Mattbballman19: Many-worlds new thread

[garthoverman]

Not unknowability. Unpredictability.

Hmm. When you said, ' . . . that quantum indeterminancy renders the classical conception of divine foreknowledge obsolete . . .' I supposed that knowledge was related. At least the alleged idea that God does not possess knowledge to make the correct predictions or the knowledge required to make the option of making predictions obsolete.
I think I misspoke, then. You're correct - unpredictability equals unknowabilty in a different time context. Regardless, classical divine foreknowledge implies an inerrant knowledge of what will happen and what will not happen. Quantum indeterminacy indicates that - apart from being observed or measured - there is no "will happen" or "will not happen." For that matter, there is no "does happen" or "does not happen." It seems more like all variations are real and simultaneously exist until they are measured.


Not entirely correct.

The view of quantum physics that the scientists hold or the connotation of my statement that scientists are leaning towards the idea that quantum events occur on a deterministic level? I don't really want to get into this, because its a little off the topic of 'the grounding objection'.
The connotation of your statement that scientists (as a whole) are leaning towards a deterministic view of quantum events. Some scientists may feel this way, but it has been my experience that many do not. Your experience may differ.


Sure, but unless they've developed a way to resolve quantum indeterminancy, the beliefs of these scientists appears to lack any substantial support in reality. It seems to me that the uncertainty principle preludes that from ever actually happening.

I'm reading those articles now, so I'll get back to you when I finish. But from what I've read so far, it seems that certain presuppositions made as a foundation for their justification are in error. And that's probably where I'll make my attack.
I'll be interested in seeing what you have to say about them. The theological article concludes by saying that Peacocke's theory is simply something that cannot be ruled out completely, IIRC. It does not conclude that Molinism is certainly false. At least, thats the impression I got.


In other words, the probability that a person does not accept Christ is just as real as the probability that a person does. Obviously this seems completely counter-intuitive. Generally we conceive of our interactions as being one way or the other - but never both.

Here are my initial thoughts. I don't see how the latter follows from the former. I can imagine it being the case that our actions have the possibility being one way or the other, but, at the same time, each of the possible ways in which an action could go can be measured with a certain amount of probability. Maybe we should clarify what we mean by probability.
What the many-words theory says is that a real universe exists for every real possibility. Therefore there exists a universe in which I do accept Christ, and there exists a universe in which I don't. Which one of these me's does God judge? Do some of these me's go to Heaven and some to Hell? In the many-worlds view, the fracturing of universes occurs at every conceivale moment. In order to resolve the theological implications, we must first reach some level of certainty as to that which actually composes my identity. Am I the aggregate of all those me's? Am I only one of them? Does God judge the aggregate or the individual? Does the individual differ from the aggregate? Seems we've opened a whole new can of worms. The really scary thing (or exciting, depending on your POV) is that it appears that this theory may really be the best description of reality!



I'm working from a definition which looks at probability within the context of one's individual background knowledge concerning the history/pyscology etc . . . of the agent and jugding from that standpoint the probable way in which the agent will choose to go, all the while having the knowledge that it is possible that the agent could go a different way; even though a certain probability existed from other instances of background knowledge that may have existed making the probability go both ways (not in terms of the actual choice made, but the way the actual choice could have been actualized).
In the many-world's view, an agent goes every possible way.

Yours,
Garth

[mattbballman19]

Thanks for starting a the thread. I shall post once the articles are at least slightly comprehended.:smile:

matt

[Jaltus]

For that matter, there is no "does happen" or "does not happen." It seems more like all variations are real and simultaneously exist until they are measured.

Not true, though close. The correct formulation would be "until they are observed." Measuring is beside the point, it is observation of any kind which limits quantum interaction.

[mattbballman19]

Still finishing those articles. But here are my thoughts so far.

Quantum indeterminancy has never been an enemy to Molinism (the middle knowledge view), and even those non-Molinists who find the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle unsavory will opt for a Copenhagenist interpretation (one that construes quantum events as pedagogical but not real). But if quantum indeterminancy is epistemic then in no way is divine foreknowledge incompatible it.

What is curious here is your preference for the Many Worlds Interpretation on which to reduce all quantum states. You see, it is no less speculative than theism. Even worse, there are no independend reasons for preferring the MWI over theism. Moreover, if a world-ensemble must exist then there must be a guide for those initial conditions to bring about such an ensemble. In such quantum speculation, what typically collapses the wavefunction (grounding quantum states, if you will) is an observer. If the only way to make sense of reducing all such quantum states to something else then it should be yet another observer. Perhaps God is the cosmic Observer who finally collapses the wavefunction? So, far from quantum evidence against God's existence, nay, we have rational grounds for promoting God's existence.

matt

[garthoverman]

Not true, though close. The correct formulation would be "until they are observed." Measuring is beside the point, it is observation of any kind which limits quantum interaction.
That's what I said. If you'll read it again, I said immediately before the sentence you cited, "Quantum indeterminacy indicates that - apart from being observed or measured - there is no 'will happen' or 'will not happen.'"(emphasis added this time). Measuring is not besides the point because an observation is a measurement.

