The Euthyphro dilemma [Archive] - TheologyWeb Campus

Bill the Cat

November 14th 2005, 04:30 PM

It's only a problem if you're a determinist (IOW, NOT Open View)
Not even then Muz... FirstSunday33AD gave a succinct explanation of why this "dillema" is not a dillema after all...

Atheists and "false theists" struggle with this concept because they seperate the two ideals - Good and God - into parts and try to examine them as individual pieces. Your error rests in your statement "It is God's nature to do good things". Simply; no it is not. What is Good is God's nature. God's nature is Good. The two are indivisable - like "wet" and "water". Just as you cannot say "this water is less wet than this other water" or "the standard against which water is measured is wet" so too is it impossible to say "God is X amount of Good" or "It is Good because God does it". "It is good because it is God" is perhaps better or perhaps "It is God because it is Good".

There is no standard by which we measure the goodness of God. Such a question is self-refuting and an oxymoron. God IS the standard of Good. Just as Perfect Goodness IS the standard of God.

from http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/showpost.php?p=1081731&postcount=6

Teallaura

November 14th 2005, 04:48 PM

India

November 14th 2005, 04:49 PM

Bill,

What is Good is God's nature. God's nature is Good..."It is good because it is God" is perhaps better or perhaps "It is God because it is Good".

But all things that are good are not God. E.g. if we do something good, we are not therefore God.

If we sin, it is morally right to repent and ask God's forgiveness. Yet God cannot repent of wrongdoing or ask forgiveness, for he does no wrong. We all presumably understand that this does not mean God is less than perfectly good. Yet this is an instance of a moral good that is not necessarily intrinsically part of God's nature (unless we mean "God's nature" to include his intellectual moral knowledge, in which case why not abstract it out - God's knowledge of what is morally right is the moral standard, and since he adheres to it perfectly he is good?).

Teallaura

November 14th 2005, 04:55 PM

Bill,

But all things that are good are not God. E.g. if we do something good, we are not therefore God.

If we sin, it is morally right to repent and ask God's forgiveness. Yet God cannot repent of wrongdoing or ask forgiveness, for he does no wrong. We all presumably understand that this does not mean God is less than perfectly good. Yet this is an instance of a moral good that is not necessarily intrinsically part of God's nature (unless we mean "God's nature" to include his intellectual moral knowledge, in which case why not abstract it out - God's knowledge of what is morally right is the moral standard, and since he adheres to it perfectly he is good?).

*emphasis mine

Hi,

You've equated doing with being - they are not the same thing. Doing something good does not mean being God, as you rightly point out. But being (as in being human, not behavior) good is not intrinsic to humans - it is, however, intrinsic to God. So while our doing good things after His example doe not make us God, it does not refute the assertion that He is Himself good by His nature in such a manner that the two are indeed inseparable.

Soundsurfr

November 14th 2005, 05:19 PM

Not even then Muz... FirstSunday33AD gave a succinct explanation of why this "dillema" is not a dillema after all...

from http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/showpost.php?p=1081731&postcount=6

It was also pointed out that FirstSunday's response does not eliminate the dilemma, it only couches it in rhetoric. The question still remains (as Socrates would know), can God act in a way that is contrary to his 'nature', or is He constrained by it?

The same dilemma, only reworded.

Soundsurfr, this is a Christian-only forum.

Alien

November 14th 2005, 05:53 PM

I'm curious about other Christians' responses to the Euthyphro dilemma (http://www.philosophyofreligion.info/euthyphrodilemma.html).

Personally, I don't see why there should be a problem with saying God wills things because they're good. God can't do the logically impossible, yet no one that I know of sees this as meaning that God is "subject to" a "higher" standard of logic and therefore not sovereign. I see this as analogous to morality - just because we can conceive of an abstract moral standard and say that God "must" adhere to it (because it is impossible for God to do wrong) does not mean that God is not sovereign.

You know I had to get into this one!

The problem hinges on the question "How do we know if something is good?" Is there an objective morality (which I will define as "A morality independant of mind") or is all morality subjective (the product of mind)? If there is an objective morality, then the answer to the question is straightforward - we (and God) determine if something is good by comparing it to objective morality. If morality is subjective, then it becomes more complicated, and I will expand on this in a moment.

First, let's try to decide if there is an objective morality. For something to be "independant of mind", then if we remove mind then it should still exist. So, let's consider the situation of a universe that contained no minds. Would there be anything that could be labelled "morality"? My answer is "no", which is why I consider morality to be subjective. If someone has a "yes" answer to this, then please argue it ... I am particularly interested in what form "morality" would take.

Examining the Euthyphro dilemma in the light of subjective morality, it seems clear that God's morality (that is what God considers to be "good") must be subjective. The answer, therefore, must be that God "commands" our morality on a subjective basis, and therefore the alternative that something is "good" because God says so is the correct assumption.

Does that make it truly "good" when another mind (mine for example) may quite reasonably hold to a subjective morality that differs from God's? This is of course the $64000 question. With a subjective morality, each moral "opinion" is "good" to the person holding it. And that is the rather uncomfortable conclusion. Fortunately, in practice we tend to agree on what is "good", both among ourselves and with God. We may consider that to be inevitable, given that God created us "in His image" one would expect that our morality would coincide with God's and differences would be explainable by our corruption, lack of perspective, and so on. It's still follows, though, that if God had considered, say, rape to be good instead of bad, then we would all consider it to be good also (barring a few aberrant individuals who considered it to be bad, and who would be labelled "sociopaths" for thinking that way)!

Duder

November 14th 2005, 07:19 PM

India

November 14th 2005, 08:28 PM

You've equated doing with being - they are not the same thing. Doing something good does not mean being God, as you rightly point out. But being (as in being human, not behavior) good is not intrinsic to humans - it is, however, intrinsic to God. So while our doing good things after His example doe not make us God, it does not refute the assertion that He is Himself good by His nature in such a manner that the two are indeed inseparable.

What I intended to refute was FirstSunday's statements, "What is Good is God's nature" and "It is God because it is Good." God is love, but love is not God; I think it is therefore also incorrect to say "good is God," even though God is indeed good.

What I do not understand, and would like someone to explain to me if possible, is why there is an objection to there being an abstract standard of "good" by which God can be determined to be good. I believe God is omnipotent, yet I also believe there is an abstract definition of "omnipotent" which God measures up to. I don't see that God's sovereignity or power or anything is limited by an abstract definition of "good" any more than it would be by an abstract definition of any of his other attributes. However, I could be wrong, and that's why I'm going on about this - I don't want to say something that is wrong or would disrespect God.

India

November 14th 2005, 08:38 PM

It does seem to me that before God knows whether something is good or not, He has to look at it. For example, after He made the world, He beheld it and discovered that it was good. It was not clear to Him that it was good from the mere fact that He had made it. He had to inspect it, and presumably compare it against some standard known to Himself to be good, before He knew it was good.

