honey~combs
April 19th 2006, 06:30 PM
Does that mean that you accept capital punishment? And if so, how can you agree with his justification for the execution of heretics? What about freedom of conscience? Aren't the two contradictory, to say the least?
What about the naturalistic fallacy, i.e., just because something is a certain way doesn't mean that we should behave a certain way.
Isn't natural law theory really just moral relativism? If a promulgated law violates the mysterious natural law, isn't anybody who protests that law just a scadalous rebel, failing miserably in the virtue of obedience? What about render unto Ceasar what is Ceasar's? If the people are Ceasar, then render unto the people.
In the end, isn't ethics just a careful balance of necessity and social conditioning? When we're in Rome, we do as the Romans do. Ethics applies to social interactions and morality applies to personal behavior. People are going to do what they are going to do, and you can't make people be good, so the best social policy is license, because any infringement of personal liberty is a greater evil than most venial sins. And for the most part, serious sins reap their own reward, and we suffer enough in this life anyway.
Or, are people dumb animals that need strict rules and heavy-handed judges to frighten them into submission, because they're all afraid of pain, and can be controled through this fear? But the good should be rewarded with good jobs and good cars and good children with good grades. The bad should be put into slavery to work off their debt to the entire society. Because even if your sin hurts nobody else, it hurts God, and you should be punished for that. But if you do enough penance, and charity, good works, then you can work off your venial sins.
johnmartin
April 25th 2006, 07:52 PM
Well why not make your case in brief and then people can see whether they find fault with it and then your can expand your argument at leisure.
I also like Saint Thomas.Good to hear.
The first source of morality is the object of the act[i] (http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/newreply.php?do=newreply&p=1463244#_edn1). The object may be taken in a broad sense as all whatsoever which in any manner is object to the will in the human act. In this sense the purpose and circumstances of the act are included in the object. When taken distinctly from circumstance and purpose it is that which is primarily-essentially attained by the act and the circumstances are then only secondarily and accidentally obtained by the act and the purpose is only secondarily and contingently attained by the act.
The object as a source of morality of an act is not physical but moral which may be considered as either as 1. an object of an act or 2. as it is attained by the will of the moral agent as known by the agent. Taken in the former sense it is the source of objective or material morality. For example a physically good or bad object can be either morally good or bad. The good God proposed as loving is a good object, but proposed as hateful is a morally bad object. Giving money which is physically one can be in various species of good (donation, reward, payment and so on) according to object. Object taken in the later sense is the source of subjective or formal morality. For if an act is done which is objectively bad through ignorance is then subjectively good. For example a man gives away money that he thinks is his own but is not. This is an objectively bad act as the money is not his to give away. However out of invincible ignorance the act is then subjectively and formally good[ii] (http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/newreply.php?do=newreply&p=1463244#_edn2).
The second source of morality is circumstance[iii] (http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/newreply.php?do=newreply&p=1463244#_edn3) which is outside the substance of the act yet an accident of the act. The circumstances of the human act are the accidents of a human act, affecting it already constituted in be. The circumstances belong to the act and meet the act at the same subject. Circumstance must be accidental to the act, for otherwise the circumstance would become the object of the act. The moral circumstance morally affects the act because it modifies its relation to the rule of morals (modifies its morality). From the circumstances other action are distinguished. An act may be performed according to a circumstance and during the act a distinct act can also be made which does not affect the circumstance but is rather a distinct act. For example a mother cares for her sick child who acts from sensible affection, which is a circumstance of the act (why). During the caring process she becomes impatient and then act with impatience but not from impatience. This act is distinct from the circumstance[iv] (http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/newreply.php?do=newreply&p=1463244#_edn4).
There are seven circumstances according to
who what sort of person does something.
What is it of large importance or only of small importance, say steeling as small amount or a large amount.
Where location.
Wherewith manner in which an act is done, as a thief steels by robbing a bank or through fraud.
Why from the intention of the end someone does something.
How according to the effects on the moral act such as ignorance, fear, passion, intensity and so on.
When at what time. The circumstance is divided into seven as the circumstance is said to be something existing outside the substance of the act, yet so that it touches it in some manner. This happens in three manners.