Matt - your response will take me more time to address, and I'm heading into a busy weekend. I'll try and address it as comprehensively as possible at my first opportunity.

Yours,
Garth

[garthoverman]

Hello, Matt. I can address this portion of your response at this time because it won't require me to look anything up and I can respond off the cuff....


Today @ 05:44 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=105251#post105251)
mattbballman19:

What is curious here is your preference for the Many Worlds Interpretation on which to reduce all quantum states. You see, it is no less speculative than theism.
Not in my opinion. They're actually building computer processors based on exploiting this model. This is a good indication that the model is a relable representation of reality. I don't see them developing any technology attempting to exploit the supernatural powers of God.


Even worse, there are no independend reasons for preferring the MWI over theism.
I would say the above reason is a good one.


Moreover, if a world-ensemble must exist then there must be a guide for those initial conditions to bring about such an ensemble.
Does not follow. It may be the case that such an "ensemble" was not "brought about" but instead plainly exists.


In such quantum speculation, what typically collapses the wavefunction (grounding quantum states, if you will) is an observer. If the only way to make sense of reducing all such quantum states to something else then it should be yet another observer. Perhaps God is the cosmic Observer who finally collapses the wavefunction?
But that's just it... In MWI the wave function doesn't really collapse. It merely appears to as a precondition to the nature of our observations. In reality, every probability within the wave function is distributed across the real universe and therefore has an actual existence!



So, far from quantum evidence against God's existence, nay, we have rational grounds for promoting God's existence.
The only god's existence that might be supported by this theory (IMNSHO) is the pantheistic god. It just may be that the pantheistic god is the one described in the Bible, but typical Christian theism does not regard its God as identical to the universe.

Yours,
Garth

[wwatts]

Regardless, classical divine foreknowledge implies an inerrant knowledge of what will happen and what will not happen. Quantum indeterminacy indicates that - apart from being observed or measured - there is no "will happen" or "will not happen."



What the many-words theory says is that a real universe exists for every real possibility. Therefore there exists a universe in which I do accept Christ, and there exists a universe in which I don't.


I may be venturing out on a limb here, but if a universe exists for every possibility, then wouldn't a God's knowledge just have to be represented per universe. For instance, If God knows about event E in a single universe model, then in a multi-verse model wouldn't he just have to know about an event E in universe U? So then God instead of having to know every event E, he would have to know every E at every U. What am I missing?

[garthoverman]

Today @ 10:14 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=105917#post105917)
wwatts:

I may be venturing out on a limb here, but if a universe exists for every possibility, then wouldn't a God's knowledge just have to be represented per universe. For instance, If God knows about event E in a single universe model, then in a multi-verse model wouldn't he just have to know about an event E in universe U? So then God instead of having to know every event E, he would have to know every E at every U. What am I missing?
Its possible to define God's foreknowledge as "knows everything that ever can exist" and then no matter what the case is with reality, the definition of God's foreknowledge matches it. I have no problem with this type of foreknowledge existing in conjunction to the MWI.

The issues are less with respect to the possibilty of exhaustive foreknowledge, and greater in regard to free-will, identity, and consequence. If there exists a universe U-1 where I carry out act A-1 and another universe U-2 where I carry out act A-2, which of those ME's is really me? Both? If at event E it appears that I can choose among variable outcomes X-1, X-2, X-3, and X-4, (and God knows that I will choose ALL of them - each in unique universes) how free is my choice? Since there exists universe U-1 where ME-1 chooses X-1, and there exists universe U-2 where ME-2 chooses X-2, and so on... Which one of those ME's is me? Any of them? All of them?

My normal experience seems to tell me that I am not more than one ME. It seems that I have only one identity. So who decides which of those ME's I am identified with? My answer is a resounding "ME!" IOW it seems to me that I get to decide my own identity. Free-will is contained within the freedom to self-identify. Does that mean that those ME's that I do not identify with do not exist? No, I don't think so. They are still me also - I am simply free to ignore them.

But what about the Christian concept of Final judgement? If I am composed of a bunch of ME's that do accept Christ and a bunch of ME's that don't accept Christ, how would God judge me? Does He send the unsaved ME's to Hell and the saved ME's to Heaven? If the freedom to self-identify holds, then the ME's that get sent to Hell could simply decide to identify with the ME's that are in Heaven and God's judgement is meaningless.

I suppose that one could assert that God removes the freedom to self-identify at final judgement, but from my standpoint in the present what meaning does that have to me? Will it all come down to the ME that I happen to be self-identified with at the very moment of my death? How can there be a precise moment of death if it is entirely possible that some versions of me pursued probabilities that have already led to their demise? Has God already judged them?

