Non-theist's Unattractive Premises

[wwatts]

It seems to me that an argument starts with some premises and ends in a conclusion. I think the most a person can do to change another person's mind is force them to realize premises that they hold in hopes that some day they will change their minds. I'd like to make a post that contains the most basic unattractive premises that atheists and non-theists must hold and maybe arguments for or against them. I'm sure another post can be made for unattractive theist premises. I'd be interested in seeing that one too.

With that in mind, I will just keep adding premises to this post as they come, if indeed they do come.

(1. Objective moral values do not exist

or

1.a. Moral values do not necessarily exist as part of a person)



(2. Our cognitive faculties (minds and senses) are generally reliable (correct more then 50% of the time) for no reason at all

or

(2.a. Our mind's thoughts are determined (caused).

and

2.b Nothing can be rationally affirmed ))



((3. The universe is infinite

and

3.a Actual infinites exist)

Or

(3.b. The universe began to exist

and

3.c. Things can begin to exist without a cause))


I think this can be expanded on greatly, especially the universe part. There probably could be sections devoted to epistemological premises, cosmology premises, and more. I'd like to see some of the other premises that could potentially be listed. I'd also like to see some rejections to these premises if there are any.

Also, If someone makes a theist's unattractive premises post, I would put those premises that were unattractive that I hold to in my signature file. I would invite an non-theist to do the same here. I personally think everyone should put their basic epistemological premises in their signature. It would stop a lot of confusion. :P

[Passant]

Hello wwatts and everyone! This is my first post here, so I guess I will just jump in with both feet. wwatts correctly points out that some atheist premises are unattractive. This is not make them incorrect. I would really like to address point1.

objective moral values do not exist

I believe that the statement is most likely true. I find this unattractive, and somewhat troubling, but unfortunately likely true. Of course you must first define what you mean by " objective moral values " but in most generally accepted meanings, it is likely to be true. The general Christian claim is that morality comes directly from God. And either the objective morality is revealed in the Bible or directly to humans by some supranatural or transcendental means. The problem with this theory is that no to Christians can agree on the same moral standards. The 10 Commandments is often touted as the basis for God's objective moral values. However, what these commandments actually mean cannot be agreed on. It seems to me that if God was communicating objective moral values to his believers, then his believers would necessarily agree on what these objective moral values are. Thou shalt not kill. To one Christian this means you will not kill anyone at any time for any reason. To the next Christian this means you will not murder someone, but you can kill in self-defense. To the next Christian you can kill in self-defense and you can also put a criminal to death. To the next Christian you can kill people that are defying God's law. (i.e. homosexuals, abortionist, witches, etc.)
and of course the problem is compounded by the fact that God evidently changes these " objective moral values " from time to time. Now I understand that some Christians definition of " objective moral values " means that what ever God says it is moral is a moral simply because it God says it is, and if God changes his mind something moral today can be immoral tomorrow and vice versa, but this only clouds the issue more. If God does indeed change what is moral or immoral his faithful followers should all be able to agree on what he is saying at this point in time. I have come to the unattractive realization that moral values are dictated by society. They are constantly in flux, and what is moral today may be immoral tomorrow, what is immoral to day may be moral tomorrow. I generally believed that the only objective if part of moral values is the desire of society for individuals to take actions that produces more good than harm, and unfortunately what constitutes good and harm or generally subjective. Very unattractive, just like many things in this world.

Best Wishes,
P

[Someone7]

(1. Objective moral values do not exist

or

1.a. Moral values do not necessarily exist as part of a person)

Atheism doesn't necessarily imply this. In fact, many atheists believe in "Objective" morality. They're called Objectivists, or as I like to call them, Randians.

(2. Our cognitive faculties (minds and senses) are generally reliable (correct more then 50% of the time) for no reason at all

This is just silly. Ever heard of evolution? What do you think our chances of survival would be if our cognitive faculities weren't reliable?

[Benjamin]

Okay passant - having realised that many atheistic assumptions are unnatractive - can you give any good reasons for believing them?

In fact, for the sake of argument, let's assume orthodox materialism is absolutely true. Now: Why be an orthodox materialist?:wink:

[Passant]

Okay passant - having realised that many atheistic assumptions are unnatractive - can you give any good reasons for believing them?

I guess that I should have asked for definitions before posting in a philosophy thread. I take the word “unattractive” as meaning “not aesthetically pleasing”. Whether it is aesthetically pleasing or not, has no bearing on validity. I would like there to be an objective morality, but that has no bearing on whether one exists or not.

In fact, for the sake of argument, let's assume orthodox materialism is absolutely true. Now: Why be an orthodox materialist?

I would have to ask, “if it is true why wouldn’t you?” Acting in accord with reality is the best way to avoid error. If orthodox materialism is true, then any philosophy that contradicted it will lead to error, and at best wasted time and energy.

[Ryokan]

Actually, someone7, with that assumption, you have no way of knowing whether or not evolution, your memories, or whats happening now are true. Its the Matrix problem.
and why believe in orthodox materialism? You don't choose what you believe. It just is.

[wwatts]

(1. Objective moral values do not exist

or

1.a. Moral values do not necessarily exist as part of a person)


Atheism doesn't necessarily imply this. In fact, many atheists believe in "Objective" morality. They're called Objectivists, or as I like to call them, Randians.

Ok a quick definition of objective moral values can be that which defines those things that are ultimately good or bad no matter what anyone’s opinion is about them. Objective moral values are not affected by a majority vote and don't change. Do Objectivists believe that torturing a baby for fun is wrong whether anyone believes it or not? If so, then what is it that is outside of a person that makes something wrong or right (this admits the second proposition). If there is nothing outside of a person that does it, then if that moral is objective, it can't change, so there must be an unchanging person somewhere. So please explain the Objectivists viewpoint here so we can modify our proposition if it needs modifying.




(2. Our cognitive faculties (minds and senses) are generally reliable (correct more then 50% of the time) for no reason at all

or

(2.a. Our mind's thoughts are determined (caused).

and

2.b Nothing can be rationally affirmed ))


This is just silly. Ever heard of evolution? What do you think our chances of survival would be if our cognitive faculties weren't reliable?

Maybe you don’t understand the premises, or maybe I don't understand your rebuttal.

2.i) Are you saying that you can use an a-posteriori proposition (evolution) to validate the thing (the sense perception component of your cognitive faculties) that you use to gather a-posteriori information? That would be viscously circular reasoning.

2.ii) Given a denial of (2.i) and a denial of (2.a) and (2.b ) I think that what you are saying is that evolution in a non-deterministic worldview can produce cognitive faculties that are generally reliable. But if that’s the case, then the evolution component of what you are saying is irrelevant since they aren't in a causal relationship with the mind and then (2) becomes true again. This is because in that worldview nothing causes minds (the object that is undetermined) to be generally reliable. Let me know what you think of this. Also, I have another syllogism for you to comment on:


2.1 It would be circular reasoning for humanoid A to use its own cognitive faculties to determine if its own cognitive faculties are generally reliable.

2.2 The probability of any humanoid A actually having cognitive faculties that are generally reliable are
2.2.a low (less then 50%) or
2.2.b inscrutable (unknown).

2.3. If it is unknown if a proposition is true, then there is a defeater for that proposition.

2.4. If generally unreliable cognitive faculties hold a proposition as true, those cognitive faculties are probably wrong about that proposition.

2.5. Therefore any humanoid either has a defeater for everything it holds true, or is probably wrong about everything it holds true, including atheism, materialism, etc (4, 3, 2)


2iii) Or maybe what you are doing is denying (2.i) and (2.a) but not (2.b) if so I would like you to explain. I think that if a mind is determined to hold a certain view (i.e. determinism itself) then it is the case that nothing can be rationally affirmed.

