Shame culture, and some fringe anthropology on Tektonics.org

[Whinney]

Hello there!

I was reading some of the articles on tektonics.org, and noticed that the author(s) relied heavily on some fringe anthropology concerning ancient "Shame culture" versus "guilt culture". That site refers me here, and I hope this is the right forum to reply to their articles. Now, much on tektonics.org is well-informed, but it is a 'shame' that the authors have relied to such a great extent on theories which are not at all widely-accepted today in anthropology, although they have been taken up by some bible scholars, most notably Bruce Malina.

What is wrong with the view? Briefly, it is far too extreme and unrealistic. Taking the first century AD, it is now widely agreed that Hellenistic societies were more individualist than collectivist (albeit, to a different extent to today). While some collectivist ways of thinking lingered on from pre-Hellenistic times, the society was essentially individualistic in mindset. What does this mean. Accepting the link between collectivism and shame cultures, and between individualism and guilt cultures, by the first century (and probably since the fifth century BC), people experienced interior feelings of guilt, and customarily expressed their "introspective conscience" which, while not of exactly the same make-up as the modern and even more individualistic West, experienced much the same as what we would call "guilt".

It is a shame that this site, tektonics.org, which otherwise provides much good information on many topics, has chosen to side so closely with what is essentially a defunct anthropological understanding of the first-century Hellenistic conscience. Siding with such a fringe, outdated, and demonstrably incorrect viewpoint spoils and undermines what otherwise could have been a quite convincing site.

I refer the authors to the following work, which contains a fine summary of current, mainstream anthropology, in relation to St Paul:
Gary W Burnett, Paul and the Salvation of the Individual (Leiden, Boston & Koln: Brill, 2001).

I have copied down a few quotes which comment on the fringe view, held by Malina and other eccentrics, that first-century men and women did not experience "guilt".

"A consideration of the way in which classical scholarship views what has been termed the shame culture of the ancient world from Homer though to the Hellenistic period suggests that it is too simple to characterise this society as one where shame and honour were the pivotal values, and where behaviour was largely motivated by concern for reputation and social standing. In addition, the suggestion is that shame and honour become much less important in comparison with the more internalised, introspective value of guilt as the world moved towards the Hellenistic age of the first century CE. Furthermore, we saw how Williams has questioned the idea of shame as merely a social value, and not an internal, introspective one. The view of Malina, however, that a shame culture persisted into the Hellenistic world of the first century, and that the collective values of this society necessitate us viewing first century selves in a radically different way from modern selves was considered, and found to be very extreme, and considered inappropriate by some anthropologist scholars. The likelihood remains that the inhabitants of the Graeco-Roman world of the first century CE were the self-aware, self-conscious, and culture-processing human beings with which we are familiar." (56)

"For Williams, the shame culture of early Greece is understood too simplistically, since Greek culture contained reactions and emotions similar to those associated with guilt." (43)

"Malina, however, surely overstates his case. Undoubtedly elements of earlier shame cultures persisted into the world of the first century Mediterranean, but we have noted the views of scholars like Lloyd-Jones and Williams who contend that earlier shame cultures were beginning to diminish by the fifth century BCE, and that there was little adherence to concepts of shame and honour in the philosophies that began to flourish from this time onwards in the Greek world." (44)

"Chance, an anthropologist, has recently criticized the way in which biblical scholars are currently using the anthropology of honour and shame in their analysis of biblical texts [Semeia 68 (1996), 139-51]. He agrees with Herzfeld's unease about the "massive generalisations of 'honour' and shame'", which he maintains, "have become couterproductive", and observes that "biblical scholars ... all seem to draw from the same well" - Peristany's 1966 Honour and Shame, the anthropology of which is "beginning to look a bit dated." It seems, then, that the categories of honour and shame may be a lens used at once too simplistically and too generally through which to observe the New Testament texts." (44-45)

"So then, what are we to make of Malina's first century individual who, he contends, existed with no individual self-consciousness, was shaped and moulded entirely by the group of which he was embedded, and had no interest or consciousness of any, inner, psychological states and no warmth in his human relationships? Such a person would be a shell of a human being, a social drone incapable of the behaviour that makes us truly human. Here we recall Cohen's objections to anthropological approaches which effectively deny individuals their self-consciousness and exalt the cultural and social to a position of dominance over individual human beings. In Malina we have an extreme example of such an approach." (45)

[Gideon Brown]

Hello there!

:wave:


I was reading some of the articles on tektonics.org,

:thumb: You should read them all.


It is a shame that this site, tektonics.org, which otherwise provides much good information on many topics, has chosen to side so closely with what is essentially a defunct anthropological understanding of the first-century Hellenistic conscience.

Well, tektonics.org doesn't say that Greek culture was honour/shame - it says that Jewish culture was honour/shame.


Siding with such a fringe, outdated, and demonstrably incorrect viewpoint spoils and undermines what otherwise could have been a quite convincing site.

What do you find convincing about it?

[Whinney]

Well, tektonics.org doesn't say that Greek culture was honour/shame - it says that Jewish culture was honour/shame.
You misunderstand.

I commented on first-century "Hellenistic" culture, not "Greek" culture (the terms have a different scope), and the book I quoted from concerned Paul, a (first-century Hellenistic) Jew. As has been widely accepted since the work of Martin Hengel, all Jewish culture in the first century AD was Hellenistic. So, in referring to "Hellenistic", I included - and in fact had especially in mind, as my reference to Paul demonstrated - Hellenistic Jewish culture.

First-century Jewish culture was certainly not predominantly one of honour/shame, but was one where individualism predominated and which was acquainted with guilt much the same as we know it. Apart from some rather fringe anthropologists, Malina's view is not widely held. This is where the authors of tektonics.org, in their reliance on such an implausible view, are letting themselves down. The book I quoted from explains this in more detail, as the quotations I made above indicate.

[ApologiaPhoenix]

This thread is being moved to Tektonics. Carry on.

[Rayado]

I'm curious about your thoughts on Honor, Patronage, Kinship, and Purity by David DeSilva (even though it's a tad off topic, it's still referenced and promoted by Tektonics).

[Minnesota]

It is a shame that this site, tektonics.org, which otherwise provides much good information on many topics, has chosen to side so closely with what is essentially a defunct anthropological understanding of the first-century Hellenistic conscience. Siding with such a fringe, outdated, and demonstrably incorrect viewpoint spoils and undermines what otherwise could have been a quite convincing site.
But this isn't at all atypical of tektonics. Like many (most?) apologist sites quote mining and biased selections are often the only way they can show support for a particular point of view. Where this really gets bad is in the area of creationism versus evolution. Here the outright lying and rampant distortion and misrepresentation by fundies borders on the criminal. So don't be surprised if you find yourself in a miasma of apologetic stink when venturing among the more fundie side of Christian thought.

Good luck, and don't expect any kind of rational response. JP Holding, the grand Pooh-Bah of tektonics, is often given to ad hominem excess. Actually, he delights in it, and resorts to it whenever you get him cornered. Either that or he will simply clam up and prays you go away.

[Philosophickle]

Hello Whinney,

I'm somewhat new to Context Group myself, so I find your pseudo-criticism interesting. I think, though, that you are overlooking some great possibilities. N.T. Wright sums it up the best:


I see the work of the 'context group' as basically a sharp-edged form of history. That is, I don't think they are doing anything other than what historians always ought to do: studying the specific and particular context, the social assumptions, the implicit narratives, etc., of the people we're interested in. Insofar as people in that group go beyond that, projecting larger theories about how societies work, they are only as valuable as the evidence they assemble for such constructs. What they succeed in doing, and what we need to pay close attention to, is joggling us out of our comfortable assumptions that, as I think Neyrey puts it, the ancient Mediterranean world was much like ours except without electronic toys. They are putting under the microscope things that a lot of historians -- and a great many non-historically minded Christians! -- have glanced at with the naked eye. As such they deserve our close attention. My sense, though, is that sometimes at least members of that group come with an explicit anti-theological agenda, almost a sociological reductionism. That's a big generalization and it wouldn't apply to all of them, or to any of them all the time, I think. But it's something to watch out for.

Linky (http://www.ntwrightpage.com/Wrightsaid_February2006.htm)

[Rayado]

Hey Minn, I don't think you poisoned that well enough. There's still a chance that Whinney could come away with a different notion of JPH.

[Amazing Rando]

I'm curious about your thoughts on Honor, Patronage, Kinship, and Purity by David DeSilva (even though it's a tad off topic, it's still referenced and promoted by Tektonics).

I don't have that work by DeSilva, but I've got his Introduction to the New Testament textbook in which he explains a bit of that stuff pretty well.

[Minnesota]

Hey Minn, I don't think you poisoned that well enough. There's still a chance that Whinney could come away with a different notion of JPH.
Perhaps (s)he will. :shrug: Yet, if I was able to poison the well it's only because its lack of integrity allowed me to. Any chinks in it are the doing of the well keeper.


In any event, I'll say no more here.

[Spheniscine]

But this isn't at all atypical of tektonics. Like many (most?) apologist sites quote mining and biased selections are often the only way they can show support for a particular point of view. Where this really gets bad is in the area of creationism versus evolution. Here the outright lying and rampant distortion and misrepresentation by fundies borders on the criminal. So don't be surprised if you find yourself in a miasma of apologetic stink when venturing among the more fundie side of Christian thought.

Good luck, and don't expect any kind of rational response. JP Holding, the grand Pooh-Bah of tektonics, is often given to ad hominem excess. Actually, he delights in it, and resorts to it whenever you get him cornered. Either that or he will simply clam up and prays you go away.
Says one whose signature uses a selective statistic based on evolutionary presuppositions ("99% extinct", because of all the transitional species that "must have existed"), in order to support an evolutionary point of view.

[jpholding]

Hello there!

I was reading some of the articles on tektonics.org, and noticed that the author(s) relied heavily on some fringe anthropology concerning ancient "Shame culture" versus "guilt culture".

That just discredited you as any sort of reliable source.

This is NOT "fringe anthropology". It is the MAINSTREAM.

The source you use here tells the story:



I refer the authors to the following work, which contains a fine summary of current, mainstream anthropology, in relation to St Paul:
Gary W Burnett, Paul and the Salvation of the Individual (Leiden, Boston & Koln: Brill, 2001).

PLEASE! Burnett himself committed the classic error of all critics of the Context Group, thinking that they denied ALL thought of persons as individuals, when their teaching is rather that the group retained PRIORITY over the individual. The critics always generalize the findings of Malina, et al -- this I have found to be the case without exception thus far.

As for shame and guilt, I leave it to that I have several readers who are "native informants" from such cultures -- and they have completely verified all that I have used from these so-called "fringe" sources.


which he maintains, "have become couterproductive", and observes that "biblical scholars ... all seem to draw from the same well" - Peristany's 1966 Honour and Shame, the anthropology of which is "beginning to look a bit dated.

This is abject nonsense, as any survey of a Context Group bibliography will show.



"So then, what are we to make of Malina's first century individual who, he contends, existed with no individual self-consciousness, was shaped and moulded entirely by the group of which he was embedded

Precisely the error the critics commit time and time again! Show us one quote where any Context Group member says there was NO individual self-consciousness! Go ahead! Show us Burnett knows what he is talking about! He doesn't. :no:

I'm not the only one who has seen Burnett make this ridiculous error:

http://lists.ibiblio.org/pipermail/corpus-paul/20030424/004266.html



Gary Burnett wrote:

> >So people from pre-industrial agricultural
> societies have little or no
> >concept of the future? Sounds just the sort of
> claim we might expect from someone who has suggested
> people from this background had no sense of their
> own selves as distinctive, unique and self-aware, or
> of others as distinct and unique beings - people for
> whom individual psychology, uniqueness and
> self-consciousness were of no conseqence. (see
> Malina's "New Testament World" & my own "Paul & the
> Salvation of the Individual")

Zeb Crook correctly responded:

> This is far overstating the claims made by Malina
> et. Al...It is not the claim of NT Social Scientific
> critics that ancient people "had no sense
> of their own selves as distinctive, unique and
> self-aware," but rather that unlike their modern
> western counterparts they did not tend to be
> governed by that awareness.

All people have a privately defined self ("Who do I
think I am?", "Who do I want to be?"), an in-group
defined self ("Who do family, friends, and peers think
I am?", "What do they expect from me?"), and a
publicly defined self ("How do people in general
perceive me?"). All three dimensions make up the human
self, and no Context Group member -- not Bruce Malina
nor any other -- has adopted the ludicrous position
that people from collectivist cultures lacked
self-awareness or a privately defined self. It's a
question of how the self-parts relate to one another.
In collectivist cultures, the publicly defined self is
generally expected to coincide with the in-group
defined self, and the privately defined self recedes
into the background -- but it's obviously still there.

[Gary Burnett]
> >Could I suggest that Malina's extreme views owe
> more to 21st century
> >US/Western imperial culturalism than to a
> sympathetic approach to other
> >cultures? Attributing such simplistic outlooks to
> other cultures, including that of the 1st century
> Mediterranean world, seems much too patronising for
> my liking -

Caricaturizing Malina in this way undermines your own
credibility. I happen to know one of the Context Group
members (a friend and associate of Malina), and the
whole point of their social-scientific and
anthropological approach is to foster a sympathetic
understanding of people who think differently than we
do in the west.

> aside from the fact that in extensive
> travel and work amongst both the urban and rural
> poor in Asia, I have never come across either the
> sort of community "embeddedness" so much touted by
> Malina, nor this latest idea that such people cannot
> have a thorough understanding, appreciation and hope
> for the future. Yes, I've seen much more
> community-orientation, but "dyadic" personalities?
> Not at all.

Interesting. I've certainly seen dyadic personalities
in action (living for two years in Africa), so I have
to wonder how much you really assimilated into these
cultures. However -- and hopefully now returning my
initial subject -- I do have doubts about Malina's
idea about peasant societies (not necessarily having
to do with collectivist or dyadic personalities in
this case) being indifferent to the future. On the one
hand, he acknowledges that such peoples can have
(immediate) future expectations ("forthcoming"), but,
on the other, that such expectations must be
undeerstood as part of a prolonged "now" (present). I
can't help but suspect that (a) distinguishing between
"forthcoming" and "future" is a semantic quibble which
eliminates "future" as a term, and (b) subsuming
"forthcoming" under a present dimension is a further
way to diffuse the issue, which eliminates "future" as
a concept. But I may be wrong; I'm still trying to get
a better hold on Malina's argument.

Loren Rosson III
Nashua NH
rossoiii at yahoo.com


http://lists.ibiblio.org/pipermail/corpus-paul/20030423/004265.html



Gary Burnett wrote:

>So people from pre-industrial agricultural societies have little or no
>concept of the future? Sounds just the sort of claim we might expect from someone who has suggested people from this background had no sense of their own selves as distinctive, unique and self-aware, or of others as distinct and unique beings - people for whom individual psychology, uniqueness and self-consciousness were of no conseqence. (see Malina's "New Testament World" & my own "Paul & the Salvation of the Individual")
>
This is far overstating the claims made by Malina et. al., even allowing
for the fact that Malina does express many of his views more exclusively
than some others who share his methodological approach. It is not the
claim of NT Social Scientific critics that ancient people "had no sense
of their own selves as distinctive, unique and self-aware," but rather
that unlike their modern western counterparts they did not tend to be
governed by that awareness.