So you can see that if we try to make these views compatible with classical Christian Theism this really gets us into some deep theological issues not necessarily related to foreknowledge and possibly unresolvable. I could probably go on for hours and hours exploring the conflicts and quandries that arise in trying to make MWI compatible with Christianity - none of which seem to be resolved within the Bible.

Lucky for me, I'm not a Christian. :teeth:

Yours,
Garth

[mattbballman19]

Gover, almost done with those articles. I'm learning alot.

As for your post above:


Not in my opinion. They're actually building computer processors based on exploiting this model. This is a good indication that the model is a relable representation of reality. I don't see them developing any technology attempting to exploit the supernatural powers of God."

Wait a minute. The only thing modeling satisfies is how the worlds correlate, not how or why the worlds exist. If one were to ask how God relates to us, that would be easy to model: It is as one person standing next to another. But in Many Worlds theory you have a bloated ontology of an infinite number of worlds. So, it may explain the existence of our world but it now conflates the problem to explaining the infinite number of others. Trust me, on a purely metaphysical analysis, the MWT is extremely more complex than a personal cause.


Does not follow. It may be the case that such an "ensemble" was not "brought about" but instead plainly exists

No contemporary theory of cosmology suggests that the present universe is eternally existent. And MWT does not explain how or why this universe came into existence, just that the universe gains its "reality" from an alternate one.


But that's just it... In MWI the wave function doesn't really collapse. It merely appears to as a precondition to the nature of our observations. In reality, every probability within the wave function is distributed across the real universe and therefore has an actual existence!

Whether it actually collapses or "appears to collapse" is not paramount here, it is that the reality of anything must be "granted" by some other measuring device/observer. This would make theism probable. Or one can side with Niels Bohr and pronounce Schrodinger's cat dead or alive despite the details of a functional quantum world.


The only god's existence that might be supported by this theory (IMNSHO) is the pantheistic god. It just may be that the pantheistic god is the one described in the Bible, but typical Christian theism does not regard its God as identical to the universe.

But wavefunctions are collapsed sequentially and not ubiquitously (though it is possible that the latter could be the case). But pantheism is not atheism. But consider this, I might collapse the wavefunction of an electron's "spin" passing through a Stern-Gerlach magnet by measuring it, but my quantum measuring device might be collapsed by yet another device looking at it, and so on. This is a sequential collapsing.

Thanks for the feedback.

matt

[wwatts]

If the freedom to self-identify holds, then the ME's that get sent to Hell could simply decide to identify with the ME's that are in Heaven and God's judgement is meaningless.


I didn't understand this one. How is it that we can decide to be someone that is in another universe?

[garthoverman]

If the freedom to self-identify holds, then the ME's that get sent to Hell could simply decide to identify with the ME's that are in Heaven and God's judgement is meaningless.
didn't understand this one. How is it that we can decide to be someone that is in another universe?

Because it isn't "someone," its YOU.

Yours,
Garth

[garthoverman]

05-24-2003 @ 06:12 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=106494#post106494)
mattbballman19:

Gover, almost done with those articles. I'm learning alot.
Good! :thumb: (and you can just call me Garth :smile:)


Wait a minute. The only thing modeling satisfies is how the worlds correlate, not how or why the worlds exist. If one were to ask how God relates to us, that would be easy to model: It is as one person standing next to another.
I hardly think that would be an accurate model because it fails to take into account some very important aspects of God's nature. Furthermore, some descriptions of God in the Bible would not correspond to that model (think: God is the "All in All").


But in Many Worlds theory you have a bloated ontology of an infinite number of worlds. So, it may explain the existence of our world but it now conflates the problem to explaining the infinite number of others. Trust me, on a purely metaphysical analysis, the MWT is extremely more complex than a personal cause.
Complexity - or lack thereof - is not a reliable measure of accuracy when attempting to contstruct a theory of reality as far as I know. Also, I think I may have misled you with my statements about this "model" and its usage. It isn't that scientists are modeling the multiverse on their computers, its that scientists are modeling their computers on the multiverse, i.e. they'll actually process computations that rely on simultaneous processes taking place in distinct universes.



No contemporary theory of cosmology suggests that the present universe is eternally existent.
Then I encourage you to research a more diverse set of comological models. Ekpyrotic models propose an eternal universe. Furthermore, where "eternal" is defined as "exists for all meaningful time values" the universe as it is currently observed certainly qualifies.


And MWT does not explain how or why this universe came into existence, just that the universe gains its "reality" from an alternate one.
First of all, it is not apparent that the universe "came into existence" at all. In order to identify an instance of "coming into existence" (especially as it relates to the set of everything that exists) one must observe a state of non-existence. Such a state is not observed of our universe. A "Coming into existence" of the universe therefore requires a "before the universe" which is a meaningless statement.


Whether it actually collapses or "appears to collapse" is not paramount here, it is that the reality of anything must be "granted" by some other measuring device/observer. This would make theism probable. Or one can side with Niels Bohr and pronounce Schrodinger's cat dead or alive despite the details of a functional quantum world.
It depends on what theism you propose, I'd think.



