Is there logical priority to God's knowledge? (for JP Holding?)

[infide]

I was perusing some comments by J.P. Holding on Unconditional Election and I came across this (I hope it is okay to quote this?):

"Norman Geisler injects the same concept, in a somewhat different way and reaching somewhat different conclusions, when he speaks in Chosen But Free of God "knowingly determining and determinately knowing" and essentially concludes that the question, "Does God foreknow because he foreordains or does he foreordain because he foreknows?" is a misplaced question. To speak of God doing A "because" of B implies a chain of causality that would be impossible for a being who transcends time. White [57] in reply quotes an observation of Feinberg "that God foreordains all things simultaneously does not mean that there is no logical order in what he foreordains." Feinberg is not really grasping Geisler's point here: That God is aware of linear order does not thereby entail that God thinks or acts in a linear order; indeed such would again be impossible for a timeless being, since a linear or logical order requires the passage of time to exist and be enacted. Geisler's solution -- that God acts based both on His sovereign will and his foreknowledge simultaneously (and I would add, acts with reference to each as He desires to accomplish His purposes)"

I'm sorry to say (can i believe I am siding with White on this one?), I don't think that can even possibly be true. The issue of acting here, i suspect, is a simple diversion (because God actually creating, in many ways, must be based on foreknowledge no matter what theological position you hold - that is, how did God know the world he was creating was the world he wanted?) . The real issue (as Feinberg rightly points out) is if any logical priority exists in what God is decreeing, that is, God's knowledge (Natural, Middle, and Free) from eternity. That is, were some things logically prior (based on) other things in His knowledge. It seems yes.

Logical priority can best be understood from sentencial logic:
(1) If P then Q
(2) P
(3) Therefore, Q.

In this example, we would say that premises (1) and (2) are logically prior to the conclusion (3). This is not a claim that there is any chronological order. It is quite reasonable to say that this logical priority is eternal (and hence God always knows that (3) is based on (1) and (2), and that eternally).

So what about foreknowledge/foreordination? well, the molinist argues thus:

God's natural knowledge is logically prior to God's middle knowledge is logically prior to God's free knowledge. With the divine decree of which world being actual coming between the last 2 logical moments. I think this divine decree, just is, God's foreordination since God's choice of which feasible world to actualize is ordaining not only which world is actual, but His own causal influence in that world.

Thus, it looks like on the pure Molinist (not congruist) account, God's foreknowledge is logically prior to God's foreordination.

Does saying that something is true "based on" (i would say rather than because of) something else and considering logical order imply time? again, i dont think so, unless God did not know from eternity that the conclusion of modus ponens was logically posterior to its premises! Also, consider that in any system, God's knowledge of necessary truths is logically prior to God's foreknowledge of the actual world. Unless someone is going to make the absurd claim that God can actualize something to defy the laws of logic or create a world where 2+2=5.

So why the claim that any logical order implies God is not timeless? i really dont know. hopefully JP Holding can cast some light on this for me.

God bless.

[jpholding]

Thus, it looks like on the pure Molinist (not congruist) account, God's foreknowledge is logically prior to God's foreordination.



Then maybe I am not a full fledged Molinist. :teeth: That's why I don't go to categories first. But:

So why the claim that any logical order implies God is not timeless?

Well...logic requires steps; steps have to be enacted in order...the outworking of logic requires time. But I'm not sure that sums me up right in the first place. The matter of enactment seems to be missing from that summation.

JP

[infide]

isnt that taking a rather anthropomorphic view of God's knowledge? It seems to me, that God doesnt need to "work out steps" to be logical. All the conclusions (say, like MP above) are known by God from eternity. does that mean God doesnt know which statements He knows are conclusions and which ones are premises? again, how could that be the case? If God knows "therefore Q" without knowing "If P then Q" and "P" are the logical premises, then He really doesnt know MP does He?

in any case, I cant see any reason to deny that some logical priority obtains from eternity (necessary truths-->contingent truths).

peace,
jd

[jpholding]

isnt that taking a rather anthropomorphic view of God's knowledge? It seems to me, that God doesnt need to "work out steps" to be logical.

If so, then it is just as much an argument against the position I addressed. Logical order in any event does not equate with enactment order. The incoherence I see in Calvinist positions derives from their use of passages like Rom. 8:29 to establish an order (in some cases, I think unwittingly) in which they reject views like mine because it does not cohere with what they see as the proper "order" of our reaction. In so doing I think they conflate the views of God and man and even unwittingly step between one and the other.

In essence I would say that Feinberg's point is an irrelevancy in context, and that it does not answer the original question posed.

[CJD®]

infide wrote:
So why the claim that any logical order implies God is not timeless? … It seems to me, that God doesnt need to "work out steps" to be logical. All the conclusions (say, like MP above) are known by God from eternity.

I would begin by answering this as Rahner did: the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity. God is fundamentally temporal. If God is doing anything before the creation of the cosmos, time is implied. There must be some kind of 'GodTime', or else we wind up with Aristotle's Unmoved Mover. Even though the conclusion (to use your example) would be known by God from eternity, he couldn't act upon it apart from time. We either have God the person, three in one, doing, acting, thinking, feeling from all eternity (boundless though timed), OR we have a big block of wood just sitting there.

isnt that taking a rather anthropomorphic view of God's knowledge?

