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  • #16
    Originally posted by hedrick View Post
    A more delicate question is whether Christ is one or two beings. As Christology was finally formulated, Christ has a separate human will with separate human actions. In a common-language sense I think it’s clear that Jesus is a human being. However I’m not aware of classical theology speaking of Christ as two beings. I think it could be justified.
    Christ is one being/person with two distinct natures. The disagreement is one will or two. There is human will and divine will that can be described. One will being one person.
    See this discussion: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/monotheletism
    . . . the gospel of Christ: for it is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth; . . . -- Romans 1:16 KJV

    . . . that Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures; And that he was buried, and that he rose again the third day according to the scriptures: . . . -- 1 Corinthians 15:3-4 KJV

    Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ is born of God: . . . -- 1 John 5:1 KJV

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    • #17
      Originally posted by 37818 View Post
      Christ is one being/person with two distinct natures. The disagreement is one will or two. There is human will and divine will that can be described. One will being one person.
      See this discussion: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/monotheletism
      Interesting. I hadn’t realized that Craig is a monothelite.

      My opinion on the matter is that associating will with person is using a modern concept of what person means. I believe that “person” as used in the Trinity and Incarnation is a technical definition which isn’t quite the same as the way we use person in normal discussion.

      The problem with the monothelite position is that without a human will it’s hard to see Jesus as being an actual human being. I understand that some Christians don’t see Jesus as an actual human being, but see the Logos as the only being. In that concept the Logos incorporates human nature in the abstract, but not an actual human being. I think concepts similar to monothelite were actually pretty common in ancient theology, even though they were rejected in the end.

      This, however, seems completely unlike the Jesus we see in Scripture.

      I note from other answers that he believes Jesus was omniscient, though he may not have been conscious of it. Since his definition of omniscience is that for every proposition the person knows its truth, it seems baffling how one could be omniscient and not know it. This also seems to make Mat 24:36 a serious problem.

      Finally it appears from yet another answer that he think the the Logos is the soul of Jesus' human existence. This, of course, is Apolliarian, leaving Jesus without a whole human nature. He seems to think that anything else is Nestorian. Given a choice between his docetic position and Nestorianism, I would certainly take the latter, though most theologians think there's a way to avoid both.
      Last edited by hedrick; 05-28-2016, 05:21 PM.

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      • #18
        Originally posted by JohnMartin View Post
        Question - What would be the difference between a being and a person?

        Answer - being in God is the divine nature. God is being. A person is understood diversely as -

        1) a hypostases or supposit of rational nature. A hypostases is a concrete thing, for example a a chair existing in the real is a concrete thing. Likewise a person is a concrete thing existing in the real, and therefore a hypostases. A person is also different from a chair for a person is rational, and thereby has the spiritual powers of intellect and will. A person is then a concrete thing, existing in the real, with an intellect and will.

        If this definition is transferred to the notion of a divine person, each person is then a concrete thing with an intellect and a will. Yet in God, there is only one intellect and one will, for God is not composed of parts, nor has accidental perfections. A divine person is also a hypostases or supposit as a concrete thing. Such means the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are three, concrete things that exist in the real. Each concrete thing existing in the real is really distinct from the other. The Father is not the Son, nor the Holy Spirit and so on. The Father is then a concrete thing with an intellect and will. This definition does tell us something of the nature of a divine person, but the definition is lacking according to the manner in which 1) the Father's personhood is not that of the Son and Holy Spirit, and 2) the Father's intellect and will is identical to that of the Son and Holy Spirit. Likewise for the Son and Holy Spirit.

        2) that which is incommunicable. A person owns everything which it has. For example Peter owns his arms, legs, eye, heart, thoughts, willing and actions. Each of these parts can be communicated to another. Such as an idea. Peter can have an idea, which is known to him and is therefore Peter's idea. Peter can then also express the idea to another and thereby communicates the idea to another. Likewise Peter can give every other part of himself to another. For example, Peter can give all of his actions to another as to an employer.

        However, there is something Peter cannot communicate, or give to another. That which cannot be communicated to another is Peter's person. Peter is the name we give to the person, which is that that cannot be given to another. When Peter gives, it is Peter, and not another person that gives. Peter then cannot give something of himself that is Peter, for there is not person, prior to the person of Peter, by which Peter can be given to anther. Peter, then is the name given to the personhood of the rational substance, which is fundamentally incommunicable.

        When applied to God, the divine person is that which cannot be communicated to another within God. The Fathers, intellect, will, being, and life are all communicated to the Son and the Holy Spirit. Yet the Father as a person, cannot communicate His own distinct personhood to another divine person. For the Father is, and always will be a distinct, incommunicable being, other than the Son and the Holy Spirit. Like wise for the Son and the Holy Spirit.