But wavefunctions are collapsed sequentially and not ubiquitously (though it is possible that the latter could be the case).
It is my belief that the latter is the case, and I'm pretty certain that once relativistic effects are accounted for that the end result is the same.


But pantheism is not atheism.
I like to consider it as spiritual atheism, something not unlike Buddhism.


But consider this, I might collapse the wavefunction of an electron's "spin" passing through a Stern-Gerlach magnet by measuring it, but my quantum measuring device might be collapsed by yet another device looking at it, and so on. This is a sequential collapsing.
Sequential without regard to GR.

Yours,
Garth

[wwatts]

Today @ 04:53 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=108949#post108949)
garthoverman:


didn't understand this one. How is it that we can decide to be someone that is in another universe?

Because it isn't "someone," its YOU.

Yours,
Garth [/QUOTE]

I guess we would have to discuss identity, the nature of identity and how I and that other person are identical.

Also I'm beginning to think that if we accept the many-worlds theory, there is no more examples of undetermined things in the universe. If thats true and someone accepts determinism, it seems there are other problems one would have to deal with ...

[garthoverman]

Today @ 07:04 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=109104#post109104)
wwatts:

I guess we would have to discuss identity, the nature of identity and how I and that other person are identical.
I agree, but first I think it would do you well to refrain from regarding those different parts of yourself as "other person(s)". They are you just as much as you are you now.


Also I'm beginning to think that if we accept the many-worlds theory, there is no more examples of undetermined things in the universe. If thats true and someone accepts determinism, it seems there are other problems one would have to deal with ...
Perhaps. I would say that indeterminacy is preserved in the freedom to self-identify. IOW outcomes A, B, and C will all happen (and arguably have already happened) and you as a sentient individual are theoretically capable of identifying yourself with the version(s) of you that experience any one or all of those outcomes. Pragmatically this is a bit more difficult to observe in everyday life since much of our existence is based upon a mutual agreement of experience among distinct conscious participants. IOW, if I report that I experience A, and you report that you experience B, the discrepency might still reflect reality accurately, but it short-circuits a lot of different human conventions such as communication. As a result, the desire for general agreement about reality can seem to limit the freedom to self-identify.

There are theories of consciousness that can reconcile the theoretic possibilities of MWT with the pragmatically experienced effects, and most of those (not surprisingly) involve a brand of panpsychism or pantheism wherein individual consciousnesses are embedded within unitary global consciousness somewhat like Jung's "collective unconscious." Thus the experience of a collective of individuals may be directed by the over-arching collective consciousness of which each individual is a conscious participant. At any given event, the experience of event A to the seeming exclusion of event B is generally agreed upon by the group experiencing the event because event A fulfills the a maximum intent of the collective. This does not mean that event B does not happen - it means simply that an individual's desire to continually identify with the group necessitates the individual self-identification with the version of itself that experiences that which the rest of the group experiences. IOW, in order to commune with a group, one must to some extent submit to the collective will of that group.

Yours,
Garth

[wwatts]

Yesterday @ 07:53 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=109173#post109173)
garthoverman:


I agree, but first I think it would do you well to refrain from regarding those different parts of yourself as "other person(s)". They are you just as much as you are you now.


Perhaps. I would say that indeterminacy is preserved in the freedom to self-identify. IOW outcomes A, B, and C will all happen (and arguably have already happened) and you as a sentient individual are theoretically capable of identifying yourself with the version(s) of you that experience any one or all of those outcomes. Pragmatically this is a bit more difficult to observe in everyday life since much of our existence is based upon a mutual agreement of experience among distinct conscious participants. IOW, if I report that I experience A, and you report that you experience B, the discrepency might still reflect reality accurately, but it short-circuits a lot of different human conventions such as communication. As a result, the desire for general agreement about reality can seem to limit the freedom to self-identify.

There are theories of consciousness that can reconcile the theoretic possibilities of MWT with the pragmatically experienced effects, and most of those (not surprisingly) involve a brand of panpsychism or pantheism wherein individual consciousnesses are embedded within unitary global consciousness somewhat like Jung's "collective unconscious." Thus the experience of a collective of individuals may be directed by the over-arching collective consciousness of which each individual is a conscious participant. At any given event, the experience of event A to the seeming exclusion of event B is generally agreed upon by the group experiencing the event because event A fulfills the a maximum intent of the collective. This does not mean that event B does not happen - it means simply that an individual's desire to continually identify with the group necessitates the individual self-identification with the version of itself that experiences that which the rest of the group experiences. IOW, in order to commune with a group, one must to some extent submit to the collective will of that group.

Yours,
Garth

I need to read a little bit more on this before I can even comment :O Can you refer me to any good sites?

