kawaika
May 9th 2006, 06:00 AM
This is an essay I just wrote for my WW2 class. No, I'm not asking for help (it's already been graded--my prof that it was pretty good, I got a 95%). I just want to know what you guys think about the issue.
During World War II American scientists learned to unleash the atom. When America used these new atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a debate was also unleashed, a debate which has lasted and probably will last for quite some time. Did America really need to use the bombs? Did America need to use both bombs or just one bomb? In the famous movie Dr. Strangelove or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb, by Stanley Kubrick, there is an amusing scene in which a character rides an atomic bomb like a bull. Perhaps some think of President Truman as a “bomb rider.” Truman did not want to use the atomic bombs, but he was forced to use them because the Japanese leaders refused to surrender.
There are many reasons people give for Truman using the atom bombs against Japan: racism, revenge (for Pearl Harbor, the death marches, etc.), to show Russia how powerful America was, or as the Dr Strangelove movie suggests, that the military was itching for a chance to use nuclear bombs. The standard and most reasonable explanation for the use of atomic bombs against Japan is that the Japanese were not willing to surrender and the bombs were necessary to save American lives. How many American lives were saved by using the atomic bombs on Japan? One source claims that invading Kyushu and Honshu would result in 1 million American casualties. (Boyer Et Al, 811) Another source claims that the 100,000 to 1 million casualty projection for the full scale invasion of Japan was “probably low.” (Allen and Schweikart, 627) John Keegan says that “From a source never satisfactorily identified, the figure of “a million casualties,” even “a million dead,” had begun to circulate among American strategic planners as the number of losses to be expected in an invasion of Japan.” (Keegan, 574) Some have argued that the million man casualty predictions were post war creations, but “…the estimate that American casualties could surpass the million mark was set in the summer of 1944 and was never changed.” (Giangreco, 580) While it is possible that the casualties may not have been that high had America invaded Japan, it is chilling to note that the Purple Heart was “a medal minted in preparation for the invasion of Japan in 1945.” (Giangreco, 581) The casualties that the American government expected from the invasion of Japan were so high that it seemed more sensible to use the new weapons (atomic bombs) to help win the war.
Truman did not want to use the atomic bombs but felt he had to; he received a letter from Senator Richard B. Russell in which the senator implored Truman to deal with the Japanese as harshly as possible and that “If we do not have available a sufficient number of atomic bombs with which to finish the job immediately, let us carry on with TNT and fire bombs until we can produce them.” (Truman Presidential Museum and Library) President Truman responded on 9 August, 1945 stating: “For myself, I certainly regret the necessity of wiping out whole populations because of the "pigheadedness” of the leaders of a nation and for your information, I am not going to do it unless it is absolutely necessary. It is my opinion that after the Russians enter into war the Japanese will very shortly fold up. My object is to save as many American lives as possible but I also have a humane feeling for the women and children in Japan.” (Truman Presidential Museum and Library)
Some feel that Truman did not do enough to negotiate a peace treaty with Japan. The problem, though, was that the Japanese were deeply divided over the issue of surrender. When Truman issued his Potsdam Declaration, urging the Japanese to surrender, Prime Minister Kendaro Suzuki stated “For the enemy to say something like that means circumstances have risen that force them also to end the war, that is why they are talking about unconditional surrender. Precisely at a time like this, if we hold firm, then they will yield before we do. Just because they broadcast their Declaration, it is not necessary to stop the fighting. You advisors may ask me to reconsider, but I don't think there is any need to stop [the war].” (Villa and Bonnett, 531) This statement was made on 30 July, 1945. Many have claimed that air raids and the naval blockades had broken Japan and that Japan was about to collapse. The fact of the matter is, the Japanese leadership was not prepared to surrender. Over 400 Japanese were arrested by the Japanese government in 1945 simply because they might be favoring negotiation. (Keegan, 578) Robert P. Newman points out that “MAGIC showed the Japanese elite desperately trying to persuade Russia to act as mediator in the Pacific War, to secure for Japan an armistice with easy terms.” (Newman, 8-9) These easy terms are explained by Richard B. Frank as “satisfactory to the Big Six [Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki, Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, Army Minister Korechika Anami, Navy Minister Mitsumasa Yonai, and the chiefs of staff of the Imperial Army (General Yoshijiro Umezu) and Imperial Navy (Admiral Soemu Toyoda).]—in other words, a peace on terms satisfactory to the dominant militarists. Their minimal goal was not confined to guaranteed retention of the Imperial Institution; they also insisted on preservation of the old militaristic order in Japan, the one in which they ruled.” (Frank)
