we expect for that event?

As an aside, why is it that I can count on a defense of evolution during the course of virtually any discussion on philosophy of science?
:teeth:

i know just what you'll say
i know just what you'll do
there ain't no surprises
no mystery prizes
that's why the knee jerk's for you

knee jerk
do the knee jerk baby
knee jerk
do the knee jerk now

a few lyrics from "Knee Jerk" by the Swirling Eddies
http://www.danielamos.com/swirly/outdoorelvis/kneejerk.html

<snip off-topic excursion>

In this case, it's not a "genetic fallacy".

I'll be looking for a rationale from you that does not qualify as the fallacy of special pleading.

The argument that there was a difference between "origin" and "operational" science was started by Morris.

So far, this fits the pattern of the genetic fallacy perfectly.
Agreed?

We can question his motives and look at his reasoning.

If you use Morris' motives and Morris' reasoning to undermine the distinction between operational and historical (origins) science, then you can still qualify for the genetic fallacy.
Agreed?

Was his motive a simple description based upon looking at how science works? NO! Morris based his arguments on the difference within his PRESUPPOSITION that Genesis was literally true. Therefore, everything had to fit within that presupposition. Morris faced a problem: science is extremely reliable information and people do rightfully trust it. So, since science is trusted in the areas of nuclear physics, medicine, etc and the SAME SCIENTIFIC METHODS are used to conclude evolution happened, you can see Morris' problem. He can't deny ALL science but wants to deny evolution. What does he do? Well, he attempts to separate science into 2 camps: operational vs origins. Then he can claim that operational is reliable and correct but that origins science (which produced evolution) is wrong.

1) I doubt that even Morris would suggest that origins science itself is wrong--merely the evolutionary aspect of origins science. Morris himself would probably claim to be doing origins science via his own YE creationist ideas.
2) The NCSE agrees that an appropriate distinction may be made between single-event study and normative study:
Of course there are differences in the study of repeatable events vs. non-repeatable ones, but mainstream philosophers of science agree that phenomena of historical sciences like geology, paleontology, and astronomy can be studied scientifically, and even experimentally. Mount St. Helens erupted as a singular event, but this does not prevent there being a science of volcanoes. Similarly, even if bears and dogs split from a common ancestor only once, we can still evaluate the hypothesis that bears and dogs are closely related against empirical evidence (from fossils, comparative anatomy, biochemistry, etc.) We can also learn about the processes that influence evolution by looking at the evidence for other such splits. There are many ways to scientifically study events of this type
http://www.ncseweb.org/resources/articles/5200_creationism_ideology_and_sci_6_24_1996.asp
3) We still have a pattern that is eligible for classification as the genetic fallacy.

The argument, therefore, has the "genetics" of trying to deny data that goes against Morris' PRESUPPOSITIONS.

And? :lol:
A critic commits the genetic fallacy if the critic attempts to discredit or support a claim or an argument because of its origin (genesis) when such an appeal to origins is irrelevant.
Example:

Whatever your reasons are for buying that DVD they've got to be ridiculous. You said yourself that you got the idea for buying it from last night's fortune cookie. Cookies can't think!

Fortune cookies are not reliable sources of information about what DVD to buy, but the reasons the person is willing to give are likely to be quite relevant and should be listened to. The speaker is committing the genetic fallacy by paying too much attention to the genesis of the idea rather than to the reasons offered for it.
http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/f/fallacies.htm#Genetic

Since you say we should not argue from presuppositions, then you must (by your own criteria) reject Morris' argument and artificial duality of the nature of science.

I do not say that we should not argue from presuppositions, AFAIK.
I'd welcome your presentation of evidence showing otherwise.

[lucaspa]

You mean to say lack of evidence, I suppose. Correct. Within the context of the conversation, my typo is easily seen and it is understood I meant "absence of evidence"

Would you agree that the lack of evidence for the other two statements similarly would not mean that the statements were therefore untrue (thus acknowledging my point)?
You asked what HRG's "absence of evidence" referred to. What was the point? If the point was that absence of evidence did not make the questions untrue, we have to look at the questions:
The first question -- lack of evidence for a particular dinosaur -- would not make sense in context since you acknowledge that you have a fossil (evidence) of the dino. So HRG's statement of "absence of evidence" could not be referring to this.

The last question -- absence of evidence for miraculous creation -- makes no sense since we have evidence AGAINST miraculous creation. So there is evidence involved. HRG's statement, therefore, could only apply to your second question.

I don't think that you mean it. OK, so we know you don't think. Because I do mean it. Let's take another example: you hypothesize there is no couch in my living room. You haven't ever seen my living room, so your absence of evidence of a couch there is not evidence that a couch is absent, is it? Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. However, if you come over and search my living room, you will find there is no couch there. Since you have searched the finite space that is my living room, the absence of evidence of a couch is now evidence of absence. Do you follow?


A few curiousities:
http://www.unicornlady.net/Legends/evidence.html
http://www.answers.com/topic/unicorn
http://www.antoranz.net/CURIOSA/ZBIOR3/C0311/05en-QZC08031_jednorozce.HTM
You aren't serious. IN the first, we have fossils that don't exist and a video that is never seen. In the second, we start out with a definition of unicorn as "a fabled creature". I suggest you look up the word "fabled".

We still have the evidence that Europe has been searched in every nook and cranny capable of housing horse-sized creatures. Like the living room example, the absence of evidence is evidence of absence.

Was the conclusion that the coelocanth was extinct justified prior to the discovery of a living specimen? You tell me. Was absence of evidence evidence of absence?

What evidence do we have that the one dinosaur in my example did not appear miraculously? ... I'm making a point about science, not arguing against evolution. Supposing this one species in my example was specially created and appeared miraculously, what observable consequences should we expect for that event?
1. We would not be able to place the dino in a nested hierarchy of classification. Such a classification is only possible with objects related by descent with modification, not manufactured artifacts.
2. Morphology would not be related to any other creature.
3. DNA would be an independent observation and not related to any other creature -- after all, the dino is not related, is it?

BTW, we do now have creatures that are specially created. It's not miracle, but genetic engineering. I work with ROSA mice. These mice have been manipulated such that a bacterial gene for beta-galactosidase is present in every cell. Their DNA is an independent observation.

Finally, I notice you said "one dinosaur in my example". You commented about using the fallacy of special pleading. Please show how you are not committing that fallacy here and invoking special pleading for this "one" dinosaur.

As an aside, why is it that I can count on a defense of evolution during the course of virtually any discussion on philosophy of science? Because all your discussions on philosophy of science are an attack on evolution.

However, in this case what you got was a lesson in the history of science. You have been stating that evolution is considered because it is a presupposition. All I did was show you that, instead, creationism was the presupposition. And the presupposition was discarded in the face of contrary data.

If you use Morris' motives and Morris' reasoning to undermine the distinction between operational and historical (origins) science, then you can still qualify for the genetic fallacy. Agreed?
Notice that I am talking motives and reasoning. I am using "Morris'" as a convenient label to identify the ideas used in the argument. So we can analyze the argument for validity. No genetic fallacy, because we are looking at the ideas, which are independent of Morris.


1) I doubt that even Morris would suggest that origins science itself is wrong--merely the evolutionary aspect of origins science. Morris himself would probably claim to be doing origins science via his own YE creationist ideas. In other places Morris does state this explicitly. He claims we can't do origin science because God isn't using the methods of creation anymore. Now, you've noted the internal inconsistency of Morris' argument, because Morris does indeed claim we can know the method -- instantaneous creation -- of YEC.

2) The NCSE agrees that an appropriate distinction may be made between single-event study and normative study:
Of course there are differences in the study of repeatable events vs. non-repeatable ones, but mainstream philosophers of science agree that phenomena of historical sciences like geology, paleontology, and astronomy can be studied scientifically, and even experimentally. Mount St. Helens erupted as a singular event, but this does not prevent there being a science of volcanoes. Similarly, even if bears and dogs split from a common ancestor only once, we can still evaluate the hypothesis that bears and dogs are closely related against empirical evidence (from fossils, comparative anatomy, biochemistry, etc.) We can also learn about the processes that influence evolution by looking at the evidence for other such splits. There are many ways to scientifically study events of this type
http://www.ncseweb.org/resources/articles/5200_creationism_ideology_and_sci_6_24_1996.asp
You need to look at that above. Look at the part I've bolded. Scott is saying there is no essential difference.

The speaker is committing the genetic fallacy by paying too much attention to the genesis of the idea rather than to the reasons offered for it.[/box]
http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/f/fallacies.htm#Genetic But I paid no attentioon to the origin of the idea other than to give credit to the person -- Morris -- who came up with it. Otherwise, I discussed the reasons offered for the idea -- motives and reasoning. So, thank you Captain Ochre, for showing us conclusively that I did not commit the genetic fallacy.

However, I have noticed that you are no longer talking about the ideas or motivations. IOW, you have made no attempt to show that the distinction made between operations and origins science was NOT a result of the motives and reasoning I've outlined.

Instead, you've tried to distract from the arguments and tried to belittle them by saying that they are the "genetic fallacy". Isn't distraction into an irrelevancy a fallacy of its own?

I do not say that we should not argue from presuppositions, AFAIK.
I'd welcome your presentation of evidence showing otherwise.
"The primary difference occurs as the presuppositions interfere with the nature of the question."

Now, if presuppositions interfere with the nature of the question, you are saying we should use them?

"Your personal conviction betrays a whopping case of worldview bigotry."

Doesn't "worldview bigotry" come under the heading of "presuppositions"? Now, "bigotry" is not a complimentary term. I can't see you using "bigotry" when you want us to argue from presuppositions.

[lucaspa]

http://www.ncseweb.org/resources/articles/5200_creationism_ideology_and_sci_6_24_1996.asp

Since you think Scott should be listened to on the topic of "operations" and "origins" science, I wonder how you will respond to these other quotes from the article you referenced.

"But creationists would say that Mendel's laws are examples of "operational" science, which begs the question of "what are the topics of origins science?" In my reading, I find that "origins science" is limited to subjects that have theological importance. Conservative Christian theology is concerned with the special creation of the earth, the special creation of life, the special creation of animals and plants, and the special creation of human beings, all by a personal God who had an ultimate purpose in mind. As a result, "origins science", focuses on the Big Bang (the origin of the universe), the origin of life, the origin of the "kinds" of plants and animals, and the origin of humans."

Now, should we define different types of science based on the theological implications? Scott is saying that dividing science up into "operations" and "origin" sciences is done on that basis.

"Creationists add an additional factor to this bimodal division of the scientific world, which I believe sheds light on why the division was invented in the first place: it allows the intrusion of the supernatural into scientific explanation. Geisler proposes that to accompany the two kinds of science, there are two kinds of causation: primary causes and secondary causes. Operations science relies properly on secondary causes, but origins science is allowed to invoke primary causes. Thaxton, et al., refer to primary cause more bluntly as the "God hypothesis", and agree that in operation science, "the appeal to God is quite illegitimate, since by definition God's supernatural action would be willed at His pleasure and not in a recurring manner." (Thaxton, et al., 1984:203) But when dealing with "origins science", it is not only permissible, but essential to allow recourse to supernatural causation (i.e., miracles.)

Few would argue with not resorting to miracles in operation science, but proponents of this artificial division do not make a solid case for resorting to miracles in origin science. Arguably, non-recurrent events may be more difficult and challenging to study than repeated events, but that in itself is insufficient to require resorting to the supernatural. "

1. Notice Scott calls the division ARTIFICIAL. That means she is using it solely as a means of discussing the idea, not endorsing it, as you implied.

2. Scott says there is no solid case for resorting to miracles in origin science. Will you please present what you consider to be a solid case? Thank you.



And? :lol:
A critic commits the genetic fallacy if the critic attempts to discredit or support a claim or an argument because of its origin (genesis) when such an appeal to origins is irrelevant.
Example:

Whatever your reasons are for buying that DVD they've got to be ridiculous. You said yourself that you got the idea for buying it from last night's fortune cookie. Cookies can't think!

Fortune cookies are not reliable sources of information about what DVD to buy, but the reasons the person is willing to give are likely to be quite relevant and should be listened to. The speaker is committing the genetic fallacy by paying too much attention to the genesis of the idea rather than to the reasons offered for it.
http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/f/fallacies.htm#Genetic



I do not say that we should not argue from presuppositions, AFAIK.
I'd welcome your presentation of evidence showing otherwise.[/QUOTE]

[Captain Ochre]

You asked what HRG's "absence of evidence" referred to.

Did I?
Or did you jump to conclusions?
:lol:
http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showpost.php?p=935471&postcount=62

What was the point? If the point was that absence of evidence did not make the questions untrue, we have to look at the questions:
The first question -- lack of evidence for a particular dinosaur -- would not make sense in context since you acknowledge that you have a fossil (evidence) of the dino.

So, I'm not allowed to ask a question with an obvious answer, or it doesn't make sense to ask a question with an obvious answer?

So HRG's statement of "absence of evidence" could not be referring to this.

And search your brain as you might, you can't think of any reason why I would ask the question?

The last question -- absence of evidence for miraculous creation -- makes no sense since we have evidence AGAINST miraculous creation.

We do? Where and what is it?
You're not talking about evidence apart from one case of this particular hypothetical dinosaur that I'm using as an example, I hope. If that's the case, then I'll have to ask you precisely how you adduce the evidence against the special creation of this hypothetical dinosaur which was created ex nihilo.

So there is evidence involved. HRG's statement, therefore, could only apply to your second question.

HRG's statement appeared to be a statement of general principle, IMHO, applicable in any case where we find an absence of evidence.
Would you disagree?

OK, so we know you don't think. Because I do mean it.

I think that you'll show yourself to be inconsistent.
We have evidence that you do that sort of thing.
:wink:

Let's take another example: you hypothesize there is no couch in my living room.

The more examples, the better!
:joy:

You haven't ever seen my living room, so your absence of evidence of a couch there is not evidence that a couch is absent, is it?

Well, it might be if I used the same standard that you used to discover evidence that my specially-created hypothetical dinosaur wasn't specially created.

Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. However, if you come over and search my living room, you will find there is no couch there. Since you have searched the finite space that is my living room, the absence of evidence of a couch is now evidence of absence. Do you follow?

Sure. Except for how the example applies to my dinosaur example.

You aren't serious. IN the first, we have fossils that don't exist and a video that is never seen. In the second, we start out with a definition of unicorn as "a fabled creature". I suggest you look up the word "fabled".

:lol: You're such an idiot!
Did you check the third URL?

We still have the evidence that Europe has been searched in every nook and cranny capable of housing horse-sized creatures.

No we don't, though I could grant the point for the sake of argument, just as I let pass your cooking of the example to emphasize the persistence of the unicorn line through the present age.

You tell me.

I asked you first. Doesn't that count for anything?
:smile:

Was absence of evidence evidence of absence?

After you.

1. We would not be able to place the dino in a nested hierarchy of classification. Such a classification is only possible with objects related by descent with modification, not manufactured artifacts.

So, it would be absolutely impossible for science to ever produce an organism that would have the appearance of classification within a double-nested hierarchy? Science could never map a hypothetical transitional form and then produce it from scratch?
The first rationale is false.

2. Morphology would not be related to any other creature.

Why not, given the hypothetical ability of a scientist to produce a synthetic "transitional form"?

3. DNA would be an independent observation and not related to any other creature -- after all, the dino is not related, is it?

Not by descent, no, but I caution you against the fallacy of equivocation.
Would you say that we could not have a creature whose cellular information system is DNA which was not also part of a direct line of descent from some other creature?

BTW, we do now have creatures that are specially created. It's not miracle, but genetic engineering. I work with ROSA mice. These mice have been manipulated such that a bacterial gene for beta-galactosidase is present in every cell. Their DNA is an independent observation.

I'm still wondering when you got a look at my hypothetical dinosaur's DNA.

Finally, I notice you said "one dinosaur in my example". You commented about using the fallacy of special pleading. Please show how you are not committing that fallacy here and invoking special pleading for this "one" dinosaur.

:lol:
Because it's a hypothetical case, of course. :bonk:

Because all your discussions on philosophy of science are an attack on evolution.

For example? I encourage you to use one or more quotations in support of your wild claim.

However, in this case what you got was a lesson in the history of science. You have been stating that evolution is considered because it is a presupposition.

That's funny, 'cause I don't remember stating any such thing. Perhaps you could quote me in support of your wild claim?
Perhaps your statement is merely equivocal, OTOH.

All I did was show you that, instead, creationism was the presupposition. And the presupposition was discarded in the face of contrary data.

That's neat trick how you can discard the presuppositions of hypothetical case in order to show that the hypothetical case is different than it was posed to be.
:hehe:

Notice that I am talking motives and reasoning. I am using "Morris'" as a convenient label to identify the ideas used in the argument.

Are you at all concerned that Morris' articulation of the argument might not be the flavor that you're dealing with respecting your debate opponent?

So we can analyze the argument for validity. No genetic fallacy, because we are looking at the ideas, which are independent of Morris.

You don't appear to treat the ideas as independent of Morris.

In other places Morris does state this explicitly. He claims we can't do origin science because God isn't using the methods of creation anymore.

Will you be producing evidence in support of this claim?

Now, you've noted the internal inconsistency of Morris' argument, because Morris does indeed claim we can know the method -- instantaneous creation -- of YEC.

Your claim regarding Morris hinges on your evidenceless claim that Morris rejects origins science as a category.
That claim remains highly dubious despite your facile assurance to the contrary.

You need to look at that above. Look at the part I've bolded. Scott is saying there is no essential difference.

... mainstream philosophers of science agree that phenomena of historical sciences like geology, paleontology, and astronomy can be studied scientifically, and even experimentally.

:stare:

Non sequitur.

But I paid no attentioon to the origin of the idea other than to give credit to the person -- Morris -- who came up with it.

Oh, really. No reference to Morris' motives and arguments, eh?

Otherwise, I discussed the reasons offered for the idea -- motives and reasoning. So, thank you Captain Ochre, for showing us conclusively that I did not commit the genetic fallacy.

:hehe:

However, I have noticed that you are no longer talking about the ideas or motivations. IOW, you have made no attempt to show that the distinction made between operations and origins science was NOT a result of the motives and reasoning I've outlined.

Should I take up the burden of proof to prove the converse instead of undermining your arguments, then?

Instead, you've tried to distract from the arguments and tried to belittle them by saying that they are the "genetic fallacy". Isn't distraction into an irrelevancy a fallacy of its own?

Sure. Would you care to suggest explicitly that I have committed such a fallacy?
See Glenn's point on the possible origins of the alleged distinction.
http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showpost.php?p=935343&postcount=61

"The primary difference occurs as the presuppositions interfere with the nature of the question."

Now, if presuppositions interfere with the nature of the question, you are saying we should use them?

My statement above neither recommends reasoning from presuppositions nor forbids the same.
What it does is stipulate (in effect) that one should ask questions appropriate to the presuppositions one is using.

"Your personal conviction betrays a whopping case of worldview bigotry."

Doesn't "worldview bigotry" come under the heading of "presuppositions"?

Perhaps (though it's not particularly clear that it would be the case here)--but the same could be said of the term "worldview" by itself.

Now, "bigotry" is not a complimentary term. I can't see you using "bigotry" when you want us to argue from presuppositions.

Right, because I couldn't argue against using one particular presupposition without arguing that all presuppositions are improper as a basis for argument.

:lol:

[Captain Ochre]

Since you think Scott should be listened to on the topic of "operations" and "origins" science, I wonder how you will respond to these other quotes from the article you referenced.

Heh. Lucaspa jumps to yet another unfounded conclusion. I specified the reason for the reference, and it wasn't because I think that it should be listened to on the topic of "operations" and "origins" science.
I picked it because you would be likely to give it credence.

"But creationists would say that Mendel's laws are examples of "operational" science, which begs the question of "what are the topics of origins science?" In my reading, I find that "origins science" is limited to subjects that have theological importance. Conservative Christian theology is concerned with the special creation of the earth, the special creation of life, the special creation of animals and plants, and the special creation of human beings, all by a personal God who had an ultimate purpose in mind. As a result, "origins science", focuses on the Big Bang (the origin of the universe), the origin of life, the origin of the "kinds" of plants and animals, and the origin of humans."

Now, should we define different types of science based on the theological implications? Scott is saying that dividing science up into "operations" and "origin" sciences is done on that basis.

Scott's opinion on this matter is irrelevant, AFAICT. I haven't defined the difference between the two as Scott has done according to her reading.

"Creationists add an additional factor to this bimodal division of the scientific world, which I believe sheds light on why the division was invented in the first place: it allows the intrusion of the supernatural into scientific explanation. Geisler proposes that to accompany the two kinds of science, there are two kinds of causation: primary causes and secondary causes. Operations science relies properly on secondary causes, but origins science is allowed to invoke primary causes. Thaxton, et al., refer to primary cause more bluntly as the "God hypothesis", and agree that in operation science, "the appeal to God is quite illegitimate, since by definition God's supernatural action would be willed at His pleasure and not in a recurring manner." (Thaxton, et al., 1984:203) But when dealing with "origins science", it is not only permissible, but essential to allow recourse to supernatural causation (i.e., miracles.)

Few would argue with not resorting to miracles in operation science, but proponents of this artificial division do not make a solid case for resorting to miracles in origin science. Arguably, non-recurrent events may be more difficult and challenging to study than repeated events, but that in itself is insufficient to require resorting to the supernatural. "

1. Notice Scott calls the division ARTIFICIAL. That means she is using it solely as a means of discussing the idea, not endorsing it, as you implied.

You have put yourself in the position of having to explain how she can call the division "artificial" while at the same time granting a difference.
Good luck with that.
:smile:

2. Scott says there is no solid case for resorting to miracles in origin science. Will you please present what you consider to be a solid case? Thank you.

There's no point in discussing it unless you can give me an account of what you mean by "miracles". We'd be talking past each other.

I think that it should be granted that the random formation of quantum particles (uncaused, according to a goodly number of the experts) is a miracle. If that isn't a miracle, then I suspect that the term cannot have any meaning at all which would make your challenge a farce.
So ... you tell me what a miracle is supposed to be, and I'll fashion my reply accordingly.

[Jugulum]

You have put yourself in the position of having to explain how she can call the division "artificial" while at the same time granting a difference.
Good luck with that.
:smile:

It's pretty simple, actually. Scott spells it out. The "difference" she recognizes is recurrent vs. non-recurrent events--she calls it a "bimodal division". What Scott calls an "artificial division" is the distinction between primary and secondary causes--Geisler's argument that "origins science" requires appeal to miracles--and the idea that non-recurrent events cannot be studied scientifically.

Scott says, "Arguably, non-recurrent events may be more difficult and challenging to study than repeated events, but that in itself is insufficient to require resorting to the supernatural."

A "difference" isn't necessarily a fundamental distinction. UV light is different from visible light, but they're both electromagnetic radiation. We can't use all the same tools to study them--most notably, we can't use our eyes to study UV light directly--but we still approach them the same way. Scott (and lucaspa) are arguing that the difference between recurrent vs. non-recurrent events doesn't demand a fundamentally different approach.

This analogy is mine; my apologies to lucaspa if it doesn't really capture his point well.

[Captain Ochre]

It's pretty simple, actually. Scott spells it out. The "difference" she recognizes is recurrent vs. non-recurrent events--she calls it a "bimodal division". What Scott calls an "artificial division" is the distinction between primary and secondary causes--Geisler's argument that "origins science" requires appeal to miracles--and the idea that non-recurrent events cannot be studied scientifically.

Like lucaspa wrt Morris, you seem to have drawn an incorrect conclusion regarding what Geisler advocates.
I'd ask you to document specifically where Geisler suggestst aht non-recurrent events cannot be studied scientifically. Moreover, it is not that origins science must refer to primary causes ("miracles") but that origins science must be able to countenance miracles unless our science begs the question of the truth of naturalism by design.

