Does Atemporality Imply Calvinism?

[Jaltus]

I said this in another thread:

Also, I think you mischaracterize the atemporal view of God. If God functions atemporally, it means that His only act ever is ALL of creation. There is no differentiation of God from His one act, and therefore everything that happens is this one act.

In writing that, I realize that there might be a connection between atemporality and Calvinism that excludes Arminians from an atemporal view of God.

Hold on, I have a feeling I am going to explain this poorly.

Ok, atemporality means that all of creation is a single act for God.

We know that God holds all things together just by His existence.

This means that God is actively involved in everythng that occurs and that everything that occurs is part of His one action.

If this is true, does determinism necessarily or likely follow from this?

I mean, it seems as if God is necessarily linked to every act by everything being part of His one act, that He is then not only accountable for every act, but responsible as well in a causal sense.

Dang, I have no idea if I am communicating this well or not. Sheepdog, Mattbballman19, others, please help me out in kicking this idea around.

[Paul]

I think you're right that it implies that God is causally in one sense or another responsible for everything. But that is not Calvinism. Calvinism includes other propositions also.

[Jaltus]

I did switch to determinism in the post, I just wanted to grab attention with the thread title.

[Ormly]

God created Satan. Was God responsible his fall; was God in it? Becareful here, you are about to enter the twilight zone.

[mattbballman19]

Yo!

In writing that, I realize that there might be a connection between atemporality and Calvinism that excludes Arminians from an atemporal view of God.

I definitely have reservations about the relationship between God's timeless status after creation, and how that subsequentness affects the actions of creatures, who are themselves, the quintessential subset of such creation. It seems we either must disavow creaturely freedom, or God's atemporality - after creation. We take away freedom, because if God is outside of time both before and after the time at which the universe came into being, then it per force means that at that time, the particular, set courses or routes of particular acts have been heretofore determined. For a God that entered into time could construct creation in accord with His omniscience (thus retaining sovereignty), and relate metaphysically to creation by merely sustaining it in existence, rather than determining how such existences act. It seems that a necessary condition for such a feat is temporality after creation, since this alone precludes a kind of creation where all states of affairs - including actions of creatures - are directly and immediately instantiated, thus determining them, abrogating freedom. This isn't a position (atemporality both before and after creation) which speaks of knowledge alone of particular acts, but the acts themselves. If the acts themselves are included among the things that are etched onto the cloth of the first instance of creation itself, it seems to follow that those acts are fettered to travel through fatalistic vistas.

This may be hopelessly vauge. :lol:

mattd

[semmie]

a God that entered into time could construct creation in accord with His omniscience... is there "time" for god to enter prior to creation, though? :huh:

i really have nothing productive to offer, but i'm reading Craig's Time and Eternity at the moment, so i'm gonna try to follow you guys on this.

~sarah

[mattbballman19]

is there "time" for god to enter prior to creation, though? :huh:

i really have nothing productive to offer, but i'm reading Craig's Time and Eternity at the moment, so i'm gonna try to follow you guys on this.

~sarah

Good question! I was sloppy with my terms right here. The time I speak of here is not before (for, as you intimated, this would be nonsensical) or after, but simultaneous with, the first instant of time. Just as 'Humanness' can't begin until the simultaneous union of sperm and egg, God's temporality can't begin until the simultaneous union of timeless agent and time itself.

Let me know if this helps. :wink:

mattd

[semmie]

:yes:

that works. thanks, matt!

[harmonmsp]

Jaltus,

Although my Calvinistic side is saying "yes, it does!", I'm fighting that simplification-tendency for your sake. :) I also have to stay intellecutally honest.

It doesn't necessarily follow that because God has atemporality it means He must have literally determined everything. Remember, in order to create in the first place, God has to step into time. Creation cannot be without a time. He could still foresee the things that would happen without necessarily ACTIVELY dictating that everything would.

Now, did He necessarily want the foreseen results? By choosing to argue that point, THEN you step into the Cal/Arm debate. But merely stating that God created it, does not mean that His atemporality necessarily determined everything. Everything is happening in time. By definition, then, His A-temporality cannot affect anything happening WITHIN time. Perhaps His not being limited to existence in a particular time frame is tied to His level of determininsm, but not His being completely outside of time.