I don't think that's literally true, that is, I don't think God lacked the knowledge that the world he created was good until he examined it. However, I do think the Bible implies that there is an abstract standard of good. The following is from an article I'm working on for my web site:

The Bible seems to indicate that there is an abstract definition of right and wrong which constitutes a standard that God is expected to adhere to. Why else would Abraham ask of God:

"Will you sweep away the righteous with the wicked? What if there are fifty righteous people in the city? Will you really sweep it away and not spare the place for the sake of the fifty righteous people in it? Far be it from you to do such a thing - to kill the righteous with the wicked, treating the righteous and wicked alike. Far be it from you! Will not the Judge of all the earth do right?" (Gen 18:23-25)

People in the Bible praise God because he is good and does good, not because he simply exists. The Psalmists thanked God for the good things he did and obeyed his laws because they were good laws. (Ps 107, 119) If there is no abstract standard of "good" for God to perfectly meet, the Psalmists' praise becomes simply "Thank God because he is God" rather than "Thank God because he is good."

People in the Bible even (falsely) accuse God of wrongdoing. If there were no understanding of right and wrong apart from God's nature, accusations of God's doing wrong would be nonsensical rather than true or false. Yet when God responds to questions about his judgments, he does not ask, "By what standard apart from my own nature do you dare to judge me?" Instead he often seems to refer to an abstract standard of right and wrong in order to answer and/or rebuke them:

In response to Abraham's question above, God said he would not destroy the righteous along with the wicked.
In Ezekiel 18, God responded to Israel's complaints of his injustice with explanations of his judgment and then asked, "Is my way unjust? Is it not your ways that are unjust?"
When Jonah disapproved of God's decision to spare Ninevah, God asked, "Isn't it right for me to care about the people I've created? (Jonah 4)

India

November 14th 2005, 08:46 PM

First, let's try to decide if there is an objective morality. For something to be "independant of mind", then if we remove mind then it should still exist. So, let's consider the situation of a universe that contained no minds. Would there be anything that could be labelled "morality"? My answer is "no", which is why I consider morality to be subjective. If someone has a "yes" answer to this, then please argue it ... I am particularly interested in what form "morality" would take.

IMO the definition of morality would still exist in the abstract, even if there were no beings to understand it or practice it. It's like imagining a universe with only one object (the universe itself might have to be the one object, I dunno...) and asking if 1+1=2 still exists/is still true. Practically, no, but it doesn't change the fact that 1+1=2 in the abstract and in a universe with multiple objects.

Alien

November 15th 2005, 01:04 PM

IMO the definition of morality would still exist in the abstract, even if there were no beings to understand it or practice it. It's like imagining a universe with only one object (the universe itself might have to be the one object, I dunno...) and asking if 1+1=2 still exists/is still true. Practically, no, but it doesn't change the fact that 1+1=2 in the abstract and in a universe with multiple objects.

Exist where though? An abstract concept exists only within a mind that conceives it. And, there is a qualitative difference between "1+1=2" and "it is good to (whatever)", in that the first can be verified externally. If this nearly empty universe suddenly gained some more objects, we can verify the math by putting a second object with the first and counting them. What additional object can be added to the universe to verify the second statement? Only a mind, because the concept of "good" is just that - something that is produced by a mind. Essentially, it is a mind examining something and deciding the value that thing has to the being that generates that mind. (Actually, arithmetic is purely conceptual too, so we don't need objects to verify it, but at least it has some relevance to the objective world.) To summarise, a judgment of "good" is a value judgment and values only apply to thinking beings.

I don't think that's literally true, that is, I don't think God lacked the knowledge that the world he created was good until he examined it.

I assume He could make a perfect plan and then know that he had executed it perfectly, so He wouldn't have to actually examine the world to see if He had gotten it right. I would say, though, that His original plan was "good" (to Him) because that was how He wanted things to be.

The Bible seems to indicate that there is an abstract definition of right and wrong which constitutes a standard that God is expected to adhere to. Why else would Abraham ask of God: [...]

I don't agree that this necessarily implies that there is such a standard outside God's and our minds. What is meant by "righteous" here? Later, it would have meant "adherence to the Law", but the Law didn't exist then. I don't see though why Abraham couldn't simply be assuming his own standard and expecting God to agree because it was "obvious" to him. Alternatively, we could see it as allowing God to decide what is righteous.

Looking at Job we find that justice is much less obvious. God behaves in what seems to be a very unjust way, and never gives a straight answer as to why. It's not quite so simple as "because I say so", but it is strongly implied that God has purposes and explanations for His behavior that are not (currently at least) accessable to us. Now this could be because God "sees" this "abstract morality" more clearly than we do, or because He is simply applying His own subjective values, but I see no reason to assume the first over the second.

What I intended to refute was FirstSunday's statements, "What is Good is God's nature" and "It is God because it is Good." God is love, but love is not God; I think it is therefore also incorrect to say "good is God," even though God is indeed good.

You are right imo. "God is love" is a metaphor. We don't mean "God is made of love", which would be nonsensical, but something like "God's primary attribute is love". The same thing applies to "God is good", but it is less obvious because that sentence normally means "God can be decribed as good" rather than "God is made of good".

What I do not understand, and would like someone to explain to me if possible, is why there is an objection to there being an abstract standard of "good" by which God can be determined to be good. I believe God is omnipotent, yet I also believe there is an abstract definition of "omnipotent" which God measures up to. I don't see that God's sovereignity or power or anything is limited by an abstract definition of "good" any more than it would be by an abstract definition of any of his other attributes. However, I could be wrong, and that's why I'm going on about this - I don't want to say something that is wrong or would disrespect God.

I object to an abstract (objective) concept of good because I don't believe it exists. The usual theological objection though is that it diminishes God to be subject to something external to Himself. I don't see that, as after all God would be choosing to apply the standard to Himself as opposed to being forced into it in some way.

Jezz

November 16th 2005, 05:36 AM

Exist where though? An abstract concept exists only within a mind that conceives it.
I disagree with the last sentence. If it were true, then how do you explain the fact that various different people have all independently come to the conclusion that 1+1=2? If the concept "1+1=2" only exists in the mind of the person who conceived it, then this would mean that the fact that nearly everyone in history came to this exact same conclusion by some great coincidence. The alternative is to believe that they all came to the same conclusion because they have all been somehow made aware of this fact (I would argue by Revelation) which is external to them. The mind does not conceive it, but discovers it.

On to the main subject: the way I tackle the Euthyphro "dilemma" is to do as Sheepdog did - to show it is not a dilemma. Let me show this by analogy.

The two "horns" of Euthyphro dilemma are as follows:

1. If there is a standard external to God to which must adhere, then God is inferior to this standard, which is unacceptable because it means God is not all-powerful.
2. If God is superior to the standard to He holds us and does not adhere to it, then it is arbitrary, which is unacceptable because it means God is a tyrant.

For clarity, I will express this mathematically. Let mG measure the majesty of God, and let ms measure the majesty of the moral standard. The horns are then expressed as follows:

1. mG < ms
2. ms < mG

The Euthyphro "dilemma" then makes the assumption that one of 1 or 2 must be true. But when expressed with this clarity, the hole in this argument becomes obvious: there is a third possibility, which has not been accounted for: mG = ms. And hence, the "dilemma" is not a dilemma at all.

I happen to go for this position. God is the objective moral standard. By a similar argument, I would argue that God is the objective logical standard - which is why there is deep agreement on fundamental terms of logic like "1+1=2".

An interesting thing about the Euthyphro dilemma: It was Socrates who (to our knowledge) first composed it. The funny thing is, it was only recorded for us by Plato (Socrates' disciple) - who also rebutted it (the above refutation is essentially Plato's argument). Those who are keen to maintain the memory of the Euthyphro dilemma seem to be equally keen to forget the rebuttal. Plato actually went further with his rebuttal - using it as proof for his monotheistic worldview and his belief in a Creator-God - "the highest good". Christian philosophers like St Augustine and Thomas Aquinas borrowed such arguments from him.

