Mind is not reduceable to brain

[MattMurdock]

I recall a comment regarding the past instances of a phenomena having been thought to have supernatural origins, but then science eventually explaining it. I don't deny that. Lightning is one example. With consciousness though we are, again, looking at a different train of thought.

And it seems that we should not simply assume metaphysical naturalism as a worldview before the debate has even started, which is precisely what I see too many people doing. Is the proponent of whatever form of dualism simply saying, "Science hasn't explained this yet, therefore dualism is true?"

I have yet to see that argument presented. Rather, what actually is being argued that is that metaphysical naturalism does not have the resources within its worldview to explain mental phenomena. It is being argued that there cannot be a completely physical explanation for consciousness.

We may, through neuroscience, come to a much richer understanding of different phenomena pertaining to consciousness and the thoughts associated with our brain patterns. I expect that we will. But is that going to equate to explaining how a congregate of atoms has a thought when assembled this way? A scientist can look at my brain, put electrodes to it, and monitor certain patterns in order to infer that I am angry. That scientist cannot, however, see the thought I am having concerning my disappointment towards a friend who made a bad choice which is causing that anger. He only sees physical reflections of those thoughts. On dualism, whatever form it takes, we expect correlations with the brain. So naturally neuroscience will help us understand the phenomenon of consciousness. Explaining how consciousness exists though? That is another matter.

I can take water, carbon, lime, ammonia, salt, salt-peter, phosphorus, sulfur, silicon, iron, and all of the trace elements, throw them together, and should I expect consciousness? No, but then again, they have to be arranged a certain way, to give us the structures of the brain, the microtubules, and so on. I, as a person, only know of one person. Is it possible that that person comes from any of that? Is that mind given birth to by the interactions of neurons and microtubules?

Obviously, I'm no neuroscientist. But there are plenty of neuroscientists who share my befuddlement, so much so that they are convinced that the mind and the brain cannot be one and the same. I share that same line of thinking.

[shunyadragon]

Huh? If science isn't quantifying and then measuring, then what is it doing?

Science.

Don't know what you mean by Newtonian but I think what I'm looking for is pretty simple from a scientific standpoint. If science wants to explain subjective experience ("what it's like") then it needs to be able to quantify and measure it. Right? Otherwise it's just finding "nebulous, vague and poorly defined" correlations.

No. Not everything in science is simply quantifying "things." observing the qualities and behavioral properties of "things" does not necessarily need to quantify "things." The only criteria for science is being to falsify theories and hypothesis with scientific methods, and that includes falsifying both quantities and qualities concerning the relationship between the brain and the mind and consciousness. Your still stuck in an ancient antiquated Newtonian view of science with your religious agenda showing through the cracks..

So? Sure, some monkeys have been shown to be self aware. That's not the issue. The issue is what it's like to be that monkey.

No problem science has spent many years studying monkeys as to what it is like to be monkeys.

Sure, complexity seems to be engendering consciousness. So what's going on there? From a physicalism standpoint there is no categorical difference between what a thermostat does and the human brain does. Just a level of complexity. The thermostat senses temperature and makes a decision. The human senses temperature and flips the switch to turn on the heater. But most people would say that there is something added to the human, the "what it's like" to be cold. What made the difference? Some would say that consciousness emerges (whatever that means) from the higher level of complexity. OK, but if all physical events come about through either chance or necessity (a physicalist maxim) for both the thermostat and the human brain, what's going on differently? Science needs an empirical approach to finding "what is different" and collecting data on it.

Science has had methods and continues to develop methods on empirical approaches to finding data concerning "what is different."

Ok, so you have a problem with ways certain people tend to think. So do I. If their arguments aren't sound they can be dismissed. However, I think you are misreading what is going on here for many serious minded thinkers. Science often progresses from the "nebulous, vague and poorly defined". I think scientists often look at current theories, methods, data, and interpretations and vaguely think, "there is something wrong with the current theory". It's an intuitive sense engendered by years of experience that tells a scientist to look at this differently. From there they may refine that vague sense, formulate an alternative hypothesis and then get specific about ways to take measurements and test it. Major breakthroughs in science have come about this way.