As it touches the act itself, which is either through time or place or the manner of acting.
As it touches the cause of the act itself which is divided into the final cause on account of what, material cause as taken about what, on the side of the principal acting cause or object, is taken who did it, and regarding the instrumental acting cause, is taken wherewith.
As it touches the effect of the act itself when considering what someone did. Why, what and who are not circumstances as they belong to the specific end, or object, or agent acting, thereby belonging to the essence of the act. They are circumstances when they are accidental conditions either on the part of end, object or acting agent[v] (http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/newreply.php?do=newreply&p=1463244#_edn5).
The most principle circumstance is that which touches the act on part of the end, which is for the sake of what. The second touches the substance of the act which is what he did. The other circumstances are more or less principle as they approach more or less these.
The third source of morality is purposed end which is to be distinguished from natural end. Natural end is the end whereto the action from itself or from its own nature tends. The end purposed is the end intended[vi] (http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/newreply.php?do=newreply&p=1463244#_edn6) by the agent. The purposed end is a circumstance that is not taken as the interior act of the will or the intention but rather as the effects of the exterior act of the will or act imperated by the will. The purposed end which is more than a circumstance is illustrated by an example of a man giving a donation. The interior act of the will to donate the money is for the glory of God. The exterior effects of the act regarding purpose as end are to relive poverty, which results in the giving of the money to relieve the needy. Hear the interior and the exterior acts have different objects. But the object of the act is properly from the interior act of the will formally which determines the exterior act materially to be a donation but formally an act for the glory of God.
The act of donation can be made bad from a bad object purposed in the interior act of the will which would be for vain glory. Other aspects that may determine the act to be bad are the seven circumstances 1. Who a person gives money that should be given by another. 2. What the money given is too small or too big. 3. Where the money is given in public for vain glory. 4. Wherewith the donation is given an a way that cannot be used by the person receiving it. 5.. Why donation is give from a bad intention. 6. How donation is given with full intention of vain glory. 7. When donation is given at a time for everyone to see. An example of an integrally good act is worship of God, done with good motive and correct circumstance.
JM
johnmartin
April 26th 2006, 09:29 AM
Does that mean that you accept capital punishment? Only in certain circumstances.
And if so, how can you agree with his justification for the execution of heretics? if they are formal heretics they would be punished in a society that knows the truth. We see this in just about every society thats existed.
What about freedom of conscience? Nobody has a free conscience. People only have free will.
Aren't the two contradictory, to say the least? No. A true conscience is one informed with the true. Many consciences are only subjectively true at best.
What about the naturalistic fallacy, i.e., just because something is a certain way doesn't mean that we should behave a certain way.
We are obligated to attain the ultimate end of all our acts which is the beatific vision of God sen face to face. This can only be attained by correct action according to the natural and supernatural moral laws. Such action on account of an end is an imperative action whereby we must attain that end.
Isn't natural law theory really just moral relativism? Quite the opposite. Its action founded on the nature of man which does not change.
If a promulgated law violates the mysterious natural law, isn't anybody who protests that law just a scandalous rebel, failing miserably in the virtue of obedience? No. An unjust law is not a law.
What about render unto Ceasar what is Ceasar's? If the people are Ceasar, then render unto the people.
Good for them.
In the end, isn't ethics just a careful balance of necessity and social conditioning? When we're in Rome, we do as the Romans do. Ethics applies to social interactions and morality applies to personal behavior. People are going to do what they are going to do, and you can't make people be good, so the best social policy is license, because any infringement of personal liberty is a greater evil than most venial sins. And for the most part, serious sins reap their own reward, and we suffer enough in this life anyway.
See the post on the nature of the moral act for details.
Or, are people dumb animals that need strict rules and heavy-handed judges to frighten them into submission, because they're all afraid of pain, and can be controlled through this fear? But the good should be rewarded with good jobs and good cars and good children with good grades. The bad should be put into slavery to work off their debt to the entire society. Because even if your sin hurts nobody else, it hurts God, and you should be punished for that. But if you do enough penance, and charity, good works, then you can work off your venial sins.Laws are given for several reasons - to teach, to guide, to prevent harm, to allow for a good society and so on.
