The 'grounding objection' against the truth of counterfactuals

[mattbballman19]

Consider this arguement just as a foundation for the way in which I shall approach my critique to the 'grounding objection'. This argument will be supporting the fact that God has middle knowledge (which Molinism adovocates). I exhort you to critique not the argument itself, but the grounding objection to the second premise. Here is the argument:

1. If there are true counterfactuals about creaturely free choices, then God knows these truths.

2. There are true counterfactuals about creaturely free choices.

3. If God knows true counterfactuals about creaturely free choices, God knows them either logically prior to the divine decree or only logically posterior to the divine decree.

4. Counterfactuals about creaturely free choices cannot be known only logically posterior to the divine creative decree.

5. Therefore, God knows true counterfactuals about creaturely free choices (MP 1 and 2)

6. Therefore, God knows true counterfactuals about creaturely free choices either logically prior to the divine decree or only logically posterior to the divine decree (MP 3 and 5)

7. Therefore, God knows the true counterfactuals about creaturely free choices loically prior to the divine creative decree (DS 4 and 6)

This is basically the essence of the doctrine of middle knowledge. Our focus will be centered upon the truth-value of premise two, which is being challenged by the so-called 'grounding-objection' (GO). Proponents of this objection state that if the counterfactual in question has any truth value at all, it is uniformly false, since there is no ground of their truth. Proponents of GO have never clearly articulated or defended the version of what is called the truth-maker theory (TMT), according to which true propositions are made to be true by various entities in the world. TMT reject truth-maker maximalism (TMM), which is the doctrine that all types of true propositions have truth-makers.

Which brings us to the yet unanswered rebuttal of Plantinga answering the the challenge of the GO saying, "It seems to me much clearer that some counterfactuals of freedom are at least possibly true than that the truth of propositions must, in general, be grounded in this way."

Also, acceptable truth-makers for counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (COCF) are available. Freddoso proposes that COCF are grounded by the fact that a relevant indicative proposition would have grounds of its truth. So, the truth-maker of the counterfactual If matt were at his computer, he would type this post is the state of affairs. So matt at his computer would have a truth-maker, under this specific condition.

That's all for now.

matt

[garthoverman]

Two cents (and hello again, Matt):

It seems to me that if counterfactuals are to have a known truth value (especially if more than one is not false), then the knowledge must be 'grounded' in a real encounter with an actual world. This, of course, necessitates the simultaneous existence of mutliple actualities such that counterfactuals can exist yet more than one has a non-false truth value.

One might consider as an example the famous two-slit experiment where the propositions "the photon passed through slit A" and "the photon passed through slit B" can both have a non-false truth value.

In other words, its seems to me that two-valued logic is inadequate to describe reality, especially as it relates to counterfactuals, the notion of so-called "middle-knowledge," etc...

Yours,
Garth

[mattbballman19]

The "grounding objection", as well as the points you raised, have been adequately answered by William Craig http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/grounding.html). There are essentially two points: (i) If I am more sure of the truth of counterfactuals than the grounding objection, then so much the worse for such truth-maker philosophy; (ii) There are things that have a truth value that are not "grounded" such as "Dinosaurs are extinct today" and "No physical objects exist." But check out the article for a more lengthy defense, and I'll discuss the specifics you raise here.

matt

[garthoverman]

Today @ 04:25 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=101748#post101748)
mattbballman19:

The "grounding objection", as well as the points you raised, have been adequately answered by William Craig http://www.leaderu.com/offices/billcraig/docs/grounding.html). There are essentially two points: (i) If I am more sure of the truth of counterfactuals than the grounding objection, then so much the worse for such truth-maker philosophy; (ii) There are things that have a truth value that are not "grounded" such as "Dinosaurs are extinct today" and "No physical objects exist." But check out the article for a more lengthy defense, and I'll discuss the specifics you raise here.

Hello, Matt, and good day.

I'll confess that I didn't read Craig's article. I'm not particularly interested in the theological implications of "middle-knowledge" and counterfactuals because I'm not a Christian, and the discussion really has no application within my worldview. I was only chiming in to make the point that quantum indeterminancy renders the classical conception of divine foreknowledge obsolete until one can derive a successful model for objective reduction of the quantum state. If this is what is meant by "truth-maker" I'd be curious to here it explained in greater detail. Otherwise I'm more apt to accept a many-worlds interpretation of quantum-state reduction which thereby renders the Christian God's foreknowledge incompatible with final judgement.

Yours,
Garth

[wwatts]

Today @ 04:46 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=102248#post102248)
garthoverman:



Hello, Matt, and good day.