Hope that helps.

Duder

November 16th 2005, 11:25 AM

I disagree with the last sentence. If it were true, then how do you explain the fact that various different people have all independently come to the conclusion that 1+1=2? If the concept "1+1=2" only exists in the mind of the person who conceived it, then this would mean that the fact that nearly everyone in history came to this exact same conclusion by some great coincidence. The alternative is to believe that they all came to the same conclusion because they have all been somehow made aware of this fact (I would argue by Revelation) which is external to them. The mind does not conceive it, but discovers it.

On to the main subject: the way I tackle the Euthyphro "dilemma" is to do as Sheepdog did - to show it is not a dilemma. Let me show this by analogy.

The two "horns" of Euthyphro dilemma are as follows:

1. If there is a standard external to God to which must adhere, then God is inferior to this standard, which is unacceptable because it means God is not all-powerful.
2. If God is superior to the standard to He holds us and does not adhere to it, then it is arbitrary, which is unacceptable because it means God is a tyrant.

For clarity, I will express this mathematically. Let mG measure the majesty of God, and let ms measure the majesty of the moral standard. The horns are then expressed as follows:

1. mG < ms
2. ms < mG

The Euthyphro "dilemma" then makes the assumption that one of 1 or 2 must be true. But when expressed with this clarity, the hole in this argument becomes obvious: there is a third possibility, which has not been accounted for: mG = ms. And hence, the "dilemma" is not a dilemma at all.

I happen to go for this position. God is the objective moral standard. By a similar argument, I would argue that God is the objective logical standard - which is why there is deep agreement on fundamental terms of logic like "1+1=2".

An interesting thing about the Euthyphro dilemma: It was Socrates who (to our knowledge) first composed it. The funny thing is, it was only recorded for us by Plato (Socrates' disciple) - who also rebutted it (the above refutation is essentially Plato's argument). Those who are keen to maintain the memory of the Euthyphro dilemma seem to be equally keen to forget the rebuttal. Plato actually went further with his rebuttal - using it as proof for his monotheistic worldview and his belief in a Creator-God - "the highest good". Christian philosophers like St Augustine and Thomas Aquinas borrowed such arguments from him.

Hope that helps.

Greetings, Jezz -

There is a problem. You are proposing as a way out of the dilemma that God and the moral principle are one and the same. However, the condition of their being one and the same is exactly one of the horns of the dilemma. What the dilemma comes down to is not whether it is God or the moral principle that is the greater, it comes down to whether God and the moral principle are the same or different.

If God and the moral principle are the same, then things are good because God loves them. Good and God would be synonymous. "God is good" would mean the same thing as "God is godly" (which doesn't say very much at all since it is a mere tautology). Goodness cannot be a quality that God possesses, because goodness in a quality that is arbitrarily defined by God.

You could argue that it is not arbitrary at all - that God set a definite and firm standard of goodness that can thereafter be used by anyone, Himself included, as the model for what is good. But was there some critereon He used when He initially set the standard? If yes, then goodness is different from God, and God loves virtue because it is good. If no, then the standard was set arbitrarily, goodness has no meaning beyond the arbitrary whim of God, and virtue is good because God loves it.

Just my $.02

Darth Executor

November 16th 2005, 11:43 AM

Greetings, Jezz -

There is a problem. You are proposing as a way out of the dilemma that God and the moral principle are one and the same. However, the condition of their being one and the same is exactly one of the horns of the dilemma. What the dilemma comes down to is not whether it is God or the moral principle that is the greater, it comes down to whether God and the moral principle are the same or different.

That's incorrect. The dilemma is this:

The Euthyphro dilemma rests on a modernised version of the question asked by Socrates in the Euthyphro: “Are morally good acts willed by God because they are morally good, or are they morally good because they are willed by God?”

What you are proposing is not the same thing nor is it even a dilemma.

If God and the moral principle are the same, then things are good because God loves them. Good and God would be synonymous. "God is good" would mean the same thing as "God is godly" (which doesn't say very much at all since it is a mere tautology). Goodness cannot be a quality that God possesses, because goodness in a quality that is arbitrarily defined by God.

This sounds a lot like a begged question. Why can't goodness be a quality that God possesses? Why must it be arbitrarily defined by God? But you get to that next.

You could argue that it is not arbitrary at all - that God set a definite and firm standard of goodness that can thereafter be used by anyone, Himself included, as the model for what is good. But was there some critereon He used when He initially set the standard? If yes, then goodness is different from God, and God loves virtue because it is good. If no, then the standard was set arbitrarily, goodness has no meaning beyond the arbitrary whim of God, and virtue is good because God loves it.

Here is where you attack a straw man. The "horn" you proposed does not state God sets or defines anything to begin with. All of it is already defined and has always been defined because it has always been a part of God.

Duder

November 16th 2005, 01:37 PM

That's incorrect. The dilemma is this:

The Euthyphro dilemma rests on a modernised version of the question asked by Socrates in the Euthyphro: “Are morally good acts willed by God because they are morally good, or are they morally good because they are willed by God?”

What you are proposing is not the same thing nor is it even a dilemma.

Hello, Darth -

What you quoted above is not the Euthyphro dilemma as it was posed by Socrates, it is someone's else's paraphrase of the Euthypro dilemma.

Euthyphro's dilemma appears in the dialog Euthyphro, written in the 5th century BCE by Plato (whether it records an actual conversation of Socrates', we don't know. It could, since we do know that Plato was present at Socrates' trial).

It is the day of Sacrates' trial on charges of impiety, and Socrates encounters Euthyphro outside the courthouse. Euthyphro tells Socrates that he has come there to bring charges of impiety against his own father. For reasons that we can understand, Socrates has been thinking about the subject of impiety, and he proposes to talk it over with Euthyphro, to try and discover
". . . what is the nature of this idea, and then I shall have a standard to which I may look, and by which I may measure actions, whether yours or those of anyone else, and then I shall be able to say that such and such an action is pious, and another is impious." 1

After some faltering attempts at defining impiety on Euthyphro's part, Socrates puts the conversation on track by posing the dilemma:
"The point which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods." 2

As you can see, the way I presented the the dilemma from memory is much closer than your quotation to how it actually appears in the ancient sourse:But was there some critereon He used when He initially set the standard? If yes, then goodness is different from God, and God loves virtue because it is good. If no, then the standard was set arbitrarily, goodness has no meaning beyond the arbitrary whim of God, and virtue is good because God loves it.__________

]This sounds a lot like a begged question. Why can't goodness be a quality that God possesses? Why must it be arbitrarily defined by God? But you get to that next.

Goodness (or holiness, if we use Socreates' words) can be a property that God possesses, if we are prepared to say that goodness and God are not the same thing. Let me try and illustrate that with an example.

I am a mammal. Mammalness is a propery that I possess. We can verify that by comparing my features with a certain standard of what mammalness means. But if we are right in saying that mammalness is a property I possess, we cannot say that I am mammalness. Why not? Because we find that mammalness is a property possessed by a whole class of creatures, not just me. All of mammalness is not manifested in me. So to determine whether or not I possess mammalness, we must look beyond me to some standard, such as a list of attributes possessed by all mammals. And so we find that, while Duder has mammalness, mammalness and Duder are not identical. They refer to different things. Duder is a manifestation of mammalness, but mammalness is not a manifestation of Duder.