2iv) I'm considering adding another proposition for (2) that would necessarily accepted by non-theists. That would be this:

2.c Wish projection is generally reliable.

This is the case that if you hold (2) then you must hold (2.c) as well. It is interesting that non-theists accuse theists of holding 2.c as true when they themselves hold 2.c as true as well.

[wwatts]

The problem with this theory is that no to Christians can agree on the same moral standards.

I think I'm going to deny this. I think that any human being who is properly functioning can tell that torturing a baby for fun is objectively morally wrong. I think that you may be confusing exhaustive knowledge of moral standards with knowledge of moral standards. I don't think we have to have exhaustive knowledge in order to have knowledge, moral or otherwise.

[Passant]

The problem with this theory is that no to Christians can agree on the same moral standards.

I think I'm going to deny this. I think that any human being who is properly functioning can tell that torturing a baby for fun is objectively morally wrong. I think that you may be confusing exhaustive knowledge of moral standards with knowledge of moral standards. I don't think we have to have exhaustive knowledge in order to have knowledge, moral or otherwise.

WHY is it morally wrong to torture a baby? YOU THINK that a properly functioning human being knows that torturing a baby for fun is wrong, but that is your subjective opinion. How can we have knowledge of “objective” moral standards, and not exhaustive knowledge? If you believe there is an Objective morality, what is it, how do we know what it is? I will accept your definition of objective morals

“a quick definition of objective moral values can be that which defines those things that are ultimately good or bad no matter what anyone’s opinion is about them. Objective moral values are not affected by a majority vote and don't change.”
By this definition, either objective morals don’t exist, or at least we don’t know of them.

But you also skirted my point. I feel confident that ALL Christians agree that torturing a baby for fun is immoral, but what about killing? Where is the total agreement on that? And that is only one of many moral issues that Christians THEMSELVES cannot agree on.

[wwatts]

Today @ 06:14 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=103355#post103355)
Passant:

The problem with this theory is that no to Christians can agree on the same moral standards.



WHY is it morally wrong to torture a baby? YOU THINK that a properly functioning human being knows that torturing a baby for fun is wrong, but that is your subjective opinion. How can we have knowledge of “objective” moral standards, and not exhaustive knowledge? If you believe there is an Objective morality, what is it, how do we know what it is? I will accept your definition of objective morals

“a quick definition of objective moral values can be that which defines those things that are ultimately good or bad no matter what anyone’s opinion is about them. Objective moral values are not affected by a majority vote and don't change.”
By this definition, either objective morals don’t exist, or at least we don’t know of them.

But you also skirted my point. I feel confident that ALL Christians agree that torturing a baby for fun is immoral, but what about killing? Where is the total agreement on that? And that is only one of many moral issues that Christians THEMSELVES cannot agree on.

You seem to be saying this premise and conclusion:

1) Christians dont agree on every moral value
2) ....
3) Therefore there is not even one objective moral value.

You need to fill in the blank for (2) in order to get to (3)

I am saying this:

1) We have cognitive faculties that see, hear, taste, smell, touch and tell us that things are morally wrong and right (moral values)
2) Our cognitive faculties collect data about the objective world
3) Our cognitive faculties are generally correct
4) Therefore the moral values that are experienced by our cognitive faculties are generally correct and are about the objective world.

It seems to me that you are trying to deny (3). But if you deny (3) then you have a defeater for everything you experience. What premises do you deny in this argument?

[Passant]

Hello wwatts,


You seem to be saying this premise and conclusion:

1) Christians dont agree on every moral value
2) ....
3) Therefore there is not even one objective moral value.

You need to fill in the blank for (2) in order to get to (3)

I am saying this:

1) We have cognitive faculties that see, hear, taste, smell, touch and tell us that things are morally wrong and right (moral values)
2) Our cognitive faculties collect data about the objective world
3) Our cognitive faculties are generally correct
4) Therefore the moral values that are experienced by our cognitive faculties are generally correct and are about the objective world.

It seems to me that you are trying to deny (3). But if you deny (3) then you have a defeater for everything you experience. What premises do you deny in this argument?

I believe that my argument should be structured as follows ,

1) Christians claim to have knowledge of an objective of morality revealed to them by god, either through the Bible or direct revelation.

2) Christians do not agree on every moral value.

3) therefore, their source of moral values cannot come from one objective source.


now your second argument is closer to what I could agree on. I believe the only way to judge the morality or immorality of any action is by the results of that action. Any action that creates more good than harm is moral. Any action that creates more harm than good is in moral. Of course the problem here is how do we judge " good " and " harm ". If humans employed only reason, and had a complete knowledge of all the possible ramifications of any action, this judgment would be an easy task. Since this is not the case in the real world, judging the morality or immorality of many actions is difficult. But trying to judge our morality by a book that was written thousands of years ago, just confuses the issue more. The attractiveness of the Christian worldview is that these issues, while not eliminated are at least reduced. For many simple issues such as premarital sex, the Christian worldview is very clear, this is immoral. If we eliminate this guideline the issue becomes complex. For some people at some times and in some cases, premarital sex can be a moral and beneficial act. For other people at other times and in other cases premarital sex can be immoral and detrimental. But we can see that all moral issues are so clear even within the Christian worldview. A Catholic will say that birth control is a sin and immoral. A Protestant will say that birth control within a marriage is not immoral, however abortion at any time is immoral. A Presbyterian will say that abortion under some circumstances is not immoral. Now you can argue that Presbyterians are not true Christians. Or that Catholics are not interpreting scripture correctly. But if we start from the assumption that all the denominations truly believe in the one Christian God, and have opened their hearts, received the Holy Spirit, or whatever, they should all come to the same conclusion, after all they are receiving their moral values directly from God. The fact that they all come to different conclusions and that many Christians come to many different conclusion on what is moral and immoral, and that the standards of morality seem to change with the general standards of society, (abet more slowly), the only conclusion that I can draw, is that the Bible was written by men to enforce their idea of morality at the time. And that Christians, as with any other religion, change their idea of morality to suit their current society.

The problem of God changing what is moral and immoral is a separate but equally important problem. Even whatxx the majority of Christians consider moral or immoral changes with the times. A hundred years ago a woman and showing her ankles was considered immoral. Not that long ago a woman showing her knees was considered immoral. So maybe God has changed the standards, but how we know that? It seems to me that in many of these areas the church is led by the flock. Preachers would rant and rave against women showing their ankles, until so many of their parishioners realized that this was not so, and the preachers would eventually have to concede. Maybe the parishioners had received direct word from God, while the preacher had evidently missed it, but it seems more likely the parishioners did indeed used their common sense and their cognitive faculties, just as you suggest, and found nothing immoral about women showing their ankles. I will state again that your second structure seems very close to the mark if we use our cognitive faculties we can discover which actions are harmful and which are not. As you also state, are cognitive faculties are " generally reliable ", which is where the problem enters. They're not a hundred percent reliable, so as a society we must come to some general consensus as to what is moral and immoral, using our cognitive faculties, reason, and logic. Very unattractive, but most likely the reality we're stuck with.

I've edited this post to add this,
I should of read your responses better, if you are claiming that objective morals never change, then you must concede that these objective morals don't exist, as morality is in constant flux and change, even within the christian worldview. (Is it fair for me to bring this up after I conceded that God could change moral values? I don't know, but it is your defination.)

[Benjamin]

Acting in accord with reality is the best way to avoid error. If orthodox materialism is true, then any philosophy that contradicted it will lead to error, and at best wasted time and energy.

So why avoid being in error, if being in error feels good? Why avoid "wasting time and energy", if such waste feels good?

[wwatts]

Today @ 12:11 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=103650#post103650)
Passant:

Hello wwatts,




I believe that my argument should be structured as follows ,

1) Christians claim to have knowledge of an objective of morality revealed to them by god, either through the Bible or direct revelation.

2) Christians do not agree on every moral value.

