The University of Oxford offers online courses in philosophy. I took a metaphysics course and wrote a paper for it. What do you think?
In this essay, I will argue that free will is compatible with determinism. First, I will define the terms “free will” and “determinism.” Then, I will argue that free will is compatible with determinism given that all of these conditions are met: 1) An agent can act in accordance with his or her true self, 2) An agent can weigh the reasons for and against various courses of action, and 3) An agent is capable of doing what is morally right or he was capable of doing what is morally right, but lost that ability due to his own fault.
Free will is the ability to make decisions of the sort for which one can be morally responsible. Free will confers people with moral responsibility. There are philosophers who define free will in the libertarian sense. They say that free will is the ability to choose one way or another given the same exact conditions. For this paper, I’m not defining free will in the libertarian sense. To be morally responsible means to act in a way so that one is praiseworthy or blameworthy. If someone earned an award for being the best employee of the year, then his behavior was praiseworthy. If someone robbed a bank, then his behavior was blameworthy.
Determinism is the idea that every event including human behavior has a sufficient cause other than itself. According to Robert Kane, an event is determined when there are conditions obtained earlier whose occurrence is a sufficient condition for the occurrence of the event. Events can be guaranteed by the foreordaining acts of God, one’s genetic material, environment or antecedent causes in combination with the laws of nature. A determined event is inevitable or necessary if certain conditions are met. A determined event does not have to occur, no matter what else happens, but it must occur when the determining conditions occur.
The first condition that must be met in order for free will to be compatible with determinism is that an agent must act in accordance with his or her true self. To act in accordance with one’s true self means acting according to one’s character and strongest desires. If an agent is forced to do something that he does not want to do, then he is not acting in accordance with his or her true self. An involuntary response to some stimulus would not be acting in accordance with one’s true self. Some people might object to this condition by claiming that a mad scientist could make a person commit murder by putting a computer chip in his brain. My response to this objection is that this would not be representative of the person’s true self. A person’s behavior as a result of a computer chip would not necessarily reflect that person’s true character. The computer chip would bypass the normal deliberative process that a person goes though when making a decision.
The second condition that must be met in order for free will to be compatible with determinism is that an agent must be able to weigh the reasons for and against various courses of action. People are able to use their reasoning process in order to figure out what is best to do and act in accordance with our judgment about what is best. People can make mistakes when they reason, but they still go through the process of deliberation. If a person is deciding which car to buy, he can weigh the reasons for and against buying that particular car. If the reasons for buying a particular car outweigh the reasons against buying that particular car, then he can act in accordance with that judgment. Even though a person is determined to buy a particular car, he can still go through the process of deliberation.
Some philosophers have argued that a person cannot go through the process of deliberation if determinism is true. For example, Richard Taylor argues that a person cannot deliberate about what to do unless it is up to him to do it. He also claims that the notion of “up to me” is not compatible with determinism. If carrying out some action is up to me, then this implies that whether or not I do it ultimately depends upon me.
My response to this is that determinism does not eliminate the means by which a decision is made. As long as a person does not know what he or she will choose, there still is a point to deliberation. That person would still need to figure out whether or not there are good reasons for choosing a particular course of action. One’s reasons for deciding to do something can determine which course of action to take, but he or she can still deliberate. The person can find out if there are good reasons for taking a course of action and acting in accordance with his judgment.
The third condition that must be met in order for free will to be compatible with determinism is that an agent must be capable of doing what is morally right or he was capable of doing what is morally right, but lost that ability due to his own fault. It is important to distinguish the difference between being capable of doing what is morally right and having the desire to do what is morally right. Suppose my co-worker knows how to rescue drowning people. He has the knowledge and skills to save people from drowning. Suppose he goes to a swimming pool and sees someone drowning. There is no external force or external constraint that is preventing him from rescuing that person. Suppose he lacks the desire to rescue that person. He would be morally responsible for not rescuing that person because he had the ability to save him. He did not rescue him because he lacked the desire to rescue him. Someone could say that the event where he did not rescue the drowning person was a determined event. Just because the event was determined does not necessarily mean that he was incapable of saving that person. It could mean that he lacked the desire to save that person.
Someone could lose the ability to do what is morally right due to his own fault. Suppose there is a person who started shoplifting at the age of twenty. Before that age he had resisted the temptation to steal. When he started to shoplift for the first time, he developed a habit that caused him to have a strong desire to steal. He would shoplift again and again. He thinks that he cannot avoid shoplifting. He feels a strong urge to shoplift and he cannot overcome it. Is he morally responsible for shoplifting even though he lost the ability to avoid shoplifting? Yes, he is still morally responsible for shoplifting. His decision to shoplift for the first time led him down the path of impulsive behavior. It was his fault for making the decision to start shoplifting.
If determinism were true, the three conditions mentioned above would preserve one’s free will. The first condition ensures that the agent acts in accordance with his character and strongest desires. The agent’s mind, will, and emotions can be involved in his actions. The agent is not like a robot that merely does what it is programmed to do. The second condition ensures that the agent has control over his actions. The agent does not have to act according to instinct. The agent could have his or her reasons for doing something expressed as behavior. The third condition ensures that an agent can deserve reward or punishment. If someone were capable of doing what he or she ought to do, but does not do it because of a lack of desire, then he or she would deserve blame. If someone had the capability to do what is morally right, but lost that ability due to his or her own fault, then he or she would deserve blame.
Many people are concerned about whether we would have free will if determinism were true. In this paper, I argued that free will is compatible with determinism if certain conditions are met. If all of those conditions are met, determinism is no threat to their free will.
