Argument against Determinism/For nihilism

[wwatts]

Against Determinism

1) A person A may only be held responsible for an event E that person A could have avoided doing

2) If determinism is true, and person A did event E, then person A could not avoid doing event E

3) There is at least one event E (Hitler ordering jews killed in WW2) that a person A could have avoided doing, and is therefore held responsible.

4) Therefore determinsm is false


For nihilism:

1) A Person A may only be held responsible for an event E that Person A could have avoided doing

2) If determinism is true, and person A did event E, then person A could not avoid doing event E

3) Determinism is true

4) Therefore person A may not be held responsible for anything he or she does.


Thoughts?

[Solly]

Define "Determinism" and its context. What is it that determines a person's response to a given situation, and leads to a choice and an action? Is there Moral equilibrium at every juncture of our lives, every act of our volition? Or are we swayed towards one thing over another?

To use the illustration; Hitler was the sum total of all that went before in his life, and not just in himself, but the history of Germany and the german speaking people, and the wider european situation viz the French revolution and Napolean. All the "devices and desires of his heart" led him up to that point, that decision.
Just as, to use another analogy, John Galt (in Atlas Shrugged)could not have done anything else but love Dagny Taggart, destroy his machine, and be tortured; that is who he was; that is how sociologists can plot charts and trends in society.

But are they determined to the extent that a rock is determined to fall under the influence of gravity? No.
And we do assume moral responsibility in people, and always have.

A person may do something, and everything that they are points in that way; but another element can be brought to bear that changes that. Perhaps the right person at the right time might have changed, deflected Hitler. Perhaps something greater might have appealed to John Galt? We follow the strongest desire, and take means to enact our decisions.

In the theological arena, the determinist/voluntarist dichotomy is so much hair splitting.
For the Reformed, it is God who brings to bear that new element, changing the desires of our hearts to will new things.

[wwatts]

Define "Determinism" and its context.

For this argument, its premise (2) or

www.dictionary.com

de·ter·min·ism ( P ) Pronunciation Key (d-tûrm-nzm)
n.
The philosophical doctrine that every state of affairs, including every human event, act, and decision is the inevitable consequence of antecedent states of affairs.

[Solly]

and do you mean materialist determinism, or theistic determinism, or both?

"Determinism" is a slippery customer. Are our actions determined by what goes before, or are they single events unrelated to anything, not even my character, desires, knowledge, situation, etc. Is an honest man who does not pocket the money he finds in a lost wallet "determined" by his honesty? Could he really have pocketted that money. Would the whole history of humanity have to be rewritten in order that he, a previously honest man, could pocket that money and not bring to pass a state of affairs that otherwise could not exist?
People who are enslaved to immoral behaviour are just as responsible, in the eyes of the law and people, ad someone who commits the act for the first time, even though that person says "I couldn't help myself, it's got a grip on me" (Said immoral behaviour could be embezzlement, for instance, or political corruption, or shoplifting.)

(once again I find myself coming to this at the end of the day; ah well, perhaps someone else will post now.)

I also might have more to ssay in a few days, I'm reading some stuff by Ted Honderich and Peter Van Inwagen at the moment.

[wwatts]

Are our actions determined by what goes before, or are they single events unrelated to anything


I think that determinism could be confusing, but it is very simple in this syllogism.

if person A did event E, then person A could not avoid doing event E

Whats so hard to understand about that? I must be missing something ...

Maybe if I say that this talks about a materialist determinism would that help? I don't see how hyper Calvinism could escape the same fate, but I'm not arguing against it here.

[Solly]

It's not that it's hard to understand, just that there are so many variables that can come into people's understanding of terms that I wanted to clarify.

It does matter whether it is materialistic, psychological or theisitic determinism.