Woo! What a rush! :thumb:

[Chief of Staff Lizard]

OK I am probably in way over my head here, but this is something that I have been thinking about a lot lately. Calvinism, not how it relates to time. But I think that my thoughts on God's temporality may be unconsciously effecting my thoughts on Calvinism.

And I really do not have any thing to add (other than more questions)

Does anyone see a difference between God being atemporal and God being transtemporal?

I think God is transtemporal, but may not be atemporal. After all God the Son took on a temporal form during the incarnation.

In otherwords, if God transcends time, yet can also interact within time would that make a difference between trans- and a-temporality?

[harmonmsp]

Does anyone see a difference between God being atemporal and God being transtemporal?

I think God is transtemporal, but may not be atemporal. After all God the Son took on a temporal form during the incarnation.

In otherwords, if God transcends time, yet can also interact within time would that make a difference between trans- and a-temporality?

This is exactly what I was talking about in post #9, I believe it was.

When you say 'a-temporal', you are literally saying that His existence can ... well, exist ... <b>apart from</b> time. When you say 'trans-temporal' you are saying, I think, that God exists in all frames of time in which He wishes to enter into; He is not constrained to the present time as we experience it. This is why it makes sense to say that God is 'eternal' -- He has, does and will exist in every aspect of time; every instance of time can be 'present' for Him in the same sense that <b>only</b> the present is 'present' for us.

You might be onto something interesting to think about how God could not be a-temporal, but you can't limit yourself to only One member of the Trinity (Jesus) just to make your argument.

Oh my, what a discussion we have. :sigh: :wink:

[Jaltus]

OK I am probably in way over my head here, but this is something that I have been thinking about a lot lately. Calvinism, not how it relates to time. But I think that my thoughts on God's temporality may be unconsciously effecting my thoughts on Calvinism.

And I really do not have any thing to add (other than more questions)

Does anyone see a difference between God being atemporal and God being transtemporal?

I think God is transtemporal, but may not be atemporal. After all God the Son took on a temporal form during the incarnation.

In otherwords, if God transcends time, yet can also interact within time would that make a difference between trans- and a-temporality?

Instead of trans-temporal, I tend to use the terminology of omnitemporal. Atemporality means that God does not experience our time, though He might experience sequence of some sort. Trans-temporality, or at least what I am taking by your explanation of the term, is that God is able to both be in and out of time in some meaningful way. The problem is that once God enters time (or anyone does), they are now temporal in some respect since there is a subset of sequence which is dependant upon time.

I go for omnitemporality, which signifies God's mastery over time in that He can move to any when with His complete counsciousness (please let this term slide by, the only other moderately suitable term would be awareness). The problem with omnitemporality is that it allows for God to "rewind" and "tape over" parts He did not like.

[Chief of Staff Lizard]

Instead of trans-temporal, I tend to use the terminology of omnitemporal. Atemporality means that God does not experience our time, though He might experience sequence of some sort. Trans-temporality, or at least what I am taking by your explanation of the term, is that God is able to both be in and out of time in some meaningful way. The problem is that once God enters time (or anyone does), they are now temporal in some respect since there is a subset of sequence which is dependant upon time.

I go for omnitemporality, which signifies God's mastery over time in that He can move to any when with His complete counsciousness (please let this term slide by, the only other moderately suitable term would be awareness). The problem with omnitemporality is that it allows for God to "rewind" and "tape over" parts He did not like.
I have trouble conceiving of an All Powerful, All Knowing, God not liking what He created. In fact, I have trouble comprehending an Omnitemporal God who “went back” in time to ‘erase’ something. If He is omnitemporal, wouldn’t he be able to be move to any when or all any whens simultaneously (well as simultaneity can be applied to an omnitemporal being).



IOW, an Omnipotent, Omniscient, God would get it right the first time. If He is also Omnitemporal, he would know if he did not get it right before (again how can you apply that to an omnitemporal being) he “messed up”.



