Proofs for the Existence of God

[JohnMartin]

Introduction

I have decided to introduce the proofs with a discussion on preliminary notions and then later move to the proofs. I will begin with some definitions taken from the Thomistic tradition of Thomas Aquinas.

Preliminary DefinitionsDoes God need to be demonstrated to Exist?

Demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through the cause, and is called "a priori," and this is to argue from what is prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a demonstration "a posteriori"; this is to argue from what is prior relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause. And from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the cause must pre-exist. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects which are known to us.

Is the existence of God demonstrable?

Demonstration is twofold. One which is through cause, and is called demonstration wherefore; and this is through what is prior simply. The other is through effect, and is called demonstration that, and this is through what is prior to us, for when some effect is more manifest to us than is its cause, we proceed through the effect to knowledge of the cause. But from whatsoever effect it can be demonstrated that the proper cause of it is (so long as its effects are known to us ); because since effects depend on cause, given the effect, it musts needs be that the cause pre-exist. Therefore, that God is, according as it is not self-evident to us, is demonstrable through effects known to us.

Principle of A posteriori Demonstration.The manner of Causation used in the demonstrationApplication of this theory.Conditions of this Demonstration

The demonstration of Gods existence is taken not according to a series of past causes, which are subordinated per accidens, but according to a series of causes now existing among which there is subordination per se. These demonstrations have ontological value as will be demonstrated below according to the following order 1. Subordination of Causes per se and 2. Metaphysical value of principles.

Demonstration that God is, is taken according to causes influencing now, and therefore existing now; so that, if there is a series of such causes, then each subsequent cause is subordinate per se to the preceding cause. For to demonstrate that God is requires the demonstration of a prime and universal cause which is causing now. This cannot be demonstrated according to a series of causes per accidens, such as a series of men generating, say grandfather, father, generating son. The generation of the son does not necessitate that grandfather exist now. Whereas a series subordinate per se requires all causes to cause now. For example the rock (A) is moved by the hand (B), which is moved by the arm (C), which is moved by the cerebral motor centre (D), which is moved by the will (E) and so on. According to this method E moves D moves C moves B to move A. So in this series if there is a first cause it is a cause acting now. A according to the principle of limited regress there is a first cause acting now.

Principle of Limited RegressInfinite Regression of accidental causes.

Causes per accidens may regress to infinity as past causes, according to the example of men generating. A man generating a son does not necessitate the grandfather or the first man be existing now. But even with this example there is still a prime cause, which has priority of perfection and causality over the world as the world, if it always existed, is only a contingent being and therefore requires for its existence the causation of a prime cause.

Metaphysical Value of principles.

[shunyadragon]

Terribly long and convoluted, and need spell check.

[37818]

Why doesn't existence need proof of its existence? And any entity contingent on existence is no God.

[JohnMartin]

The proofs are based on the notion of proper causation as explained above. Proper cause as necessarily required by the effect and differs from an accidental cause. Proper cause as primarily and immediately required, differs from every cause, even necessarily required, but only mediately or secondarily. Accordingly from movement it ought to be concluded to the necessary and prime universal movement, but not a prime being.

The five proofs are called ways as they do not demonstrate the physical be of God, but only the proposition that "God is" is to be affirmed as true. The attributes of God are subsequently proven following upon this truth.

Each way is composed of a minor and major premise. Each minor is a fact common to every being other than God, which is movement, caused causality, contingency of being, limited perfection and passive ordination. Each effect is a sign of dependence on a cause and ultimately a prime cause. Each proof is therefore materially dependent upon a fact but formally dependent upon the nature of that fact which will be determined in the proofs.

The major is a principle whereby the it becomes necessary to admit the prime proper cause of the fact. The principle is divided into the principle of efficient causality under five modes of causation and the principle of limited regress. The conclusion of each way states the existence of the prime proper cause of the fact whereby there is a prime unmoved movent, uncaused cause, absolutely necessary being, most perfect being and an unordered orderer. Each conclusion will suit the subsistent being alone, which will be shown below. This supreme truth is stated as God exists by existence which is himself.