Robert A. Pape believes three things convinced the “...Japanese leaders that their military position was untenable...:” the Allied sea blockade which cut off all outside sources of supply to Japan, the fall of Okinawa (which allowed American air power to be in range of Kyushu, and the defeat of Japanese armies in Manchuria. (Pape, 156) The problem with this argument though is that even after all of these things, and even after Hiroshima and Nagasaki were bombed, the Japanese leaders couldn't decide what they should do. The Japanese Imperial War Council had a meeting on 9 August, 1945 to discuss all of these things, but when the votes were cast they were “almost evenly divided between the peace and war factions of the Cabinet.” (Villa and Bonnett, 532) After hours of debating, Prime Minister Suzuki asked the Emperor to resolve the issue, and the Emperor said: “I cannot bear to see my innocent people to suffer any longer. I swallow my own tears and give sanction to the proposal to accept the Allied proclamation on the basis outlined by the foreign minister.” (Loebs) This must have shocked some of the leaders. General Anami, for example, wanted to continue the war and he told the Emperor “The battle would cause the Allies to suffer greatly. If we cannot halt the enemy, 100 million Japanese would gladly prefer death to the dishonor of surrender and they would thus leave the Japanese people's mark on history.” (Loebs)
The Emperor's justification to the Japanese people for his decision mentioned only one thing: the use of “a most cruel bomb.” (Villa and Bennett, 532) Some Japanese were speculating that the Americans only had one atomic bomb. (Spector, 559) If the Emperor had been swayed by these people, his opinion would have certainly changed on 9 August, 1945, when the second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. The Emperor's status was what ended the war. Kido, an adviser to the Emperor stated “The only reason the Japanese Army stopped fighting was because the emperor ordered them to do so.” (Loebs)
Probably the most disturbing aspect of dropping of the atomic bombs is that many Japanese people were irradiated—people who had nothing to do with the war. Did the Americans know the consequences of using atomic bombs? After testing an atomic bomb in New Mexico (on 16 July, 1944) there was concern about the affects of Radiation. By 27 July, 1944 radiation monitors wanted to speak with a family living 20 miles away from ground zero to see how they were doing. (Atomic Bomb: Decision) It is true that the Americans knew that radiation would be an after affect of using atomic weapons, but at the time they did not know how bad the radiation would be. General George Marshall actually had rough plans on using the atomic bombs tactically when Americans were to invade Kyushu. (Bernstein, 168) Marshall was warned that the men would need to stay at least 6 miles away from the bomb when it detonated, but he was assured that the men could travel through the bombed area safely within an hour. (Bernstein, 161) This clearly proves that the Americans did not know how bad the radiation from the bombs would be—they were planning to send their troops through recently atom bombed areas!
Shortly after the bombs were dropped, “the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) issued its conclusions, from Vice Chairman Paul Nitze’s office, about Japan’s readiness to surrender” and the report claimed that Japan would have surrendered “certainly prior to December 31, 1945, and in all probability prior to November 1, 1945...even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.” (Newman, 8) It is difficult to trust this report. First of all, Nitze didn't include information in the report that hurt his theory. For example, Prince Fumimaro Konoye, an influential premier, was interviewed and was asked on 9 November, 1945, how long the war would continue if the atomic bomb had not been used—he responded by saying “Probably it would have lasted all this year.” (Gentile, 1098) Nitze then asked him if the war would have ended before 1 November, and Konoye said that it “Probably would have lasted beyond that.” (Gentile, 1099) This report is often seen as impartial, but it is not. In fact, Nitze “who wrote the crucial parts of the USSBS report, was firmly committed to the ambition of the Army Air Corps to establish, after the war, a large, independent Air Force.” (Newman, 9) In order to show that the Army Air Corps was effective, the atom bombs' role had to be downplayed. After World War II, the American services were having their own war with each other over funding. The services tried to influence the conclusions of the report.
