Within the Abrahamic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, there seems to be a tension between at least two traditions:
Some background on this tension:
This opens up an interesting question: what sort of tradition will various Abrahamic monotheists opt for? Will they opt for the realist/objectivist tradition? Or will they opt for a subjectivist tradition of blind obedience? Some Abahamic monotheists have clearly made their decision...
An objectivist (or realist) position that recognizes that actions can be morally right or morally wrong independent of what Gos says, commands, etc.
A subjectivist position that claims that actions are morally right or morally wrong in virtue of God's commands, say-so, etc. This is often called divine command theory, or DCT for short.
A subjectivist position that claims that actions are morally right or morally wrong in virtue of God's commands, say-so, etc. This is often called divine command theory, or DCT for short.
Some background on this tension:
"Muslim patients and cross-gender interactions in medicine: an Islamic bioethical perspective"
http://pmr.uchicago.edu/sites/pmr.uc...ve,%202010.pdf
"Beyond Divine Command Theory: Moral Realism in the Hebrew Bible"
http://www.hts.org.za/index.php/HTS/...ewFile/160/237
http://pmr.uchicago.edu/sites/pmr.uc...ve,%202010.pdf
"While the philosophical debates on the use of reason within the Islamic ethicolegal traditions is beyond the scope of this paper, Islamic bioethical reflection is shaped by two broad tendencies. The first is a tendency toward theological voluntarism or theistic subjectivism: God alone defines the standard of right and wrong, thus ‘good deeds are good only because God commands them, and evil is evil because God forbids it’.20 This belief by itself would lead to a near-total dependence upon revelation to guide human conduct. However, the second tendency holds that God’s commands are purposeful and as such ‘human reason in dependence upon revelation can discern rules and apply them’, thereby allowing the intellect to enter into the equation.20"
"Beyond Divine Command Theory: Moral Realism in the Hebrew Bible"
http://www.hts.org.za/index.php/HTS/...ewFile/160/237
"Strong arguments for the presence of DCT in the text include the giving of seemingly unnecessary commands (as to Adam and Eve or the rituals of Leviticus) and even seemingly immoral commands (e.g. the commanding of Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, of the Israelites to plunder the Egyptians, the slaughtering of the Canaanites, Hosea being told to marry a prostitute, etc. […]). In philosophical terms this would mean that the Hebrew Bible took for granted a subjectivist yet universalist form of cognitivism that one might contrast with other forms of ethical subjectivism (e.g. ideal observer theory, moral relativism, and individualist ethical subjectivism) , moral realism (which claims that moral propositions refer to objective facts, independent of anyone’s attitudes or opinions) [emphasis added], error theory (which denies that any moral propositions are true in any sense), and non-cognitivism (which denies that moral sentences express propositions at all) (306).
[...]
Yet because DCT is anachronistic in the context of the Hebrew Bible, the upside is that in the context of the moral–realist trajectories in ancient Israelite religion the Euthyphro’s Dilemma qua dilemma is in fact a pseudo-problem. For while the Hebrew Bible often implies that YHWH commanded something because it is good the deity was not made redundant, thereby as is the case with DCT when this divinity–morality relation is opted for. The reason for this is that, unlike what is assumed in Euthyphro’s Dilemma, the ancient Israelites were not optimists in their religious epistemology. Even though the moral order was believed to have existed independent of the divine, the divine will – if the deity was of the moral type – was still believed to be humanity’s only access to that order. The deity was thus assumed to function in relation to the moral order as an instructor, a mediator, a judge and an authority on right and wrong – not as its creator [emphasis added] (308-309)."
[...]
Yet because DCT is anachronistic in the context of the Hebrew Bible, the upside is that in the context of the moral–realist trajectories in ancient Israelite religion the Euthyphro’s Dilemma qua dilemma is in fact a pseudo-problem. For while the Hebrew Bible often implies that YHWH commanded something because it is good the deity was not made redundant, thereby as is the case with DCT when this divinity–morality relation is opted for. The reason for this is that, unlike what is assumed in Euthyphro’s Dilemma, the ancient Israelites were not optimists in their religious epistemology. Even though the moral order was believed to have existed independent of the divine, the divine will – if the deity was of the moral type – was still believed to be humanity’s only access to that order. The deity was thus assumed to function in relation to the moral order as an instructor, a mediator, a judge and an authority on right and wrong – not as its creator [emphasis added] (308-309)."
This opens up an interesting question: what sort of tradition will various Abrahamic monotheists opt for? Will they opt for the realist/objectivist tradition? Or will they opt for a subjectivist tradition of blind obedience? Some Abahamic monotheists have clearly made their decision...
Originally posted by seer
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