I believe we act in a psychologically determined manner - whether it is choosing the flavour of an ice cream, or deciding upon a moral course of action. We do not act ex nihilo. but that does not mean we act in a nonAccountable manner; for instance,
Consider a man who is, in middle age, a corrupt politician and is, owing to his corrupted nature, unable to refuse bribes when he believes there is no significant likelihood of the bribery coming to light. That is how he is, but how did he get that way? Suppose the answer is this: as a young man, he made a certain series of free choices, choices preceded by genuine deliberation, which collectively had the effect of establishing him in settled and unbreakable habits of venality. Van Inwagen argued - guided, I suppose, by Aristotle - that this politician can properly be held morally responsible for the baleful effects on the public welfare of the informal services he renders to his political cronies in return for money. And this despite the fact that he is unable, in middle age, to reject he bribes he is offered. He can properly be held responsible for, say, the deaths of the four children in the fire in the building that wasn't up to code, because he could, as a young man, have avoided becoming the sort of man who would be unable to resist the bribe offered by the slumlord who owned the building.
"Van Inwagen on Free Will", by Ted Honderich

So here was have a limited determinism that does not undermine moral accountability.

Honderich summarises Inwagen views thus:
He gradually came to the conclusion that if one was faced with the necessity of doing either A or B, and that if one saw every reason to do A and no reason whatever to do B, then one would simply not be able to do B. From this conclusion it was no great leap to the slightly stronger conclusion that, if one was faced with a choice between A and B, and one was aware of considerations that could be brought in support of both alternatives, and if the considerations that supported A seemed to one clearly and decisively to outweigh the considerations that supported B, then one would simply not be able to do B. Van Inwagen defended, in "When Is the Will Free?," (7) the thesis that the general principles about ability that lead philosophers to incompatibilism should lead anyone who accepts them to accept these conclusions as well.
And he went on to argue that, since occasions that call for serious deliberation - occasions, that is, on which one is choosing between alternatives and it does not seem to one that (once all the purely factual questions have been settled) that the reasons that favor either alternative are clearly the stronger - at best only a small proportion of the occasions on which we make a choice are occasions on which we make a free choice...
Van Inwagen concluded that no action is free unless it is the outcome of deliberation in which one considers reasons that support that act, reasons that support various alternative acts, and in the course of which one finds no obvious answer to the question, "Which set of reasons should prevail?"
To take one example among many different sorts of possible example of the consequences of this position, if you answer the telephone "automatically," if you answer the telephone without so much as considering the question whether you should answer it, your act is not a free act: you could not have done otherwise than answer the telephone; you were not able to let it ring till it fell silent; it was not within your power not to raise the receiver.
"Van Inwagen on Free Will", by Ted Honderich

Inwagen is writing from a christian background, though Honderich is not, and I have more to read, and Honderich's book to be delivered; but this is all very interesting, even before one comes to the Reformed doctrine of providence and foreordination, and predestination.

/ot I had hoped others would enter this discussion as well, as they haven't I will leave it with you to decide where you want to take it, as you are the thread starter.

[Benjamin]

Interesting that the moral culpability of the Corrupt policitian was contingent upon his being able (in his youth) not to have followed the path of corruption. But surely his choices to do so were equally absolutely dictated by his personality and his circumstances?

And surely Wwats' argument for nihilism stands?

[Solly]

There are two issues Benjamin.
Firstly his culpability for making that first decision.
Secondly his current culpability in spite of his psychological and moral inablity to refrain from continuing.
If the second is allowable, then determinism is not a block to moral accountability.
Of the first it must be shown that the action was "ex nihilo" as opposed to the form of the example in the second quote from Honderich.

Do you believe that every toime you have to make a moral decision you have to reinvent the wheel? Do you believe that your character, experiences, body state, etc have not affected that decision?

In a Christian context, that first instance of "free will" was Adam in the garden; we are down the line from that, but the human race is still morally culpable for the situation it is in; and God tells us he has left enough information for us to know that: the existence of a just God, the conscience, etc Rom 1-3. However "hard-wired" our choices may seem in the analysis, yet God has not closed the circle. we are trapped by sin, which guides our responses; but we know there is another way.

What is important is the response to such a situation.
Despite the caricatures of Reformed Theology as "fatalistic" "Deterministic" "cold" etc, it is actually a very optimistic theology; because it admits man's problem, and says only God can do something about it, and he does.