>Could I suggest that Malina's extreme views owe more to 21st century
>US/Western imperial culturalism than to a sympathetic approach to other
>cultures? Attributing such simplistic outlooks to other cultures, including that of the 1st century Mediterranean world, seems much too patronising for my liking - aside from the fact that in extensive travel and work amongst both the urban and rural poor in Asia, I have never come across either the sort of community "embeddedness" so much touted by Malina, nor this latest idea that such people cannot have a thorough understanding, appreciation and hope for the future. (Yes, I've seen much more community-orientation, but "dyadic" personalities? Not at all.)
>
This is patently unfair criticism. "21st century US/Western imperial
culturalism"? The point is precisely to be the opposite, to emphasise
that people the world over are not exactly the same. Your reference to
first-hand experience could be read to imply the charge that Malina has
never left the confines of his armchair, nor that he too has plenty of
first hand cultural experience. Further, his observations in this
respect are based solidly on many other anthropological and
social-psychological studies emphasising the basic but important
differences between individualistic and collectivistic cultures, none of
which contends an absence of individual self awareness in collectivistic
cultures nor an absence of allocentric behaviour in individualistic
cultures.

Cheers,

Zeb

--

Zeba Antonin Crook (Ph.D. Cand)

University of St. Michael's College

Faculty of Theology

81 St. Mary Street

Toronto, Ontario, Canada

I do not agree 100% with all these people offer, but your criticism, taken from an abject misrepresenter/misunderstander like Burnett, falls far short of being a credible one.

[jpholding]

But this isn't at all atypical of tektonics. Like many (most?) apologist sites quote mining and biased selections are often the only way they can show support for a particular point of view.

And like all Skeptics, you, little Minny, are too ignorant to address arguments from either side. :hehe:



Where this really gets bad is in the area of creationism versus evolution. Here the outright lying and rampant distortion and misrepresentation by fundies borders on the criminal.

Says also the mindless drone that plagiarizes and distorts the work of his artistic betters. :lol:


Actually, he delights in it, and resorts to it whenever you get him cornered. Either that or he will simply clam up and prays you go away.

Actually, I call a spade a spade. I call you dumb, Minny, because you ARE dumb. If you weren't, you'd be able to defend yourself when I paste you to the wall for posting crap like "the story of Jesus was copied from Attis". :rofl: Instead of just giggling like a little schoolgirl and saying, "As if I would bother!"

[jpholding]

http://www.sbl-site.org/Publications/JBL/JBL1214.pdf

For those who might think Burnett has a clue, I recommend this review in JBL (starts page 179 of the document, p. 777 of JBL) in which it is noted repeatedly that Burnett has no idea what he is talking about and regularly misses the point. His treatment of Malina -- the very quote above -- is called an "absurd distortion".

[TheAnalogman]

I don't have that work by DeSilva, but I've got his Introduction to the New Testament textbook in which he explains a bit of that stuff pretty well.

Ohh, I got that two weeks ago! :thumb:

[NeilUnreal]

The Psalms and other writings within the Bible as well as elsewhere clearly show that strong concepts of personal guilt existed in the ANE in times well before the first century.

I think we tend to overemphasize the "shame culture" mainly as an artifact of preserved documentation. Not much personal, introspective writing survives (if it existed at all) from prior to the first century; most of what we have are the corporate documents of society. We mainly have to infer what people were thinking internally from other sources, so our view is skewed.

In any event, it may be impossible to even imagine a shame culture without some simultaneous strong concept of personal guilt. The concept of shame culture seems to be mainly a medium for transfering either personal guilt up to the group, or inducing group guilt into the individuals, depending on the various cultures and circumstances.*

-Neil

*E.g. On the one hand:

"You did the deed, brother, but we're all in this together."

And on the other:

"You may not have had a direct role in this, brother, but no one's hands are clean."

[jpholding]

The Psalms and other writings within the Bible as well as elsewhere clearly show that strong concepts of personal guilt existed in the ANE in times well before the first century.

You're likely mistaking recognition of LEGAL guilt for guilt feelings.


We mainly have to infer what people were thinking internally from other sources, so our view is skewed.

Not at all. Native informants in modern shame cultures have validated the findings.


In any event, it may be impossible to even imagine a shame culture without some simultaneous strong concept of personal guilt.

Consider whether that's a problem caused by your own impositions of experience.

[NeilUnreal]

You're likely mistaking recognition of LEGAL guilt for guilt feelings.

I don’t know, passages like:

“My guilt has overwhelmed me like a burden too heavy to bear.”

“I confess my iniquity; I am troubled by my sin.”

And:

“For I know my transgressions, and my sin is always before me. Against you, you only, have I sinned…”

Certainly seem to express the kind of internal agony we associate with personal feelings of guilt.


Not at all. Native informants in modern shame cultures have validated the findings.

I don’t dispute the fact that there will be degrees to which societies implement a shame culture concept. And there’s an element of positive feedback here. Clannish and close-knit societies may have a greater need for shame culture. Simultaneously, there are other centripetal forces in such societies which also tend to submerge the identity of the individual into the group.*

However, this does not mean that individual experiences of guilt are not present, and more importantly, it does not mean that shame culture is not a result of the need to mediate between individual and social concepts of identity and feeling. It may, on the other hand, change how the individuals experience and report internal emotions like shame.

So, yes, there is such a thing as shame culture, and it can be very strong in some societies. In my opinion, however, it is mainly a social construct which exists to balance the needs and experiences of the group against the needs and experiences of the individual.** When people live in society, corporate and individual guilt needs are inextricably bound and will be worked out somehow. Shame culture is a very common mechanism for this, but it only exists because both the corporate and individual needs must be balanced.

Otherwise, IMHO, one risks missing an important aspect of the work of Christ:

God, for reasons we may never understand entirely in this mortal coil, chose the route of "crossing the battle lines" and personally becoming a scapegoat in Christ. In a symbolic sense, Christ is the Heavenly King who, in defeating the enemy, also "crossed the lines" and offered Himself as a sacrificial mediation on behalf of the defeated earth. Thus resolving the conflict between the polity of heaven and that of earth. But, since corporate guilt and personal guild are bound, Christ also mediates the individual guilt of the separate persons of the earthly polity.

One can see both these concepts, coporate and individual, at play throughout the NT. They even come into play today, sometimes controversially, as when some (unwise IMHO) preachers claimed that hurricane Katrina was a punishment for the sins of New Orleans. Yet these same preachers, in another context, would stress the need for individual repentance.

Hence, now as then, coporate and personal guilt are linked in both directions. We in the West just tend to talk (and think) more in the language of the individual and less in that of the clan. So when we encounter people who talk the other way, we think "Oh! They don't have a concept of personal guilt."

-Neil

*Cultures with strong individual submergence also sometimes develop culturally-sanctioned methods of individuation. An example would be societies where it is expected that individuals may occasionally “go wild,” experience states of ecstasy, etc. This helps keep the balance.

**And sometimes the need of one polity against another. This can be extreme, as when whole cities are “put to the sword,” or mainly symbolic, as when leaders are punished as scapegoats.

[jpholding]

I don’t know, passages like:

“My guilt has overwhelmed me like a burden too heavy to bear.”

It should probably read "shame" rather than guilt. That's the effect of modernist translators imposing their cultural values.


“I confess my iniquity; I am troubled by my sin.”

Members of shame cultures are also troubled by their sin. Just not for the same reason.


“For I know my transgressions, and my sin is always before me. Against you, you only, have I sinned…”

Ditto.


Certainly seem to express the kind of internal agony we associate with personal feelings of guilt.

It is also what is associated with shame. The critical issue is whether the agony comes of internal introspection or from external pressure. Obviously the Psalmist would, within his own world, not conceive of it coming from introspection and would hardly make the distinction for our convenience.


However, this does not mean that individual experiences of guilt are not present,

I have yet to see evidence presented to the contrary. My native informants speak otherwise, as this one did:

http://www.tektonics.org/tsr/tillstill7-5.html


It is amazing how myopic so-called Skeptics can be when it comes to anything outside of their mental bubbles. [Little Stevie] Carr has somehow found the idea that the majority of the modern world thinks like the people in the Bible, namely as collectivists, quite distasteful. A majority of the world is Chinese. So am I. We emphasize the extended family as a unit, we carry a monstrously vast line of traditions, and we even place surnames in front of personal names to show priorities in terms of identity. Certainly, not all of us follow the ways of our ancestors strictly, but this is due to the influence of, you guessed it, the Western world. But having been raised as in the first generation in this nation, I can say for certain that there are immense cultural differences. In particular, honor and shame rather than innocence and guilt are the issue: we do not think in terms of Jiminy Crickets in our heads, but rather base values on the group as a whole.

At gatherings, for instance, a father may yell at his child for being "diu liên"--throwing one's face away, a lovely image for what it means to be, for lack of a better word, shameful. But even in instances of moral guilt, what happens? The same phrase is applied, whether the child was caught cheating on homework, stealing a bicycle, or throwing food across the room in a restaurant. In some cases, yes, manners are the issue, but for some reason, it is not the fact that the action was in itself wrong that one is condemned for--it is the fact that it brought shame, particularly to the family name. For this reason, perhaps, Asians in general have been advocates of stricter discipline, particularly corporal. Modern psychologists may claim that punishment does no good, but for the honor-driven parents, it certainly brings about the desired behavior modification.

Of course, there are more trivial examples. There is rarely a gathering in which people will not "fight" over the right to pay the bill. Of course, each will attempt to claim it first, (not because it is morally right, or because they really want to, but because it is honorable,) and they will attempt to excuse the others by elaborating on how embarrassing it would be to accept it. Then there is the stereotype of the high grades, the good schools, the countless extracurriculars, at least piano or violin, and so forth. For what purpose? To represent the family name. You will never hear the older generation say, "It's for your own good," whether in regard to an order, or a punishment, or anything, because it simply isn't about us as individuals. And you will most certainly never hear, "Don't you feel bad?" The Chinese are notorious for their stoic attitudes. It is sometimes joked that we as a race don't even have emotions.

There is another silly game often played. One might say something intentionally belittling so as to win reinforcing praise from the other party, whether with regard to how a child never studies or how poorly the food is cooked. This, of course, is a cheap way to win, you guessed it, honor. As a result, the principle of limited good shows up all the time. People do not dispense presents or hospitality out of goodwill, but necessity, because it would be shameful to accept it without returning the favor.

Of course, a known tendency in such a society can be to become completely dishonest. So long as one is not caught, any means are fine. There is fierce competition and pressure, which is why it never surprised me that many of my fellow American- born Chinese peers ended up, in fact, doing this. They had become so obsessed with the outward favor that they took a Machiavellian approach to it all. It never once bothered them that they might be doing the wrong thing. It never once occurred to them to live for themselves. It never occurred to them that there was an internal concept of right and wrong. These are ideas foreign to us.

I was once reprimanded for inappropriate behavior during recess back in elementary school. When the teacher tried to explain how I might hurt the other children, how I should feel bad, and how I should say sorry, much of it did not make any sense, because I knew my parents would scold me for making them look bad. One view was individualistic, emotional, and personal. The other was collectivist, pragmatic, and social. I can understand how the modern understanding of the Christian message came to be this fuzzy idea of accepting Jesus into one's heart, to believe and have a wonderful, soul-lifting experience and freedom from guilt, replete with flowers and singing. On the other hand, I have never been able to identify with this, although I can most certainly say that the collectivist, honor-shame mindset was crucial to making the Chinese church I grew up in look a lot more like the one seen in Acts rather than the dead, formal service churches are popularly made out to be.

I see little in your answers other than a vague plea for diversity unevidenced. Recognition of individual responsilbity does not equate with internalized conscience.



Otherwise, IMHO, one risks missing an important aspect of the work of Christ:

It's hard to see how, unless one assumes the caricatured position described in the OP. After all, individual guilt is mediated so that one may become part of the corporate BODY of Christ.

[NeilUnreal]

If we could truly be "Skinner machines," the Apostle Paul would have been wrong: the law would have been enough.

-Neil

[jpholding]

I hope whoever said that sees your answer.


So where's Whinney now? I'd leave and never come back if I were him. :whistle:

[Frogwarrior]

From Whinney's posts so far, I can't tell if he/she/it would be scared off by such a display, or provoked to a hotheaded flamefest, or convinced of your correctness, or somewhat mollified but still want to continue with a reasonable discussion - but then I can think of exactly one way to find out. :wink:

[BronzeArcher]

fringe anthropology concerning ancient "Shame culture" versus "guilt culture". . . most notably Bruce Malina.

What is wrong with the view? Briefly, it is far too extreme and unrealistic. Taking the first century AD, it is now widely agreed that Hellenistic societies were more individualist than collectivist (albeit, to a different extent to today). While some collectivist ways of thinking lingered on from pre-Hellenistic times, the society was essentially individualistic in mindset. [...]

I think JP's given you a good response, and I'm pretty curious to see what you have to say in return. I've read several CG publications myself (see the end of this post), particularly Neyrey's Portraits of Paul, a book focusing on models of personality. But I don't think we have to go in depth to see that Burnett's criticisms miss the point--though I'd be quite curious to see what arguments he has that the models Malina or another CG scholar use necessitate a complete dividual... let's just go to the Handbook of Biblical Social Values, with Pilch and Malina as editors:

"Group orientation. The people in the biblical world are dyadic. This means that individuals basically depend on others for their sense of identity, for their understanding of their role and status in society, for clues to the duties and rights they have, and for indications of what is honorable and shameful behavior. . . The group, whether it be clan, village, family, etc., communicates what is expected and proper, and individuals respond accordingly. Deference to the group is evident in the reverence given to "tradition." [...]

Group orientation indicates that individuals should always "seek the good of the neighbor" (1 Cor 10:24) and not pursue individualistic objectives. Strong individualists at Corinth seem to have bucked the sense of accountability to the group, either by an unseemly marriage (5:1-2), or by eating proscribed foods (1 Cor 8:1-2, 7-11). Paul points out how the incestuous marriage harmed the group, as leaven pollutes flour (1 Cor 5:6-8); the unscrupulous eating of meats sacrificed to idols causes scandal to come, destroying the weak person for whom Chris died (1 Cor 8:11). Promoting one's interests, then, offenders the group, and so comes under censure." (p. 94-6)

I'd like to point out a few things. The author of this entry, Neyrey, says that people learn culture from others (that's what roles, status, obligations, and values amount to). This isn't very exciting because it's such a common point, but the difference between group-oriented societies and individualist societies is that the limits of accepted deviance are quite different. Neyrey does not posit a complete dividual; he specifically picks out cases of [unwelcome] deviance to show how a group-orientation would respond to deviance: censure.

I think Burnett misreads Malina quite badly. Malina, as a professional biblical scholar, must know about many characters in Jewish and Greco-Roman sources that act in deviant ways. It would be an exceptional mistake to posit a complete dividual. There are also many other characteristics of peasant society that Malina is aware about and that would be problematic in asserting a complete dividual. The way peasants are tied to their land must be checked by the fact that peasants do leave their land; the way family is important must be checked by the reality of internal conflict; the way avoidance of envy is important must be checked by the presence of people who boast. Malina is no newb.

I didn't catch what sources you appeal to in saying that Hellenistic culture was basically individualistic. I definitely agree that it was MORE individualistic than past societies, but that it was basically individualistic does not make sense given the economic realities of the ancient world. Also, I would be curious to know what social classes you talk about. If you're also in anthropology, I think you'd agree that some classes simply couldn't afford to be individualists.

Good to see more people engaging with social context material.

====
Looking at my small library, I see the Social Science Commentary on the Synoptics (Malina & Rohrbaugh), Portraits of Paul (Neyrey), Handbook of Biblical Social Values (Pilch & Malina, ed.), A Time for War (Hobbs), Ancient Israel: the old testament in its social context (Esler, ed.), and Honor Patronage Kinship Purity (deSilva, not a CG member). I have also read upwards of 30 CG articles and several from BTB.