Otherwise, I like the concept of omnitemporality.



Or am I just missing something (that happens a lot when I talk theoretically about time. :dizzy: )

[Jaltus]

I have trouble conceiving of an All Powerful, All Knowing, God not liking what He created. In fact, I have trouble comprehending an Omnitemporal God who “went back” in time to ‘erase’ something. If He is omnitemporal, wouldn’t he be able to be move to any when or all any whens simultaneously (well as simultaneity can be applied to an omnitemporal being).

As I mentioned, it just happens to be a theoretical weakness in my stance. Just because it is possible does not even make it probable that God would do such a thing. FWIW, Calvinists in general have the same problem with their view of God since He can do anything anway. I just tend to be upfront with the problem since it is my weird little view.


IOW, an Omnipotent, Omniscient, God would get it right the first time. If He is also Omnitemporal, he would know if he did not get it right before (again how can you apply that to an omnitemporal being) he “messed up”.

In my example, I am assuming human free-will. If you disregard free-will, God has no reason to "be kind, rewind." Only when free-will is assumed need there be any hint of rewinding, and thus God would not have messed up, man would have. However, I do not think that fully engages your point, but I am not sure what would.

Otherwise, I like the concept of omnitemporality.



Or am I just missing something (that happens a lot when I talk theoretically about time. :dizzy: )


Thanks, I like it also. WLC tends to use the word for something different, but then he thinks like a philsopher instead of a scientist.

[infide]

I tend to think it is a mistake to think that God being omni-temporal is some kind of restriction for God. Thats like saying that God's knowledge is "restricted" because it must be consistant with the laws of logic. (though, obviously time is begun and logic isnt... but still).

It seems to me that whenever God brings about something other than Himself, this necessitates some kind of time. (since now there is an event related to God at a particular moment).

but, i must admit, jaitus, i dont see how timelessness posits determinism. probably because i cant see how timelessness could be true with God creating the Universe.

anyway, my interest has been peaked.
God bless,
jd

[Pereynol of Sheer Dread]

You know, I always take it as an axiom that human attempts to isolate the inner workings of God's being are not reliable. I am skeptical of any attempts to dogmatize human speculations concerning God's modus operandi as to the mechanistic relation between such things as foreknowledge and predestination (no matter how informed such speculations are). That being said, I'll speculate a little---sans dogma....

I do think that determinism plays a role in the world; if it did not, I'd guess that all the human advances in technology and science that are predicated upon our observation of causal connections would not have met with very much success. I also believe that God does determine the world. And he may do it from some kind of "eternal now," whether his own expereince entails sequence of a sort or not. (We have no way of knowing, IMHO.) I don't see any reason that any of this implies Calvinism---especially a Calvinist soteriology, however.

I suppose the real issue surrounds the traditional debate over the logical priority of what God knows and what he ordains---even though this kind of language is fraught from the beginning with human cognitive limitations. What God ordains is also that which God determines, and it is here precisely that we begin to ask about God's modus operandi. Does God foreknow things because he determined those things, as in Calvinism, or does he determine a foreseen sequence of events and intertwined human lives, with all the attendant decisons involved? Is it the former, or the latter? (All theologies, including Arminianism, involve some sort of determinism; the question surrounds its scope and its application with respect to human freedom. And God's timelessness doesn't seem to place limitations upon how one answers this question.) So again, if we try to answer the question, shall we give the former answer, or the latter?

I think the latter. I tend to think that determinism is introduced "AFTER," or, logically subsequent to, the way God foreknows a certain possible world (I mean this term in a less technical sense than in modal logic) will unfold. God chooses to actualize one world, in totality, as well as all the collective events and beings that compose that world. He chooses to endow human beings with incompatibilistic freedom, and he foreknows the contingencies involved. He sees and knows it all, and he determines what he knows. If this is the case, God has ordained that human beings possess incompatibilistic freedom within the world he has chosen to actualize, and this state of affairs wouldn't be impeded by God's supposed timelessness.