        3) the first subject of attribution. The first subject is that subject which is before all others. A second subject is that which depends upon the first subject as a first. For example, my hand is the subject of my fingers. My fingers are dependent upon my hand as a third subject is dependent upon a second subject. The hand is then in turn dependent upon the first subject, which is the owner of all other subjects. The first subject, is the person that owns all the attributes of the man, called Peter. Peter has hands, legs and arms and habits, which are all owned by Peter. All these things are known as attributes. Therefore Peter, is the first subject of attribution, and is therefore the human person, who owns all of the attributes.

        When applied to God, the F/S/HS all own the divine attributes. The divine persons who own the divine attributes are the first subjects of attribution. Therefore in God, there are three, first subjects of attribution.

        4) Substantial relation. There is no examples in creation of a substantial relation. We do however have examples of accidental relation. Predicamental relation occurs when a substance has an accidental being towards another, whereby that relational (accidental) being is not the natural power of the substance. For example a Father has an accidental relation to the Son. The Father as man, is naturally a rational animal, and is not thereby naturally a Father. This means, man as the nature of man, is rational animal, and man as man is not from the nature of man, a father. In this way, fatherhood, motherhood, sonship and daughterhood are all accidental to the nature of man, and are thereby predicated of man. For example, Peter is a father, Jane is a mother. Both the predicates of father and mother indicate they are accidental to the nature of man.

        Transcendental relation occurs when there is a relation within a thing that is ordered to act towards another, from the nature of a thing. For example, the eye is an organ of sight and is thereby from the nature of eye, ordered towards another thing - illuminated colour. Similarly, the other senses are also ordered towards another, and thereby are transcendentally related to another, as to an object.

        In God there are no accidents. Therefore in God, there is neither predicamental, nor transcendental relation. All in God is substance. Yet in God it has been revealed that there is opposition and therefore relation. Each relation in God is not accidental, but substantial. Therefore in God, there are three persons, whereby each person is defined as a substantial relation. The F is a substantial relation to the Son. The Son is a substantial relation to the Father, etc. There are four relations in God of F->S, S->F, F&S->HS, and HS->F&S. Each relation, of F/S/HS indicates a divine person as a being towards another.

        Now as to the question of What would be the difference between a being and a person? The differences are according to manner of defining person within God.

        1) a hypostases or supposit of rational nature. A divine person is a hypostases. The divine being is the being had in common with the three divine hypostases.

        2) that which is incommunicable. A divine person is that which is incommunicable. The divine being is that being which is communicated to each of the divine persons.

        3) the first subject of attribution. A divine person is that first subject of the divine attributes. The divine being is owned by three divine, first subjects of the F/S and HS.

        4) Substantial relation. A divine person is a substantial being towards another. The divine being of each person is not had as a being towards another, but as being had is common. The divine person is then a mode of being, particular to each person, whereby the divine being had in common is being had as essence.

        JM
        What would be the distinction between these things?

        one being and three persons

        one dog nature and three dogs

        Comment


        • #19
          Originally posted by 37818 View Post
          The short answer no. God is one being. Persons are beings. God is referred to as one person. God is also known by three persons who are not the same persons but are the very same God. In this latter statement there is a distinction between God and personhood. Three divine persons who are the one and the same God.

          God being one being without parts or division: ". . . The LORD our God [is] one LORD: . . ." -- Deuteronomy 6:4.

          That being said, the Hebrew translated "one" can refer to a group or a set (Genesis 2:24, "one flesh"; Numbers 13:23, "one cluster of grapes").

          In the NT God the Father (one person) (1 Corinthians 8:6).

          Christ being understood to be called God (Ephesians 5:5, Darby Translation).
          There are other examples (John 1:1,3, 10, 14; Hebrews 1:8).

          That Christ, in the incarnation, being both fully human and remaining fully God (John 20:28).

          The Holy Spirit being referred to as God (Acts 5:3-4).

          There are far more references and arguments that require the Trinity explanation and Christ being one person with two distinct natures.
          There is one God and three divine persons. The definitions of the words "God" and "person" are not the same. God is one in one sense and three in another sense.

          Comment


          • #20
            Originally posted by hedrick View Post
            A more delicate question is whether Christ is one or two beings. As Christology was finally formulated, Christ has a separate human will with separate human actions. In a common-language sense I think it’s clear that Jesus is a human being. However I’m not aware of classical theology speaking of Christ as two beings. I think it could be justified.
            I have always heard that Christ is one person with two natures.