I'll confess that I didn't read Craig's article. I'm not particularly interested in the theological implications of "middle-knowledge" and counterfactuals because I'm not a Christian, and the discussion really has no application within my worldview. I was only chiming in to make the point that quantum indeterminancy renders the classical conception of divine foreknowledge obsolete until one can derive a successful model for objective reduction of the quantum state. If this is what is meant by "truth-maker" I'd be curious to here it explained in greater detail. Otherwise I'm more apt to accept a many-worlds interpretation of quantum-state reduction which thereby renders the Christian God's foreknowledge incompatible with final judgement.

Yours,
Garth

Garth, good answer!

I'd be very interested in seeing your argument against God's foreknowledge in a syllogism form. I'm not an expert in the subject so I'd like to know the basic premises and conclusion you have drawn. Thanks!

[mattbballman19]

Hello, Matt, and good day.

Yo! I'm still researching some of the points you made, so this is not my final response to your post.

I'll confess that I didn't read Craig's article. I'm not particularly interested in the theological implications of "middle-knowledge" and counterfactuals because I'm not a Christian, and the discussion really has no application within my worldview.

Inherent within the 'theologically' based article is actually some important data relating you the issues you raised. Just in case an article is technically 'theolgical' (in the broadest sense of the word), doesn't mean there may not be some philosophical explanations inherent in whatever terms are being utilized in premises provided for various arguments.

I was only chiming in to make the point that quantum indeterminancy renders the classical conception of divine foreknowledge obsolete until one can derive a successful model for objective reduction of the quantum state.

Your statement wrongly presupposes the universal unknowability of quantum events. For one thing, scientists believe that the quantum world is just as determined as the regurlar world of macro-objects like me and my computer. We just do not (perhaps can't) know the causes for some events and we can't predict exactly the precise behavior of quantum entities. So, in effect, not all scientists agree that subatomic events are uncaused. Craig says, "A great many physicists today are quite dissatisfied with the Copenhagen interpretation of sub-atomic physics and are exploring deterministic theories like that of David Bohm."

If this is what is meant by "truth-maker" I'd be curious to here it explained in greater detail.

Craig defines it thusly, " A truth–maker is typically defined as that in virtue of which a sentence and/or a proposition is true. According to Peter Simons, "Truth–maker theory accepts the role of something which makes a proposition true, that is, whose existence suffices for the proposition to be true. But it does not automatically pronounce on the ontological category of the truth–maker."{6} "Indeed," he insists, "anything whatever is a truth–maker."{7} But historically the orthodox view has identified truth–makers with such abstract realities as facts or states of affairs–more often than not, the fact stated as a proposition's truth condition, as disclosed by the disquotation principle. Thus, what makes the statement "Al Plantinga is an avid rock–climber" true is the fact that Al Plantinga is an avid rock–climber or the state of affairs of Al Plantinga's being an avid rock–climber.

Otherwise I'm more apt to accept a many-worlds interpretation of quantum-state reduction which thereby renders the Christian God's foreknowledge incompatible with final judgement.

Could you explain this in a little more detail. Thanks.

matt

[Jaltus]

Interesting, I'll stay tuned to this debate and probably chime in later, since I tend to be the resident Molinist.

[mattbballman19]

Thanks Jaltus! Your input would be appreciated!

matt

[garthoverman]

Today @ 04:37 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=103823#post103823)
mattbballman19:

Hello, Matt, and good day.

Yo! I'm still researching some of the points you made, so this is not my final response to your post.
Cool beans. :thumb:

I'll confess that I didn't read Craig's article. I'm not particularly interested in the theological implications of "middle-knowledge" and counterfactuals because I'm not a Christian, and the discussion really has no application within my worldview.

Inherent within the 'theologically' based article is actually some important data relating you the issues you raised. Just in case an article is technically 'theolgical' (in the broadest sense of the word), doesn't mean there may not be some philosophical explanations inherent in whatever terms are being utilized in premises provided for various arguments.
Basically I'm saying that I really don't care about the limitations (or lack thereof) on the knowledge of a being that I don't believe to exist.

I was only chiming in to make the point that quantum indeterminancy renders the classical conception of divine foreknowledge obsolete until one can derive a successful model for objective reduction of the quantum state.

Your statement wrongly presupposes the universal unknowability of quantum events.
Not unknowability. Unpredictability.


For one thing, scientists believe that the quantum world is just as determined as the regurlar world of macro-objects like me and my computer.
Not entirely correct. Some may believe that the quantum world is as deterministic as the macro-world seems to be, but I think that those are in the minority. Your perception and mine on this issue both may be distorted by the types of scientists we familarize ourselves with. I would simply say that the matter is undecided.