[garthoverman]

Today @ 01:49 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=109846#post109846)
wwatts:

I need to read a little bit more on this before I can even comment :O Can you refer me to any good sites?
Hey, no problem! :smile: Here are a few links to some good papers to get you started:

Quantum Indeterminacy and the Omniscience of God (http://www.bostontheological.org/colloquium/bts/btsdavis.htm)

David Deutsch's Many Worlds (http://www.qubit.org/people/david/Articles/Frontiers.html)

Interview with David Deutsch (http://www.qubit.org/people/david/Articles/PhilosophyNow.html)

I posted those to mattbballman19 in his thread on Molinism and counterfactuals which spawned this thread.

Here are some resources for my favorite theories of consciousness:

Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness (http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/papers/facing.html)

Consciousness, Information, and Panpsychism (http://members.aol.com/NeoNoetics/CONSC_INFO_PANPSY.html)

And here is an online repository of papers on consciousness:

Online Papers on Consciousness (http://www.u.arizona.edu/~chalmers/online1.html#panpsychism)

Hope that helps! :smile:

Yours,
Garth

[mattbballman19]

Hey Garth!

I've finished the articles, but it's going to take a couple more reads for full comprehension. But to your immediate post.

Good! :thumb: (and you can just call me Garth :smile:)

I really have no idea why I called you gover. I must have been half-awake, because I remember posting right have whenever it was I got off work, which was around 11:30 PM. :smile:

Here are 4 observations I gathered while reading your post:

(i) God's omnipresence is not in the sense of being physically ubiquitous with the world. God is not a physical being and so does not saturate space as odor does with air. Instead, God is immediately related to every point in space and knows every such point as a being that transcends space-time.

(ii) Not much has been said in support of the MWT except that complexity is not a sufficient defeater. But scientific exlanations always prefer the simplest explanations unless there are overriding factors. In the MWT, I don't see such factors. And the MWT is clearly more complex as it posits an infinite number of universes. Also, the best explanations will be the most plausible and there is nothing more plausible about a MWT over and above theism. And the MWT surmises a complicated ensemble of universes that will require initial conditions anyway thereby failing as a full and complete explanation of reality. At least we have independent reasons to think that theism is true.

(iii) I have researched cosmology pretty thoroughly. It is definitely the case that no viable cosmological model proposes that the present universe is eternal -- not a one! All contemporary cosmological theories begin by attempting to explain the problems of the standard big bang model, not that there is no beginning of the universe, but that certain elements of the basic theory are not adequately explained. Every competing model begins with the assumption that the universe began to exist. And the phrase "coming into existence" for the universe is only absurd if one already believes that the universe is eternal. One cannot begin by assuming what needs to be proven. On the other hand, there is a wealth of evidence proving the contrary.

(iv) By a sequential collapsing, one need not mean a temporal sequential collapsing. One can just mean a logical sequential collapsing. Moreover, a Lorentzian model with respect to General Relativity might simply be a better model than a pure, unadulterated Einsteinian cosmology -- Lorentz advocated objective temporal duration.

That's all for now.

matt

[mattbballman19]

Also (even though the links were helpful) I've heard that administrator Dee Dee Warren is unsavory towards the idea of posting links (in accordance with the forum rules), so, in the name of fairness, you or I could isolate certain blocks of the linked articles and discuss them one block at a time.

Just a suggestion.

matt

[wwatts]

And the phrase "coming into existence" for the universe is only absurd if one already believes that the universe is eternal.

We need a time thread in here that talks about nothing but the nature of time. I know people that believe in 'block time' don't believe in the universe having a beginning or end, but it's more like a north and south pole in relation to the earth. Of course they must deny that anything begins to exist and that our experience of time passing is just an illusion. There's some other problems too I think.

[garthoverman]

Today @ 08:22 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=111769#post111769)
mattbballman19:

Hey Garth!

I've finished the articles, but it's going to take a couple more reads for full comprehension. But to your immediate post.

Good! :thumb: (and you can just call me Garth :smile:)

I really have no idea why I called you gover. I must have been half-awake, because I remember posting right have whenever it was I got off work, which was around 11:30 PM. :smile:
I figured it was something like that. No biggie.


Here are 4 observations I gathered while reading your post:

(i) God's omnipresence is not in the sense of being physically ubiquitous with the world. God is not a physical being and so does not saturate space as odor does with air. Instead, God is immediately related to every point in space and knows every such point as a being that transcends space-time.
I don't interpret "All in All" and "omnipresent" to mean "not really everywhere, just kinda-sorta related to everything." If you do, well, then you seem to be using an uncommon version of English.


(ii) Not much has been said in support of the MWT except that complexity is not a sufficient defeater.
I'd like to know exactly which objective criteria you use to measure the "complexity" of a scientific theory.


But scientific exlanations always prefer the simplest explanations unless there are overriding factors. In the MWT, I don't see such factors.
Here's the simple version of the MWT: All things that are possible actually happen.



And the MWT is clearly more complex as it posits an infinite number of universes.
If those universes are really there, what does it matter? Wouldn't you say quantum theory is a rather complex theory? Basically, I think the issue of complexity as it relates to accuracy is a red herring.