[BronzeArcher]

The Psalms and other writings within the Bible as well as elsewhere clearly show that strong concepts of personal guilt existed in the ANE in times well before the first century.

I think we tend to overemphasize the "shame culture" mainly as an artifact of preserved documentation. Not much personal, introspective writing survives (if it existed at all) from prior to the first century; most of what we have are the corporate documents of society. We mainly have to infer what people were thinking internally from other sources, so our view is skewed.

In any event, it may be impossible to even imagine a shame culture without some simultaneous strong concept of personal guilt. The concept of shame culture seems to be mainly a medium for transfering either personal guilt up to the group, or inducing group guilt into the individuals, depending on the various cultures and circumstances.*

-Neil

Neil,

It doesn't suffice to cite a text and say, "Hey, this seems to be about guilt." There are a few good reasons for this. First, meaning comes from social contexts. If we don't know a thing about someone's social context, we have no justification at all for thinking we understand what they are saying. I'm sure you can think of words that mean different things within difficult cultures. If not, consider what "economic gain" means to a capitalist, and then consider what "economic gain" means to a limited good peasant. For the capitalist, it is basically good, for the limited good peasant, it evokes ideas about envy. Second, in interpretation we use models, even if we pay no explicit attention to them. We have models (could also be thought of as concepts) about gender, goodness, war, memory, action, etc. The danger in avoiding explicit attention to models is that we allow for a whole bunch of ethnocentric assumptions to skew our interpretations. If middle-class, American city dwellers read the OT and their idea of OT folk are extremely similar to themselves, there's something very wrong. American middle-class city dwellers do not exist within a covenant (a formalized patronage relationship), nor is hand-to-hand battle a very real possibility, or being dominated by a foreign power. Americans think of themselves as (among other things) a nation, rather than 'my tribe [to the exclusion of others]' that happens to be in league with others in a political alliance.

So I think you need to do a lot more before you can simply say that some ancient text "clearly shows" that "strong" ideas of personal (psychological, I think you mean) guilt existed in ancient times.

It also strikes me as awkward that you appeal to some texts that "clearly shows" psychological guilt, and then say that "We mainly have to infer what people were thinking internally from other sources, so our view is skewed." I think you are undercutting your own methods, but I may be misunderstanding you.

I think it's logically possible to have honor-shame without psychological shame. I think you would need a very high degree of dividuality, horrible economic conditions, and little interaction with other groups, among other things. But I think we'd have a lot of difficulties finding such a society post-imperialism. :(

Your suggestion about shame culture and guilt (you should say shame here, I think) transfer is interesting, but I don't think you account for cognitive effects of 'strong' collectivism enough. If one understands oneself as "I am part of they," then what happens to "they" happens to "I," and vice versa. Also, the way you talk about culture suggests that there is some group of people that deliberately decide to "induc[e] group guilt into the individuals" and that is rather odd. I'm not sure there's such conscious decision-making going on when it comes to creation of culture.

Oh well, I'm interested to hear what you have to say.

[Darth Executor]

He hasn't been back since the day he first posted.

[Hierophant]

I had asked JP Holding this very question in an Email

I think he answered it well here. My question to be more accurate was. If lack of internal conscience did exist how would any one find it. I guess there honestly is a good way to tell that it was likely there.

[NeilUnreal]

Oh well, I'm interested to hear what you have to say.

Sorry, I've been back from vacation for two weeks now and still haven't gotten back to this thread. Let me think about it a bit before giving a more full reply, but the gist of my thought is:

Our feelings of guilt must be individual, because otherwise we wouldn't have them. We may feel guilty with respect to shaming the "hive," and a kind of "hive mind shame" may arise from that, but the hive mind shame would not be directly a part of us, so it is only something we can recognize in theory. I don't dispute that shame cultures can exist, but rather that the underlying mechanism which makes those shame cultures possible is underlying guilt.

I'm willing, on reflection, to conceed the fact that cultures may develop hive mind shame which operates largely independent of individual guilt. However, it appears to me that even if the invidual guilt is sometimes forgotten or supressed, it was the most likely a major mechanism in allowing the hive mind shame culture to arise. (At least in primates and possibly other social mammals.)

-Neil

[NeilUnreal]

p.s. (Because I can't figure out how to get edit to work.) So to relate back to the texts, since the writers are discribing primary internal feelings, it seems to me that they must be working off of individual guilt, and not hive guilt, though they may see their guilt in terms of the hive. A true shame culture would not provoke primary internal feelings of anguish about the shameful act.

[jpholding]

However, it appears to me that even if the invidual guilt is sometimes forgotten or supressed, it was the most likely a major mechanism in allowing the hive mind shame culture to arise. (At least in primates and possibly other social mammals.)


Sounds like the theory is dictating the facts here. :thumbd:

[BronzeArcher]

Well, not necessarily... a social psychology theory of origins of h-s culture might suggest such, and then see how useful that model is in understanding h-s culture in general. But I suppose that's for the anthropologists to tell us.

Neil, I'm not sure what it means to be socialized in a strong h-s culture and not think in terms of shame. Honor is a thoroughly social phenomenon. Anything that garners respect is honor, anything that does the opposite is shame. I suppose I just don't see why you think guilt comes into the equation. :shrug:

[OckhamsRazor]

I have some objections to your view on this JP. I would like to explore them here. First, I'm not comfortable with what we're assuming. We are only accounting for the context of the human author. The idea is to ascertain what that author meant not just what his culture tended toward. I acknowledge that understanding a persons culture is vital but I seems over represented in this view. God's word frequently attacks the cultural tendencies of the people being addressed. Secondly we must never make the mistake of seeing the text as only a product of human culture. God is the original author of the ideas being conveyed. Let me give an example of God's word correcting a cultural assumption.

Jer 31:29 In those days they shall say no more, The fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the children's teeth are set on edge.
Jer 31:30 But every one shall die for his own iniquity: every man that eateth the sour grape, his teeth shall be set on edge.

Mat 19:23 Then said Jesus unto his disciples, Verily I say unto you, That a rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of heaven.
Mat 19:24 And again I say unto you, It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God.
Mat 19:25 When his disciples heard it, they were exceedingly amazed, saying, Who then can be saved?
Mat 19:26 But Jesus beheld them, and said unto them, With men this is impossible; but with God all things are possible.

Here our Lord corrects a common assumption of the people in Jewish culture of the time. They believed that the rich were rich because they were very righteous and so God made them prosperous. Therefore surely they would be the first among those to be saved.


Another assumption being made by the Honor/Shame argument is the influence of Hellenistic culture on the Jewish people. Certainly there would be some but the Jewish people after the Babylonian exile began to be concerned about preserving their culture and not allowing it to be corrupted by pagans. There would have been a certain amount of cultural "shielding".

I question the idea that the Patron Client relationship is in view in the Bible. I'm familiar with the idea of a Patron in the Roman culture but not in Jewish culture. The Jewish people had a concept of adoption. A person might be adopted by a Jewish man in order to aquire a legal heir. The person was referred to as a son. Jewish ideology here seems to promote a close personal relationship not a distant Patron Client relationship. Jesus radically alters the view that God is remote and emotionally distant. He doesn't depict it as a Patron Client relationship either. Here's what I mean:

Luk 11:2 And he said unto them, When ye pray, say, Our Father which art in heaven, Hallowed be thy name. Thy kingdom come. Thy will be done, as in heaven, so in earth.

This personally calling God father was a radical concept from what I understand.

Mat 10:30 But the very hairs of your head are all numbered.

Again this denotes intimacy not distance.

Luk 15:19 And am no more worthy to be called thy son: make me as one of thy hired servants.
Luk 15:20 And he arose, and came to his father. But when he was yet a great way off, his father saw him, and had compassion, and ran, and fell on his neck, and kissed him.
Luk 15:21 And the son said unto him, Father, I have sinned against heaven, and in thy sight, and am no more worthy to be called thy son.
Luk 15:22 But the father said to his servants, Bring forth the best robe, and put it on him; and put a ring on his hand, and shoes on his feet:
Luk 15:23 And bring hither the fatted calf, and kill it; and let us eat, and be merry:
Luk 15:24 For this my son was dead, and is alive again; he was lost, and is found. And they began to be merry.

Here again we see something very different from a distant Patron to Client relationship. I would point that here again we see God correcting cultural notions of the Jewish people.

The idea that the Biblical picture of what needs to be addressed in regard to sin is different from concern for God's honor. Here is what I mean. The story of Gomer is an example. (sorry for my spelling if I blew it) The husband(a prophet) is instructed to go and get his wife out of prostitution and keep her as a wife. God shows that He forgoes His concern for His honor out of His love for His people who had been being idolaters. They were cheating on God. God here is motivated not by honor but by love.

I do not think we should be filtering our reading of Scripture through the lens of this anthropology that is being presented because it doesn't match God's intent in the text.

I also question comparing Jewish society to Japanese society. The Japanese are very stoic people. To me they are more reminiscent of the Roman empire and it's spartan culture than Jewish culture. Unlike Jewish society, the Japanese would see outward displays of strong emotion as inappropriate. You'll see this passionate emotion and also a pationate closeness to friends and family in the Middle East to this day. Fear over God's condemnation, which denotes personal guilt over conduct rather than a societal based sense of shame, is what motivates people to be willing to commit suicide attacks. The believe that the martyr is guaranteed a place in heaven. Other people don't have this assurance of God's mercy in their view. They fear being damned for there own sins.

[jpholding]

I have some objections to your view on this JP. I would like to explore them here. First, I'm not comfortable with what we're assuming. We are only accounting for the context of the human author. The idea is to ascertain what that author meant not just what his culture tended toward. I acknowledge that understanding a persons culture is vital but I seems over represented in this view. God's word frequently attacks the cultural tendencies of the people being addressed. Secondly we must never make the mistake of seeing the text as only a product of human culture. God is the original author of the ideas being conveyed. Let me give an example of God's word correcting a cultural assumption.

I'll be glad to consider anything you can show me where God "corrects" an honor-shame paradigm and replaces it with modern, Western values of guilt. Quoting other examples of correction on entirely different issues doesn't argue for anything of the sort.



Another assumption being made by the Honor/Shame argument is the influence of Hellenistic culture on the Jewish people. Certainly there would be some but the Jewish people after the Babylonian exile began to be concerned about preserving their culture and not allowing it to be corrupted by pagans. There would have been a certain amount of cultural "shielding".

:doh: Come on. This begs the question that honor-shame CAME TO Jews FROM pagans rather than being an intrinsic value of humans as a whole, which is what every scrap of data indicates.


I question the idea that the Patron Client relationship is in view in the Bible. I'm familiar with the idea of a Patron in the Roman culture but not in Jewish culture.

It's found in the OT, where the patron is a suzerain, as in the treaty form of Deuteronomy. The basic concept is there.


The Jewish people had a concept of adoption. A person might be adopted by a Jewish man in order to aquire a legal heir.

Adoption is hardly mutually exclusive to patronage. In fact it is a form of patronage.


Jesus radically alters the view that God is remote and emotionally distant. He doesn't depict it as a Patron Client relationship either. Here's what I mean:

Please. There's nothing in Luke 11:2 refuting the idea that God is (compared to modern sentiments) remoter and more distant. You're simply reading modern emotive value into the text; there is none. The appeal is no different than would come from the mouth of a typical client who wishes for his patron's will to be done.



Mat 10:30 But the very hairs of your head are all numbered.

Again this denotes intimacy not distance.

.... :twitch: Being able to count hairs is "intimacy".

I'll have to file that for my next "date night" with Mrs. H.




Luk 15:24 For this my son was dead, and is alive again; he was lost, and is found. And they began to be merry.

Here again we see something very different from a distant Patron to Client relationship

No, we don't. Like most critics of this view, you vastly overstate what it is that this view holds. This is ingroup agape at its finest, looking out for the best interests of one's own family. It does not require the depths of intimacy of a modern relationship.




The idea that the Biblical picture of what needs to be addressed in regard to sin is different from concern for God's honor. Here is what I mean. The story of Gomer is an example. (sorry for my spelling if I blew it) The husband(a prophet) is instructed to go and get his wife out of prostitution and keep her as a wife. God shows that He forgoes His concern for His honor out of His love for His people who had been being idolaters. They were cheating on God. God here is motivated not by honor but by love.

No, once again you simply read this into the text based on modern understandings. Marriages did not involve romantic love unless AFTER the fact. The motivation is loyalty to covenant and ingroup.


I do not think we should be filtering our reading of Scripture through the lens of this anthropology that is being presented because it doesn't match God's intent in the text.

Circular reasoning at its finest. :ahem:



I also question comparing Jewish society to Japanese society. The Japanese are very stoic people. To me they are more reminiscent of the Roman empire and it's spartan culture than Jewish culture.

Apples and oranges. This does not in the least affect comparisons on the points I discussed.

A very disappointing response. It seems clear that you're just trying to hang on to a reading that you want to see in the text rather than letting the text and its contexts speak for themselves.

[Ryokan]

The Psalms and other writings within the Bible as well as elsewhere clearly show that strong concepts of personal guilt existed in the ANE in times well before the first century.

I think we tend to overemphasize the "shame culture" mainly as an artifact of preserved documentation. Not much personal, introspective writing survives (if it existed at all) from prior to the first century; most of what we have are the corporate documents of society. We mainly have to infer what people were thinking internally from other sources, so our view is skewed.

In any event, it may be impossible to even imagine a shame culture without some simultaneous strong concept of personal guilt. The concept of shame culture seems to be mainly a medium for transfering either personal guilt up to the group, or inducing group guilt into the individuals, depending on the various cultures and circumstances.*

-Neil

*E.g. On the one hand:

"You did the deed, brother, but we're all in this together."

And on the other:

"You may not have had a direct role in this, brother, but no one's hands are clean."

Its also worth noting the idea of shame was, in some cultures, a mechanism of social control fosterted, encouraged, and enforced by the state.

[NeilUnreal]

I suppose I just don't see why you think guilt comes into the equation.

For two reasons:

1) Documents and reports produced by introspective individuals within h-s cultures mirror the patterns of reports by produced by introspection on guilt in our own culture. So much so that the genesis of this thread is in a ongoing discussion of the fact that most people in our culture automatically associate such h-s reports with guilt.

2) There must be some primary psychological mechanism for inducing h-s behavior. Introspecting, remembering primary experiences with other humans, thinking about primate (and even lower-animal) behavior, etc., leads me to feel that h-s and guilt are allied. Not exactly proof, I know, but a good working hypothesis.

Neuroscience might be able to tell us more, but I'm not current with that field so I don't know what's been done. It's most likely that what we are calling h-s and guilt coevolve in social animals and that differentiation comes fairly late. Therefore it's barely possibly that the differentiation was not as great 2000 years ago, though that seems like very little time for an organic neurological change. It's more likely that our psychological plasticity allows us to emphasize different aspects of the phenomenon.

As OckhamsRazor pointed out, a good bit of both the Hebrew and Hellenized portions of our Scripture seem to weigh-in in favor of emphasizing the guilt aspect vs. the shame aspect.