Scott says, "Arguably, non-recurrent events may be more difficult and challenging to study than repeated events, but that in itself is insufficient to require resorting to the supernatural."

I quite agree with Ms. Scott on that point.
But where do Geisler et. al. advocate any requirement for resorting to the supernatural?

A "difference" isn't necessarily a fundamental distinction. UV light is different from visible light, but they're both electromagnetic radiation.

Who's advocating a "fundamental distinction" where origins science is not science?

We can't use all the same tools to study them--most notably, we can't use our eyes to study UV light directly--but we still approach them the same way.

Rather, there are factors in common for the approach to each. If they were truly approached the same way then there would be no distinction between them.

Scott (and lucaspa) are arguing that the difference between recurrent vs. non-recurrent events doesn't demand a fundamentally different approach.

I think that you give lucaspa more benefit of the doubt than he deserves. Eugenie Scott has earned her benefit of the doubt, OTOH.

[Jugulum]

Like lucaspa wrt Morris, you seem to have drawn an incorrect conclusion regarding what Geisler advocates.
I'd ask you to document specifically where Geisler suggestst aht non-recurrent events cannot be studied scientifically.
I didn't say he did, though I can see how you might have gotten that impression. I wasn't saying Geisler claimed non-recurrent events cannot be studied scientifically, I was saying that idea is part of what Scott was calling an "artificial division."
Moreover, it is not that origins science must refer to primary causes ("miracles") but that origins science must be able to countenance miracles unless our science begs the question of the truth of naturalism by design.
Fair enough; it looks like "must" is indeed a misrepresentation of Geisler.

I have more of a response to the rest of this claim and your comments on my UV/IR analogy, but I only have a few minutes to write at the moment. I should be able to finish in a few hours.

I think that you give lucaspa more benefit of the doubt than he deserves. Eugenie Scott has earned her benefit of the doubt, OTOH.
How am I giving either any benefit of the doubt? I restated their arguments (part of their arguments, at least). If I mischaracterized lucaspa's point, he'll point that out. I don't see how a value judgement like "benefit of the doubt" enters in.

[Captain Ochre]

I didn't say he did, though I can see how you might have gotten that impression. I wasn't saying Geisler claimed non-recurrent events cannot be studied scientifically, I was saying that idea is part of what Scott was calling an "artificial division."

We'll have to see, eventually, who the advocates of that division happen to be.

I have more of a response to the rest of this claim and your comments on my UV/IR analogy, but I only have a few minutes to write at the moment. I should be able to finish in a few hours.

I look forward to your comments.


How am I giving either any benefit of the doubt?

The argument you're crediting to lucaspa would be a reasonable argument, even if ultimately wrong. I don't think you're presenting his argument. I predict that not only is he arguing something different, but that it will also prove wrong and unreasonable.
My humble opinion, of course. :smile:

I restated their arguments (part of their arguments, at least). If I mischaracterized lucaspa's point, he'll point that out.

Maybe. Maybe he'll skirt the issue, OTOH.

I don't see how a value judgement like "benefit of the doubt" enters in.

Quite simply in putting the best face on his argument where that best face probably represents a facade (suggested in earnest on your part) placed in front of the actual argument.
I could be wrong. We'll see what happens.

[Jugulum]

Quite simply in putting the best face on his argument where that best face probably represents a facade (suggested in earnest on your part) placed in front of the actual argument.
I could be wrong. We'll see what happens.
Ah, I see. In that case, I have no doubt whatsoever that "the difference between recurrent vs. non-recurrent events doesn't demand a fundamentally different approach" is at least part of his argument. The validity of his responses to other justifications for an O-O distinction is irrelevant. For that reason, your "benefit of the doubt" comment strikes me as a pointless insult. Such damages the quality of the discussion, IMO.

[Captain Ochre]

Ah, I see. In that case, I have no doubt whatsoever that "the difference between recurrent vs. non-recurrent events doesn't demand a fundamentally different approach" is at least part of his argument.

Which would bring up the issue of why he would be attempting to make that point to me.
You're attempting to clarify Scott's position. Lucaspa doesn't have that excuse.

The validity of his responses to other justifications for an O-O distinction is irrelevant.

It is?
:huh:

For that reason, your "benefit of the doubt" comment strikes me as a pointless insult. Such damages the quality of the discussion, IMO.

You're certainly entitled to your opinion, but I'm also entitled to mine wrt your assessment of lucaspa's argument being overly hopeful.
Lucaspa and I have a brief history of exchanges, and I wouldn't have replied to his post in the first place if it hadn't been for the amusement value.
If you're reading the thread for quality, I recommend that you pay more attention to HRG or geochron.
My tendency will be to toy with lucaspa, while treating other responses more seriously.
FWIW.

[Jugulum]

The validity of his responses to other justifications for an O-O distinction is irrelevant.
It is?
:huh:
Irrelevant to the thread, no. Of course not. But my comment that prompted your response about "benefit of the doubt" was zoomed in on the recurrent vs. non-recurrent question. If that wasn't clear in my original comment, I explained it when I said "I restated their arguments (part of their arguments, at least)."

But this is getting rather pointless to argue. I'll get back to finishing my other response.


If you're reading the thread for quality, I recommend that you pay more attention to HRG or geochron.
My tendency will be to toy with lucaspa, while treating other responses more seriously.
FWIW.
:shrug: I suppose we'll have to disagree on that. I've found his contributions to the various philosophy of science threads over the last month to be largely interesting and thoughtful.

[Jugulum]

Captain Ochre:

First, I want to restate the purpose of my interjection. You implied lucaspa was faced with a contradiction, that it was somehow going to be difficult for him to explain how Scott could recognize a difference but say the distinction isn't real. It was plain to me that there is no such contradiction, so I decided to point out why: The "difference" she recognizes is recurrent vs. non-recurrent events. The "division" she calls artificial is origin vs. operation science--she attacks the idea that this difference or the primary/secondary cause argument justifies any significant alteration to the scientific method for "origins" subjects. There's no contradiction there, and I didn't want your discussion with lucaspa to become sidetracked on settling that somewhat irrelevant point.

I brought up UV/visible light as an off-the-cuff illustration that not all differences imply real division. (Quick point: I misspoke a couple posts ago and called it a "UV/IR" analogy.) UV and visible light differ only in degree, not in kind; the former has more energy and shorter wavelength than the latter.

You argue that there is a real limitation to the standard scientific method. You argue that there are fields of study (lumped together as "origins science") for which the methodology is in need of significant alteration. However, you seem to agree that the "recurrent vs. non-recurrent" distinction Scott recognizes does not justify that alteration. Good--that's what I wanted to get across.

Moreover, it is not that origins science must refer to primary causes ("miracles") but that origins science must be able to countenance miracles unless our science begs the question of the truth of naturalism by design.
I see your point and agree, somewhat. If science assumes away any miracles, it will lead to the wrong conclusion if a miracle did indeed occur. So it would be helpful to determine how we can approach matters in which we suspect the presence of supernatural activity. But I disagree on two points.

First--and this is somewhat of a side-issue--that refusing to countenance miracles begs the question of the truth of naturalism. If you simply mean, "When you claim miracles are impossible, you assume naturalism," I suppose you're obviously right. But I want to point out that naturalistic origins theories do not assume the truth of naturalism. Suppose we follow the Big Bang (or another naturalistic cosmology) forward to the formation of the earth to the formation of an imperfect replicator that gives rise to cells and then modern life through mutation and natural selection--all happening naturalistically. That not mean God does not exist, nor does it mean God is not Creator. It would simply mean that God's creative activity does/did not take the form of a suspension of the usual rules; rather, it powers those usual rules. He set them up, and is active in such events in the same way that he makes clouds rise from the ends of the earth, sends lightning with the rain, and makes grass grow.

"Refusing to countenance miracles" does assume away the truth of a YEC interpretation of the Bible--but that's not the same thing at all.

Second, I'm not convinced an origins/operations distinction is necessary to handle this problem. This line of reasoning is getting into the question of whether methodological naturalism is science. As I explained in more detail last month in the Georgia Evolution Disclaimer (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showpost.php?p=902350&postcount=230) thread, I'm inclined to think it is, and that this doesn't prevent exploring YEC claims. Claims such as "global flood" and "6000 year-old earth" are naturalistic claims we can explore scientifically; flood models are naturalistic attempts to explain the fossil and geological records. We're still asking questions like, "If this were true, what observations would we expect?"

Your comment about countenancing miracles could equally apply to any field of study--what you're calling "operations" science--and not just "origins" questions. That is, someone can always have a supernatural assumption at odds with a naturalistic theory--and I'm not just thinking of contrived, "What if fairies did it?" examples. I'm including real Christian ideas. For example, when we study meteorology, we use MN, even though the Bible says God makes the clouds rise and send lightning with the rain.

[Captain Ochre]

Captain Ochre:

First, I want to restate the purpose of my interjection. You implied lucaspa was faced with a contradiction, that it was somehow going to be difficult for him to explain how Scott could recognize a difference but say the distinction isn't real. It was plain to me that there is no such contradiction, so I decided to point out why: The "difference" she recognizes is recurrent vs. non-recurrent events. The "division" she calls artificial is origin vs. operation science--she attacks the idea that this difference or the primary/secondary cause argument justifies any significant alteration to the scientific method for "origins" subjects. There's no contradiction there, and I didn't want your discussion with lucaspa to become sidetracked on settling that somewhat irrelevant point.

No worries there, since I'd just use your observation to nail lucaspa on his interpretation of Scott.
It's all about digression.
:wink:

I brought up UV/visible light as an off-the-cuff illustration that not all differences imply real division. (Quick point: I misspoke a couple posts ago and called it a "UV/IR" analogy.) UV and visible light differ only in degree, not in kind; the former has more energy and shorter wavelength than the latter.

I'm wondering who's arguing for a "real division" in any analogous sense.

You argue that there is a real limitation to the standard scientific method.

I'd argue that some presuppositions make some questions unanswerable. It is not usually controversial that science has limitations.

You argue that there are fields of study (lumped together as "origins science") for which the methodology is in need of significant alteration.

I do?

However, you seem to agree that the "recurrent vs. non-recurrent" distinction Scott recognizes does not justify that alteration. Good--that's what I wanted to get across.

While Scott's nomenclature is more compact, I think that mine is more descriptive of what science is actually doing in the two cases. It's a matter of answering different types of questions.

I see your point and agree, somewhat. If science assumes away any miracles, it will lead to the wrong conclusion if a miracle did indeed occur. So it would be helpful to determine how we can approach matters in which we suspect the presence of supernatural activity. But I disagree on two points.

First--and this is somewhat of a side-issue--that refusing to countenance miracles begs the question of the truth of naturalism. If you simply mean, "When you claim miracles are impossible, you assume naturalism," I suppose you're obviously right.

That's my point, and I'm glad that you agree.

But I want to point out that naturalistic origins theories do not assume the truth of naturalism. Suppose we follow the Big Bang (or another naturalistic cosmology) forward to the formation of the earth to the formation of an imperfect replicator that gives rise to cells and then modern life through mutation and natural selection--all happening naturalistically. That not mean God does not exist, nor does it mean God is not Creator. It would simply mean that God's creative activity does/did not take the form of a suspension of the usual rules; rather, it powers those usual rules. He set them up, and is active in such events in the same way that he makes clouds rise from the ends of the earth, sends lightning with the rain, and makes grass grow.

That's a good point, albeit it's not controversial with me. It only takes one miracle (for example) for philosophical naturalism to be false in the universal sense, which leaves plenty of room for naturalistic explanations of historical events.

"Refusing to countenance miracles" does assume away the truth of a YEC interpretation of the Bible--but that's not the same thing at all.

Agreed.

Second, I'm not convinced an origins/operations distinction is necessary to handle this problem. This line of reasoning is getting into the question of whether methodological naturalism is science. As I explained in more detail last month in the Georgia Evolution Disclaimer (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showpost.php?p=902350&postcount=230) thread, I'm inclined to think it is, and that this doesn't prevent exploring YEC claims. Claims such as "global flood" and "6000 year-old earth" are naturalistic claims we can explore scientifically; flood models are naturalistic attempts to explain the fossil and geological records. We're still asking questions like, "If this were true, what observations would we expect?"

Hmmm. I'm not sure that the global flood and such are "naturalistic claims" as such. If you mean that they are supposed to be events that happened in the natural world and thus will leave evidence that is amenable to scientific investigation (MN), then I would agree to that (that seems to be how you've directed your paragraph above, indeed).
Historical science needs tools in addition to MN, however. Historical science can scarcely be done without Ockham's razor, for example.

Your comment about countenancing miracles could equally apply to any field of study--what you're calling "operations" science--and not just "origins" questions. That is, someone can always have a supernatural assumption at odds with a naturalistic theory--and I'm not just thinking of contrived, "What if fairies did it?" examples. I'm including real Christian ideas. For example, when we study meteorology, we use MN, even though the Bible says God makes the clouds rise and send lightning with the rain.

Is "what if fairies did it?" a question that we should associate with operational science? It rings to me like historical science.

Are you familiar with this paper by Mark Vuletic?
You might find it interesting.
http://www.utexas.edu/cola/depts/philosophy/faculty/koons/ntse/papers/Vuletic.html

[Jugulum]

No worries there, since I'd just use your observation to nail lucaspa on his interpretation of Scott.
It's all about digression.
:wink:
Good luck with that, then. You brought up Scott's essay in post 65 (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showpost.php?p=938042&postcount=65) with the comment, "The NCSE agrees that an appropriate distinction may be made between single-event study and normative study:" Lucaspa pointed out (correctly) that Scott's distinction is not the same distinction you or Morris make, because she says, "phenomena of historical sciences like geology, paleontology, and astronomy can be studied scientifically, and even experimentally." Scott rejects the "origins" distinction--the one made by Thaxton, Geisler, etc., which could be different from yours--as invalid. In the "origins" distinction she discusses, the real recurrent vs. non-recurrent distinction does play a role, but is not the only factor.

According to her, the kind of science we do on non-recurrent historical events is the same--even to the point of doing experiments. Lucaspa was arguing the same in post 63 (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showpost.php?p=937037&postcount=63), to which you didn't respond. I think his points on the purpose of controls, the meteor crater, and the question, "if this event happened in the past, what are the consequences of that event that will persist and be observable today?" are all quite relevant.

In other words, mainstream philosophers of science recognize the difference between recurrent and non-recurrent events, but do not see any real difference in the way we study them--experiments/new observations are sometimes difficult to obtain, but that can happen in "operations" science, too. They do not recognize a justification for considering miracles in any field: "proponents of this artificial division do not make a solid case for resorting to miracles in origin science".

I'm wondering who's arguing for a "real division" in any analogous sense.
Well, you're arguing that we should let miracles into some areas of science. I would call that a real division.

You argue that there is a real limitation to the standard scientific method.I'd argue that some presuppositions make some questions unanswerable. It is not usually controversial that science has limitations.
I think I need some clarification.

Do you mean specifically, "If you assume miracles don't happen, you'll get the answer wrong"? Or maybe, "If you assume Creation wasn't miraculous, you might get the answer wrong in anything impacted by the creation miracles"?

I'll zoom out to the larger question: Please spell out the major ingredients of your operations/origins distinction, and a basic statement of your justification for each. Some of your comments, such as "Historical science needs tools in addition to MN," seem to arise simply from a recurrent vs. non-recurrent distinction. Others, such as "origins science must be able to countenance miracles," seem to arise from an entirely different principle. It would help the discussion if you addressed/defended those separate points separately.

For the former, I suspect the point of contention lies in the way you're viewing the assumptions involved. For the latter, I suspect we can avoid the pitfalls (such as PN) without dropping MN from our definition of science. Moreover, I'm not sure there's a justification for dropping MN in origins that doesn't equally apply to operations.

If you simply mean, "When you claim miracles are impossible, you assume naturalism," I suppose you're obviously right.
That's my point, and I'm glad that you agree.
I agree, but it's an uninteresting statement--it's naturalism by definition. (Hmm...actually, it could also be deism, I suppose. Some people actually think that even if there is a God, he can't suspend natural law.)

Hmmm. I'm not sure that the global flood and such are "naturalistic claims" as such. If you mean that they are supposed to be events that happened in the natural world and thus will leave evidence that is amenable to scientific investigation (MN), then I would agree to that (that seems to be how you've directed your paragraph above, indeed).
Basically, yes. I did word it poorly. It would be better to say that the global flood and such are not entirely miraculous events--perhaps even not mostly miraculous events. A miracle happens in there somewhere, but a great deal happens naturalistically. They can be studied--and even falsified--through scientific investigation.

Historical science needs tools in addition to MN, however. Historical science can scarcely be done without Ockham's razor, for example.
Are you saying Ockham's razor is not needed in non-historical science? If so, why?

This goes back to my question about the ingredients of your O-O distinction. What tools does historical science (meaning non-recurrent events?) need that non-historical science doesn't?

Is "what if fairies did it?" a question that we should associate with operational science? It rings to me like historical science.
"Why is this piece of iron attracted to this rock? Maybe fairies did it." "Why do clouds rise? God does it." "How does a fetus grow? God knits it together."

Are you familiar with this paper by Mark Vuletic?
You might find it interesting.
http://www.utexas.edu/cola/depts/philosophy/faculty/koons/ntse/papers/Vuletic.html
Nope, haven't seen it. I'll read it before my next reply.

[lucaspa]

Did I?
Or did you jump to conclusions?
:lol:
http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showpost.php?p=935471&postcount=62
This is what you said in that post:
What evidence do you propose as absent?
The evidence that a particular dinosaur existed?
The evidence of a line of evolutionary descent that includes our particular dinosaur?
The evidence of a miraculous appearance?
This is what I said:
You asked what HRG's "absence of evidence" referred to.
So, yes, you did ask what HRG's "absence of evidence" referred to. Game, set, and match.

And search your brain as you might, you can't think of any reason why I would ask the question? Your reason is irrelevant, since in the context of the conversation HRG can't be referring to that.

We do? Where and what is it?
You're not talking about evidence apart from one case of this particular hypothetical dinosaur that I'm using as an example, I hope. If that's the case, then I'll have to ask you precisely how you adduce the evidence against the special creation of this hypothetical dinosaur which was created ex nihilo.['/quote]
Special pleading. You are proposing that, since we don't have evidence against miraculous creation for THIS PARTICULAR species, or maybe this PARTICULAR animal, then we should entertain the idea. What you are doing now is 1) special pleading and 2) trying to make the theory unfalsifiable. We do have evidence -- in the form of phylogenetic analysis -- that no living species is specially created. We also have evidence in the form of transitional series of individuals and series of transitional species, that other species of dinos were not specially created.

The above is science. But we also have to consider the damage to God your idea entails. What you are proposing is that God is being deceptive. Since all the evidence we find via science is from God's Creation, it follows that God put it there -- either directly or indirectly. Now, we have an immense amount of data that God did not create by miraculous creation. Yet you are proposing that God sneaked one dinosaur species in as miraculous or even an individual dino. But God also left no evidence of that. So God deceives us. So, what we have is that, in order to shore up your own weak faith, we end up with a lying god that we can't trust or worship. No thanks, Captain. I'm sorry for your weak faith that you have to find "proof" of God via science. Perhaps if you pray some more God will be kind and help you with your faith so that you don't have to discredit God.

HRG's statement appeared to be a statement of general principle, IMHO, applicable in any case where we find an absence of evidence.
Would you disagree? Yes and no. We have two concepts going:
1. What did HRG specifically mean in the context of your example. In that context, HRG was plainly referring only to your second question. For the reasons I gave. Lack of evidence of an ancestor-descendent lineage in this particular case does not mean that ancestor-descendent does not apply to it. Because we have descent with modification strongly supported for other lineages and have established that as a general principle. Therefore absence of evidence for this particular example does not constitute absence of evidence.

2. What you apparently want is to say "because evidence is lacking for miraculous creation of this particular example, that is not evidence of absence of miraculous creation." Superficially, it looks like a valid point. However, miraculous creation is not confined to one or two individuals or species, is it? As a theory, special creation applies to ALL species, or at least to a large number of "kinds". This idea has false consequences, and thus is false. IOW, we have evidence falsifying special (miraculous) creation of species.

We have evidence that you do that sort of thing. If you have evidence, you should present it. But then, this wasn't intended to have evidence, it was intended to attack my credibility.

Sure. Except for how the example applies to my dinosaur example. It wasn't mant to apply to your dino example. It was meant to explain that absence of evidence CAN be evidence of absence IF you search the entire search space. Apparently you understand that now.

You're such an idiot!
Did you check the third URL?
Have you ever heard of "civil discussion", Captain? Perhaps your mother just never taught you manners? Ad hominem is not a valid form of argument.

I asked you first. Doesn't that count for anything?
I'd already answered in my post. You simply didn't see it. So now I can ask you. What is your opinion? Afraid to give it?

So, it would be absolutely impossible for science to ever produce an organism that would have the appearance of classification within a double-nested hierarchy? Science could never map a hypothetical transitional form and then produce it from scratch?
I don't see how. "Transitional forms", or intermediates, by definition have characteristics of both the species before them and the species after them. If I can, I'll attach a picture of a transitional series at the end of the post. So, transitional forms do fit in the nested hierarchy.

But manufactured artifacts (miraculously created) can't be classified in a nested hierarchy because they do derive independently and are not connected via descent with modification.

[Why not, given the hypothetical ability of a scientist to produce a synthetic "transitional form"? I challenge the "given". How would a scientist produce a transitional form?

Not by descent, no, ... Would you say that we could not have a creature whose cellular information system is DNA which was not also part of a direct line of descent from some other creature? Of course you COULD have an organism with DNA but not related. That was a possibility when phylogenetic studies were started. However, I apologize, I should have said "DNA sequence" and not just "DNA". What happens is that you compare the sequences of bases in the DNA. The sequence would be independent and not related to the sequences of any other species.

I'm still wondering when you got a look at my hypothetical dinosaur's DNA. I didn't. You asked for POSSIBLE ways to refute special creation. So far, all dino DNA has been too degraded to get a sequence analysis from. (BTW, that itself argues against a young earth, since it takes time for the DNA to get that degraded that we can't get any at all, and we do get DNA from carcasses/fossils that are several thousand years old.)

Because it's a hypothetical case, of course. That doesn't matter. It's still special pleading that this one dino would be specially created.

Lucaspa: "All I did was show you that, instead, creationism was the presupposition. And the presupposition was discarded in the face of contrary data."
That's neat trick how you can discard the presuppositions of hypothetical case in order to show that the hypothetical case is different than it was posed to be.
??? Creationism is a "hypothetical case"? Captain, I wasn't discussing yourhypothetical dinosaur when I wrote how creationism was the presupposition. It's fun watching you attempt to distract with personal attacks when you can't answer an argument, but it's not helping special creation or your personal reputation.

Are you at all concerned that Morris' articulation of the argument might not be the flavor that you're dealing with respecting your debate opponent?
1. I'm not debating. Therefore I don't have an "opponent". I'm discussing the validity of ideas.
2. When you use terms that represent ideas, you should use them as the people that coined the terms defined them. If I use the term "selfish gene", I would use it the way Dawkins did. If you as Captain are using the terms operation and origins science differently than Morris and other creationist authors, then you should say so. Unless and until you do, everyone will understood you are using the terms as Morris used them.

Your claim regarding Morris hinges on your evidenceless claim that Morris rejects origins science as a category.

"We do not know how the Creator created, what processes He used, for He used processes which are not now operating anywhere in the natural universe (emphasis in the original). That is why we refer to creation as special creation. We cannot discover by scientific investigation anything about the creative processes used by the Creator." Morris, Scientific Creationism.