            Comment


            • #21
              Originally posted by NorrinRadd View Post
              As usual, I find this whole discussion only reaffirms my conviction that human language is inadequate to meaningfully characterize the details of the Trinity and the Incarnation (which two doctrines are, IMO, inextricably linked).
              We cannot fully comprehend the Trinity, but at least it can be stated in such a way to avoid contradiction.

              Comment


              • #22
                Originally posted by Jaxb View Post
                What would be the distinction between these things?

                one being and three persons
                One being and three persons are distinct according to mode of being. Being by essence is the nature of God. Being by divine supposit is the nature of personal being in God. being by essence and being by supposit are both being, yet diverse according to manner by which being is had in God. Hence the modes of being in God distinguish the essence from person in God.

                one dog nature and three dogs
                The one dog nature is had in common with the three dogs. The three dogs are distinct according to the seal of matter as a cause of each dog being an individual dog. A dog is not a person, for a dog is not a rational animal, but a sentient animal. As sentient, the dog does not have an intellect and will. A dog is therefore not distinct from another dog according to distinct supposit of intellectual nature, but a distinct supposit of sentient nature, sealed by matter.

                Some good questions here. Keep them coming.

                JM

                Comment


                • #23
                  Originally posted by Jaxb View Post
                  We cannot fully comprehend the Trinity, but at least it can be stated in such a way to avoid contradiction.
                  We can also know something about the Trinity to support faith. The Christian faith is not fidistic, whereby faith is the only way to know of the Trinity. The Trinity is believed by faith, but also understood by reason, even though our understanding is weak and incomplete.

                  JM

                  Comment


                  • #24
                    Originally posted by NorrinRadd View Post
                    As usual, I find this whole discussion only reaffirms my conviction that human language is inadequate to meaningfully characterize the details of the Trinity and the Incarnation (which two doctrines are, IMO, inextricably linked).
                    Human language is inadequate to fully understand the mysteries of the Trinity and incarnation, but any inadequacy is to be taken with the truths we can understand about the revelation given. We do know something of the following - three, person, nature, being, one, relation, substance, accident, infinite, life, intellect, will, and several other concepts. We can use such knowledge to develop a knowledge of those mysteries, whilst knowing that such mysteries we never be fully comprehended in this life.

                    A mystery is intelligible, in so far as it can be understood, and is not absurd or contradictory. A mystery is not fully comprehensible, as it cannot be fully understood. Any incomprehension does not destroy any comprehension we do have and any intelligibility within the mystery.

                    JM

                    Comment


                    • #25
                      Originally posted by hedrick View Post
                      A more delicate question is whether Christ is one or two beings. As Christology was finally formulated, Christ has a separate human will with separate human actions. In a common-language sense I think it’s clear that Jesus is a human being. However I’m not aware of classical theology speaking of Christ as two beings. I think it could be justified.
                      St Thomas says Christ had only one being - that of the Word. The being of the Word actualized the human nature of the Word, which is united to the divine nature. Even though it seems there are two beings in Christ, following upon two natures in Christ, yet two beings in Christ is a heterodox doctrine.

                      JM

                      Comment


                      • #26
                        Originally posted by JohnMartin View Post
                        St Thomas says Christ had only one being - that of the Word. The being of the Word actualized the human nature of the Word, which is united to the divine nature. Even though it seems there are two beings in Christ, following upon two natures in Christ, yet two beings in Christ is a heterodox doctrine.
                        I noted when I asked the question that it’s not entirely clear how to define “being” in this context. I’m not a Thomist, but in the section on the incarnation in the Summa, he sometimes treats the human nature as a kind of pseudo-hypostasis. I think whatever technical vocabulary was used historically, he’s treating the nature as a being. However as we’ll see, he doesn’t do that with complete consistency.

                        The clearest example of treating that human nature as a pseudo-hypostasis is Part 3, Q3, Art 7: Can one Person assume two individual natures? The answer is yes. He says that the Son could assume two distinct human natures. This makes it clear that he’s seeing the human nature as an individual. Otherwise there couldn’t be two of them. This is far from how "nature" is used in common speech.

                        Similarly in Part 3, Q2, Art 2, he says that the Word assumed the human nature not in general but in an individual. However he argues that this individual is not a person because it doesn’t exist by itself but rather in a more perfect thing, i.e. the incarnate Word. “And hence, too, this is signified by a "person" being defined as "an individual substance," for the hand is not a complete substance, but part of a substance. Therefore, although this human nature is a kind of individual in the genus of substance, it has not its own personality, because it does not exist separately, but in something more perfect, viz. in the Person of the Word. Therefore the union took place in the person.”