I think what some thinkers are doing with the issue of phenomenal consciousness is pointing out things that may need to be addressed. They are not necessarily trying to put a limit on science.

Things claimed to be needed to be addressed concerning philosophical and theological do not concern science unless they can be falsified as theories and hypothesis. You do not need to quantify things to falsify theories and hypothesis.

Your statements and those of the Chalmers certainly do try to put limits on science concerning the relationship. 'Thinkers' in philosophy do not do science.

Chalmers, for instance, is exploring information approaches to explaining conscious experience which would have a scientific element. I think it is perfectly reasonable and healthy for science to raise doubts about how it's done and its definitions. It happened in quantum physics. It appears to some serious thinkers (both scientists and philosophers) that subjective experience is a challenge for the way science is approaching it now. So, unless scientists and philosophers want to ignore the issue or deny it's existence, then show how it's not really an issue or come up with some new ideas on how to approach it. Figure out a way to measure subjective experience.

Chalmers is not a qualified scientist to even comment on what science is capable or not capable of concerning the relationship between the brain, and the mind and consciousness. He does not have a degree in 'cognitive sciences.' He is a philosopher who plays in a rock band.

Science does not have to specifically measure subjective experiences. It can very accurately observe subjective behavior and observe its relationship to neural activity of the brain, and falsify hypothesis concerning this relationship.

[Tassman]

I recall a comment regarding the past instances of a phenomena having been thought to have supernatural origins, but then science eventually explaining it. I don't deny that. Lightning is one example. With consciousness though we are, again, looking at a different train of thought.

And it seems that we should not simply assume metaphysical naturalism as a worldview before the debate has even started, which is precisely what I see too many people doing. Is the proponent of whatever form of dualism simply saying, "Science hasn't explained this yet, therefore dualism is true?"

I have yet to see that argument presented. Rather, what actually is being argued that is that metaphysical naturalism does not have the resources within its worldview to explain mental phenomena. It is being argued that there cannot be a completely physical explanation for consciousness.

This is just an Argument from Ignorance.

We may, through neuroscience, come to a much richer understanding of different phenomena pertaining to consciousness and the thoughts associated with our brain patterns. I expect that we will. But is that going to equate to explaining how a congregate of atoms has a thought when assembled this way? A scientist can look at my brain, put electrodes to it, and monitor certain patterns in order to infer that I am angry. That scientist cannot, however, see the thought I am having concerning my disappointment towards a friend who made a bad choice which is causing that anger. He only sees physical reflections of those thoughts. On dualism, whatever form it takes, we expect correlations with the brain. So naturally neuroscience will help us understand the phenomenon of consciousness. Explaining how consciousness exists though? That is another matter.

I can take water, carbon, lime, ammonia, salt, salt-peter, phosphorus, sulfur, silicon, iron, and all of the trace elements, throw them together, and should I expect consciousness? No, but then again, they have to be arranged a certain way, to give us the structures of the brain, the microtubules, and so on. I, as a person, only know of one person. Is it possible that that person comes from any of that? Is that mind given birth to by the interactions of neurons and microtubules?

Obviously, I'm no neuroscientist. But there are plenty of neuroscientists who share my befuddlement, so much so that they are convinced that the mind and the brain cannot be one and the same. I share that same line of thinking.

Besides, the notorious problems with the supposed transactions at that dualistic interface are as good as a reductio ad absurdum of the view

[Jim B.]

Chalmers is not a qualified scientist to even comment on what science is capable or not capable of concerning the relationship between the brain, and the mind and consciousness. He does not have a degree in 'cognitive sciences.' He is a philosopher who plays in a rock band.