Now, since Morris discusses science as ONLY what is repeatable, the above statement removes origins science from science, doesn't it?

... mainstream philosophers of science agree that phenomena of historical sciences like geology, paleontology, and astronomy can be studied scientifically, and even experimentally.

Non sequitur. Not really, since the basis of a difference between origin science and operations science is that origins science can't be studied experimentally.

No reference to Morris' motives and arguments, eh? And the reference to Morris is giving him credit for them. Again, saying "Morris'" is also a convenient label to identify the ideas -- by the man who first came up with them. Why else do we say "Darwinism" or "Darwinian evolution"? Or Pauline theology? Or Jesus' teachings? Are we committing "genetic fallacy" when we say "Jesus' parables"?

lucaspa: "However, I have noticed that you are no longer talking about the ideas or motivations. IOW, you have made no attempt to show that the distinction made between operations and origins science was NOT a result of the motives and reasoning I've outlined."

Should I take up the burden of proof to prove the converse instead of undermining your arguments, then?
If you believe the converse, then "Yes". Because the converse is a position you hold. And you have a burden of proof for your position.

http://www.sjsu.edu/depts/itl/graphics/claims/truth.html#burden
"Burden of Proof refers to the sense you have, in any dispute, of how much each side needs to prove in order to win your agreement. ... "Intentionally shifting the burden of proof, in order to avoid offering support for one's premises, is a logical fallacy."

What you are doing is not even "undermining", but ignoring or trying to avoid the argument. Now what you are trying to do is shift the burden of proof and pretend like your position has none.

Of course, since you think you are in a "debate" and are therefore trying to "win", I suspect you are following the guidelines Macbeth (a creationist) sets out below. But, that is not a way to discover truth. You wouldn't be afraid of the truth, would you, Captain?
""Courtroom experience during my career at the bar taught me to attach great weight to something that may seem trivial to persons not skilled in argumentation -- the burden of proof. The proponents of a theory, in science or elsewhere, are obligated to support every link in the chain of reasoning, whereas a critic or skeptic may peck at any aspect of the theory, testing it for flaws. He is not obligated to set up any theory of his own or to offer any alternative explanations. He can be purely negative if he so desires. William Jennings Bryan forgot this in Tennessee, and was jockeyed into trying to defend fundamentalism, although this was not necessary to the matter in hand. The results were disastrous. They would have been equally disastrous for Clarence Darrow if he had tried to discharge the burden of proof for the other side. The winner in these matters is the skeptic who has no case to prove." Norman Macbeth, Darwin Retried, 1971, pg 5.

Sure. Would you care to suggest explicitly that I have committed such a fallacy? I just did. By showing that I never committed the genetic fallacy. Instead of discussing the errors of the idea on origin and operational science (stated by Morris), we are discussing whether you committed a fallacy. Nice distraction you are doing, no?

My statement above neither recommends reasoning from presuppositions nor forbids the same.
What it does is stipulate (in effect) that one should ask questions appropriate to the presuppositions one is using.
Very well. Thank you for clearing that up. I will be sure to pay attention from now on that you are not condemning theories simply for having presuppositions. Instead, I presume we will be discussing whether they really have the presuppositions you claim.


lucaspa: "Doesn't "worldview bigotry" come under the heading of "presuppositions"?

Perhaps (though it's not particularly clear that it would be the case here)--but the same could be said of the term "worldview" by itself.

lucaspa "Now, "bigotry" is not a complimentary term. I can't see you using "bigotry" when you want us to argue from presuppositions."

Right, because I couldn't argue against using one particular presupposition without arguing that all presuppositions are improper as a basis for argument.
But you DID use the uncomplimentary word "bigotry" in describing worldview -- ""Your personal conviction betrays a whopping case of worldview bigotry."
ROFL! Sorry, Captain, but you just cut yourself down. You took my rhetorical question, decided to be sarcastic, take it seriuosly, and try to turn it back on me. But all you did was slit your own throat. You said you "couldn't have used it" because you can't argue against one particulat presupposition. But since you DID use "bigotry", you are asserting the contrary! LOL!

[lucaspa]

I specified the reason for the reference, and it wasn't because I think that it should be listened to on the topic of "operations" and "origins" science.
I picked it because you would be likely to give it credence.
So you picked it because Scott used the term. And you think that her use of the term then justifies and backs the creationist distinction?

If that is the case, then the article does not support your position, since the additional quotes show that she thinks the attempts to make a distinction between operational and origins science are artificial and incorrect. Since Scott has evidenced good reasoning and critical thinking in the evolution vs creationism issue in other areas, I do give credence to her conclusion that the attempted distinction does not exist. Thank you for sending me to someone that undermines your position. I didn't think you had that much objectivity in you.

I haven't defined the difference between the two as Scott has done according to her reading. As far as I can read in this thread, you haven't defined the difference at all. If I've missed it please post the reference. If you haven't defined the difference, please post it.

You have put yourself in the position of having to explain how she can call the division "artificial" while at the same time granting a difference.
Good luck with that.
Jugulum did a good job with that. She noted a difference between repeatable events and one time events. However, what she showed was that both "origins" and "operational" sciences have both repeatable and one time events. So that distinction is artificial.

There's no point in discussing it unless you can give me an account of what you mean by "miracles". We'd be talking past each other.
You used the term in your dino example: "miraculous creation". So you have invoked miracles. Since you used the term first, why don't you give us an account of what you meant so we won't be talking past each other? Thank you.

I think that it should be granted that the random formation of quantum particles (uncaused, according to a goodly number of the experts) is a miracle. If that isn't a miracle, then I suspect that the term cannot have any meaning at all which would make your challenge a farce.
Why is this a "miracle"? Because of the "uncaused"? Or are you using "miracle" to refer to any instantaneous transition without intermediates? That is, the particle is "not there" and then it is "there". If that is what you refer to as "miracle", let me suggest the term "instantaneous appearance" instead. My reason for this is that "miracle" is not used outside religion and it is always implied that God performs the instantaneous formation. However, you don't seem to be implying God is involved in the formation of virtual particles.

BTW, the way you phrased "If that isn't a miracle, then I suspect that the term cannot have any meaning at all which would make your challenge a farce" is such that ANY meaning that I come up with will be OK.

[lucaspa]

Moreover, it is not that origins science must refer to primary causes ("miracles") but that origins science must be able to countenance miracles unless our science begs the question of the truth of naturalism by design.
However, with your example of virtual particles, "miracles" does not exclude naturalism. YOu say virtual particles are "miracles" (even tho they are repeatable and not one-time events). But no one says virtual particles violates naturalism. So if science considers instantaneous appearance, then naturalism is not affected.

But where do Geisler et. al. advocate any requirement for resorting to the supernatural? What are Geisler et al. resorting to? Do they propose a mechanism or cause for the instantaneous appearance? Let's go back to you dino example. If "miracle" does NOT include God -- as your virtual particle example implies -- then how would a dino have a "miraculous creation"? Virtual particles are all subatomic. We have never seen a macroscopic object instantaneously disappear? If "miraculous creation" does not involve choice by God, why has it stopped? Why aren't dinos being "miraculously created" today?

Rather, there are factors in common for the approach to each. If they were truly approached the same way then there would be no distinction between them.
The distinction is whether the events happened one time or whether they happen repeatedly. The approach is the same. Hypothesize what happened, make deductions from the hypothesis of consequences you should find, then look for the the consequences.

For example, one of the first experiments I did in undergraduate organic chemistry was reacting organic acid with an alcohol to get an ester. Esters have distinctive odors that depend on the acid and alcohol used. My reaction produced an ester that smelled like bananas. My lab partner and I knew we had succeeded when we began smelling bananas. Did we ever see the 2 molecules actually come together to form an ester? No. We knew we had those 2 chemicals and that we got the reaction product. We DEDUCED the reaction took place, but never directly observed it.

Let's compare that to the one time event of a meteor impact at the end of the Cretaceous (KT impact theory). First, we have the repeatable event that every time iridium levels in sediment at the KT boundary is measured, those levels are much higher than in the adjacent sediments. That is, the measurement is a repeatable event. And the iridium levels in different sediments is repeatable. From that observation, Alvarez hypothesized that a very large meteor (since they have high levels of iridium) had impacted at the end of the Cretaceous, and the vaporized iridium got incorporated into the sediments around the world.

Now, other deductions from that are 1) we should find tektites (glass formed from the heat of a meteor impact) "close" to the site of impact and 2) we should find a crator -- a BIG crator. Well, tektites were found in cores from the Atlantic Ocean and ground radar found a large crator of the appropriate age at Chixulub in the Yucatan.

So, just like I never saw the molecules come together but deduced they did from the consequences, we never saw the meteor hit but deduced it did from the consequences.

I think that you give lucaspa more benefit of the doubt than he deserves. Eugenie Scott has earned her benefit of the doubt, OTOH.Once again we should thank you for so objectively providing trustworthy evidence to disprove your own position. Because that is what Scott does: disproves a distinction between origins and operational science. Thank you.

[lucaspa]

I'd argue that some presuppositions make some questions unanswerable.
Which presuppositions?

It only takes one miracle (for example) for philosophical naturalism to be false in the universal sense, which leaves plenty of room for naturalistic explanations of historical events. So you too separate God from nature. Nice to know you're an atheist, Captain.

Hmmm. I'm not sure that the global flood and such are "naturalistic claims" as such. If you mean that they are supposed to be events that happened in the natural world and thus will leave evidence that is amenable to scientific investigation (MN), then I would agree to that (that seems to be how you've directed your paragraph above, indeed).
Historical science needs tools in addition to MN, however. Historical science can scarcely be done without Ockham's razor, for example.
So now we have a new term? "Historical science"? What exactly is that?

A Global Flood is a naturalistic claim, as you noted. So is "miraculous creation" as in "instantaneous formation". Both leave evidence that is amenable to scientific investigation. And it is this evidence that falsifies both a global flood and "miraculous creation".

Is "what if fairies did it?" a question that we should associate with operational science? It rings to me like historical science.
Ah, but the question realy is not "what if fairies did it?", but "HOW did fairies do it?" More on that below.

Are you familiar with this paper by Mark Vuletic?
You might find it interesting.
http://www.utexas.edu/cola/depts/philosophy/faculty/koons/ntse/papers/Vuletic.html
I am familiar with it. I disagree with it. MN does not arise because we simply don't want to include the "supernatural". MN arises directly from how we do experiments. A simple example should suffice:
You want to find ALL causes/entities necessary for plant growth. So you go out and get a number of plants. You put them in the following conditions:
1. Sunlight, water, soil, air
2. Sunlight, water, soil, but in a clear box where the air has been pumped out.
3. Sunlight, water, no soil, air.
4. Sunlight, no water, soil, air
5. A darkened box with no sunlight, water, soil, air.

This scientific protocol will tell you if these 4 entities/causes are necessary for plant growth. You can add others if you wish but you will follow the same scientific protocol of having a control where you KNOW the entity is absent and compare it to an experimental where you KNOW the entity is present.

Now comes the kicker. How about the supernatural? Where is my control for that? Which plant can I point to and say "this one has NO supernatural in it?" I can't. This is MN -- inability to put supernatural or God into a test tube and the inability to keep supernatural or God out of one.

Yes, we "ignore" the supernatural when we do experiments. Not because it causes problems or we want to, but because the supernatural is such that we can't include it in an experiment.

So, how does creationism get supernatural into science? By the back door. What you do is propose a MATERIAL MECHANISM by which the supernatural is said to work, and then test for the mechanism. This is what a global flood does. The theory is that a Flood caused all geological formations and fossils. Now, behind the theory is the idea that God caused the Flood. But what we test for is whether geological formations can be caused by a world wide flood. In the event, no world-wide formation or class of formations can possibly caused by a world wide flood. Flood geology is therefore falsified. Is God falsified? NO! Because we didn't test for God; we just tested a hypothesis on how God works.

So, in the sense that Morris, Gish, and Captain are using the term, "miracle" does become a material method that we can test for. In this case, "miracle" is instantaneous formation/manufacture of each species or "kind" without any antecedents. HOW the species are formed is irrelevant. We don't need to know how (God) performed the miracle. Transmutation of dirt, creation of matter by spoken word, whatever. Instantaneous formation/manufacture has consequences we can test for. We've done that, and falsified special creation.

[lucaspa]

Good luck with that, then. You brought up Scott's essay in post 65 (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showpost.php?p=938042&postcount=65) with the comment, "The NCSE agrees that an appropriate distinction may be made between single-event study and normative study:" Lucaspa pointed out (correctly) that Scott's distinction is not the same distinction you or Morris make, because she says, "phenomena of historical sciences like geology, paleontology, and astronomy can be studied scientifically, and even experimentally." Scott rejects the "origins" distinction--the one made by Thaxton, Geisler, etc., which could be different from yours--as invalid. In the "origins" distinction she discusses, the real recurrent vs. non-recurrent distinction does play a role, but is not the only factor.
Thank you. It's nice to know that someone reading the thread has good reading comprehension. :smile: Scott notes a difference between repeating events and one-time events, but says that both happen in both "origins" and "operational" science. For instance, each mutation is a one time event, yet Mendelian genetics falls under "operations" science.

According to her, the kind of science we do on non-recurrent historical events is the same--even to the point of doing experiments. Lucaspa was arguing the same in post 63 (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showpost.php?p=937037&postcount=63), to which you didn't respond.
Captain not respond? I'm shocked! Shocked, I tell you! :lol:

In other words, mainstream philosophers of science recognize the difference between recurrent and non-recurrent events, but do not see any real difference in the way we study them--experiments/new observations are sometimes difficult to obtain, but that can happen in "operations" science, too.
Nice summary! For what it's worth, you seem to be doing a good job of absorbing and presenting my posts. Should we split up the threads so we can cover more ground? You cover some and I'll cover others?

Do you mean specifically, "If you assume miracles don't happen, you'll get the answer wrong"? Or maybe, "If you assume Creation wasn't miraculous, you might get the answer wrong in anything impacted by the creation miracles"?Whatever Captain means, miracles are not excluded a priori by science. Some atheists, misrepresenting science, do make this claim. But it's not true. If species were instantaneously formed (by miracle) in their present form, then that would be fine. In fact, it WAS fine by science since special creation was THE accepted scientific theory for several hundred years. Even while falsifying the Flood with uniformitarianism in 1830, Lyell was asserting the special creation of species. :smile: So, science DID consider "miracle" as a means of creation, but rejected it based on evidence from Creation.

I'll zoom out to the larger question: Please spell out the major ingredients of your operations/origins distinction, and a basic statement of your justification for each.
It appears you can't find Captain's definition, either. I'm not surprised. By keeping it hidden, he can restrict himself to "sniping" at other positions. If we nail the view of Geisler or Morris on the subject, he can always say "that's not my view". It's not an honest way to discuss.

For the former, I suspect the point of contention lies in the way you're viewing the assumptions involved. For the latter, I suspect we can avoid the pitfalls (such as PN) without dropping MN from our definition of science. Moreover, I'm not sure there's a justification for dropping MN in origins that doesn't equally apply to operations.You CAN'T drop MN, because you can't do experiments any differently. Now, if Captain or anyone else has a way for us to set up controls for the supernatural and can point to a test tube and say: "God isn't in that one" I am all ears. If it works, I'll recommend him to the Nobel Prize Committee. It will be one of the greatest breakthrus in science ever.

Basically, yes. I did word it poorly. It would be better to say that the global flood and such are not entirely miraculous events--perhaps even not mostly miraculous events. A miracle happens in there somewhere, but a great deal happens naturalistically. They can be studied--and even falsified--through scientific investigation.
The key here is that global flood is used as MATERIAL cause of geology! What caused the Flood is merly implied. That is, we still have no direct evidence of God. What we have is: "God caused the Flood and the Flood caused geology." So we can test: did the Flood really cause geology? Answer: "No". Now, the non sequitor is to conclude "God did not cause geology." But that is the non sequitor all YECs make. Instead, we simply propose a new method for God causing geology. For instance, God sustains all the processes of erosion, plate tectonics, etc and these processes cause geology.

You see, YEC is closet atheism. YEC says: if something is natural, then supernatural is absent. As you can see from MN, SCIENCE says nothing of the kind. Instead, natural = without God is the fundamental statement of faith of atheism. If natural requires God to work, then atheism is toast. But MN means science can't tell us one way or the other because we can't set up the appropriate controls.

So, YEC works on god-of-the-gaps theology. They need a "gap" in the material processes of the universe in order to stick God into it. This is why I found it so interesting that Captain classed virtual particles as "miracle" but excluded God from his definition of "miracle". In virtual particles, we do indeed have a gap in our understanding of cause and effect. Virtual particles pop into and out of existence without any apparent cause. They do so all the time and everywhere. Yet it appears that supernatural not only has to be in a "gap", but a one-time gap. The supernatural, apparently, can't do anything on a regular basis. Interesting.

Are you saying Ockham's razor is not needed in non-historical science? If so, why? Be careful of the Razor. It's a terrible guide to truth. It is so poor at finding truth that it has been discarded in large areas -- signal transduction and transcription control -- in the biological sciences.

"Why is this piece of iron attracted to this rock? Maybe fairies did it." "Why do clouds rise? God does it." "How does a fetus grow? God knits it together."
Ah, but the interesting questions are: How did the fairies do it? How does God do it? Do fairies take their hands and push the iron to the rock? Does God take knitting needles and stitch a fetus together?

OR, do fairies cause magnetic attraction between iron and rock? Or does God sustain cell division and intercellular interactions in the fetus?

It's all in the HOW fairies or God acts.


Read the article carefully. It has as a lot of common misconceptions about MN.

[lucaspa]

Like lucaspa wrt Morris, you seem to have drawn an incorrect conclusion regarding what Geisler advocates.
I was talking about the distinction between origins and operations science, from the perspective of the person who originated the idea. Now, if Geisler has modified Morris' ideas, that's something else. Perhaps you would enlighten us how Geisler differs from Morris. What's more, I've re-read the whole thread, and nowhere in your posts do you reference Geisler. So where did Geisler come into the conversation? As a way to try to avoid admitting no distinction between origins and operations science?

What's more, you have acknowledged that Geochron's original OP example had elements of BOTH operations and origins science.
"I'm saying that one of your examples has elements of both questions to it "
http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?t=41241&page=4&pp=16

But, if they are "distinct", as you now claim, then there can't be examples of using both. That defeats the whole definition of "distinct".

[lucaspa]

Your claim regarding Morris hinges on your evidenceless claim that Morris rejects origins science as a category.
That claim remains highly dubious despite your facile assurance to the contrary.

See Glenn's point on the possible origins of the alleged distinction.
http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showpost.php?p=935343&postcount=61
Oh, the IRONY! I claimed that Morris rejected "origins science" as SCIENCE. Not as a category. In addition to the quote I gave Morris has a great quote in the very post you reference! RFOL!
"Henry M. Morris, The Troubled Waters of
Evolution, (San Diego: Creation-Life Publishers, 1974), p. 104
"The creation model therefore postulates a primeval period of
special creation in the past - 'special' in the sense that the
processes of creation which were then in operation are no longer
in operation today, and therefore not accessible for scientific
measurment and study." "

Well, since "origins" science is about the origin of things when they were created. Right here, Morris says "origins science" can't be done!

It would be nice if you even read the material you post as reference. That's twice you've posted material supporting my claims. Very generous of you. Thanks.





My statement above neither recommends reasoning from presuppositions nor forbids the same.
What it does is stipulate (in effect) that one should ask questions appropriate to the presuppositions one is using.



Perhaps (though it's not particularly clear that it would be the case here)--but the same could be said of the term "worldview" by itself.



Right, because I couldn't argue against using one particular presupposition without arguing that all presuppositions are improper as a basis for argument.

:lol:[/QUOTE]

[Jugulum]

I'm going to start using RE and NRE as abbreviations for recurrent and non-recurrent events.

Thank you. It's nice to know that someone reading the thread has good reading comprehension. :smile: Scott notes a difference between repeating events and one-time events, but says that both happen in both "origins" and "operational" science. For instance, each mutation is a one time event, yet Mendelian genetics falls under "operations" science.
That's a good point, but I don't think Scott makes it. Her reference to Mendel was to show that MN does not entail PN. And I while I don't disagree with you, I can't find an argument in her essay that both REs and NREs happen in both "origins" and "operational" science. Her arguments seem to center on three ideas: 1.) NREs are studied the same way as REs. 2.) No one's made a case for resorting to the supernatural for "origins" topics. 3.) No one's given a clear criteria for "origins" topics.

You seem to disagree somewhat with point 2, and I think you may be right. That is, you argue supernatural hypotheses aren't excluded even from "operations" science, to the extent that those hypotheses describe naturalistic events. In other words, they're allowed in science if they describe the "how", and science just ignores the part about the supernatural. But this still leads to the conclusion that the O-O division is artificial.

Nice summary! For what it's worth, you seem to be doing a good job of absorbing and presenting my posts. Should we split up the threads so we can cover more ground? You cover some and I'll cover others?
Thanks for the compliment. :smile: This is the only active PoS (philosophy of science:smile:) thread, so it's a moot point. I will stick around here as long as I think I have anything to contribute.

Whatever Captain means, miracles are not excluded a priori by science. Some atheists, misrepresenting science, do make this claim. But it's not true. If species were instantaneously formed (by miracle) in their present form, then that would be fine. In fact, it WAS fine by science since special creation was THE accepted scientific theory for several hundred years. Even while falsifying the Flood with uniformitarianism in 1830, Lyell was asserting the special creation of species. :smile: So, science DID consider "miracle" as a means of creation, but rejected it based on evidence from Creation.
Hmm. Good point.

There is still a form of supernatural explanation that scientists do reject out-of-hand: Ad hoc, random "God made it that way" explanations. For instance, responding to the Missing Isotopes (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?t=15133) argument by saying "God just decided to make less of the short-lived isotopes" is unsatisfactory. Or saying the light from Supernova 1987A (showing the explosion and later reflection from the gas ring) was made en route.

It appears you can't find Captain's definition, either. I'm not surprised. By keeping it hidden, he can restrict himself to "sniping" at other positions. If we nail the view of Geisler or Morris on the subject, he can always say "that's not my view". It's not an honest way to discuss.
Unless and until he actually refuses to clarify, this strikes me as the same sort of pointless insult as his "benefit of the doubt" comment. Even if you can make a case that he has deliberately ignored a previous request for a comprehensive explanation, it seems counter-productive to bring that up now, right after I ask the question. It's too likely to distract from the discussion of ideas and lead into fruitless argument about who has used what bad debate tactics.

You CAN'T drop MN, because you can't do experiments any differently. Now, if Captain or anyone else has a way for us to set up controls for the supernatural and can point to a test tube and say: "God isn't in that one" I am all ears. If it works, I'll recommend him to the Nobel Prize Committee. It will be one of the greatest breakthrus in science ever.
So in this context, you're saying the O-O distinction is unnecessary, because MN doesn't preclude studying the idea of special creation or other miraculous origins.

The key here is that global flood is used as MATERIAL cause of geology! What caused the Flood is merly implied. That is, we still have no direct evidence of God.
Right. I think that was HRG's point in Where should we make the cut? (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?t=47375)

What we have is: "God caused the Flood and the Flood caused geology." So we can test: did the Flood really cause geology? Answer: "No". Now, the non sequitor is to conclude "God did not cause geology." But that is the non sequitor all YECs make. Instead, we simply propose a new method for God causing geology. For instance, God sustains all the processes of erosion, plate tectonics, etc and these processes cause geology.
Agreed, and Captain already said he also agrees with that point.