JM
johnmartin
April 27th 2006, 02:51 AM
Are actions as graded by this system morally bad if only one component (why; for vain glory) is "bad?"A moral act is bad if any one or more of the three sources of morality are against reason. However there is a twist to it as mens reason is defective according to memory, ignorance, passion and so on. There is also effects on the will as it acts freely. For example an action may be done under duress of without enough deliberation. These other impediments to the free act conclude to two rules of morals. There is the subjective rule which is that of consience and there is the objective rule which is law.
Is there some sort of scale for a couple of minorly bad components coupled with some really good ones? Yes act can be perfectly good, imperfectly good, good and accidentally bad, bad and accidentally good, and plain bad. Each category depends on the three sources and impediments to the free act of will.
I like the idea of the system in evaluating it, but think it is either real hard to use, or is too simplistic with just good or bad. Just some thoughts. The seven circumstances account fro all possible circumstances available.
It also leaves a lot to question, like when is a Good time to worship God? When God tells you according to divine positive law.
All the time. When I'm driving? What about going 70, or only 15? Let's toss it around a bit, I'm interested to see where it goes.Any of these are fine according to reasonable circumstances and correct intention.
I wrote this essay below some time ago that gives futher information on the nature of morality. It answers the following question - Explain why some kinds of actions can never perfect the human person.
God and His Nature.
God is proven to exist from observations of facts and the principle of limited regress. This principle states that causes per se subordinated do not regress to infinity. This principle cannot be proven directly, but its denial can be shown to be absurd. In other words, the principle states that causes that have a proper effect do no regress without there being a first cause. For if there were no first cause then there would be no second, third or any intermediate causes. However, there are intermediary causes, therefore there is a first cause. Therefore, the principle is valid.
The facts observed are movement, efficient causation, limited perfection, contingency and order in things. Movement is transition from a potency (can do) to act (does do) and as potency does not actualize itself but is actualised by other, then every potency is moved into act by another act. Therefore, as causes per se must have a first cause, all movement is derived from a first mover. The first mover must be unmoved and have no potency. The first mover is pure act called God. Also through the principle of limited regress and the observed facts of: 1. Efficient causation determines a necessary first efficient cause, 2. Beings of limited perfection are caused by the first perfector that is perfection 3. Contingent beings are caused by the necessary being and 4. Order is caused by an intellect that is not ordered by other and is therefore the first unordered orderer. The first mover, cause, perfector, necessary orderer is found only in God. Because God is pure act and contains all perfection, God is infinite good according to nature and because Gods nature is His existence, then Gods existence, nature and goodness are identical.
Because being is analogous, all beings have something in common. For example, a substance which is that which bes is self and an accident which is that which be's in other are both beings. However, they are compared to each other according to analogy only. Similarly, any creature has being by participation, or in other words has being. However, God is being by essence and is therefore the only necessary being.
Hence from the conclusions concerning Gods nature as known through that which He has in common with creatures, it is then concluded that God also has properties or a life that is proper to God alone where He has no commonality with creatures. This life or essence in God is the supernatural as God is deity. From reason alone man cannot know what the supernatural is in God is but has to be told by God. The supernatural in God has been revealed to be the Trinity whereby three persons exist in the divine nature. The supernatural cannot be understood but can be shown to be without contradiction. The Trinity cannot be believed by reason but only by faith. Further, it has been revealed by God that through the incarnation, sacraments and the church, that man is raised to the supernatural order to see God, as He is deity in the beatific vision.
Nature of Man
Now that the existence of God and His goodness has been shown from reason, the nature of man is to be exposed. Man is defined as a rational animal with an intellect to know natures abstracted from the singular, will to appetise the understood good, irascible sense appetite to appetise the difficult sensed goods and the concupiscible appetite to appetise the simply pleasant sensed goods. Man also has the five external senses of taste, touch, smell, sight and hearing, the four internal senses of imagination, memory, estimative sense and sense consciousness. There are also the eleven passions, six concerning sensible goodness of the concupiscible appetite of love and hate, desire and aversion, joy and sadness and five concerning the sense goodness of the arduous which are hope and despair, fear and boldness and anger. Man has a proportionally organized body with vegetative powers to nourish, grow and reproduce which are ordered to serve the sensitive powers that man has in common with animals, that are in turn ordered to serve the spiritual powers of intellect and will.