Clearly the Japanese could not carry out offensive operations against the Allies. The economy of Japan was in ruins, yet the Japanese military leaders wanted to continue fighting until the last man. The blockade and the fire bombings clearly had not concerned the military leaders—even the atomic bombs did not change their minds. However, Emperor Hirohito was affected by the use of atomic bombs and ordered the surrender of Japan. It is doubtful that the Emperor would have ordered Japan's surrender had atomic bombs not been used. Japan's situation was dire before the use of atomic bombs but that wasn't enough to make him change his position. Truman was not a “bomb rider;” he used the bombs because he had to, not because he wanted to.
Bibliography
Atomic Bomb: Decision. “Trinity Test, July 16, 1945 - Radiation Monitoring.” http://www.dannen.com/decision/trin-rad.html
Allen, Michael, and Larry Scweikart. A Patriot's History of the United Sates: From Columbus's Great Discovery to the War on Terror. New York, NY: Sentinel, 2004.
Bernstein, Barton J. “Eclipsed by Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Early Thinking about Tactical Nuclear Weapons.” International Security 15, no. 4 (Spring, 1991): 149- 173. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162- 2889%28199121%2915%3A4%3C149%3AEBHANE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P
Boyer, Paul S. Et al. The Enduring Vision: A History of the American People Volume 2: From 1865. New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004.
Frank, Richard B. “Why Truman dropped the bomb: sixty years after Hiroshima, we now have the secret intercepts that shaped his decision.” The Weekly Standard. August 8, 2005.
http://galenet.galegroup.com.ezproxy.umuc.edu/servlet/HistRC/hits?r=d&origSearch=true&bucket=iac&o=&tab=2&n=10&l=dJ&hdb=US&items=0&tabMap=2&c=1&docNum=A135164006&locID=umd_umuc&secondary=true&t=RK&s=1&SU=%22Why+Truman+Dropped+the+Bomb%22&finalAuth=true
Gentile, Gian P. “Shaping the Past Battlefield, “For the future”: The United States Strategic Bombing Survey's Evaluation of the American Air War Against Japan.” The Journal of Military History 64 no. 4 (Oct., 2000): 1085-1112. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0899-3718%28200010%2964%3A4%3C1085%3ASTPB%22T%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B
Giangreco, D. M. Casualty Projections for the U.S. Invasions of Japan, 1945-1946: Planning and Policy Implications. The Journal of Military History 61 no. 3 (Jul., 1997): 521-581. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0899-3718%28199707%2961%3A3%3C521%3ACPFTUI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0
Keegan, John. The Second World War. New York, NY: Penguin, 2005.
Loebs, Bruce. “Hiroshima & Nagasaki: one Necessary Evil, one Tragic Mistake.” Commonweal August 18, 1995. http://galenet.galegroup.com.ezproxy.umuc.edu/servlet/History/hits?r=d&origSearch=true&bucket=iac&o=&tab=2&n=10&l=dJ&hdb=MW&items=0&tabMap=2&c=1&docNum=A17210233&sgPhrase=false&locID=umd_umuc&secondary=true&t=RK&s=1&SU=Hiroshima+%26+Nagasaki%3A+one+Necessary+Evil%2C+one+Tragic+Mistake.
Newman, Robert P. “Hiroshima and the Trashing of Stimson.” The New England Quarterly. 71 no. 1 (Mar., 1998): 5-32. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0028-4866%28199803%2971%3A1%3C5%3AHATTOH%3E2.0.CO%3B2-U
Pape, Robert A. “Why Japan Surrendered.” International Security 18 no. 2 (Autumn, 1993): 154-201. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-2889%28199323%2918%3A2%3C154%3AWJS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C
Spector, Ronald H. The Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1985.