You see, YEC is closet atheism. YEC says: if something is natural, then supernatural is absent. As you can see from MN, SCIENCE says nothing of the kind. Instead, natural = without God is the fundamental statement of faith of atheism. If natural requires God to work, then atheism is toast. But MN means science can't tell us one way or the other because we can't set up the appropriate controls.
"YEC is closet atheism" is certainly an effective attention-getter, but it's an overstatement. Better to say that some forms of devotion to YEC share the "natural = without God" fallacy with atheism. Or perhaps "anti-evolution" is more accurate here than YEC.

Be careful of the Razor. It's a terrible guide to truth. It is so poor at finding truth that it has been discarded in large areas -- signal transduction and transcription control -- in the biological sciences.
I'll look into it more.

Ah, but the interesting questions are: How did the fairies do it? How does God do it? Do fairies take their hands and push the iron to the rock? Does God take knitting needles and stitch a fetus together?

OR, do fairies cause magnetic attraction between iron and rock? Or does God sustain cell division and intercellular interactions in the fetus?

It's all in the HOW fairies or God acts.
Right. Science doesn't exactly ignore statements that "fairies did it"--science just ignores the "fairies" part or the "God" part, and focuses on the "how".

[lucaspa]

That's a good point, but I don't think Scott makes it. Her reference to Mendel was to show that MN does not entail PN. And I while I don't disagree with you, I can't find an argument in her essay that both REs and NREs happen in both "origins" and "operational" science. Her arguments seem to center on three ideas: 1.) NREs are studied the same way as REs. 2.) No one's made a case for resorting to the supernatural for "origins" topics. 3.) No one's given a clear criteria for "origins" topics.
From Scott:
"But creationists would say that Mendel's laws are examples of "operational" science, which begs the question of "what are the topics of origins science?" " Now, why would Scott think that Mendel's laws would be part of origins science? In other contexts, Scott does indeed use Mendel as an example of adhering to MN but rejecting PN. But not here. REs and NREs being present in both operations and origins science is implicit in begging the question of what are the topics of operations and origins science.

You seem to disagree somewhat with point 2, and I think you may be right. That is, you argue supernatural hypotheses aren't excluded even from "operations" science, to the extent that those hypotheses describe naturalistic events. In other words, they're allowed in science if they describe the "how", and science just ignores the part about the supernatural. But this still leads to the conclusion that the O-O division is artificial.
Oh yes. there is nothing in my discussion to challenge that the O-O division is artificial. I was simply noting that science does NOT exclude the supernatural a priori, which is a common argument from both extremes of the theism vs atheism debate. As long as you propose a material method (even if instantaneous formation by miracle) for the supernatural to work, then supernatural is not excluded.

There is still a form of supernatural explanation that scientists do reject out-of-hand: Ad hoc, random "God made it that way" explanations. For instance, responding to the Missing Isotopes (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?t=15133) argument by saying "God just decided to make less of the short-lived isotopes" is unsatisfactory. Or saying the light from Supernova 1987A (showing the explosion and later reflection from the gas ring) was made en route.
Notice the critical term "ad hoc". The reason this is rejected is not because it is "God did it". It is because the hypothesis explains only that particular data and either 1) can't be tested outside the data it is trying to explain (make less of the short-lived isotopes) or 2) it's only purpose is to avoid falsification of the theory. Both of the examples you gave come under the Appearance of Age argument. The answer to that has never been from science. Yes, a supernatural deity COULD have done it this way. Just like deity could have made the universe last Tuesday with all our memories intact.

No, the answer to the Appearance of Age comes from theology, not science. Such a god is inherently deceptive. It is deliberately setting us up to believe one thing when something else is true. Now, since theists MUST implicitly trust God to keep His promises regarding salvation, eternal life, etc. Christianity can't survive God being deliberately deceptive. If God lies in one area, then God can lie about all the others. While the ad hoc hypotheses save creationism from falsification, the cost is a god that no one can worship.

This is what Rev. Kingsley wrote to Rev. Paul Gosse -- the guy who first came up with the Appearance of Age argument -- when Gosse asked Kingsley to write a forward to his book laying out the argument.
"Shall I tell you the truth? It is best. Your book is the first that ever made me doubt the doctrine of absolute creation, and I fear it will make hundreds do so. Your book tends to prove this - that if we accept the fact of absolute creation, God becomes God-the-Sometime-Deceiver. I do not mean merely in the case of fossils which pretend to be the bones of dead animals; but in ...your newly created Adam's navel, you make God tell a lie. It is not my reason, but my conscience which revolts here ... I cannot ...believe that God has written on the rocks one enormous and superfluous lie for all mankind. To this painful dilemma you have brought me, and will, I fear, bring hundreds. It will not make me throw away my Bible. I trust and hope. I know in whom I have believed, and can trust Him to bring my faith safe through this puzzle, as He has through others; but for the young I do fear. I would not for a thousand pounds put your book into my children's hands." Garret Hardin, ""Scientific Creationism'" - Marketing Deception as Truth" in Science and Creationism edited by Ashley Montagu, 1982.

BTW, making unsupportable ad hoc hypotheses that are dismissed are not the sole province of creationism. Some scientists have done so when faced with falsification of a favorite theory. For instance, when phlogiston was falsified as the agent of combustion, some phlogiston chemists tried to counter the data that ash weighed more than the original wood and yet phlogiston was supposed to have left during combustion. The unsupportable ad hoc hypothesis? "Phlogiston has negative weight"

Unless and until he actually refuses to clarify, this strikes me as the same sort of pointless insult as his "benefit of the doubt" comment. Even if you can make a case that he has deliberately ignored a previous request for a comprehensive explanation, it seems counter-productive to bring that up now, right after I ask the question. It's too likely to distract from the discussion of ideas and lead into fruitless argument about who has used what bad debate tactics.
I don't intend to make it part of the discussion. I'm simply pointing out the tactic and the benefits to Captain of using it. I accept that he ignores requests for information and clarification. But I do predict that, instead of providing the info, Captain will try to start the very fruitless argument you mention.

So in this context, you're saying the O-O distinction is unnecessary, because MN doesn't preclude studying the idea of special creation or other miraculous origins. Yep. The proof is that science has ALWAYS operated under MN, but special creation was THE accepted scientific theory prior to about 1850. Read Origin of the Species. A lot of the data and arguments Darwin uses are directed at showing that the current theory of special creation is wrong. Now, Darwin would not have spent the time and effort if his fellow scientist were not studying special creation. :smile:


Right. I think that was HRG's point in Where should we make the cut? (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?t=47375) I know. And I dealt with it (again) there. As long as you ascribe a material method by which God works, then you test the method.

Agreed, and Captain already said he also agrees with that point. Captain agreed that the Flood was a material event. I don't think he agrees that it is falsified. :smile: Biblically, the Flood isn't even miraculous. In the cosmology of the time, all God has to do is turn the valves to release all the "waters above" and "waters below". It's only now, with our later extrabiblical knowledge, that Flood geologists have to invoke miracle to get the water and get rid of it.

"YEC is closet atheism" is certainly an effective attention-getter, but it's an overstatement. Better to say that some forms of devotion to YEC share the "natural = without God" fallacy with atheism. Or perhaps "anti-evolution" is more accurate here than YEC.
All creationism -- from YEC to ID -- share the god-of-the-gaps theology that insists that you can find God ONLY in gaps where science can't explain.
"What exactly is the debate abut the legitimacy of theistic science? Advocates of theistic science hold to these beliefs:

1. God, conceived of as a personal, transcendent agent of great power and intelligence, has through direct, immediate, primary agency and indirect, mediate, secondary causation created and designed the world for a purpose and has directly acted through immediate, primary agency in the course of its development at various times, including prehistory (i.e., history prior to the arrival of human beings).

2. The commitment expressed in proposition #1 above can appropriately enter into the very fabric of the practice of science and the utilization of scientific methodology.

3. One way this commitment can appropriately enter into the practice of science is through various uses in scientific methodology of gaps in the natural world that are essential features of direct, immediate, primary divine agency properly understood. When God acts as a primary cause, a gap will be present in the natural world because the effect of his action is a result of his direct causal power and not the result of his guidance of natural processes alone." JP Moreland and M Reynolds, Introduction, in Three Views on Creation and Evolution edited by JP Moreland and M Reynolds, 1999, pg 19

Right. Science doesn't exactly ignore statements that "fairies did it"--science just ignores the "fairies" part or the "God" part, and focuses on the "how".There you go. Either the "how" or the "what". Not the "who". Did a Flood cause geology? Does intercessory prayer affect health?

FYI, this is one of the best statements of that I've found:
"Neither this study nor that of Byrd provided any mechanistic explanation for the possible benefits of intercessory prayer. However, others have speculated as to what they might be10; they generally fall into 2 broad categories: natural or supernatural explanations. The former explanation would attribute the beneficial effects of intercessory prayer to "real" but currently unknown physical forces that are "generated" by the intercessors and "received" by the patients; the latter explanation would be, by definition, beyond the ken of science. However, this trial was designed to explore not a mechanism but a phenomenon. Clearly, proof of the latter must precede exploration of the former. By analogy, when James Lind, by clinical trial, determined that lemons and limes cured scurvy aboard the HMS Salisbury in 1753, he not only did not know about ascorbic acid, he did not even understand the concept of a "nutrient." There was a natural explanation for his findings that would be clarified centuries later, but his inability to articulate it did not invalidate his observations.

Although we cannot know why we obtained the results we did, we can comment on what our data do not show. For example, we have not proven that God answers prayer or that God even exists. It was intercessory prayer, not the existence of God, that was tested here." WS Harris, M Gowda, JW Kolb, CP Strychacz, JL Vacek, PG Jones, A Forker, JH O'Keefe, BD McCallister, A randomized, controlled trial of the effects of remote, intercessory prayer on outcomes in patients admitted to the coronary care unit. Arch Intern Med. 1999;159:2273-2278

[Jugulum]

From Scott:
"But creationists would say that Mendel's laws are examples of "operational" science, which begs the question of "what are the topics of origins science?" " Now, why would Scott think that Mendel's laws would be part of origins science? In other contexts, Scott does indeed use Mendel as an example of adhering to MN but rejecting PN. But not here. REs and NREs being present in both operations and origins science is implicit in begging the question of what are the topics of operations and origins science.
She doesn't think that Mendel's laws would be part of origins science, and there are no "other contexts"--that quote is in the context of noting the MN/PN distinction and transitioning to a discussion of which topics creationists place in "origins science". The implication you draw doesn't fit into the flow of thought. Here's the whole context--and the only occurences of the word "Mendel" in the entire essay:

From Creationism, Ideology, and Science (http://www.ncseweb.org/resources/articles/5200_creationism_ideology_and_sci_6_24_1996.asp):

Actually, modern science has omitted the supernatural for methodological, not philosophical reasons. It is simply the case that we get better explanations by ignoring the possibility of supernatural intervention or causation, not because scientists have an axe to grind against theism. Much confusion exists between materialism as a philosophy, and the methodological materialism that informs all of modern science. It is logically possible to decouple philosophical and methodological materialism, and individual scientists who are believers do it all the time. Gregor Mendel was certainly not a metaphysical naturalist, but he developed his understanding of the rules of heredity using methodological materialism. Alternatively, I am a philosophical materialist, not a believer, but when I teach science to students, I leave my irrelevant philosophy out of my course content. I stress methodological materialism as a tool to better understand the natural world, not as a foundation for a personal belief.

But creationists would say that Mendel's laws are examples of "operational" science, which begs the question of "what are the topics of origins science?" In my reading, I find that "origins science" is limited to subjects that have theological importance. ...[etc.]
Note: I think she was improperly using "begs the question" to mean "raises the question."

I could rephrase the second-to-last sentence like this: But creationists don't place Mendel's laws in "origins" science, so this raises the question of "what are the topics of origins science?"

I'm fairly sure something like the bolded is implicit: But creationists don't place Mendel's laws in "origins" science; they may object that in origins science, MN does entail PN. They may say that this analysis only applies to operations science. So this raises the question of "what are the topics of origins science?"

Oh yes. there is nothing in my discussion to challenge that the O-O division is artificial.
I wasn't implying you did--I was noting the opposite for the readers.

Notice the critical term "ad hoc". The reason this is rejected is not because it is "God did it". It is because the hypothesis explains only that particular data and either 1) can't be tested outside the data it is trying to explain (make less of the short-lived isotopes) or 2) it's only purpose is to avoid falsification of the theory.
I would add (or rephrase) that its only justification is to avoid falsification of the theory. I think some Appearance of Age arguments are acceptable, insofar as the appearance is due to something other than God saying, "I'll make this look old." For instance, soil made ex nihilo would "look old" under the assumption that it came about by weathering of rocks.

No, the answer to the Appearance of Age comes from theology, not science. Such a god is inherently deceptive.
It can't come only from such theology, because atheists also reject it.

This is what Rev. Kingsley wrote to Rev. Paul Gosse -- the guy who first came up with the Appearance of Age argument -- when Gosse asked Kingsley to write a forward to his book laying out the argument.
"Shall I tell you the truth? It is best. Your book is the first that ever made me doubt the doctrine of absolute creation, and I fear it will make hundreds do so. Your book tends to prove this - that if we accept the fact of absolute creation, God becomes God-the-Sometime-Deceiver. I do not mean merely in the case of fossils which pretend to be the bones of dead animals; but in ...your newly created Adam's navel, you make God tell a lie. It is not my reason, but my conscience which revolts here ... I cannot ...believe that God has written on the rocks one enormous and superfluous lie for all mankind. To this painful dilemma you have brought me, and will, I fear, bring hundreds. It will not make me throw away my Bible. I trust and hope. I know in whom I have believed, and can trust Him to bring my faith safe through this puzzle, as He has through others; but for the young I do fear. I would not for a thousand pounds put your book into my children's hands." Garret Hardin, ""Scientific Creationism'" - Marketing Deception as Truth" in Science and Creationism edited by Ashley Montagu, 1982.
That's rather good, thanks.

BTW, making unsupportable ad hoc hypotheses that are dismissed are not the sole province of creationism.
Absolutely.

Some scientists have done so when faced with falsification of a favorite theory. For instance, when phlogiston was falsified as the agent of combustion, some phlogiston chemists tried to counter the data that ash weighed more than the original wood and yet phlogiston was supposed to have left during combustion. The unsupportable ad hoc hypothesis? "Phlogiston has negative weight"
Is that really unsupportable? Couldn't we test that notion?

I don't intend to make it part of the discussion. I'm simply pointing out the tactic and the benefits to Captain of using it. I accept that he ignores requests for information and clarification. But I do predict that, instead of providing the info, Captain will try to start the very fruitless argument you mention.
Intent isn't the issue; I'm worried about actual effect. If you're wrong, you'll look bad. If you're right, you can feel good about yourself for correctly predicting his behavior, but it will contribute nothing to the evaluation of ideas. Either way, if he objects to your comment, you'll have sparked an unnecessary distraction.

If he actually does it, it would indeed be important to note that he isn't engaging in honest discussion, but only after he's done it.

I'll thank you if you don't point out that now we're engaged in unnecessary distraction. :smile:

Captain agreed that the Flood was a material event. I don't think he agrees that it is falsified. :smile:
I'm not saying it is, either. I'm trying to limit my comments to how we should approach the evidence, not the specific conclusions we might make.

All creationism -- from YEC to ID -- share the god-of-the-gaps theology that insists that you can find God ONLY in gaps where science can't explain.
No. Nothing in the idea of a young earth, special creation of kinds, or a global flood entails any theology of distinctions between natural and supernatural. Whether J.P. Moreland agrees with you is irrelevant.

FYI, this is one of the best statements of that I've found:
"Neither this study nor that of Byrd provided any mechanistic explanation for the possible benefits of intercessory prayer. However, others have speculated as to what they might be10; they generally fall into 2 broad categories: natural or supernatural explanations. The former explanation would attribute the beneficial effects of intercessory prayer to "real" but currently unknown physical forces that are "generated" by the intercessors and "received" by the patients; the latter explanation would be, by definition, beyond the ken of science. However, this trial was designed to explore not a mechanism but a phenomenon. Clearly, proof of the latter must precede exploration of the former. By analogy, when James Lind, by clinical trial, determined that lemons and limes cured scurvy aboard the HMS Salisbury in 1753, he not only did not know about ascorbic acid, he did not even understand the concept of a "nutrient." There was a natural explanation for his findings that would be clarified centuries later, but his inability to articulate it did not invalidate his observations.

Although we cannot know why we obtained the results we did, we can comment on what our data do not show. For example, we have not proven that God answers prayer or that God even exists. It was intercessory prayer, not the existence of God, that was tested here." WS Harris, M Gowda, JW Kolb, CP Strychacz, JL Vacek, PG Jones, A Forker, JH O'Keefe, BD McCallister, A randomized, controlled trial of the effects of remote, intercessory prayer on outcomes in patients admitted to the coronary care unit. Arch Intern Med. 1999;159:2273-2278
Also quite good. Thanks again.

[lucaspa]

From Creationism, Ideology, and Science (http://www.ncseweb.org/resources/articles/5200_creationism_ideology_and_sci_6_24_1996.asp):

Actually, modern science has omitted the supernatural for methodological, not philosophical reasons. It is simply the case that we get better explanations by ignoring the possibility of supernatural intervention or causation, not because scientists have an axe to grind against theism. Much confusion exists between materialism as a philosophy, and the methodological materialism that informs all of modern science. It is logically possible to decouple philosophical and methodological materialism, and individual scientists who are believers do it all the time. Gregor Mendel was certainly not a metaphysical naturalist, but he developed his understanding of the rules of heredity using methodological materialism. Alternatively, I am a philosophical materialist, not a believer, but when I teach science to students, I leave my irrelevant philosophy out of my course content. I stress methodological materialism as a tool to better understand the natural world, not as a foundation for a personal belief.

But creationists would say that Mendel's laws are examples of "operational" science, which begs the question of "what are the topics of origins science?" In my reading, I find that "origins science" is limited to subjects that have theological importance. ...[etc.]
Note: I think she was improperly using "begs the question" to mean "raises the question."
OK. I stand corrected. You're right. Scott did use Mendel in the context of MN/PN. Which makes me wonder why she cares that he is doing "operational science". Nothing in the concept of "origins" vs "operational" science indicates that theistic scientists are limited to origins research. It would only matter in the discussion IF his research had elements of "origins" science in it. So I'm puzzled. Ah, see below before you respond.

I could rephrase the second-to-last sentence like this: But creationists don't place Mendel's laws in "origins" science, so this raises the question of "what are the topics of origins science?" That makes more sense.

I'm fairly sure something like the bolded is implicit: But creationists don't place Mendel's laws in "origins" science; they may object that in origins science, MN does entail PN. They may say that this analysis only applies to operations science. So this raises the question of "what are the topics of origins science?"

I would add (or rephrase) that its only justification is to avoid falsification of the theory.
I think we should stick with "purpose" or perhaps "function". Hypotheses are imaginative constructs. They are made for a purpose: usually explaining data or proposing a link between different data. Hypotheses are not statements that simply pop out as inevitable consequences of the data. If that were the case, then, yes, "justification" would be appropriate, because then the ad hoc hypothesis would be inevitable. But hypotheses are not inevitable. Someone has to think them up; and they have reasons for doing so (even if that reason is a wild ass guess or intuition. :smile: )

I think some Appearance of Age arguments are acceptable, insofar as the appearance is due to something other than God saying, "I'll make this look old." For instance, soil made ex nihilo would "look old" under the assumption that it came about by weathering of rocks. But in that case, the soil IS old. Or rather, the isotopes in the soil are old. This isn't an "appearance" of age; it is true age.

It can't come only from such theology, because atheists also reject it. But they don't have a good argument for rejecting it. :smile: Their argument is: "there is no God, therefore something can't appear old by being created by God that way." But since the whole point is to determine whether God created it that way, this is circular reasoning.


Is that really unsupportable? Couldn't we test that notion? No, because the ONLY stated way to get phlogiston out of a substance is to burn it! So there is no independent case to test the idea of the weight of phlogiston. So, the ad hoc hypothesis can't be tested outside the case for which it is proposed, and the only function of the hypothesis is to avoid falsification. Now, if phlogiston could be removed by say, water extraction, then you would have a test. But the theory says it can't.


If you're wrong, you'll look bad. If you're right, you can feel good about yourself for correctly predicting his behavior, but it will contribute nothing to the evaluation of ideas. Either way, if he objects to your comment, you'll have sparked an unnecessary distraction. It gets to be a distraction only if I respond to it. And, if I'm wrong, then we get needed information from Captain. I'm willing to look a little "bad" in order to get the information needed to continue the discussion. For me, it's a win-win situtation.

I'm not saying it is, either. I'm trying to limit my comments to how we should approach the evidence, not the specific conclusions we might make. Then you need to examine the evidence. Remember, Flood geology was THE accepted scientific theory prior to 1800. From 1800-1831 there was debate on it as new geological evidence piled up. Virtually every geologist (including the most ardent supporters) had admitted a world-wide flood never happened by 1831.

No. Nothing in the idea of a young earth, special creation of kinds, or a global flood entails any theology of distinctions between natural and supernatural. Whether J.P. Moreland agrees with you is irrelevant.
1. I said "god-of-the-gaps" theology, not "distinctions between natural and supernatural". Two separate things. I'll get to the second later.
2. Moreland is relevant because he is one of the founders of ID. HE is making the statements of what ID is. IOW, he is making the theory. That's why I chose him. As one of the founders of ID, I want you to know that I am stating that part of creationism accurately. Now, young earth and special creation of kinds obviously involve gaps. The earth was not there and poof! it was. Elephants were not here and poof! there was a herd of elephants. No gradual transition as the population changed over generations, but a gap. And by that gap, we know God is there. By claiming that evolution is atheism and denies God, creationists say that God can't exist where there are "natural" explanations (would you like the quotes there also?)

Now, as to the distinction (or non-distinction) between natural and supernatural, try this:

"The only distinct meaning of the word 'natural' is stated, fixed, or settled; since what is natural as much requires and presupposes an intelligent agent to render it so, i.e., to effect it continually or at stated times, as what is supernatural or miraculous does to effect it for once." Butler: Analogy of Revealed Religion.

Now, I didn't get this from Butler's book. Would you care to make a guess where I did find it?

Or this:
"A Law of Nature then is the rule and Law, according to which God resolved that certain Motions should always, that is, in all Cases be performed. Every Law does immediately depend upon the Will of God." Gravesande, Mathematical Elements of Natural Philosophy, I, 2-3, 1726, quoted in CC Gillespie, Genesis and Geology, 1959.

Now, that sounds a lot like "indirect, mediate, secondary causation created and designed the world for a purpose" from Moreland. However, where others look to see IF God has acted thru indirect causation and are willing to accept that He never used direct causation except in historical intervention, Moreland states: "and has directly acted through immediate, primary agency in the course of its development at various times, including prehistory (i.e., history prior to the arrival of human beings)." IOW, Moreland is not looking to see how things ACTUALLY happened. Instead, he already "knows" how they happened and thinks there is a giant conspiracy to suppress that knowledge.

Instead, there is no conspiracy and the evidence God left in His Creation says He used only indirect methods and not the methods Moreland wants Him to have used.

[Jugulum]

OK. I stand corrected. You're right. Scott did use Mendel in the context of MN/PN. Which makes me wonder why she cares that he is doing "operational science". Nothing in the concept of "origins" vs "operational" science indicates that theistic scientists are limited to origins research. It would only matter in the discussion IF his research had elements of "origins" science in it. So I'm puzzled. Ah, see below before you respond.
Where below? My second rephrasing showed up in your post without QUOTE tags--was that a typo? Did you have some comments in mind that you just forgot to write?

That second rephrasing is my guess for the answer to your puzzlement: She mentioned the fact that creationists call genetics "operations" science in anticipation of a creationist objection.