-Neil

[BronzeArcher]

[snip]

I also question comparing Jewish society to Japanese society. The Japanese are very stoic people. To me they are more reminiscent of the Roman empire and it's spartan culture than Jewish culture. Unlike Jewish society, the Japanese would see outward displays of strong emotion as inappropriate. You'll see this passionate emotion and also a pationate closeness to friends and family in the Middle East to this day. Fear over God's condemnation, which denotes personal guilt over conduct rather than a societal based sense of shame, is what motivates people to be willing to commit suicide attacks. The believe that the martyr is guaranteed a place in heaven. Other people don't have this assurance of God's mercy in their view. They fear being damned for there own sins.

I cut out most of your post because I basically agree with JP's criticisms. Just to hammer one point: I would challenge your hermeneutics on the grounds that they are ethnocentric. When you quote an ancient text coming out of a very different culture, and then simply say "this suggests x"--this is methodologically flawed.

In order for that simple read-assert method to be used across the board, as you do in your criticisms, one must assume that meaning is (and I don't have a nice technical term for this) essentially self-presenting. That is to say, one must assume that the meaning of a text is immediately and clearly apprehended by the reader.

If this assumption were true, it would mean that we would be able to understand every instance of culture, past, present, and future without flaw.

This assumption fails to consider cognitive lenses, or form a sustainable idea of communication. This assumption is entirely refuted by a single instance of cultural mis- and non-communication, and we have masses of them. I can supply an exhaustive amount, but here are a few. Natives thought that Europeans were gods because the Europeans controlled thunder. Captain Cook was regarded as Lono (see Marshall Sahlins). An Australian friend recalled his first day of university classes, particularly about the professor discussing the schedule. The professor noted that there would be a break part way, and suggested that students take the time to stretch their legs, get something to eat, or smoke a fag. My Australian friend commented, "It immediately became clear who were Americans."

For the future, I suggest you undergo the empirical task of applying what you think are the proper anthropological models to interpretation, giving attention to model formulation. If you were to show that your models are more appropriate, that would be an important contribution to the task of recontextualization.

Now, a comment on what I quoted.

One should question the purpose of comparing any society. The point of comparing Japanese society to ancient Mediterranean society (specifically Jewish) is to provide concrete ways of understanding certain cultural patterns. Let me restate the qualification: certain cultural patterns. The point is not to say that ancient Mediterraneans are essentially modern Japanese in all likeness and form. Indeed you will not see that claim being made. I personally reject your stereotype of Japanese, but even so, calling disposition into question is rather irrelevant, because the comparisons are not made unqualifiedly. That is to say, no one is claiming that Japanese demeanor is equivalent to ancient Mediterranean demeanor.

I think the understanding that you present in your example of suicide bombers is flawed, because you assume that God is not a member of the group. If God were a member of the group, God would be included in one's "court of reputation"--meaning, dying in the name of God is not about personal guilt, but rather about acting out one's proper social obligations.

The summary point is: be emic.

[BronzeArcher]

For two reasons:

1) Documents and reports produced by introspective individuals within h-s cultures mirror the patterns of reports by produced by introspection on guilt in our own culture. So much so that the genesis of this thread is in a ongoing discussion of the fact that most people in our culture automatically associate such h-s reports with guilt.

Are you aware of how many questions you are begging? There are sixty different things (give or take; the number is rhetorical) I need to comment on or ask about. :eek:

There are A LOT of issues that relate to the impact of colonialism. I wonder if you even know what you're saying. If you don't, I refer you to Laura Ahearn, "Literacy, Power, and Agency: Love Letters and Development in Nepal," Language and Education 2004, pp. 305-316. The impact of literacy, for example, is very important to understand.

I'll leave it at that for now. What sources do you refer to? Let me make a preemptive move:

I suspect that we'll see one or a combination of three things in your sources. First, that all or most of your sources are in fact colonial or postcolonial. Second, that all or most of your sources are non-representative of their culture in important ways. Third, that there are indeed cases of introspect-ing (not -ive) individuals, but these pose no problem to contemporary anthropological models.

An interview of an informant may involve him reflecting on a person he killed, and that he expresses regret. Fair enough; we expect that to some degree. But then the question is of generalizability. And there I think you run out of steam while modern anthropology continues on.

Contrary to your last statement, I think this thread comes out of a deep misunderstanding of Malina. . . as well as some other things which I'll keep to myself. :tongue:


2) There must be some primary psychological mechanism for inducing h-s behavior. Introspecting, remembering primary experiences with other humans, thinking about primate (and even lower-animal) behavior, etc., leads me to feel that h-s and guilt are allied. Not exactly proof, I know, but a good working hypothesis.

[snip]

As OckhamsRazor pointed out, a good bit of both the Hebrew and Hellenized portions of our Scripture seem to weigh-in in favor of emphasizing the guilt aspect vs. the shame aspect.

-Neil

"Must be". I take it you are a materialist. I think our discussion stops about here unless you can make an empirical case, in which case I will research.

OR has gratuitiously decontextualized, thanks. I would caution you not to treat ancient texts like newspapers as he has done.

[NeilUnreal]

Are you aware of how many questions you are begging?

As I said, I present my ideas at the level of a working hypothesis. This topic (among others) has spurred an interesting in me regarding the coevolution of biology and culture. I got ahold of some resources regarding this, but it may be a few weeks or months before I'm able to get them read.


"Must be". I take it you are a materialist.

Well, yes, at least in the same sense that one might say:

"There must be some primary physical mechanism for letting me walk."

I don't find it particularly threatening that the psychological mechanisms which allow us to interact with and understand the world may have evolved materialistically. Like feet for walking, God had to implement such abilities somehow.

So I agree, to go beyond mere hypothesis, I need empirical evidence. I admit I don't have it. So little time, so much to do... :lol:


OR has gratuitiously decontextualized, thanks. I would caution you not to treat ancient texts like newspapers as he has done.

We can't completely decontextualize anything. Otherwise we would not understand it as human culture. One of my points is that to totally separate the ideas of h-s and guilt seems to require decontextualizing the sources not merely beyond the realm of particular culture, but beyond the realm of common human experience. I'm a bit of a post-modern, but I believe that most cultural constructs rest on basic building blocks of socio-biology and culture, which may change and be re-assorted, yet which retain some commonality. To me, even if not identical, h-s and guilt seem to at least share a lot of building blocks.

-Neil

[BronzeArcher]

Well, yes, at least in the same sense that one might say:

"There must be some primary physical mechanism for letting me walk."

I don't find it particularly threatening that the psychological mechanisms which allow us to interact with and understand the world may have evolved materialistically. Like feet for walking, God had to implement such abilities somehow.

So I agree, to go beyond mere hypothesis, I need empirical evidence. I admit I don't have it. So little time, so much to do... :lol:

I don't find it threatening either. . . in fact, I'm quite at ease with the idea that God was not involved with evolution at all. My concern is that you're taking a too-rigid materialist approach (I have a lot of sympathies with materialism). You might also be taking a biological determinist approach, in saying that some aspect of biology causes x behavior. There is variance in honor-shame behavior that I don't think can be explained by biology.


We can't completely decontextualize anything. Otherwise we would not understand it as human culture. One of my points is that to totally separate the ideas of h-s and guilt seems to require decontextualizing the sources not merely beyond the realm of particular culture, but beyond the realm of common human experience. I'm a bit of a post-modern, but I believe that most cultural constructs rest on basic building blocks of socio-biology and culture, which may change and be re-assorted, yet which retain some commonality. To me, even if not identical, h-s and guilt seem to at least share a lot of building blocks.

-Neil

I didn't say he completely decontextualized. I said he gratuitiously decontextualized. All he did was take an ancient text, yank it out of any historical reference, and interpret it--equivalent to reading it like a newspaper. I don't know about you, but I have a pretty developed idea of what reading entails, and what good exegesis involves. He certainly hasn't done good exegesis.

You said that you believe most cultural constructs come from sociobiology and culture. Cultural constructs coming from culture, how shocking.

It might just be academic politics, but all of my professors to date in sociology and anthropology have major problems with sociobiology. :shrug: Tell me when you publish. :noid:

[OckhamsRazor]

I'll be glad to consider anything you can show me where God "corrects" an honor-shame paradigm and replaces it with modern, Western values of guilt. Quoting other examples of correction on entirely different issues doesn't argue for anything of the sort. I'm not arguing that. Let me clairify then. I am arguing that just because the culture has certain expectations doesn't mean that God intends to endorse that cultures thinking. God corrects the thinking of the Jewish community repeatedly. My main objection is the attack on the idea of intamacy with God.
Come on. This begs the question that honor-shame CAME TO Jews FROM pagans rather than being an intrinsic value of humans as a whole, which is what every scrap of data indicates. No, because at least some have argued that the evidence for that H-S thinking came from the Hellenistic culture. This might be a mistake given the desire of the Jewish people of that time to preserve their culture. If they had that sort of culture can be argued for I'm sure but then you should not appeal to the Hellenistic culture to support it.
It's found in the OT, where the patron is a suzerain, as in the treaty form of Deuteronomy. The basic concept is there. Adoption is hardly mutually exclusive to patronage. In fact it is a form of patronage. I've checked this out. I did a word search for the term "Patron'' first. I checked approx. 20 versions of the Bible. In fairness some of them were OT only. Here are the versions Murdock NT, Youngs Literal, KJV, ESV, Websters, Good News, Gods Word, Genva, Weymouth NT, Analytical-Literal, Contemparary English Bible, Bishops Bible 1568, Darby, Douay-Rheims 1899, English Majority Text Version, ISV, Jewish Publication Society Bible OT, Literal Translation, Modern KJV, RV, and NASB. NONE of these translations EVER use the word Patron accept twice. Once in Darby: 1Jo 2:1 My children, these things I write to you in order that ye may not sin; and if any one sin, we have a patron with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous; and Once in ESV: Rom 16:2 that you may welcome her in the Lord in a way worthy of the saints, and help her in whatever she may need from you, for she has been a patron of many and of myself as well. I checked an english thesaurus for alternate english words for patron: Synonyms: angel*, backer, benefactor, benefactress, booster, champion, defender, encourager, fairy godmother, fan, financer, friend, front*, grubstaker, guarantor, guardian, guide, head, helper, lady bountiful, leader, live one, mark, money, partisan, patron saint*, philanthropist, pigeon, protector, sponsor, sugar daddy, supporter, surety, sympathizer, well-wisher and Synonyms: buyer, client, customer, frequenter, habitué, purchaser, shopper I include these in the event that one might want to search into these other english words in the Bible and see if the meaning of the words there mean patron in the sense that we are talking about. My point is this: Why do none of the translators use that word accept in these two instances. These are translations spanning about 400 years. Why is it that Paul a Roman citizen never use the word accpet in regard to the woman in the Romans verse. Why is it that Paul a Roman citizen speaking to people in the Grecko-Roman culture not use that metaphor, at least I'm not aware of him every using that metaphor. Paul generally uses the Father metaphor. Why would he use the Father metaphor in a culture that would have known the diffrence between a father and a patron. If we are not to understand that our relationship with God is not to be understood in the terms of deepest intamacy then why does Paul use the metaphor of sex in order to demonstrate the relationship between God and the individual.
Please. There's nothing in Luke 11:2 refuting the idea that God is (compared to modern sentiments) remoter and more distant. You're simply reading modern emotive value into the text; there is none. The appeal is no different than would come from the mouth of a typical client who wishes for his patron's will to be done. Granted the word father is inconclusive on this point. Here's the Strongs on this mater: G3962 πατήρ patēr pat-ayr' Apparently a primary word; a "father" (literally or figuratively, near or more remote): - father, parent.
.... Being able to count hairs is "intimacy". I'll have to file that for my next "date night" with Mrs. H. Here you don't respond to my point at all accept to snipe. My point is an excellent one. Obviously God is deeply familiar with us and in this context deeply concerned with our needs. Although sparrows are mentioned too and God is attentive to them as well. Though I don't see how that must undermine the concept of God being intimate.
No, we don't. Like most critics of this view, you vastly overstate what it is that this view holds. This is ingroup agape at its finest, looking out for the best interests of one's own family. It does not require the depths of intimacy of a modern relationship. It seems like your in denial outright. Let's look at the relevant portion of the passage. Luk 15:20 And he rose up and went to his own father. But while he was yet a long way off, his father saw him, and was moved with compassion, and ran, and fell upon his neck, and covered him with kisses. Further, if the meaning here would have been a patron then why did the son express the desire to just be a servent and yet his father does so much more beyond that. Wouldn't a servent be a better example of a client.
No, once again you simply read this into the text based on modern understandings. Marriages did not involve romantic love unless AFTER the fact. The motivation is loyalty to covenant and ingroup. My argument is that the metaphor here is that God is exposed to the most humiliating kind of betrayal. A betrayal that would have caused deep emotional distress. We see the intensity of the emotions involved with adultry in the Proverbs. Loyalty involves holding up ones end of the bargin but that is supposed to be recipricol. If one was to suffer that kind of betrayal, it would take a love and concern far beyond loyalty for that person to do what God does for His people. Not only sticking with them (loyalty) but seeking them out actively. Clearly God's intention here is to say to his people. "Here is how bad you hurt me. Can you imagine how you would feel if your wife went this far in betrayal. You have done so to me. But I love you so much that I will not only take you back but I will actively seek you out and get you out of your mess." It seems God is going to a great deal of trouble to express a powerful sense of emotional attachment. It's also interesting that God uses metaphors like a mother to express His relationship to His people.
Circular reasoning at its finest. Granted. I messed up on this point.
Apples and oranges. This does not in the least affect comparisons on the points I discussed. A very disappointing response. It seems clear that you're just trying to hang on to a reading that you want to see in the text rather than letting the text and its contexts speak for themselves It is a poor idea to compare the Japanese society to the First Century Jewish community because they are radically different cultures. It seems to me that Japan has been imperial on and off throughout it's history. It is a very militaristic society. It seems to me that Japan doesn't have enough land to be largely agrarian. Another thing is that I don't know of an established cast system in the Bible the way they have in the orient. Admittedly they have fishing as a major industry. Further, it seems to me that Jesus would have aggressively criticized many of the attitudes in the Japanese society. As I said before, emotional displays are considered inappropriate in Japan. This is the opposite of the Middle East. Remember I didn't use Japan as an example, you did. Or rather the sources you use did. And you failed to respond to the fact that people in the Middle East do not act they way you are attributing to them. It is ironic that you accuse me of filtering the text when it is clear that is precisely what you are doing. You doing it is obvious too. Your interpretation is strained. It seems like you have to do allot of gymnastics to get the text to say what you say they mean. You also never responded to the reality that God's intention for the Bible is the primary concern. The authors is secondary. You failed to respond to the fact that God repeatedly corrects the cultural notions and assumptions of His people. You go on as though we should just assume that the text should be understood in terms of the attitudes of the people and ignore what and if God is trying to correct. One more thing. On your website you say that we should interpret Prophesy in terms of the understanding of First Century Jewish community. Why would I do that without considerable caution? Jesus aggressively attacked the theology of the First Century Jewish community. This goes back to the point I've been making all along.

[OckhamsRazor]

I cut out most of your post because I basically agree with JP's criticisms. Just to hammer one point: I would challenge your hermeneutics on the grounds that they are ethnocentric. When you quote an ancient text coming out of a very different culture, and then simply say "this suggests x"--this is methodologically flawed.

In order for that simple read-assert method to be used across the board, as you do in your criticisms, one must assume that meaning is (and I don't have a nice technical term for this) essentially self-presenting. That is to say, one must assume that the meaning of a text is immediately and clearly apprehended by the reader.

If this assumption were true, it would mean that we would be able to understand every instance of culture, past, present, and future without flaw.


No, I'm simply assuming that the translators are competent.

[NeilUnreal]

I don't find it threatening either. . . in fact, I'm quite at ease with the idea that God was not involved with evolution at all.