This is appeal to authority. I prefer to actually look at the content of what someone is claiming and the evidence used to support it rather than at their credentials. You're begging the question, but that's like saying that you're typing something. BTW, Dennett is a philosopher as well. To be consistent, I am sure you discredit his conclusions as well.

[Jim B.]

Besides, the notorious problems with the supposed transactions at that dualistic interface are as good as a reductio ad absurdum of the view

We don't have to assume a "supernatural explanation" for consciousness to resist physical reduction of consciousness to brain states. You seem to think that there is only identity theory and substance dualism. There are other options....

[shunyadragon]

We don't have to assume a "supernatural explanation" for consciousness to resist physical reduction of consciousness to brain states. You seem to think that there is only identity theory and substance dualism. There are other options....

What other options . . . ?

[shunyadragon]

This is appeal to authority.

No it is a rejection of someone who is not remotely qualified to comment on what science is capable of or not.

I prefer to actually look at the content of what someone is claiming and the evidence used to support it rather than at their credentials.

The content is not worthy either, because it does not take into consideration the actual current research concerning the relationship between the mind and the brain. Actually if anything Chalmers 'appeals to ignorance' claiming the lack of knowledge justifies his position.

You're begging the question, but that's like saying that you're typing something. BTW, Dennett is a philosopher as well. To be consistent, I am sure you discredit his conclusions as well.

Actually I prefer the actual scientists who are involved in the nuts and bolts of the research of the relationship between the mind and the brain. Examples are in many universities such as: http://brainandmind.weill.cornell.edu/, sydney.edu.au/brain-mind/, or https://www.uottawa.ca/brain/research.

[Jim B.]

What other options . . . ?

Emergent properties dualism, substance monism, dual aspect theories...

[Jim B.]

No it is a rejection of someone who is not remotely qualified to comment on what science is capable of or not.

He is a cognitive scientist as well, just as Dennett is. Are you equally skeptical of Dennett's theories of consciounsess? And I doubt that actual scientists are the most qualified to comment on what science is or is not capable of. If they do deliver an opinion on this question, they do so as philosophers of science and not as scientists per se. Research scientists are not generally in the business of speculating about the conceptual possibilities or boundary conditions of their own disciplines. Practitioners in nearly all disciplines are not concerned with such questions. That's why we have these disciplines such as "philosophy of science."

It is appeal to authority because you are using the credentials of someone as a qualifying or disqualifying criterion in whether to take their views seriously. It is begging the question because the question is and has always been whether or not consciousness is, in principle, explainable in terms of current physical theory. You embed the assumption that it is in one of the premises in your argument that it is explainable in terms of current physical theory.

"Identity theory", whether token or type, is a philosophical position and has to be argued for as such. It's a conceptual question and no amount of correlational data will make that fact go away.

You seem to have this idea that there is "hard scientific data" over here and theology and philosophy and airy fairy speculation over there. This is simplistic. Science does not work this way. Science and philosophy interpenetrate in various ways at various levels. Scientific data are not self-interpreting. This is why science is rife with heated debates and controversies.

Chalmers' arguments are not an "appeal to ignorance." We've been over this before. There is a crucial difference between absence of evidence and evidence of absence that you seem incapable and/or unwilling to understand. (I'm guessing it's the latter, just to be charitable.)

The content is not worthy either, because it does not take into consideration the actual current research concerning the relationship between the mind and the brain. Actually if anything Chalmers 'appeals to ignorance' claiming the lack of knowledge justifies his position.

I am curious how you know what he takes into consideration and what he does not. And please don't respond in your usual question-begging manner "Because if he knew what to take into consideration, he would agree with me!" Please just this once try using independent reasons to support your argument.

[shunyadragon]

He is a cognitive scientist as well, just as Dennett is. Are you equally skeptical of Dennett's theories of consciounsess? And I doubt that actual scientists are the most qualified to comment on what science is or is not capable of. If they do deliver an opinion on this question, they do so as philosophers of science and not as scientists per se. Research scientists are not generally in the business of speculating about the conceptual possibilities or boundary conditions of their own disciplines. Practitioners in nearly all disciplines are not concerned with such questions. That's why we have these disciplines such as "philosophy of science."