Here is another example. Is singularity a property possessed by the number 1? It cannot be. One is singularity. We find that one and singularity are different words for the same thing. And since it would convey nothing at all about the number one to say "one is one", it is meaningless to propose that singularity is a property possessed by the number one.

In much the same way as I am a mammal, let's say that God is good. If that means that goodness is a property God possesses, then God and goodness cannot be the same thing. For if the one thing (goodness) is to shed light on what the other thing (God) is all about, then the two things have to be different. If we do not already know what God is like, then to say that He is good will not increase our knowledge about Him if "good" means the same thing as "God". See? Goodness, if it is a property of God, is not exactly identical to God.

Here is where you attack a straw man. The "horn" you proposed does not state God sets or defines anything to begin with. All of it is already defined and has always been defined because it has always been a part of God.

Let's see if I can untangle the confusion here. The horn3 I alluded to, that God and goodness are the same, would mean that God defines goodness, even if it is it His very nature that sets the standard. Don't be confused by stylistic language that talks about this as if it were an intentional decision on God's part to set a standard. That makes no difference to the philosophical points we are talking about, because if goodness is no more than some arbitrary feature that we happen to find in God's nature, then goodness means no more than that arbitrary feature.

Is that feature good? Of course it is, if good means only something that is found in God's nature. But that does not tell us that good is desireable, or advantageous to pursue, or better than bad.

________________________

1 Plato. Euthyphro, in "The Works of Plato". Jowlette, trans. New York: Carlton House, 1928. 41

2 Ibid., 46

3 The "horns" of a dilemma are like the horns of a charging bull. If you dodge left, the left horn gets you. If you dodge right, the right horn gets you. Thus, either way you answer a dilemma, you are in an uncomfortable position.

.

Darth Executor

November 16th 2005, 02:12 PM

Hello, Darth -

I don't have time to answer to your entire post right now so I'll just reply to the first part.

What you quoted above is not the Euthyphro dilemma as it was posed by Socrates, it is someone's else's paraphrase of the Euthypro dilemma.

Euthyphro's dilemma appears in the dialog Euthyphro, written in the 5th century BCE by Plato (whether it records an actual conversation of Socrates', we don't know. It could, since we do know that Plato was present at Socrates' trial).

It is the day of Sacrates' trial on charges of impiety, and Socrates encounters Euthyphro outside the courthouse. Euthyphro tells Socrates that he has come there to bring charges of impiety against his own father. For reasons that we can understand, Socrates has been thinking about the subject of impiety, and he proposes to talk it over with Euthyphro, to try and discover
". . . what is the nature of this idea, and then I shall have a standard to which I may look, and by which I may measure actions, whether yours or those of anyone else, and then I shall be able to say that such and such an action is pious, and another is impious." 1

After some faltering attempts at defining impiety on Euthyphro's part, Socrates puts the conversation on track by posing the dilemma:
"The point which I should first wish to understand is whether the pious or holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods." 2

As you can see, the way I presented the the dilemma from memory is much closer than your quotation to how it actually appears in the ancient sourse:__________

That is because the way you presented the dilemma a second time is not the one I was criticizing. You said, and I quote:

There is a problem. You are proposing as a way out of the dilemma that God and the moral principle are one and the same. However, the condition of their being one and the same is exactly one of the horns of the dilemma.

The quote you provided is no different than the paraphrase and it most certainly is not what you said in the above quote. Had Socrates said

"The point which I should first wish to understand is whether the gods are apart from holy, or whether holy is a part of the gods." 2

Socrates most certainly does not make the gods and holiness to be one like you proposed.

I'll get to the rest when I get back from school tonight.

Duder

November 16th 2005, 02:18 PM

I don't have time to answer to your entire post right now so I'll just reply to the first part.

That is because the way you presented the dilemma a second time is not the one I was criticizing. You said, and I quote:

The quote you provided is no different than the paraphrase and it most certainly is not what you said in the above quote. Had Socrates said

"The point which I should first wish to understand is whether the gods are apart from holy, or whether holy is a part of the gods." 2

Socrates most certainly does not make the gods and holiness to be one like you proposed.

I'll get to the rest when I get back from school tonight.

Okay, I will look forward to it.

In the meantime, reflect that I was not saying Socrates at first presented the dilemma as if it were a chioce between God and good being the same, or God and good being different. I was saying what the respective horns of the dilemma imply. We can argue about whether or not those implications
indeed follow from the dilemma's choices, but be assured I did not try to misrepresent the dilemma.

That said...

If we read further from the text of Euthyphro we find that Socrates does himself draw the same implication that I did. At first, Euthyphro does not understand Socrates question, as so Socrates has to do some explaining:
Socrates:The point I wish to understand is whether the pious or the holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods.
Euthyphro:I do not understand your meaning, Socrates.
Socrates:I will endeavour to explain: we speak of carrying and we speak of being carried, of leading and being led, seeing and being seen. You know that in all such cases there is a difference and you know also in what the difference lies?
Euthyphro: I think that I understand.
Socrates: And is not that which is beloved distinct from that which loves?
Euthyphro: Certainly.

.

Darth Executor

November 16th 2005, 10:48 PM

Okay, I will look forward to it.

In the meantime, reflect that I was not saying Socrates at first presented the dilemma as if it were a chioce between God and good being the same, or God and good being different. I was saying what the respective horns of the dilemma imply. We can argue about whether or not those implications
indeed follow from the dilemma's choices, but be assured I did not try to misrepresent the dilemma.

Yes, we can argue what they imply. I do not think that either horn implies that God and good/holiness, whatever are one and the same. We can discuss this in my next post.

That said...

If we read further from the text of Euthyphro we find that Socrates does himself draw the same implication that I did. At first, Euthyphro does not understand Socrates question, as so Socrates has to do some explaining:
Socrates:The point I wish to understand is whether the pious or the holy is beloved by the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of the gods.
Euthyphro:I do not understand your meaning, Socrates.
Socrates:I will endeavour to explain: we speak of carrying and we speak of being carried, of leading and being led, seeing and being seen. You know that in all such cases there is a difference and you know also in what the difference lies?
Euthyphro: I think that I understand.
Socrates: And is not that which is beloved distinct from that which loves?
Euthyphro: Certainly.

.

I'm sorry, I don't see where Socrates arrives at the same conclusion that you did. Did you paste everything you wanted to paste?

Darth Executor

November 16th 2005, 10:54 PM

Goodness (or holiness, if we use Socreates' words) can be a property that God possesses, if we are prepared to say that goodness and God are not the same thing. Let me try and illustrate that with an example.

You are right that they are not the same thing. However, God encompasses goodness.

I am a mammal. Mammalness is a propery that I possess. We can verify that by comparing my features with a certain standard of what mammalness means. But if we are right in saying that mammalness is a property I possess, we cannot say that I am mammalness. Why not? Because we find that mammalness is a property possessed by a whole class of creatures, not just me. All of mammalness is not manifested in me. So to determine whether or not I possess mammalness, we must look beyond me to some standard, such as a list of attributes possessed by all mammals. And so we find that, while Duder has mammalness, mammalness and Duder are not identical. They refer to different things. Duder is a manifestation of mammalness, but mammalness is not a manifestation of Duder.