After I wrote that, I examined your profile, and since you listed “Theistic Evolutionist,” I assumed you probably were. I decided to leave it in there for any lurkers who might think any Christian taking a materialist approach to science was an automatic heretic. :lol:


You might also be taking a biological determinist approach, in saying that some aspect of biology causes x behavior. There is variance in honor-shame behavior that I don't think can be explained by biology.

I tend to keep an open mind about such things, but my default approach is to assume biological reductionism when looking at the problem. That is, that psychology and culture are epiphenomena of biology with their corresponding meta-histories. I don't think the pathways and eventual expression are necessarily simple, however.


You said that you believe most cultural constructs come from sociobiology and culture. Cultural constructs coming from culture, how shocking.

Sorry I was getting ready to leave and was rushing a bit. WRT culture I meant that overall culture may be dissectible to a certain extent into common building blocks. As in: “…most cultural constructs rest on lower level cultural building blocks and the even more basic building blocks of socio-biology.”


It might just be academic politics, but all of my professors to date in sociology and anthropology have major problems with sociobiology.

Yeah, I know, sometimes I think I must feel more like E. O. Wilson than Wilson himself. :lol: Still my opinion is that in the future we are more likely to be surprised than not about how thin a wrapper psychology and culture cast over basic biology and even physics.* Though I think the end result of such a surprise will be a greater appreciation of the complexity inherent in sentient, social organisms.

-Neil

*I do know that when I examine my own consciousness -- as opposed to awaress -- that consciousness does seem to thin out pretty fast. By that I mean, it doesn't take much introspection before one gets the feeling that one can almost discern the rudimentary bits which make up one's day-to-day conscious interaction with the world. It may be that consciousness somehow "closes the loop" back to physics (a la QM) and every thing physical is just some sort of construct of awarness, but who knows?

[jpholding]

I'm not arguing that. Let me clairify then. I am arguing that just because the culture has certain expectations doesn't mean that God intends to endorse that cultures thinking.

The same also applies to our own culture, then, doesn't it?



God corrects the thinking of the Jewish community repeatedly.

And as I said, there needs to be a correction of these specific points, to wit:

1 Confusions 3:12 Brothers, know you not that real intimacy is much more than our people believe?

No such statement is anywhere in the text. Your appeal to translators isn't valid, because you'd need to show that the translators were competent in the social sciences, which they were not. Decontextualization is a very common occurrence in translation, even of secular documents.


My main objection is the attack on the idea of intamacy with God. No, because at least some have argued that the evidence for that H-S thinking came from the Hellenistic culture.

I don't know who "some" is but that is wrong. H-S thinking is found in cultures worldwide.


I've checked this out. I did a word search for the term "Patron'' first. I checked approx. 20 versions of the Bible. In fairness some of them were OT only. Here are the versions Murdock

Meaningless, as I said. Translators are not expert in social science. They also would not use "patron" anyway since in modern English the word means a customer of a business; in earlier English versions, I can't say what it might mean in each case, but it certainly does not cohere with the context of a Mediterranean patronage arrangement. This is like arguing that unicorns must exist because the KJV uses the word. After all, the translators must have chosen the right word, no?


as well. I checked an english thesaurus for alternate english words for patron:

Also meaningless. The context is specific to the time and place and modern English synonyms are of no relevance.


Paul generally uses the Father metaphor. Why would he use the Father metaphor in a culture that would have known the diffrence between a father and a patron.

Um, "Father" was a term applied to patrons often. The Emperors were called "Fathers". So is the Pope, but do you think Catholics sit on his lap and listen to stories? How about George Washington, for that matter, the "father of our country"? Had any intimate chats with George lately?


If we are not to understand that our relationship with God is not to be understood in the terms of deepest intamacy then why does Paul use the metaphor of sex in order to demonstrate the relationship between God and the individual.

People in agonistic cultures have married sex, without relational intimacy as we know it, all the time.


My point is an excellent one.

No, quite frankly, it isn't. You're confusing concern for needs with personal intimacy. They are not inextricably entwined. We can care for the needs of starving Bangladeshi without knowing them personally.


outright. Let's look at the relevant portion of the passage. Luk 15:20 And he rose up and went to his own father. But while he was yet a long way off, his father saw him, and was moved with compassion, and ran, and fell upon his neck, and covered him with kisses.

My bad. I guess when Yasser Arafat kissed the king of Jordan, they must have had some sort of special relationship. No....a kiss was a standard greeting, no more intimate than a handshake between business partners today. As for the rest, you may want to know that the villagers would have killed the son upon his return for the disgraceful way he treated his family. This was all done to preserve the kid's life.


Further, if the meaning here would have been a patron then why did the son express the desire to just be a servent and yet his father does so much more beyond that.

He didn't. Patrons could treat their clients poorly or treat them well in accord with what they felt was deserved. Dad chose the "well" option, so no, a servant is NOT a better example of a client.

I'm not bothering with the rest of this. You're clearly trying to hang stubbornly on to an anachronistic reading, and I have enough to do trying to correct Skeptics who do the same thing.

[BronzeArcher]

Luk 15:20 And he rose up and went to his own father. But while he was yet a long way off, his father saw him, and was moved with compassion, and ran, and fell upon his neck, and covered him with kisses.

You're decontextualizing again. You're simply assuming that kissing has the same social meaning there as it does here.

See George Shillington, Jesus and His Parables, pp. 141-164. There's Richard Rohrbaugh's commentary on the parable.

JP, again, is basically right. It seems you know a few things about ancient Jewish culture, but your picture is very small. The robe and ring showed everyone that the son was accepted back into the family, and the feast was to protect the family's standing in the village. We should primarily, if not exclusively, understand the father's actions as protection.


No, I'm simply assuming that the translators are competent.

That means your idea of what translation involves is incomplete in very significant ways. I've given some examples of where symbols held very different meanings relative to the particular cultures. Communication is a lot more than language. Meaning derives from social structure; that is to say, the meaning of a symbol is defined by social structure. If translators are unable to tap into relevant, key aspects of social structure, they simply cannot produce an accurate translation. If you don't really understand this, or think you do but don't agree, say so, and I will elaborate at length. Communication is one of my major interests and I have a lot to draw on.

I think you are setting forth a red herring, too. Competence does not mean that one has access to relevant and important data.

[BronzeArcher]

It is a poor idea to compare the Japanese society to the First Century Jewish community because they are radically different cultures.


The point of comparing Japanese society to ancient Mediterranean society (specifically Jewish) is to provide concrete ways of understanding certain cultural patterns. Let me restate the qualification: certain cultural patterns. The point is not to say that ancient Mediterraneans are essentially modern Japanese in all likeness and form.

What's really obvious is that you aren't looking at the article and showing how it fails. You are simply making general comments without analyzing the comparison itself. The first point JP looks at, for example, is quite uncontroversial. Clearly defined norms are well known in small-scale societies (e.g. a lot of ancient civ). Do you understand the qualification and clarification I'm making?

[OckhamsRazor]

I have been accused of "Decontextualizing" on this thread. I have been told that the story of "The Prodigal Son" is a story about things such as

No, we don't. Like most critics of this view, you vastly overstate what it is that this view holds. This is ingroup agape at its finest, looking out for the best interests of one's own family. It does not require the depths of intimacy of a modern relationship.

and


JP, again, is basically right. It seems you know a few things about ancient Jewish culture, but your picture is very small. The robe and ring showed everyone that the son was accepted back into the family, and the feast was to protect the family's standing in the village. We should primarily, if not exclusively, understand the father's actions as protection

Let's look at the context of this passage then and try to establish the meaning of the text.

First, what was the point in the discussion?


Luk 15:2 and the Pharisees and the scribes murmured, saying, This man receives sinners and eats with them.

So, Jesus is responding to people being angry with Jesus spending time with disgraced people. (I agree that shame and honor are the primary issues being considered by the community at the time. I have benifited from this thread in that way.)


Luk 15:3 And he spoke to them this parable, saying,
Luk 15:4 What man of you having a hundred sheep, and having lost one of them, does not leave the ninety and nine in the wilderness and go after that which is lost, until he find it?
Luk 15:5 and having found it, he lays it upon his own shoulders, rejoicing;
Luk 15:6 and being come to the house, calls together the friends and the neighbours, saying to them, Rejoice with me, for I have found my lost sheep.


We are in a community that concerns it self with the well being of the group above the individual. But what does Jesus say above:


leave the ninety and nine in the wilderness

Jesus here rejects the whole notion of excluding someone on the basis that they have disgraced them selves and bring shame on the group. He also rejects the idea of overall concern for the group ruling peoples decisions. Notice

in the wilderness



This clearly undermines the concept that concern for the well being of the group is in view.

The following establishes more of the same.



Luk 15:7 I say unto you, that thus there shall be joy in heaven for one repenting sinner, more than for ninety and nine righteous who have no need of repentance.
Luk 15:8 Or, what woman having ten drachmas, if she lose one drachma, does not light a lamp and sweep the house and seek carefully till she find it?
Luk 15:9 and having found it she calls together the friends and neighbours, saying, Rejoice with me, for I have found the drachma which I had lost.
Luk 15:10 Thus, I say unto you, there is joy before the angels of God for one repenting sinner.


Now for the relevant passage:



Luk 15:11 And he said, A certain man had two sons;
Luk 15:12 and the younger of them said to his father, Father, give to me the share of the property that falls to me . And he divided to them what he was possessed of.
Luk 15:13 And after not many days the younger son gathering all together went away into a country a long way off, and there dissipated his property, living in debauchery.
Luk 15:14 But when he had spent all there arose a violent famine throughout that country, and he began to be in want.
Luk 15:15 And he went and joined himself to one of the citizens of that country, and he sent him into his fields to feed swine.
Luk 15:16 And he longed to fill his belly with the husks which the swine were eating; and no one gave to him.
Luk 15:17 And coming to himself, he said, How many hired servants of my father's have abundance of bread, and *I* perish here by famine.

Now, I agree a major issue emotionaly here is shame. The person here has sunk about as low as you can go in that culture.



Luk 15:18 I will rise up and go to my father, and I will say to him, Father, I have sinned against heaven and before thee;
Luk 15:19 I am no longer worthy to be called thy son: make me as one of thy hired servants.

But, notice here the sons concern: He is concerned with his fathers anger and rejection of him not the communities reaction.
Now, what is the fathers reaction and why:


Luk 15:20 And he rose up and went to his own father. But while he was yet a long way off, his father saw him, and was moved with compassion, and ran, and fell upon his neck, and covered him with kisses.
Luk 15:21 And the son said to him, Father, I have sinned against heaven and before thee; I am no longer worthy to be called thy son.
Luk 15:22 But the father said to his bondmen, Bring out the best robe and clothe him in it , and put a ring on his hand and sandals on his feet;
Luk 15:23 and bring the fatted calf and kill it, and let us eat and make merry:
Luk 15:24 for this my son was dead and has come to life, was lost and has been found. And they began to make merry.

The words that come up repeatedly are "Rejoice" in all the passages as well as this one. What was the father's reason for making merry? Was it fear of the group if he didn't make marry to show the acceptance of his son's return? No:



Luk 15:24 for this my son was dead and has come to life, was lost and has been found.


So far we have the shamed of the community (the sinners) depicted as the son. We have God depicted as a rejoicing father at getting his son back. Clearly God is a father who cherrishes and loves his shamed and sinful children when they turn back to Him.

Now let's look at the reaction of the other son who represents the people of the community who are angry with Jesus for sitting with these disgraced people.




Luk 15:25 And his elder son was in the field; and as, coming up , he drew nigh to the house, he heard music and dancing.
Luk 15:26 And having called one of the servants, he inquired what these things might be.
Luk 15:27 And he said to him, Thy brother is come, and thy father has killed the fatted calf because he has received him safe and well.
Luk 15:28 But he became angry and would not go in. And his father went out and besought him.
Luk 15:29 But he answering said to his father, Behold, so many years I serve thee, and never have I transgressed a commandment of thine; and to me hast thou never given a kid that I might make merry with my friends:
Luk 15:30 but when this thy son, who has devoured thy substance with harlots, is come, thou hast killed for him the fatted calf.

Is the son (objectors in the community) angry at the returning son? No. Are they ready to attack the returning son? No. They are angry at the Father (God/Jesus)

The father (God/Jesus) says to his son,



Luk 15:31 But he said to him, Child, *thou* art ever with me, and all that is mine is thine.
Luk 15:32 But it was right to make merry and rejoice, because this thy brother was dead and has come to life again, and was lost and has been found.


And why is the father rejocing? Because he's worried the "Good" son (community) will hurt the returning son? No. To show that the father accepts this returning son so the "Good" son (community) won't hurt the returning son? No.
He is rejoicing because:



Luk 15:32 But it was right to make merry and rejoice, because this thy brother was dead and has come to life again, and was lost and has been found.


What's the point of the entire passage then? That God wants his people, a people that value the wellbeing of the group over the individual, to understand that God loves and remembers the lost and shamed individual and will go to great lengths to get that person back. That the communities desire not to be shamed by this individual and their sense of honor is not worth giving up even one of God's lost children.

I have learned that this ancient community is indeed a Shame-Honor centered culture. This has helped me understand the force of such passages like "Turn the other cheek" and that it means don't take revenge when someone shames you. But it is important to not become so involved with the ideas of a few men that we lose sight of God's intent in the passage.

And finally one more thing:

The meaning of the word Agape Love from God's perspective:



1Co 13:1 If I speak in the tongues of men and of angels, but have not love, I am a noisy gong or a clanging cymbal.
1Co 13:2 And if I have prophetic powers, and understand all mysteries and all knowledge, and if I have all faith, so as to remove mountains, but have not love, I am nothing.
1Co 13:3 If I give away all I have, and if I deliver up my body to be burned, but have not love, I gain nothing.
1Co 13:4 Love is patient and kind; love does not envy or boast; it is not arrogant
1Co 13:5 or rude. It does not insist on its own way; it is not irritable or resentful;
1Co 13:6 it does not rejoice at wrongdoing, but rejoices with the truth.
1Co 13:7 Love bears all things, believes all things, hopes all things, endures all things.
1Co 13:8 Love never ends. As for prophecies, they will pass away; as for tongues, they will cease; as for knowledge, it will pass away.
1Co 13:9 For we know in part and we prophesy in part,
1Co 13:10 but when the perfect comes, the partial will pass away.
1Co 13:11 When I was a child, I spoke like a child, I thought like a child, I reasoned like a child. When I became a man, I gave up childish ways.
1Co 13:12 For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face. Now I know in part; then I shall know fully, even as I have been fully known.
1Co 13:13 So now faith, hope, and love abide, these three; but the greatest of these is love.

[BronzeArcher]

Hi OR, I won't be able to reply to your post until a few days at least, because I am getting over a case of bronchitis with a secondary infection. In the meantime, I suggest you dig up Shillington's book and look at Rohrbaugh's commentary. I will be basing my reply off that commentary.

[OckhamsRazor]

Hi OR, I won't be able to reply to your post until a few days at least, because I am getting over a case of bronchitis with a secondary infection. In the meantime, I suggest you dig up Shillington's book and look at Rohrbaugh's commentary. I will be basing my reply off that commentary.

Why would I do that? I've proved my point conclusively. The context and text support the posistion I'm sharing. Not to mention that fact that I don't have the money to invest in a new commentary right now. You have the right to disagree with me but it seems that any truly disinterested third party looking at this will come to the same conclusion that I have. I feel that disagreeing with the posistion that I've shared will make you look irrational.