I think we should stick with "purpose" or perhaps "function". Hypotheses are imaginative constructs. They are made for a purpose: usually explaining data or proposing a link between different data. Hypotheses are not statements that simply pop out as inevitable consequences of the data. If that were the case, then, yes, "justification" would be appropriate, because then the ad hoc hypothesis would be inevitable. But hypotheses are not inevitable. Someone has to think them up; and they have reasons for doing so (even if that reason is a wild ass guess or intuition. :smile: )
The main reason for refining a theory is to fit it to the data. There's some observation that's inconsistent with theoretical prediction, so the theory requires reexamination. So "the purpose is to save the theory" isn't necessarily a valid objection; all refinements are made to save the theory.
Sometimes refinements are made that seem at first glance to be ad hoc, but really aren't. That is, it turns out that the refinement is not truly a brand new, out-of-the-blue hypothesis, but can be deduced from the original statement of the theory. Sometimes that can be accomplished with a minor, reasonable alteration to the statement of the original theory. If the justification for a refinement/new hypothesis--the reasoning that leads to it--lies in the original theory or a reasonable restatement, then it would be unfair to call it ad hoc.

But in that case, the soil IS old. Or rather, the isotopes in the soil are old. This isn't an "appearance" of age; it is true age.
I'm not sure I follow. What about the soil makes it truly old as opposed to apparently old? And unless you can suggest how God could make soil ex nihilo without it looking (or actually being) old, how can you call it deceptive?

This (I think) is an example of a non-ad-hoc detail in the description of an initial state of special creation from which we then apply naturalistic processes.

But they don't have a good argument for rejecting it. :smile: Their argument is: "there is no God, therefore something can't appear old by being created by God that way." But since the whole point is to determine whether God created it that way, this is circular reasoning.
Hmm. I'll have to think about it some more. It deserves more detailed treatment. For instance, I'm guessing an atheist would introduce the "supernatural explanations close off study" argument.

No, because the ONLY stated way to get phlogiston out of a substance is to burn it! So there is no independent case to test the idea of the weight of phlogiston. So, the ad hoc hypothesis can't be tested outside the case for which it is proposed, and the only function of the hypothesis is to avoid falsification. Now, if phlogiston could be removed by say, water extraction, then you would have a test. But the theory says it can't.
If that's the case, then objection withdrawn.

It gets to be a distraction only if I respond to it. And, if I'm wrong, then we get needed information from Captain. I'm willing to look a little "bad" in order to get the information needed to continue the discussion. For me, it's a win-win situtation.
So you're attempting to prod him into giving the information. It still seems unnecessary unless and until he's failed to answer the question, but I'll drop the point.

Then you need to examine the evidence.
That's another reason I'm not saying whether it's been falsified; I haven't examined the evidence and arguments well enough to make a critical judgement. Desiccation cracks, footprints, and burrows are certainly strong candidates for falsifying evidence, but I haven't examined the issue enough to be sufficiently sure there isn't a reasonable explanation. So my stance as such is provisional.

1. I said "god-of-the-gaps" theology, not "distinctions between natural and supernatural". Two separate things. I'll get to the second later.
Fair enough. I'll rephrase: Nothing in the idea of a young earth, special creation of kinds, or a global flood entails any theology of "god-of-the-gaps".

"God made separate kinds instantaneously" is not the same as "life can only come about through instantaneous creation."

Now, young earth and special creation of kinds obviously involve gaps. The earth was not there and poof! it was. Elephants were not here and poof! there was a herd of elephants. No gradual transition as the population changed over generations, but a gap. And by that gap, we know God is there. By claiming that evolution is atheism and denies God, creationists say that God can't exist where there are "natural" explanations (would you like the quotes there also?)
The bolded portion is key. There's no need for quotes; I realize such claims are a common to YEC. However, they are not a necessary component of YEC, so an argument against "god-of-the-gaps" theology is not an argument against YEC, and YEC is not (necessarily) "closet atheism".

IOW, Moreland is not looking to see how things ACTUALLY happened. Instead, he already "knows" how they happened and thinks there is a giant conspiracy to suppress that knowledge.
Fair enough; Moreland thinks that way. That doesn't mean such thinking is necessary to YEC.

[Captain Ochre]

1. Even with "controls", most experiments in "real time" are nothing of the sort.

No such thing as a controlled experiment?
Justify the claim without ridiculous semantic acrobatics.

They are still historical of events not directly witnessed, even if here "history" is in the last few minutes or days.

They are events as directly witnessed as it is possible to witness events. Historical science deals in events where no attempt at all may be made to establish a controlled experiment and moreover collected evidence typically has ample opportunity for contamination.

2. The "controls" are there merely to eliminate alternative hypotheses as explanations. You can do the same thing with one-time events by looking for the different consequences the alternative hypotheses will produce.

One wonders why we bother with a control group for experimentation in the first place, if that method is so very satisfactory.
Will you be explaining it, lucaspa?

The question being asked is of the general form: if this event happened in the past, what are the consequences of that event that will persist and be observable today?

Fine, but that's not the only question.

It should and it can. Instantaneousl appearance without lines of descent will have consequences we can see today. IF we had seen those consequences, we could have concluded instantaneous appearance. In fact, the first theory in science was that dinosaurs did "appear miraculously without any line of descent". But the observations falsified that theory.

For a scientist, you appear to have a problem with the use of the term falsification. Special creation is very probably unfalsifiable in its general form. Finding one theory more parsimonious than another does not falsify the less parsimonious theory, and the failure of unnecessary predictions likewise would not falsify a theory (hypothesis).

All science assumes "unity" as one of the 5 assumptions about the universe. The others are objectivity, contingency, rationality, accessibility. Those assumptions about the universe originally were derived from characteristics of God. So, if you say "unity" doesn't apply, which in this case is that laws are the same thru all spacetime, you are denying an aspect of God! It's not science you are attacking, but God. Ironic, isn't it?

:rofl:
That one might be worth treating in the Locker Room someday.

Let's try Meteor Crator. An unwitnessed meteor impact in the past. How do we conclude that the hypothesis that a meteor impacted at the site and caused the crator to be such a well-supported hypothesis that we accept it (provisionally) as fact?

1. We find pieces of rock at the site that are very different from the rocks in the surrounding strata.
2. We perform experiments today at firing small rocks at high velocity at mud and seeing the splash pattern. That splash pattern is identical to Meteor Crator. So we "assume" (bad word) that particles traveling at high velocities in the past and hitting the ground will form the same type of spash pattern as particles doing so today.

Now, you have a problem with any of this?

Only with the liklihood that you can make it relevant. :smile:

[Captain Ochre]

Good luck with that, then. You brought up Scott's essay in post 65 (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showpost.php?p=938042&postcount=65) with the comment, "The NCSE agrees that an appropriate distinction may be made between single-event study and normative study:" Lucaspa pointed out (correctly) that Scott's distinction is not the same distinction you or Morris make, because she says, "phenomena of historical sciences like geology, paleontology, and astronomy can be studied scientifically, and even experimentally."

I'm not aware that Morris or I would hold that phenomena of historical sciences like geology, paleontology, and astronomy cannot be studied scientifically, and I am not aware of any solid evidence that lucaspa has provided in support of his claims wrt Morris.
Consequently, I have to wonder why you judge his claim as a correct claim.

Scott rejects the "origins" distinction--the one made by Thaxton, Geisler, etc., which could be different from yours--as invalid.

Where? I see her rejecting the specific appeal to the supernatural while maintaining a distinction between two types of scientific questions.
She doesn't reject the appeal in principle, AFAICT, but rejects it in favor of what she considers better answers (again, her writing perhaps could be considered sleight-of-keyboard on that one--a bit tricky of her).

In the "origins" distinction she discusses, the real recurrent vs. non-recurrent distinction does play a role, but is not the only factor.

I'm not sure what you're attempting to say, particularly as to how I should see the relevance.
You seem to be allowing that Scott sees distinctions between two scientific pursuits while saying that recurrent vs. non-recurrent isn't the only factor (I've already recommended an alternate understanding of the distincton).

According to her, the kind of science we do on non-recurrent historical events is the same--even to the point of doing experiments. Lucaspa was arguing the same in post 63 (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showpost.php?p=937037&postcount=63), to which you didn't respond. I think his points on the purpose of controls, the meteor crater, and the question, "if this event happened in the past, what are the consequences of that event that will persist and be observable today?" are all quite relevant.

While I've replied to that post by this time, you should feel free to repeat any good points that you think that lucaspa makes, since he's mostly on manual "ignore".
Why does Scott mention that answering historical questions tends to be more difficult if the science is exactly the same, IYO?

In other words, mainstream philosophers of science recognize the difference between recurrent and non-recurrent events, but do not see any real difference in the way we study them--experiments/new observations are sometimes difficult to obtain, but that can happen in "operations" science, too.

As with Popper's demarcation criteria, there probably isn't a hard-and-fast distinction to be made between operational and "origins" science--yet I think that you would hold that there is a real distinction between science and non-science.

They do not recognize a justification for considering miracles in any field: "proponents of this artificial division do not make a solid case for resorting to miracles in origin science".

The rationale for considering miracles is a issue of logic, and you have already granted it. The line Scott and others draw is in resisting specific proposals of miraculous explanation (assuming that we do not count the "uncaused" formation of quantum particles in that category).
I'm a bit suspicious of Scott's choice of words in that section of her text, FWIW.

Well, you're arguing that we should let miracles into some areas of science. I would call that a real division.

Good.
:smile:
Even if miracles were considered, that doesn't mean that the particular practice of science would necessarily have a real division as a result (as you appear to use the term).

I think I need some clarification.

Do you mean specifically, "If you assume miracles don't happen, you'll get the answer wrong"? Or maybe, "If you assume Creation wasn't miraculous, you might get the answer wrong in anything impacted by the creation miracles"?

The latter, MOL.

I'll zoom out to the larger question: Please spell out the major ingredients of your operations/origins distinction, and a basic statement of your justification for each.

I don't think that I need to do anything of the kind to make my point. I've been over the major points already. Lucaspa's example of similarity (the meteor impact) demonstrates some of them. First, the quetion asked is different. Second, the question doesn't begin to get answered until a operational science question has been asked and addressed (what typically happens when rocks collide with the surface of the Earth at high speed?). Third, the data are compared and inductive judgments are rendered.

Some of your comments, such as "Historical science needs tools in addition to MN," seem to arise simply from a recurrent vs. non-recurrent distinction. Others, such as "origins science must be able to countenance miracles," seem to arise from an entirely different principle. It would help the discussion if you addressed/defended those separate points separately.

Science as a pursuit of true information about our world cannot ignore the possibility of miracles without committing a logical fallacy.
Granting such a possibility, the practice of science must refrain from using naturalistic assumptions exclusively to reach conclusions. An inference to the best explanation will take the place of observations as to what typically happens.

For the former, I suspect the point of contention lies in the way you're viewing the assumptions involved. For the latter, I suspect we can avoid the pitfalls (such as PN) without dropping MN from our definition of science.

MN doesn't need to be dropped. It needs to be supplemented.

Moreover, I'm not sure there's a justification for dropping MN in origins that doesn't equally apply to operations.


I agree, but it's an uninteresting statement--it's naturalism by definition.

It seems to me that it becomes an interesting statement when one considers that an origins science that fails to countenance the possibility of miracles commits a logical fallacy to which operational science is not subject.
The fact that it's hard to deny would make it uninteresting in one sense, however.

Are you saying Ockham's razor is not needed in non-historical science? If so, why?

Because you can get the same answers regardless in operational science.

This goes back to my question about the ingredients of your O-O distinction. What tools does historical science (meaning non-recurrent events?) need that non-historical science doesn't?

It's more that historical science tends to be built on piles of inductive notions. Where operational science uses one inference, historical science both borrows that inference and extrapolates on it--perhaps in conjunction with a few others. The more inductive notions serve as the foundation, the less secure the conclusion.
That's the difficulty mentioned by Eugenie Scott, IMO.

"Why is this piece of iron attracted to this rock? Maybe fairies did it." "Why do clouds rise? God does it." "How does a fetus grow? God knits it together."

The first is a particular (1x), the latter two are "how things usually work" afaics (perhaps I should have read "why is this piece of iron repeatedly attracted to this rock?").
The first could be crafted into operational science by trying to find out how iron usually gets attracted to this rock.

[lucaspa]

That second rephrasing is my guess for the answer to your puzzlement: She mentioned the fact that creationists call genetics "operations" science in anticipation of a creationist objection.
Your gloss or rephrasing makes sense.

The main reason for refining a theory is to fit it to the data. Ad hoc hypotheses are different from refining a theory. Instead, they are additional hypotheses so that the theory won't have to be "refined" or modified. Let's take the classic example: the orbit of Uranus. Newtonian mechanics had been remarkably successful in explaining a large number of phenomena -- from the flight of cannonballs to the orbits of the planets. But the prediction of the orbit of Uranus was different from what was actually observed. So, Uranus was a possible falsification or requirement of modification of Newtonian gravity/mechanics. However, because Newton's laws had been so successful, people were reluctant to tinker with them. Instead, the ad hoc hypothesis of an as-yet-undiscovered planet whose gravity (by Newtonian mechanics) was disturbing the orbit of Uranus and causing the deviation from the predicted orbit.

See? An ad hoc hypothesis of an unobserved entity -- a new planet. A hypothesis whose function is to save Newtonian mechanics from being even partially wrong. Now, in this case, the hypothesis could be tested INDEPENDENTLY of Newtonian mechanics -- by using the theories of optics as embodied in a telescope. Yes, the position of the planet was predicted by using Newtonian mechanics to calculate where a planet should be in order to disturb the orbit of Uranus, but the testing (telescope) was independent of the Newton's theories. Now, when Neptune was found exactly where predicted, Newtonian mechanics received further support.

all refinements are made to save the theory. Refinements are not "saving" of the theory; they are modifications to make a new theory. I know, it's a different use of language, but let me give you a simple example.

The original statement of gravity can be: "All objects fall when released." This works well as you drop rocks, sticks, apples, etc. But now comes helium balloons. They rise when released. Now, an ad hoc hypothesis would be something like "Helium falls toward Mars rather than Earth" This preserves the theory intact. However, instead you modify the theory to say: "All objects fall when released EXCEPT when they displace more air than they weigh." Now you have a new theory; a modification of an old one, but still new.

If the justification for a refinement/new hypothesis--the reasoning that leads to it--lies in the original theory or a reasonable restatement, then it would be unfair to call it ad hoc.
This is the language again. Notice you are saying "a reasonable restatement". That's the key. Ad hoc hypotheses are made so that the original theory does not need ANY restatement.

I'm not sure I follow. What about the soil makes it truly old as opposed to apparently old? And unless you can suggest how God could make soil ex nihilo without it looking (or actually being) old, how can you call it deceptive?
If there is a young earth and soil is made by erosion, then a young earth should have NO SOIL AT ALL. Or very little, just what has been generated by erosion in the few years since creation. That's the point: if God really made a young earth, a deduction from that theory (young earth) is that we should see no or very little topsoil at all. That we do see sedimentary rocks that are miles thick constitutes evidence falsifying a young earth.

Now, notice that YEC doesn't invoke God creating soil ex nihilo. Instead, Flood geology is one huge ad hoc hypothesis to preserve the theory of a young earth intact. The miles of sedimentary rock and the soil we have now is hypothesized to come from massive erosion of a violent world-wide flood.

Jugulum, if God had really created a universe that is only 10,000 years old, then that universe could easily LOOK that old. And, if it had, then we would have concluded the universe was created much as stated in a literal Genesis 1. Here's how:
1. No or very little sedimentary rock, because there has not been enough time for erosion to make sediments.
2. No stars visible beyond 10,000 light years and stars becoming visible thru history as their light first reached the earth.
3. Isotopes with half-lives less than 50 million years in the earth's crust.
4. No or very few fossils. And those fossils are those of contemporary organisms. Skeletons of ALL organisms mixed together in the sediments.
5. Clear genetic boundaries between the "kinds" of organisms.

This (I think) is an example of a non-ad-hoc detail in the description of an initial state of special creation from which we then apply naturalistic processes. I disagree. The hypothesis that God somehow was compelled to make soil, and thus have "old" soil, is an ad hoc hypothesis. And one that is done solely to save a theory from falsification and can't be tested outside the theory. So it is dismissed. Of course, you still have the theological objections that God is deceiving us -- because a young earth should not have large amounts of soil.

Hmm. I'll have to think about it some more. It deserves more detailed treatment. For instance, I'm guessing an atheist would introduce the "supernatural explanations close off study" argument. Not a valid excuse. Even IF study is closed off, then that's the way it is. The singularity of the BB closes off study of events "before" it, yet we don't discard it.

That's another reason I'm not saying whether it's been falsified; I haven't examined the evidence and arguments well enough to make a critical judgement.
Now we have a different statement.
1.The theory is falsified.
2. Jugulum admits the theory is falsified.

See the difference? The evidence falsifying the theory exists and is known whether YOU personally know about that evidence or not. I have looked at some of the evidence found by others and read about more of it. Enough to know that the evidence exists and to know that all the people who found the evidence admitted that a world-wide flood was falsified. Now, I am trusting (a little) in their judgement, but I know that trust is justified because I always CAN go back and look at the evidence myself. There are many textbooks in geology that will describe the evidence for you; my daughter's high school Earth Science textbook for one. Or you can start at http://www.wheaton.edu/ACG/ and see what geologists who are also Christians say.

Fair enough. I'll rephrase: Nothing in the idea of a young earth, special creation of kinds, or a global flood entails any theology of "god-of-the-gaps".
The first two do. We supposedly have "gaps" in the natural processes in which we insert God. And, if there are no "gaps", then they say God is absent -- evolution is atheism. Classic god-of-the-gaps theology. Global flood is somewhat of a gap -- a gap in the standard processes we observe today. Which is why Flood geologists always object to uniformitarianism.

"God made separate kinds instantaneously" is not the same as "life can only come about through instantaneous creation." How is it not? The second is simply a restatement of the first. Karl Popper noted that all theories are really statements forbidding things; the more a theory forbids, the better it is. Saying "God made separate kinds instantaneously" is the same as saying "there is no other way for life to arise except by instantaneous creation by God of separate kinds". Do you really think creationism allows some life to arise by chemistry but other life to be instantaneously created?

The bolded portion is key. There's no need for quotes; I realize such claims are a common to YEC. However, they are not a necessary component of YEC, so an argument against "god-of-the-gaps" theology is not an argument against YEC, and YEC is not (necessarily) "closet atheism". Ah, you don't like the "closet atheism" statement. OK, please show me how the claims are NOT a necessary component to YEC.

Fair enough; Moreland thinks that way. That doesn't mean such thinking is necessary to YEC.
This is the oath required for membership in the Institute for Creation Research. Answers in Genesis has a similar statement:
"(1)The Bible is the written Word of God, and because we believe it to be inspired thruout, all of its assertions are historically and scientifically true in all of the original autographs. To the student of nature, this means that the account of origins in Genesis is a factual presentation of simple historical truths. (2) All basic types of living things, including man, were made by direct creative acts of God during Creation Week as described in Genesis. Whatever biological changes have occurred since Creation have accomplished only changes within the original created kinds. (3) The great Flood described in Genesis, commonly referred to as the Noachian Deluge, was an historical event, world-wide in its extent and effect. (4) Finally, we are an organization of Christian men of science, who accept Jesus Christ as our Lord and Savior. The account of the special creation of Adam and Eve as one man and one woman, and their subsequent Fall into sin, is the basis for our belief in the necessity of a Savior for all mankind. Therefore, salvation can come only thru accepting Jesus Christ as our Savior."

Notice that we start with "knowledge" -- "Genesis is a factual presentation of simple historical truths". Nothing can change that.

Now, these are the statements defining YEC by YECers. So, can you please show me where YEC is somehow different from that? Either thru statements of people defining YEC or by logical extension of the scientific statements of YEC. Thanks.

[lucaspa]

lucaspa: "1. Even with "controls", most experiments in "real time" are nothing of the sort."

No such thing as a controlled experiment?
Justify the claim without ridiculous semantic acrobatics.
No such thing as "real time". You simply read the sentence incorrectly. When controls are used,we are still looking at things that happened in the past and we do not directly observe. Instead, we observe the present consequences of a past event.

They are events as directly witnessed as it is possible to witness events. Historical science deals in events where no attempt at all may be made to establish a controlled experiment and moreover collected evidence typically has ample opportunity for contamination.
But "as it is possible" still doesn't mean "directly witnessed". But we can often have controls for past events. For instance, in my Meteor Crator example, when we collect rocks from Meteor Crator (looking for fragments of meteors), we compare the rocks to the "controls" -- rocks collected from flat areas without a crator. Similarly, when Alvarez took the iridium readings from the sediment line at the KT boundary, he compared the iridium levels to controls consisting not only of the sediments to either side of KT boundary, but to many other sedimentary layers as well.

Now, so-called direct experiments also have "ample opportunity for contamination". This is the mistakes of the people making up the reagents or even the accidental mistakes. For instance, many years ago a colleague had difficulty growing cells in culture when we had both moved to a new institution. We had never had that difficulty at the old institution. It turned out that the glassware was contaminated with guanidinium chloride. At the new institution he was using the same glassware to do 4 M guandinium chloride extraction of proteins from bone AND make up cell culture reagents. At the old lab protein purification was done in one room with one set of glassware and cell culture in another room with a separate set of glassware. Guanidinium chloride is very toxid to cells and sticks to glassware. Enough stuck to the glassware and then dissolved when culture media was mixed in the glassware to kill the cells in culture.

Once again you have failed to find a distinction between "origins" and "operations" science.

lucaspa: "2. The "controls" are there merely to eliminate alternative hypotheses as explanations. You can do the same thing with one-time events by looking for the different consequences the alternative hypotheses will produce."

One wonders why we bother with a control group for experimentation in the first place, if that method is so very satisfactory.
Will you be explaining it, lucaspa?{/quote]
The explanation is not that control groups are unsatisfactory, but that they don't yield "direct observation". You are still suffering from misreading the first sentence you quoted in your most recent post. As I said, you can have equivalent of controls in one-time events by 1) looking at areas and times when the event did NOT happen and 2) looking at different consequences of alternative hypotheses.

[quote]Fine, but that's not the only question. Then what are the other questions? Please list them for us.


For a scientist, you appear to have a problem with the use of the term falsification. Special creation is very probably unfalsifiable in its general form. Finding one theory more parsimonious than another does not falsify the less parsimonious theory, and the failure of unnecessary predictions likewise would not falsify a theory (hypothesis).
Special creation has deductions with consequences, like any other scientific theory. When we find consequences opposite of those deduced, then the theory is falsified. For instance, the theory of a flat earth has a consequence that a shadow in the same longitude at the same time at different latitudes will have the same angle. Erasthones observation of different angles under those conditions falsified flat earth. Similarly, special creation has a consequence that DNA sequences between "kinds" must be independent observations. Instead, phylogenetic analysis of DNA sequences among different groups of organisms shows that the sequences are related by historical connections and are NOT independent. Special creation falsified.

lucaspa: "All science assumes "unity" as one of the 5 assumptions about the universe. The others are objectivity, contingency, rationality, accessibility. Those assumptions about the universe originally were derived from characteristics of God. So, if you say "unity" doesn't apply, which in this case is that laws are the same thru all spacetime, you are denying an aspect of God! It's not science you are attacking, but God. Ironic, isn't it?"