Also, the best explanations will be the most plausible and there is nothing more plausible about a MWT over and above theism.
Ummm.... but they're acutally testing it and planning to implement it. In what ways might we reliably test for the existence of God? Which God?


And the MWT surmises a complicated ensemble of universes that will require initial conditions anyway thereby failing as a full and complete explanation of reality. At least we have independent reasons to think that theism is true.
I maintain that "initial conditions" are non-existent in the real universe and that this "complicated ensemble" is not required to be brought about.


(iii) I have researched cosmology pretty thoroughly. It is definitely the case that no viable cosmological model proposes that the present universe is eternal -- not a one!
What do you understand of the Ekpyrotic model or Eternal Chaotic Inflation model? Are these not "viable?" If you think not, please explain why.


All contemporary cosmological theories begin by attempting to explain the problems of the standard big bang model, not that there is no beginning of the universe, but that certain elements of the basic theory are not adequately explained. Every competing model begins with the assumption that the universe began to exist.
I think you and I are speaking about two different senses of the "universe" (which is not uncommon, actually). When I speak of the universe I mean the set of everything that exists. It may be the case that the physical universe began to exist, but the real universe is not necessarily entirely phsyical. Furthermore, in order to define a beginning to the set of everything that exists one must observe a state of absolute non-existence prior to the supposed "beginning." No such state is observed, nor is such a state at all logically possible. "Before the universe" is as meaningless as "100km north of the north pole."


And the phrase "coming into existence" for the universe is only absurd if one already believes that the universe is eternal.
No its not, see above how a beginning to the set of everything that exists is illogical.


One cannot begin by assuming what needs to be proven. On the other hand, there is a wealth of evidence proving the contrary.
Please do provide this evidence.


(iv) By a sequential collapsing, one need not mean a temporal sequential collapsing. One can just mean a logical sequential collapsing. Moreover, a Lorentzian model with respect to General Relativity might simply be a better model than a pure, unadulterated Einsteinian cosmology -- Lorentz advocated objective temporal duration.
Yeah and Newton hypothesized that elementary particles bounced around like little marbles. The success of Newtonian mechanics does not make his hypotheses regarding elementary particles correct. Analagously, the facility of Lorentz transformations does not instantiate an objective time in reality.

Yours,
Garth

[Morpheus]

i'm sorry if i missed the relevant information in another post, but is there posited scientific support for the MWT? in the first post of the thread, garthoverman said:


Quantum indeterminacy indicates that - apart from being observed or measured - there is no "will happen" or "will not happen." For that matter, there is no "does happen" or "does not happen." It seems more like all variations are real and simultaneously exist until they are measured.

i thought all that quantum indeterminancy indicates is that, before some quantum event occurs, it is impossible to determine which possibility will become real (hence "there is no 'will happen' or 'will not happen'"). but i didn't think it followed that, therefore, all of the possibilities become real. why isn't it the case that, for a quantum event, one of the possibilities becomes real and the other simply is not real, i.e., does not instantiate itself in objective reality?

[garthoverman]

Today @ 05:47 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=114196#post114196)
Morpheus:

i'm sorry if i missed the relevant information in another post, but is there posited scientific support for the MWT?

Yes. I posted some links in this thread on the first page to some articles on www.qubit.com featuring David Deutsch. If you looked up some more of his recent work you'll find more. The May 2003 cover story of Scientific American was about MWT and cosmology written by Max Tegmark if I am not mistaken. Here it is:

http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?colID=1&articleID=000F1EDD-B48A-1E90-8EA5809EC5880000


i thought all that quantum indeterminancy indicates is that, before some quantum event occurs, it is impossible to determine which possibility will become real (hence "there is no 'will happen' or 'will not happen'").

I should have said that research with regard to quantum indeterminacy leads us to believe that there is no "will happen or will not happen," not quantum indeterminacy itself.


but i didn't think it followed that, therefore, all of the possibilities become real. why isn't it the case that, for a quantum event, one of the possibilities becomes real and the other simply is not real, i.e., does not instantiate itself in objective reality?
We really aren't sure "why" nor how yet. It simply seems to be the facts of the matter.

Yours,
Garth

[mattbballman19]

garth,

Did you read my last post?

I stated that since it is against the rules to post links, either you or I could, at your call, bring the information, paragraph by paragraph, to the forum for discussion. Since I finished the articles, I am now fairly familiar with the position, therefore, better suited for intelligable discussion. So my questions are these:

1. Which of the two articles would you prefer we discuss first.

2. Would you like the idea of extracting the preferred paragraphs here to the forums for discussion?

3. Should you or me start the extracting?

matt

[garthoverman]

Today @ 12:32 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=119184#post119184)
mattbballman19:

garth,

Did you read my last post?