[BronzeArcher]

Because, silly, I'm going to refute your interpretation! :teeth: If you think your point is "proven" and you don't need to see an extensive socio-cultural commentary, I'm going to surprise you.

[Sakarja]

I cut out most of your post because I basically agree with JP's criticisms. Just to hammer one point: I would challenge your hermeneutics on the grounds that they are ethnocentric. When you quote an ancient text coming out of a very different culture, and then simply say "this suggests x"--this is methodologically flawed.

As an interested observer of this discussion, I would like to ask a you question about methodology. Here's how I understand your argument in three simple steps:

1. To understand a text, it is important to know the writer's background.
2. Therefore, to understand texts produced by an ancient culture, we must understand the ancient culture behind the text.

And a different point:
3. Therefore, a person reading a text produced in an ancient culture through modern assumptions cannot understand it.

Now here's my methodological question: If we can't understand texts produced by a different culture AT ALL from the basis provided by our own culture and our shared human nature, then HOW can we understand them at all? After all, the basis provided by our own culture and our human nature is the only basis we can have for research. If there is nothing in this basis that enabled us to understand the other culture, then that other culture will remain incurably alien and incomprehensible.


My understanding of the matter is this: We can investigate other cultures and understand texts produced by them because we are not totally different from them. Human brains and human souls are built in a certain way; human psychology works in a certain way and so on. Sure, there are differences, but there is also much that is common. It is only on the basis of what is shared that we can come to understand our differences. Because we know a feeling called shame, we can look at another culture and see "this is shame" and also "shame and honor are apparently more important for them than for us."


But if I have understanding the matter correctly, then our own assumptions and traditional ways of seeing and experiencing human nature and our emotions are not the enemy of cultural research; rather they are the only thing that makes it possible. If this is true, perhaps our assumptions about what love feels like, the emotions experienced during sex , etc. can also be helpful in understanding other cultures? I certainly think that it would require quite a bit of cultural interaction and extraordinary evidence to prove that other human beings do not experience emotions which to us seem basic to the human psyche.



I hope the cross-culturality of this post doesn't bother you :). I'm not a native English speaker.

[BronzeArcher]

I have been accused of "Decontextualizing" on this thread. I have been told that the story of "The Prodigal Son" is a story about things such as

and

Let's look at the context of this passage then and try to establish the meaning of the text.

Before we do that, please note that OR is asserting a strawman. He portrays JP's and my comments as 'this is what the prodigal is about', but JP's/my comments were in refutation of OR's earlier appeal to the kissing of the father as a sign of intimacy (in the modern, emotional sense). Instead of being a sign of intimacy, the kissing, robe, and ring, were all symbols of the prodigal's re-integration with his family. The solidarity issue will be made clear. . . once I find my notes. :teeth:


First, what was the point in the discussion?
{quotes Lk 15:2}
So, Jesus is responding to people being angry with Jesus spending time with disgraced people. (I agree that shame and honor are the primary issues being considered by the community at the time. I have benifited from this thread in that way.)

A minor point to begin with. Emotional outrage need not be the motivation. The Pharisees are not necessarily "angry;" that is a popular way of describing their motivation.

What they are objecting to is that Jesus shares table fellowship with unclean persons. Table fellowship was THE sign of acceptance; 'family' before the 18th century was almost always conceptualized in terms of "who eats with us?" and this is the case for all peasants. When Jesus eats with the unclean; shares table fellowship with them, He is asserting to everyone that they are members of His group. Jesus has accepted them as family. The unclean, deemed failures according to the Law, were to be avoided.

Jesus, presumably a religious teacher, was expected to maintain separation from the unclean in order to maintain His own purity. When we understand these aspects of eating and social role expectation, it seems that the Pharisees were in fact raising a very serious objection. Jesus the teacher accepts unclean persons as His family. Whether the Pharisees were "angry" or not is quite irrelevant.


We are in a community that concerns it self with the well being of the group above the individual. But what does Jesus say above:
{quotes Lk 15:4}
Jesus here rejects the whole notion of excluding someone on the basis that they have disgraced them selves and bring shame on the group. He also rejects the idea of overall concern for the group ruling peoples decisions. Notice
{quotes: 'in the wilderness}
This clearly undermines the concept that concern for the well being of the group is in view.

The following establishes more of the same.
{quotes Lk 15:7-10}

What OR does here is quote some passages, and takes what seems to him to be the meaning. We've already seen aspects of this culture that people wouldn't usually pick up on, such as the social significance of eating with someone. At this point, we should be wondering if OR's seemingly obvious interpretation runs into similar problems.

I personally really like this one-lost-sheep passage. Let me make an obvious logistical point to begin. One shepherd cannot control a hundred sheep by himself. :teeth: You try it!

A flock THAT big would be very valuable. It would be economically nonsensical to leave the majority of one's flock to go looking, especially if one was alone. Other sheep could eaily wander off. If we take OR's interpretation, Jesus' audience would have said, "You idiot, no one would do that!" A flock THAT big would likely belong to an extended family, one rich enough to amass a hundred some sheep. This means that multiple people would be tending the herd. Losing a sheep, or any number of sheep, would make the shepherds accountable to the family, and not in a desirable way. When Jesus asked His audience if they would go looking for a lost sheep, the obvious answer is yes!

Now, OR focuses on "leave the ninety and nine in the wilderness" and simply asserts this means that the good of the group doesn't matter. We've already seen that it's very likely that an extended family owns the flock, and that there are multiple shepherds (to the point where it would be economically nonsensical if it weren't). OR's reading fails to contextualize on this point and is thus off. There's yet another cultural aspect that OR hasn't considered. The concept of the "wilderness" is an unordered place, outside of society. The desert is a wilderness because it is not ordered. If you're interested about this idea, I suggest you look up Mary Douglas and ritual purity. Now, practically speaking, the grazing areas were not frequently adjacent to a village. Shepherds would bring sheep quite far away--note: they would be leaving larger society. Shepherds were always going into the wilderness, into the unordered and dangerous.

OR thinks that "in the wilderness" speaks against a group-oriented mentality, but he's pulling that out of thin air. The likely place to "leave" the flock would BE in the wilderness, because that's where the flock was most often. :teeth:

I like the lost coin parable as well. Theft was a major concern. A missing good would mean suspicision all around. Remember, this is a peasant world where one's security extended as far as one's group. Also, many peasants were very poor. One coin is a lot. At this point we can talk about estimates of living costs and so on, but I don't think we need to do that to see the social dynamics of this parable. What OR doesn't tell us is why the woman lights a lamp. This is because most peasant houses were windowless, and so extra light would be required to search the house. What we're seeing is a very practical reaction by the woman. OR's interpretation, on the other hand, requires that the woman forsake her other nine coins. Similar to OR's interpretation about the sheep, this would be economically nonsensible. The rejoicing is by now an obvious conclusion to a good turnout. Suspicion of theft is gone, and a valuable amount of money is once again secured. There is indeed much reason to rejoice.

The analogy Jesus draws in opposition to the Pharisees carries much force. Yes, they would go looking for the lost sheep. Yes, they would go looking for the lost coin. And indeed, as Jesus would have it, God would go after the lost of Israel.


Now for the relevant passage:
{quotes Lk 15:11-17}
Now, I agree a major issue emotionaly here is shame. The person here has sunk about as low as you can go in that culture.

I wonder if OR knows how low. I can point out a lot of interesting aspects, but I'll leave this open for OR to respond to: explain, in cultural terms, what greviances the son has committed.

Here's an important clue: The son changes identity in several ways.


{quotes Lk 15:18-19}
But, notice here the sons concern: He is concerned with his fathers anger and rejection of him not the communities reaction.

And I think that's really funny (in a morbid way). :rofl:

The son has shown himself to be incredibly foolish. Showing no concern for his family's place in the village is a continuation of his cultural stupidity.


Now, what is the fathers reaction and why:
{quotes Lk 15:20-24}
The words that come up repeatedly are "Rejoice" in all the passages as well as this one. What was the father's reason for making merry? Was it fear of the group if he didn't make marry to show the acceptance of his son's return? No:
{quotes Lk 15:24}
So far we have the shamed of the community (the sinners) depicted as the son. We have God depicted as a rejoicing father at getting his son back. Clearly God is a father who cherrishes and loves his shamed and sinful children when they turn back to Him.

OR has, once again, simply read the passage and taken what seems to him to be the meaning. By now we've seen many cultural aspects that OR has been completely unaware of. But is he right on this point?

The first thing I want to point out is that OR depicts the father as acting individualistically, with the motivation of personal happiness. If this were the case, the father would be amazingly stupid. Let's hold off for a moment, and go back to Lk 15:11-15, where I earlier left an open challenge to OR to contextualize. I think it's clear that he can't, and I'm going to demonstrate why.

A man had two sons. The younger of them said to his father, 'Father, give me the share of the estate that falls to me ' So he divided his wealth between them. And not many days later, the younger son gathered everything together and went on a journey into a distant country, and there he squandered his estate with loose living. Now when he had spent everything, a severe famine occurred in that country, and he began to be impoverished. So he went and hired himself out to one of the citizens of that country, and he sent him into his fields to feed swine. (NAB)

Let's go through this bit by bit.

It's well known that when the son asks for inheritance, he's also wishing that the father were dead.

The father is foolish because he gives up his place as the head of the family; his property is now divided among his sons. The older son is foolish because he does not protest. Neither does the father. From the outset, no character acts as they would be expected to. (It may be the case that the older son's honorable refusal is in mind, because the father still acts as the head.)

When the father divides up his property, eliminates his own position, he's showing himself unable to control family conflict. The village would then regard the family as a danger, and engage in "damage control" so that everyone knows--rather, that they reinforce the idea--that what the father did, and what that family did, is dishonorable. This is because noncomformity is a threat to village life. Villagers depended on each other on a daily basis--help in the fields, help with children, food, materials, etc. Cohesion was integral for survival. Thus, the family's status in the village is threatened (this is why the lack of protest is foolish).

The son is not expected to leave. The mother depended on her sons to maintain her place; the father in old age would require a caregiver; the son leaving requires a break of all social relations with all other villagers. The son's departure further threatens the family's status. When the son takes up all he has, it means he's sold the land. The major piece in an inheritance was land, and the intimate tie between peasants and their land is well known (I can expand on this also). This screws up a lot of things. The family is now considerably less valuable, threatening the strength of their support networks, as well as screwing up possible marriages. The consequences of the son's actions are extremely far reaching.

Note where the son goes. He goes far away. In other words, he leaves Israel. He's left his homeland and gone to another land. Consider what this suggests about keeping the Covenant.

The son blows his fortune, which is a common fate of peasants moving to cities. I can expand on this later.

The phrase "joined himself" is an indicator of patronage. Having no wealth, the son becomes a laborer for a patron, working with ritually unclean animals.

So, we've seen the destructive consequences of not just the son's actions, but also his father's and brother's actions (or nonactions). Let's go back to Lk 15:20-24.

Now we can understand why I said that if the father's motivation was personal happiness, the father is amazingly stupid. The son has screwed over the family in an extensive and irreversible way.

The father was expected to severely beat the son, and the son's life was at risk. The son comes back having flipped off everyone in the village, and he comes back empty handed--that is, he comes only with offense, with nothing to restore his place. Upon being spotted, word would be passed through the village, and a crowd would gather.

The father runs. The shame this brings is also well known. He must run because if he wishes to save his son, he must be there before the villagers. The father orders that the best robe be brought out, and this would be one of the father's special robes used for key rituals. The kissing, robe, ring, and sandals, signified that the son was reaccepted as a member of the family. Further, they signified that the son was not a worker.

What the village sees is a father and son they disapprove of. The family must do something to restore their place.

That is precisely what the calf is for. "Let us" is an invitation for the whole village. The father confronts the village, and puts all his money on this gamble. If no one comes, the family is effectively rejected. The land claims, lodged in collective memory, would be wiped away, leading to the exile of the family. Indeed, let the village rejoice! The father's gamble is successful.

Now, OR says that the sinners are represented by the son. He also says that God is the father in this parable. We've seen that his understanding of the parable is quite decontextualized. He doesn't offer reasons to accept his identifications, or reasons to identify characters with certain groups or agents. I'll leave this open.


Now let's look at the reaction of the other son who represents the people of the community who are angry with Jesus for sitting with these disgraced people.
{quotes Lk 15:25-30}
Is the son (objectors in the community) angry at the returning son? No. Are they ready to attack the returning son? No. They are angry at the Father (God/Jesus)

Note again that he simply asserts an identification without offering reasons why. I'll continue contextualizing to further demonstrate how decontextualized OR's reading is:

The older son's refusal is shaming to the father. His refual also shames the family, because he refuses to greet the guests (i.e. the villagers)! His refusal demonstrates his disagreement with his brother's reacceptance. We may understand his anger at his brother from the discussions above.

The father attempts to reason with his son. This is more foolishness from the father. Fathers ordered their sons; they did not request things with a puppy dog face. When the father says that all he has belongs to the son, he's stating the obvious. Having lost some wealth to the younger son, all that remains is the older son's share. The father's reply of "this brother of yours" uses the same words the older son uses, with the substitution of son.

OR asks if the older son is angry at the younger son. That this is the case is now obvious, whereas OR answers in the negative.

OR asks if the older son is ready to attack. Physical aggression would be quite an unwise reaction, given that it would be in the middle of a feast, and against a [restored] member of the community.


And why is the father rejocing? Because he's worried the "Good" son (community) will hurt the returning son? No. To show that the father accepts this returning son so the "Good" son (community) won't hurt the returning son? No.
He is rejoicing because:
{quotes Lk 15:32}
What's the point of the entire passage then? That God wants his people, a people that value the wellbeing of the group over the individual, to understand that God loves and remembers the lost and shamed individual and will go to great lengths to get that person back. That the communities desire not to be shamed by this individual and their sense of honor is not worth giving up even one of God's lost children.

By now it's clear that OR's reading has very little ground, and suffers from quite extensive decontextualization.

OR's reading also misses the reality of family conflict. The prodigal is essentially a story of family reconciliation. There are also other elements that would be important to peasants: the danger of the cities, for example. I'm not going to offer a monolithic, sweeping "this is why Jesus said x." I think that's too simple, and doesn't consider that Jesus likely said the same thing many times in different contexts.


I have learned that this ancient community is indeed a Shame-Honor centered culture. This has helped me understand the force of such passages like "Turn the other cheek" and that it means don't take revenge when someone shames you. But it is important to not become so involved with the ideas of a few men that we lose sight of God's intent in the passage.

Maybe so, but you need to develop your idea of honor and shame. You also need to gain a fuller picture of ancient life, because the degree that one understands honor and shame correlates with the degree that one understands about ancient life.

You have an ad hominem in your phrase "the ideas of a few men." I think it's clear that your reading has serious problems, so I'll leave it up to you to salvage what you can.


And finally one more thing:

The meaning of the word Agape Love from God's perspective:[

You forgot to contextualize.

[BronzeArcher]

As an interested observer of this discussion, I would like to ask a you question about methodology. Here's how I understand your argument in three simple steps:

1. To understand a text, it is important to know the writer's background.
2. Therefore, to understand texts produced by an ancient culture, we must understand the ancient culture behind the text.

And a different point:
3. Therefore, a person reading a text produced in an ancient culture through modern assumptions cannot understand it.

Now here's my methodological question: If we can't understand texts produced by a different culture AT ALL from the basis provided by our own culture and our shared human nature, then HOW can we understand them at all? After all, the basis provided by our own culture and our human nature is the only basis we can have for research. If there is nothing in this basis that enabled us to understand the other culture, then that other culture will remain incurably alien and incomprehensible.