3) therefore, their source of moral values cannot come from one objective source.


now your second argument is closer to what I could agree on. I believe the only way to judge the morality or immorality of any action is by the results of that action. Any action that creates more good than harm is moral. Any action that creates more harm than good is in moral. Of course the problem here is how do we judge " good " and " harm ". If humans employed only reason, and had a complete knowledge of all the possible ramifications of any action, this judgment would be an easy task. Since this is not the case in the real world, judging the morality or immorality of many actions is difficult. But trying to judge our morality by a book that was written thousands of years ago, just confuses the issue more. The attractiveness of the Christian worldview is that these issues, while not eliminated are at least reduced. For many simple issues such as premarital sex, the Christian worldview is very clear, this is immoral. If we eliminate this guideline the issue becomes complex. For some people at some times and in some cases, premarital sex can be a moral and beneficial act. For other people at other times and in other cases premarital sex can be immoral and detrimental. But we can see that all moral issues are so clear even within the Christian worldview. A Catholic will say that birth control is a sin and immoral. A Protestant will say that birth control within a marriage is not immoral, however abortion at any time is immoral. A Presbyterian will say that abortion under some circumstances is not immoral. Now you can argue that Presbyterians are not true Christians. Or that Catholics are not interpreting scripture correctly. But if we start from the assumption that all the denominations truly believe in the one Christian God, and have opened their hearts, received the Holy Spirit, or whatever, they should all come to the same conclusion, after all they are receiving their moral values directly from God. The fact that they all come to different conclusions and that many Christians come to many different conclusion on what is moral and immoral, and that the standards of morality seem to change with the general standards of society, (abet more slowly), the only conclusion that I can draw, is that the Bible was written by men to enforce their idea of morality at the time. And that Christians, as with any other religion, change their idea of morality to suit their current society.

The problem of God changing what is moral and immoral is a separate but equally important problem. Even whatxx the majority of Christians consider moral or immoral changes with the times. A hundred years ago a woman and showing her ankles was considered immoral. Not that long ago a woman showing her knees was considered immoral. So maybe God has changed the standards, but how we know that? It seems to me that in many of these areas the church is led by the flock. Preachers would rant and rave against women showing their ankles, until so many of their parishioners realized that this was not so, and the preachers would eventually have to concede. Maybe the parishioners had received direct word from God, while the preacher had evidently missed it, but it seems more likely the parishioners did indeed used their common sense and their cognitive faculties, just as you suggest, and found nothing immoral about women showing their ankles. I will state again that your second structure seems very close to the mark if we use our cognitive faculties we can discover which actions are harmful and which are not. As you also state, are cognitive faculties are " generally reliable ", which is where the problem enters. They're not a hundred percent reliable, so as a society we must come to some general consensus as to what is moral and immoral, using our cognitive faculties, reason, and logic. Very unattractive, but most likely the reality we're stuck with.

I've edited this post to add this,
I should of read your responses better, if you are claiming that objective morals never change, then you must concede that these objective morals don't exist, as morality is in constant flux and change, even within the christian worldview. (Is it fair for me to bring this up after I conceded that God could change moral values? I don't know, but it is your defination.)

I believe that my argument should be structured as follows ,

1) Christians claim to have knowledge of an objective of morality revealed to them by god, either through the Bible or direct revelation.

2) Christians do not agree on every moral value.

3) therefore, their source of moral values cannot come from one objective source.

I think (3) does not follow from (2). (2) would have to be something like 'Properly functioning Christians or all humans don't agree on any objective moral value'. I think what you have done is take the whole set of christian's moral values, taken one attribute of the set (ie there are some subjective moral values in the set) and attributed that to all of the moral values in the set, even those that are objective. This might be understood as the fallacy of Division. See this link: http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/division.html

I think our miscommunication might be that you think that christians can't believe in subjective moral values AND objective moral values. I didn't say that. All I'm saying is that if there is 1 objective moral value, and given that there has to be an unchanging person to base that on, there is an unchanging person. That objective moral value could be 'torturing innocent babies is objectively wrong for all people'. Do you believe this value changes?

Also, you must deny one of the premises from my argument in order for the conclusion to be avoided. Do you deny any of the premises?

[wwatts]

(4. Objective aesthetics (ie art, beauty, ugliness) do not exist

or

4.a. Aesthetics do not necessarily exist as part of a person)

[Archimedes]

05-20-2003 @ 10:29 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=102490#post102490)
wwatts:

(1. Objective moral values do not exist

or

1.a. Moral values do not necessarily exist as part of a person)
I pick 1.a. What's so untenable about that position? And if moral values did necessarily exist as part of a person, wouldn't that make objective moral values an impossibility? Same applies to aesthetics, in fact I consider moral values to be a kind of aesthetical values.

(2. Our cognitive faculties (minds and senses) are generally reliable (correct more then 50% of the time) for no reason at all

or

(2.a. Our mind's thoughts are determined (caused).

and

2.b Nothing can be rationally affirmed ))
The first premise is false because there is a reason why our minds tend to work more or less reliably, so my pick is 2.a and 2.b. Minds are deterministic barring quantum phenomena, and if you really want to split hairs nothing can be rationally affirmed with 100% certainty due to the fact that our brains are not perfect mathematical models but a lump of meat. I can imagine that some people don't like these premises, but I have no problem with them.

((3. The universe is infinite

and

3.a Actual infinites exist)

Or

(3.b. The universe began to exist

and

3.c. Things can begin to exist without a cause))
My choice is 3b + 3c. The phrase "began to exist" itself presupposes that there's a predefined dimension of time where cause and effect take place, but I reject this notion. Time is a part of the universe, therefore the "event" (if you can call it that) of universe beginning to exist takes place outside time and is not constrained by cause and effect.

[Passant]

Hello Benjamin,
So why avoid being in error, if being in error feels good? Why avoid "wasting time and energy", if such waste feels good?
The problem is there is a difference between an action "doing good" and action asleep in Ottawa route good. I'm sure using drugs feels good to a drug addict, but it obviously is not doing them good.

[Passant]

Hello wwatts,
I believe that my argument should be structured as follows ,

1) Christians claim to have knowledge of an objective of morality revealed to them by god, either through the Bible or direct revelation.

2) Christians do not agree on every moral value.

3) therefore, their source of moral values cannot come from one objective source.

I think (3) does not follow from (2). (2) would have to be something like 'Properly functioning Christians or all humans don't agree on any objective moral value'. I think what you have done is take the whole set of christian's moral values, taken one attribute of the set (ie there are some subjective moral values in the set) and attributed that to all of the moral values in the set, even those that are objective. This might be understood as the fallacy of Division. See this link: <http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/division.html>
I think our miscommunication might be that you think that christians can't believe in subjective moral values AND objective moral values. I didn't say that. All I'm saying is that if there is 1 objective moral value, and given that there has to be an unchanging person to base that on, there is an unchanging person. That objective moral value could be 'torturing innocent babies is objectively wrong for all people'. Do you believe this value changes?
This is a unique approach, at least I have never run across it. Which leads me does several questions. What is the difference between subjective and objective moral values? What would be the source of subjective moral values? And how would you prove whether a moral value was truly objective. I am not aware of any culture that considered torturing a baby for fun to be morally correct. That does not mean that no such culture exists or ever existed. I would propose that the objection of torturing a baby for fun is a product of our evolution. The more that a moral value is useful to the continuation and well-being of the species the more likely it is to be held by a larger part of the population. I would propose that the fact that torturing a baby for fun is considered an immoral act by all religions including those that deny the Christian God, and worship other gods, as well as atheist tends to show that this is a purely human phenomenon.
What about " thou shalt not kill "? This is a direct commandment from the Christian god. This should be an objective moral value. Christians cannot agree on its meaning, therefore this excludes it from being an objective moral value. There are many moral values that Christians claim to be objective i.e. emanating from God, that they are unable to agree on. The problem is further complicated by the fact that Christians, Jews, and Muslims all worship the same God and all have different conclusions as to what to these objective moral values that emanate from this God are. It should not be surprising that there are some moral values that are held by all, or at least a majority of Christians since they are all reading the same book. This can only lead me to the conclusion that these are not objective moral values, do not emanate from God, and the products of our evolution, designed by nature (and man) to facilitate the survival of our species.