In this essay, I will argue that free will is compatible with determinism. First, I will define the terms “free will” and “determinism.” Then, I will argue that free will is compatible with determinism given that all of these conditions are met: 1) An agent can act in accordance with his or her true self, 2) An agent can weigh the reasons for and against various courses of action, and 3) An agent is capable of doing what is morally right or he was capable of doing what is morally right, but lost that ability due to his own fault.
Free will is the ability to make decisions of the sort for which one can be morally responsible. Free will confers people with moral responsibility. There are philosophers who define free will in the libertarian sense. They say that free will is the ability to choose one way or another given the same exact conditions. For this paper, I’m not defining free will in the libertarian sense. To be morally responsible means to act in a way so that one is praiseworthy or blameworthy. If someone earned an award for being the best employee of the year, then his behavior was praiseworthy. If someone robbed a bank, then his behavior was blameworthy.
Determinism is the idea that every event including human behavior has a sufficient cause other than itself. According to Robert Kane, an event is determined when there are conditions obtained earlier whose occurrence is a sufficient condition for the occurrence of the event. Events can be guaranteed by the foreordaining acts of God, one’s genetic material, environment or antecedent causes in combination with the laws of nature. A determined event is inevitable or necessary if certain conditions are met. A determined event does not have to occur, no matter what else happens, but it must occur when the determining conditions occur.
The first condition that must be met in order for free will to be compatible with determinism is that an agent must act in accordance with his or her true self. To act in accordance with one’s true self means acting according to one’s character and strongest desires. If an agent is forced to do something that he does not want to do, then he is not acting in accordance with his or her true self. An involuntary response to some stimulus would not be acting in accordance with one’s true self. Some people might object to this condition by claiming that a mad scientist could make a person commit murder by putting a computer chip in his brain. My response to this objection is that this would not be representative of the person’s true self. A person’s behavior as a result of a computer chip would not necessarily reflect that person’s true character. The computer chip would bypass the normal deliberative process that a person goes though when making a decision.
The second condition that must be met in order for free will to be compatible with determinism is that an agent must be able to weigh the reasons for and against various courses of action. People are able to use their reasoning process in order to figure out what is best to do and act in accordance with our judgment about what is best. People can make mistakes when they reason, but they still go through the process of deliberation. If a person is deciding which car to buy, he can weigh the reasons for and against buying that particular car. If the reasons for buying a particular car outweigh the reasons against buying that particular car, then he can act in accordance with that judgment. Even though a person is determined to buy a particular car, he can still go through the process of deliberation.
Some philosophers have argued that a person cannot go through the process of deliberation if determinism is true. For example, Richard Taylor argues that a person cannot deliberate about what to do unless it is up to him to do it. He also claims that the notion of “up to me” is not compatible with determinism. If carrying out some action is up to me, then this implies that whether or not I do it ultimately depends upon me.
My response to this is that determinism does not eliminate the means by which a decision is made. As long as a person does not know what he or she will choose, there still is a point to deliberation. That person would still need to figure out whether or not there are good reasons for choosing a particular course of action. One’s reasons for deciding to do something can determine which course of action to take, but he or she can still deliberate. The person can find out if there are good reasons for taking a course of action and acting in accordance with his judgment.
The third condition that must be met in order for free will to be compatible with determinism is that an agent must be capable of doing what is morally right or he was capable of doing what is morally right, but lost that ability due to his own fault. It is important to distinguish the difference between being capable of doing what is morally right and having the desire to do what is morally right. Suppose my co-worker knows how to rescue drowning people. He has the knowledge and skills to save people from drowning. Suppose he goes to a swimming pool and sees someone drowning. There is no external force or external constraint that is preventing him from rescuing that person. Suppose he lacks the desire to rescue that person. He would be morally responsible for not rescuing that person because he had the ability to save him. He did not rescue him because he lacked the desire to rescue him. Someone could say that the event where he did not rescue the drowning person was a determined event. Just because the event was determined does not necessarily mean that he was incapable of saving that person. It could mean that he lacked the desire to save that person.
Someone could lose the ability to do what is morally right due to his own fault. Suppose there is a person who started shoplifting at the age of twenty. Before that age he had resisted the temptation to steal. When he started to shoplift for the first time, he developed a habit that caused him to have a strong desire to steal. He would shoplift again and again. He thinks that he cannot avoid shoplifting. He feels a strong urge to shoplift and he cannot overcome it. Is he morally responsible for shoplifting even though he lost the ability to avoid shoplifting? Yes, he is still morally responsible for shoplifting. His decision to shoplift for the first time led him down the path of impulsive behavior. It was his fault for making the decision to start shoplifting.
If determinism were true, the three conditions mentioned above would preserve one’s free will. The first condition ensures that the agent acts in accordance with his character and strongest desires. The agent’s mind, will, and emotions can be involved in his actions. The agent is not like a robot that merely does what it is programmed to do. The second condition ensures that the agent has control over his actions. The agent does not have to act according to instinct. The agent could have his or her reasons for doing something expressed as behavior. The third condition ensures that an agent can deserve reward or punishment. If someone were capable of doing what he or she ought to do, but does not do it because of a lack of desire, then he or she would deserve blame. If someone had the capability to do what is morally right, but lost that ability due to his or her own fault, then he or she would deserve blame.
Many people are concerned about whether we would have free will if determinism were true. In this paper, I argued that free will is compatible with determinism if certain conditions are met. If all of those conditions are met, determinism is no threat to their free will.
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