Philosophy of Science is not a degree in science, which requires the Chemistry, Biology, and the advanced neurology, niochemistry for research on the actual scientific physical relationship between the brain and the mind.

I already gave my preferences as to the actual science of the relationship, and it is not Dennett nor Chalmers.

It is appeal to authority because you are using the credentials of someone as a qualifying or disqualifying criterion in whether to take their views seriously.

It is a well reasoned appeal to authority. I would not ask a philosopher to diagnose a disease if I had one.

It is begging the question because the question is and has always been whether or not consciousness is, in principle, explainable in terms of current physical theory. You embed the assumption that it is in one of the premises in your argument that it is explainable in terms of current physical theory.

Yes the boldded above has always been the question. No begging the question here. The evidence is sufficient at this point to conclude that mind and the brain are biologically related. One may argue that there is insufficient knowledge to absolutely conclude that there may be another relationship that explains the mind, but we have found nothing objective that would indicate a third party. There is nothing has been discovered in the research that does not support the physical relationship between the brain and the mind.

"Identity theory", whether token or type, is a philosophical position and has to be argued for as such. It's a conceptual question and no amount of correlational data will make that fact go away.

Ahhh . . . an excellent example of an appeal to ignorance, but . . .

You seem to have this idea that there is "hard scientific data" over here and theology and philosophy and airy fairy speculation over there. This is simplistic. Science does not work this way. Science and philosophy interpenetrate in various ways at various levels. Scientific data are not self-interpreting. This is why science is rife with heated debates and controversies.

No, but if we are talking science concerning the relationship between the brain and the mind I refer to scientists as primary sources.

Chalmers' arguments are not an "appeal to ignorance." We've been over this before. There is a crucial difference between absence of evidence and evidence of absence that you seem incapable and/or unwilling to understand. (I'm guessing it's the latter, just to be charitable.)

Chalmers appeals to an 'absence of evidence' therefore an appeal to ignorance. His description claim of the 'explanatory gap' is specifically an argument from ignorance as far as the science is concerned.

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Chalmers

Chalmers argues for an "explanatory gap" from the objective to the subjective, and criticizes physical explanations of mental experience, making him a dualist. Chalmers characterizes his view as "naturalistic dualism": naturalistic because he believes mental states are caused by physical systems (such as brains); dualist because he believes mental states are ontologically distinct from and not reducible to physical systems.

© Copyright Original Source

Source: http://consc.net/chalmers/

Research

When I have time and run out of excuses, I sometimes do some real work. I've written articles on consciousness, metaphysics and meaning, AI and computation, and various other topics in philosophy and cognitive science (see top of page). Consciousness is my first love, and it's what I always come back to, but one of the nice things about being a philosopher is that one is allowed to be interested in all sorts of things. (If you get interested in X, you just say "I'm working on the philosophy of X"). I do a lot of fairly technical philosophy (philosophy of language, metaphysics, epistemology) as well as being closely involved with work in science (neuroscience, psychology, AI, physics).

© Copyright Original Source

No much 'real science' above!

[Jim B.]

Philosophy of Science is not a degree in science, which requires the Chemistry, Biology, and the advanced neurology, niochemistry for research on the actual scientific physical relationship between the brain and the mind.

Who ever implied that it was a degree in science???

It is a well reasoned appeal to authority. I would not ask a philosopher to diagnose a disease if I had one.

You're begging the question once again. The question at issue here is whether or not consciousness is analogous to a "physical disease" at all.

Yes the boldded above has always been the question. No begging the question here. The evidence is sufficient at this point to conclude that mind and the brain are biologically related. One may argue that there is insufficient knowledge to absolutely conclude that there may be another relationship that explains the mind, but we have found nothing objective that would indicate a third party. There is nothing has been discovered in the research that does not support the physical relationship between the brain and the mind.