Also, you must deny one of the premises from my argument in order for the conclusion to be avoided. Do you deny any of the premises?

1) We have cognitive faculties that see, hear, taste, smell, touch and tell us that things are morally wrong and right (moral values)
2) Our cognitive faculties collect data about the objective world
3) Our cognitive faculties are generally correct
4) Therefore the moral values that are experienced by our cognitive faculties are generally correct and are about the objective world.
Actually I believe I had said that I tend to agree with this statement. The only problem I see with #1, is you would have to include the indoctrination by society that also shapes our opinions of moral values. And of course the big problem for mankind is that No. 3 is correct when you emphasize " generally " this is of course not always the case, and humans have the ability to ignore their cognitive faculties. But the conclusion stated in #4 seems reasonable. If we abandon religious restraints, and use our cognitive faculties to conclude what our moral and immoral values, we will be generally correct. I also believe that these opinions and values are about the objective world. So are cognitive faculties would have to say that torturing babies for fun is immoral. We are glad that we were not tortured as a baby's, and we would not want our babies to be tortured. We also realize that for society to function successfully depends on empathy, and someone lacking empathy is a danger to society as a whole. So it seems that by your definition of of objective moral values, and your idea as to where the moral values originate seems reasonable! Of course, your definition of objective moral value, and the logic you have outlined above, is quite in line with the atheist worldview. I'm sure I am misunderstanding somewhere or else we would not gotten here!
Thanks

[Benjamin]

Passant:

That only works if you allow for an objective idea of what is good for you. If the whole shebang is subjective, (ie what is good is what is most pleasurable) I don't see why anyone would be a materialist if it didn't make them feel good, regardless of arguments for or against.

[wwatts]

Hello wwatts,

This is a unique approach, at least I have never run across it. Which leads me does several questions. What is the difference between subjective and objective moral values?

Hi again! I'm enjoying this discussion!

Lets define Subjective and Objective from www.dictionary.com

sub•jec•tive ( P ) Pronunciation Key (sb-jktv)
adj.
Proceeding from or taking place in a person's mind rather than the external world: a subjective decision.

ob•jec•tive ( P ) Pronunciation Key (b-jktv)
adj.
Having actual existence or reality.


An easy way to think of something that is subjective is as an illusion.

I.E. You actually do get the stimulus to your eyes that there is an oasis in the desert, but there isn't an oasis in the desert.

A way to think of something that is objective is the stimulus + something actually being there to create the stimulus.

I.E. You get the stimulus to your eyes that there is an oasis in the desert, and there is an oasis in the desert.

We get stimulus, the trick is whether the stimulus is only an illusion or does it relate to something in the real world.

Note that an objective oasis exists whether anyone sees it or not.

So subjective vs. objective moral values is the same thing as an illusion of an oasis vs an actual oasis.

What would be the source of subjective moral values?

I think the only thing that can be the source of moral values is a personal agent. The only example of moral values that we have exist as the character and attributes of personal agents. Rocks and even animals don't have moral values. Animals respond to stimulae and their instincts when doing things.

Subsequently, if an objective moral value exists for all times for all people (ie torturing an innocent child being wrong) whether they think it is true or not, it must exist as an unchanging person. Or at least the moral part of that person can't change.

Hence:

1) If objective moral values exist, they must exist as an unchanging person
2) Objective moral values exist
3) Therefore an unchanging person exists.

And how would you prove whether a moral value was truly objective.

Remember this?

3) Our cognitive faculties are generally correct

If you hold (3) as true and if you see something, you are probably seeing a real thing and not an illusion. Likewise if (3) is true and you sense that something is wrong(bad), then it is probably wrong(bad) and not an illusion.


I would propose that the objection of torturing a baby for fun is a product of our evolution.

Remember that the origin of an idea doesn't make it wrong or right. That would be a genetic fallacy. See
http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/genetic-fallacy.html

What that means is that even if our sense of moral values came from evolution, that has nothing to do with whether objective moral values exist or not. Furthermore, given evolution, here is an arguement:

1) Evolution produces cognitive faculties that are generally reliable
2) Our judgements of moral values is a cognitive faculty
3) Therefore our judgements of moral values are generally reliable.

Keep in mind that generally reliable means that the cognitive faculties usually produce beliefs that are not from illusions.
Which premise do you deny? If you were to deny (1) and say that our eyesight is generally reliable but the judgements of objective moral values was unreliable that would be a fallacy of special pleading unless you have justification for doing so. See
http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/special-pleading.html

Please remember that all we need is one objective moral value for our discussion.

4) Therefore the moral values that are experienced by our cognitive faculties are generally correct and are about the objective world.


Actually I believe I had said that I tend to agree with this statement.

Please see the unchanging person argument

I also believe that these opinions and values are about the objective world.

So are you saying that given our definition of objective, that it is wrong for an innocent child to be tortured whether anyone believed it or not? That would be what is required for an objective moral value

[Passant]

Hello Benjamin,

That only works if you allow for an objective idea of what is good for you. If the whole shebang is subjective, (ie what is good is what is most pleasurable)

I refer back to the case of the drug addict. Using drugs gives them pleasure. It makes them feel good. But, if they used their cognitive faculties, reason, logic, and experience, they would realize that that pleasure is only short-term, and will be far outweighed by the discomfort they will experience in the long run. This seems to be a common argument, " if morals or subjective than anything goes " but this is entirely false. The entire reason for morals is to facilitate our lives in a society. Like it or not, humans are social animals, very few can live in isolation. We must all live in interact together, the purpose of morals is to protect ourselves i.e. society. Stealing is immoral because if people steal society will break down. Murder is immoral because it people go-arounds murdering society will break down. Morals allow us not only to survive but to live in relative comfort and protection. The idea of anything goes or if it feels good do it, is totally naive, and by ignoring the consequences of any of those actions is therefore immoral.

I don't see why anyone would be a materialist if it didn't make them feel good, regardless of arguments for or against.
I suppose I am forced to agree with this statement. I believe that although a materialistic can see the attractiveness of a theological worldview, they would feel more comfortable and accepting what they feel is compelling evidence for materialism.
Here is one of my own examples. Scientists say that there are two possibilities as to the end of the universe. Either it will expand to a certain point where gravity will start to take over and the universe will collapse into a big crunch, resulting in an a big bang, and the universe will cycle over and over. The other possibility is the universe will continue to expand forever becoming completely cold, empty, and lifeless. The first example is very attractive to me. I would feel very good thinking that the universe will continue in some shape and form forever. As it stands right now this does not seem to be likely. But as the evidence is not very definitive for either situation I feel more comfortable in believing and hoping that this will be the case. If it some point the evidence becomes very compelling that this is not so and the universe will and in a cold death, I will have to accept that fact. It would just make me feel better to except the truth of nature rather than to deny it for a false idea though matter how attractive that idea is to me. So to me learning the truth about objective reality makes me feel better than the accepting a falsehood that is attractive.

[Passant]

Hi again! I'm enjoying this discussion!
Hello wwatts! I'm glad you're enjoying it, so am I! It's nice to have a reasonable cordial discussion!

Lets define Subjective and Objective from www.dictionary.com <http://www.dictionary.com>

sub•jec•tive ( P ) Pronunciation Key (sb-jktv)
adj.
Proceeding from or taking place in a person's mind rather than the external world: a subjective decision.

ob•jec•tive ( P ) Pronunciation Key (b-jktv)
adj.
Having actual existence or reality .