I think we've largely gotten it backwards. Rather, it is taking a theomorphic view of God's knowledge. He is God, and as such, far more complex intellectually, emotionally, etc., than we can articulate.

Best,

CJD

[infide]

If so, then it is just as much an argument against the position I addressed. Logical order in any event does not equate with enactment order.

yeah, definately. the priority exists from eternity so the logical ordering does not equate to chronological causation. And it seems to me, though, that such logical ordering does present a structure to God's knowledge which reflects His wisdom, goodness, etc. That is, I wouldnt think something like "God permits evil" would be logically prior to "God permits freedom". However, it seems the reverse would be true.

The incoherence I see in Calvinist positions derives from their use of passages like Rom. 8:29 to establish an order (in some cases, I think unwittingly) in which they reject views like mine because it does not cohere with what they see as the proper "order" of our reaction. In so doing I think they conflate the views of God and man and even unwittingly step between one and the other.

It seems to me that its because Calvinists fail to establish logical ordering that they mess up interpreting passages like Rom 8:29. because doesnt the text seem to suggest (though, granted, somewhat loosely) that foreknowledge is the logical basis for predesting unto sanctification? that is:
"God foreknows" --> "God predestines unto sanctification". It seems to me that they want these to be equal in some way.

They also fail to see in this passage that a strict 1-1 mapping is probably not even meant, and is certainly not required. That is, it seems likely (from teachings of Christ) that although God calls those He predestines, He also calls others. In the sense that those He predestined are a subset of those He called.

[lee_merrill]

Hi everyone,

Well, doesn't almost every decision we make have a logical sequence embedded in it? As in the "why?" questions young folks ask!

"Why did you wave to the policeman?"

"Well, I wanted to encourage him."

"Why did you want to encourage him?"

"Because I thought he might need a lift, standing out there directing traffic."

"Why did you think etc."

But we don't usually sit down and work through all these reasons, one by one, in a sequence...

Blessings,
Lee

[Jaltus]

I would begin by answering this as Rahner did: the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity. God is fundamentally temporal. If God is doing anything before the creation of the cosmos, time is implied. There must be some kind of 'GodTime', or else we wind up with Aristotle's Unmoved Mover. Even though the conclusion (to use your example) would be known by God from eternity, he couldn't act upon it apart from time. We either have God the person, three in one, doing, acting, thinking, feeling from all eternity (boundless though timed), OR we have a big block of wood just sitting there.



I think we've largely gotten it backwards. Rather, it is taking a theomorphic view of God's knowledge. He is God, and as such, far more complex intellectually, emotionally, etc., than we can articulate.

Best,

CJD


The problem I have with the above is that I do not know how one can assert that God is fundementally temporal. That would mean that something controls or is above God. In addition, I have yet to see any coherent definition of time that does not rely on the physical, in which case there can be no time before creation, and thus God by definition cannot be fundementally temporal. If one denies this, the next step seems to be a form of Process thought were creation is necessary instead of contingent (an error many theologians back into from different directions, admittedly).

Also, I think you mischaracterize the atemporal view of God. If God functions atemporally, it means that His only act ever is ALL of creation. There is no differentiation of God from His one act, and therefore everything that happens is this one act.

Hmmm, that makes me think of something else. I think I need to start another thread.

However, I have found two new posters I will enjoy getting to know. Good to have you here, CJD and Infide.

Lee,

Stop trying to confuse the issue with the facts! :wink:

[infide]

CJD,

Sorry i missed this post. you mustve posted it right before i posted my other one.

I would begin by answering this as Rahner did: the economic Trinity is the immanent Trinity. God is fundamentally temporal. If God is doing anything before the creation of the cosmos, time is implied.

it may be that the doctrine of the trinity implies this. (though i dont think so - couldnt there be eternal relations among Trinity members? Also there may be some kind of undifferentiated metaphysical time). but my issue was with the idea that logical priority implied temporality. That is, cant there be structure to God's knowledge eternally? i dont see why not (though admittedly it is, as it should be, extraordinary).

There must be some kind of 'GodTime', or else we wind up with Aristotle's Unmoved Mover. Even though the conclusion (to use your example) would be known by God from eternity, he couldn't act upon it apart from time. We either have God the person, three in one, doing, acting, thinking, feeling from all eternity (boundless though timed), OR we have a big block of wood just sitting there.

well, there is a third option - God was timeless sans creation and then temporal with creation. I am inclined to agree with this one. but for other reasons. Also, the problem that faced the newtonians seems to plague your view, why did God wait for infinity to create the world? (i.e. how did we get to now if God had to traverse an infinity of moments of His existence. we shouldve never gotten here, but here we are.)

I think we've largely gotten it backwards. Rather, it is taking a theomorphic view of God's knowledge. He is God, and as such, far more complex intellectually, emotionally, etc., than we can articulate.

well, theomorphic is good (since God should be God-shaped) - but i think what most people envision is a God who "learns things" by "looking" and "seeing" and "rationally deducing through steps of logic" - which are all thinking of God's innate omniscience in terms of human knowledge. But that cannot be (since there never is a time when God doesnt know all truths, so even if God did exist in "god-time" he would know every truth in the first(!?) moment and every moment after, that is, he doesnt deduce things).

[infide]

In addition, I have yet to see any coherent definition of time that does not rely on the physical,

what about the whole thought experiment where God counts down to creation? 10...9...8...7.......3...2..1..."let there be light!".

but then, isnt God counting time? even before the physical Universe exists.