Are you being serious? I never denied that the two are biologically related. How on earth would you ever get the idea that I did?! Are you actually a non-reductionist posing as a reductionist just to discredit reductionism?

Ahhh . . . an excellent example of an appeal to ignorance, but . . .

Appeal to ignorance is the claim that because we do not know, therefore we cannot know. This has no bearing on the non-reductionist arguments at all. BTW, your citation from SEP also bears no relation to this discussion.

No, but if we are talking science concerning the relationship between the brain and the mind I refer to scientists as primary sources.

SO DO I! Are you serious?

Chalmers appeals to an 'absence of evidence' therefore an appeal to ignorance. His description claim of the 'explanatory gap' is specifically an argument from ignorance as far as the science is concerned.

You continue to misunderstand and misconstrue even the most rudimentary points of the topic. He's not denying any of the claims you've made so far in this post. The points he and other non-reductionists are making are subtler than that. It has to do with the nature of the relationship: is it a priori, a posteriori, causal, constitutive, necessary, contingent? Any of these options are equally compatible with the very same scientific data, so he is not arguing based on a gap or ignorance of scientific data. It has to do with how to interpret the data in terms of the above kinds of categories, what the data mean in terms of this type of relation.

No much 'real science' above!

Not much non-question-begging above! Are cognitive scientists who work with robotics and neural networks not doing 'real science' in your view?

Here's the deal. Chalmers may be all wrong. I don't know. Neither do you, nor anyone else. The thing is, when we discuss a topic such as this, we should try as best we can to check our biases at the door. We ought to make the best faith effort to try to understand the nature and scope of the issue and the various points of view involved. When I started reading about this topic over 20 years ago, I was disposed toward reductionism. I was persuaded by Dennett, to some extent. But I tried to read all sides and to understand all sides, even if I rejected them. I soon realized that I couldn;t assume that this was a purely empirical matter without begging the question, that the question might not cut along empirical lines alone, that it was subtler than that. I had to check my "empirical bias" at the door, so to speak, to give other sides a fair hearing.

What's crucial to remember is that everyone weighing in on this question, whether philosophers, neuroscientists, or whatever, to be taken seriously, have to at least try to understand opposing viewpoints, and then they have to mount an actual argument for their own views. Everyone has to mount an actual argument, even those that rely heavily on empirical data for support. It's senseless to say "I believe x because....SCIENCE!" You have to carry your own weight by making your own argument which in turn ought to reflect an honest attempt to understand opposing positions.

I get the impression that you may not know that much about this topic, even your own position! (as far as i can try to discern an actual position) But you dismiss every other position without knowing much about it. This is not fair. You're not serious.

[seer]

I get the impression that you may not know that much about this topic, even your own position! (as far as i can try to discern an actual position) But you dismiss every other position without knowing much about it.

I'm shocked!

[shunyadragon]

Who ever implied that it was a degree in science???

You described him a as a cognitive scientist. I describe him more correctly as a cognitive philosopher. I consider Cognitive as an interdisciplinary discipline that requires scientific competence involved without the vague undefined 'explanatory gaps.'

You're begging the question once again. The question at issue here is whether or not consciousness is analogous to a "physical disease" at all.

It was an analogy only, get serious.

Are you being serious? I never denied that the two are biologically related. How on earth would you ever get the idea that I did?! Are you actually a non-reductionist posing as a reductionist just to discredit reductionism?

as far as the science goes, I am a reductionist entirely. I see no evidence that would remotely falsify that is not so. Until such evidence presents itself, I am waiting . . .

Appeal to ignorance is the claim that because we do not know, therefore we cannot know. This has no bearing on the non-reductionist arguments at all. BTW, your citation from SEP also bears no relation to this discussion.