Take the corrupt politician. Send him to jail; send him on rehab; all you are likely to do is modify his behaviour, and he will reoffend in time, as so many criminals do after going through our various criminal justice systems.
But just suppose that when he comes out he meets a woman and falls in love with her. For her he will give it all up.
Was he forced? Did she bring undue pressure to bear? Was he coerced against his will? Does anyone make us fall in love with them?
No; he does it all entirely in his will; he has new desires, new intentions.
This is that sure and certain regeneration by the Holy Spirit; the renewing of the will, bringing it in line with God's will - he reveals himself as the desire above all desires, and we are won over. Not by force, as so many suggest, but by giving us new desires.

:solly: get's off soap box

[Benjamin]

How do the actions of a man at least 6000 odd years dead make me morally culpable for a sin nature I could do nothing about?

If God made creation "very good" and Adam in his image, why did Adam sin?

If our salvation/damnation is entirely in the hands of God does that mean all people are saved?

[Solly]

Today @ 01:02 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=125372#post125372)
Benjamin:

1. How do the actions of a man at least 6000 odd years dead make me morally culpable for a sin nature I could do nothing about?

2. If God made creation "very good" and Adam in his image, why did Adam sin?

3. If our salvation/damnation is entirely in the hands of God does that mean all people are saved?

You have a christian symbol against your name and you ask me these questions?

1. It is not just the Reformed who accept that in Adam all fell, and all are guilty before God. It is not the Reformed alone who face this issue of our union with Adam and condmenation with him, though we "have not sinned after the manner of Adam".

2. It is not the Reformed alone who accept the mystery of sin and evil in God's good creation. The fact is revealed, not explained; we are called to take sides, not discuss the mechanics of it.

3. I don't see how you get from the first point to the second. since you have said "salvation/damnation" then you accept that some are damned, so why ask the last point? But since soteriology is not the mauin issue here, but moral culpability in a "deterministic" universe, i will leave this point also.

But these points are more for discussion in Theology 101.

It is difficult for a Christian to discuss this matter from a purely philosophical pov, since we have the Biblical revelation, but we must be careful not to go down roads that should be investigated separately.

[wwatts]

In a Christian context, that first instance of "free will" was Adam in the garden; we are down the line from that, but the human race is still morally culpable for the situation it is in; and God tells us he has left enough information for us to know that: the existence of a just God, the conscience, etc Rom 1-3. However "hard-wired" our choices may seem in the analysis, yet God has not closed the circle. we are trapped by sin, which guides our responses; but we know there is another way.


I think all of mankind was held accountable because mankind, at one time, had a free will. I think that could be a successful defense of Calvinism. If that is 'theological determinism' then I don't think it is determinism at all. Like Hank Hanegraaf says, if we can't accept representation by Adam, we shouldn't accept representation by Christ either.

BTW I think every man is judged by his own sins as well. I'm not a Calvinist though.

I guess my question is aimed a little more at the non-theists then the theist.

[garthoverman]

My personal musings on determinism/non-determinism

I think that objectively speaking, reality operates on a basic kind of determinism. That is to say, the outcome of a certain event is determined by the existence and outcomes of other events. Now, it's a little more complex than this since I also think personally that the many-worlds interpretation of quantum theory is the most accurate, and that on a macro-scale this has deep implications for determinism. Herein I will expound on my personal speculations as to how this relates to the issue of determinism and free-will.

For those unfamiliar with many-worlds theory (aka the Everett Interpretation), it says that for any given event with a probabilistic outcome (which we have found to be the case for all events), all of the various probable outcomes are representative of actual worlds in which one probable outcome indeed actualizes to the seeming exclusion of the others. So when I flip a coin, it is inevitable that heads will come up in one world, and tails will come up in another. In this sense, then, the outcomes are determined.

So now we must answer the question: why do we seem to observe only one world and not another or both? On a quantum level, we actually do observe multiple worlds through their interference and entanglement with one another, however this hardly answers the question on a macro scale. So what determines which outcome we observe?