Shrug, i agree with you that God cannot be fundamentally temporal - but i think my issue is with other things. (like an infinity of moments having already past).

However, I have found two new posters I will enjoy getting to know. Good to have you here, CJD and Infide.

good to hear from you too!
God bless,
jd

[Jaltus]

Does counting imply time? Does God count in time or is it all one thought in terms of numbering? What is He counting?

I think your thought experiment assumes time in order to prove it.

[infide]

Does counting imply time? Does God count in time or is it all one thought in terms of numbering? What is He counting?

I think your thought experiment assumes time in order to prove it.

I prefer the relational view of time. Which just means time is a set of ordered relations of the "before" and "after" type.

so, in the thought experiment, God counting (i am thinking of a succession of thoughts here) 10 is before 9 and 7 is after 8 etc.

therefore on the relational view, God counting is time.

peace,
jd

[CJD®]

Greetings, Jaltus. Thanks for your kind words.

The problem I have with the above is that I do not know how one can assert that God is fundementally temporal. That would mean that something controls or is above God.

What I mean to say by this is that God doesn't seem to be either ex tempus or sub tempus; rather, he is, as a thinking, feeling, person (3-in-1) boundless and yet within his own 'GodTime'. This is not he same as created time, of course, since that doesn't exist apart from light and the rhythm of day and night. Time passes, but it does not press. God is in time, and he is Lord over it.

In addition, I have yet to see any coherent definition of time that does not rely on the physical, in which case there can be no time before creation, and thus God by definition cannot be fundementally temporal.

But who says God isn't 'physical'? 'Spiritual' is not opposed to 'physical'; it is opposed to 'carnal'. Moreover, the phrase "in the beginning" (Gen 1:1) connotes the sheer, unqualified precondition for all happening in time, not the beginning of time itself. Newton too disagreed that time is merely a physical reality. 'GodTime', or absolute time, would continue to flow even in a physically empty world. Newton wrote that "although we can possibly imagine that there is nothing in space, yet we cannot think that space does not exist, just as we cannot think that there is no duration, even though it would be possible to suppose that nothing whatever endures" ("On the Gravity and Equilibrium of Fluids," pp. 137–38). Therefore, as long as God exists, so too does time.

If one denies this, the next step seems to be a form of Process thought were creation is necessary instead of contingent (an error many theologians back into from different directions, admittedly).

I don't follow this conclusion. What it does mean, though (in my opinion), is that God determines himself to be Creator. Creation is neither necessary nor contingent, for the Creator discloses himself in his decision to create. Who he is necessarily flows into this resolve, and from that resolve overflows to creation. Creation for a trinitarian God is, in a word, his 'destiny'.

Also, I think you mischaracterize the atemporal view of God. If God functions atemporally, it means that His only act ever is ALL of creation. There is no differentiation of God from His one act, and therefore everything that happens is this one act.

How is this different (in theory or philosophically) than Open Theism? God knows no future, because he knows it all at once — right now (and right … now, and now, and now, and, well, you get the picture). I still think all you've got is a block of wood if God is atemporal.


Best,

CJD

p.s. Answer to infide forthcoming when 'time' permits …

[infide]

'Spiritual' is not opposed to 'physical'; it is opposed to 'carnal'.

ehh. i dunno about that. That seems to be a functional expression (that those acting according to the spirit do not act carnally -- not so much what spirit is).

the best definition I have ever seen for "Spirit" is just simply "living, immaterial substance". In that case, material or physical is opposed to "spiritual".

peace.

[rhutchin]

I was perusing some comments by J.P. Holding on Unconditional Election and I came across this (I hope it is okay to quote this?):

"Norman Geisler injects the same concept, in a somewhat different way and reaching somewhat different conclusions, when he speaks in Chosen But Free of God "knowingly determining and determinately knowing" and essentially concludes that the question, "Does God foreknow because he foreordains or does he foreordain because he foreknows?" is a misplaced question. To speak of God doing A "because" of B implies a chain of causality that would be impossible for a being who transcends time. White [57] in reply quotes an observation of Feinberg "that God foreordains all things simultaneously does not mean that there is no logical order in what he foreordains." Feinberg is not really grasping Geisler's point here: That God is aware of linear order does not thereby entail that God thinks or acts in a linear order; indeed such would again be impossible for a timeless being, since a linear or logical order requires the passage of time to exist and be enacted. Geisler's solution -- that God acts based both on His sovereign will and his foreknowledge simultaneously (and I would add, acts with reference to each as He desires to accomplish His purposes)"
I'm sorry to say (can i believe I am siding with White on this one?), I don't think that can even possibly be true. The issue of acting here, i suspect, is a simple diversion (because God actually creating, in many ways, must be based on foreknowledge no matter what theological position you hold - that is, how did God know the world he was creating was the world he wanted?) . The real issue (as Feinberg rightly points out) is if any logical priority exists in what God is decreeing, that is, God's knowledge (Natural, Middle, and Free) from eternity. That is, were some things logically prior (based on) other things in His knowledge. It seems yes.

Logical priority can best be understood from sentencial logic:
(1) If P then Q
(2) P
(3) Therefore, Q.

In this example, we would say that premises (1) and (2) are logically prior to the conclusion (3). This is not a claim that there is any chronological order. It is quite reasonable to say that this logical priority is eternal (and hence God always knows that (3) is based on (1) and (2), and that eternally).