Nature of the Human Act
The human act is an act, which proceeds from a deliberate will. As such, the intellect and will are the spiritual powers in man and both play an important role in any human act. The intellect is the power to know natures as they are abstracted from the singular. The intellect can do three acts of apprehension, judgment and reason. Apprehension is an act where the quidity is known without affirming or denying anything about it. The judgment is an act where universal attributes are predicted of diverse subjects and reason determines the intellect to proceed from one object understood to know another intelligible truth. The quidity or nature of the thing known in the intellect is presented to the will and the will sees the goodness and lack of goodness in the thing. As the thing is seen to be only a limited good the will is not bound to appetise it but is set free to either will or not will the thing. If the will bids the thing appetised, it is appetised to terminate the appetite, or in other words, the good is appetised as it is an end. Therefore, the human act is always on account of an end.
There are three species of good that can be appetised. The fitting good is the good that can be appetised for the sake of itself and may make other goods appetable due to the good being in accordance with reason. Examples of fittings goods include wisdom, health and friendship. Pleasant goods are to be appetised when ordered towards the fitting good. Pleasant goods are appetised primarily by the sense appetites. Examples of pleasant goods include food and sex that are ordered towards the preservation of the species and the propagation of the species respectively. Useful goods are appetised when they are ordered towards the fitting good and cannot be appetised on account of pleasure. An example of a useful good that can be appetised is nasty medicine. An illegitimate useful good is slavery, which is the reduction of a fitting good of the person down to the useful good of a person providing a service. Consequently, the free act is ordered to the good, as it is fitting, which means the good, as it is reasonable.
As man acts on account of an end, as it is appetable, then man must act on account of good, as it is understood as an end. Now there are four ways to act on account of an end. A man can act actually on account of an end either inasmuch as his act is the very willing of the end or inasmuch as his act is from the influence of a present actual intention. A man can act on account of an end virtually when he acts from the abiding virtue of a previous actual intention, or habitually when he acts only with the abiding virtue of a previous actual intention. And finally, man can act interpretatively, when it is presumed that if this or that case occurred, he would act for the sake of such end.
Now as an act is on account of an end and ends are subordinate to an ultimate end, an act is always on account of an ultimate end. This is proven from the following argument. To act on account of an end is to act for either the ultimate end directly, which is to act for the ultimate end, or to act directly for proximate end. A proximate end is an end to which no other is subordinate; it is appetised for itself and for the sake of another end. Proximate ends are subordinate to intermediary ends, which are subordinate to the ultimate end. Intermediary ends are subordinate to the ultimate end and are subordinated to the proximate end. As an end is the reason or principle of any human act, then to actually act on account of a proximate end is to act virtually on account of intermediary and ultimate ends.
As man has free will, man exists for his own perfection, therefore to act on account of an end is to act to obtain a good that is self-perfective of the agent. Such perfection is ordered to obtain objective happiness and because of free will, man can act on account of an end that is either the true or the false ultimate end under the character of good. The ultimate good is either infinite which is God or is finite. If the ultimate good is a finite good, then it is internal goods either of the body such as pleasure or comfort or of the soul, such as science, virtue or art. If the ultimate good is an external good, it is either corporeal for example food clothes and money or incorporeal, such as fame or honor. Now the true ultimate end is the good that is the highest good that totally quiets and satisfies the wills appetite, excludes all evil and is ultimately perfective of man. This true ultimate end can only be God as he is the highest good, is without evil and perfectly quiets mans appetite for goodness. Whereas the false ultimate end of the sinner is a finite good, that is appetised independent of the rule of morals. This finite good is objectively found in a particular concrete or collection of concrete goods for example money, pleasure and power.
Man can act on account of an end according to knowledge either distinctly or in confusion. For example, if one acts according to human nature without directly thinking of God then he is still going for God implicitly. Man may also act on account of an end according to will by placing the focus of all his will onto God or by placing the will on God essentially but also placing the will on a created object accidentally. Here man can sin venially whilst having the will determinately focused on God as the ultimate end, thereby seeking himself in a creature regarding the particular act only.