Truman Presidential Museum and Library. “President Truman to Senator Richard B. Russell (August 9, 1945).” http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/
study_collections/bomb/large/documents/fulltext.php?fulltextid=22
Villa, Brian L. and John Bonnett. "Understanding Indignation: Gar Alperovitz, Robert Maddox and the Decision to Use the Bomb" Reviews in American History 24 no. 3, (September 1996): 529-536. http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.umuc.edu/journals/reviews_in_american_history/v024/24.3villa.html
During World War II American scientists learned to unleash the atom. When America used these new atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, a debate was also unleashed, a debate which has lasted and probably will last for quite some time. Did America really need to use the bombs? Did America need to use both bombs or just one bomb? In the famous movie Dr. Strangelove or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb, by Stanley Kubrick, there is an amusing scene in which a character rides an atomic bomb like a bull. Perhaps some think of President Truman as a “bomb rider.” Truman did not want to use the atomic bombs, but he was forced to use them because the Japanese leaders refused to surrender.
There are many reasons people give for Truman using the atom bombs against Japan: racism, revenge (for Pearl Harbor, the death marches, etc.), to show Russia how powerful America was, or as the Dr Strangelove movie suggests, that the military was itching for a chance to use nuclear bombs. The standard and most reasonable explanation for the use of atomic bombs against Japan is that the Japanese were not willing to surrender and the bombs were necessary to save American lives. How many American lives were saved by using the atomic bombs on Japan? One source claims that invading Kyushu and Honshu would result in 1 million American casualties. (Boyer Et Al, 811) Another source claims that the 100,000 to 1 million casualty projection for the full scale invasion of Japan was “probably low.” (Allen and Schweikart, 627) John Keegan says that “From a source never satisfactorily identified, the figure of “a million casualties,” even “a million dead,” had begun to circulate among American strategic planners as the number of losses to be expected in an invasion of Japan.” (Keegan, 574) Some have argued that the million man casualty predictions were post war creations, but “…the estimate that American casualties could surpass the million mark was set in the summer of 1944 and was never changed.” (Giangreco, 580) While it is possible that the casualties may not have been that high had America invaded Japan, it is chilling to note that the Purple Heart was “a medal minted in preparation for the invasion of Japan in 1945.” (Giangreco, 581) The casualties that the American government expected from the invasion of Japan were so high that it seemed more sensible to use the new weapons (atomic bombs) to help win the war.
Truman did not want to use the atomic bombs but felt he had to; he received a letter from Senator Richard B. Russell in which the senator implored Truman to deal with the Japanese as harshly as possible and that “If we do not have available a sufficient number of atomic bombs with which to finish the job immediately, let us carry on with TNT and fire bombs until we can produce them.” (Truman Presidential Museum and Library) President Truman responded on 9 August, 1945 stating: “For myself, I certainly regret the necessity of wiping out whole populations because of the "pigheadedness” of the leaders of a nation and for your information, I am not going to do it unless it is absolutely necessary. It is my opinion that after the Russians enter into war the Japanese will very shortly fold up. My object is to save as many American lives as possible but I also have a humane feeling for the women and children in Japan.” (Truman Presidential Museum and Library)
Some feel that Truman did not do enough to negotiate a peace treaty with Japan. The problem, though, was that the Japanese were deeply divided over the issue of surrender. When Truman issued his Potsdam Declaration, urging the Japanese to surrender, Prime Minister Kendaro Suzuki stated “For the enemy to say something like that means circumstances have risen that force them also to end the war, that is why they are talking about unconditional surrender. Precisely at a time like this, if we hold firm, then they will yield before we do. Just because they broadcast their Declaration, it is not necessary to stop the fighting. You advisors may ask me to reconsider, but I don't think there is any need to stop [the war].” (Villa and Bonnett, 531) This statement was made on 30 July, 1945. Many have claimed that air raids and the naval blockades had broken Japan and that Japan was about to collapse. The fact of the matter is, the Japanese leadership was not prepared to surrender. Over 400 Japanese were arrested by the Japanese government in 1945 simply because they might be favoring negotiation. (Keegan, 578) Robert P. Newman points out that “MAGIC showed the Japanese elite desperately trying to persuade Russia to act as mediator in the Pacific War, to secure for Japan an armistice with easy terms.” (Newman, 8-9) These easy terms are explained by Richard B. Frank as “satisfactory to the Big Six [Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki, Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, Army Minister Korechika Anami, Navy Minister Mitsumasa Yonai, and the chiefs of staff of the Imperial Army (General Yoshijiro Umezu) and Imperial Navy (Admiral Soemu Toyoda).]—in other words, a peace on terms satisfactory to the dominant militarists. Their minimal goal was not confined to guaranteed retention of the Imperial Institution; they also insisted on preservation of the old militaristic order in Japan, the one in which they ruled.” (Frank)