You're asking that question as a matter of anthropological theory, so I will answer based on my anthropology and sociology courses. I want to make it clear that socio-cultural commentaries are not a "side" thing, but rather that they come very naturally out of the anthropological method; the desire to be emic and not ethnocentric.

As I understand my own hermeneutics, the only source of persuasion is that meaning is socially constructed. This is essentially a given, although some find it difficult to grasp. The same action, the same word, the same symbol--we observe variance across cultures. A wink means a joke in one context, and in another context, a wink is a meaningless action (except one may wonder what eye defects the person has in order to close one eye).

That means your proposed premises are misguided.

I use cultural differences as a heuristic tool. I seek to be emic. I seek to use categories that are native. I seek to understand the world as the people I'm studying understand it. I'm not talking about a modernist-type split between able/unable to understand; I'm throwing out a very key, very useful approach of seeking to contextualize.

The reason why I and others are constantly seen telling people that they've decontextualized is because they have no inkling of what it means to be emic. Recontextualization is not a priority, and you'll meet many people who say it's not even important. That's why focusing on the extensive splits between the industrial, very text-based 21st century and ancient life is important: it shows that meaning can't be taken for granted.


My understanding of the matter is this: We can investigate other cultures and understand texts produced by them because we are not totally different from them. Human brains and human souls are built in a certain way; human psychology works in a certain way and so on. Sure, there are differences, but there is also much that is common. It is only on the basis of what is shared that we can come to understand our differences. Because we know a feeling called shame, we can look at another culture and see "this is shame" and also "shame and honor are apparently more important for them than for us."

But if I have understanding the matter correctly, then our own assumptions and traditional ways of seeing and experiencing human nature and our emotions are not the enemy of cultural research; rather they are the only thing that makes it possible. If this is true, perhaps our assumptions about what love feels like, the emotions experienced during sex , etc. can also be helpful in understanding other cultures? I certainly think that it would require quite a bit of cultural interaction and extraordinary evidence to prove that other human beings do not experience emotions which to us seem basic to the human psyche.

I hope the cross-culturality of this post doesn't bother you :). I'm not a native English speaker.

Given that meaning is socially constructed, I would question whether our concept of "shame" is a meaningful model to understand another culture's construction of "shame."

I'm not going to agree or disagree with your ideas about human cognition; that's not my area and that's also irrelevant. I hope I've opened up the way to more questions.

For a deeper understanding of the methods of socio-cultural reading, see the first chapter of Ancient Israel: the old testament in its social context, by Philip Esler, 2006/7. Esler has an explanation and defense of the use of models. If you have any training in philosophy, you'll find very strong tie overs to abduction and probability theory.

[Sakarja]

I use cultural differences as a heuristic tool. I seek to be emic. I seek to use categories that are native. I seek to understand the world as the people I'm studying understand it.

Thank you for the answer. I don't see the answer to the main question, however. If you have given it, I have probably misunderstood. The question boils down to this. You say that you "seek to understand the world as the people I'm studying understand it." But how do you do this? How can you get inside another person's head? How do you come to understand the world as the people you are studying understand it, if there is nothing shared?

I have studied some philosophy; philosophy of religion is the main subject of my studies. So let's try formulating the problem as it would appear when using the abductive method. In the abductive method, we hypothesize a model to explain / predict the data. But how can we make a model, if not by using the concepts and perceptions that we get from our own culture, experience and human nature? Certainly we can't begin our model making by using concepts from the other culture, since we aren't supposed to understand them prior to making the model, right?

[Teallaura]

Um, guys - you're all talking past one another. Myself, I suspect each discipline represented has latched onto some element of truth here (note that I said suspect - I haven't the interdisciplinary knowledge to evaluate with any high degree of certainty but I am seeing patterns in the debate that lead me toward that conclusion). BA did a good job from his field - but a poor job translating that field into recognizable terms for those from different disciplinary backgrounds. As a result I don't find his argument comprehensible enough to find it at all compelling. He loses me shortly after his premise.

He's not alone - Neil is having the exact same problem in reverse. He's not getting the full idea across - just enough to get a reaction but not enough to get the other discipline to see the problem he's having. Sakarja is also having that problem, but did catch on enough to try to rephrase into more recognizable terminology for his discipline. Odds on favorite, BA won't be able to answer; he's much too oriented to his own discipline. That's not a bad thing, by the way - it just makes cross-disciplinary communication extremely difficult.

My sole advantage here is that my own discipline, political science, has this problem internally all the time. It's fun watching the IR guys and the American Studies guys totally blow past each other using exactly the same terminology in two entirely different ways. Hmmm, maybe before contextualizing (whatever that means :ahem:) ancient cultures ya might wanna contextualize (okay, I did see BA's definition :wink:) your own disciplines?

Anyway, looking forward to some kind of comprehensible debate here.

:popcorn:

[NeilUnreal]

I guess if I could restate my point, it would be this:

We tend to construct reality out of building blocks. These range across several levels:

1) Some of those building blocks are based on recent cultural references, like mentioning a recent television show, product, etc.

2) Some of those building blocks are built out of earlier, re-used building blocks, like how our Western civilization contains bits from Classical civilization, early Christian ideas, etc. etc.

3) Some of those building blocks are cultural, but are strongly biologically based, and so cross many cultures. An example is extending an open hand to reveal the absence of a weapon.

4) Some of those building blocks are primarily biological, such as many cues associated with sex, group hierarchy, and basic survival (e.g. cries of fear). Sometimes these can even cross species boundaries (although sometimes not, as in a chimp grimace which can look like a human smile).

Semiotics – symbols of all types from winking to writing – can be based on any of these levels. Semiotics will work most effectively in proportion to how well all four levels match for two potential communicators. However, as one goes from level 1 to level 4, the semiotics become more basic and less likely to change from culture to culture. We would probably recognize a cry of fear from a Neanderthal, but even a time-traveler from the 1990s would not know what an “IPod” was.

When we read ancient documents, we have to parse the semiotics for meaning, but first, we have to parse the semiotics for level. For the most part, this is unconscious, but it can also be done with thought. (And sometimes we make mistakes.)

When I read first-century and earlier documents, from the NT, to the OT, to Egyptian stories like the Tale of Two Brothers, it appears to me that I can understand much of what is being said because the semiotics form a pyramid, with the lower levels (e.g. 4) being more important.

Therefore, it appears to me that the commonalities are much more important than the misunderstandings. (Though this does not prevent some gaffs.*)

And it further seems to me that the discussions of shame and honor discussed in ancient sources hold strong echoes at the lowest level of semiotics – levels 3 and 4. And that at those levels, honor and shame seem directly related to guilt, even if not identical. In fact, I would postulate that a likely hierarchy is this:

[honor/shame] built from [guilt] built from [basic neurology]

So we have to be careful when we read about honor and shame in the NT documents, that we realize that it is not identical to modern notions of guilt. Honor and shame are likely more complex notions built on guilt and we have to be careful not to oversimplify such complex notions. Yet the NT views are not completely beyond our understanding, even in a naïve approach. They were, after all, humans and not space-aliens.

-Neil

*A good example might be the reason for hand-washing as described in the NT. We see it as a hygiene issue, while the first-century Jews saw it as a purity issue.

However, even that is complicated, since – having imperfectly internalized the notion of hygiene – we re-mythologize it into purity; as when a kid yells: “Yuck! I touched already chewed gum!” and then starts chasing all his friends threatening to touch them. Notions of ritual purity are probably built largely on basic psychological and biological building blocks associated with hygiene. So purity vs. hygiene is another example of the same phenomenon.

The connection between purity and guilt is more complex, but certain evidence – like the strong tie between guilt and purity as expressed in many cases of OCD – indicate that the relationship is probably basic and perhaps neurological. Purity may be a psychological mechanism for extending instinctive hygienic behavior to novel situations and allowing these new notions to propagate via culture. But then, purity also seems attached to “us vs. them” group recognition. Perhaps this is where purity ties to guilt.

[BronzeArcher]

Thank you for the answer. I don't see the answer to the main question, however. If you have given it, I have probably misunderstood. The question boils down to this. You say that you "seek to understand the world as the people I'm studying understand it." But how do you do this? How can you get inside another person's head? How do you come to understand the world as the people you are studying understand it, if there is nothing shared?

I deliberately didn't answer your question, because I didn't think your proposed premises reflected the fundamental hermeneutic. So I tried to make it problematic for you, so that you would have to rethink it. An answer would be too easy. :wink:

And I'm not sure you've understood the fundamental hermeneutic. I don't agree that there is nothing shared, so I'm not sure I can answer properly when I can't answer your question as it stands. I think you also have a false dichotomy, but... we'll get to that after.

[BronzeArcher]

Um, guys - you're all talking past one another.

Hm. I'm aware I'm not explaining as much as I could or should... or need to? :shrug:

[Teallaura]

Hm. I'm aware I'm not explaining as much as I could or should... or need to? :shrug:
It's up to you but I don't think you're getting anywhere as is - I wasn't kidding, you lost me just after stating your premise. Thus far I've been able to follow Neil the best - that's scary, I usually can't follow him at all! :wink: (Sorry, Neil, couldn't resist!)

[Teallaura]

...They were, after all, humans and not space-aliens.

-Neil

...
Speak for yourself - I'm from Pluto! :goof:



















^ attempting comic relief....

[BronzeArcher]

I guess if I could restate my point, it would be this:

Hm. I think the issue I have with your approach, then, is that I don't think there are many meaningful commonalities. A resource as basic as water carries so many connotations in the ANE that we simply don't have, perhaps due to our excess. I'll agree that there are basic blocks, but I'd throw more weight on the ideas than the biology. I'm not sure you really posit a process of how biology leads to certain kinds of culture. Have you heard of intensification (a la Harris, who is a materialist)?


When I read first-century and earlier documents, from the NT, to the OT, to Egyptian stories like the Tale of Two Brothers, it appears to me that I can understand much of what is being said because the semiotics form a pyramid, with the lower levels (e.g. 4) being more important.

My hermeneutics predicts this. Please forgive me for making reference to something I haven't fully expounded in front of you; I'm still working out the expression myself. It's frustrating trying to talk about something so fundamental as meaning.

I would say, in contrary, that ancient documents are high-context documents, and that you naturally fill in the gap with your own experience. I believe we use our own experience (more likely, the resulting lens) to understand what we read. If I use the term "father," you have experience of something that you would designate as "father." When I use that term, you draw on your own experience; you believe that I am referring to an older male, whose DNA I carry, someone with some degree of authority, probably working, as well as a few other ideas. That's well and good. The degree to which your interpretation (i.e. what you think I mean by "father") is accurate is based on the degree to which your concept corresponds to my experience. Change up the contexts and you suddenly have no ground to understand that as a gangster, I do not refer to my biological parents as "father" or "mother;" instead "father" refers to my leader who is not necessarily male or older. That means your concept is accurate in that there is some degree of authority, but your experience does not allow you to even accurately estimate what degree of authority.

Do you understand (hahaha) so far? (It's in fact quite hilarious to ask someone if they "understand," after discoursing on hermeneutics. The only real positive answer one can give is "I think so," and then respond based on their understanding, and judge by the responses to see if they've gone astray. . .)

Note that I formulate understanding in terms of degrees, and concepts in terms of usefulness. Esler (in the Ancient Israel reference I gave above) would call those concepts "models" which is a more useful term. If we pay attention to social-science criticism, we may formulate more accurate models. The models we formulate on our own (the ones that result from our experience) are not necessarily generalizable, and I would argue that they aren't.

There's a huge amount that goes into a model, and this enormity is what makes me so irritated when people don't pay attention to what models they presuppose.

Take the concept of family. The amazing diversity of family patterns is well known (if you want, I can give you salient highlights). But what one must understand is that in each family pattern, in each context, the experiences are very different: therefore the resulting lenses are very different. For a trivial example, someone raised under strict authority will be more familiar in a very controlled environment, than someone raised under little authority. Growing up in a nuclear family, where the majority of families around one are also nuclear (well, depending on where one is in North America), having one's parents work certain typical patterns of jobs and hours, etc, etc, etc. . . all this is vastly different from the experience of an ancient Mediterranean peasant.

If you aren't convinced, I challenge you to study the worldview differences between traditional peasants (some still exist in parts of Italy), and modern city-dwellers. As one of my Classics prof put it, "You don't know what patronage is like until you feel like you need to ask permission to [excrete]." We typically have no experience of utter, physical, immediate dependence upon one person. In fact, the few cases we hear about that might be characterized such involve psychotic criminals.

I suppose I could gloss the above into two points:

1. We'd expect that a reader believe he "gets it" because of how interpretation works.
2. Modern urban experience compared to ancient Mediterranean peasant experience is vastly different. Family, domestic economy and religion, power structures--it's almost funny to say that one's experience in the modern western world allows accurate understanding of ancient peasants.


And it further seems to me that the discussions of shame and honor discussed in ancient sources hold strong echoes at the lowest level of semiotics – levels 3 and 4. And that at those levels, honor and shame seem directly related to guilt, even if not identical.

I think this would turn out to be your most weakly supported point. By the time the first century rolled around (what fun contradictions), well, let's just say that a lot happened. But I think you need to reconsider this after the points I made above. :shrug:


*A good example might be the reason for hand-washing as described in the NT. We see it as a hygiene issue, while the first-century Jews saw it as a purity issue.

However, even that is complicated, since – having imperfectly internalized the notion of hygiene – we re-mythologize it into purity; as when a kid yells: “Yuck! I touched already chewed gum!” and then starts chasing all his friends threatening to touch them. Notions of ritual purity are probably built largely on basic psychological and biological building blocks associated with hygiene. So purity vs. hygiene is another example of the same phenomenon.

The connection between purity and guilt is more complex, but certain evidence – like the strong tie between guilt and purity as expressed in many cases of OCD – indicate that the relationship is probably basic and perhaps neurological. Purity may be a psychological mechanism for extending instinctive hygienic behavior to novel situations and allowing these new notions to propagate via culture. But then, purity also seems attached to “us vs. them” group recognition. Perhaps this is where purity ties to guilt.

I hate to do this, because it's not purely relevant, and it may detract... but ritual purity is one of my favorite concepts. :blush:

There is no difference between hygiene and purity. Let me rephrase that. It's meaningless to separate hygiene from purity. Hygiene is a form of purity. Ritual purity is about drawing boundaries and attaching dangers to crossing those boundaries. Every culture does this. Don't do x because of y. So I don't know where you're getting this idea that hygiene gets mythologized into purity, when hygiene is a form of ritual purity. You can't say "hygiene vs purity"; that makes no sense. You can say "A culture's purity system vs B culture's purity system"; that makes sense.

When you assume that "hygienic behavior" (whatever you mean by that) is instinctive, I worry about what you're really saying. I really hope you aren't saying that our western notions of purity are hereditary as if they were somehow encoded into our DNA, rather than culturally constructed.

[Sakarja]

I deliberately didn't answer your question, because I didn't think your proposed premises reflected the fundamental hermeneutic. So I tried to make it problematic for you, so that you would have to rethink it. An answer would be too easy. :wink:

It would be great if you did my thinking for me, though :-). After all, you've done a lot of studying on this. It's always nice to get to enjoy the fruits of other people's research.


And I'm not sure you've understood the fundamental hermeneutic. I don't agree that there is nothing shared, so I'm not sure I can answer properly when I can't answer your question as it stands. I think you also have a false dichotomy, but... we'll get to that after.