Here is another example. Is singularity a property possessed by the number 1? It cannot be. One is singularity. We find that one and singularity are different words for the same thing. And since it would convey nothing at all about the number one to say "one is one", it is meaningless to propose that singularity is a property possessed by the number one.

In much the same way as I am a mammal, let's say that God is good. If that means that goodness is a property God possesses, then God and goodness cannot be the same thing. For if the one thing (goodness) is to shed light on what the other thing (God) is all about, then the two things have to be different. If we do not already know what God is like, then to say that He is good will not increase our knowledge about Him if "good" means the same thing as "God". See? Goodness, if it is a property of God, is not exactly identical to God.

Good so far. Here's where you trip:

Let's see if I can untangle the confusion here. The horn3 I alluded to, that God and goodness are the same, would mean that God defines goodness, even if it is it His very nature that sets the standard. Don't be confused by stylistic language that talks about this as if it were an intentional decision on God's part to set a standard. That makes no difference to the philosophical points we are talking about, because if goodness is no more than some arbitrary feature that we happen to find in God's nature, then goodness means no more than that arbitrary feature.

Before I move on, I have to ask a question: what makes you think it is arbitrary?

Is that feature good? Of course it is, if good means only something that is found in God's nature. But that does not tell us that good is desireable, or advantageous to pursue, or better than bad.

No, God does. :wink:

Duder

November 17th 2005, 12:12 AM

Yes, we can argue what they imply. I do not think that either horn implies that God and good/holiness, whatever are one and the same. We can discuss this in my next post.

I'm sorry, I don't see where Socrates arrives at the same conclusion that you did. Did you paste everything you wanted to paste?

Busy right now - back later . . . but, no, that isn't a paste job. It's from a physical book - a very old one in my library that I rather prize.

Check the part where Socrates tells U. that the beloved is distinct from the one doing the beloving. I think he is saying that if God loves goodness, he cannot exactly be goodness.

Darth Executor

November 17th 2005, 12:19 AM

Busy right now - back later . . . but, no, that isn't a paste job. It's from a physical book - a very old one in my library that I rather prize.

Don't worry about it. I'm tired right now after hours of class and running around town anyway. I probably won't respond until tomorrow anyway.

Check the part where Socrates tells U. that the beloved is distinct from the one doing the beloving. I think he is saying that if God loves goodness, he cannot exactly be goodness.

Ok I see it now. In this case, I'd have to say Socrates was smoking something. I don't see why somebody cannot love himself. I certainly don't see God hating Himself.

Duder

November 17th 2005, 12:56 PM

YBefore I move on, I have to ask a question: what makes you think it is arbitrary?

That is the central question. The rest is window dressing.

Here is what I think arbitrary means. If something is arbitrary, it is not to our knowledge based on any objective principle, such that we could have predicted it in light of that principle. For instance, if I tell you "pick a card - any card" I am asking you to make an arbitrary selection.

On the other hand, if I play the shell game with you and say "pick the shell with the pea beneath it", I am not asking you to make an arbitrary selection. There is a definite principle that I am saying you should consider in your selection of shells - namely, whether or not a shell has a pea under it.

With that understanding of "arbitrary", let's ask God to pick what things are good and what things are not good. As God surveys the field of all things to determine which are good and which are not, is there a "pea" under the things he selects as being good?

You might say at this point, "Hold on a minute - yes, of course there is a pea under the good things, because God put the pea there." Granted. But the next question is, is there some principle that guides God in his choice of which things shall get a pea in the first place?

So really, what we are asking is whether or not there is something about things and actions in themselves that tells you, me, God or anyone else who wants to know that they are good things. This was the subject of a great novel from the 1970s, where the hero of the story pursues this question to great depth*. Does goodness reside in the thing, or does goodness reside in the mind that beholds the thing?

This is a dilemma. If goodness is in the mind, then "good" is whatever one happens to like. If goodness is in the thing, then you have to explain why no scientific instrument can detect it. That's a problem, as the raging debate in these threads over the objectivity or subjectivity of values demonstrates.

In terms of how God values things, does he select them because they have a pea, or do they have a pea because he selects them?

_______________________

* Robert Pirsig. Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance

.

Alien

November 17th 2005, 04:56 PM

I said:

Exist where though? An abstract concept exists only within a mind that conceives it.

And Jezz commented:

I disagree with the last sentence. If it were true, then how do you explain the fact that various different people have all independently come to the conclusion that 1+1=2? If the concept "1+1=2" only exists in the mind of the person who conceived it, then this would mean that the fact that nearly everyone in history came to this exact same conclusion by some great coincidence.

Perhaps I should explain further. Where else can a concept be but in a mind? A concept is not the thing that it models. There is (sometimes but not always) an external "thing" that is modelled in our minds. The concept is not the thing, and the thing is not the concept. The question usually is: how closely does the concept match the external object?

Arithmetic can be arrived at independently in (at least) two ways, I would say. First, because it models the real world in some extent, it can be arrived at pragmatically ... get two objects and count them. Second, it can be derived mentally by visualising the objects. I'm not sure this is a good example though, because arithmetic is tautological ... two is defined as two ones.

The alternative is to believe that they all came to the same conclusion because they have all been somehow made aware of this fact (I would argue by Revelation) which is external to them. The mind does not conceive it, but discovers it.

Some concepts can be derived by examination of the real world (if that is what you mean by "revealed") certainly. They are still mental models of the world though, not the world itself. Morality (which is what we are discussing), however has no external referent. It only exists in the mind that conceives it.

Alien

November 17th 2005, 05:39 PM

This is a dilemma. If goodness is in the mind, then "good" is whatever one happens to like. If goodness is in the thing, then you have to explain why no scientific instrument can detect it. That's a problem, as the raging debate in these threads over the objectivity or subjectivity of values demonstrates.

In terms of how God values things, does he select them because they have a pea, or do they have a pea because he selects them?

Duder, that was very well put indeed.

I personally cannot see how "goodness" can be anything but a personal judgment, as evidenced by the demonstrable fact that the same object can (validly) be considered "good" by one person and "bad" by another, but many disagree, so I guess there must be something I'm not getting.

Duder

November 17th 2005, 07:26 PM

Duder, that was very well put indeed.

I personally cannot see how "goodness" can be anything but a personal judgment, as evidenced by the demonstrable fact that the same object can (validly) be considered "good" by one person and "bad" by another, but many disagree, so I guess there must be something I'm not getting.

I tried to talk about this topic down in Apologetics, and the place erupted into screeching chaos as if it were the primate section of the zoo and female monkeys in heat ran through the place carry bushels of bananas.... I'm stayin' outta there, man!

Hi, Alien -

I don't know the answer. I favor the opposite side of the dilemma as you, but I know that leaves me with a lapful of problems.

I guess I lean the way I do because I want any God that I worship to be a good God. And by good, I mean that he has qualities - good qualities - that I can count on. I can look to God and say "there is a good God" - and I can tell he is good, because there is an objective and real standard that is good, even if I do not know exactly how to put it into words, which you and I know when we see it and which we can compare to what we have experienced in our relationship with God and say "yep, he's good."

If there is no standard that would help us know whether God is a good God or not, then it seems to me that good means nothing at all when applied to God, Good just means "whatever God does". He could do anything at all, and it would be good by virtue of the fact that he did it.

I think a major feature of the Judea/Christian God that distinguishes him from the gods of the older, polytheistic religions is that he is not capricious.