That one might be worth treating in the Locker Room someday.
This is your only reply??? Ad hominem. That's not a reply. It's a duck. All it shows, Captain, is that you have NO reply. Yes, Captain, no matter how bad creationism is as science -- and it is dreadful -- it is SOOO much worse as theology. For instance, here is what Francis Bacon said about creationism amost 400 years ago:
"For nothing is so mischievous as the apotheosis of error; and it is a very plague of the understanding for vanity to become the object of veneration. Yet in this vanity some of the moderns have with extreme levity indulged so far as to attempt to found a system of natural philosophy on the first chapter of Genesis, on the book of Job, and other parts of the sacred writings, seeking for the dead among the living; which also makes the inhibition and repression of it the more important, because from this unwholesome mixture of things human and divine there arises not only a fantastic philosophy but also a heretical religion. Very meet it is therefore that we be sober-minded, and give to faith that only which is faith's." Francis Bacon. Novum Organum LXV, 1620 http://www.constitution.org/bacon/nov_org.htm

It's too bad creationists never paid attention and still propagate heresy today while trying to defend their false idol. But that is what is happening.

Only with the liklihood that you can make it relevant.
You said that we couldn't use present events to study the past. That is an example of how we can. You never refuted that. Nor have you refuted that we use controls ("We find pieces of rock at the site that are very different from the rocks in the surrounding strata." with the "surrounding strata" being the controls.)

Now, I believe you were going to define "miracle" for us and tell us Geisler's position on origins science. Anytime, Captain. We are eagerly waiting for you to do this.

[Captain Ochre]

No such thing as "real time".

I didn't mention "real time". You introduced that concept, AFAICS, and I have yet to discern why you would do so. Why should it matter to the concept of experimental controls that experiments are (supposedly) not conducted in "real time"?
http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showpost.php?p=937037&postcount=63

You simply read the sentence incorrectly.

Indeed, for I foolishly assumed that your comment had something to do with what I had written prior.
:metro:

When controls are used,we are still looking at things that happened in the past and we do not directly observe. Instead, we observe the present consequences of a past event.

So what?
What does that have to do with what I wrote? There is no assertion that "how things usually work" has no historical component. "Historical science" is a way of saying the science of examining particular occurrences rather than normative occurrences.

But "as it is possible" still doesn't mean "directly witnessed".

Develop that nitpick for all it's worth.

But we can often have controls for past events. For instance, in my Meteor Crator example, when we collect rocks from Meteor Crator (looking for fragments of meteors), we compare the rocks to the "controls" -- rocks collected from flat areas without a crator.

That's correct (though it's not an experiment in the classical sense anyway), but ordinarily it is very unrealistic to claim the same degree isolation of the relevant variable. There may be a small crater that you missed, or meteorite fragments may have been otherwise imported into your control region. You know this, so I wonder why you even attempt this tack.
Perhaps that's why you even placed "control" within quotation marks.

Similarly, when Alvarez took the iridium readings from the sediment line at the KT boundary, he compared the iridium levels to controls consisting not only of the sediments to either side of KT boundary, but to many other sedimentary layers as well.

What did Alvarez do to ensure that his control group wasn't contaminated?

Now, so-called direct experiments also have "ample opportunity for contamination". This is the mistakes of the people making up the reagents or even the accidental mistakes.

That's why repetition of the experiment is critical.
Again, you know this.
You'd also know that meteors cannot be summoned at will to virgin ground.

Once again you have failed to find a distinction between "origins" and "operations" science.

Finding the distinction is dead easy.
Finding one that you will not nitpick for irrelevancies is the difficulty--and not one that I'm particularly concerned about.

lucaspa: "2. The "controls" are there merely to eliminate alternative hypotheses as explanations.

That's about enough from you.
Controls exist to isolate the variable being tested for its relevance in confirming a prediction (made on the basis of the hypothesis being tested). There is no elimination of alternative hypotheses, only the attempt to achieve a true test of the hypothesis being tested. The same experiment might conceivably test two different hypotheses (where the prediction for the outcome happens to vary).

You can do the same thing with one-time events by looking for the different consequences the alternative hypotheses will produce."

And how would that illuminate the historical nature of the one-time event in question?

One wonders why we bother with a control group for experimentation in the first place, if that method is so very satisfactory.
Will you be explaining it, lucaspa?
The explanation is not that control groups are unsatisfactory,

:ahem:
I said satisfactory, did I not?

but that they don't yield "direct observation".

You'll let me know when you're prepared to amplify that beyond its being an apparent irrelevancy, I trust.

You are still suffering from misreading the first sentence you quoted in your most recent post.

That appears to be a blatant non sequitur. I did not assume that you were saying that controlled experiments were impossible, hence the question regarding your intent. This later question is founded on your own choice of words in this latter instance.

As I said, you can have equivalent of controls in one-time events by 1) looking at areas and times when the event did NOT happen and 2) looking at different consequences of alternative hypotheses.

So when you say "... by looking for the different consequences the alternative hypotheses will produce" you mean by conducting controlled experiments (except that it's not really a controlled experiment but an alleged equivalent)?
Could you be under the illusion that your mode of communication was clear on that point, assuming that's what you meant?
Feel free any time to explain the intended relevance of introducing "real time".

Then what are the other questions? Please list them for us.

Is the point contested? Affirm that you believe that there is only one question at issue, and it might be worth it. Otherwise, it just looks like you want another red herring in play (pending your rationale for discussing "real time").

Special creation has deductions with consequences, like any other scientific theory. When we find consequences opposite of those deduced, then the theory is falsified. For instance, the theory of a flat earth has a consequence that a shadow in the same longitude at the same time at different latitudes will have the same angle. Erasthones observation of different angles under those conditions falsified flat earth. Similarly, special creation has a consequence that DNA sequences between "kinds" must be independent observations. Instead, phylogenetic analysis of DNA sequences among different groups of organisms shows that the sequences are related by historical connections and are NOT independent. Special creation falsified.

Heh. Another perfect example of the type of logical error by which you are characterized, IMO.
No amount of genetic cataloguing can establish a historical connection in any absolute sense (correlation only, never causation). There simply isn't any reason why a special creator couldn't create one modified "descendent" after another starting from scratch each time. Special creation is not falsfied thereby. It simply becomes a less elegant explanation.

This is your only reply???

In this thread, yes. Why should I be eager to go off-topic?

Ad hominem.

I laughed out loud when I read what you wrote, and I attached an emoticon (smiley) to my response indicating that fact. How is that an attack on your person?
I said that your comments might be worth treating in the Locker Room someday. How is that an attack on your person?
One of them or both should be an attack on your person in some manner that you can explain coherently, otherwise we should conclude that you probably don't know what ad hominem means.

That's not a reply. It's a duck.

So what? You want digression?

All it shows, Captain, is that you have NO reply.

It shows that I have no reply in that post. Concluding that I have no reply at all would be yet another fallacy on your part. You won't see my reply to that comment in this thread, I assure you. It belongs in another thread, and another forum (Locker Room, IMO).

Yes, Captain, no matter how bad creationism is as science -- and it is dreadful -- it is SOOO much worse as theology.

That one's obviously off-topic also, so I'm slicing it without even reading it. You want a reply, post it to it's own thread and PM me the location.
And don't forget to commit a fallacy by concluding that I have no reply at all.
:wink:
... absence of evidence isn't evidence of absence ...

You said that we couldn't use present events to study the past.

I don't remember saying anything of the kind. Quote me, won't you, so that my memory will be refreshed?

That is an example of how we can. You never refuted that. Nor have you refuted that we use controls ("We find pieces of rock at the site that are very different from the rocks in the surrounding strata." with the "surrounding strata" being the controls.)

Now, I believe you were going to define "miracle" for us and tell us Geisler's position on origins science. Anytime, Captain. We are eagerly waiting for you to do this.

That was a different post, IIRC. You'll just have to wait until I get around to that one.
Feel free to time me, if it pleases you.
:smile:

[Jugulum]

I'm going to save the analysis of Scott's essay for a later post.

I'll zoom out to the larger question: Please spell out the major ingredients of your operations/origins distinction, and a basic statement of your justification for each.
I don't think that I need to do anything of the kind to make my point. I've been over the major points already.
You think the non-standard terms "operations" and "origins" are useful for distinguishing different types of science. I'm trying to find out why. Perhaps everything is there in your previous posts, but I asked for clarification because it's spread all over, and there seem to be a couple completely separate ideas going into it. I want to pull it all out into a concise, well-defined picture; without it it's too easy to talk past each other. I didn't mean to ask for something burdensome--just a sentence or two for each component.

As far as I can tell, your distinction has two bases: 1.) Historical science, or science involving NREs, is more inductive. That is, it makes inferences from fewer observations. It makes more assumptions. 2.) Studies relating to ultimate beginnings must countenance miracles.

Is this correct? Did I miss anything important?

Lucaspa's example of similarity (the meteor impact) demonstrates some of them. First, the quetion asked is different. Second, the question doesn't begin to get answered until a operational science question has been asked and addressed (what typically happens when rocks collide with the surface of the Earth at high speed?). Third, the data are compared and inductive judgments are rendered.
I'm still not following. Exactly how is the question different, and how is the difference significant? How many "operations" questions can only be answered after another question is answered? Isn't induction pervasive in science? (See below.)

Science as a pursuit of true information about our world cannot ignore the possibility of miracles without committing a logical fallacy.
Granting such a possibility, the practice of science must refrain from using naturalistic assumptions exclusively to reach conclusions. An inference to the best explanation will take the place of observations as to what typically happens.
...
It seems to me that it becomes an interesting statement when one considers that an origins science that fails to countenance the possibility of miracles commits a logical fallacy to which operational science is not subject.
The fact that it's hard to deny would make it uninteresting in one sense, however.
There seems to be an inconsistency there. First you say that science cannot logically ignore the possibility of miracles, then you say that only origins science requires that consideration. Why? Why do you think we can safely ignore miracles in operations science? You're casting this in terms of logical fallacies; what's the philosophical justification for saying that observations we presently ascribe to current, "naturalistic" processes actually don't involve miracles? Or are you reasoning from Biblical revelation? If so, aren't you ignoring Biblical statements of God's active involvement in various processes (e.g. weather, feeding animals)? Why are those processes grouped separately from "origins" science? And even if the operations/origins distinction can be properly deduced from the Bible--if that's what you're doing--what about people of other religions? Why should they accept it?

Are you saying Ockham's razor is not needed in non-historical science? If so, why?
Because you can get the same answers regardless in operational science.
Really? You don't think scientists use Ockham's razor in physics, chemistry, or biology? That surprises me. Can you back it up?

It's more that historical science tends to be built on piles of inductive notions. Where operational science uses one inference, historical science both borrows that inference and extrapolates on it--perhaps in conjunction with a few others. The more inductive notions serve as the foundation, the less secure the conclusion.
That's the difficulty mentioned by Eugenie Scott, IMO.
Of course. Part of that is what I said about experiments/new observations being more often difficult to obtain. I'll grant that as a trend, historical science is more often built on induction from fewer data points. I most certainly do not grant your contention that "operational" sciences use only one inference.

Yes, when we look at evidence of past events, we generally try to explain them in terms of processes we already understand. But that's how we approach every question in science, at least at first. Sometimes we have to bring in an entirely new process to explain the data, as with Newton's action-at-a-distance. Reasonably, we may remain more skeptical than normal until such hypotheses are rigorously tested. And this is in no way unique to historical science.

Take particle physics. The big particle accelerators like Fermilab take charged particles, get them zooming, ram them into each other, then try to figure out what happened based on the pieces that go flying. A Fermi worker who spoke at my undergraduate university likened this to rolling a ball into a closed box, then trying to reconstruct what happened by letting things bounce around for a while and looking at where things end up--without even knowing how everything started. (Sorry, I'm not doing the analogy justice; it's been a couple years. He actually made it seem even worse.) Their observations are never "direct"; you can't even directly observe an electron. Its entire existence is built on induction, and modern studies are built on that and other inductive conclusions. Quite a lot of observations in "operations" are indirect, inferred, inductive.

All science is an edifice of induction, with layers on top of layers. The uncertainty of a theory is directly related to how much it has been tested. Testing is performed by making falsifying predictions of new observations. Experimentation is one way to do that; if we can set up an experiment, those observations will be easier to obtain. But there is no guarantee with what you consider "operational" science that we are always able to set up a situation in which the suspected process occurs (e.g. meteorology). Moreover, experiments are only an example of how to gain new observations. New geological and paleontological "experiments" consist of heading into the field and looking at what's there; astronomical "experiments" are performed with telescopes.

With NREs, it is more often difficult to obtain the particular observations that could test a hypothesis, so hypotheses of historical sciences are less likely to be well-tested. When examining historical hypothesis, it's perfectly legitimate to check carefully how tested it really is. And yes, untested assumptions shouldn't be blithely accepted. (As a Christian, I will approach with skepticism any scientific conclusion that doesn't fit with my understanding of something the Bible says, especially if it involves unwarranted assumptions.)

But all this is true of all science; it is only a trend that historical conclusions are less tested. (You already recognized this, I think, when you said that NREs can be approached scientifically.) More importantly, all this in uncontroversial, and covered by standard terminology--historical science, recurrent and non-recurrent events, etc. So why the new terms? Miracles? If so, all this is irrelevant to the thread; let's focus on the miracles point. Respond to my questions above, and we can continue to discuss it.

[Captain Ochre]

This is what you said in that post:
What evidence do you propose as absent?
The evidence that a particular dinosaur existed?
The evidence of a line of evolutionary descent that includes our particular dinosaur?
The evidence of a miraculous appearance?
This is what I said:
You asked what HRG's "absence of evidence" referred to.
So, yes, you did ask what HRG's "absence of evidence" referred to. Game, set, and match.

This is the second time in recent memory that you have declared "Game, set, and match" based on equivocation.
As I've already noted, HRG makes his comment non-specific. He presents the maxim as a general principle to be applied to the SC dino. I gave three potential applications of it. That leaves it to him to clarify, but it should be emphasized that his presentation never made it necessary to connect his claim regarding absence of evidence to any particular facet of the dinosaur example.

Your reason is irrelevant, since in the context of the conversation HRG can't be referring to that.

Can't be referring to what?
Each of the questions I asked of him were potentially applicable to the case of a specially-created dinosaur, AFAICT.
Your attempted ad hoc rationale for rejecting other than the second one as HRG's referrent didn't add up.
http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showpost.php?p=938042&postcount=65

Lucaspa apparently ran into formatting difficulties again.
I'll try to get it sorted out properly so that nothing is missed.

We do? Where and what is it?
You're not talking about evidence apart from one case of this particular hypothetical dinosaur that I'm using as an example, I hope. If that's the case, then I'll have to ask you precisely how you adduce the evidence against the special creation of this hypothetical dinosaur which was created ex nihilo.

Special pleading. You are proposing that, since we don't have evidence against miraculous creation for THIS PARTICULAR species, or maybe this PARTICULAR animal, then we should entertain the idea.

And how is that special pleading?
http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/f/fallacies.htm#Special%20Pleading

What you are doing now is 1) special pleading and

I don't think that you understand the fallacy of special pleading.
I'm not committing that fallacy.

2) trying to make the theory unfalsifiable.

I don't have a theory in this case. I am presenting a hypothetical set of facts to be tested by science as HRG understands it (though you're allowed to stand in for him, certainly).
Thus, your #2 doesn't follow.

We do have evidence -- in the form of phylogenetic analysis -- that no living species is specially created.

That's a red herring, since your claim totally ignores my hypothetical. Obviously if the hypothetical dinosaur is specially created, any evidence that you have to the contrary (not that you've specified any) would have misled you regarding the actual state of affairs (according to the hypothetical) by definition.

We also have evidence in the form of transitional series of individuals and series of transitional species, that other species of dinos were not specially created.

Transitional status is inferred probabilistically, is it not? You don't have videos of the dinosaurs "doing it" or birth certificates (or the like) for their progeny, do you?
Congratulations, Mr. Saur. It's a healthy baby transitional!.
You could argue probabilistically based on the existence of dinosaurs which appear to be evolved from a common ancestor, but that argument is inductive and comparatively weak as well as pointed in the wrong direction with respect to the hypothetical.
What we get is lucaspa giving us a good example of the way a scientist might treat the science of the day as firm footing for presupposition.

The above is science.

It's bad science, since it's pointing you away from the truth of the hypothetical.
I could hardly have asked for a better illustration.

But we also have to consider the damage to God your idea entails.

:lol:
No, we don't, but I'll humor your digression this once.

What you are proposing is that God is being deceptive.

Do tell.

Since all the evidence we find via science is from God's Creation, it follows that God put it there -- either directly or indirectly. Now, we have an immense amount of data that God did not create by miraculous creation.

Not in the case of my hypothetical, we don't. I guess you could make some up in your imagination, but you'd be kind of begging the question.

Yet you are proposing that God sneaked one dinosaur species in as miraculous or even an individual dino. But God also left no evidence of that. So God deceives us.

How did God supposedly deceive us? He should have known that we would assume based on an absence of evidence for a particular origin for the dinosaur that therefore the dinosaur came into being by evolution instead of special creation?
That's kooky.

So, what we have is that, in order to shore up your own weak faith, we end up with a lying god that we can't trust or worship. No thanks, Captain. I'm sorry for your weak faith that you have to find "proof" of God via science. Perhaps if you pray some more God will be kind and help you with your faith so that you don't have to discredit God.

You've made it particularly clear that your comments were a digression (and a poor one).


HRG's statement appeared to be a statement of general principle, IMHO, applicable in any case where we find an absence of evidence.
Would you disagree?

Yes and no. We have two concepts going:
1. What did HRG specifically mean in the context of your example. In that context, HRG was plainly referring only to your second question. For the reasons I gave. Lack of evidence of an ancestor-descendent lineage in this particular case does not mean that ancestor-descendent does not apply to it. Because we have descent with modification strongly supported for other lineages and have established that as a general principle. Therefore absence of evidence for this particular example does not constitute absence of evidence.

2. What you apparently want is to say "because evidence is lacking for miraculous creation of this particular example, that is not evidence of absence of miraculous creation." Superficially, it looks like a valid point. However, miraculous creation is not confined to one or two individuals or species, is it? As a theory, special creation applies to ALL species, or at least to a large number of "kinds". This idea has false consequences, and thus is false. IOW, we have evidence falsifying special (miraculous) creation of species.

1) HRG may have had one thing or the other in mind, but he presented his reasoning as a general maxim, not as a rule for judging instances of the second example. It's fair game for me to suggest counterexamples to his reasoning, particularly as they touch directly on the topic of discussion. Further, I was not asking him which particular thing he referred to but rather giving him a panoply of applicable examples touching the hypothetical case. It is only in that loose sense (of asking HRG to which of the three we should apply his maxim) that I asked HRG to which thing he referred. That's why lucaspa's boast of "Game, set, and match" was based on equivocation of a phrase.

2) Thanks for granting the validity (if only superficially). My point is about science, not about Creationism vs. evolution. Therefore, the rest of your comments are moot (though you remain incorrect about the falsification of Creationism, AFAICS).

We have evidence that you do that sort of thing [argue inconsistently].

If you have evidence, you should present it. But then, this wasn't intended to have evidence, it was intended to attack my credibility.

Happy to oblige with the evidence, since you suggested it.
"Your definition and Woese is the equivocation. By trying to equate evolution to being true ONLY IF there is ONE common ancestor."
lucaspa, from
http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showpost.php?p=873650&postcount=78

Lucaspa failed to demonstrate any equivocation on my part (and he failed to back up the claim that I had argued that evolution was true if and only if there is one common ancestor). His argumentation was inconsistent.

http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showpost.php?p=873814&postcount=80
"Whether you tried to make the equation is immaterial. The statement was that you did make the equivalence."
http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showpost.php?p=874000&postcount=83
http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showpost.php?p=874261&postcount=88
"As I've shown, you are attempting to confuse "common ancestry" with the 'Doctrine of common ancestry'. Two different things but having similar names."
"Think about this. A species splits in two. You still have the ORIGINAL species and ONE NEW species. One observation!"
"Note that this is NOT "common descent" as a single common ancestor as you are using it. Instead, it is essentially what Futuyma says. Therefore, showing speciation in real time -- "any two species on Earth living at any time share a common ancestor" -- meets the criteria for common descent discussed here."
http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showpost.php?p=874804&postcount=89
http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showpost.php?p=876110&postcount=94
Your exact words were:
"It appears that you have chosen the tactic of substituting quantity for quality. Well, we're only a wee bit over halfway through your post by my estimation, so maybe you improve your performance from here on out."

You said "your performance". But even if you had said "your argumentation" it would not have helped. Both of those are directed at me as a person, not what the actual arguments are. Therefore, since it is directed at criticizing me as a person, it is ad hominem. If you want to use ad argumentum, you address the arguments and declare the arguments as weak.
http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showpost.php?p=878021&postcount=104
http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showpost.php?p=879673&postcount=118
http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showpost.php?p=900498&postcount=214
http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showpost.php?p=900923&postcount=221

The included quotations aren't necessarily intended to support the specific claim of inconsistency. Sometimes they're just funny. The main inconsistency that I'm highlighting is lucaspa's flip-flopping over the nature of his accusation.

It wasn't m[e]ant to apply to your dino example. It was meant to explain that absence of evidence CAN be evidence of absence IF you search the entire search space. Apparently you understand that now.

Searching the entire search space remains difficult with respect to the unobserved past, so it's nearly pointless to bring up that point (as I have already noted: "Sure. Except for how the example applies to my dinosaur example.")
http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showpost.php?p=938937&postcount=68

You're such an idiot!
Did you check the third URL?

Have you ever heard of "civil discussion", Captain?

Of course. Are you going to answer the question I asked you above?

Perhaps your mother just never taught you manners? Ad hominem is not a valid form of argument.

It's not an argument (you don't understand the fallacy of ad hominem, afaics). I was castigating you for apparently jumping to conclusions based on your failure to check the third URL. Are you going to answer the question?
Did you check the third URL?

I asked you first. Doesn't that count for anything?

I'd already answered in my post. You simply didn't see it. So now I can ask you. What is your opinion? Afraid to give it?

In reverse order:
No.
You first.
Your premise seems to be flawed.
I'm not sure it was simply a matter of my not seeing it.
I believe that you are mistaken.

[CO:]
Was the conclusion that the coelocanth was extinct justified prior to the discovery of a living specimen?
http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showpost.php?p=938120&postcount=66

If you think that you answered the specific case by offering an explanation of the general principle coincidentally involved (which is a stretch, IMO), then I've already answered by agreeing with you, AFAICS. Did you answer the question specifically? If so, where?

I don't see how.

You're either avoiding the question or making yourself guilty of the appeal to ignorance, AFAICS.
http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/f/fallacies.htm#Appeal%20to%20Ignorance

"Transitional forms", or intermediates, by definition have characteristics of both the species before them and the species after them. If I can, I'll attach a picture of a transitional series at the end of the post. So, transitional forms do fit in the nested hierarchy.

Great. Assuming that you found a picture, pretend that scientists in 25 years have the ability to manipulate genes in order to create a synthesized species with characteristics in common with both a bird and a reptile.

But manufactured artifacts (miraculously created) can't be classified in a nested hierarchy because they do derive independently and are not connected via descent with modification.

You could synthesize the twin nested hierarchy as well, given sufficient technology.
Science would be able to make predictions concerning shared morphological characteristics as well as biochemical relationships. Sufficient technology could simulate those factors in a synthetic being (despite your plea of ignorance as to how it would be accomplished).

I challenge the "given". How would a scientist produce a transitional form?

Gene synthesis plus cloning. You know, like on "Star Trek". :wink:

Of course you COULD have an organism with DNA but not related.

There's no reason in principle why an organism with the appearance of related DNA could not be synthesized.
Your concession does not go far enough.
Where is your faith in Science? :wink:

That was a possibility when phylogenetic studies were started.

It remains a(n ever increasing) possibility with advent of gene mapping and cloning technologies.

However, I apologize, I should have said "DNA sequence" and not just "DNA". What happens is that you compare the sequences of bases in the DNA. The sequence would be independent and not related to the sequences of any other species.