It might be better, really, not to speak of logical priority at all---but rather to see all God's powers, knowledge, and acts as constituting a simple unity, as in classical theism, BUT also, to view this unity as being impossible without all the elements we so cavalierly distinguish (as we must---if we are to think about any of this at all). All God's powers and acts are co-ordinated, and they could well be fixed within his unchanging being (pure actuality) as in classical theism, or they could be "arranged" otherwise---but we really don't know about these things....

[Kenny]

Sorry, but this is likely to be a single drive by posting on my part as I don't have time to get into another discussion at the moment

I said this in another thread:

In writing that, I realize that there might be a connection between atemporality and Calvinism that excludes Arminians from an atemporal view of God.

I don't see why an Arminian couldn't be a soft determinist, though it usually doesn't happen that way.

Ok, atemporality means that all of creation is a single act for God.

Say Dee Dee finally loses it and punches you in the face. How many actions did she perform? Well, she punched you in the face, she swung her arm, she kept her fist clenched, she aimed, … The point is that a single action can be composed of several actions, or it may be that two distinct actions (like swinging one's fist and punching someone in the face) occupy the same temporal event sequence. This gets into some murky waters about how to differentiate actions, and I would be careful about overdrawing conclusions here.

We know that God holds all things together just by His existence.

Yes, and at each stage of something's existence in time. So what difference does it make if all the stages exist in some metaphysical sense (a 4D block sort of time) or if only the present stage exists – God's relationship to the "present" stage of an object (whether 'present' is merely indexical or if it singles out something metaphysically privileged) is the same in both scenarios (in the 4D scenario, God just happens to hold the same relationship with other stages of the object).

This means that God is actively involved in everythng that occurs and that everything that occurs is part of His one action.

If this is true, does determinism necessarily or likely follow from this?

I don't see any direct connection between the two (although I would argue that an atemporal notion of God's relationship to time is inconsistent with open theism and I would also argue that EDF is inconsistent with indeterminism – with or without atemporality – so that leads to the conclusion that an atermporal version of God's relationship to time entails determinism – but that's a very indirect and controversial route to such a conclusion)

I mean, it seems as if God is necessarily linked to every act by everything being part of His one act,

Well, yes, God remains, in a sense, the primary cause of everything, but even traditional Arminians and Molinists affirm that. God's being the primary cause of everything doesn't rule out secondary causation nor does it entail that there are deterministic links between the secondary causes, nor, as far as I can discern, does it mean that a Molinist style distinction between strong and weak actualization of events couldn't hold up. Say God causes x, atemporally, knowing that x will produce y, then we can say that God is the primary cause of y. This would remain true even if x only indeterministically causes y (although I would argue, then, that God could not have known what x would cause, but for other reasons that are off topic here).

that He is then not only accountable for every act, but responsible as well in a causal sense.

Same problem for EDFers no matter how you slice the cake. If I know that by pushing a button, a bomb will go off, then I am responsible for setting of the bomb, even if the causal links between my pushing the button and the explosion are extremely indirect and even if they are indeterministic. And, open theist are not quite off the hook here either. If I know that by pushing the button, then the bomb may go off (but not for certain), then am I not still responsible when the bomb does go off?

In short, even as a soft determinist, a Calvinist and an advocate of a 4-D block view of time, I don't think you have isolated any direct links between God's atemporality and determinism.

[Kenny]

Also, on the subject of God changing the past, I have argued before that the concept of time travel is logically consistent, but I'm not so sure about the idea of changing the past, since to change the past would mean that one makes it the case that something that did happen did not happen (which strikes me as a contradiction). The time travel stories that I regard as coherent are those that involve causal loops in which the time traveler, upon traveling into the past, merely fulfils what has "already" taken place.

I understand the concept of "rewinding the tape and starting over again," but that would involve God merely resetting the state of the universe and not "changing the past," strictly speaking. Furthermore, the affirmation that God can reset the state of the universe makes no special assumptions about God's relationship to time. God could reset the state of the universe even if an A theory of time holds or even if open theism is true, provided that resetting the state of the universe is logically possible.