India

November 17th 2005, 07:36 PM

I personally cannot see how "goodness" can be anything but a personal judgment, as evidenced by the demonstrable fact that the same object can (validly) be considered "good" by one person and "bad" by another, but many disagree, so I guess there must be something I'm not getting.

But remember that conversation we had, where I asked you why you seem to trust God as having better moral judgment than you if you think morality is ultimately subjective? :smile:

For clarity, I will express this mathematically. Let mG measure the majesty of God, and let ms measure the majesty of the moral standard. The horns are then expressed as follows:

1. mG < ms
2. ms < mG

The Euthyphro "dilemma" then makes the assumption that one of 1 or 2 must be true. But when expressed with this clarity, the hole in this argument becomes obvious: there is a third possibility, which has not been accounted for: mG = ms. And hence, the "dilemma" is not a dilemma at all.

I agree with you here, Jezz...

God is the objective moral standard. By a similar argument, I would argue that God is the objective logical standard - which is why there is deep agreement on fundamental terms of logic like "1+1=2".

...but here I agree with Duder that this particular position doesn't solve the problem.

IMO there is a standard of "good," and there is God who has perfect knowledge of the standard and conforms to it perfectly. The standard is an abstract entity, so to say that it is more sovereign/majestical/etc. than God doesn't make sense to me. Nor does it make sense to me to say that God "is" the standard (unless one means, as Alien seems to, that the standard's only existence is in God's mind, i.e. his knowledge of it).

Darth Executor

November 17th 2005, 10:11 PM

That is the central question. The rest is window dressing.

Here is what I think arbitrary means. If something is arbitrary, it is not to our knowledge based on any objective principle, such that we could have predicted it in light of that principle. For instance, if I tell you "pick a card - any card" I am asking you to make an arbitrary selection.

On the other hand, if I play the shell game with you and say "pick the shell with the pea beneath it", I am not asking you to make an arbitrary selection. There is a definite principle that I am saying you should consider in your selection of shells - namely, whether or not a shell has a pea under it.

With that understanding of "arbitrary", let's ask God to pick what things are good and what things are not good. As God surveys the field of all things to determine which are good and which are not, is there a "pea" under the things he selects as being good?

You might say at this point, "Hold on a minute - yes, of course there is a pea under the good things, because God put the pea there." Granted. But the next question is, is there some principle that guides God in his choice of which things shall get a pea in the first place?

So really, what we are asking is whether or not there is something about things and actions in themselves that tells you, me, God or anyone else who wants to know that they are good things. This was the subject of a great novel from the 1970s, where the hero of the story pursues this question to great depth*. Does goodness reside in the thing, or does goodness reside in the mind that beholds the thing?

This is a dilemma. If goodness is in the mind, then "good" is whatever one happens to like. If goodness is in the thing, then you have to explain why no scientific instrument can detect it. That's a problem, as the raging debate in these threads over the objectivity or subjectivity of values demonstrates.

In terms of how God values things, does he select them because they have a pea, or do they have a pea because he selects them?

_______________________

* Robert Pirsig. Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance

.

I dislike analogies so I'm going to go into the meat of the issues. Let's assume for a second God does decide what is good. How do we know it is arbitrary? How do we know God just throws some sort of galactic dice and if he rolls a natural 20 (God likes Dungeons & Dragons dice), then killing babies is wrong. Here is what I am proposing: because God is absolute already, then by His mere existance, God has an objective standard by which to decide everything else: Himself. If God is perfection, then everything else is decided in relation to Him. From this, all of creation flows. God has many attributes, one of which is Wisdom. You are very familiar with this attribute of God, because God's wisdom became flesh and died for us. (http://www.tektonics.org/jesusclaims/trinitydefense.html). Let us take the example of man. Who did God use as a template to make man? Himself. Man's creation was not arbitrary. In a similar manner, I propose that nothing God does is arbitrary because everything He does is a reflection of Himself. He doesn't roll galactic dices to make decisions. In the beginning, there was nothing but God. If God used Himself as a guide by which to create something else, then God's decisions were not arbitrary. Of course, I do not believe we can actually know what God did although I admit I didn't actually do much research. One hint I can think of is given in John 1. In particular, John 1:3:
All things were made through him, and without him was not any thing made that was made.
We know everything was created through God's wisdom so, in my opinion, if God had to use His wisdom to create then it implies He had to rely on something other than a dice roll.

Alien

November 18th 2005, 04:14 PM

I dislike analogies so I'm going to go into the meat of the issues. Let's assume for a second God does decide what is good. How do we know it is arbitrary? How do we know God just throws some sort of galactic dice and if he rolls a natural 20 (God likes Dungeons & Dragons dice), then killing babies is wrong. Here is what I am proposing: because God is absolute already, then by His mere existance, God has an objective standard by which to decide everything else: Himself. If God is perfection, then everything else is decided in relation to Him. From this, all of creation flows. God has many attributes, one of which is Wisdom. You are very familiar with this attribute of God, because God's wisdom became flesh and died for us. (http://www.tektonics.org/jesusclaims/trinitydefense.html). Let us take the example of man. Who did God use as a template to make man? Himself. Man's creation was not arbitrary. In a similar manner, I propose that nothing God does is arbitrary because everything He does is a reflection of Himself. He doesn't roll galactic dices to make decisions. In the beginning, there was nothing but God. If God used Himself as a guide by which to create something else, then God's decisions were not arbitrary. Of course, I do not believe we can actually know what God did although I admit I didn't actually do much research. One hint I can think of is given in John 1. In particular, John 1:3:
All things were made through him, and without him was not any thing made that was made.
We know everything was created through God's wisdom so, in my opinion, if God had to use His wisdom to create then it implies He had to rely on something other than a dice roll.

Hi Darth.

ar·bi·trar·y
adj.

1. Determined by chance, whim, or impulse, and not by necessity, reason, or principle: stopped at the first motel we passed, an arbitrary choice.
2. Based on or subject to individual judgment or preference: The diet imposes overall calorie limits, but daily menus are arbitrary.
3. Established by a court or judge rather than by a specific law or statute: an arbitrary penalty.
4. Not limited by law; despotic: the arbitrary rule of a dictator.

(From dictionary.com)

You seem to be using the first definition of arbitrary. One of the others is what Duder means, I think. I'll let him reply to the rest.

Alien

November 18th 2005, 04:47 PM

But remember that conversation we had, where I asked you why you seem to trust God as having better moral judgment than you if you think morality is ultimately subjective? :smile:

I remember the conversation, but not what I said. I make this stuff up anew every time, you know! :grin:

Hmmm, let's see. I think there are two distinct things here. One is the basis for morality (what is good?) and the other is how best to apply it (the detailed rules). The first I consider to be subjective. The second is objective. Thus, if God and I agree that some state of affairs is good, then it is obvious to all (I hope) that, if we differ, God's way of achieving it is certain to be better than mine. Thus, if we both want to drive to New York, then I will accept His route plan over mine every time. The problem arises when we disagree on "what is good".

I'll add something here. If a subjective judgment seems to have an objective component, then we have to dig deeper to find the true subjectivity. For example, a thief might consider it good to take the possessions of others. If I point out that stealing causes suffering to the victim and that causes him to decide that stealing is bad, then I didn't change his subjective belief. I just found a deeper level that we agreed on - that causing suffering is wrong - and he decided to apply that to stealing. If, on the other hand, he feels that causing suffering is OK, then we have an impasse at that level. Note that I'm not saying that these subjective feelings cannot be changed. I'm sure brain surgery could do it quite handily. The test is whether the feeling is justified by something else, or is a true "basic".