Nothing subtle here. It has bearing on what is claimed to be 'explanatory gaps' in science. You soft selling the reality of Chalmer's claims:

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Chalmers

Chalmers argues that consciousness is a fundamental property ontologically autonomous of any known (or even possible) physical properties, and that there may be lawlike rules which he terms "psychophysical laws" that determine which physical systems are associated with which types of qualia. He further speculates that all information-bearing systems may be conscious, leading him to entertain the possibility of conscious thermostats and a qualified panpsychism he calls panprotopsychism. Chalmers maintains a formal agnosticism on the issue, even conceding that the viability of panpsychism places him at odds with the majority of his contemporaries.

© Copyright Original Source

You continue to misunderstand and misconstrue even the most rudimentary points of the topic. He's not denying any of the claims you've made so far in this post. The points he and other non-reductionists are making are subtler than that. It has to do with the nature of the relationship: is it a priori, a posteriori, causal, constitutive, necessary, contingent? Any of these options are equally compatible with the very same scientific data, so he is not arguing based on a gap or ignorance of scientific data. It has to do with how to interpret the data in terms of the above kinds of categories, what the data mean in terms of this type of relation.

Your options may well be compatible with science, but that is not the issue.

He explicitly claims 'explanatory gaps in science'

You poorly defined foggy subtleties remain problematic and not very meaningful concerning the discussion as in our discussion before. Nothing has changed, nor Chalmers actual claims.

Not much non-question-begging above! Are cognitive scientists who work with robotics and neural networks not doing 'real science' in your view?

NO! Scientists dealing with robotics and (artificial) neuron network are NOT dealing with this issue. The university departments I cited did not deal with these topics. Are you changing and broadening the subject here. Biological scientists that actually research of the biological and and specifically the neurological relationship between the mind and the brain takes precedence over the 'thinking' speculation of philosophers.

Here's the deal. Chalmers may be all wrong. I don't know. Neither do you, nor anyone else.

True as the sky is Carolina Blue at noon on a clear day on the 4th of July. That is why I do not give Chalmers much traction on the issue as a philosopher, not a cognitive biological scientist.

The thing is, when we discuss a topic such as this, we should try as best we can to check our biases at the door. We ought to make the best faith effort to try to understand the nature and scope of the issue and the various points of view involved. When I started reading about this topic over 20 years ago, I was disposed toward reductionism. I was persuaded by Dennett, to some extent. But I tried to read all sides and to understand all sides, even if I rejected them. I soon realized that I couldn't assume that this was a purely empirical matter without begging the question, that the question might not cut along empirical lines alone, that it was subtler than that. I had to check my "empirical bias" at the door, so to speak, to give other sides a fair hearing.

I like Dennett, because he provides more actual references on science, but no, I do not rely on Dennett for my actual argument.

I do not believe you 'check you bias at the door. It is quite apparent that biases are apparent and human on all sides. Yes, my bias is toward actual biological science research by those who are competent concerning the biology of the neurological system, and what the research indicates.

It is this foggy vague subtle issues you claim to bring to the table, because you have not put forward anything substantive to support this.

For these reason I remain disposed to reductionism, unless you can come up with something more than subtle issues.

[quote] What's crucial to remember is that everyone weighing in on this question, whether philosophers, neuroscientists, or whatever, to be taken seriously, have to at least try to understand opposing viewpoints, and then they have to mount an actual argument for their own views. Everyone has to mount an actual argument, even those that rely heavily on empirical data for support. It's senseless to say "I believe x because....SCIENCE!" You have to carry your own weight by making your own argument which in turn ought to reflect an honest attempt to understand opposing positions.

I get the impression that you may not know that much about this topic, even your own position! (as far as i can try to discern an actual position) But you dismiss every other position without knowing much about it. This is not fair. You're not serious.

I apparently no more than you considering Chalmers claims above, which are more blatant than subtle.

I do not necessarily believe X because scientist believe X. You hyperventalation and exaggeration of my view is ridiculous. I admittedly weigh heavily on the scientific biological work, because it the real nuts and bolts of the issue. I read and study the philosophers, but they too have to step forward and integrate the science in their view without posing an argument of 'explanatory gaps.'