We just do not (perhaps can't) know the causes for some events and we can't predict exactly the precise behavior of quantum entities. So, in effect, not all scientists agree that subatomic events are uncaused. Craig says, "A great many physicists today are quite dissatisfied with the Copenhagen interpretation of sub-atomic physics and are exploring deterministic theories like that of David Bohm."
Sure, but unless they've developed a way to resolve quantum indeterminancy, the beliefs of these scientists appears to lack any substantial support in reality. It seems to me that the uncertainty principle preludes that from ever actually happening.

If this is what is meant by "truth-maker" I'd be curious to here it explained in greater detail.

Craig defines it thusly, " A truth–maker is typically defined as that in virtue of which a sentence and/or a proposition is true. According to Peter Simons, "Truth–maker theory accepts the role of something which makes a proposition true, that is, whose existence suffices for the proposition to be true. But it does not automatically pronounce on the ontological category of the truth–maker."{6} "Indeed," he insists, "anything whatever is a truth–maker."{7} But historically the orthodox view has identified truth–makers with such abstract realities as facts or states of affairs–more often than not, the fact stated as a proposition's truth condition, as disclosed by the disquotation principle. Thus, what makes the statement "Al Plantinga is an avid rock–climber" true is the fact that Al Plantinga is an avid rock–climber or the state of affairs of Al Plantinga's being an avid rock–climber.

I see. You might read Quantum Indeterminacy and the Omniscience of God (http://www.bostontheological.org/colloquium/bts/btsdavis.htm) for some more theological application of what I'm talking about.

Otherwise I'm more apt to accept a many-worlds interpretation of quantum-state reduction which thereby renders the Christian God's foreknowledge incompatible with final judgement.

Could you explain this in a little more detail. Thanks.
The many-worlds interpretation theorizes that for every probable outcome of a quantum process, a real universe exists to represent that outcome. In other words, the measurement of a superposed state collapses the wave-function and fractures reality into two or more unique universes - Schröedinger's Cat is dead in one universe and alive in another. David Deutsch is one of the leading proponents of this theory, and it is upon this theory that the latest developments in quantum computing are based. Read:

http://www.qubit.org/people/david/Articles/Frontiers.html

and

http://www.qubit.org/people/david/Articles/PhilosophyNow.html

The reason this is incompatible with final judgement as typically conceived in Christian Theism is that in the many-words scenario there are no real probabilities that do not actualize. In other words, the probability that a person does not accept Christ is just as real as the probability that a person does. Obviously this seems completely counter-intuitive. Generally we conceive of our interactions as being one way or the other - but never both. Still, like many other aspects of reality, quantum theory is showing us that our typical classical approximations are fundamentally inadequate for describing it.

BTW - wwatts, I'm sorry, but I don't really have a penchant for constructing syllogisms and prefer expository dialogue instead. I'd be happy to answer any direct questions you might have - to the best of my abilty, of course.

Yours,
Garth

[mattbballman19]

Not unknowability. Unpredictability.

Hmm. When you said, ' . . . that quantum indeterminancy renders the classical conception of divine foreknowledge obsolete . . .' I supposed that knowledge was related. At least the alleged idea that God does not possess knowledge to make the correct predictions or the knowledge required to make the option of making predictions obsolete.

Not entirely correct.

The view of quantum physics that the scientists hold or the connotation of my statement that scientists are leaning towards the idea that quantum events occur on a deterministic level? I don't really want to get into this, because its a little off the topic of 'the grounding objection'.

Sure, but unless they've developed a way to resolve quantum indeterminancy, the beliefs of these scientists appears to lack any substantial support in reality. It seems to me that the uncertainty principle preludes that from ever actually happening.

I'm reading those articles now, so I'll get back to you when I finish. But from what I've read so far, it seems that certain presuppositions made as a foundation for their justification are in error. And that's probably where I'll make my attack.

In other words, the probability that a person does not accept Christ is just as real as the probability that a person does. Obviously this seems completely counter-intuitive. Generally we conceive of our interactions as being one way or the other - but never both.

Here are my initial thoughts. I don't see how the latter follows from the former. I can imagine it being the case that our actions have the possibility being one way or the other, but, at the same time, each of the possible ways in which an action could go can be measured with a certain amount of probability. Maybe we should clarify what we mean by probability. I'm working from a definition which looks at probability within the context of one's individual background knowledge concerning the history/pyscology etc . . . of the agent and jugding from that standpoint the probable way in which the agent will choose to go, all the while having the knowledge that it is possible that the agent could go a different way; even though a certain probability existed from other instances of background knowledge that may have existed making the probability go both ways (not in terms of the actual choice made, but the way the actual choice could have been actualized).

This is just me thinking out loud. But, in all respect, this is a little off the topic of the 'grounding objection'. But, if you want, you could start a seperate thread.

matt