So what about foreknowledge/foreordination? well, the molinist argues thus:

God's natural knowledge is logically prior to God's middle knowledge is logically prior to God's free knowledge. With the divine decree of which world being actual coming between the last 2 logical moments. I think this divine decree, just is, God's foreordination since God's choice of which feasible world to actualize is ordaining not only which world is actual, but His own causal influence in that world.

Thus, it looks like on the pure Molinist (not congruist) account, God's foreknowledge is logically prior to God's foreordination.

Does saying that something is true "based on" (i would say rather than because of) something else and considering logical order imply time? again, i dont think so, unless God did not know from eternity that the conclusion of modus ponens was logically posterior to its premises! Also, consider that in any system, God's knowledge of necessary truths is logically prior to God's foreknowledge of the actual world. Unless someone is going to make the absurd claim that God can actualize something to defy the laws of logic or create a world where 2+2=5.

So why the claim that any logical order implies God is not timeless? i really dont know. hopefully JP Holding can cast some light on this for me.

God bless.
Focussing on two statements made by infide (one here, the other later) that confused me--

God's natural knowledge is logically prior to God's middle knowledge is logically prior to God's free knowledge. With the divine decree of which world being actual coming between the last 2 logical moments.

…(since there never is a time when God doesnt know all truths, so even if God did exist in "god-time" he would know every truth in the first(!?) moment and every moment after, that is, he doesnt deduce things).

It seems to me that if God has two types of knowledge (or more) then time is implied by the difference in knowledge. If God has natural knowledge, middle knowledge, and free knowledge, and natural knowledge is different from middle knowledge which is different from free knowledge then time must pass in the process of going from the lesser to the greater. If God simply has knowledge so that God’s natural knowledge equals His middle knowledge equals His free knowledge, then there is no time implied by His having knowledge.

If God's natural knowledge can be logically prior to God's middle knowledge, then they must be two different sets of knowledge. If they were the same set of knowledge then we do not seem to be able to talk about one set being logically prior to another.

If God knows all truth at the same moment (speaking from a human perspective) then there would not seem to be room to distinguish between natural knowledge, middle knowledge or free knowledge since they would all be the same knowledge.

The problem seems to come from our human perspective in which there is time and everything changes as this “time” changes. From the human perspective, God acts in time since a person is born at one moment in time and dies at another moment in time. However, God’s knowledge does not change over human time as the man changed.

I read Geisler’s Chosen But Free in which he argues against “hyper-Calvinism” and for “moderate Calvinism” and Geisler convinced me that he lacked a fundamental understanding of Calvinism. As a consequence, it seemed to me that he said a lot of goofy things in an effort to take both sides of issues. To be fair, I was not all that impressed with White’s rebuttal, The Potter’s Freedom, which had its confusing moments also. The most interesting section of White’s book were the endorsements at the beginning and the end of the book. They were merciless in speaking of Geisler, and I tend to think Geisler earned a lot of the criticism.

I somewhat doubt that even Geisler understands what he meant when he said, "knowingly determining and determinately knowing," or that the statement, itself, is much more than gibberish.

I have found the discussion of God’s knowledge to be interesting, however.

[infide]

no, they are not chronological moments, or "types" of knowledge. It is all referring to God's omniscience, but a certain kind of structure in God's knowledge, where some propositions are based on other propositions. It does not imply time, nor that there is some kind of change in God's knowledge.

peace.

[rhutchin]

no, they are not chronological moments, or "types" of knowledge. It is all referring to God's omniscience, but a certain kind of structure in God's knowledge, where some propositions are based on other propositions. It does not imply time, nor that there is some kind of change in God's knowledge.

peace.

OK. then you need to define better what you mean by terms like "natural" or "middle" or "free" when used with respect to God's knowledge.

It seems that you mean that these are subsets of knowledge. We might say that God is omniscient and that this omniscience consists of one set of knowledge (natural) and this set (middle) and this (free). Neither of these has any priority over the others but none can exist without the others and each is equally dependent on the others.

In your OP you said, "Logical priority can best be understood from sentencial logic:
(1) If P then Q
(2) P
(3) Therefore, Q."

From God's perspective the following would also be true at the same time--
(1) If Q then P
(2) Q
(3) Therefore, P.
--because Q is known by God in the same sense that P is known.

So that we might frame it as--

1. P,Q (Natural knowledge)
2. Therefore P then Q (middle (?) knowledge)

or something in that vein.

[infide]

OK. then you need to define better what you mean by terms like "natural" or "middle" or "free" when used with respect to God's knowledge.

these are well-understood terms which are/were commonly used in scholastic theology (except middle-knowledge, which Molina came up with). God's natural knowledge consists of all metaphysically-necessary truths. (think laws of logic, all the possible worlds, mathematical truths, moral truths, etc) And God's free-knowledge consists of knowledge of that will be case given God's free decision to actualize a particular world.

Molina postulated that there was an intermediate (logical)stage of God's knowledge, middle-knowledge which stood somewhere in between these two. That is, these truths were not metaphysically necessary (like natural knowledge) but also may not be true of the actual world (like free-knowledge). This is God's knowledge of metaphysically contingent states of affairs.