The proofs of the existence of God

The following are the five ways from the Summa Theologica. The five ways may be stated on other manners to elaborate on points as required.

The First way

1. The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act.

For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it.

Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another.

If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; which is God.

The first way is more simply put as follows.

There is movement in the world, but whatever undergoes movement is moved by a second. And if this second is moved to move (not merely to be or to become), it must be moved by a third, which must be in order to move; and if this third is moved to move, it must be moved by a fourth and so on. But this series cannot regress to infinity because if there is none, which starts the series, then neither will there be any intermediate movements, nor will there be any movement. Therefore there must be a movent which starts movements and is therefore the prime movent, itself unmoved. But a prime movent itself unmoved is God. Therefore God is.

The Second way

2. The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible.

Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect.

Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, which is God.

The Second way is more simply put as follows.

There are efficient causes in the world, since they are not their do, are efficiently caused to cause (not merely to be and to become). But whatever is efficiently caused is caused by a second, which must be in the order of cause. And if this second is similarly caused, it is caused by a third, which is caused to cause and so on. But this series cannot regress to infinity because if there is none that is and supplies the causation of the series, then causation will never be found in the series, nor reach the end of the series. Therefore there must exist an efficient cause, which causes the causation of the whole series, and therefore is a prime efficient cause itself uncaused in causing which is God. Therefore God is.

The Third way

3. The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus.

We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence.

Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence--which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity which is God.

The Third way is more simply put as follows.

There do exist contingent beings. But every contingent being, if it is, has distinct from itself, an efficient cause, not only of its become, but also of its be. And if this efficient cause itself is a contingent being also of it there is such a cause, And if this cause also is contingent, also of it there must be such a cause. But this series cannot regress to infinity because since efficient causes subordinated with regard to be, are subordinated per se. Therefore there is outside the series of causes which are contingent beings, a cause which is necessary being. But a necessary being is either itself a prime cause, and therefore a prime being, self existent and so absolutely necessary, or supposes a prime cause, and therefore a prime being, self existent and so absolutely necessary, since in such causes there is no infinite regress. Therefore there is a prime cause, and therefore a prime being, self existent and so absolutely necessary., which is God.

The Fourth way

4. The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii.

Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.

The Fifth way

5. The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things, which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.

The following are summary arguments, which conclude that God is.

General proofArguments from actual essences of things

Since the essences of things of this observable world are really distinct from be, these essences are not beings by essence, but beings by participation. But those things which are beings by participation, require being by essence: as their extrinsic formal cause, and as their efficient cause. Therefore there exists essences, which are beings by participation, there must exist a being, which is being by essence. Therefore God is.

Argument form possible essences

There are possible real essences as real being is divided into actual real being and possible real being. Actual real essences exist, and therefore are possible, not only while they are actual but also before they exist, for then they are not nothing, but can be, that is, they are in potency to exist.

But possibles are objective potencies, which are objects of an intellect. Therefore there exists an intellect in which objective potencies are found, as in their ultimate foundation. Such potencies are only found in the ultimate intellect, as a created intellect cannot be the ultimate foundation can be the exemplar of natural things as such an intellect has human and angelic intellects have their objects from things.

Therefore an intellect, which knows possibles, as received by abstraction from existing things is not the exemplar (outstanding cause) of natural things. An intellect, which is the exemplary, (outstanding cause) of natural things must then have the objects of its knowledge from itself. This can only occur in an intellect, which is its own essence, through which all other things are known. This intellect is the divine intellect. Therefore God is.

Argument from the immutability of truth.

True judgements, whether contingent or universal, are immutably true. Contingent judgements, which are at some time true, remain immutably to have been then true. For example, if it said John is standing and later he is found to be sitting, the original statement is true in the sense that John was standing.