I stated that since it is against the rules to post links, either you or I could, at your call, bring the information, paragraph by paragraph, to the forum for discussion. Since I finished the articles, I am now fairly familiar with the position, therefore, better suited for intelligable discussion. So my questions are these:

1. Which of the two articles would you prefer we discuss first..
David Deutsch and Many Worlds. To be honest, though, this has gone on so long that at the moment I don't feel the enthusiasm I had to discuss either of these topics that I did before.


2. Would you like the idea of extracting the preferred paragraphs here to the forums for discussion?

3. Should you or me start the extracting?
You can feel free to extract whatever you like from any of those articles. I will discuss with you what I can. As I believe I said once before, I'm not particularly concerned with the omniscience of the Christian God since it too much concerns a God that I don't believe exists. My personal interests lie in the many-world theory, and theories of consciousness as they relate to that that theory. However, if you would like to address the omniscience of the Chrisitan God by extracting from the article I supplied that addressed it, please feel free to raise that topic. Over all at the moment I'm indifferent.

Take care.

Yours,
Garth

[mattbballman19]

hey garth,

To that David Deutsch article:

David Deutsch himself confesses that a Many Worlds Interpretation is not prevailing in his community -- he just blows it off as a product of the positivist movement. But the so-called "direct evidence" is merely consistent with a MWI view, not that it implies it (as most quantum physicists will tell you). Nick Herbert in his monumental book Quantum Reality exposits 8 ways how quantum metaphysics can be assessed. If one begins with the assumption that quantum interaction is actual then she might consider MWI one way to explain the data. But not much hangs on Deutsch's metaphysical interpretation here, especially since he admits that he is an anti-supernaturalist -- I guess theism has to be wrong and so the MWI, no matter how fantastic, is more viable for him.

David Chalmers, though I haven't read much of his writings in detail, has been instrumental in combatting the errors of the Churchlands. I agree with Chalmers that consciousness will not explained in a reductionist theory, but his agnosticism about the source of qualia and such with only working models of integration show that the field of the cognitive sciences have a long, hard path in front of them -- particularly if they are physicalists. As a Christian theist, J.P. Moreland's presentation of substance dualism strikes me as the most plausible view (see his book Body and Soul with Scott Rae).

matt

[garthoverman]

Today @ 03:06 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=120846#post120846)
mattbballman19:

hey garth,

To that David Deutsch article:

David Deutsch himself confesses that a Many Worlds Interpretation is not prevailing in his community -- he just blows it off as a product of the positivist movement. But the so-called "direct evidence" is merely consistent with a MWI view, not that it implies it (as most quantum physicists will tell you). Nick Herbert in his monumental book Quantum Reality exposits 8 ways how quantum metaphysics can be assessed. If one begins with the assumption that quantum interaction is actual then she might consider MWI one way to explain the data.
It appears, though, that the 'assumption' has been tested and successfully withstood scrutiny. How else can we acheive computations in parallel worlds if they aren't really there? What alternative explanations are equally viable yet mutually exclusive with MWI? AFAICT, its quite possible for many of the interpretations to be simultaneously correct.


But not much hangs on Deutsch's metaphysical interpretation here, especially since he admits that he is an anti-supernaturalist
Now come on, Matt. What type of propaganda is this? All scientists, when practicing science, are "anti-supernaturalists," yet you paint it as though such a position is one of counter-culture. That may be the case within the community of Tweb, but not among the body of scientists and probably not among the general populous. Would you feel comfortable labelling all Christians as "anti-naturalists"?


-- I guess theism has to be wrong and so the MWI, no matter how fantastic, is more viable for him.
By no means does this falsify theism entirely -- specifically because theism (in general) is unfalsifiable. You might say that certain conceptualizations of God have been falsified, though I'm not positive which. As I explained earlier in this thread, the MWI seems (to me) to fragment traditional Christian concepts of soteriology almost to the point of meaninglessness. Having seen the persistence of Young Earth Creationists in the face of overwhelming evidence, though, I am certain that these dogmas will continue to propogate regardless of the implications of our scientific knowledge.


David Chalmers, though I haven't read much of his writings in detail, has been instrumental in combatting the errors of the Churchlands. I agree with Chalmers that consciousness will not explained in a reductionist theory, but his agnosticism about the source of qualia and such with only working models of integration show that the field of the cognitive sciences have a long, hard path in front of them -- particularly if they are physicalists. As a Christian theist, J.P. Moreland's presentation of substance dualism strikes me as the most plausible view (see his book Body and Soul with Scott Rae).
I will join you in noting that physicists and physicalists have hit a tremendous obstacle with the realization of the inadequacies of present-day reductionism. In fact, I spent a few days in the last week over on the Atheist Network discussion forum presenting a solid argument against the non-computability of reality, concluding that there must exists aspects of physical theory that are non-computable if we hope to continue explaining the nature of the universe in physical terms. I'm not uncomfortable recognizing that there may exist a compliment to physical theory that is intrinsically non-physical -- what makes me uncomfortable is the line of theologians like Mr. Moreland chomping at the bit awaiting their first opportunity to label "non-physical" as "supernatural" and thus bog down the tireless pursuits of science with religious red herrings. It may well be that the non-computable aspects of physics can still be assailed methodologically, and if that is the case then calling these phenomena "supernatural" is not only unwarranted but impeding.