IMO there is a standard of "good," and there is God who has perfect knowledge of the standard and conforms to it perfectly. The standard is an abstract entity, so to say that it is more sovereign/majestical/etc. than God doesn't make sense to me.

It's certainly not more sovereign etc, it's inanimate and doesn't make decisions. On the other hand it appears that God is powerless to change it.

Nor does it make sense to me to say that God "is" the standard (unless one means, as Alien seems to, that the standard's only existence is in God's mind, i.e. his knowledge of it).

Yes, that's what I mean, though I wouldn't say "his knowledge of it"; I would prefer to say it is part of God's nature, just as my moral standards are part of mine. And I'm still waiting for someone to explain how it could be otherwise.

Darth Executor

November 18th 2005, 06:07 PM

You seem to be using the first definition of arbitrary. One of the others is what Duder means, I think. I'll let him reply to the rest.

The way Duder defined it, he had to be using the first definition since he used an example of performing a random action as an analogy (the picking of a card).

Dr. Jack Bauer

November 22nd 2005, 11:33 PM

It's only a problem if you're a determinist (IOW, NOT Open View)muzicman, what in the world is the connection between open vs closed futures, and the Euthyphro dilemma. This is the first time I have heard anyone even imply that there is a connection, and I cannot stretch my imagination far enough to think what that connection might be.

Dr. Jack Bauer

November 23rd 2005, 12:06 AM

I'm curious about other Christians' responses to the Euthyphro dilemma (http://www.philosophyofreligion.info/euthyphrodilemma.html).In my typical style, I haven't read the thread, but here's my answer to the OP. Fisrt, here's my forumlation of the Euthyphro dilemma, just so that people know which "version" I'm dealing with:

God commands/wills certain things (when I say "commands," I mean to include the concept of willing something as well). Either those things are good just because God commands them, or God commands those things because they are good.

If the former, then God's commands are arbitrary, which produces counterintuitive results. For example, if God commanded me to rape a young woman, that would be good.

If the latter, then God is answerable to a moral authority outside of Himself, and is not sovereign in the sense of being the greatst moral authority.

Response1:

The dilemma presents the relationshi between goodness nd God's commands as causal. It says X is the case because Y is the case. If the relationship between God's commands and moral facts is not causal, then the dilemma falls apart, and neither horn is correct. A number of divine command theorists have responded by saying that the relationship is not one of causality but of identity. Once this change ois made, observe why the dilemma is silly:

"Either what God commands is identical with what is good, or what is good is identical with what God commands."

This change alone reduces the proposed dilemma to nonsense.

End of response 1. The dilemma has been overcome. But wait, there's more.

Response 2:

Consider the second horn of the dilemma: If God commands something because it is good, then God is answerable to a moral authority outside of Himself, and is not sovereign in the sense of being the greatst moral authority.

This is just false. This would only follow if God commanded something because it was good, and if it was good because of something independent of God. But the mere fact that God commands something because it is good does not entail that its goodness did not derive from God in some way other than God's commands.

Consider the following sequence of events. Remember, it's a sequence of events, one after the other. It's not an argument.

1) God creates the world in such a way that when all of its parts work as they were designed to, they do xyz. This thing called xyz, we will call "good" with respect to what things in the world do.
2) God takes into account they way he has created the world, and then decides to issue some moral judgements and commands.
3) God commands xyz.

In this account, God commands what is good, and nothing about his moral sovereignty is undermined.

End of Response 2, which would also settle the matter.

There are other responses that have been made, but I think it's pretty clear that there's nothing to worry about in this dilemma.

India

November 23rd 2005, 05:41 PM

Response1:

The dilemma presents the relationshi between goodness nd God's commands as causal. It says X is the case because Y is the case. If the relationship between God's commands and moral facts is not causal, then the dilemma falls apart, and neither horn is correct. A number of divine command theorists have responded by saying that the relationship is not one of causality but of identity. Once this change ois made, observe why the dilemma is silly:

"Either what God commands is identical with what is good, or what is good is identical with what God commands."

This change alone reduces the proposed dilemma to nonsense.

A nitpick: I'd rather you said God's will is identical with what is good. God may not have explicitly commanded everything that is good, e.g. he probably doesn't issue commands to himself.

IMO you haven't gotten rid of the dilemma. God's will may be exactly that which is good, but what does "good" mean? "God is good" ought to, and does, mean something beyond "God is who he is." The reason we can talk about God's will being perfectly good is because we have an understanding of "good" in the abstract.

Response 2:

Consider the second horn of the dilemma: If God commands something because it is good, then God is answerable to a moral authority outside of Himself, and is not sovereign in the sense of being the greatst moral authority.

This is just false.

It's just silly, is what it is. There is a definition of morality that says it's wrong for even God to do certain things, e.g. to judge unjustly. Thus God is constrained by this moral standard. So what? Is God not omnipotent or sovereign because he meets the definition of "good"? Is God not sovereign because he meets the definition of "omniscient" or the definition of any other of his attributes? Is he not sovereign or confined in some way because we can come up with abstract definitions of his attributes that he "must" measure up to in order to be God? We can think of the moral standard in the abstract and/or we can think of God's will as being the embodiment of the standard and/or we can think of God as having perfect knowledge of what is "good". So what? Is God somehow no longer the Judge of all simply because we can conceive of an abstract definition of morality?

magus

November 23rd 2005, 08:58 PM

Dr. Jack Bauer

November 23rd 2005, 10:55 PM

A nitpick: I'd rather you said God's will is identical with what is good. God may not have explicitly commanded everything that is good, e.g. he probably doesn't issue commands to himself.But that is what i said. Recall how I started out by saying that when i refer to God's commands, I'm including His will as well.
IMO you haven't gotten rid of the dilemma. God's will may be exactly that which is good, but what does "good" mean? "God is good" ought to, and does, mean something beyond "God is who he is." The reason we can talk about God's will being perfectly good is because we have an understanding of "good" in the abstract.Well that's another issue, it's not the Euthyphro dilemma. The Euthyphro dilemma requires that the relationship between God's will and goodness be a causal relationship. It absolutely requires that the relationship be of this nature. If the relationship is not of this nature, then the Euthyphro dilemma loses all of its teeth. Proposing a different sort of relationship between God's will and goodness then does get rid of the dilemma, whatever other questions it moight raise.

The question "but what does good mean" may be of importance, but it's a seperate one to the above dilemma. And saying "God is good" only means "God is what he is" if we construe the relationship between goodness and God's will as a semantic relationship. But what I proposed is different, I proposed that the relationship is not a causal relationship or a semantic relationship, but one of idenity, which is different from both of the others.

Here's a very commonly used analogy: The object that we call the morning star is the same object that we call the evening star. In other words, they are identical, they have a relationship of identity. Is the evening star the evening star because it i the morning star? No, that would be a relationship of causation, which is entirely different. Does the sentence "that is the morning star" then just mean "that is the evening star"? No, that is a semantic relationship, which is different.