It seems that you mean that these are subsets of knowledge. We might say that God is omniscient and that this omniscience consists of one set of knowledge (natural) and this set (middle) and this (free). Neither of these has any priority over the others but none can exist without the others and each is equally dependent on the others.

well, i wouldnt say that logically prior logical stages are "dependent" on logically posterior ones. For example, God's knowledge that "50 is a number" is not dependent on "The United States will have 50 states", but the reverse does seem true, "The United States will have 50 states" seems to depend on the statement "50 is a number". see what i mean? The logical priority only goes in one direction.

and yes, in a sense, these are subsets of God's knowledge.


In your OP you said, "Logical priority can best be understood from sentencial logic:
(1) If P then Q
(2) P
(3) Therefore, Q."

From God's perspective the following would also be true at the same time--
(1) If Q then P
(2) Q
(3) Therefore, P.
--because Q is known by God in the same sense that P is known.

no not at all. I wasnt talking about variable instantiation!! it was just supposed to demonstrate what logical priority was, going DOWN the argument (not inside the premises). That is, P and Q are representative of anything! it could be X and Z. the logical priority exists between the premises and the conclusion of the argument. (1) and (2) is logically prior to (3).


So that we might frame it as--

1. P,Q (Natural knowledge)
2. Therefore P then Q (middle (?) knowledge)

or something in that vein.

ohh sheesh no. you totally messed up the argument. We arent talking about God simply knowing something (P or Q) but God knowing a conditional "IF P THEN Q" and a second premise which affirms the antecedent ("P (is true)") Then it follows from those two premises that the conclusion "therefore, Q (is true)" is true.

However, this whole argument (and infinately many instantiations of it) would be part of God's natural knowledge. (since modus ponens is a metaphysically necessary logical inference). That example was merely to show what logical priority is, not to give an example of natural-->middle knowledge priority. Ill try to give you an example:

Natural Knowledge:
"If the American Colonists were taxed without representation, they could declare their independence."
(AND of course "If the American Colonists were taxed without representation, they could not declare their independence.")

Middle Knowledge:
"If the American Colonists were taxed without representation, they would declare their independence."

Free Knowledge:
"When the American Colonists are taxed without representation, they will declare their independence."

Of course, this is simplistic (in reality there are many, many conditions in the antecedent, but i simplified it here) but it should give you the general idea.

[rhutchin]

...
ohh sheesh no. you totally messed up the argument...

Well, of course. Accurate specification of the argument is what any discussion is all about. Your argument works because you created (and specified) conditions that allow it to work. That does not make your argument correct. Logical Yes; correct, No.

[harmonmsp]

Just a thought:

Just because God's foreknowledge means logical priority (which I MIGHT doubt), it doesn't mean that God is BOUND by time. I would be just fine saying that, at this point, I think God's existence NECESSITATES time while at the same time transcending its limitations on created beings. This is just like how His existence necessitates the reality of 'existence' without being bound by the 'existence' that created beings have.

[rhutchin]

Just a thought:

Just because God's foreknowledge means logical priority (which I MIGHT doubt), it doesn't mean that God is BOUND by time. I would be just fine saying that, at this point, I think God's existence NECESSITATES time while at the same time transcending its limitations on created beings. This is just like how His existence necessitates the reality of 'existence' without being bound by the 'existence' that created beings have.

Time is an indicator of change. In our human world, each second measures the rotation of the earth on its axis and each year measures the rotation of the earth around the sun. In each second of each year, the earth has changed in that it occupies a different position at each sec. Time tells us that there is a difference between point A and point B.

When we say that God is not bound by time, it means that He is changeless so that He is the same from one second to the next and there is no record of any difference. It also means that God occupies all of existence at the same time and never has to move. If God were to gain knowledge as events occurred, then that change in knowledge would be indicated by time.

Logical priority is a term that allows the human mind to picture what God would do if God were human and bound by time.

[harmonmsp]

I'm going to take an issue or two with this:

Time is an indicator of change. In our human world, each second measures the rotation of the earth on its axis and each year measures the rotation of the earth around the sun. In each second of each year, the earth has changed in that it occupies a different position at each sec. Time tells us that there is a difference between point A and point B.

You seem to be conflating meaning between your use of 'change'. Time is not dependent on change, it's dependent on existence. Time is only an indicator of change because of the created order, which God determined would be as such. Plus, I think Malachi 3:6 is meant in a different sense than you are understanding it. See my next comment ...

When we say that God is not bound by time, it means that He is changeless so that He is the same from one second to the next and there is no record of any difference.

The same in what sense? Is He uniform in consistency, for instance? Careful, because then you've got a problem with the human form of Jesus making that characteristic invalid ... I personally believe that Malachi 3:6 is determined by the context of the passage; in other words, God doesn't change his allegiences, decisions and standards of integrity. That has nothing to do with time or His ability, for instance, to be Christ in Jerusalem one day and Capernaum the next. Or take, for example, His speaking to us. There was a time when He had not yet said to Moses "I AM THAT I AM", was there not?

It also means that God occupies all of existence at the same time and never has to move. If God were to gain knowledge as events occurred, then that change in knowledge would be indicated by time.

Again: did the Spirit 'descend like a dove' on Christ or not? In what sense do you think God 'never has to move'? And just to make it clear, I in no way want to back Open Theism.