These answers are even trickier, IMHO, because we can see from our experimentation at the quantum level that there is nothing intrinsic in physical reality that should prevent us from observing multiple parallel actualities. The actualities are there, they only await to be observed. Why don't we seem to observe them?

Well, the truth is that we do observe them on the macro-scale, except that we, being physical creatures, also disperse across the probable realities with each quantum event. IOW, you observe heads in the world where it comes up heads, AND you observe tails in the world where it comes up tails. You (or versions of you) also exist in multiple parallel realities simultaneously. So the question really becomes: why do I find myself to be this version of me, as opposed to the other versions? Why do I seem to be Garth-who-observed-the-outcome-'heads,' and not Garth-who-observed-the-outcome-'tails'?

Basically, as I’ve said before in different threads, I think this comes down to the nature of individual and collective consciousness because this seems to me to be fundamentally associated with an individual’s self-awareness. We can see that there is a Garth-who-observed-heads as well as a Garth-who-observed-tails. Garth is both of them. Therefore, if Garth is going to be one of them, it is up to Garth to decide which Garth he wants to be. I will even assert that it should be possible to identify with multiple selves simultaneously, and that hints of this possibility are evident in our own imaginative self-reflections. IOW, reminiscing that “I could have been a contender” is to some extent identifying with the probability in which the individual was, indeed, a contender.

Now, this seems highly counter-intuitive at first glance. Most individuals are not aware of any conscious decision to be one version of themselves as opposed to another. Most simply identify with what seems to be one self, in one place and time. My response to this is that it seems to me that the process of self-identification from quantum reality-dispersion (like the rest of our corporeal processes) is an evolutionary development. In other words, the process is so fundamental to our physical existence that it is literally hard-wired into our genes. It is a subconscious process just as our heartbeat and our breathing are. With hardly a thought, we are constantly grasping and clutching our own self-identities and barely recognizing the very process – which also seems to make sense since it happens at every conceivable quantum event.

So what does this have to do with determinism? Well, I think that even though self-identification is a subconscious process, it is still basically a volitional process. So even though reality determines what the various probabilities will be at any given moment, each individual is free to identify volitionally with the probable version him/herself and the associated reality that suits his/her purposes at that moment. This also is a recursive process, I imagine, in that we have memory capacity, and imagination, and thus these will affect which probable reality is identified with. These do not necessarily determine the subsequent identification, since memories and imagination are less factually oriented and more emotionally oriented, however they certainly affect the probabilities -- making some realities more probable than others.

I guess this is a really long pseudo-answer to your arguments regarding non-determinism. In short, I think that reality determines reality, but reality has a volitional element (since humans are real and have volition) that permits individual freedom. I have some additional conjectures regarding self-imposed limitations on freedom for the sake of participation within a collective, however I'll save those for the occasion of answering any questions/objections that may arise.

Yours,
Garth

[Kenny]

06-13-2003 @ 10:29 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=122406#post122406)
wwatts:

Against Determinism

1) A person A may only be held responsible for an event E that person A could have avoided doing

As a compatiblist, I think this premise needs some nuancing. It all depends on what you mean by ‘could have avoided.’ If by ‘could have avoided’ you mean that there was nothing external to A acting as a moral agent which compelled or forced A to do E contrary to her will, then I agree. If by ‘could have avoided’ you mean that there is a logically possible world where A chose differently under the exact same circumstances, then I disagree. Since I think that A, acting as moral agent, is causally responsible for her choices and I would hold as a metaphysical principle that identical causes in identical circumstances produce identical effects, I don’t think that A could have chosen any differently than she did. She could not chose differently, however, because she would not have chosen differently. A herself, acting as a moral agent, constitutes the deterministic causal explanation for her choices and her actions and, thus, she is morally responsible for them. In this way, I actually think that moral responsibility presupposes compatiblistic determinism. I say more about this subject on this (http://theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&threadid=5896) thread.