Robert A. Pape believes three things convinced the “...Japanese leaders that their military position was untenable...:” the Allied sea blockade which cut off all outside sources of supply to Japan, the fall of Okinawa (which allowed American air power to be in range of Kyushu, and the defeat of Japanese armies in Manchuria. (Pape, 156) The problem with this argument though is that even after all of these things, and even after Hiroshima and Nagasaki were bombed, the Japanese leaders couldn't decide what they should do. The Japanese Imperial War Council had a meeting on 9 August, 1945 to discuss all of these things, but when the votes were cast they were “almost evenly divided between the peace and war factions of the Cabinet.” (Villa and Bonnett, 532) After hours of debating, Prime Minister Suzuki asked the Emperor to resolve the issue, and the Emperor said: “I cannot bear to see my innocent people to suffer any longer. I swallow my own tears and give sanction to the proposal to accept the Allied proclamation on the basis outlined by the foreign minister.” (Loebs) This must have shocked some of the leaders. General Anami, for example, wanted to continue the war and he told the Emperor “The battle would cause the Allies to suffer greatly. If we cannot halt the enemy, 100 million Japanese would gladly prefer death to the dishonor of surrender and they would thus leave the Japanese people's mark on history.” (Loebs)
The Emperor's justification to the Japanese people for his decision mentioned only one thing: the use of “a most cruel bomb.” (Villa and Bennett, 532) Some Japanese were speculating that the Americans only had one atomic bomb. (Spector, 559) If the Emperor had been swayed by these people, his opinion would have certainly changed on 9 August, 1945, when the second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. The Emperor's status was what ended the war. Kido, an adviser to the Emperor stated “The only reason the Japanese Army stopped fighting was because the emperor ordered them to do so.” (Loebs)
Probably the most disturbing aspect of dropping of the atomic bombs is that many Japanese people were irradiated—people who had nothing to do with the war. Did the Americans know the consequences of using atomic bombs? After testing an atomic bomb in New Mexico (on 16 July, 1944) there was concern about the affects of Radiation. By 27 July, 1944 radiation monitors wanted to speak with a family living 20 miles away from ground zero to see how they were doing. (Atomic Bomb: Decision) It is true that the Americans knew that radiation would be an after affect of using atomic weapons, but at the time they did not know how bad the radiation would be. General George Marshall actually had rough plans on using the atomic bombs tactically when Americans were to invade Kyushu. (Bernstein, 168) Marshall was warned that the men would need to stay at least 6 miles away from the bomb when it detonated, but he was assured that the men could travel through the bombed area safely within an hour. (Bernstein, 161) This clearly proves that the Americans did not know how bad the radiation from the bombs would be—they were planning to send their troops through recently atom bombed areas!
Shortly after the bombs were dropped, “the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) issued its conclusions, from Vice Chairman Paul Nitze’s office, about Japan’s readiness to surrender” and the report claimed that Japan would have surrendered “certainly prior to December 31, 1945, and in all probability prior to November 1, 1945...even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated.” (Newman, 8) It is difficult to trust this report. First of all, Nitze didn't include information in the report that hurt his theory. For example, Prince Fumimaro Konoye, an influential premier, was interviewed and was asked on 9 November, 1945, how long the war would continue if the atomic bomb had not been used—he responded by saying “Probably it would have lasted all this year.” (Gentile, 1098) Nitze then asked him if the war would have ended before 1 November, and Konoye said that it “Probably would have lasted beyond that.” (Gentile, 1099) This report is often seen as impartial, but it is not. In fact, Nitze “who wrote the crucial parts of the USSBS report, was firmly committed to the ambition of the Army Air Corps to establish, after the war, a large, independent Air Force.” (Newman, 9) In order to show that the Army Air Corps was effective, the atom bombs' role had to be downplayed. After World War II, the American services were having their own war with each other over funding. The services tried to influence the conclusions of the report.