[infide]

Well, of course. Accurate specification of the argument is what any discussion is all about. Your argument works because you created (and specified) conditions that allow it to work. That does not make your argument correct. Logical Yes; correct, No.

what are you talking about? there was no argument. i was merely showing what logical priority is. what exactly do you find incorrect about the conclusion of an argument being logically posterior to its premises? and no, i must confess, modus ponens isnt "my argument".

[infide]

Just a thought:

Just because God's foreknowledge means logical priority (which I MIGHT doubt), it doesn't mean that God is BOUND by time. I would be just fine saying that, at this point, I think God's existence NECESSITATES time while at the same time transcending its limitations on created beings. This is just like how His existence necessitates the reality of 'existence' without being bound by the 'existence' that created beings have.

why think that if God is temporal this is some kind of restriction on Him. I dont see why it would be. I mean is this really a limitation for humans that we act at different moments in time? Its actually a benefit! otherwise all our actions would run into each other.

same thing for God - time is not a limitation, its just an aspect of God creating something other than Himself.

you might as well claim that God's knowledge is "bound by" the laws of logic.

further, God's existence does not necessitate time, as far as i can tell. God is necessarily perfect, and need not move or reason things out or undergo any change at all (and so need not have anything in his history as "before" or "after" anything else). The relations within the Trinity could also be eternal and changeless. But once God creates, it seems He enters into time (since He creates at one moment of time rather than another).

[rhutchin]

rhutchin
Time is an indicator of change. In our human world, each second measures the rotation of the earth on its axis and each year measures the rotation of the earth around the sun. In each second of each year, the earth has changed in that it occupies a different position at each sec. Time tells us that there is a difference between point A and point B.

harmonmsp
You seem to be conflating meaning between your use of 'change'. Time is not dependent on change, it's dependent on existence. Time is only an indicator of change because of the created order, which God determined would be as such. Plus, I think Malachi 3:6 is meant in a different sense than you are understanding it. See my next comment ...

When you say that time is only an indicator of change because of the created order you seem to be restricting time to the universe That He created (I agree if that is what you are doing). Outside the universe, there would be no time from what I can tell. Within the universe time exists because of the relationship that God gave it to that which God created.

If we say that God can change, then we should be able to identify how God could change. I am at a loss for examples. The idea that God does not change is based on several verses beginning with Exodus where God says, I AM THAT I AM and building on that.

rhutchin
When we say that God is not bound by time, it means that He is changeless so that He is the same from one second to the next and there is no record of any difference.

harmonmsp
The same in what sense? Is He uniform in consistency, for instance? Careful, because then you've got a problem with the human form of Jesus making that characteristic invalid ... I personally believe that Malachi 3:6 is determined by the context of the passage; in other words, God doesn't change his allegiences, decisions and standards of integrity. That has nothing to do with time or His ability, for instance, to be Christ in Jerusalem one day and Capernaum the next. Or take, for example, His speaking to us. There was a time when He had not yet said to Moses "I AM THAT I AM", was there not?

OK. Maybe you could expand on what you mean when you say that God is not bound by time.

We are told that God is a spirit (even as we humans also seem to be spirits). God could inhabit a physical body just as we now do for a short time. When the physical body dies, we do not die. Although there was a time before He said, "I AM THAT I AM," to Moses, God could have said it to Adam or could say it to you and it would mean the same at each point. Again, if God could change, what is it that would change?

rhutchin
It also means that God occupies all of existence at the same time and never has to move. If God were to gain knowledge as events occurred, then that change in knowledge would be indicated by time.

harmonmsp
Again: did the Spirit 'descend like a dove' on Christ or not? In what sense do you think God 'never has to move'? And just to make it clear, I in no way want to back Open Theism.

The problem I see here is that we have examples of God acting in our physical universe when God is not confined to our physical universe. So, the Scriptures describe God as descending on Christ and pictured as a dove (probably because we can relate to a dove and sort of get a mental picture of the scene). God seems to have done it that way for our benefit even as He took the form of a man to speak to Abraham or as a man called Christ. However, that did not mean that God was confined to the body of Christ (else why would Christ pray to the Father).

I think, in this discussion, it would help if we dwelt on the manner in which God might change if it were possible and work from there. How do you see God changing (and doing so over time)? I also think we need to involve some Scripture in this to nail down as many specifics as we can before we allow our imaginations to take off.

[rhutchin]

what are you talking about? there was no argument. i was merely showing what logical priority is. what exactly do you find incorrect about the conclusion of an argument being logically posterior to its premises? and no, i must confess, modus ponens isnt "my argument".

In your OP, you say, "...were some things logically prior (based on) other things in His knowledge. It seems yes." That seemed (to me) to have the markings of an argument that you then seemed to proceed to defend. I guess I misunderstood what you were doing.

[infide]

In your OP, you say, "...were some things logically prior (based on) other things in His knowledge. It seems yes." That seemed (to me) to have the markings of an argument that you then seemed to proceed to defend. I guess I misunderstood what you were doing.

I am referring to your comment, it was about the modus ponens example - not THAT statement I made. you are the master of confusion and "theological filibuster".

please stop with the meaningless accusations.

If you were referring to my statement that logical priority makes sense when speaking of God's knowledge, then prove me wrong. You make all these statements and can never deal with the issues. Can you show that I made this work for my argument, or is this just another empty (and meaningless) attempt at a rebuttal?