Universal judgements are true independently of time, since they are concerned about essences, which transcend any or all time whatsoever. But truth of these judgements is taken relatively to the actual be of existing things or to the possible be of essences as exercised. But this actual or possible be, as exercised refers to participated being itself. Therefore from immutable truth requires being by essence. Therefore God is.

Argument from desire of happiness

Concerning the ordering of the intellect and will to their perfect happiness. A natural ordering cannot be towards something intrinsically impossible as an ordering is specified from its term. Therefore if the specific tern were impossible, also the ordering would be impossible. But human intellect is naturally ordered towards some infinite being, and human will towards some infinite good. As the formal object of intellect is being, and formal object of will is good, which formal objects are unlimited according to being and goodness. Therefore the human intellect and will attain their ultimate fulfillment according to their natural ordering in only some infinite being which is infinitely good. This ultimate being, which is infinite, is God. Therefore God is.

Argument from Moral Conscience

[37818]

Causation presumes existence. There has to be existence - and such an uncaused existence needs no God. And causation means change to cause a change.

[JohnMartin]

Why doesn't existence need proof of its existence?

Be is a fundamental that is defined via description according to what be does. Be actualizes acts. Such is proven indirectly by denying the description and concluding the denial is false, therefore the affirmation is true.

And any entity contingent on existence is no God.

The contingent are composed of essence and being, hence the contingent is not God. By definition, God is the necessary being, and therefore that being which must be by nature. Contingent beings are not necessary and therefore must be efficiently caused by another cause - God, as the necessary being.

An argument for the existence of God according to being is given below.

A real thing is either contingent or necessary.
If contingent, then that thing is dependent for its being upon another.
The other, is the necessary being.
If the thing is necessary, then necessary.
Therefore if a thing exists, the necessary being exists.
The necessary being is God.
Therefore God exists.

JM

[JohnMartin]

Causation presumes existence.

Causation is defined in the opening page.

There has to be existence

There only has to be a necessary be. All other contingent beings need not exist.

- and such an uncaused existence needs no God.

The uncaused be is God, which does not need another God.

And causation means change to cause a change.

This is circular.

If you wish to make comment, it is best to do so using the terminology and definitions provided.

JM

[37818]

Causation is defined in the opening page.

There has to first be an existence.

There only has to be a necessary be[ing]. All other contingent beings need not exist.

There has to be existence for there to be a being. Unless you are saying that the necessary being is the uncaused existence. You presumed existence. Any being contingent on existence is not a necessary being.

The uncaused be[ng] is God, which does not need another God. This is circular.

Then "Proofs for the Existence of God" is silly like "Proofs for the Existence of Existence."

If you wish to make comment, it is best to do so using the terminology and definitions provided.

JM

You did not define existence - which was presumed in your "Proofs for the Existence of God"

[JohnMartin]

There has to first be an existence.

Which is God. God is being. Which means God is His own existence.

There has to be existence for there to be a being. Unless you are saying that the necessary being is the uncaused existence. You presumed existence. Any being contingent on existence is not a necessary being.

Yes, God is the necessary being, who is the uncaused existence.

Then "Proofs for the Existence of God" is silly like "Proofs for the Existence of Existence."

No. Not all existence is God. Being is not univocal whereby all being is the same, but analogous, whereby being is modally different. We can prove the existence of a cat, which is not God. So too, we can prove the existence of God as being, which means God's nature is 'to be'. Existence is only one way of saying God is. We can also conclude to God as prime mover, cause, orderer, and perfector. Hence we can say God exists as the prime mover, cause, orderer, and perfector. Proofs for the existence of God then does not collapse only into proofs for the existence of existence but proofs for the existence of that being which is the prime mover, cause, orderer, and perfector, and which must exist.

You did not define existence - which was presumed in your "Proofs for the Existence of God"

Existence is to exist, which is the same as 'to be', which is defined above as an act which implies a nature.

JM

[37818]

Which is God. God is being. Which means God is His own existence.

He is the Self Existent.