In Christ,
Kenny

[wwatts]

As a compatiblist, I think this premise needs some nuancing. It all depends on what you mean by ‘could have avoided.’ If by ‘could have avoided’ you mean that there was nothing external to A acting as a moral agent which compelled or forced A to do E contrary to her will, then I agree. If by ‘could have avoided’ you mean that there is a logically possible world where A chose differently under the exact same circumstances, then I disagree.

Lets try this premise

1) A person A may only be held responsible for an event E if a person A has no sufficient conditions for choosing E

2) If determinism is true, and person A did event E, Person A had sufficient conditions for choosing E

3) There is at least one event E (Hitler ordering jews killed in WW2) that a person A did not have sufficient conditions for choose E, and is therefore held responsible.

4) Therefore determinsm is false


http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/swartz/conditions1.htm

Definition of "sufficient condition"


Definition: A condition A is said to be sufficient for a condition B, if (and only if) the truth (/existence /occurrence) [as the case may be] of A brings about) the truth (/existence /occurrence) of B.

Kenny:
I'll read through your thread

Garth:
Which premises do you deny?

[Kenny]

Today @ 08:39 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=125695#post125695)
wwatts: Lets try this premise

1) A person A may only be held responsible for an event E if a person A has no sufficient conditions for choosing E

As a compatiblist, I hold that A is only responsible for events which are caused by herself acting as a moral agent in a given set of circumstances according to her character. The sufficient conditions possessed by A for choosing E are therefore her merely being who she is as a moral agent and being free to act accordingly in a given set of circumstances. Inevitably, A, acting as a moral agent in an exhaustive set of antecedent circumstances C, will choose E, and so determinism holds, but because it is A, acting as a morally responsible agent in accordance with her character, that determines the outcome, A is morally responsible for the outcome.

We, in fact recognize this all the time. Sometimes we might say of a person with especially noble character, with respect to a bad action, “She is simply incapable of doing something like that,” and often, I believe such descriptions are quite literally true. I do not believe my wife to be capable of deliberately hurting a child out of cruel motives, for example. But this does not mean that when my wife refrains from deliberately hurting children out of cruel motives that she is not acting as a morally responsible agent. Similar considerations apply to people with especially bad characters. Generalizing, I believe that all of our choices, provided that we are acting as morally responsible agents (our ability to act as such can be destroyed, in some circumstances, by such things as mind altering drugs or mental illness or brain washing, for example – things which rob us of the ability to deliberate and genuinely choose), flow out of our moral characters, out of who we are as moral beings, and as such, they are inevitable. But, the fact that they are inevitable does not mean that we fail to be responsible for them. It is the very fact that they flow out of who we are as moral agents which makes us morally accountable for them.

In Christ,
Kenny

[wwatts]

Today @ 09:26 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=125732#post125732)
Kenny:



As a compatiblist, I hold that A is only responsible for events which are caused by herself acting as a moral agent in a given set of circumstances according to her character. The sufficient conditions possessed by A for choosing E are therefore her merely being who she is as a moral agent and being free to act accordingly in a given set of circumstances. Inevitably, A, acting as a moral agent in an exhaustive set of antecedent circumstances C, will choose E, and so determinism holds, but because it is A, acting as a morally responsible agent in accordance with her character, that determines the outcome, A is morally responsible for the outcome.

We, in fact recognize this all the time. Sometimes we might say of a person with especially noble character, with respect to a bad action, “She is simply incapable of doing something like that,” and often, I believe such descriptions are quite literally true. I do not believe my wife to be capable of deliberately hurting a child out of cruel motives, for example. But this does not mean that when my wife refrains from deliberately hurting children out of cruel motives that she is not acting as a morally responsible agent. Similar considerations apply to people with especially bad characters. Generalizing, I believe that all of our choices, provided that we are acting as morally responsible agents (our ability to act as such can be destroyed, in some circumstances, by such things as mind altering drugs or mental illness or brain washing, for example – things which rob us of the ability to deliberate and genuinely choose), flow out of our moral characters, out of who we are as moral beings, and as such, they are inevitable. But, the fact that they are inevitable does not mean that we fail to be responsible for them. It is the very fact that they flow out of who we are as moral agents which makes us morally accountable for them.