And the expected biochemical signs of relationship could not be simulated with advanced technology because ...?

I didn't. You asked for POSSIBLE ways to refute special creation.

Your recollection appears to be mistaken:
CO:
What evidence do we have that the one dinosaur in my example did not appear miraculously? ... I'm making a point about science, not arguing against evolution. Supposing this one species in my example was specially created and appeared miraculously, what observable consequences should we expect for that event?

lucaspa:
1. We would not be able to place the dino in a nested hierarchy of classification. Such a classification is only possible with objects related by descent with modification, not manufactured artifacts.
2. Morphology would not be related to any other creature.
3. DNA would be an independent observation and not related to any other creature -- after all, the dino is not related, is it?
http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showpost.php?p=938120&postcount=66
bold emphasis added

That doesn't matter. It's still special pleading that this one dino would be specially created.

:lol:
No, it's not "special pleading".
http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/special-pleading.html
http://www.adamsmith.org/logicalfallacies/000657.php

??? Creationism is a "hypothetical case"? Captain, I wasn't discussing yourhypothetical dinosaur when I wrote how creationism was the presupposition. It's fun watching you attempt to distract with personal attacks when you can't answer an argument, but it's not helping special creation or your personal reputation.

While you weren't commenting on the SC dino specifically with your comment, you're still doing what I suggest you're doing, via the supposed "special pleading" fallacy.

1. I'm not debating. Therefore I don't have an "opponent". I'm discussing the validity of ideas.

To engage in argument by discussing opposing points
http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=debate

You're not debating? You're totally sure about that?

2. When you use terms that represent ideas, you should use them as the people that coined the terms defined them.

I was invited to this this thread, and it wasn't on the basis of my use of the term "operational science".
That was the term in use here already, and I do not accept that the meaning of the term is established by Morris. Nor have I seen any convincing case that Morris holds the view of "operational science" that seems to be used by you, lucaspa. IMO, you could use a helping of your own advice.

If I use the term "selfish gene", I would use it the way Dawkins did.

If Dawkins hadn't written a book with that term in the title, then it very probably wouldn't be attached to him as it is. Did Morris write a popular book entitled Operational Science?

If you as Captain are using the terms operation and origins science differently than Morris and other creationist authors, then you should say so. Unless and until you do, everyone will understood you are using the terms as Morris used them.

I doubt that most people associate the term with Morris. Feel free to support that implicit claim, however.

"We do not know how the Creator created, what processes He used, for He used processes which are not now operating anywhere in the natural universe (emphasis in the original). That is why we refer to creation as special creation. We cannot discover by scientific investigation anything about the creative processes used by the Creator." Morris, Scientific Creationism.

You seem to be quoting Duane Gish. I think that it would be appropriate for you to offer a citation in support of your source attribution.
http://www.gainesvillehumanists.org/goals.htm

Now, since Morris discusses science as ONLY what is repeatable, the above statement removes origins science from science, doesn't it?

For that to follow, you'd have to equate "origins science" with the literal investigation of the "creative processes used by the Creator" rather than including the results of those processes.
Do so at your own risk, and it goes without saying that the source of your quotation is disputed.

Not really, since the basis of a difference between origin science and operations science is that origins science can't be studied experimentally.

For example (an example of experimental study of a specific past phenomenon)?
I think we'll find that the claim is somewhat-to-blatantly equivocal.

FWIW:
The late Dr. Richard Bliss, a great educator, explained the distinction better than anyone else when he coined the word "operation science" to contrast with "origins science." Operation science is what is done when scientists are trying to learn how something works, how it "operates."
http://www.creationresearch.org/crsq/articles/32/32_2a.html

And the reference to Morris is giving him credit for them.

Credit which seems doubtful he is owed in the first place, AFAICS.

Again, saying "Morris'" is also a convenient label to identify the ideas -- by the man who first came up with them. Why else do we say "Darwinism" or "Darwinian evolution"? Or Pauline theology? Or Jesus' teachings? Are we committing "genetic fallacy" when we say "Jesus' parables"?

Where's our term "Morrisism"? :teeth:
My personal conviction says that the distinction was invented *) by creationists so that they would be able to play the innocent: "We aren't at all against science - we are very much in favor of true, i.e. operational science!"

*) and if not directly invented, then propagandized ...
http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showpost.php?p=934460&postcount=56

CO:Your personal conviction betrays a whopping case of worldview bigotry.
:teeth:

HRG:
See Glenn's point on the possible origins of the alleged distinction.

The bigot will call any realistic and unbiased assessment of his views bigotry. How else could he mentally survive ?
http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showpost.php?p=935343&postcount=61

If you believe the converse, then "Yes". Because the converse is a position you hold. And you have a burden of proof for your position.

I'm agnostic on the subject. I regard Morris' motives as irrelevant, and his specific views on "operational" vs. "origins" science too vaguely described to be of use in this discussion.
The burden of proof is entirely on the one who thinks that Morris is relevant to the topic, AFAICS.

http://www.sjsu.edu/depts/itl/graphics/claims/truth.html#burden
"Burden of Proof refers to the sense you have, in any dispute, of how much each side needs to prove in order to win your agreement. ... "Intentionally shifting the burden of proof, in order to avoid offering support for one's premises, is a logical fallacy."

What you are doing is not even "undermining", but ignoring or trying to avoid the argument. Now what you are trying to do is shift the burden of proof and pretend like your position has none.

What should I do in order to prove that I don't believe that Morris should be connected with a popular conception of "operational science"? If I have a burden of proof for that, would you agree that the soft atheist has to provide proof of his lack of belief in a god or gods?

Of course, since you think you are in a "debate" and are therefore trying to "win",

A debate is an argument, and the goal of argument is to reach the truth of the matter.

I suspect you are following the guidelines Macbeth (a creationist) sets out below. But, that is not a way to discover truth.

Why not?
:smile:

You wouldn't be afraid of the truth, would you, Captain?

Not so far as I can tell.

""Courtroom experience during my career at the bar taught me to attach great weight to something that may seem trivial to persons not skilled in argumentation -- the burden of proof. The proponents of a theory, in science or elsewhere, are obligated to support every link in the chain of reasoning, whereas a critic or skeptic may peck at any aspect of the theory, testing it for flaws. He is not obligated to set up any theory of his own or to offer any alternative explanations. He can be purely negative if he so desires. William Jennings Bryan forgot this in Tennessee, and was jockeyed into trying to defend fundamentalism, although this was not necessary to the matter in hand. The results were disastrous. They would have been equally disastrous for Clarence Darrow if he had tried to discharge the burden of proof for the other side. The winner in these matters is the skeptic who has no case to prove." Norman Macbeth, Darwin Retried, 1971, pg 5.

Smart guy. Why wouldn't his method enable an apprehension of the truth?

Sure. Would you care to suggest explicitly that I have committed such a fallacy?

I just did. By showing that I never committed the genetic fallacy.

When were you accused of having committed the genetic fallacy?
Let's have the quotation and a URL linking to the document.

Instead of discussing the errors of the idea on origin and operational science (stated by Morris), we are discussing whether you committed a fallacy. Nice distraction you are doing, no?

Heh. But it's okay for you to bring up (elsewhere) how creationism is a theological disaster.
:hehe:
If you'll recall, HRG brought up the motive for the "operational science" distinction. I questioned him on it, suggesting that the focus on Morris' motives might lead us to a genetic fallacy.
That's when you stopped by to try to defend HRG on that particular point. Supposedly I'm guilty of a fallacy of distraction for questioning the relevance of Morris' motivations.

But you DID use the uncomplimentary word "bigotry" in describing worldview -- ""Your personal conviction betrays a whopping case of worldview bigotry."

That's a poor analysis (or sadly ambiguous). My comment simply states that HRG was disrespecting one worldview's presuppositions based on his own. It is not a statement that HRG's worldview itself is bigoted.

ROFL! Sorry, Captain, but you just cut yourself down. You took my rhetorical question, decided to be sarcastic, take it seriuosly, and try to turn it back on me. But all you did was slit your own throat. You said you "couldn't have used it" because you can't argue against one particulat presupposition. But since you DID use "bigotry", you are asserting the contrary! LOL!

You appear to have badly misinterpreted my response.
:hehe:

[Jugulum]

Your gloss or rephrasing makes sense.
Ah. I guess I was being obtuse.

Ad hoc hypotheses are different from refining a theory.
I concede the distinction. To clarify, I was saying that what we call "refinement" is nothing more than reasonable ad hoc hypotheses, but you showed how the two are actually different in kind.

But this wasn't the actual point I was trying to make. Let's go back to my original statement in post 87: "There is still a form of supernatural explanation that scientists do reject out-of-hand: Ad hoc, random 'God made it that way' explanations."

The sort of disallowed explanations I was trying to describe are those that cannot be deduced from the original theory.

I also said
If the justification for a refinement/new hypothesis--the reasoning that leads to it--lies in the original theory or a reasonable restatement, then it would be unfair to call it ad hoc.
You replied:
This is the language again. Notice you are saying "a reasonable restatement". That's the key. Ad hoc hypotheses are made so that the original theory does not need ANY restatement.
Conceded. The "reasonable restatement" part needs to be dropped. So I'll rephrase it: If the justification for an explanation of apparently anomalous data--the reasoning that leads to it--lies in the original theory, then it would be unfair to call it ad hoc.

To apply this: Data does not count as evidence against YEC if it can be explained using a miraculous initial state reasonably inferred from a "literal" interpretation of Genesis.

Back to the soil case we're looking at.

If there is a young earth and soil is made by erosion, then a young earth should have NO SOIL AT ALL. Or very little, just what has been generated by erosion in the few years since creation. That's the point: if God really made a young earth, a deduction from that theory (young earth) is that we should see no or very little topsoil at all.
I think you're operating under a misconception. The "YE" part of YEC means that the earth is young now, not that God made a young earth. It's technically meaningless to talk about God making an "old" earth--if Last Thursdayism were true, I would actually be five days old, and only think I'm in my twenties--so it would be pointless to specify that the earth was young right after it was made.

YEC proposes that God made the earth described in Genesis in six days, miraculously. That means that on the third day, God separated the dry land from the seas, and made all the vegetation. Vegetation implies a layer of some kind of soil. The fact that erosion of rocks makes more soil does not mean YEC makes God into a deceiver; he told us about it.

In short, we do not deduce the initial state from "young earth", we deduce it from "earth as described in Genesis 1".

That we do see sedimentary rocks that are miles thick constitutes evidence falsifying a young earth.
Sure, as long as the sedimentary rock could not have been made through the processes of a global flood or however it is Dave Tyler thinks it was made. But I was talking about soil; I didn't say anything about the earth being made with sedimentary rock. That idea would have no justification--it's the sort of random, "God did it that way" idea I reject.

Jugulum, if God had really created a universe that is only 10,000 years old, then that universe could easily LOOK that old.
Sure. Was that supposed to be an argument against something I said?

I don't agree 100% with the details of each evidence you listed, but I agree in principle.

I disagree. The hypothesis that God somehow was compelled to make soil, and thus have "old" soil, is an ad hoc hypothesis.
It's not that God was compelled to make soil, it's that soil is inferred from the description of what he did make. See above.

Now we have a different statement.
1.The theory is falsified.
2. Jugulum admits the theory is falsified.
That's not a different statement--it's what I originally said back in post 89. And I said it for two reasons. First, as I also said in post 89, "I'm trying to limit my comments to how we should approach the evidence, not the specific conclusions we might make." After all, that's the topic of the thread. Second, I haven't examined all the evidence well enough to know whether it's been falsified.

Fair enough. I'll rephrase: Nothing in the idea of a young earth, special creation of kinds, or a global flood entails any theology of "god-of-the-gaps".
The first two do. We supposedly have "gaps" in the natural processes in which we insert God. And, if there are no "gaps", then they say God is absent -- evolution is atheism. Classic god-of-the-gaps theology.
God-of-the-gaps theology says that there must be gaps into which we can insert God, because if there are no gaps, God is absent. Yes, "evolution is atheism" is God-of-the-gaps. And yes, many (if not most) YECs think that way. But "evolution is atheism" is not part of the factual claims YEC makes about the history of the earth.

The ideas of young earth and special creation of kinds do include the idea that the history of the world includes events which cannot be explained naturalistically. In other words, they do involve the idea of gaps that God "bridged". But "there are gaps" is not the same as "there must be gaps or God is absent". Saying "the earth is 10,000 years old and separate kinds were specially created" is not the same as "theism requires the earth to 10,000 years old and separate kinds to be specially created."

"God made separate kinds instantaneously" is not the same as "life can only come about through instantaneous creation."
How is it not? The second is simply a restatement of the first.
No. The first is a statement about what did happen. The second is a statement about what can possibly happen.

If you add to the second the statement, "otherwise God is absent," you're left with God-of-the-gaps.

Saying "God made separate kinds instantaneously" is the same as saying "there is no other way for life to arise except by instantaneous creation by God of separate kinds".
No. The first is a statement about what did happen. The second is a statement about what can possibly happen.

If you add to the second the statement, "otherwise God is absent," you're left with God-of-the-gaps.

Do you really think creationism allows some life to arise by chemistry but other life to be instantaneously created?
Creationism disallows life on earth having actually come about by chemistry. Creationism does not disallow life such as what we have on earth coming about by chemistry. See the difference?

Notice that we start with "knowledge" -- "Genesis is a factual presentation of simple historical truths". Nothing can change that.
What does that have to do with God-of-the-gaps theology?

Now, these are the statements defining YEC by YECers. So, can you please show me where YEC is somehow different from that? Either thru statements of people defining YEC or by logical extension of the scientific statements of YEC. Thanks.
No, that's not what these statements are. These are the statements defining what you have to agree with to work at ICR and AiG. They include the theology of point 4, something completely separate from the factual, scientific claims they make.

I suppose it depends on what you mean by "YEC". I take it to mean, "The set of statements made about the history of the world based on a 'literal' interpretation of Genesis." If you agree with those statements, you are a YECer. You seem to want it to include theology over which YECers might disagree.

[lucaspa]

I didn't mention "real time". You introduced that concept, AFAICS, and I have yet to discern why you would do so. Why should it matter to the concept of experimental controls that experiments are (supposedly) not conducted in "real time"?
http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showpost.php?p=937037&postcount=63
You didn't use the term "real time", but the concept you did introduce in the distinction between "historical" and "operational" science. Operational sciences are supposedly those experiments that we do in the present. What I showed was that those are not really in the "present". Rather, they are "historical" in that they also happen in the past, and are unobserved directly. Instead, we use the same inference that you apply to "historical" science in "operational" science. Thus, no distinction between the 2.

Indeed, As long as you admit that you misread. :smile:

lucaspa:
When controls are used,we are still looking at things that happened in the past and we do not directly observe. Instead, we observe the present consequences of a past event.

So what?
What does that have to do with what I wrote? There is no assertion that "how things usually work" has no historical component. "Historical science" is a way of saying the science of examining particular occurrences rather than normative occurrences.
But "normative occurrences" are particular occurences, aren't they? That is, each time I mix an organic alcohol with an ether, that is one particular occurrence in the past. Recent past, but past. Each time, I infer the reaction takes place not because I directly witness it, but because I see the consequences -- ketones.

Same with the past. Each meteor impact is a particular occurrence. BUT, there have been a lot of them in the past. And each time they leave the same consequence (when they hit land) -- a crator. So ... no difference between how we study "normative occurrences" and what you say are particular occurrences in the past.

Develop that nitpick for all it's worth. Nice duck. But is it a nitpick? I don't think so, as witness your changing your argument.

That's correct (though it's not an experiment in the classical sense anyway), but ordinarily it is very unrealistic to claim the same degree isolation of the relevant variable. There may be a small crater that you missed, or meteorite fragments may have been otherwise imported into your control region. You know this, so I wonder why you even attempt this tack.
Perhaps that's why you even placed "control" within quotation marks.
I placed the quotation marks to show how your use of control was misplaced. The same arguments apply to what you call normative science. For instance, when growth factors were first tested on cells in culture, the cell culture media always contained animal sera -- otherwise the cells would not grow. However, sera contains small amounts of the very growth factors that were being added: so the controls and experimentals both had growth factors.

Now, notice what would happen IF there were a small crator we had missed or meteor fragments had been otherwise imported. What would happen is that the hypothesis would not be supported. IOW, we could not conclude that a meteor had made the crator. So, what we would have is a meteor impact but we would not conclude one had happened. We would miss the event.

But this isn't what you are objecting to. What creationism needs to find is a way that we concluded the event happened when it really didn't. That is, we conclude that the earth is really old when it isn't. That a meteor caused the KT extinction when there was no meteor. Your objections would result in that we do NOT conclude the earth is old -- because there are daughter isotopes in the rock initially. IOW, your objections would result in an action exactly opposite to what we really conclude.

What did Alvarez do to ensure that his control group wasn't contaminated? What would have happened if his control group WAS contaminated? It would have had high iridium content, wouldn't it? That means that a high iridium content would not have been unique to the sediments at the KT boundary. Which means that his hypothesis of iridium by an extraterrestrial impact would not have been supported. So he would have (wrongly) dropped the hypothesis. It was only the low levels of iridium in the adjacent layers that allowed the hypothesis to be supported.

That's why repetition of the experiment is critical.
Again, you know this.
You'd also know that meteors cannot be summoned at will to virgin ground.
Nice of you to acknowledge the point that, again, operational and historical science are the same. In this case, operate by the same limitations.

Now, ti is true that you cannot summon a meteor at the will of the scientist. But it is also true that lots of meteors have hit virgin ground thruout history. So the general event has been repeated.

Also look how creationism uses operational science to study a one time event:
"The footprint trackways in the Coconino Sandstone have recently been re-examined in the light of experimental studies by Dr Leonard Brand of Loma Linda University in California.8 His research program involved careful surveying and detailed measurements of 82 fossilized vertebrate trackways discovered in the Coconino Sandstone along the Hermit Trail in Grand Canyon. He then observed and measured 236 experimental trackways made by living amphibians and reptiles in experimental chambers. These tracks were formed on sand beneath the water, on moist sand at the water’s edge, and on dry sand, the sand mostly sloping at an angle of 25 degrees, although some observations were made on slopes of 15deg; and 20° for comparison. Observations were also made of the underwater locomotion of five species of salamanders (amphibians) both in the laboratory and in their natural habitat, and measurements were again taken of their trackways. " http://www.answersingenesis.org/creation/v15/i1/flood.asp

Now, if operational science is distinct from historical science and can't be used to study a one-time event, then this experiment is invalid. But creationists view it as valid. Therefore, the distinction between operational and historical sciences cannot be valid. They can't have it both ways.

Finding the distinction is dead easy. Not all that easy. Because every time you find a "distinction", I show how both operational and historical sciences both use what you call a "distinction".


lucaspa: "2. The "controls" are there merely to eliminate alternative hypotheses as explanations.

Controls exist to isolate the variable being tested for its relevance in confirming a prediction (made on the basis of the hypothesis being tested). There is no elimination of alternative hypotheses, only the attempt to achieve a true test of the hypothesis being tested. The same experiment might conceivably test two different hypotheses (where the prediction for the outcome happens to vary).
Captain, read what you wrote. It's what I said in different words. What is a "true test of the hypothesis being tested"? It's elimination of all alternative hypotheses. Pierre Duhem showed in 1905 that hypotheses are not tested singly. Instead, they are tested in huge bundles. Let's go back to the simple experiment of mixing organic alcohols and acids. Let's look at the alternative hypotheses:
1. The results could be due to reaction of the alcohol with water
2. The results could be due to the reaction of the alcohol withthe sides of the container.
3. The results could be due to reaction of the acid with water.
4. The results cold be due to reaction of the acid with the sides of the container.

So ... what are the controls for this experiment? Well, you have the alcohol in the container alone. You have the acid in the container alone. You have alcohol and water in the container alone. You have acid and water in the container alone. That you don't get the reaction -- fruity odors -- shows that those alternative hypotheses are wrong.

One thing that has come out of the threads is that more philosophy of science needs to be discussed in science classes. Your statements are a prime example of why.

lucaspa: You can do the same thing with one-time events by looking for the different consequences the alternative hypotheses will produce."

And how would that illuminate the historical nature of the one-time event in question?
I'm afraid I don't understand the question. Can you please rephrase. As far as I can see, your question is irrelevant to the point I was making. "historical nature" = "one-time event" to you, doesn't it? All I'm saying is that you can eliminate alternative hypotheses as to the cause of the event by looking at different consequences that would be produced by the event. For instance, let's go back to Alvarez's high iridium in the layer. We could hypothesize that the levels are due to the Flood and settling. However, since the Flood was a very violent event with the small clay sized particles containing the iridium mixed thoroughly with particles of the same size without iridium, the consequence of the Flood would be no layer of high iridium content. Thus, we eliminate one alternative hypothesis.


but that they don't yield "direct observation".
http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/images/misc//quote/quote_r.gif http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/images/misc//quote/quote_bl.gif http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/images/misc//quote/quote_b.gif http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/images/misc//quote/quote_br.gif


You'll let me know when you're prepared to amplify that beyond its being an apparent irrelevancy, I trust.
As soon as you let me know why you think that is irrelevant to the discussion of operational vs historical science. One proposed "distinction" is that historical events are not directly observed. I have pointed out that events in "operational" science are not directly observed either. And that both operational and historical science deal with events in the past. Now, why do you think that having both "types" of science work identically is not relevant to showing that the attempted distinction of operational and historical science is flawed?

So when you say "... by looking for the different consequences the alternative hypotheses will produce" you mean by conducting controlled experiments (except that it's not really a controlled experiment but an alleged equivalent)?
Not quite. Two slightly different things. By control, I mean looking at areas where the proposed event did not happen. By "different consequences" I mean looking at what the consequences of alternative hypotheses would be. See above for the example of the iridium layer and the Flood hypothesis.

Feel free any time to explain the intended relevance of introducing "real time".
Captain, don't "directly observed" events happen in real time? If you directly observe a robbery, doesn't that mean that you watched it in real time?

Is the point contested? Affirm that you believe that there is only one question at issue, and it might be worth it.Again, you are ducking putting forth your own position. A good debating tactic but not one for someone looking for truth. You brought up the issue of other questions. I'm simply trying to find out what you mean by them. Apparently you don't want to list them, for fear that they will undermine your position.

Heh. Another perfect example of the type of logical error by which you are characterized, IMO.
Another perfect example of ad hominem. You went from disagreement with a consequence of creationism to a slur on my character. Invalid argument.

No amount of genetic cataloguing can establish a historical connection in any absolute sense (correlation only, never causation).
Bare assertion. Where's your data. What can be done is look at the sequences and test 2 hypotheses:
1. Did the sequences arise from historical connections?
2. Are the sequences independent observations?

Now, that can be done. Standard statistical analysis.

There simply isn't any reason why a special creator couldn't create one modified "descendent" after another starting from scratch each time. Yes, there is a very good reason: such a Creator would be deceptive. Therefore, since the Creator postulated by creationism -- the God of the Bible -- is not deceptive, such a hypothesis is already falsified by different data.

Captain, this is where special creation becomes so dangerous to Christianity. In its zeal to preserve a literal Genesis 1-3, creationism will sacrifice God to keep the literal interpretation of Genesis. This is the reason the Rev. Kingsley would not "for a thousand pounds [over $10,000 at the time]" put this argument to his children.

Special creation is not falsfied thereby. It simply becomes a less elegant explanation. What you have done is just shown a perfect example of an ad hoc hypothesis to try to avoid falsification. It doesn't save the theory of special creation, because the ad hoc hypothesis is falsified itself by other means.

In this thread, yes. Why should I be eager to go off-topic? Because it is not off-topic. A direct question about the topic. It's obvious you don't want to answer because you can't defend the position.