[rhutchin]

rhutchin
In your OP, you say, "...were some things logically prior (based on) other things in His knowledge. It seems yes." That seemed (to me) to have the markings of an argument that you then seemed to proceed to defend. I guess I misunderstood what you were doing.

infide
I am referring to your comment, it was about the modus ponens example - not THAT statement I made. you are the master of confusion and "theological filibuster".

please stop with the meaningless accusations.

If you were referring to my statement that logical priority makes sense when speaking of God's knowledge, then prove me wrong. You make all these statements and can never deal with the issues. Can you show that I made this work for my argument, or is this just another empty (and meaningless) attempt at a rebuttal?

OK. I will take it that you made the argument “that logical priority makes sense when speaking of God's knowledge” in your OP and that the following citation of modus ponens and apparent application had nothing to do with that argument.

I understand your proposal - “that logical priority makes sense when speaking of God's knowledge”. If you want to present a defense of that proposal (using the modus ponens framework or any other), then I will respond to that defense. Otherwise, I will drop my comments on what I thought was a defense but was not and what I thought was an attempt to argue a la modus ponens but was not.

[infide]

OK. I will take it that you made the argument “that logical priority makes sense when speaking of God's knowledge” in your OP and that the following citation of modus ponens and apparent application had nothing to do with that argument.

i was showing that logical priority need not imply chronological ordering. The premises and conclusion of modus ponens can be known from eternity (non-chronologically) but yet there is still a clear logical priority from premises to conclusion.

I understand your proposal - “that logical priority makes sense when speaking of God's knowledge”. If you want to present a defense of that proposal (using the modus ponens framework or any other), then I will respond to that defense. Otherwise, I will drop my comments on what I thought was a defense but was not and what I thought was an attempt to argue a la modus ponens but was not.

because it follows by definition! There are certain things in God's knowledge which entail other things in His knowledge. I don't see a need to present a defense to that. It should be the person who denies such a thing to argue why it could not be the case.

[rhutchin]

rhutchin
OK. I will take it that you made the argument “that logical priority makes sense when speaking of God's knowledge” in your OP and that the following citation of modus ponens and apparent application had nothing to do with that argument.

infide
i was showing that logical priority need not imply chronological ordering. The premises and conclusion of modus ponens can be known from eternity (non-chronologically) but yet there is still a clear logical priority from premises to conclusion.

Logical priority from premises to conclusion tells us nothing about the truth of the argument. So, when you put down your premises and conclusion, we can look at it.

rhutchin
I understand your proposal - “that logical priority makes sense when speaking of God's knowledge”. If you want to present a defense of that proposal (using the modus ponens framework or any other), then I will respond to that defense. Otherwise, I will drop my comments on what I thought was a defense but was not and what I thought was an attempt to argue a la modus ponens but was not.

infide
because it follows by definition! There are certain things in God's knowledge which entail other things in His knowledge. I don't see a need to present a defense to that. It should be the person who denies such a thing to argue why it could not be the case.

Generally, the person who puts forth the presupposition has some responsibility to defend the presupposition. If God is omniscient and knows the end from the beginning, then the presupposition that, “There are certain things in God's knowledge which entail other things in His knowledge,” does not seem to say anything more than that which is conveyed by the statement, 5+5=10.

Logical priority in decision-making is unique to human thinking where lack of knowledge and slowness of thought dictate that the human work through a problem in a logical order. God is not constrained in this fashion -- He is not forced to think the way humans think.

You said that logical priority makes sense when speaking of God's knowledge. I don't see where that is necessarily the case unless you only mean to describe God's knowledge from an inferior human persepective.

[harmonmsp]

If we say that God can change, then we should be able to identify how God could change. I am at a loss for examples. The idea that God does not change is based on several verses beginning with Exodus where God says, I AM THAT I AM and building on that.

OK. Maybe you could expand on what you mean when you say that God is not bound by time.

Two things, here, it looks like:

(a) I am NOT saying that God changes in the fact of His existence, nature, moral quality, moral judgments or decisions. I am merely saying that when you talk about God 'changing' one has to include the fact that God has said different things (not contradictory things) at different times. If 'time is an indicator of change' as you are saying, then the logical progression from that is that God ALWAYS changes because God exists in EVERY fragment of time. By saying, then, that God cannot change when coupled with this definition, I am wary of you 'preserving' God's transcendence at the expense of His immanence. If God cannot change and time necessarily indicates change, then God cannot both be immutable and at the same time interact with the created order.

(b) When I say that God 'is not bound by time', what I am saying is that God can exist in time without being seen as being limited by it. God can exist outside of time, but we also must continue to understand that God also exists inside of time as well. Does this mean that when He acts it is within time? Yes. Does this mean that when He acts He is limited in how He can exist? No.

We are told that God is a spirit (even as we humans also seem to be spirits). God could inhabit a physical body just as we now do for a short time. When the physical body dies, we do not die. Although there was a time before He said, "I AM THAT I AM," to Moses, God could have said it to Adam or could say it to you and it would mean the same at each point. Again, if God could change, what is it that would change?

A problem I see with <b>what seems to me</b> to be your definition of "change" is that it means that God cannot take on a new form.

God seems to have done it that way for our benefit even as He took the form of a man to speak to Abraham or as a man called Christ. However, that did not mean that God was confined to the body of Christ (else why would Christ pray to the Father).