In Christ,
Kenny


The sufficient conditions possessed by A for choosing E are therefore her merely being who she is as a moral agent and being free to act accordingly in a given set of circumstances


Free to act meaning acting without sufficent condition(s)s?
Do you deny (1)? Or do you have some meaning for free that I'm not following?

www.dictionary.com

free ( P ) Pronunciation Key (fr)
adj. fre·er, fre·est
Not subject to external restraint:

[Kenny]

Today @ 10:35 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=125767#post125767)
wwatts: Free to act meaning acting without sufficent condition(s)s? Do you deny (1)? Or do you have some meaning for free that I'm not following?

www.dictionary.com

free ( P ) Pronunciation Key (fr)
adj. fre·er, fre·est
Not subject to external restraint:

When I say "free to act as a moral agent," I mean the agent's ability to deliberate and choose in accordance with her moral character remains in tact (i.e. her moral agency has not been causally overwhelmed by factors such as mind altering drugs, brainwashing, mental illness, etc.), and she is free of external restraints which prevent her from carrying out her action. I deny that free action entails acting in the absence of sufficient conditions. The agent being who she is as a moral agent and freely acting as such provide the sufficient conditions for her actions. The agent’s actions are the inevitable consequences of her acting in accordance with her moral character in a given set of circumstances.

In Christ,
Kenny

[wwatts]

The agent being who she is as a moral agent and freely acting as such provide the sufficient conditions for her actions.


I think an object A being a sufficient condition for an Object A is an infinite regress.

If you are saying that a moral agent's free actions provide sufficient conditions for her free actions then thats a problem.

If you are saying that a moral agent has sufficient conditions for acting (in whatever way) then I think that is not free.

I basically reject the definition you have for free, I think.

[Kenny]

Today @ 04:01 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=126400#post126400)
wwatts: I think an object A being a sufficient condition for an Object A is an infinite regress.

I’m not saying that the agent functions as a significant condition for the agent or that her actions function as sufficient conditions for her actions. I’m saying that the agent herself, free to act as a moral being in accordance with her character as such, functions as a sufficient condition for her actions.

If you are saying that a moral agent's free actions provide sufficient conditions for her free actions then thats a problem.

No, I saying that agent herself, being who she is as a moral agent in a given set of circumstances, provides a sufficient condition for her actions. In other words, her actions are brought about in a given set of circumstances because she chooses to act in accordance with her character. Since her choices are made in accordance with her character, they could not have turned out any other way in that set of circumstances. Consequently her choices are both inevitable (because they flow out of who she is and do not just pop into being arbitrarily) and free (again, because they flow out of who she is).

In Christ,
Kenny

[wwatts]

In other words, her actions are brought about in a given set of circumstances because she chooses to act in accordance with her character
Kenny

Let me see if I understand what you are a saying.

1. A moral agent and a moral agent's character are distinct
2. A moral agent has a relationship with that moral agent's character, in that the moral agent does not act outside of it's character.
3. There are sufficient conditions for character
4. Circumstances are a sufficient condition for a moral agent to have to make *some choice* within the moral agent's character
5. Circumstances and character are not sufficient conditions for a moral agent to make a *specific choice* because while circumstances cause a choice character does not cause a specific choice

Is this what you are saying?

[Kenny]

06-18-2003 @ 07:17 PM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=126645#post126645)
wwatts: Let me see if I understand what you are a saying.

1. A moral agent and a moral agent's character are distinct

Correct; the moral agent’s character is an abstraction of the qualities which describe that agent qua her being the particular moral agent she is at a particular point in time.

2. A moral agent has a relationship with that moral agent's character, in that the moral agent does not act outside of it's character.

Yes.

3. There are sufficient conditions for character

Yes, I see a moral agent’s character as being a function of her essence, which is the set of properties she possesses in all possible worlds in which she exists, and her total set of life circumstances up to a given point in time

4. Circumstances are a sufficient condition for a moral agent to have to make *some choice* within the moral agent's character

Not only that, but because of who she is, there is only one particular choice that she will make in those circumstances. But she is free and morally responsible for her actions precisely because they flow out of who she is, out of her character.