The ways in which man can act towards an end is demonstrated by the following example showing an act in four manners. Firstly, a carpenter places all his efforts into building a house, including all the time he spends away from the house is used towards that end. Here the carpenter is totally dominated by the end of building the house so that he is a perfect carpenter. Secondly, a carpenter changes his mind completely and does something so that the house cannot be built. This act makes the ultimate end of built house impossible to achieve. Thirdly, the carpenter does not put all his focus into building the house but spends time on other occupations. The carpenter does not do an act that will stop the house being built and thereby acts habitually towards building the house. Therefore if the carpenter were given a choice to build or not build the house then he would build the house as it still dominates the will. Here building the house is pursued less well than what he could do. Fourthly, a carpenter neither rejects the end of his activity as the building of a house pursuing it as in the first case, but does things less well than is fitting.
This example can be applied to man directing his life towards God. A man can direct his whole self towards God as the ultimate end of all his acts, making him perfectly virtuous. Second, a man does an act that renders the attainment of God as the ultimate end impossible. An act such as theft moves the will from love of the reasonable good to an unreasonable good that is either a pleasant or a useful good. Thirdly, a man takes all the necessary means to direct his actions to God as the ultimate end but does acts that do not conduce to that end, whilst maintaining a disposition in the will so that if a choice had to be made to either sin mortally or chose God then he would chose God. Thus, the act done that does not conduce to the true ultimate end is towards an end for the sake of itself whist maintaining a habitual determination on God. Fourthly, a man can do acts that of themselves are directed towards God but are done instead of other acts that are more conducive to that end. For example, a man can spend time on entertainment that is not sinful, or could be otherwise praying. The first act will not impede God as the ultimate end but the act of prayer will perfect his intention and dominate the will as God as the ultimate end. Therefore, to do acts of entertainment instead of prayer, the act is imperfect although not sinful.
The example can also be shown with regard to acts towards a false ultimate end. Firstly, a man can direct his acts to the false ultimate end of fame. Thereby the man becomes a very great sinner as the false end consumes all his actions. Secondly, a man can act on account of another end that does not conduce to fame but to God. This act is towards the true ultimate end and makes the man virtuous. Thirdly, man makes fame his ultimate end but does an act that will not conduce to his fame, but still retains fame as a habitual determination in the will whereby if a choice had to be made between God and fame, he would chose fame. Accordingly, the act is a morally good act and the man is less sinful, although he still retains a false ultimate end. Fourthly, a man directs all his acts towards fame but the acts are not directed to that end as fully or as energetically as possible. Then the man is then not choosing good which is also a less evil as shown in the first example. These acts render the man less sinful.
Existence and Nature of Morality
The existence of morality is proven in two manners. Firstly, from the universal agreement of mankind that human acts have a value. This value is either a goodness or badness that is not physical or ontological, but is based on the action of a free agent that can determine its own acts. These acts contain an element of reason, where reason used prior to the act; based on the universal precept that good is to be done and evil avoided. Reason then determines that this particular act is to be done for the act to be good. After the act, a judgment is made in accordance as the act is judged to be good or evil according to reason. These judgments presuppose ideas concerning the moral order showing morality exists. Secondly, morality is also proven from the fact that good and bad are spoken of in actions and in things, because as thing is good, so does it act. Something is good due to the fullness of goodness due to it; a fullness of goodness that it ought to have. As such, goodness and due-ness are taken according to a rule whereby a thing has what it ought to have. In things, this rule is an ontological rule, which respects the physical entity of the thing. However, in things that do not have freedom concerning end, the rule is a measure of the nature of the thing without freedom. Nevertheless, the human act is concerned with the act as it is free; therefore the rule or measure of the act is not an ontological rule but is a rule of another order. This rule is morality or in other words, the free act is measured by the rule of morals.