Okay, I'll try rephrasing the question. Thank you in advance for your patience. I guess "nothing" was overstating it. But your posts do give me the impression that you believe the difference is quite radical. For instance, you wrote to NeilUnreal:

"Hm. I think the issue I have with your approach, then, is that I don't think there are many meaningful commonalities. "

Earlier, you wrote on Paul's metaphor of sexuality and marriage in illustration of the relationship between Christ and the Church,, saying (as I understood you) that people in agonistic cultures didn't associate relational intimacy with sex.*

So it seems to me that you are positing a radical difference between our culture and theirs. And this leads to the same question as before, slightly modified: If they are so radically different, how can we understand them? You write to NeilUnreal:


it's almost funny to say that one's experience in the modern western world allows accurate understanding of ancient peasants.

Ironic as it is, unfortunately this is the ONLY basis we have for accurate understanding of these peasants. Whether we like it or not, we are not first century peasants. The only concepts and experiences we can use are those that we have as citizen of the modern western world. Therefore, if we wish to undertand them, we must understand them from the basis given by our modern concepts and words.

I don't mean to say that we must look at them as though they were modern westerners. Rather I am saying that when we look at them and formulate models about their behaviour, we can only do so by using modern western concepts, if we ourselves are modern westerners. But if these concepts are totally inapplicable to their situation, meaning that there is no analogy, no similary, between our notion of shame and their notion of shame, for example, then we cannot understand them at all.

But if there is enough similarity in our human nature etc to make understanding possible, then perhaps those who use their own experience as one guide the Bible's meaning aren't so far off base after all? That's the dilemma here.

I'm going to try writing my basic point more philosophically :-).

What underlies your hermeneutic is the idea that the meaning of words is based on how words are used in cultural contexts. Wittgenstein spoke of "language games", and like "scoring" means a different thing in baseball and another in football, so love, shame etc. can mean different things in another culture. In learning words, we learn how our culture uses them. From this starting point it's obvious that a first century culture would use words differently from the way we use them.

But philosophy of language has historically led to my question: If these language games / cultures are radically different or totally separate, then can we understand them at all from the outside, without participating in the language game? We can only think in the expressions that our culture gives us. If another culture is so different from ours that we cannot use our experience even to make models about how they might experience things, then we simply cannot understand them.




* By the way, when did western culture cease to be agonistic? If not in a few hundred years after Christ, then I would like to contest your interpretation that the marriage metaphor doesn't speak of intimacy. I ask because the church father Origen (A.D. 185-254) did consider the comparison between a marriage relationship / our relationship with Christ to speak of intimacy. Actually, he thought of Christ as the "lover of our souls" and interpreted the Song of Solomon as a description of the intimacy of this relationship.

[OckhamsRazor]

I personally really like this one-lost-sheep passage. Let me make an obvious logistical point to begin. One shepherd cannot control a hundred sheep by himself. :teeth: You try it!

A flock THAT big would be very valuable. It would be economically nonsensical to leave the majority of one's flock to go looking, especially if one was alone. Other sheep could eaily wander off. If we take OR's interpretation, Jesus' audience would have said, "You idiot, no one would do that!" A flock THAT big would likely belong to an extended family, one rich enough to amass a hundred some sheep. This means that multiple people would be tending the herd. Losing a sheep, or any number of sheep, would make the shepherds accountable to the family, and not in a desirable way. When Jesus asked His audience if they would go looking for a lost sheep, the obvious answer is yes!

I have overstated my case on this point. I would say that the point in the passage is still the concept of the value of the individual to the shepperd. It seems to me that the point is that God doesn't forget the lost sheep. As far as the pharises objection to Jesus eating with these people; they didn't say it was about uncleaness. They objected to them being sinners:





Luk 15:2 and the Pharisees and the scribes murmured, saying, This man receives sinners and eats with them.

It seems to me they would have mentioned uncleanness if that is what they had meant. As they did when they complained about the disciples eating with unwashed hands.

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[NeilUnreal]

Speak for yourself - I'm from Pluto!

I always tell my business partner that I'm from earth, but I can channel the space brothers. :lol:

-Neil

[NeilUnreal]

Thanks, BronzeArcher, that was quite an interesting response and it’s given me a lot to think about. I may want to reply to several points, but I want to think about it some more.

For now, I just want to address a couple of issues about purity vs. hygiene. Although these may appear to be orthogonal the current topic, I think they bear directly on the different ways in which you and I approach the data. I’m trying (in part) to see whether our different conclusions (i.e. lower vs. higher importance of context to the semiotics), are because of this difference in approach or whether our conclusions are different for other reasons.


There is no difference between hygiene and purity.

My view would be that hygiene and purity are related, but not identical. Our psychological notions of purity seem to develop quite naturally on top of hygienic factors that we share with our less psychologically complex animal cousins. On the other hand, notions of purity sometimes develop around notions of group identity that appear only indirectly to hygiene. As you said:


purity is about drawing boundaries and attaching dangers to crossing those boundaries

The biological impetus for attaching purity to dangerous boundaries appears to be complex; sometimes hygiene, sometimes group identity, and sometimes basic things like gender differentiation (like when a six-year-old says: “Ewwww! Girls have cooties!”). So purity seems to be a more general psychological mechanism for attaching the disgust reaction to general operations ranging from basic biology to culture.


When you assume that "hygienic behavior" (whatever you mean by that) is instinctive, I worry about what you're really saying. I really hope you aren't saying that our western notions of purity are hereditary as if they were somehow encoded into our DNA, rather than culturally constructed.

Yes, that’s exactly what I’m saying. I don’t mean to imply that all concepts of hygiene are forced on us as biological imperatives, but that:

1) The basic disgust mechanism tying hygiene to purity appears to be biologically-based, and may exist at levels below the primates.

2) The basic hygiene requirements of most animals, and particularly mammals, are similar. It therefore makes sense that disgust reactions tying hygiene (and other issues of biology) to purity would be similar across many cultures (though with exceptions, some notable).

3) One example is that mammals don’t generally eat their own excrement. When they do, it is nearly always in the context of a specific digestive cycle, for re-use of nutrients, or as a social signal. In most other contexts, it elicits a reaction that humans would call disgust. We encode that biological imperative in notions of purity to such an extent that we use it metaphorically in expressions of contempt.

4) Another example is the fact that eating human flesh is generally taboo in human societies. So much so that we remark on the societies in which it is not. In general, eating human flesh is a bad thing from a biological standpoint; it can spread disease, it is trophically inefficient, and it disrupts other aspects of our social behavior. So it seems perfectly reasonable that the general reaction is one of disgust, and the exceptions are notable and nearly always tied to ritual behavior when practiced as a norm. (Ritual can be used to temporarily over come sociobiological imperatives in a controlled manner.)

-Neil

[BronzeArcher]

I have overstated my case on this point. I would say that the point in the passage is still the concept of the value of the individual to the shepperd. It seems to me that the point is that God doesn't forget the lost sheep.

If that--"the value of the individual"--was your case, then you've changed it now.

Your earlier case was that those passages show that Jesus rejects the collectivism of His culture, and that the passages "[undermine] the concept that concern for the well being of the group is in view."

I find it a little incredulous that I've demonstrated a fair degree of cultural depth in Lk 15 and you're still simply taking a passage and taking what it seems to mean to you. I even gave you the basis for your above interpretation; the value of the sheep to the shepherds. You might just be rushed. . . :shrug:


As far as the pharises objection to Jesus eating with these people; they didn't say it was about uncleaness. They objected to them being sinners:
{Lk 15:2}
It seems to me they would have mentioned uncleanness if that is what they had meant. As they did when they complained about the disciples eating with unwashed hands.

Oh my. Under the rubric of ritual purity (hey, care to explicate that for us?) to be a sinner was to be unclean. I could once again discourse on some cultural aspects to show that you've once again decontexualized, but I'd like to give you the option of admitting that you were decontextualizing. Your treatment of the kissing in the Prodigal was ripped out of context; your methods of interpreting Scripture are fundamentally flawed. At least you dropped the bit about comparing cultures.

I think you're intelligent and coherent. I just think you're wrong in fundamental ways, and I've tried to demonstrate how--and more importantly, how to rectify those errors. But do you understand my arguments? Do you believe your methods are wrong? I await your take on the whole matter.

[BronzeArcher]

Okay, I'll try rephrasing the question. Thank you in advance for your patience. I guess "nothing" was overstating it. But your posts do give me the impression that you believe the difference is quite radical. For instance, you wrote to NeilUnreal:

"Hm. I think the issue I have with your approach, then, is that I don't think there are many meaningful commonalities. "

Earlier, you wrote on Paul's metaphor of sexuality and marriage in illustration of the relationship between Christ and the Church,, saying (as I understood you) that people in agonistic cultures didn't associate relational intimacy with sex.*

So it seems to me that you are positing a radical difference between our culture and theirs. And this leads to the same question as before, slightly modified: If they are so radically different, how can we understand them? You write to NeilUnreal:

Out of curiosity. How much Context Group, or social-science criticism, or socio-rhetorical criticism material have you read? If you haven't read any, or much, then you'll have a very slim basis to understand what I'd mean by radical. Radical is a high-context term. :hehe: I can only agree to the label if the content is properly spelt out. This, I think, is the main reason why you don't seem to understand what I mean (seeing as how your characterization and responses are quite off). If you were conversant with Context Group or similar material, you would have a great picture of what I mean when I say there are lots of differences and not many meaningful commonalities.

Everything beyond this point is very minor compared to the above issue.

(It was JP who wrote about marriage. He was responding to OR's anachronized discourse on "intimacy," saying, "Marriages did not involve romantic love unless AFTER the fact. . . People in agonistic cultures have married sex, without relational intimacy as we know it, all the time.")


I don't mean to say that we must look at them as though they were modern westerners. Rather I am saying that when we look at them and formulate models about their behaviour, we can only do so by using modern western concepts, if we ourselves are modern westerners. But if these concepts are totally inapplicable to their situation, meaning that there is no analogy, no similary, between our notion of shame and their notion of shame, for example, then we cannot understand them at all.

Similar to asking if you know what I mean by "differences," did you read Esler's chapter on modelling? What you mean by "formulate models" and what I'd mean by "formulate models" are likely different, because I view model creation as a very fluid process, one that's fundamental to human thought. In my terms (and Esler's terms) it doesn't make sense to talk about a one-way interaction, as you seem to assume--

I don't think any anthropologist will agree that "we can only do so by using modern western concepts"--there is something called being emic. There is the ability to suspend one's own cosmologies, one's own purity maps, one's own classifications of reality--and understand another's. This is such a real possibility that a major warning in fieldwork training is keeping oneself from "going native."


What underlies your hermeneutic is the idea that the meaning of words is based on how words are used in cultural contexts.

Not to be overly anal, but that's a big strawman--I hold that meaning is socially constructed. That goes for all symbols. Words are just one category of symbols.


By the way, when did western culture cease to be agonistic?

Please define what you mean by "agonistic," then perform an analysis of ancient Mediterranean power structures and modern western power structures. Then tell me if it's meaningful to say that a modern westerner's experience is generalizable (i.e. can accurately interpret) to the ancient Mediterranean peasant.

[Sakarja]

Out of curiosity. How much Context Group, or social-science criticism, or socio-rhetorical criticism material have you read?

I have read a book on the New Testament social world from Malina, some introductory stuff on socio-rhetorical criticism and a 600-page book on the NT social world whose name currently escapes me (I can look it up if you are really interested). Also some stuff from sociologist Stark. So, not very much. I would have read Esler's chapter on modeling, but the local theological faculty library only has one copy of the book, and that's loaned out at the moment. Unfortunately regular libraries over here seldom carry this stuff.

I read more on the philosophy of religion. Anthropology and exegetics have not been major reading subjects for me, and I doubt if I will ever have the time to read as much on them as you guys. That's why I was hoping to get your expert answers. But if my questions at the moment are, to you, too misguided to answer, I guess I'll just have to think on my own - which is apparently leading to some major misunderstanding already, if you are correct ;-).



If you were conversant with Context Group or similar material, you would have a great picture of what I mean when I say there are lots of differences and not many meaningful commonalities.

I do think I understand quite a bit about what you mean by the "lots of differences". I've read enough social-scientific stuff to know something. My question was a methodological one, and it had to do with how you arrive at these conceptions of differences. In your answer you say that you "try to be emic". But this really sounds very mystical for me and doesn't really open the logic of the process up. I can't understand how we can come to use their categories, if these categories really are alien to us, meaning that there are almost no analogies (which doesn't mean exact resemblances) from our categories.

I am aware of the fact that anthropologists often get very involved in different cultures, imitating their lifestyles etc. If there's enough common stuff in the background (somewhat like in Neil's model) then I can understand emicness fine. Otherwise it sounds mystical.


In my terms (and Esler's terms) it doesn't make sense to talk about a one-way interaction, as you seem to assume--

Actually I don't. I just emphasize that a person needs concepts to think at all, and that these concepts can only come from one's own culture. It follows that we can only understand and learn if we have a basis for it in our own culture. Modern traditions and experiences enable understanding, though they can also block it. In time and with enough interaction and input from another culture, we can come to understand new stuff. But the whole process can't get started if our culture gives no basis for it. For more on this, read stuff about the hermeneutic philosophers like Gadamer.



Not to be overly anal, but that's a big strawman--I hold that meaning is socially constructed. That goes for all symbols. Words are just one category of symbols.

Just substitute the word "meaning" for the word "words" and my point stands, then. Wittgenstein meant more than just words, too. Words were just my easy example of this, since we have been discussing words/concepts like shame and love.




Please define what you mean by "agonistic," then perform an analysis of ancient Mediterranean power structures and modern western power structures.

I mean a honor-shame culture, as described by Malina in The New Testament World: insights from cultural anthropology, for example.


Then tell me if it's meaningful to say that a modern westerner's experience is generalizable (i.e. can accurately interpret) to the ancient Mediterranean peasant.

That's not what I am saying, so that is a strawman. ;-) What I'm saying is that if it doesn't enable us to understand the life of an ancient Mediterranean peasant, then nothing will. I don't mean to say that this understanding can come without model building and the appreciation of a major difference between us and them, though. I just say that this model building cannot get started if there is not a substantial amount of shared stuff (somewhat like in Neil's model, except I hold that there is less shared).

p.s. I apologize for attributing J.P's quote to you. I understand you agree with him, though, so the substantial point about a radical difference stands.

[BronzeArcher]

Sorry, I've been busy with catching up, and family is coming up for who knows how long.

I have a really long post in my mind but I'm not sure if it'll be as helpful as it is long. Basically, I'm not saying anything significantly different from the basic hermeneutics that Malina/Rohrbaugh use. The content of my concept of "different" is defined by recontextualization material.

Also simplistically, I think asking about the process that we come to understand another worldview is quite similar to asking how literature allows one to live another life. Except that one can get extremely indepth with fieldwork. I think we have the ability to suspend our own beliefs (not entirely, of course), and eventually--through thesis-formulation and testing in experience--have a fairly accurate model of another worldview. I'm thinking of the contextualization principle, which basically is about learning as much about a culture as possible, so that everything studied is properly contextualized within the culture. For example, the Bali cockfights in terms of what roles it plays in culture, what it affects, what affects it, and so on. The more one successfully contextualizes, the better one understands any given aspect. So. . . I'm getting distracted. I think of it as one huge enterprise of model construction and testing. Not testing in a rigorous, clearly defined sense, but the sense of testing that one thinks (un/consciously) "I'll try this" and observes the effects. How does one learn to fit into a different society? Observation, model construction, testing. . .