Yes, God is the necessary being, who is the uncaused existence.

Of which all caused existence is contingent.

No. Not all existence is God.

I did not say that. But, ". . . For in him we live, and move, and have our being; . . ." -- Acts 17:28. He is the uncaused omnipresent Existence in which all other caused existences are present in.

. . . Being is not univocal whereby all being is the same, but analogous, whereby being is modally different. We can prove the existence of a cat, which is not God. So too, we can prove the existence of God as being, which means God's nature is 'to be'. Existence is only one way of saying God is. We can also conclude to God as prime mover, cause, orderer, and perfector. Hence we can say God exists as the prime mover, cause, orderer, and perfector. Proofs for the existence of God then does not collapse only into proofs for the existence of existence but proofs for the existence of that being which is the prime mover, cause, orderer, and perfector, and which must exist.

God is the fundamental self evident uncaused existence. Self evident truth needs no proof. God's identity is the Self Existent.

Existence is to exist, which is the same as 'to be', which is defined above as an act which implies a nature.

JM

[37818]

Be is a fundamental that is defined via description according to what be does. Be actualizes acts. Such is proven indirectly by denying the description and concluding the denial is false, therefore the affirmation is true.



The contingent are composed of essence and being, hence the contingent is not God. By definition, God is the necessary being, and therefore that being which must be by nature. Contingent beings are not necessary and therefore must be efficiently caused by another cause - God, as the necessary being.

An argument for the existence of God according to being is given below.

A real thing is either contingent or necessary.
If contingent, then that thing is dependent for its being upon another.
The other, is the necessary being.
If the thing is necessary, then necessary.
Therefore if a thing exists, the necessary being exists.
The necessary being is God.
Therefore God exists.

JM

Essence and being are in the above being said "exists." They are being presented as contingent to say they "exist." Uncaused existence is the starting point of all contingent things. Only uncaused existence is self existent. And the Self Existent is the idenity of God - else there is none.

[JimL]

Be is a fundamental that is defined via description according to what be does. Be actualizes acts. Such is proven indirectly by denying the description and concluding the denial is false, therefore the affirmation is true.



The contingent are composed of essence and being, hence the contingent is not God. By definition, God is the necessary being, and therefore that being which must be by nature. Contingent beings are not necessary and therefore must be efficiently caused by another cause - God, as the necessary being.

An argument for the existence of God according to being is given below.

A real thing is either contingent or necessary.
If contingent, then that thing is dependent for its being upon another.
The other, is the necessary being.
If the thing is necessary, then necessary.
Therefore if a thing exists, the necessary being exists.
The necessary being is God.
Therefore God exists.

JM

One of the problems with the above is in the assertion that necessity=being, in the sense of a god. Another problem with it is that if the contingent thing is of one and the same substance as that of the necessary, then fundamentally they are one and the same thing. In other words, if the effect is in the cause, if the effect wasn't created out of nothing, then it is the same thing as its cause.

[The Pixie]

Just picking out a few of those definitions from the OP.

Be - the act to be, which implies a nature. Be is the actualization of all acts and is the fundamental perfection of all creatures. For example, the be of an apple is the act of the apple, which implies the nature of apple. The be of an apple means the actualization of the nature of apple, whereby the nature of apple-ness is in act in this particular, concrete, apple.

In what way does an apple act? It does not. It does nothing. There is no action involved in being. So how can you say "Be is the actualization of all acts".

What does be "is the fundamental perfection of all creatures" mean, and why should we suppose it is true? Is the be of an apple the fundamental perfection of all creatures? This appears to be an implication of the statement, but makes no sense at all.
Well a rock is very unlike Sundays, so are they analogous? Not according to any sense of the word I know of.
I do not not where to start with this nonsense.
Okay, so the marble and the apple are substance, fair enough, but their mass, colour and shape are accident?

Perfection: fullness of be. For example, a glass has water, whereby the water is a perfection of a glass.