So what? You want digression? I want answers to relevant questions. Please show how an answer would be digression.

lucaspa:
Yes, Captain, no matter how bad creationism is as science -- and it is dreadful -- it is SOOO much worse as theology.


That one's obviously off-topic also, so I'm slicing it without even reading it. You should have read it, because it is directly relevant to your statement above: "There simply isn't any reason why a special creator couldn't create one modified "descendent" after another starting from scratch each time. "

... absence of evidence isn't evidence of absence ...
In this case, we do have evidence: your ducks. If you had a straightforward reply, you would have used it.

lucaspa: Now, I believe you were going to define "miracle" for us and tell us Geisler's position on origins science. Anytime, Captain. We are eagerly waiting for you to do this.

That was a different post, IIRC. You'll just have to wait until I get around to that one.
Feel free to time me, if it pleases you.
Jugulum, am I now allowed an "I told you so"? IOW, Captain, you say
1. that past events are by "miraculous creation" but won't define "miracle"
2. That your and Geisler's position on operational and historical science is different from what we have disproved here, but won't give us what those positions are.

I don't think there is anything more to discuss unless and until you provide us with the answers to the questions I've asked: information well within your capability to provide. But thanks for showing us how you operate, Captain.

[lucaspa]

But this wasn't the actual point I was trying to make. Let's go back to my original statement in post 87: "There is still a form of supernatural explanation that scientists do reject out-of-hand: Ad hoc, random 'God made it that way' explanations."

The sort of disallowed explanations I was trying to describe are those that cannot be deduced from the original theory.
And this is where I got into ad hoc hypotheses and noted that ad hoc hypotheses with 2 characteristics are indeed ignored. See my post after your post 87.

If the justification for an explanation of apparently anomalous data--the reasoning that leads to it--lies in the original theory, then it would be unfair to call it ad hoc.
That doesn't work in the classic example: Uranus' orbit and Newtonian mechanics. The ad hoc hypothesis -- the existence of an unobserved planet -- was in hte original theory. That is, an unobserved planet, using Newtonian mechanics, could account for Uranus' anomalous orbit. So I'm afraid that your criteria doesn't stop a hypothesis from being ad hoc.

To apply this: Data does not count as evidence against YEC if it can be explained using a miraculous initial state reasonably inferred from a "literal" interpretation of Genesis.
That doesn't save most of the ad hoc hypotheses in YEC from being ad hoc even by your definition. The problem is that a lot of the hypotheses being used are NOT from a literal interpretation of Genesis. For instance, a literal interpretation of Genesis gives a very gentle Flood. But YEC invokes a very violent Flood. Another instance is the ad hoc hypothesis of light in transit. There is nothing in a literal Genesis to justify making that hypothesis.

I think you're operating under a misconception. The "YE" part of YEC means that the earth is young now, not that God made a young earth. It's technically meaningless to talk about God making an "old" earth--if Last Thursdayism were true, I would actually be five days old, and only think I'm in my twenties--so it would be pointless to specify that the earth was young right after it was made.
YEC is that God made the earth less than 20,000 years ago. Thus, the earth is "young" and not millions or billions of years old. What I am saying is that, if God made the earth less than 20,000 years ago, then the earth would look as if it was only 20,000 years old. What you are saying is that God made the earth only 20,000 years ago but that He made an earth that looks much older.

However, that gets us into major theological problems. It makes God a deceiver. Because God did not have to make the earth look old. The earth and universe could indeed look like it was made only 20,000 years ago.

YEC proposes that God made the earth described in Genesis in six days, miraculously. That means that on the third day, God separated the dry land from the seas, and made all the vegetation. Vegetation implies a layer of some kind of soil. The fact that erosion of rocks makes more soil does not mean YEC makes God into a deceiver; he told us about it.
But it doesn't imply soil that are many yards thick -- as we see in the Midwest. It implies only soil thick enough to support the plants. Nor does it imply miles thick sedimentary rocks that are made from erosion of other rocks. Erosion which is a slow process. Finally, it does not imply metamorphic rocks, which are sedimentary rocks that have been subjected to slow heat and pressure to transform them.

So, God did not tell us about these. IF we had found soil that was very thin and, at its thickest indicated erosion over 20,000 years, then I would happily conclude that the earth is 20,000 years old.

Also, there is no reason that God had to make all the plants. He could easily make just those plants that can live in thin soil.

In short, we do not deduce the initial state from "young earth", we deduce it from "earth as described in Genesis 1".
The point is that you should deduce what we should see NOW from "young earth". IOW, if the earth really is young, then what should it look like? In this case, you are using "earth as described in Genesis 1" as an ad hoc hypothesis to avoid falsification of young earth.

Sure, as long as the sedimentary rock could not have been made through the processes of a global flood or however it is Dave Tyler thinks it was made. But I was talking about soil; I didn't say anything about the earth being made with sedimentary rock. That idea would have no justification--it's the sort of random, "God did it that way" idea I reject.
Again, let's look at the Midwest. Iowa, Missouri, Illinois, etc. How deep does the soil need to be to grow the grasses that were the prairie before we started farming it? About 6 inches. How deep is the soil? Initially, it was over 20 feet. No way that could accumulate in 20,000 years. So the depth of the soil there is the same random "God did it that way" that you reject.

lucaspa: "Jugulum, if God had really created a universe that is only 10,000 years old, then that universe could easily LOOK that old."

Sure. Was that supposed to be an argument against something I said?
Yes. look at what you wrote jusst below:
"It's not that God was compelled to make soil, it's that soil is inferred from the description of what he did make. See above."
Now, what you have is that God is compelled to make all the plants we see now -- including redwoods and other trees that require a lot of topsoil. However, is that true? Did God have to make those particular plants? NO! God could have made only plants that required very little soil or that lived on bare rocks -- like lichen. In that case we would have an earth that looked its real age. Not a deceptive one that looks older.

That's not a different statement--it's what I originally said back in post 89. And I said it for two reasons. First, as I also said in post 89, "I'm trying to limit my comments to how we should approach the evidence, not the specific conclusions we might make." After all, that's the topic of the thread. Second, I haven't examined all the evidence well enough to know whether it's been falsified.
And again we have 2 different statements, or maybe 3:
1. YEC is falsified.
2. Jugulum accepts that YEC is falsified.
3. Jugulum has examined the evidence so that he knows YEC is falsified.

Now, this does get back to how we should approach the evidence. The evidence is going to support or falsify YEC. That is independent of how we approach it. IOW, the universe is what it is, not what we would like it to be. And the evidence is going to reflect what the universe really is, not what we would like it to be.

Now, you are approaching the evidence as tho falsification of YEC depends on whether you believe it is falsified. It doesn't. Falsification of YEC (or any theory) is independent on your knowledge or whether you accept the evidence.

God-of-the-gaps theology says that there must be gaps into which we can insert God, because if there are no gaps, God is absent. Yes, "evolution is atheism" is God-of-the-gaps. And yes, many (if not most) YECs think that way. But "evolution is atheism" is not part of the factual claims YEC makes about the history of the earth. The ideas of young earth and special creation of kinds do include the idea that the history of the world includes events which cannot be explained naturalistically. In other words, they do involve the idea of gaps that God "bridged". But "there are gaps" is not the same as "there must be gaps or God is absent".
I disagree with your characterization of god-of-the-gaps. Gotg states, or at least implies, that God is absent outside of gaps. That is, if there is a "natural' explanation, then God is absent.

Now, it looks to me that you are arguing not on the totality of statements make by YEC, but only on what has been stated here. That is valid, as long as you label it as such.

Now, let's look at Kent Hovind's famous $250,000 prize for "proving" evolution:
"Choices of how the observed phenomena came into being..

The universe was created by God.
The universe always existed.
The universe came into being by itself by purely natural processes (known as evolution) so that no appeal to the supernatural is needed. "http://www.drdino.com/Ministry/250k/index.jsp
Notice the "purely natural ... no appeal to the supernatural is needed." BTW, notice also that Hovind characterizes the debate as Creation vs evolution. The idea that God created by evolution is excluded.

Let's look at Act 590 and the defintions of "creation science" [YEC] and evolution as put forward by YEC:


"(1) Sudden creation of the universe, energy, and life from nothing; (2) The insufficiency of mutation and natural selection in bringing about development of all living kinds from a single organism; (3) Changes only within fixed limits of originally created kinds of plants and animals; (4) Separate ancestry for man and apes; (5) Explanation of the earth's geology by catastrophism including the occurrence of a worldwide flood; and (6) A relatively recent inception of the earth and living kinds.


In contrast, "evolution-science" was defined as being scientific evidences and their inferences that indicate:



(1) Emergence by naturalistic processes of the universe from disordered matter and emergence of life from nonlife; (2) The sufficiency of mutation and natural selection in bringing about the development of present living kinds from simple earlier kinds; (3) Emergence by mutation and natural selection of present living kinds from simple earlier kinds; (4) Emergence of man from a common ancestor with apes; (5) Explanation of the earth's geology and the evolutionary sequence by uniformitarianism; and (6) An inception several billion years ago of the earth and somewhat later of life.



Now, let's look at the creation science oath:""(1)The Bible is the written Word of God, and because we believe it to be inspired thruout, all of its assertions are historically and scientifically true in all of the original autographs. To the student of nature, this means that the account of origins in Genesis is a factual presentation of simple historical truths. (2) All basic types of living things, including man, were made by direct creative acts of God during Creation Week as described in Genesis. Whatever biological changes have occurred since Creation have accomplished only changes within the original created kinds. (3) The great Flood described in Genesis, commonly referred to as the Noachian Deluge, was an historical event, world-wide in its extent and effect. (4) Finally, we are an organization of Christian men of science, who accept Jesus Christ as our Lord and Savior. The account of the special creation of Adam and Eve as one man and one woman, and their subsequent Fall into sin, is the basis for our belief in the necessity of a Savior for all mankind. Therefore, salvation can come only thru accepting Jesus Christ as our Savior."



Now, notice the bolded statement. If there is no special creation, there is no theism.


Compare the definitions of evolution and creation science and then the oath. That separate creation is by God in the oath. Taken together, it is plain that evolution = without God. It's gotg.


"God made separate kinds instantaneously" is not the same as "life can only come about through instantaneous creation."

No. The first is a statement about what did happen. The second is a statement about what can possibly happen.
If the first statement is true -- this is what did happen -- then the second is a logical conclusion that this is the only way it could have happened.

Jugulum, in order to accept a scientific hypothesis, you have to show that all the other hypotheses are wrong. So, if you are going to state, as a theory, that "God made separate kinds instantaneously", then you are also stating that kinds can only come about by God creating them instantaneously.

As I said, do you really think creationism allows the possibility of the formation of life by chemical reactions? If such could happen, how would you know that "God made separate kinds instantaneously" was true? In that case, all the separate kinds could come about thru chemistry.

Creationism disallows life on earth having actually come about by chemistry. Creationism does not disallow life such as what we have on earth coming about by chemistry. See the difference?
Nope. If the second is allowed, then you can never say the first is true. After all, if it could happen, how can you say it did not happen? Also, if you look at the work of Spetner and the quotes of work by Hoyle, you find that creationism does indeed stated that it is impossible for life to arise by chemistry.

Also, look back in the Act 590 definition of YEC:
(2) The insufficiency of mutation and natural selection in bringing about development of all living kinds from a single organism;
See that "insufficiency"? That means it is impossible for mutation and natural selection to bring about new kinds.

lucaspa:
Now, these are the statements defining YEC by YECers. So, can you please show me where YEC is somehow different from that? Either thru statements of people defining YEC or by logical extension of the scientific statements of YEC. Thanks.

No, that's not what these statements are. These are the statements defining what you have to agree with to work at ICR and AiG. They include the theology of point 4, something completely separate from the factual, scientific claims they make.
I asked you to show me where YEC is different from the claims. You didn't do that.

Now, look at the scientific claims in Act 590:
2) The insufficiency of mutation and natural selection in bringing about development of all living kinds from a single organism; (3) Changes only within fixed limits of originally created kinds of plants and animals;

Compare with the ICR oath:
(2) All basic types of living things, including man, were made by direct creative acts of God during Creation Week as described in Genesis. Whatever biological changes have occurred since Creation have accomplished only changes within the original created kinds.

Back to Act 590:
(5) Explanation of the earth's geology by catastrophism including the occurrence of a worldwide flood;

Now the Oath:
(3) The great Flood described in Genesis, commonly referred to as the Noachian Deluge, was an historical event, world-wide in its extent and effect.

Looks pretty similar to me.

I suppose it depends on what you mean by "YEC". I take it to mean, "The set of statements made about the history of the world based on a 'literal' interpretation of Genesis." If you agree with those statements, you are a YECer. You seem to want it to include theology over which YECers might disagree.I'm saying that YEC includes theology in those statements. I don't mind; that doesn't stop YEC from being a scientific theory. If they want to appeal to direct action by God, that's fine. If you disagree with the theology, you might want to find a different label for yourself.

[Jugulum]

lucaspa,

Before I respond to your post in full, I want to make sure you understand one of my points. It's not clear to me whether you do, and I want to find out if any of your arguments would change after clarification of that point.

To apply this: Data does not count as evidence against YEC if it can be explained using a miraculous initial state reasonably inferred from a "literal" interpretation of Genesis.
That doesn't save most of the ad hoc hypotheses in YEC from being ad hoc even by your definition. The problem is that a lot of the hypotheses being used are NOT from a literal interpretation of Genesis. For instance, a literal interpretation of Genesis gives a very gentle Flood. But YEC invokes a very violent Flood. Another instance is the ad hoc hypothesis of light in transit. There is nothing in a literal Genesis to justify making that hypothesis.
Here you seem to understand my definition. The question of which or how many YEC hypotheses are saved by that definition is a separate issue, but the argument seems a logical response to mine.

In short, we do not deduce the initial state from "young earth", we deduce it from "earth as described in Genesis 1".
The point is that you should deduce what we should see NOW from "young earth". IOW, if the earth really is young, then what should it look like? In this case, you are using "earth as described in Genesis 1" as an ad hoc hypothesis to avoid falsification of young earth.
Here's where I'm not sure you understood me. I'm saying that "young earth" by itself isn't the hypothesis to be falsified in the first place. Rather, "an earth/universe created less than 20,000 years ago with the features described in Genesis 1" is the hypothesis. So we should deduce what we should see NOW from "young earth that started as described". In other words, we should deduce from the hypothesized starting point; deducing from other starting points does not lead to predictions that can falsify the hypothesis.

That's what I meant. Did you understand that when you wrote your response? If you didn't, does this clarification lead you to alter any of your arguments? If you did, do you see why I'm uncertain whether you did, and can you clarify your argument to help eliminate that uncertainty?

[Jugulum]

And again we have 2 different statements, or maybe 3:
1. YEC is falsified.
2. Jugulum accepts that YEC is falsified.
3. Jugulum has examined the evidence so that he knows YEC is falsified.

Now, this does get back to how we should approach the evidence. The evidence is going to support or falsify YEC. That is independent of how we approach it. IOW, the universe is what it is, not what we would like it to be. And the evidence is going to reflect what the universe really is, not what we would like it to be.

Now, you are approaching the evidence as tho falsification of YEC depends on whether you believe it is falsified. It doesn't. Falsification of YEC (or any theory) is independent on your knowledge or whether you accept the evidence.
I want to respond to this separately, because I have no idea WHERE you're getting this.

The purpose of my original statement--not saying whether YEC has been falsified--was very simple. I just meant that my arguments didn't assume anything about whether or not YEC has been falsified. My arguments are about how we should approach evidence, about philosophy of science, and not about whether the earth really is old; they don't rely on that conclusion in any way.

Of course YEC either has or has not been falsified completely independent of my beliefs on the matter. I'm not asking anyone to change their minds based on my knowledge of the evidence. All I'm saying is that I don't know whether or not YEC really has been falsified or not, and the reason for my ignorance is that I haven't evaluated enough of the evidence.

That's all. I don't understand your objection.

[lucaspa]

I'm not aware that Morris or I would hold that phenomena of historical sciences like geology, paleontology, and astronomy cannot be studied scientifically, and I am not aware of any solid evidence that lucaspa has provided in support of his claims wrt Morris.
Read my posts immediately before and after this one I'm quoting. Let's be clear. Morris doesn't claim that ALL historical sciences cannot be studied scientifically (after all, he claims to study geology scientifically), but that "origins" science cannot be studied scientifically. Sometimes. However, it is difficult to judge where Morris draws the line between "origins" and historical sciences. Obviously, the 3 disciplines mentioned about deal with origins: of stars, galaxies, the universe itself, geological strata, origin of fossils, etc.

While I've replied to that post by this time, you should feel free to repeat any good points that you think that lucaspa makes, since he's mostly on manual "ignore". Hmmm. Aren't you the one that wants me to feel free to "time" your non-response? I see you run by 2 separate standards -- for Captain and for everyone else.

As with Popper's demarcation criteria, there probably isn't a hard-and-fast distinction to be made between operational and "origins" science--yet I think that you would hold that there is a real distinction between science and non-science. Notice that you slipped into "origins science" and not "historical sciences" like you used above. Nice sleight-of-hand here. I have shown where Morris denies that "origins science" is science. What is the distinction between "historical science" and "origins science".?

I don't think that I need to do anything of the kind to make my point. I've been over the major points already. Lucaspa's example of similarity (the meteor impact) demonstrates some of them. First, the quetion asked is different. Second, the question doesn't begin to get answered until a operational science question has been asked and addressed (what typically happens when rocks collide with the surface of the Earth at high speed?). Third, the data are compared and inductive judgments are rendered.
1. How is the question different? What is the difference in asking "what caused meteor crator?" and "what causes the smell of fruit from mixing aldehyde and alcohol?"
2. The question of the origin of meteor crator can be answered without any reference to operational science. It can be deduced that a rock collided with the earth at high speed (fragments and melting of the fragments) and then you can hypothesize that a crator will result whenever a rock at high speed hits the earth.
3. Please specify why you think "inductive judgements are rendered". Why do you think this is inductive and not deductive?

Science as a pursuit of true information about our world cannot ignore the possibility of miracles without committing a logical fallacy.
Granting such a possibility, the practice of science must refrain from using naturalistic assumptions exclusively to reach conclusions. An inference to the best explanation will take the place of observations as to what typically happens.
1. I agree that miracle cannot be ruled out a priori. And that hasn't been done in the history of science. Remember, the first accepted theories were special creation (miracle) and global flood. So, miracle was considered, tested, and rejected.
2. What you call "miracle" is, in reality, an alternative natural mechanism. That is, the process may not be understood, but instantaneous formation -- as you use miracle -- becomes a natural mechanism. Deductions can be drawn from that and tested.
3. Because of the limitations of experiments that result in methodological naturalism, a naturalistic assumption about how God works is the only way God can get into science. What we are testing, therefore, becomes whether the "natural" method of evolution or the "natural" method of special creation can explain the data.

MN doesn't need to be dropped. It needs to be supplemented. Not really, since what creationism proposes is not really miracle but an alternative material (natural) method for the origin of entities. Instead of the "material" method of evolution of new species from existing species, special creation has the "material" method of instantaneous manufacture of species.

It seems to me that it becomes an interesting statement when one considers that an origins science that fails to countenance the possibility of miracles commits a logical fallacy to which operational science is not subject. Why isn't operational science subject to the same possibility of miracle? Instead of looking for a material method -- chemical reaction -- of aldehyde and alcohol to form ketones, why don't we look for the possibility of a miraculous creation of the ketones and miraculous disappearance of the alcohol and aldehyde in the beaker?

The first is a particular (1x), the latter two are "how things usually work" afaics (perhaps I should have read "why is this piece of iron repeatedly attracted to this rock?").
The first could be crafted into operational science by trying to find out how iron usually gets attracted to this rock.Why don't you consider the miracle of God's invisible finger pushing the iron to the rock?

This is where Scott, quite rightly, wonders why it is appropriate to invoke miracle in historical/origins science. Since miracle is not invoked in operational science, why should it be invoked in origins science? The only reason seems to be: because that fits with a particular religious viewpoint. Not that there is anything in science to or philosophy of science to justify it.

[lucaspa]

Here's where I'm not sure you understood me. I'm saying that "young earth" by itself isn't the hypothesis to be falsified in the first place. Rather, "an earth/universe created less than 20,000 years ago with the features described in Genesis 1" is the hypothesis. So we should deduce what we should see NOW from "young earth that started as described". In other words, we should deduce from the hypothesized starting point; deducing from other starting points does not lead to predictions that can falsify the hypothesis. That's what I meant. Did you understand that when you wrote your response?
I did understand that when I wrote my response. I just ignored it because I thought you would see the problems with it. I see what you are saying. You are justifying the Appearance of Age by saying: "God created plants on day 3. Since those plants include sequoias, aspens, and other plants that require deep topsoil, then God also created the topsoil in which they can grow. That topsoil looks as though it took much longer than 20,000 years to form by erosion, etc, but it had to be created in place in order to have those plants." Have I got that right?

The problem is that you have an underlying premise here: God had to create these particular plants and this particular ecosystem. Plants and ecosystem which, in turn, requires deep topsoil.

BUT, God is under no such restriction. IOW, the premise is wrong. There are plants adapted to living on rocks or in very little topsoil. Therefore, God could have created varieties of plants that live on bare rock or a little topsoil. Plants that would provide fruit and grains for herbivores to eat, and then predators to prey on those herbivores. IOW, an ecosystem that does run on a young planet with very little topsoil.

Do you see the scientific and theological fallacy in the "hypothesis"? You are putting limits on God by saying "God was required to create just this ecosystem we see and not one that is consistent with a young planet." All you have done is move the problem of God's deception back a step. God is still deceiving because He is deceptive in choosing an ecosystem that requires an earth that looks old when it is young instead of providing an ecosystem consistent with an earth that really is young.

That's why I say the hypothesis is: the earth is young. Anything else gets you into the logical problem of saying that this ecosystem is the only possible ecosystem and thus the circular reasoning of saying "God could only create this ecosystem because this is the ecosystem He created." You still have the problem of the Appearance of Age hypothesis: God deceived us. Yes, you "save" YEC, but the cost is making a god that no one can trust or worship.

This can be avoided simply by noting that textual clues tell you that Genesis 1-3 isn't meant to be read literally in the first place and realizing that the how that God creates is not logically connected to the existence of God. God can create any way He chooses, and the honest way for Him to create is by the processes and by the timing discovered in a study of God's Creation.

[geochron]

In each case you have something in the present that you expect to give you insight into the past.
Historical science is "What happened?"
Operational science is "How do things usually work"?



No, the examples both relate to how things usually work. The only distinction is in the timeframe over which one applies "usually"



The expectation of this thread seems to be that there are totally different approaches to obtaining answers to these two questions, but the point is more subtle than that. You can obtain information about how things usually work thought direct and repeatable observations (experimentation that requires no significant extrapolations). Determining the occurrence of specific events in the past frequently requires different (or more) steps of reasoning, and requires a presuppositional framework that is more thinly spread than for "how do things usually work?"



No, the expectation of this thread was that somebody could explain how one example was different in kind from another.



How is relying on one record different in kind from relying on the other?


That's the wrong question, IMO.



That's the crucial question for people who want to say that the difference is relevant to the creationism debate. If you're happy to agree that there is no difference in kind between the two there is no disagreement between us.



Sorry for not returning to this thread sooner. The feeling that the discussion isn't progressing sometimes serves to diminish my enthusiasm.



That's a little harsh - I think you made a lot of progress.



No, but I'm saying that one of your examples has elements of both questions to it (one of them tries to ask "How did things usually work?") and from there you have pressed the point that there is no distinction to be made.



"How did things usually work" (as you put it) is asked by both examples, once of the 1950s and once of the early solar system.