According to St Thomas, morality has four causes. The material cause is human activity. The intrinsic formal cause of morality is the morality itself. The extrinsic formal cause of morality is the constitutive rule of morals which is the eternal law or the ordering of the divine wisdom as it is directive of all actions and motions of things to their due end. As the eternal law is participated by human reason, morality has as its extrinsic formal cause both the eternal law as the supreme rule and right human reason as the proximate rule. Therefore, morality of an act is determined according to its suitability or unsuitability to human nature. The suitability of an act is determined by the fitting good, as it is an end of the wills act. Therefore, morality is natural to man and accordingly acts are either morally good or bad from their nature. In other words, a moral act from its nature is either ordered towards the fitting good as a proximate end to the only true ultimate end or it is ordered to a pleasant or useful good as an end that is ordered to a false ultimate end. The efficient causes are the perceptive rule, which are the eternal law and other derived laws, which has obligation as its effect. Morality also has the productive principle, which has, as its remote cause the productive powers of man and proximate cause the habits or virtues in the powers. The final cause or ultimate end or morality is the supreme fitting good.
To understand what is the nature of morality it is necessary to determine its metaphysical essence. The metaphysical essence of a thing is that thing primarily conceived, as distinct from the metaphysical properties consequently conceived. For example, the metaphysical essence of man is rational animal. Therefore, the metaphysical essence of morality is that whereby morality is first constituted in itself or that whereby morality is distinguish from that which is not morality. This is proven from the principle of specification, which states acts, habits and powers are specified from their formal object. For example according to physical be sight is determined to be such as it has a relation to illuminated colour, hearing is such because it has a relation to sound waves and taste is specified according to its relation to flavor.
Therefore according to the free human act having a moral be, as opposed to a physical be, its act is specified from its formal moral object. In other words, as the moral act is both an act and has a be-ness towards an object, it then is an act and a relation to a measure of the act. As the measure of the moral act is law, the object of the act must be a rule of morals. As the rule of morals is determined by the first cause of law, the supreme law, which is the eternal law, the metaphysical nature of morality is the transcendental relation to the eternal law and its participation, which is the natural law. Accordingly, the metaphysical essence of morality is the transcendental relation to the rule of morals as found in reason as the proximate rule and the divine mind as the eternal law. From this conclusion, the value of a moral act can be determined. An act is morally good if it conforms to the rule of morals or morally bad as it is not conformed to the rule of morals.
Accordingly, any act that is not in accordance with reason is also against the eternal law, ecclesiastical law and also may be against human positive law. Such act changes the ultimate end of the human act from the true ultimate end which is God as known through faith to a false ultimate end that is some created good. These acts are known as mortal sins and are not in accordance with the rule of morals which ought to direct human acts to God as the only good that can fulfill mans appetite.
Examples of mortal sins include any sin that removes one or more of the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity or moral virtues of prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude. As the theological virtues are about God as an end and charity is in the will to determine the will to love God as the end, a change in ultimate end necessarily removes charity. Mortal sins require the object to be grave matter, full or at least confused knowledge concerning the gravity of the act and free will. Some mortal sins against charity are hatred of God, love of any creature above God, against faith is heresy and apostasy, against hope is presumption and despair, against the moral virtues include lust, adultery, lying, cowardice, greed, envy, hatred and anger. These sins can never perfect the human person however the gravity of the sin depends on any cause that has an influence on the human act.
Influences include forgetfulness, ignorance, misunderstanding, the nature of the act done, the object of the act, the vehemence of the act, the self control of the agent in the act, the sense passions that influence the intellect and will. Some influences such as ignorance, misunderstanding and forgetfulness can reduce the guilt imputed through an act to being almost negligible. For example if a man shoots another man, it can be asked does the man commit the sin of murder. The answer has to consider the circumstances of the act such as if the man was shooting at what he thought was an animal but mistakenly was a man, then the shooter did not commit murder by intent by possibly another sin due to carelessness. Another example that is relevant for Catholics is the possibility of missing mass on Sunday. The guilt imputed from the act depends on causes such as the knowledge of the man doing the act and other circumstances. For example, he may have confused the days of the week due to shift work or he may not have been able to attend to family duties such as caring for the sick. Accordingly, although the act or lack of act itself will not perfect the human person, the possible change of ultimate end through the act has to be determined by accounting for all the influences and circumstances of the act.
JM
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