                        I don’t think that he used this terminology with complete consistency. In Part 3, Q4, Art 2, reply to Obj 1, he uses the exact same language about the Word assuming human nature in an individual, but this individual is the Logos. Because in this analysis there’s no separate human individual, he refuses to say that “a man” was assumed.

                        I believe the language in 3.2.2 is sufficiently clear that it has to be speaking of an individual as separate from the Word, since otherwise it makes no sense to argue that it isn’t a Person because it isn’t complete. Yet in 3.4.2 it is equally explicit that the individual is the Word, because there is no separate human individual. This kind of inconsistency may mean that we can both find support for the idea that there is a human being and the idea that there is not.

                        Comment


                        • #27
                          Originally posted by hedrick View Post
                          I believe the language in 3.2.2 is sufficiently clear that it has to be speaking of an individual as separate from the Word, since otherwise it makes no sense to argue that it isn’t a Person because it isn’t complete. Yet in 3.4.2 it is equally explicit that the individual is the Word, because there is no separate human individual. This kind of inconsistency may mean that we can both find support for the idea that there is a human being and the idea that there is not.
                          You think so, only because you have been vague with your terms and have misunderstood what St Thomas said. I suggest you go and purchase a good dictionary of St Thomas and check the meaning of words such as logos, nature, individual, hypostasis etc before making an argument contrary to what St Thomas teaches. Try Bernard J. Wuellner, A Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy as a good source. Just do it for your own education to see what you got it right and where you can improve your own understanding of what St Thomas is saying.

                          St Thomas clearly teaches there is only one being in Christ, which is that of the Word. Hence any claims of a pseudo human nature in Christ is merely your own understanding of what St Thomas has said in other parts of the summa, made apart from the direct argument for only one being in Christ. As there is only one being, then there is only one act in Christ. Therefore both the human and divine natures, though distinct, have the same fundamental act, which is the being of the Word.

                          The Word and the Logos are fundamentally the same notion, using different terms. The difference between Word and Logos is of no consequence with regard to your argument for a pseudo human nature in Christ. Even if there is evidence for your argument, you have not informed us of what a pseudo nature is. As far as I can tell, St Thomas never uses such terminology. In this manner, if you make the claim, then for others to take your claim seriously, you must bear the burden of demonstrating such a claim from St Thomas's writings.

                          It is good that you are thinking, but I believe your argument suffers from a lack of clarity concerning the definitions of your words used and projecting meanings into St Thomas that aren't there. Keep thinking, but to understand what St Thomas is saying, it is best to remain faithful to his clear teachings and use words the way he used them.

                          JM

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                          • #28
                            Originally posted by JohnMartin View Post
                            St Thomas says Christ had only one being - that of the Word. The being of the Word actualized the human nature of the Word, which is united to the divine nature. Even though it seems there are two beings in Christ, following upon two natures in Christ, yet two beings in Christ is a heterodox doctrine.
                            In a posting just above you defined God as one being with three persons.

                            It seems very odd to turn to the Incarnation and equate being with person. You’re now saying that the Logos is a being, after having denied it a couple of posts before. I don't think you want to say that Christ has one being, meaning the being of the Trinity, because making Christ the incarnation of the Trinity as a whole is Patripassian.

                            I actually think that this whole approach of dealing with theology in terms of metaphysics is a dead end. I don't think you can say anything non-trivial about God or Christ without ending up in self-contradiction, heresy, or both. With all due respect to Aquinas, who clearly did the best job one could hope to do.
                            Last edited by hedrick; 05-30-2016, 01:10 PM.

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                            • #29
                              Originally posted by hedrick View Post
                              ...

                              I actually think that this whole approach of dealing with theology in terms of metaphysics is a dead end. I don't think you can say anything non-trivial about God or Christ without ending up in self-contradiction, heresy, or both. With all due respect to Aquinas, who clearly did the best job one could hope to do.
                              Kind of my point earlier.
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                              • #30
                                Modalism is the theological doctrine that the Father, Son, and Spirit are not three distinct Persons, but rather three modes or forms of activity under which God manifests Himself.

                                Basil defended the "one in substance" three in person formula that destroyed the revitalized semi-Arian heresy arising at the time of the Council at Constantinople 381.

                                Don't let the word "mode" trick you into believing he was teaching modalism, most strongly recognized in the teachings of Sebellius (No not the 20th century Finnish composer), in the late 3rd century.

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