So I have avoided the dilemma, and I have not fallen into the semantic tautology you refer to. There is a difference between semantic relationships and relationships of identity.
It's just silly, is what it is. There is a definition of morality that says it's wrong for even God to do certain things, e.g. to judge unjustly. Thus God is constrained by this moral standard. So what? Is God not omnipotent or sovereign because he meets the definition of "good"? Is God not sovereign because he meets the definition of "omniscient" or the definition of any other of his attributes? Is he not sovereign or confined in some way because we can come up with abstract definitions of his attributes that he "must" measure up to in order to be God? We can think of the moral standard in the abstract and/or we can think of God's will as being the embodiment of the standard and/or we can think of God as having perfect knowledge of what is "good". So what? Is God somehow no longer the Judge of all simply because we can conceive of an abstract definition of morality?I probably agree with that, but I can't quite tell.

Alien

November 24th 2005, 07:47 PM

The presupposition here is that we're capable (or have the right) to judge and/or criticise God. We don't. We cannot. If God has always been, is now and always will be, then He could not have initially set the standard. Indeed, the things that make up 'holiness' have always existed because God embodies holiness.

To put it another way, then, God has always existed in a triune relationship. The Son has always obeyed the Father. The Holy Spirit has always loved the Father and the Son. It is my belief that morality can flow from these and other similar facts.

It's not a matter of judging and/or criticising God. It just a fun mental exercise, and the whole thing should be prefixed with something like "If God has [...] attributes ...". Incidentally, and just to satisfy my curiousity, how can you be sure of what you assert so confidentally about the nature of God?

To have an absolute standard implies a standard-maker. God made the standard, and He abides by it. However, for the lesser being to complain about it being arbitrary, when the higher being who set the standard leads by example, is plain illogical. Worse, it's ingratitude.

I would say that there is nothing about being a lesser being that precludes complaining about, or at least examining and expressing doubt about some aspect of God as we understand that aspect. I don't think God is like some kind of human tyrant, who flies into a rage if one of his subjects dares to question his authority.

magus

November 24th 2005, 09:17 PM

About the nature of God? Certainly. From the Bible. Nowhere else would I dare to pick out His characteristics or His nature. Only from what He revealed about Himself.

And I'm not saying that God will fly into a rage. I'm saying that from our perspective, it's just not on. As for fun mental exercises...

Can God create a rock so heavy He can't lift it?

or

If Achilles can run 10x faster than Hercules, and Hercules is given a 10 metre head start, could Achilles ever catch up?

The devil lies in the details, in the semantics, in the grammar, and even in the construction of the problem. And, as I've said, in the presuppositions. Look at it. The second horn says pretty much that if God imposes an arbitrary standard, it's not worth following. Doesn't that sum it the presupposition that we are worthy/capable of judging the standard?

Magus

India

November 24th 2005, 09:28 PM

But that is what i said. Recall how I started out by saying that when i refer to God's commands, I'm including His will as well.

Oh, sorry. :blush:

Well that's another issue, it's not the Euthyphro dilemma. The Euthyphro dilemma requires that the relationship between God's will and goodness be a causal relationship. It absolutely requires that the relationship be of this nature. If the relationship is not of this nature, then the Euthyphro dilemma loses all of its teeth. Proposing a different sort of relationship between God's will and goodness then does get rid of the dilemma, whatever other questions it moight raise.

I guess it depends on how literally you take the word "because." If you're saying the dilemma is "Is what God commands caused by a previously existing standard of good, or is the standard of good caused by what God commands?" then your response is right. I understand the dilemma to be "Does God command things for the reason that they're good, or are things good for the reason that God commands them?"

I probably agree with that, but I can't quite tell.

Because I was unclear?

Dr. Jack Bauer

November 24th 2005, 09:43 PM

I guess it depends on how literally you take the word "because." If you're saying the dilemma is "Is what God commands caused by a previously existing standard of good, or is the standard of good caused by what God commands?" then your response is right. I understand the dilemma to be "Does God command things for the reason that they're good, or are things good for the reason that God commands them?"What's the difference?
Because I was unclear?Yes, I think so.

India

November 24th 2005, 09:54 PM

The presupposition here is that we're capable (or have the right) to judge and/or criticise God. We don't.

I would say there is a difference between making a judgment concerning God, e.g. determining that he is good and praising him for it, and judging God, e.g. finding fault with him. The former is Biblical; the latter is sin.

Your statutes are wonderful, therefore I obey them.

Praise the Lord, for the Lord is good...

Do not believe me unless I do what my Father does.

That is, God wants us to use the reason and moral sense he gave us to determine that he is good and worthy of following. Yet we are finite and fallible beings and therefore are not capable of fully judging God. IMO we can determine that God is good because we observe that he is loving, etc. and from there we can get to a point of having reason to believe his judgment is infallible, even when his judgment conflicts with ours (meaning that in such a case, we conclude our judgment is wrong).

If God has always been, is now and always will be, then He could not have initially set the standard. Indeed, the things that make up 'holiness' have always existed because God embodies holiness.

...

God made the standard, and He abides by it.

Did God make the standard, or has it always existed in the form of his Person? Is morality something that is creatable, or something that simply is? Beats me. :huh:

magus

November 24th 2005, 10:14 PM

Did God make the standard, or has it always existed in the form of his Person? Is morality something that is creatable, or something that simply is? Beats me.
Ah... good point. My belief is that 'goodness' is an attribute of God. Thus, like His omniscience and omnipotence, has been ever-present.

Love in Christ,
Magus

Alien

November 25th 2005, 12:49 PM

The devil lies in the details, in the semantics, in the grammar, and even in the construction of the problem.

Agreed. Though sometimes there's a real problem ....

And, as I've said, in the presuppositions. Look at it. The second horn says pretty much that if God imposes an arbitrary standard, it's not worth following. Doesn't that sum it the presupposition that we are worthy/capable of judging the standard?

I wouldn't say that the standard is necessarily "not worth following". It may well be. For example, the standard that we drive on the right side of the road (in the USA) is quite arbitrary; the left works just as well, as in the UK. It's important that we all drive on the same side, that's all.

What the "second horn" says is that if God defines what is good by fiat, so to speak, then the word "good" is redefined as "what God commands", and we have no way of determining if a "new" action (that is one that God has not defined as good or bad) is good, as we have no way of predicting how God will define it. It's not that we are not "worthy" or "capable" of judging the standard, rather that such judgment is inherently impossible, as effectively there is no "standard" to judge.

Alien

November 25th 2005, 01:03 PM

I would say there is a difference between making a judgment concerning God, e.g. determining that he is good and praising him for it, and judging God, e.g. finding fault with him. The former is Biblical; the latter is sin.

I'd add that there are examples in the Bible of people challenging God on the basis of what seems to them to be a contradiction (Job stands out as an example). In other words, they don't just say "This looks wrong to me, but God is good regardless", they say "This looks wrong to me, I don't get it, please explain".

That is, God wants us to use the reason and moral sense he gave us to determine that he is good and worthy of following. Yet we are finite and fallible beings and therefore are not capable of fully judging God. IMO we can determine that God is good because we observe that he is loving, etc. and from there we can get to a point of having reason to believe his judgment is infallible, even when his judgment conflicts with ours (meaning that in such a case, we conclude our judgment is wrong).

I agree that in the end we will find that God is good. Nevertheless, there seems to be a contradiction in saying that God wants us to use our reason to understand Him when a whole area of supposition is forbidden to us. It's like saying to a science class "I want you to perform a test to determine if this solution is acid or alkaline. The correct answer is "acid" and anyone who suggests it is alkaline will be punished".