Yours,
Garth

[Morpheus]

garth,

i read the articles you suggested, and found them very interesting. as far as i can tell, mwi, while not accepted by the majority of physicists and cosmologists, does provide a plausible explanation for some occurences we have observed (e.g. quantum computation) that may be inexplicable otherwise. however, i simply don't know enough about quantum mechanics to pontificate very meaningfully with regard to mwi. i am learning more in that area right now, and perhaps in a few months or so i'll be able to form a solid position in favor of or against mwi.

maybe in one universe i'll accept it, and in another i'll deny it. :smile:

[JCA]

As a part time student of DD's Many Worlds Work, and a Christian, I spent a little time trying to work out how the Judgment scenario would work within it..

This is what I concluded, although it is obviously speculation :teeth:

I can accept the idea that there is a Universe for every choice that can be made.. In fact, it fits with my view of God and the Omni's..

Imagine yourself as a compass sitting in Gods hand.. you are the dot in the middle.. around the rim is the result of every choice you could every make.. say at 180 is salvation, at 90 is Damnation etc.. God knows the resolution of every choice.. not because you have made it yet, but because every choice is indeed 'played out'.. so as you move around the compass, it really isn't important which direction you go in - as long as it's YOUR choice, in the end, God is waiting...

How this ties in to the MW theory is that obviously, even if it is in Gods mind, these choices are all taken into account.. just as each universe is real that the choice exists in. SO the discovery of the possibility of an infinite amount of choices and universes for them to play out in, doesn't surprise or ruffle me.

Now on to the Judgment thing.. You see, it all depends on how you are tying all of these things together. As of yet, we haven't formerly theorised or found a cementing force.. in Science.. but in Theism, it is possible that what is indeed being checked, is the SOUL.

Sure.. I know.. I could say morality, but that would mean that somehow each of ourselves share the same moral codes - which may also be as possible as this soul thing :teeth:

Let me explain.. In the Bible, we are told that God will write His laws and commands upon our hearts and minds.. This could be taken to be a deep seated subconscious knowledge of right and wrong.. your conscience, if you will... whcih helps to direct your morality.

How this Judgment would work is if every one of 'us' shared that same morality/soul/conscience (whatever you want to call it), and so no matter what 'environment' we where in, we could be tested as to how we stand up to our own 'self'.

This would mean that the concept that there is a universe for every choice, it wouldn't have to directly relate that there would be places where you where doing good, and places where you where doing bad.. but there are only places where those possiblities exist, but YOUR choice dictates how the next Universe/Choice is 'created' (from our perspective, from Gods, it was already made, we just hadn't chosen it yet - if you see what I mean).

Basically, although there may be many parts of us in an infinite amount of Universes, we are apprently held together with all of these other 'selves' by some bond that is then 'judgable' - this is explainable theologically by a "soul", and as some unyet determined theory within Many Worlds that may be a 'universal conscience' (not with others perhaps, but with 'ourselves').

If any of that makes any sense :teeth:

IN Love and Peace

JCA

[mattbballman19]

Garth!

Sorry for the LONG wait. Work is killing me. :shrug:

I agree that inherent within the notion of Christianity is "anti-naturalism." It is part of the Christian metaphysic. But this is absolutely not the case about science -- that it is "anti-supernatural." That's a metaphysical position about science, not a scientific position itself. My point about Deutsch's anti-supernaturalism was that he held it as a metaphysical assumption in his scientific endeavors. That's okay for him to do, but when he is called to task he should be ready to support his anti-supernaturalism. He can't just say it's a given. It's like a crime scene investigator already believing that the butler can't be culpable when he begins his investigation of a murder. There is no "anti-butler-did-it" or "anti-butler-didn't-do-it" theses inherent in crime scene investigations. I surely hope you recognize the difference between science and metaphysics! (Incidently, the culture of America is actually overwhelmingly supernaturalistic. So, though I never made the claim, it is actually true that "anti-supernaturalism" is counter-cultural). You have to get out of this mindset that to be scientific is to be a naturalist. That's propoganda!

With respect to reductionism and mind/body dualism, it isn't the case that the collapse of computational reductionism prima facie leads to substance dualism. You're cheating Moreland out of his case. He proposes positive reasons for his view that have no dependence on the current research of a neurocomputational perspective. The reason for this is found in Paul Churchland's own words in his book Matter and Consciousness where he admits that substance dualism is logically possible even if his reductionism turns out to be true. So, a proper discounting of Moreland's dualism should not be based on labeling it as passe or imposing. I hate to break it to you, but you'll need to defend your contentions about dualism with actual reasons just as Moreland did in supporting it.

matt