No problem with this. :smile:

[infide]

Logical priority from premises to conclusion tells us nothing about the truth of the argument. So, when you put down your premises and conclusion, we can look at it.

yes it does. If there is logical priority in any subset of omniscience then there is logical priority in all of God's omniscience. But God knows modus ponens, which is a proper subset. So heres an argument:

(1) If there is logical priority in any subset of God's knowledge, then there is logical priority in God's knowledge. (definition of subset)
(2) There is logical priority in the subset which contains modus ponens alone. (definition of logical priority, instantiated in MP)
(3)Therefore, there is logical priority in God's knowledge.

Generally, the person who puts forth the presupposition has some responsibility to defend the presupposition. If God is omniscient and knows the end from the beginning, then the presupposition that, “There are certain things in God's knowledge which entail other things in His knowledge,” does not seem to say anything more than that which is conveyed by the statement, 5+5=10.
I dont see your point. Is there logical priority to 5+5=10? not really, since this is bidirectional, that is 10=5+5 <==> 5+5=10.

However, there is logical priority implicit in your statement. It hardly makes sense that God knows "5+5=10", if none of those symbols are defined. But that means the definitions of those symbols are logically prior to God's knowledge that "5+5 = 10". So that "5 is a number" or perhaps "5 is(def.) a set of cardinality 5" (if you like set-theoretical notions of numbers) and "+ means arithmetic sum" or "+ is (def.) the union operator" etc. ALL are logically prior to "5+5=10".

Logical priority in decision-making is unique to human thinking where lack of knowledge and slowness of thought dictate that the human work through a problem in a logical order. God is not constrained in this fashion -- He is not forced to think the way humans think.

you miss the point. The logical priority to God's knowledge does not indicate that God "thinks through" these logical-steps. Rather, God's knowledge has a particular structure to it, where some things in his knowledge are based on other things.

You said that logical priority makes sense when speaking of God's knowledge. I don't see where that is necessarily the case unless you only mean to describe God's knowledge from an inferior human persepective.

well it does make sense. youre the one who is confusing things. well now you have an argument to screw up above. enjoy.

[rhutchin]

rhutchin
Logical priority from premises to conclusion tells us nothing about the truth of the argument. So, when you put down your premises and conclusion, we can look at it.

infide
yes it does. If there is logical priority in any subset of omniscience then there is logical priority in all of God's omniscience. But God knows modus ponens, which is a proper subset. So heres an argument:

(1) If there is logical priority in any subset of God's knowledge, then there is logical priority in God's knowledge. (definition of subset)
(2) There is logical priority in the subset which contains modus ponens alone. (definition of logical priority, instantiated in MP)
(3)Therefore, there is logical priority in God's knowledge.

We know that the argument rests on the truth of the premise, “there is logical priority in any subset of God's knowledge.” If you presuppose this to be true, then the argument is true. That presupposition is not warranted (at least you provide no basis to believe it to be true). So, we have a logical argument whose truth cannot be established from the above.

rhutchin
Logical priority in decision-making is unique to human thinking where lack of knowledge and slowness of thought dictate that the human work through a problem in a logical order. God is not constrained in this fashion -- He is not forced to think the way humans think.

infide
you miss the point. The logical priority to God's knowledge does not indicate that God "thinks through" these logical-steps. Rather, God's knowledge has a particular structure to it, where some things in his knowledge are based on other things.

That is the interesting point. We tend to suspect that God “thinks through” that which He thinks. However, is it true that some things in His knowledge are based on other things. Certainly, that is true for humans. However, if we can only picture God as an extension of ourselves, do we accurately understand God as He is? When God says that His thoughts are not our thoughts, does that mean more than the superficial reading allows? The issue, which is uncertain, is whether God’s knowledge has any structure to it at all. I see no way to determine whether it does or not without presupposing that it does.

rhutchin
You said that logical priority makes sense when speaking of God's knowledge. I don't see where that is necessarily the case unless you only mean to describe God's knowledge from an inferior human persepective.

infide
well it does make sense. youre the one who is confusing things. well now you have an argument to screw up above. enjoy.

If you present an argument, I will make time to try to screw it up.

[infide]

We know that the argument rests on the truth of the premise, “there is logical priority in any subset of God's knowledge.” If you presuppose this to be true, then the argument is true. That presupposition is not warranted (at least you provide no basis to believe it to be true). So, we have a logical argument whose truth cannot be established from the above.

that wasnt a premise. Are you talking about (1) or (2)?

both seem true to me. Unless you are saying that God doesnt know Modus Ponens? Which would be quite a strange thing.

That is the interesting point. We tend to suspect that God “thinks through” that which He thinks. However, is it true that some things in His knowledge are based on other things. Certainly, that is true for humans. However, if we can only picture God as an extension of ourselves, do we accurately understand God as He is? When God says that His thoughts are not our thoughts, does that mean more than the superficial reading allows? The issue, which is uncertain, is whether God’s knowledge has any structure to it at all. I see no way to determine whether it does or not without presupposing that it does.

yes of course its true. I have already given you several examples. I think you are just being difficult. (or thick-headed?) Modus Ponens, the math/definitions thing, knowledge of what could be/what will be (natural and free knowledge). etc. are all examples where God's knowledge of some things is based on other things he knows.

If you present an argument, I will make time to try to screw it up.

and i did, and you made no attempt to refute it, you just said "that premise is not warrented", well why not!? if you think about it for more than a few seconds maybe youll see it.