I can accept these definitions. And by using them I would say moral values are subjective.
An easy way to think of something that is subjective is as an illusion.
That is one way to think of them, but not all things that are subjective are illusions.
Proceeding from or taking place in a person's mind rather than the external world.
This does not mean that what is taking place in your mind is an illusion. I believe that moral values are a method for establishing guidelines of human behavior that produce the maximum benefit for the society as a whole.
I.E. You actually do get the stimulus to your eyes that there is an oasis in the desert, but there isn't an oasis in the desert.

A way to think of something that is objective is the stimulus + something actually being there to create the stimulus.

I.E. You get the stimulus to your eyes that there is an oasis in the desert, and there is an oasis in the desert.

We get stimulus, the trick is whether the stimulus is only an illusion or does it relate to something in the real world.

Note that an objective oasis exists whether anyone sees it or not.

So subjective vs. objective moral values is the same thing as an illusion of an oasis vs an actual oasis.
Here I must disagree, although moral values are not physical objects there'll also not illusions, they are guidelines for human behavior.

" What would be the source of subjective moral values? "



I think the only thing that can be the source of moral values is a personal agent. The only example of moral values that we have exist as the character and attributes of personal agents. Rocks and even animals don't have moral values. Animals respond to stimulae and their instincts when doing things.
I will accept this for the purpose of this discussion, although I believe that some of the more intelligent animals to show moral values. (perhaps this would be a good topic for another discussion!)

Subsequently, if an objective moral value exists for all times for all people (ie torturing an innocent child being wrong) whether they think it is true or not, it must exist as an unchanging person. Or at least the moral part of that person can't change.
If a particular behavior is very detrimental to all societies at all times with little or no redeeming value, then it would be no surprise that it would be universal and appear to be objective. In this particular example, we have a behavior that is detrimental and threatening to society, it actually cuts to the core of our survival. How can we determine if this is an objective value , i.e. something that originated outside of our minds and exists independently, or whether it is subjective, i.e. proceeding from the human mind? If we use our cognitive faculties, reason, and logic, it seems that we could come to no other conclusion than that this is an immoral act. Earlier you stated "I think that any human being who is properly functioning can tell that torturing a baby for fun is objectively morally wrong. " but by our definitions I would say that any human being who is properly functioning can tell that torturing a baby for fun is morally wrong, not that this is objectively wrong as then there is some type of moral value floating around in the universe, but by using our cognitive faculties, reason, and logic what would proceed from our mind would be the conclusion that it is immoral.
But what if we took Benjamin's definition of moral? If someone's definition of moral is defined by doing what feels good, and torturing a baby feels good, then they are acting within their own moral parameters. We can only deny the morality of this act by appealing to subjectivity. We can explain why it is wrong by explaining the thought that proceeding from and taking place in our minds. If we simply declare that some personal agent has been to it objectively wrong, that person has the right to deny it. It cannot be objectively wrong if he does not feel it is wrong.


Hence:

1) If objective moral values exist, they must exist as an unchanging person
2) Objective moral values exist
3) Therefore an unchanging person exists.
Now formal logic is not my strongest subject, so correct me if I am wrong.I would say that this argument may be logically valid, but not necessarily sound. In other words I see no error in your logic, however I deny number two, and therefore believe No. 3 is false.

" And how would you prove whether a moral value was truly objective. "



Remember this?

3) Our cognitive faculties are generally correct

If you hold (3) as true and if you see something, you are probably seeing a real thing and not an illusion. Likewise if (3) is true and you sense that something is wrong(bad), then it is probably wrong(bad) and not an illusion.
The first problem I see here are the terms " generally " and " probably ", this leads to room for error. If my cognitive faculties are only generally correct, I may be wrong, and not know it.
The second problem I see is the term " sense ". This implies my " feeling " something wrong, not coming to the conclusion that something is wrong based on reason and logic. And there again if I determine something is wrong or right, does not make it an illusion.


" I would propose that the objection of torturing a baby for fun is a product of our evolution. "



Remember that the origin of an idea doesn't make it wrong or right. That would be a genetic fallacy. See
http://www.nizkor.org/features/fall...ic-fallacy.html <http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/genetic-fallacy.html>

What that means is that even if our sense of moral values came from evolution, that has nothing to do with whether objective moral values exist or not. Furthermore, given evolution, here is an arguement:

1) Evolution produces cognitive faculties that are generally reliable
2) Our judgements of moral values is a cognitive faculty
3) Therefore our judgements of moral values are generally reliable.

Keep in mind that generally reliable means that the cognitive faculties usually produce beliefs that are not from illusions.
Which premise do you deny? If you were to deny (1) and say that our eyesight is generally reliable but the judgements of objective moral values was unreliable that would be a fallacy of special pleading unless you have justification for doing so. See
http://www.nizkor.org/features/fall...l-pleading.html <http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies/special-pleading.html>

I see your point, and I would state my position as follows;
1) Evolution produces cognitive faculties that are generally reliable
2) our cognitive abilities, produce moral values to protect and promote our species.
3) therefore, our moral values are generally reliable to protect and promote our species.
Please remember that all we need is one objective moral value for our discussion.
this may be true if we are limiting our discussion to a personal agent. If we are discussing the Judeo-Christian Islamic God, then his followers should at least be able to come to a reasonable consensus as to the moral values he has created.

4) Therefore the moral values that are experienced by our cognitive faculties are generally correct and are about the objective world.

4) therefore moral values are developed from our cognitive faculties and are generally correct and are about the objective world.

" Actually I believe I had said that I tend to agree with this statement. "



Please see the unchanging person argument
I guess I should pay closer attention to semantics! This is more along the lines of what I'm saying,
4) therefore moral values are developed from our cognitive faculties and are generally correct and are about the objective world.

" I also believe that these opinions and values are about the objective world. "
So are you saying that given our definition of objective, that it is wrong for an innocent child to be tortured whether anyone believed it or not? That would be what is required for an objective moral value
Semantics again! I'm saying that I believe that there is an objective world, and that there is an objective being (the baby), and an objective human population. My subjective moral value (the ideas that are proceeding from are taking place in my mind) lead me to the conclusion that torturing a baby for fun, is detrimental, therefore immoral.
Now I hate to confuse the issue even further, but it seems to me in these type of discussions the issue of empathy is usually left out. I believe that empathy is a product of our evolution, and part of our moral values, in fact one of the most important parts. When I say that I come to the conclusion that torturing a baby for fun is immoral, I must admit that a large part of that decision relies on empathy. teaching moral guidelines as law is not good enough, we must teach empathy!
Thank you for listening to me rant, unfortunately I will be offline until Monday evening or Tuesday morning. I hope you have a good holiday weekend!

[Vorkosigan]

1) Evolution produces cognitive faculties that are generally reliable
2) our cognitive abilities, produce moral values to protect and promote our species.
3) therefore, our moral values are generally reliable to protect and promote our species.

Seems to me that all the premises discussed so far, hinge on the unexamined definition of "reliability" that you and w-watts are using. I'll get back to that later. Plantinga makes the same error, so don't feel bad.

In any case, there is an unstated premise here. I'll flush it out by asking if, moral values that "promote the species" (whatever that means!) are good for individuals to hold.

Watts writes:
I think that any human being who is properly functioning can tell that torturing a baby for fun is objectively morally wrong.

Really? So you mean whatever we agree on universally is objectively moral? So your subjective definition of "objective" is "if it is universal, it is objective." But what if someone has another definition, like "found in my holy book" or "dictated to me by the Angel Gabriel" or "whatever the needs of the State are." How would you refute them?