5. Circumstances and character are not sufficient conditions for a moral agent to make a *specific choice* because while circumstances cause a choice character does not cause a specific choice

Not quite. A particular moral agent with a particular character acting in a particular set of circumstances is a sufficient condition for that agent to make a specific choice, on my view, but her character does not cause her to make a specific choice. Strictly speaking, her character is nothing more than an abstraction and abstractions have no causal powers. The agent causes the action, but she causes the action she does as a function of the kind of agent she is.

So determinism or, rather, soft determinism, a sort of determinism which holds that personal agents are irreducible causes in a nonetheless deterministic network of causes, is not incompatible with moral responsibility. The question, as it pertains to moral responsibility, is not whether things are determined, but how they are determined. I agree that if all of our actions are causally determined by factors outside of ourselves, then we are not morally responsible for them. However, there are deterministic views which do not go in for that sort of causal reductionism but allow for the existence of moral agents as being among the network of deterministic causes. Still, on these views, if you take into consideration all the causes in the universe, moral agents included, there is only one particular history that can possibly unfold. That is the view which I hold.

In Christ,
Kenny

[wwatts]

Today @ 12:18 AM post located here (http://www.theologyweb.com/forum/showthread.php?s=&postid=132665#post132665)
Kenny:



Correct; the moral agent’s character is an abstraction of the qualities which describe that agent qua her being the particular moral agent she is at a particular point in time.



Yes.



Yes, I see a moral agent’s character as being a function of her essence, which is the set of properties she possesses in all possible worlds in which she exists, and her total set of life circumstances up to a given point in time



Not only that, but because of who she is, there is only one particular choice that she will make in those circumstances. But she is free and morally responsible for her actions precisely because they flow out of who she is, out of her character.



Not quite. A particular moral agent with a particular character acting in a particular set of circumstances is a sufficient condition for that agent to make a specific choice, on my view, but her character does not cause her to make a specific choice. Strictly speaking, her character is nothing more than an abstraction and abstractions have no causal powers. The agent causes the action, but she causes the action she does as a function of the kind of agent she is.

So determinism or, rather, soft determinism, a sort of determinism which holds that personal agents are irreducible causes in a nonetheless deterministic network of causes, is not incompatible with moral responsibility. The question, as it pertains to moral responsibility, is not whether things are determined, but how they are determined. I agree that if all of our actions are causally determined by factors outside of ourselves, then we are not morally responsible for them. However, there are deterministic views which do not go in for that sort of causal reductionism but allow for the existence of moral agents as being among the network of deterministic causes. Still, on these views, if you take into consideration all the causes in the universe, moral agents included, there is only one particular history that can possibly unfold. That is the view which I hold.

In Christ,
Kenny


So we have a basic disagreement on what an agent is, and what a real cause is.

Cause example:

10 motionless cars numbered 1 through 10

cars 2 through 8 are green

If car 1 moves and crashes into 2, car 2 crashes into 3, 3 crashes into 4 ect to 10 then what caused what?

I say that car 1 really is what caused 9 to crash into 10

the greeen cars (2 through 8) are just instrumental causes. car 1 is the real cause.

You would say that car 8 is what really caused 9 to crash into 10

Given this, everything that causes another thing in your opinion is an agent. basically, everything is an agent.

An agent in my opinion is something that has no sufficient cause. It may have necessary causes, though.

Car 8 is an agent in your definition. Only car 1 is an agent in my opinion

www.dictionary.com

a·gent ( P ) Pronunciation Key (jnt)
n.
One that acts or has the power or authority to act.
One empowered to act for or represent another: an author's agent; an insurance agent.
A means by which something is done or caused; instrument.


We also disagree on what freedom is.

What is it that an agent is free from?

In your opinion an agent is free when it is free from things outside of some causal chain.

I say a agent is free when they are free from a sufficient cause.

I just can't agree with your definitions.