Clearly the Japanese could not carry out offensive operations against the Allies. The economy of Japan was in ruins, yet the Japanese military leaders wanted to continue fighting until the last man. The blockade and the fire bombings clearly had not concerned the military leaders—even the atomic bombs did not change their minds. However, Emperor Hirohito was affected by the use of atomic bombs and ordered the surrender of Japan. It is doubtful that the Emperor would have ordered Japan's surrender had atomic bombs not been used. Japan's situation was dire before the use of atomic bombs but that wasn't enough to make him change his position. Truman was not a “bomb rider;” he used the bombs because he had to, not because he wanted to.
Bibliography
Atomic Bomb: Decision. “Trinity Test, July 16, 1945 - Radiation Monitoring.” http://www.dannen.com/decision/trin-rad.html
Allen, Michael, and Larry Scweikart. A Patriot's History of the United Sates: From Columbus's Great Discovery to the War on Terror. New York, NY: Sentinel, 2004.
Bernstein, Barton J. “Eclipsed by Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Early Thinking about Tactical Nuclear Weapons.” International Security 15, no. 4 (Spring, 1991): 149- 173. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162- 2889%28199121%2915%3A4%3C149%3AEBHANE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P
Boyer, Paul S. Et al. The Enduring Vision: A History of the American People Volume 2: From 1865. New York, NY: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004.
Frank, Richard B. “Why Truman dropped the bomb: sixty years after Hiroshima, we now have the secret intercepts that shaped his decision.” The Weekly Standard. August 8, 2005.
http://galenet.galegroup.com.ezproxy.umuc.edu/servlet/HistRC/hits?r=d&origSearch=true&bucket=iac&o=&tab=2&n=10&l=dJ&hdb=US&items=0&tabMap=2&c=1&docNum=A135164006&locID=umd_umuc&secondary=true&t=RK&s=1&SU=%22Why+Truman+Dropped+the+Bomb%22&finalAuth=true
Gentile, Gian P. “Shaping the Past Battlefield, “For the future”: The United States Strategic Bombing Survey's Evaluation of the American Air War Against Japan.” The Journal of Military History 64 no. 4 (Oct., 2000): 1085-1112. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0899-3718%28200010%2964%3A4%3C1085%3ASTPB%22T%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B
Giangreco, D. M. Casualty Projections for the U.S. Invasions of Japan, 1945-1946: Planning and Policy Implications. The Journal of Military History 61 no. 3 (Jul., 1997): 521-581. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0899-3718%28199707%2961%3A3%3C521%3ACPFTUI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0
Keegan, John. The Second World War. New York, NY: Penguin, 2005.
Loebs, Bruce. “Hiroshima & Nagasaki: one Necessary Evil, one Tragic Mistake.” Commonweal August 18, 1995. http://galenet.galegroup.com.ezproxy.umuc.edu/servlet/History/hits?r=d&origSearch=true&bucket=iac&o=&tab=2&n=10&l=dJ&hdb=MW&items=0&tabMap=2&c=1&docNum=A17210233&sgPhrase=false&locID=umd_umuc&secondary=true&t=RK&s=1&SU=Hiroshima+%26+Nagasaki%3A+one+Necessary+Evil%2C+one+Tragic+Mistake.
Newman, Robert P. “Hiroshima and the Trashing of Stimson.” The New England Quarterly. 71 no. 1 (Mar., 1998): 5-32. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0028-4866%28199803%2971%3A1%3C5%3AHATTOH%3E2.0.CO%3B2-U
Pape, Robert A. “Why Japan Surrendered.” International Security 18 no. 2 (Autumn, 1993): 154-201. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-2889%28199323%2918%3A2%3C154%3AWJS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C
Spector, Ronald H. The Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1985.
Truman Presidential Museum and Library. “President Truman to Senator Richard B. Russell (August 9, 1945).” http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/
study_collections/bomb/large/documents/fulltext.php?fulltextid=22
Villa, Brian L. and John Bonnett. "Understanding Indignation: Gar Alperovitz, Robert Maddox and the Decision to Use the Bomb" Reviews in American History 24 no. 3, (September 1996): 529-536. http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.umuc.edu/journals/reviews_in_american_history/v024/24.3villa.html