I agree that everyone pretty much would see torturing a baby for fun as wrong, but that does not make it objectively moral. To show the existence of this "objective" or "absolute" or "transcendant" morality you will need more than universal agreement. For one thing, think of how few moral issues are universally agreed on....and for another, think of how many "universal morals" like "not marrying my biological sib" are of no great account, morally.

2.1 It would be circular reasoning for humanoid A to use its own cognitive faculties to determine if its own cognitive faculties are generally reliable.

Incorrect. It might be an interpretive spiral, if done properly. You've missed the fact that as the humanoid explores its own cognitive process, as the circle iterates, something changes: you have more information than in the previous iteration. Thus, you have a virtuous cycle and not a circle. See Giere's evolutionary naturalism as laid out in Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach.

2.2 The probability of any humanoid A actually having cognitive faculties that are generally reliable are
2.2.a low (less then 50%) or
2.2.b inscrutable (unknown).

This is simply a meaningless assertion. You don't give us any reason to conclude in this manner, nor do you specify what "reliable" might mean. As a matter of fact, humans do not have "reliable" cognitive faculties but "effective" ones, quite a different issue.

2.3. If it is unknown if a proposition is true, then there is a defeater for that proposition.

Incorrect. Not being able to prove a proposition is not the same as seeing that proposition defeated. Information may be insufficient to chose. Who shot Kennedy? If I can't prove Oswald did it, does that mean he didn't do it?

2.4. If generally unreliable cognitive faculties hold a proposition as true, those cognitive faculties are probably wrong about that proposition.

Again, we do not know what "reliable" means. In any case, "wrong" conclusions may well be useful in some situations, useless in others, and irrelevant in some. Abilities are relative to situations. The color correction device in your visual processing system works perfectly in sunlight but flunks under flourescent light, and processes some colors incorrectly. "Cognitive reliability" is a meaningless entity because you have not specified the conditions under which you are going to assess it.

2.5. Therefore any humanoid either has a defeater for everything it holds true, or is probably wrong about everything it holds true, including atheism, materialism, etc (4, 3, 2)

Or, the person who originally constructed this argument had very little familiarity with either cognitive science or evolution, and hence got everything wrong. That is the most likely answer.

Vorkosigan

[Passant]

Vorkosigan,


1) Evolution produces cognitive faculties that are generally reliable
2) our cognitive abilities, produce moral values to protect and promote our species.
3) therefore, our moral values are generally reliable to protect and promote our species.

Seems to me that all the premises discussed so far, hinge on the unexamined definition of "reliability" that you and w-watts are using. I'll get back to that later. Plantinga makes the same error, so don't feel bad.

I don't know if a definition of "reliability" is needed for our discussion, both wwatts and I seem to agree that we can indeed generaly depend on our cognitive faculties to make sense of the world, although not completly.



In any case, there is an unstated premise here. I'll flush it out by asking if, moral values that "promote the species" (whatever that means!) are good for individuals to hold.


I would say that the welfare of the species is dependant on the welfare of the individual, so yes.

[wwatts]

1) Evolution produces cognitive faculties that are generally reliable
2) our cognitive abilities, produce moral values to protect and promote our species.
3) therefore, our moral values are generally reliable to protect and promote our species.

Seems to me that all the premises discussed so far, hinge on the unexamined definition of &quot;reliability&quot; that you and w-watts are using. I'll get back to that later. Plantinga makes the same error, so don't feel bad.


You can define reliable in many ways. Here is dictionary.com's definition

re·li·a·ble ( P ) Pronunciation Key (r-l-bl)
adj.
1. Capable of being relied on; dependable: a reliable assistant; a reliable car.
2. Yielding the same or compatible results in different clinical experiments or statistical trials.

I'll let you present your denials again given this definition. Since you may have a problem with the term reliable you can just substitute generally reliable with probably correct. Let me know what you think. Also, let me know if you think that your cognitive faculties are probably correct.


In any case, there is an unstated premise here. I'll flush it out by asking if, moral values that &quot;promote the species&quot; (whatever that means!) are good for individuals to hold.


Define 'promote the species' and define 'good for individuals'




Really? So you mean whatever we agree on universally is objectively moral? So your subjective definition of &quot;objective&quot; is &quot;if it is universal, it is objective.&quot; But what if someone has another definition, like &quot;found in my holy book&quot; or &quot;dictated to me by the Angel Gabriel&quot; or &quot;whatever the needs of the State are.&quot; How would you refute them?


Maybe you don't understand my position. I'm saying that beliefs that our cognitive faculties hold are probably correct along with our empiricle senses. Or, if you take a proposition that you hold as true, it is probably true. If you have nothing else to use as a defeater for that proposition, then you should believe it. The same thing with empirical senses.


I agree that everyone pretty much would see torturing a baby for fun as wrong, but that does not make it objectively moral.


I agree with you 100%. In order for it to be objectively moral it would need something outside the observer to ground it.

To show the existence of this &quot;objective&quot; or &quot;absolute&quot; or &quot;transcendant&quot; morality you will need more than universal agreement.

We agree again.


For one thing, think of how few moral issues are universally agreed on....and for another, think of how many &quot;universal morals&quot; like &quot;not marrying my biological sib&quot; are of no great account, morally.


Sounds like you are saying something like this:

1) Christians claim to have knowledge of an objective of morality revealed to them by god, either through the Bible or direct revelation.

2) Christians do not agree on every moral value.

3) therefore, their source of moral values cannot come from one objective source.

If so, please see my previous post or please clarify.


.1 It would be circular reasoning for humanoid A to use its own cognitive faculties to determine if its own cognitive faculties are generally reliable. ”



Incorrect. It might be an interpretive spiral, if done properly. You've missed the fact that as the humanoid explores its own cognitive process, as the circle iterates, something changes: you have more information than in the previous iteration. Thus, you have a virtuous cycle and not a circle. See Giere's evolutionary naturalism as laid out in Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach.



This is interesting to me. I will definitly have to pick up this book. I don't know what an interpretive spiral is. If you can give me a definition where the conclusion of an interpretive spiral is not assumed in the premises that would be a good start. Specifically define how 'more information' is gathered.


2.2 The probability of any humanoid A actually having cognitive faculties that are generally reliable are
2.2.a low (less then 50%) or
2.2.b inscrutable (unknown). ”

This is simply a meaningless assertion. You don't give us any reason to conclude in this manner, nor do you specify what "reliable" might mean. As a matter of fact, humans do not have "reliable" cognitive faculties but "effective" ones, quite a different issue.



First let me ask you a question, do you believe that your cognitive faculties are probably correct? If so, why? I want you to use the interpretive spiral in your answer so that I can see what it is all about. If you don't have a reason thats fine too.



2.3. If it is unknown if a proposition is true, then there is a defeater for that proposition.


Incorrect. Not being able to prove a proposition is not the same as seeing that proposition defeated. Information may be insufficient to chose. Who shot Kennedy? If I can't prove Oswald did it, does that mean he didn't do it?



Let's define defeaters.
An Undercutting defeater shows that a proposition has not been proved. It just points out that there is no reason to believe that the proposition is true.

A Rebutting defeater shows that the purported proposition is false.

So I think there is an undercutting defeater for Oswald shooting Kennedy if there is no reason to believe Oswald shot Kennedy. You can also go so far as to say a belief in Oswald shooting Kennedy is not properly basic. In other words you need a reason to believe that Oswald shot Kennedy, and if you don't have a reason, that belief is defeated.

Let me ask you another question, what constitues proof?

[wwatts]

1) If objective moral values exist, they must exist as an unchanging person
2) Objective moral values exist
3) Therefore an unchanging person exists.
Hence:


Now formal logic is not my strongest subject, so correct me if I am wrong.I would say that this argument may be logically valid, but not necessarily sound. In other words I see no error in your logic, however I deny number two, and therefore believe No. 3 is false.