What about if the glass has beer in it? That would be better than water, and so better than perfection, right? And if the glass was half full, would it be half perfect? If not, how full must the glass be to be considered perfect? So full it cannot be picked up without spillage? What exactly?

Contingent: That which can have itself otherwise. Or that which is indifferent to be or not be. For example, a tree is not necessary to exist, and therefore is contingent.

What the heck does "That which can have itself otherwise" mean?!? Also, since this appears to be defined as the opposite of "necessary", why is "necessary not defined?

[JohnMartin]

One of the problems with the above is in the assertion that necessity=being, in the sense of a god.

Thats what God is, the necessary being. Saying that there is a problem, does not demonstrate that there is one, when one does not exist.

Another problem with it is that if the contingent thing is of one and the same substance as that of the necessary,

The contingent thing is not of one and the same substance as that of the necessary.

then fundamentally they are one and the same thing. In other words, if the effect is in the cause, if the effect wasn't created out of nothing, then it is the same thing as its cause.

The contingent has a real distinction between the essence and be of a thing. The necessary has a real identity of essence and be.

There are no problems with the above argument for the existence of God.

JM

[JohnMartin]

Just picking out a few of those definitions from the OP.

Be - the act to be, which implies a nature. Be is the actualization of all acts and is the fundamental perfection of all creatures. For example, the be of an apple is the act of the apple, which implies the nature of apple. The be of an apple means the actualization of the nature of apple, whereby the nature of apple-ness is in act in this particular, concrete, apple.

In what way does an apple act? It does not. It does nothing. There is no action involved in being. So how can you say "Be is the actualization of all acts".

The apple acts as a thing having being, whereby the apple is a concrete thing, existing. An act does not always mean the act, to do. An act can mean an act to do, but an act can also mean the act of being. For example, a poet exists, then writes poetry. The poet existing is an act to be, then the writing of the poem is an act of writing from a habit residing in the poet. According to the dictum of 'do follows be', the poem was written because the poet first existed in act, then wrote in act.

What does be "is the fundamental perfection of all creatures" mean, and why should we suppose it is true? Is the be of an apple the fundamental perfection of all creatures? This appears to be an implication of the statement, but makes no sense at all.

The fundamental perfection is the primary being of the thing. What is first in a thing is that which all other perfections in a thing are dependent. For example, a man has being as his primary perfection. When the man has being, this is the same as saying man exists. When man has being, he can then walk, talk, sleep, and eat. All these human actions are dependent upon the man having being as the fundamental perfection of the man.

Yes they are analogous. A rock has being to thereby exist as a concrete thing. Sunday exists as time. Time has being, analogous to the rock, which has being.

What is proper is a necessary accident of a thing. For example, it is necessary that a body have the accidental perfection of quantity, whereby quantity is parts outside of parts. It is not necessary for a body to have the accidental quality of the colour red. For a body can be blue or yellow as well. The colour of a body, is not a necessary accident, but a common accident.

Yes.

Perfection: fullness of be. For example, a glass has water, whereby the water is a perfection of a glass.

What about if the glass has beer in it? That would be better than water, and so better than perfection, right? And if the glass was half full, would it be half perfect? If not, how full must the glass be to be considered perfect? So full it cannot be picked up without spillage? What exactly?

Whatever fills the glass has being, and is therefore a perfection of the glass, or jar, or container.

Contingent: That which can have itself otherwise. Or that which is indifferent to be or not be. For example, a tree is not necessary to exist, and therefore is contingent.

What the heck does "That which can have itself otherwise" mean?!? Also, since this appears to be defined as the opposite of "necessary", why is "necessary not defined?

That which can be subject to change. A piece of wood can burn and have itself otherwise as ash. A man can die and have himself otherwise as a corpse.

The necessary is that which cannot be otherwise, or that which must be, or that which cannot, not be. For example, it is necessary that A is A, and not otherwise. Or, ontologically, God is the necessary being, and all creatures are contingent beings.

JM