I was just looking over our posts and I'm wondering what exactly are we discussing :) A denial of (2) is what I'm saying non-theists must do. I think we have an agreement on just about everything we posted about. I think vork may still have some disagreements though :(

[Passant]

Hello wwatts,

What I meant was, I don't think your logic is flawed, I just think that your 2nd premise is false, leading to a false conclusion. As I am busy this week, I may just let you and Vork continue on, and jump in when I can, probably with questions more than anything else.

[Vorkosigan]

I would say that the welfare of the species is dependant on the welfare of the individual, so yes.

Two terms, totally undefined.

Do you know what is meant by the Tragedy of the Commons? The welfare of individuals and the welfare of the larger community are not necessarily the same. I make big money pouring pollutants into the atmosphere....but global warming makes this a poor long-term strategy.

Vorkosigan

[Vorkosigan]

I was just looking over our posts and I'm wondering what exactly are we discussing :) A denial of (2) is what I'm saying non-theists must do. I think we have an agreement on just about everything we posted about. I think vork may still have some disagreements though :(

About denying 2? Of course. And not just Vork, but many other kinds of non-theists. It's a mistake to assume that theism and objective moral values are related. Lots of theists are subjectivists, lots of atheists are objectivists.

Vorkosigan

[wwatts]

Today @ 01:26 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=109836#post109836)
Vorkosigan:



About denying 2? Of course. And not just Vork, but many other kinds of non-theists. It's a mistake to assume that theism and objective moral values are related. Lots of theists are subjectivists, lots of atheists are objectivists.

Vorkosigan


Heya Vork I'd like to know what you think about the questions I have asked you in the previous post. Also my point of view on non-theism and moral values is in the first post. Specifically I think non-theists must accept one of these two premises.

(1. Objective moral values do not exist

or

1.a. Moral values do not necessarily exist as part of a person)

I think our main disagreement or confusion right now is about interpretive spirals. I'll be looking forward to your comments :)

[Vorkosigan]

I'll let you present your denials again given this definition. Since you may have a problem with the term reliable you can just substitute generally reliable with probably correct. Let me know what you think. Also, let me know if you think that your cognitive faculties are probably correct.

No, I do not think they are correct. I think they are effective. Different idea entirely. Words like "correct" and "reliable" are values that treat the world out there as a capital-T truth. The world out there just is, and we make our way in it, like all other animals. The cognitive faculties we have are effective for the kind of life we lead. They are "reliable" in the sense that almost all the time, given the same sense datum, they will handle it the same way, producing useful and effective data for H. sapiens sapiens. But "correct" is meaningless. A shark sense electromagnetic fields, a man sees a boat with vision. Whose faculties are "correct?" Within their respective needs, each one's is.

Define 'promote the species' and define 'good] for individuals'

I think you missed the point here. I was only pointing out that the other poster had not really pondered the individual-species relationship. Regardless of what definition you pick for "good" you face the issue, unless you trivially define the two as exactly the same.


Maybe you don't understand my position. I'm saying that beliefs that our cognitive faculties hold are probably correct along with our empiricle senses. Or, if you take a proposition that you hold as true, it is probably true. If you have nothing else to use as a defeater for that proposition, then you should believe it. The same thing with empirical senses.

I disagree. I think the situation is far more complex than you think. Many cognitive scientists view consciousness, for example, as a vehicle for giving this ape an actor for social situations. Further, many see conscious explanations of behavior as after-the-fact rationalizations, and memories as self-serving editing of reality. That is what I mean by "effective." It is very effective to equip a social creature with a strong sense of self, and a pack of memories that serve its individual interests. Is this correct or reliable? I don't know what you mean. Evolutionarily speaking, it might be beneficial to a social ape to have unreliable or incorrect cognitive systems.

Remember the color corrector in your visual processing system I mentioned? The colors you experience are not those out there -- your brain "corrects" them. It is a system that is reliable (it always works the same way) and effective (you need it to handle reality in order to survive) but it is not "correct."

Consider also -- in order for you to handle reality effectively, your brain suppresses or eliminates irrelevant data. You know how that pain in your foot vanishes when you concentrate on something? It gives you enough information for effective action. It does not give you a "correct" picture of the world, because "correct" is a floating value judgment. It has no real meaning in relation to what is out there. Is a table a porous world to be eaten? (termite) A solid 4-legged object? (human) A mass of constantly moving atoms? (physicist)

I agree with you 100%. In order for it to be objectively moral it would need something outside the observer to ground it.

Right. But without being subjective how would we know what the proper thing-outside-the-observer is? Until we have an "objective" idea of what "objective" is....but then we would need an objective defintion of the objective idea of what objective is in morals.....infinite regress, here we come.

1) Christians claim to have knowledge of an objective of morality revealed to them by god, either through the Bible or direct revelation.
2) Christians do not agree on every moral value.
3) therefore, their source of moral values cannot come from one objective source.

Partly. But if we were going to get into it, I would also add that Christianity is incomplete; there are many moral and ethical situations which the Bible never dreamed of -- naturally, it being the product of a technologically backward, fuedal, agrarian society. Here are some ethical questions not addressed in the Christian value system:

1) Are Jones Act subsidies ethical?
2) How should we site nuclear plants?
3) What's the proper amount of personal risk?
4) Is Taiwan part of China?
5) What's the best way to manage a river basin?

....etc. The Bible never imagined a world where technology has political consequences and where the level of social ethics is so dominant in all the great moral questions of our time.

This is interesting to me. I will definitly have to pick up this book. I don't know what an interpretive spiral is. If you can give me a definition where the conclusion of an interpretive spiral is not assumed in the premises that would be a good start. Specifically define how 'more information' is gathered.

Here is an old post of mine from another site that might help:

As far as my particular naturalist beliefs, I am an evolutionary naturalist. Human cognitive capacities are evolved capacities, just like those of other animals. It is undeniable that human abilities are well-adapted to the world in which humans function, and that these capacities are non-trivial. A fantastic amount of processing power is required just to walk or read a poem.

Empiricist philosophers have emphasized the role of perceptual experience in their analyses of knowledge because of the high degree of subjective certainty attached to such experience. The problem was then to get beyond this subjective experience. From an evolutionary perspective, there's a connection between subjective certainty and the objective reliability of our interactions with the world. Although the evolutionary history of some of these capacities for developing reliable perceptions of world is still in the dark, there's no denying the reliability of our perceptions.

Traditional rationalism has focused on these subjective intuitions we have, that space-time is 3D and that time is linear. These judgements seem to be built into the way we think. Indeed, they seem to be (see Tools, Language and Cognition in Human Evolution ), since those aspects of the world relevant to our fitness have that structure. But rationalists, like empiricists, are still stuck with the problem of subjectivity.

Evolutionary theory provides an alternative. By looking back at their own evolutionary history, scientists can better understand their own cognitive situation and investigate the development of their own cognitive capacities. We know already that we have reliable perceptions about the world; the problem of induction is really not "how is it we can induct" but also "how is it our inductions are so reliable?" The reply to Hume is contained in modern cognitive science, which has shown that inductive capacities are built into humans (and other animals). So are things like logic, the idea that things in the world have intentions, and so on. Most of these originate in the cognitive equipment necessary for competition in our highly developed social world. If you look at this Primer on Evolutionary Psychology (http://www.psych.ucsb.edu/research/cep/primer.html) you'll get a few simple examples of how logic (in that case, conditionals) operates in human social systems.

In other words, the cognitive view starts with the realization that our perceptions are largely reliable, wonders why this is so, and then uses the tools of science to discover why, confirming that indeed our perceptions our reliable.

Some of you I know are shouting "Hey wait! This is circular!" I would argue, as I think Wittgenstein did, that epistemology has been gripped by the idea that one must prove in Straight Lines. The philosopher reasons from first principles, then, grounded in A, moves on to B. The cognitive scientist starts with B and using B, goes back to find what A is all about. Circularity does not exist here, because at each iteration of the scientific process, something has changed: we have more knowledge about ourselves and the world. This is not circularity, but a positive feedback loop. Using our powerful cognitive abilities made reliable by evolution, we expand our knowledge of the world, thus understanding our own cognitive abilities better. This new knowledge enables us to better understand the world. And so on. As Giere noted in Explaining Science : A Cognitive Approach(Science and Its Conceptual Foundations) "the existence of these positive feedback loops is not a limitation that must be overcome by some special form of philosophical analysis. On the contrary, it is one of the things that makes modern science so powerful."

Hope this helps. In sum, we do not "presuppose" our cognitive processes produce effective reasoning abilities. We know this is true because we're still alive, despite the millions of interactions we have with the outside world each day. Instead, we use methods we know are effective to investigate why those methods are effective, and come at last to an understanding of why humans can reason so well.


First let me ask you a question, do you believe that your cognitive faculties are probably correct? If so, why? I want you to use the interpretive spiral in your answer so that I can see what it is all about. If you don't have a reason thats fine too.

I already did. As I noted above, the problem of induction is twofold. Not only do we induct, we induct well. We know this because we are still around. So we use the tools of science -- which we know produces reliable and useful results -- to understand what is going on in our own cognitive processes. We compile information, constantly under the test-and-revision process that is science. As new information comes in, we understand how it is we handle the world so well.

Let's define defeaters.
An Undercutting defeater shows that a proposition has not been proved. It just points out that there is no reason to believe that the proposition is true.

A Rebutting defeater shows that the purported proposition is false.

So I think there is an undercutting defeater for Oswald shooting Kennedy if there is no reason to believe Oswald shot Kennedy. You can also go so far as to say a belief in Oswald shooting Kennedy is not properly basic. In other words you need a reason to believe that Oswald shot Kennedy, and if you don't have a reason, that belief is defeated.

Yes, you are right. I wasn't thinking philosophically, but evidentially. My bad completely.

Let me ask you another question, what constitues proof?

In a philosophical or practical way?

Vorkosigan

[wwatts]

Let me ask you another question, what constitues proof?


In a philosophical or practical way?

Vorkosigan



Maybe I should rephrase the question. What is your criterion for proof. In other words, what things lead you to believe a proposition is true or false. IMO your practical way is your philosophical way. If you have two different ways for determining proof, let me know what your criterion is for determining when you apply each of those ways.




But "correct" is meaningless.



Maybe I should explain again.

1) Do you believe that you can hold propositions in your mind as true or false? For instance, do you hold this proposition:

The earth is round

2) Do you believe that propositions can apply to the real world? IE do you believe that there is a referent for the word earth?

3) Also, can earth either be round or not round?

4) If you believe (1, 2, 3) then what is the probability of any sample of your propositions of actually having referents and/or applying to the real world?

This is what I mean by probably correct. If this is still meaningless then I need to have a definition of meaningless.


We are almost ready to discuss some things. I'll read over your post a couple times more to digest it.

[Vorkosigan]

Maybe I should rephrase the question. What is your criterion for proof. In other words, what things lead you to believe a proposition is true or false. IMO your practical way is your philosophical way. If you have two different ways for determining proof, let me know what your criterion is for determining when you apply each of those ways.

wwatts, think about it. A philosophical proposition can acquire proof because its field of play is drastically restricted and it is rigorously defined. The real world doesn't operate that way. Real-world proof is based on piling up evidence for a proposition until it would be peevish to withhold positive judgment. So I do have several different standards of proof.

1) Do you believe that you can hold propositions in your mind as true or false? For instance, do you hold this proposition:

The earth is round

That is not a proposition. That is a conclusory statement based on innumerable pieces of evidence.

2) Do you believe that propositions can apply to the real world? IE do you believe that there is a referent for the word earth?

Of course.

3) Also, can earth either be round or not round?

So far, so good.

4) If you believe (1, 2, 3) then what is the probability of any sample of your propositions of actually having referents and/or applying to the real world?

Indisputably high. But scientific proof and philosophical proof are different things.

Most of the time I retain at least three different standards of proof. In ordinary conversation we informally state "the world is round" as if that has been proved. In scientific writing we state "the world is round" but maintain that as a revisable conclusion based on evidence. In Philosophy we have deductive proofs that are restricted and defined so we can achieve proof. The three views are different.

Vorkosigan

[wwatts]

The earth is round

That is not a proposition. That is a conclusory statement based on innumerable pieces of evidence.



www.dictionary.com
prop·o·si·tion ( P ) Pronunciation Key (prp-zshn)
n.
Logic.

5. A statement that affirms or denies something.

4. (Gram. & Logic) A complete sentence, or part of a sentence consisting of a subject and predicate united by a copula; a thought expressed or propounded in language; a form of speech in which a predicate is affirmed or denied of a subject; as, snow is white.

Maybe you are thinking of

5. (Math.) A statement in terms of a truth to be demonstrated, or of an operation to be performed.

But thats not the meaning I am intending here. I am assuming that you hold the proposition (using the above defintions) the earth is round as true, unless you still object.


Most of the time I retain at least three different standards of proof. In ordinary conversation we informally state &quot;the world is round&quot; as if that has been proved. In scientific writing we state &quot;the world is round&quot; but maintain that as a revisable conclusion based on evidence. In Philosophy we have deductive proofs that are restricted and defined so we can achieve proof. The three views are different.


Let me ask again, what is your criterion for choosing which one of those criterions for proofs you use. Indeed, if you only hold those three most of the time then I need to know what sparks a change in your criterion for your criterion for proofs. That will be your criterion for proof. We need to do this because if we have a criterion for proof that is a moving target then we can talk all day and not have any agreement. I can try to guess if you like, and you can say 'yes' or 'no' and then define it yourself. My criterion for proof is this (in this order):

1. Rationalism (basically nothing can be A and non A in the same sense)

2. My cognitive faculties (empirical senses and reasoning ability) are probably correct (since you don' t like the word reliable)

3. Induction (basically I assume that the future will probably be like the past)

4. Empiricism (basically since the future will probably be like the past, if I experience an event with any of my senses a couple times in a certain situation, I can expect to experience that same event given the same situation)


I accept all of these a-priori

www.dictionary.com

a pri·o·ri ( P ) Pronunciation Key (ä pr-ôr, -r, pr-ôr, -r)
adj.

Knowable without appeal to particular experience.

To make it easier on you, do you affirm or deny that these are the basics of your criterion for proof as well?

[Passant]

Define 'promote the species' and define 'good] for individuals'

I think you missed the point here. I was only pointing out that the other poster had not really pondered the individual-species relationship. Regardless of what definition you pick for "good" you face the issue, unless you trivially define the two as exactly the same.

Not at all, the very purpose of morals is to balance the good of the species and the good of the individual.


“ I would say that the welfare of the species is dependant on the welfare of the individual, so yes. ”
Two terms, totally undefined.

Do you know what is meant by the Tragedy of the Commons? The welfare of individuals and the welfare of the larger community are not necessarily the same. I make big money pouring pollutants into the atmosphere....but global warming makes this a poor long-term strategy.

Good example. Not only is this a poor long term strategy, it is immoral. You are causing problems for future individuals (society). If your forefathers had adopted this strategy, your welfare as an individual would have been compromised. The problem is who gets to decide? You may feel that you’re really not doing any harm. Others May feel that you’re doing some harm, but it is counteracted by good, providing goods, services, jobs, etc. Does your welfare really depend on it? Or could you do something else? I am not trying to trivialize the problem, but trying to put it in perspective. For society to be healthy, the individuals that comprise society must be happy. The real problem is that happiness for some includes actions that compromise the happiness of others. Hell, if it were simple, we wouldn’t even be talking about it.